FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 223140, September 04, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSEMARIE GARDON-MENTOY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
A lawful arrest must precede a warrantless search conducted upon the personal effects of an individual. The process cannot be reversed. Hence, the search must rest on probable cause existing independently of the arrest.
The Case
This appeal challenges the decision promulgated on April 28, 2015,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused appellant for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002). She had been incriminated following the warrantless search of her personal effects as a passenger of a shuttle van.
Antecedents
The information filed on June 1, 2008 charged the accused-appellant with the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, as follows:
On June 4, 2013, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant as charged, disposing thusly:
Decision of the CA
On April 28, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant.[7] It opined that a search could precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused -appellant had been an incident of her lawful arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the crucial links in the chain of custody.[8] It explained that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest could still be said to precede the arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest at the outset of the search; and that based on the circumstances showing the existence of probable cause the warrantless search, being an incident to the lawful arrest of the accused-appellant, was valid.[9]
Issue
In this appeal, the accused-appellant insists on the illegality of her warrantless arrest. She asserts that the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from her bag were inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule; and that the apprehending officers did not comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the concurrence of the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs had been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that the arrest had been legally conducted pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.[11]
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has merit.
Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause - the existence of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to do so; or the person whose property is to be searched has used the same to commit crime, and its issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or conjecture, or hearsay. The right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures is so sacred that no less than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution declares the right to be inviolable, and for that reason expressly prohibits the issuance of any search warrant or warrant of arrest except upon probable cause to be personally determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the exclusionary rule by unqualifiedly declaring that "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusionary rule is intended to deter the violation of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.
We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[12]
In short, inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is permissible only when the officer conducting the search had probable cause to believe prior to the search that he will find inside the vehicle to be searched the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime.[13]
Based on the alleged tip from the unidentified informant to the effect that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a Charing 19 shuttle van with plate number VRA 698, the police officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao in Narra, Palawan. There, PO1 Abdulito Rosales later flagged down the approaching shuttle van. The officers at the checkpoint introduced themselves as policemen. But even at that time none of the officers knew who would be transporting dangerous drugs to. They were, only told that the suspect was a person named Rose, but they had no independent knowledge of who she was other than her name being Rose. Upon the driver opening the door of the vehicle, PO1 Rosales nonetheless singled her out by immediately asking who of the passengers was Rose. The accused-appellant naturally answered the query by identifying herself as Rose without hesitation. The police officers also did not yet know how or where Rose was transporting the dangerous drugs. So, PO1 Rosales immediately inquired about her baggage, and, in response, she requested the driver to hand her the pink bag resting at the rear portion of the van.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Renato Felizarte and PO1 Rosales noticed that the accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape from the pink bag to a black one, and then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. At what precise moment this took place was not indicated in the records, but the officers' mere say-so was entirely subjective on their part. Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers' suspicion about the block shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."[14]
But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did occur, give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?
For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to. the knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.[15]
The general rule is that an arrest or search and seizure should be effected upon a judicial warrant. A lawful warrantless arrest may be effected by a peace officer or private person but only when any of the exceptions listed in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest to be issued is applicable. Section 5 specifically provides:
Both the RTC and the OSG submit that the case of the accused appellant came under Section 5(b), supra. However, their submission is factually unfounded because PO1 Rosales and SPO2 Felizarte concededly did not have personal knowledge that the crime had been committed inasmuch as at that point they did not yet know where the dangerous drug had been hidden. In fact, as the records bear out, they were only able to find and seize the marijuana after the barangay captain had opened her bag.
On its part, the CA upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of the accused-appellant having been. caught in flagrante delicto, the situation covered by Section 5(a), supra. An arrest made in flagrante delicto means that the arrestee is caught in the very act of committing the crime, and the phrase necessarily implies that the positive identification of the culprit has already been done by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification constitutes direct evidence of culpability because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."[17] But we find otherwise, because there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.
Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused appellant once she had identified herself as Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really contained marijuana. As earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2 Felizarte's afterthought justification considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It is noteworthy in this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had opened the bag.[18]
The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.[19] As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.
What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her. If the arrest did not precede the search, where was the probable cause that justified her warrantless arrest?
The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant and the warrantless search of her personal effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the search. The marijuana seized from her should be deemed inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule enunciated under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. With the confiscated marijuana being the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused-appellant should be acquitted because the evidence adduced against her was entirely inadmissible.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on April28, 2015 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06339; ACQUITS accused-appellant ROSEMARIE GARDON MENTOY of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165; and ORDERS her IMMEDIATE RELEASE from confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women, Bureau of Corrections, in Mandaluyong City, unless she is confined thereat for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be forthwith furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action taken conformably with this decision within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa,* Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.
