EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019 ]
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ.
VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PSUPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, CHIEF OF POLICE, SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE STATION; PSSUPT. LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN, PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, PNP-ANTIQUE; PCSUPT. JOHN C. BULALACAO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, PNP-REGION VI, AND MEMBERS OF THE PNP UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In determining whether a petition for a writ of amparo should be granted, judges, as impartial inquisitors, must assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the petitioner's life, security, or liberty. Indeed, pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, but the zeal with which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons of interest or their loved ones must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Vivian A. Sanchez (Sanchez), assailing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, which denied her Petition for a writ of amparo.
On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People's Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique.[3]
Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband's death. At the funeral home, however, the police officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left without being able to see or identify her husband's body.[4]
A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband's name, otherwise, they would go after her.[5] PO2 De la Cruz also warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating officers, or they might suspect her and put her under surveillance.[6]
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband's body.[7]
Later that day, two (2) police officers went to Sanchez's house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa.[8]
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband's wake.[9] She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children's safety.[10]
This fear was shared by her 15-year-old daughter, Scarlet Labinghisa, who attested that the constant police presence caused her anxiety as she worried for her mother's security:
Sanchez alleged that the police officers' constant surveillance of her and her family made them fear for their safety and prevented them from going out of their house.[13] She pointed out that if the conduct of surveillance and monitoring was for her and her family's safety, then the police should have informed them of it beforehand.[14]
In an August 28, 2018 Order,[15] the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection order. It also directed members of the Philippine National Police to file a verified written return. The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order read:
On September 4, 2018, a summary hearing was conducted.[20]
In a September 13, 2018 Decision,[21] the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition for a writ of amparo.
The Regional Trial Court held that Sanchez failed to substantiate her assertion that she became a person of interest to the police after she had identified her husband's dead body. This was because she was unable to specifically allege the police officers' acts or the acts they sanctioned which threatened her security and liberty.[22] The Regional Trial Court stated:
Respondents were directed to comment[27] on the Petition.
In their Comment,[28] respondents reiterate that petitioner failed to prove that she was entitled to the grant of the privilege of a writ of amparo, as her allegations against them were unsubstantiated and merely speculative.[29] They insist that as the wife of a member of the National People's Army, she was a proper interview subject. They also claim that taking her photo was merely part of the regular investigation process.[30]
Nonetheless, respondents denied that petitioner and her children were under surveillance, or that they were tailed by members of the police force.[31]
Petitioner was directed[32] to reply to respondents' Comment. However, she manifested[33] that she would not file a reply, as respondents merely refuted the arguments she raised in her Petition and did not raise any new issues.[34]
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ of amparo.
The Petition is meritorious.
I
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of its power to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[.]"[35] Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo as "a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.[36]
Section 17[37] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo:
Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a writ of amparo proceeding if required by the unique circumstances of the case.[43] This Court in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[44] concluded that the "totality of the obtaining situation"[45] must be taken into consideration to determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo:
Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and her family.
The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or security.
Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in fact from him for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of the current administration's aggressive efforts to stamp out the communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the "scourge of society[.]"[48] Her apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of the New People's Army was, thus, palpable and understandable, causing her to "act suspiciously" as claimed by respondents, who subjected her to threats and accusations.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that petitioner was only placed under general investigation because they wanted to know the identity of the last unclaimed cadaver.[49] However, the drive-bys and tailings intensified after petitioner had identified her husband, belying his assertions that their investigation was innocuous.
Further, petitioner's relationship with her husband insulates her from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's purported membership in the New People's Army. Whatever information respondents may hope to extract from her or her children are protected by spousal and filial privileges, which continue to exist even after Labinghisa's death.
II
Marriage[50] is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[51] which, in turn, is the foundation of the nation.[52]
In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society, testimonial privilege[53] and communication privilege[54] have been granted to spouses. This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free communication between the spouses or of information learned within the union.
This Court, in People v. Francisco,[55] explained the reasons behind marital disqualification:
The family and its members likewise enjoy a similar privilege. No one can be compelled to testify against his or her direct descendants or direct ascendants.[57]
Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of marital privilege or disqualification. Among these is when a spouse commits an offense that "directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]"[58] This Court expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic relations, the identity of interests and the danger of perjury disappear, and the law's aim of protecting the security of private life also ceases to exist.[59]
None of the exceptions to marital privilege exist here.
Petitioner admits to being separated in fact from Labinghisa for more than a decade. Yet, this does not suffice as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained marital relations. Further, neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union. Labinghisa's supposed
membership in the New People's Army is not an offense envisioned by jurisprudence which would create an exception to the general rule of marital disqualification.
Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents' surveillance of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo.
III
Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also a basic, fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every person's right to physical privacy, hence the explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal affairs.
To safeguard against the enormous powers wielded by the State and nip any potential abuse and interference into the private sphere, the Constitution guarantees, among others, every person's right to due process,[60] to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,[61] and to the privacy of their communication and correspondence.[62] The Civil Code,[63] in turn, punishes with damages those who meddle and pry into another person's private affairs.
This is why respondent Police Superintendent Darroca's lack of contrition over his police officers' act of taking petitioner's photo without her permission-and then placing it on display at the police station-is disturbing. It appears as though he sees nothing wrong in flagrantly and inexcusably violating petitioner's right to privacy.
Petitioner was not a person of interest when she went to the funeral parlor to identify her husband's body. Certainly, the police officers stationed there did not know who she was. Yet, they took her photo against her wishes and badgered her into admitting her relationship with her husband, a suspected member of the New People's Army.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca excused the police officers' discourteous and threatening actions toward a civilian by saying that such was merely part of the investigation process and that the police officers acted in good faith.
This Court is not convinced.
The Philippine National Police's Ethical Doctrine Manual[64] enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity and human rights,[65] and to judiciously use their authority in the performance of duty.[66]
The police officers' brusque treatment of petitioner, threatening her with imprisonment and displaying her photo at the police station, does not reflect the professional and courteous image that the Philippine National Police wishes to convey as an institution. What they did was clearly not part of the usual investigation protocol. The police officers could not be said to have acted in good faith when they ganged up on and accosted a defenseless civilian.
Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and her family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police's authority. If respondents wanted to interview petitioner and her children, they should have done so formally: informing them of their rights, holding the interview in an environment free of intimidation, and making sure that they had access to and were assisted by legal counsel or legal assistance groups. Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the interviewer should be specially trained to handle children.
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court erred in failing to consider the gender and power issues at play here, and how they affected the dynamics between the parties. Male police officers were investigating and surveilling the widow and daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers of power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female.
The Philippine National Police Manual wishes to craft the institution's image as a valiant peacekeeper dedicated to ensuring public safety and community participation,[67] but the bleak reality is that most people keep their guards up when faced with a member of the police force. In a patriarchal society where women have had to calibrate their responses toward men, the additional layer of power presented by a man in uniform would lead even an innocent civilian, especially a woman, to act jittery and nervously, trying to find a way to protect herself from her perceived vulnerabilities.
The gross imbalance in power dynamics makes it understandable for petitioner to initially hesitate to reveal her relationship with Labinghisa. As it turned out, she was correct to do so, as the moment the police officers found out who she was, she and her daughters became the subject of surveillance.
In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in relationships, judges must be careful not to be gender-blind. In denying the Petition for the writ of amparo, the Regional Trial Court echoed respondents' statement that the taking of petitioner's photo and the threats of obstruction of justice thrown at her were part of "the conduct of a logical investigation."[68] It could not see, or it refused to see that these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual or imminent threats against petitioner and her children.
In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a standpoint viewed from their implicit status in society. They must look beyond their status as well-connected people who can assert themselves against men in uniform and who have no filial relation to one tagged as a communist.
By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner's not so unique predicament as the spouse of a labeled communist, the Regional Trial Court created standards that would deny protection to those who need it most.
Petitioner's apprehension over the threat to her security was duly supported by substantial evidence. It was further corroborated by her daughter who also witnessed the constant police drive-bys and the tailings done by an unmarked vehicle. Thus, petitioner and her children deserve the protection of a writ of amparo.
IV
Respondents' claim that the police officers reported and asked for the investigation of the plate number of the car that did the surveillance[69] should not have been enough for the trial court. The trial court should have required a full report from respondents. As compared with petitioner, they had better, if not exclusive access to the information from the Land Transportation Office.
In his Affidavit[70] attached to the Verified Return,[71] respondent Police Superintendent Darroca denied putting petitioner and her children under surveillance or ordering his officers to follow them:
In granting the Petition for the writ of amparo, this Court in Republic v. Cayanan[74] pointed out that the State, in submitting its passive certificates, failed to comply with the extraordinary diligence required of it by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was crafted in an era when extrajudicial killings and involuntary disappearances were on the rise allegedly due to the government's efforts to defeat an insurgency. The Rule was, in part, this Court's statement that the insurgents' narrative that fundamental rights were not durable and universal at all times was false. It was an affirmation of the belief that, perhaps unlike the rebels, our Constitution protected civility and human rights, and that this protection was what differentiated the government from the insurgents. It was, and still is, a rule that underscores our humanity and our civility.
While pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, the zeal of our police must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons, especially the loved ones of persons of interest. After all, the values we have in our Constitution are what differentiate us from lawless elements.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER is issued prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children, Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa. The respondent police officers are reminded to uphold the rights of citizens as contained in the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in accordance with their promulgated manuals including the Ethical Doctrine Manual.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Inting, JJ., concur.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. R. Hernando.
Gesmundo, J., I join Justice Hernando dissent.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.
Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Carandang, J., I joint the dissent of J. Hernando.