* Designated as additional member vice Justice Francis H. Jardeleza per Raffle dated February 27, 2019.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
[2] Id. at 3.
[3] Id. at pp. 3-5.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
[5] SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
x x x x
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be attested has committed it; and
x x x x
[6] CA rollo, pp. 75-76.
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Rollo, pp. 7-11.
[9] Id.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 48-62.
[11] Id. at 95-103.
[12] People v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17,2016, 801 SCRA 103, 117-118.
[13] Id. at 118.
[14] United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierly, 381 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
[15] Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017, 826 SCRA 382, 411.
[16] Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018.
[17] People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 318, 330-331.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 69-70.
[19] People v. Manago, supra, note 12, at 112.
This appeal challenges the decision promulgated on April 28, 2015,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused appellant for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs defined and penalized under Section 5 of Republic Act. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002). She had been incriminated following the warrantless search of her personal effects as a passenger of a shuttle van.
The information filed on June 1, 2008 charged the accused-appellant with the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of May 2008, at more or less 4:45 o'clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Malatgao, Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport and have in her possession, custody and control of 1,400 grams of Cannavis (sic) Sativa otherwise known as "MARIJUANA", a dangerous drug contained in three (3) packages which are intended to be sold to prospective buyers with whom the accused had actually been engaged in selling, giving away and dispatching said prohibited dugs without the necessary permit and/or license from the proper authorities to possess and sell the same, and where (sic) the said 1,400 grams of marijuana amounting to FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php40,000.00), Philippine Currency.The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case in this wise:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On May 30, 2008, an informant relayed to SPO2 Renato Felizarte (SPO2 Felizarte) of the Nan-a Municipal Police Station (police station) in Palawan that a couple named @ Poks and @ Rose (later identified as accused-appellant), were transporting and selling marijuana in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan. SPO2 Felizarte relayed the information to Police Senior Inspector Yolanda Socrates (PSI Socrates) who instructed SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Abdulito Rosales (PO1 Rosales) to conduct surveillance on said suspects. At about 1:43 p.m. of said date, SPO2 Felizarte submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) a pre-operation report dated May 30, 2008 with control number PDEA R0-0508-00006, which the PDEA confirmed.
On May 31, 2008, at about 8 a.m., PSI Socrates briefed the operation team (team). At about 4:30 p.m., the informant relayed to the team that accused-appellant will be boarding a Charing 19 shuttle van (van) with plate number VRA 698. Thus, the team proceeded to the National Highway, Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan. At a distance of one (1) to two (2) meters, PO1 Rosales, while on board his motorcycle, saw accused-appellant board the van. PO1 Rosales flagged down the van as it approached them. The team introduced themselves as police officers. They declared that they were conducting a checkpoint because of information about persons transporting illegal drugs. PO1 Rosales told the driver that they will check the van passengers. The driver then opened the van's side door. PO1 Rosales asked the van passengers who among them was Rose. Accused-appellant replied, "Aka po" (I am). PO1 Rosales asked accused-appellant where her baggage was. Accused-appellant apprehensively requested the driver to hand her the pink bag placed at the rear portion of the van. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales, however, noticed that accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, from the pink bag to a black one. SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales suspected this bundle to contain marijuana leaves. Accused-appellant then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. SPO2 Felizarte also noticed that accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, but he and PO1 Rosales restrained her. Afterwards, PO1 Rosales called Barangay Captain Ernesto Maiguez (Brgy. Captain Maiguez) to proceed to the area.
When Brgy. Captain Maiguez arrived, SPO2 Felizarte and PO1 Rosales asked him if he knew accused-appellant. Brgy. Captain Maiguez said he knew accused-appellant as a rice seller who resided in Barangay Malatgao where he was chairman. The police officers asked Brgy. Captain Maiguez to pick up the black bag, which accused-appellant held beside her. Brgy. Captain Maiguez got (the) said bag and placed it by the road. SPO2 Felizarte requested him to open it. Brgy. Captain Maiguez opened said bag in the presence of accused-appellant and the other van passengers. PO1 Rosales took photographs while said bag was being opened. The black bag contained, inter alia: (a) one (1) L-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape; (b) one (1) block-shaped bundle wrapped in newspaper; and (c) one (1) sachet (covered with tissue paper), all suspected to contain marijuana leaves. The police officers smelled the bundles and sachet and confirmed that these contained marijuana leaves. The police officers returned the items inside the black bag. They arrested and informed accused-appellant that she violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 and apprised the latter of her constitutional rights. Since accused-appellant lived near the crime scene, the police officers brought her and the seized items immediately to the police station to avoid any untoward incident.