Zalameda, J., I join J. Hernandos' dissent.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-34.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by Vivian A. Sanchez (Sanchez), assailing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, which denied her Petition for a writ of amparo.
On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People's Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique.[3]
Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband's death. At the funeral home, however, the police officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left without being able to see or identify her husband's body.[4]
A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband's name, otherwise, they would go after her.[5] PO2 De la Cruz also warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating officers, or they might suspect her and put her under surveillance.[6]
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband's body.[7]
Later that day, two (2) police officers went to Sanchez's house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa.[8]
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband's wake.[9] She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children's safety.[10]
This fear was shared by her 15-year-old daughter, Scarlet Labinghisa, who attested that the constant police presence caused her anxiety as she worried for her mother's security:
... (On that same night, after dinner and while we were watching TV, I saw a patrol car pass by our house twice that me and my younger sister was puzzled and I began to feel nervous. We hurriedly closed our gate and doors. Starting that night, I already had trouble sleeping);On August 24, 2018, Sanchez filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Antique a Petition for Writ of Amparo[12] against Police Superintendent Marc Anthony D. Darroca (Police Superintendent Darroca), Police Senior Superintendent Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers under their authority.
....
... (On August 17, 2018, around 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, I woke up feeling tired and nervous, but I continued preparing for school when I saw a vehicle passing our house several times but I just did not mind it. Around 6:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, while were (sic) waiting for our ride to school, a patrol car passed in front of us, we hurriedly went inside our house and observed what they will do);
....
... (While we were on our way to Dalipe, I saw a vehicle following our ride but we continuedon (sic), then when we were already on our way to Iloilo, the same vehicle was still following us);
....
... (From that time, I always feel anxious for our security particularly that of my mother because what will happen to me and my sister if she will be gone, so my mother decided to seek help to ensure our security)[.][11]
Sanchez alleged that the police officers' constant surveillance of her and her family made them fear for their safety and prevented them from going out of their house.[13] She pointed out that if the conduct of surveillance and monitoring was for her and her family's safety, then the police should have informed them of it beforehand.[14]
In an August 28, 2018 Order,[15] the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of amparo and a temporary protection order. It also directed members of the Philippine National Police to file a verified written return. The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Order read:
WHEREFORE, in consonance with Section 6 of A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC, also known as The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued, as follows:In their Verified Return,[17] the police officers denied violating or threatening to violate Sanchez and her family's right to life, liberty, and security.[18] They stressed that Sanchez's allegations were grounded on "baseless assumptions, hearsay, mistaken belief, speculations, impressions[,] and feelings[.]"[19]
RELATIVE TO THE FOREGOING, Mr. ELMER B. ESCA O, Branch Sheriff, under the supervision of ATTY. MA. B.G. CANDIDA D. RIVERO, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of this Court, is hereby directed to PERSONALLY SERVE with DISPATCH this WRIT to the respondents herein mentioned, together with a copy of the Petition and its annexes.
Let copies of this WRIT be forthwith furnished to Branch Sheriff Elmer B. Esca o, Atty. Ma. BG Rivero, Atty. LV Jo T. Escartin and Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara and petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and let a separate copy hereof together with a copy of the verified petition be served personally upon all the respondents.
SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphasis in the original)
On September 4, 2018, a summary hearing was conducted.[20]
In a September 13, 2018 Decision,[21] the Regional Trial Court dismissed the Petition for a writ of amparo.
The Regional Trial Court held that Sanchez failed to substantiate her assertion that she became a person of interest to the police after she had identified her husband's dead body. This was because she was unable to specifically allege the police officers' acts or the acts they sanctioned which threatened her security and liberty.[22] The Regional Trial Court stated:
Furthermore, there was scarcity of any specific allegations that the public respondents had participated, authorized or at least sanctioned the perceived threat to the petitioner's right to life, liberty and security, and the evidence adduced thus far, does not inspire a sensible and judicious conclusion that a privilege of the Writ of Amparo is justified. The petition consists merely of the petitioner and her daughter's bare allegation of monitoring and surveillance made by the police, sans any corroborative evidence to support that she was purposely singled out with the intention to inflict harm, injury or damage, which thereby threatened her security or a possible allusion to or insinuation of extra-legal killing or enforced disappearance. The court, at this point, cannot make an enlightened deduction that it was really the respondents who are responsible for the alleged monitoring and surveillance, as no tangible evidence was presented to prove such fact. Assuming arguendo, that she and her daughters were indeed tailed and monitored by the PNP, the petitioner failed to offer any justification for the said act, except her relationship with the deceased Eldie Labinghisa and the latter's involvement with the New People's Army, which rationale, at the very least, is likely a mistaken belief.[23]The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read:
DISPOSING THEREBY, the petitioner has not sufficiently proven her instant Petition by substantial evidence.Thus, Sanchez filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari.[25] Before this Court, petitioner contends that she was able to prove with substantial evidence that she and her children were under constant police surveillance and monitoring, which constitutes a clear violation of their right to life, liberty, and security. She also insists that the police officers' unauthorized taking and distribution of her photo was likewise a violation of her right to privacy, which has caused her great fear and anxiety.[26]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby DENIED. Necessarily, the Temporary Protection Order previously issued is LIFTED.
Let copies of this Decision be separately furnished to Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, Atty. LV Jo. T. Escartin, Atty. Connie T. Alian, Atty. Troy Warren A. Cayanan, petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and respondents PSupt. Mark Anthony D. Darroca, PSSupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan and PCSupt. John C. Bulalacao.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis in the original)
Respondents were directed to comment[27] on the Petition.
In their Comment,[28] respondents reiterate that petitioner failed to prove that she was entitled to the grant of the privilege of a writ of amparo, as her allegations against them were unsubstantiated and merely speculative.[29] They insist that as the wife of a member of the National People's Army, she was a proper interview subject. They also claim that taking her photo was merely part of the regular investigation process.[30]
Nonetheless, respondents denied that petitioner and her children were under surveillance, or that they were tailed by members of the police force.[31]
Petitioner was directed[32] to reply to respondents' Comment. However, she manifested[33] that she would not file a reply, as respondents merely refuted the arguments she raised in her Petition and did not raise any new issues.[34]
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez was able to prove with substantial evidence her entitlement to the privilege of a writ of amparo.
The Petition is meritorious.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued by this Court as an exercise of its power to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights[.]"[35] Section 1 defines a petition for a writ of amparo as "a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty[,] and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." The writ of amparo is, thus, an equitable and extraordinary remedy primarily meant to address concerns such as, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.[36]
Section 17[37] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies substantial evidence as the degree of proof required of both parties to a petition. Section 18 further reinforces the requirement of substantial evidence for the petitioner to establish his or her allegations to warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo:
SECTION 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[38] this Court explains that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a summary proceeding, requires only substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner.[39] More than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might determine as adequate to support a conclusion.[40] In Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations,[41] this Court further defines substantial evidence as "such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."[42]
Additionally, hearsay evidence, which is generally considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, may be considered in a writ of amparo proceeding if required by the unique circumstances of the case.[43] This Court in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[44] concluded that the "totality of the obtaining situation"[45] must be taken into consideration to determine if a petitioner is entitled to a writ of amparo:
At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.[46] (Emphasis in the original)The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly showed that she became a person of interest after she had first visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by claiming that petitioner's photo was not "posted" in the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that she saw petitioner's photo at the police station.[47] Whether petitioner's photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by the police.
Respondents try to paint petitioner's claims as the ramblings of a paranoid and overly suspicious person, but even her daughter confirmed the numerous times the police drove by their house and being tailed whenever they set foot outside their house. This shows that petitioner was not merely imagining the threats against her and her family.
The totality of obtaining circumstances likewise shows that petitioner and her children were the subject of surveillance because of their relationship with a suspected member of the New People's Army, creating a real threat to their life, liberty, or security.
Being Labinghisa's widow, despite being separated in fact from him for more than a decade, puts her at a precarious position in light of the current administration's aggressive efforts to stamp out the communist struggle in the country, which is seen as the "scourge of society[.]"[48] Her apprehension at being targeted as a suspected member of the New People's Army was, thus, palpable and understandable, causing her to "act suspiciously" as claimed by respondents, who subjected her to threats and accusations.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca claims that petitioner was only placed under general investigation because they wanted to know the identity of the last unclaimed cadaver.[49] However, the drive-bys and tailings intensified after petitioner had identified her husband, belying his assertions that their investigation was innocuous.
Further, petitioner's relationship with her husband insulates her from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's purported membership in the New People's Army. Whatever information respondents may hope to extract from her or her children are protected by spousal and filial privileges, which continue to exist even after Labinghisa's death.
Marriage[50] is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[51] which, in turn, is the foundation of the nation.[52]
In recognition of the significance of marriage to Philippine society, testimonial privilege[53] and communication privilege[54] have been granted to spouses. This is to preserve their harmonious relationship and to prevent any party, including a spouse, to take advantage of the free communication between the spouses or of information learned within the union.
This Court, in People v. Francisco,[55] explained the reasons behind marital disqualification:
The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because where a want of domestic [tranquility] exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 61, 6a; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A. L. R., 133), thus:Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State's support of marriage is the recognition of its status as an inviolable social institution, with the State implicitly acknowledging the importance of unfettered communication between the spouses.
"The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. (70 C. J., 119.)"[56]
The family and its members likewise enjoy a similar privilege. No one can be compelled to testify against his or her direct descendants or direct ascendants.[57]
Nonetheless, exceptions do exist to the general rule of marital privilege or disqualification. Among these is when a spouse commits an offense that "directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation[.]"[58] This Court expounded in Francisco that when there is no more spousal harmony to be preserved because of strained domestic relations, the identity of interests and the danger of perjury disappear, and the law's aim of protecting the security of private life also ceases to exist.[59]
None of the exceptions to marital privilege exist here.