PO1 Rosales carried the black bag from the crime scene to the police station. Thereat, PO1 Rosales prepared an inventory of the seized items in the presence of a media representative and Brgy. Captain Maiguez. PO1 Rosales also marked the L-shaped bundle as "ADR-1", blocked-shaped bundle as "ADR-2", and sachet as "ADR-3", respectively, in the presence of accused-appellant. PO1 Rosales brought the bundles and sachet to the Palawan Crime Laboratory (crime laboratory) where Forensic Chemist and Police Chief Inspector Mary Jane Cordero (PCI Cordero) examined the seized items. She found the contents of the bundles and sachet positive for marijuana and prepared Chemistry Report No. D-005-08 stating her findings.
During trial, PO1 Rosales identified the seized items in open court as the same ones he marked at the police station. He also identified in open court the inventory he prepared at the police station. The defense admitted the documents presented by the prosecution, namely: the Request for Laboratory Examination; PCI Cordero's Chemistry Report No. D-005-08; dried marijuana leaves; L-shaped bundle marked "ADR-1"; dried marijuana leaves; blocked-shaped bundle marked "ADR-2", dried marijuana leaves; and sachet marked "ADR-3". PCI Cordero's testimony was concluded without cross-examination by the defense.
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on May 11, 2008, at about 4:00 p.m., she was onboard a van bound for Puerto Princesa City for a medical consultation and to canvass the price of rice. Shortly after, a man aboard a motorcycle flagged down the van. Another man, later identified as SPO2 Felizarte, asked the passengers who among them was Rose. After accused-appellant answered that she was Rose, SPO2 Felizarte handcuffed her. The other passengers were told to alight from the van, while accused-appellant remained inside. The police officers searched the baggage of the other passengers and placed these outside the van. The police officers called the passengers to look at a certain bag while they took photographs. Thereafter, accused-appellant was ordered to alight from the van while the other passengers returned inside. The bags of the passengers were returned inside the van, except for one (1) bag, which was held by the police officers. Accused-appellant did not see Brgy. Captain Maiguez open her black bag. The police officers brought her to the police station where she was asked to sign some documents, which she refused to do.[3]
Judgment of the RTC
On June 4, 2013, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant as charged, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having satisfactorily proven the guilt of accused ROSEMARIE GARDON MENTOY, the Court hereby found her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 for transportation of dangerous drug and to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).The RTC regarded the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant as validly made upon probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court;[5] and concluded that the State had established the corpus delicti of the crime by the testimonies of its witnesses.[6]
The confiscated marijuana used in prosecuting this case is hereby ordered to be turned over to the local office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 28, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant.[7] It opined that a search could precede an arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest; that the warrantless search conducted on the personal effects of the accused -appellant had been an incident of her lawful arrest; and that the Prosecution had adequately established the crucial links in the chain of custody.[8] It explained that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest could still be said to precede the arrest if the police officers had probable cause to effect the arrest at the outset of the search; and that based on the circumstances showing the existence of probable cause the warrantless search, being an incident to the lawful arrest of the accused-appellant, was valid.[9]
In this appeal, the accused-appellant insists on the illegality of her warrantless arrest. She asserts that the marijuana leaves supposedly taken from her bag were inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule; and that the apprehending officers did not comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the concurrence of the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs had been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that the arrest had been legally conducted pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court.[11]
The appeal has merit.
I
The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is inviolable
The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is inviolable
Generally, there can be no valid arrest, search and seizure without a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The warrant, to be issued by a judge, must rest upon probable cause - the existence of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed a crime, or is about to do so; or the person whose property is to be searched has used the same to commit crime, and its issuance must not be based on speculation, or surmise, or conjecture, or hearsay. The right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures is so sacred that no less than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution declares the right to be inviolable, and for that reason expressly prohibits the issuance of any search warrant or warrant of arrest except upon probable cause to be personally determined by a judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
To enforce such inviolable right, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitutions enunciates the exclusionary rule by unqualifiedly declaring that "[a]ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The exclusionary rule is intended to deter the violation of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches and arrest.