Petitioner admits to being separated in fact from Labinghisa for more than a decade. Yet, this does not suffice as an exception, as separation is not tantamount to strained marital relations. Further, neither spouse committed an offense that impaired their conjugal union. Labinghisa's supposed
membership in the New People's Army is not an offense envisioned by jurisprudence which would create an exception to the general rule of marital disqualification.
Wives and children are not ordinary witnesses, as evidenced by the privileges they enjoy against State incursion into their relationships. Hence, respondents' surveillance of petitioner and her children as witting or unwitting witnesses against her husband or his activities is correctible by a writ of amparo.
Similar to marital privilege, the right to privacy is also a basic, fundamental right. The Constitution recognizes every person's right to physical privacy, hence the explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal affairs.
To safeguard against the enormous powers wielded by the State and nip any potential abuse and interference into the private sphere, the Constitution guarantees, among others, every person's right to due process,[60] to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,[61] and to the privacy of their communication and correspondence.[62] The Civil Code,[63] in turn, punishes with damages those who meddle and pry into another person's private affairs.
This is why respondent Police Superintendent Darroca's lack of contrition over his police officers' act of taking petitioner's photo without her permission-and then placing it on display at the police station-is disturbing. It appears as though he sees nothing wrong in flagrantly and inexcusably violating petitioner's right to privacy.
Petitioner was not a person of interest when she went to the funeral parlor to identify her husband's body. Certainly, the police officers stationed there did not know who she was. Yet, they took her photo against her wishes and badgered her into admitting her relationship with her husband, a suspected member of the New People's Army.
Respondent Police Superintendent Darroca excused the police officers' discourteous and threatening actions toward a civilian by saying that such was merely part of the investigation process and that the police officers acted in good faith.
This Court is not convinced.
The Philippine National Police's Ethical Doctrine Manual[64] enjoins its police officers to respect human dignity and human rights,[65] and to judiciously use their authority in the performance of duty.[66]
The police officers' brusque treatment of petitioner, threatening her with imprisonment and displaying her photo at the police station, does not reflect the professional and courteous image that the Philippine National Police wishes to convey as an institution. What they did was clearly not part of the usual investigation protocol. The police officers could not be said to have acted in good faith when they ganged up on and accosted a defenseless civilian.
Even the surreptitious surveillance of petitioner and her family is an abuse of the Philippine National Police's authority. If respondents wanted to interview petitioner and her children, they should have done so formally: informing them of their rights, holding the interview in an environment free of intimidation, and making sure that they had access to and were assisted by legal counsel or legal assistance groups. Further, when a minor is being interviewed, the interviewer should be specially trained to handle children.
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court erred in failing to consider the gender and power issues at play here, and how they affected the dynamics between the parties. Male police officers were investigating and surveilling the widow and daughter of an alleged communist, creating two (2) tiers of power: (1) law enforcer-civilian; and (2) male-female.
The Philippine National Police Manual wishes to craft the institution's image as a valiant peacekeeper dedicated to ensuring public safety and community participation,[67] but the bleak reality is that most people keep their guards up when faced with a member of the police force. In a patriarchal society where women have had to calibrate their responses toward men, the additional layer of power presented by a man in uniform would lead even an innocent civilian, especially a woman, to act jittery and nervously, trying to find a way to protect herself from her perceived vulnerabilities.
The gross imbalance in power dynamics makes it understandable for petitioner to initially hesitate to reveal her relationship with Labinghisa. As it turned out, she was correct to do so, as the moment the police officers found out who she was, she and her daughters became the subject of surveillance.
In inferring conclusions involving power deficits in relationships, judges must be careful not to be gender-blind. In denying the Petition for the writ of amparo, the Regional Trial Court echoed respondents' statement that the taking of petitioner's photo and the threats of obstruction of justice thrown at her were part of "the conduct of a logical investigation."[68] It could not see, or it refused to see that these actions, together with the surveillance done, were actual or imminent threats against petitioner and her children.
In rendering judgment, judges must not impose a standpoint viewed from their implicit status in society. They must look beyond their status as well-connected people who can assert themselves against men in uniform and who have no filial relation to one tagged as a communist.
By advertently or inadvertently ignoring petitioner's not so unique predicament as the spouse of a labeled communist, the Regional Trial Court created standards that would deny protection to those who need it most.
Petitioner's apprehension over the threat to her security was duly supported by substantial evidence. It was further corroborated by her daughter who also witnessed the constant police drive-bys and the tailings done by an unmarked vehicle. Thus, petitioner and her children deserve the protection of a writ of amparo.
Respondents' claim that the police officers reported and asked for the investigation of the plate number of the car that did the surveillance[69] should not have been enough for the trial court. The trial court should have required a full report from respondents. As compared with petitioner, they had better, if not exclusive access to the information from the Land Transportation Office.
In his Affidavit[70] attached to the Verified Return,[71] respondent Police Superintendent Darroca denied putting petitioner and her children under surveillance or ordering his officers to follow them:
10. As regards the tinted vehicle with plate number ALL 5385 who the petitioner alleged to have followed her and her daughters to Iloilo City, I categorically state that I have no knowledge about it; Moreover, I have no knowledge about the alleged call the petitioner received on August 22, 2018 nor I did (sic) order any of my men to follow her or her children[.][72]However, his denial is not the lawful defense required in a Verified Return, but a merely general denial, which is proscribed in Section 9[73] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Further, he failed to show that he observed extraordinary diligence in performing his duty, a required by Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.Petitioner and her daughter categorically stated that police cars have driven by their house with alarming regularity after petitioner had identified her husband's body. To this, respondent Police Superintendent Darroca only issued a blanket denial that he did not direct his officers to tail or monitor petitioner and her family. He did not present affidavits from his police officers to support his claim. Further, petitioner's report of being tailed by a vehicle only merited a perfunctory request from the police to the Land Transportation Office. The police, which had better resources to perform the investigation, should have done more to follow up her request. Their failure to exert the extraordinary diligence expected of them hints at a motive against petitioner and her family.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. (Emphasis supplied)
In granting the Petition for the writ of amparo, this Court in Republic v. Cayanan[74] pointed out that the State, in submitting its passive certificates, failed to comply with the extraordinary diligence required of it by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them. Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.[75] (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)The proceedings for the issuance of writs of amparo are extraordinary. They are significant not only in terms of final relief. In determining whether the petition must be granted, judges act as impartial inquisitors seeking to assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the life or liberty of petitioners. In a way, courts hearing writs of amparo assist in ferreting out the truth by providing an antidote to the naturally intimidating atmosphere of police investigations, especially involving communist and other rebels against the government.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was crafted in an era when extrajudicial killings and involuntary disappearances were on the rise allegedly due to the government's efforts to defeat an insurgency. The Rule was, in part, this Court's statement that the insurgents' narrative that fundamental rights were not durable and universal at all times was false. It was an affirmation of the belief that, perhaps unlike the rebels, our Constitution protected civility and human rights, and that this protection was what differentiated the government from the insurgents. It was, and still is, a rule that underscores our humanity and our civility.
While pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, the zeal of our police must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons, especially the loved ones of persons of interest. After all, the values we have in our Constitution are what differentiate us from lawless elements.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. A PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER is issued prohibiting members of the Philippine National Police from monitoring or surveilling petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez and her children, Scarlet Sanchez Labinghisa and Star Sanchez Labinghisa. The respondent police officers are reminded to uphold the rights of citizens as contained in the Constitution as well as conduct investigations in accordance with their promulgated manuals including the Ethical Doctrine Manual.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Inting, JJ., concur.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., I join the Dissent of J. R. Hernando.
Gesmundo, J., I join Justice Hernando dissent.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.
Hernando, J., I dissent. Please see Dissenting Opinion.
Carandang, J., I joint the dissent of J. Hernando.
Zalameda, J., I join J. Hernandos' dissent.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-34.
[2] Id. at 169-187. The Decision, in Spl. Pro. No. 2018-08-1070 and promulgated on September 13, 2018, was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman.
[3] Id. at 36.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 36, 86, and 89.
[6] Id. at 90 and 155-156.
[7] Id. at 36-37.
[8] Id. at 37.
[8] Id. at 37.
[9] Id. at 42.
[10] Id. at 37 and 42.
[11] Id. at 45-46.
[12] Id. at 35-40. Irwin was sometimes spelled as Erwin.
[13] Id. at 37.
[13] Id. at 37.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 52-55. The Regional Trial Court Order was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman.
[16] Id. at 54-55.
[15] Id. at 52-55. The Regional Trial Court Order was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman.
[16] Id. at 54-55.
[17] Id. at 56-78.
[18] Id. at 60-61.
[19] Id. at 60.
[20] Id. at 170, RTC Decision.
[21] Id. at 169-187.
[22] Id. at 185-186.
[23] Id. at 186-187.
[23] Id. at 186-187.
[24] Id. at 187.
[25] Id. at 10-34.
[26] Id. at 23-24.
[27] Id. at 191.
[28] Id. at 199-212.
[28] Id. at 199-212.
[29] Id. at 205-206.
[30] Id. at 207-208.
[30] Id. at 207-208.
[31] Id. at 208-209.
[32] Id. at 216.
[33] Id. at 218-220.
[34] Id. at 218.
[35] CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[36] De Lima v. Gatdula, 704 Phil. 235, 243 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[37] RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
[38] 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[36] De Lima v. Gatdula, 704 Phil. 235, 243 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[37] RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
[38] 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
[39] Id. at 41.