We are mindful that the guarantee against warrantless arrests, and warrantless searches and seizures admit of some exceptions. One such exception relates to arrests, searches and seizures made at a police checkpoint. Indeed, routine inspections made at checkpoints have been regarded as permissible and valid, if the inspections are limited to the following situations: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks inside a vehicle; (c) flashes a light into the vehicle without opening its doors; (d) where the occupants of the vehicle are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.[12]
In short, inspections at checkpoints are confined to visual searches. An extensive search of the vehicle is permissible only when the officer conducting the search had probable cause to believe prior to the search that he will find inside the vehicle to be searched the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime.[13]
II
Warrantless search of the accused-appellant's
Warrantless search of the accused-appellant's
personal belongings was not based on probable cause
Based on the alleged tip from the unidentified informant to the effect that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a Charing 19 shuttle van with plate number VRA 698, the police officers had set up a checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao in Narra, Palawan. There, PO1 Abdulito Rosales later flagged down the approaching shuttle van. The officers at the checkpoint introduced themselves as policemen. But even at that time none of the officers knew who would be transporting dangerous drugs to. They were, only told that the suspect was a person named Rose, but they had no independent knowledge of who she was other than her name being Rose. Upon the driver opening the door of the vehicle, PO1 Rosales nonetheless singled her out by immediately asking who of the passengers was Rose. The accused-appellant naturally answered the query by identifying herself as Rose without hesitation. The police officers also did not yet know how or where Rose was transporting the dangerous drugs. So, PO1 Rosales immediately inquired about her baggage, and, in response, she requested the driver to hand her the pink bag resting at the rear portion of the van.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Renato Felizarte and PO1 Rosales noticed that the accused-appellant transferred a block-shaped bundle wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape from the pink bag to a black one, and then placed the black bag on a vacant seat beside her. At what precise moment this took place was not indicated in the records, but the officers' mere say-so was entirely subjective on their part. Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers' suspicion about the block shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and belief to such testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists."[14]
But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did occur, give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?
For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to another should not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant, without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to. the knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.[15]
The general rule is that an arrest or search and seizure should be effected upon a judicial warrant. A lawful warrantless arrest may be effected by a peace officer or private person but only when any of the exceptions listed in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest to be issued is applicable. Section 5 specifically provides:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:In the warrantless arrest made pursuant to Section 5(a), supra, the concurrence of two circumstances is necessary, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b), supra, requires that at the time of the warrantless arrest, an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the essential basis for. the warrantless arrest is the arresting officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5(a), the officer himself witnesses the commission of the crime; under Section 5(b), the officer actually knows that a crime has just been committed.[16]
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause'1 to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)
Both the RTC and the OSG submit that the case of the accused appellant came under Section 5(b), supra. However, their submission is factually unfounded because PO1 Rosales and SPO2 Felizarte concededly did not have personal knowledge that the crime had been committed inasmuch as at that point they did not yet know where the dangerous drug had been hidden. In fact, as the records bear out, they were only able to find and seize the marijuana after the barangay captain had opened her bag.
On its part, the CA upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of the accused-appellant having been. caught in flagrante delicto, the situation covered by Section 5(a), supra. An arrest made in flagrante delicto means that the arrestee is caught in the very act of committing the crime, and the phrase necessarily implies that the positive identification of the culprit has already been done by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification constitutes direct evidence of culpability because it "proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."[17] But we find otherwise, because there was no direct evidence on the identity of the culprit as of the time of the search simply because the officers still had to know who Rose was from among the passengers.
Also, the officers did not immediately effect the arrest of the accused appellant once she had identified herself as Rose, and the only explanation for this was that they still had to check if her bag had really contained marijuana. As earlier noted, they claimed seeing her transferring from one bag to another the block-shaped bundle, wrapped in yellow cellophane and brown tape, but their vaunted suspicion of the contents being marijuana was SPO2 Felizarte's afterthought justification considering that the contents of the bundle were not then visible on plain sight. It is noteworthy in this regard that the contents would be revealed as marijuana only after the barangay captain had opened the bag.[18]
The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.[19] As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.
What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her. If the arrest did not precede the search, where was the probable cause that justified her warrantless arrest?
The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant and the warrantless search of her personal effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the search. The marijuana seized from her should be deemed inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule enunciated under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. With the confiscated marijuana being the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused-appellant should be acquitted because the evidence adduced against her was entirely inadmissible.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on April28, 2015 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06339; ACQUITS accused-appellant ROSEMARIE GARDON MENTOY of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165; and ORDERS her IMMEDIATE RELEASE from confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women, Bureau of Corrections, in Mandaluyong City, unless she is confined thereat for some other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be forthwith furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action taken conformably with this decision within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa,* Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.
* Designated as additional member vice Justice Francis H. Jardeleza per Raffle dated February 27, 2019.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-12; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
[2] Id. at 3.
[3] Id. at pp. 3-5.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 76-77.
[5] SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
x x x x
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be attested has committed it; and
x x x x
[6] CA rollo, pp. 75-76.
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] Rollo, pp. 7-11.
[9] Id.
[10] CA rollo, pp. 48-62.
[11] Id. at 95-103.
[12] People v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17,2016, 801 SCRA 103, 117-118.
[13] Id. at 118.
[14] United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierly, 381 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
[15] Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017, 826 SCRA 382, 411.
[16] Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018.
[17] People v. Belocura, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 318, 330-331.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 69-70.
[19] People v. Manago, supra, note 12, at 112.