[40] Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
[41] 179 Phil. 109 (1979) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division].
[42] Id. at 114.
[43] Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 626 Phil. 581, 592 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[44] 626 Phil. 581 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
[45] Id. at 592.
[46] Id.
[47] Rollo, pp. 155-156.
[48] Chito Chavez, DILG: Revival of Anti-Subversion Law urgent, critical, inevitable, MANILA BULLETIN, August 15, 2019, <https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/08/15/dilg-revival-of-anti-subversion-law-urgent -critical-inevitable/> (last accessed on August 21, 2019).
ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
[51] CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
[52] CONST., art. XV, sec. 1, provides:
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
[53] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 22, provides:
SECTION 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
[54] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 24(a), provides:
SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) |
The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants[.] |
[55] 78 Phil. 693 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
[56] Id. at 703.
[57] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 25 provides:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
[58] Ordo o v. Daquigan, 159 Phil. 323, 326 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc] citing Cargill v. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314.
[59] People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 693, 704 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
[60] CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[61] CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[62] CONST., art. III, sec. 3(1) provides:
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[63] CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
[64] Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, <https://proarmm.pnp.gov.ph/downloads/EthicalDoctrine.pdf>
[65] Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 2.9 provides:
2.9 Respect for Human Rights - In the performance of duty, PNP members shall respect and protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all persons. No member shall inflict, instigate or tolerate extra judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and shall not invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state-of-war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any public emergency as a justification for committing such human rights violations.
[66] Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 3.2 provides:
3.2 Judicious Use of Authority - PNP members shall exercise proper and legitimate use of authority in the performance of duty.
[67] Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. I, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy
All members of the Philippine National Police shall abide, adhere to and internalize the provisions of this Ethical Doctrine. Towards this end, a truly professionalized and dedicated law enforcer shall be developed in promoting peace and order, ensuring public safety and enhancing community participation guided by the principle that a public office is a public trust and that all public servants must, at all times, be accountable to the people. They shall serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, morality, loyalty and efficiency with due respect to human rights and dignity as hallmark of a democratic society. They shall, at all times, support and uphold the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the legitimate government, respect the duly constituted authority and be loyal to the police service.
[68] Rollo, p. 184, RTC Decision.
[69] Rollo, p. 63.
SECTION 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
1. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
3. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
4. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
5. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
6. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
[74] G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
[75] Id. at 203-204.
HERNANDO, J.:
I dissent.
Section 1 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly states the purpose and coverage of such a writ:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The Court further expounds in Ladaga v. Mapagu[1] that:
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.The Rule on the Writ of Amparo also provides that for the court to render judgment granting the privilege of the writ, the petitioner must be able to discharge the burden of proving the allegations in the petition by the standard of proof required, that is, substantial evidence.[2] Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[3]
In a petition for writ of amparo, the court is allowed a certain degree of leniency or flexibility in the application of the evidentiary rules by adopting the totality of evidence standard. The Court explained in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis[4] that evidentiary difficulties had compelled it to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.[5] It determined that the fair and proper rule was to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.[6] In other words, the rules are reduced to the most basic test of reason - i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.[7] Thus, even hearsay testimony or circumstantial evidence can be admitted and appreciated if it satisfies this basic minimum test.[8] Yet the Court also issued a caveat in Bautista v. Dannug-Salucon[9] that such use of the standard does not unquestioningly authorize the automatic admissibility of hearsay or circumstantial evidence in all amparo proceedings. The matter of the admissibility of evidence should still depend on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Judging by the foregoing quantum of proof applicable particularly to a petition for a writ of amparo, it is my view that Sanchez failed to present substantial evidence to prove her entitlement to such a writ. After a judicious review of the records, I find no established violation or threat to the life, liberty, or security of Sanchez or her children by any of the respondents. Neither did Sanchez show proof that the respondents committed any unlawful act or omission as to justify her plea for a writ of amparo.
To reiterate, the writ of amparo specifically covers cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are described as killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[10]
At the outset, Sanchez filed the Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC with herself as the aggrieved party and not her deceased husband, Labinghisa. Hence, it is not for the Court herein to look into the circumstances of Labinghisa's death during the alleged PNP-NPA encounter. There is also, notably, no allegation here at all that Labinghisa's death was an extralegal killing.
As for Sanchez, the Court fails to perceive any actual, imminent, or continuing threat on her life and/or that of her children. By her own narrative, the only express threat made against her was that she would be persecuted for obstruction of justice if she would refuse to answer the questions of the police officers at St. Peter's during her second visit on August 17, 2018. This hardly puts her in danger of extrajudicial killing. Even assuming that the alleged surveillance and monitoring conducted on Sanchez and her children were true, the Court still cannot make a deduction simply based thereon that they are under threat of extralegal killing. Corollarily, Sanchez failed to establish that the surveillance and monitoring allegedly conducted on her and her children amounted to unlawful acts as to fall under the protective mantle of the writ of amparo.
Neither was Sanchez able to satisfactorily prove that she had been the victim of enforced disappearance or is under threat thereof, as it is defined under Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851[11] :
"Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.In Navia v. Pardico,[12] the Court identified the elements constituting enforced disappearance, to wit:
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:Pursuant to the first element of enforced disappearance, Sanchez did not allege, much less prove, that she had been arrested, detained, or abducted by any of the respondents or people acting under their authority. There is likewise absolute lack of allegations and proof of government participation in such arrest, detention, or abduction. While Sanchez might have been interrogated by police officers during her second visit to St. Peter's on August 17, 2018, she was still able to eventually leave and go home that same day. There appears to be no other instance when Sanchez or her daughters had been actually deprived of their liberty. Even until the hearing of her Petition, Sanchez apparently could still freely travel from one place to another. Sanchez's basic allegation was only that she and her daughters were afraid to leave their house and engage in their daily activities because of the purported surveillance and monitoring. Yet, their mere apprehensions, without any other substantiating evidence, do not qualify as a threat that will justify issuance of the writ.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.[13]
Sanchez mainly deduced the existence of a threat against her life, liberty, and security from information allegedly relayed to her by two persons, namely, (a) PO2 Dela Cruz, her contact in the police who disclosed to her that her photos were being circulated in the PNP and being posted at police stations;[14] and (b) her brother, who told her that the Mayor of Hamtic wanted her to go to the police station to clarify her name and involvement.[15] However, Sanchez's brother neither executed any affidavit nor testified in court. Consequently, there was no way for the courts to verify whether he had in fact relayed such information to Sanchez and whether such information was reliable and true. More significantly, PO2 Dela Cruz expressly denied telling Sanchez that her picture was being circulated within the PNP and posted at police stations.
PO2 Dela Cruz, whom Sanchez introduced in her pleadings to be not merely her contact and informant in the local police but also her close personal friend and godmother to her daughter Star, described the context and details of her exchange of text messages with Sanchez from August 15 to August 22, 2018:
That PO2 Dela Cruz testified in respondents' favor weighs heavily and adversely against Sanchez. While PO2 Dela Cruz affirmed in open court that she had informed Sanchez that the latter's picture was taken at St. Peter's and that the latter might be monitored, she also clarified that it was in connection with the investigation of the police as regards the remaining unidentified body among the seven fatalities from the PNP-NPA encounter on August 15, 2018.
Similarly, Sanchez's actuations raised the police's suspicions. Despite being able to confirm as early as the evening of August 15, 2018 that the unidentified body was Labinghisa's, Sanchez still went to St. Peter's presumably to be able to personally identify Labinghisa's remains. She went to St. Peter's on two consecutive days, on August 16 and 17, 2018, on the pretext of identifying whether one of the remains was that of her husband, but she refused to disclose to the police officers then present her deceased husband's name. There is no evident reason for her evasiveness when she and Labinghisa, as she had asserted, were already separated-in-fact for more than 13 years. Such circumstances would reasonably make her the subject of a lawful legitimate police investigation. Per PSupt. Darroca's testimony, Sanchez and other persons claiming any of the bodies at St. Peter's were all placed under general investigation[17] and interviewed to obtain information that might be vital in the ongoing anti-insurgency operations.
As for respondent police officers, I find for the sufficiency of their conduct, defenses, and compliance with Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which states:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.Extraordinary diligence as required and contemplated in this provision is more than the diligence expected of a good father of a family. Section 9 (d) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is thus relevant:
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:Respondents exercised this extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty and proved the same. The averments in their Verified Return and attached Affidavits,[18] bolstered by PSupt. Darroca's testimony in open court, that they had expended and would continue to expend extraordinary diligence in acting on Sanchez's allegations, are adequate defenses. They had respectively issued the orders to their subordinates to validate if there was any threat against Sanchez and not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius of Sanchez and her children pursuant to the TPO issued by the RTC. PSSupt. Agpangan further ordered the Police Chief of the Hamtic MPS to validate the alleged visit of its police intelligence personnel and the passing-by of its police patrol car at Sanchez's house, as well as the Officer-in-Charge of the San Jose MPS to verify with the Land Transportation Office the ownership of the tinted car with plate number ALL 5385 which purportedly followed Sanchez and her children around. To this effect, a Vehicle Verification Request to the Land Transportation Office was likewise submitted by the defense before the RTC to prove that respondents attempted to trace the said tinted vehicle alleged to have tailed Sanchez and her children outside their home.[19] It bears reiterating that PO2 Dela Cruz's corroborative statements in open court confirmed that Sanchez was in fact not under any surveillance and that there was no clear evidence that the police was plotting against her life, liberty, or security.
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Even if she was indeed being monitored, the only reason apparent from the records was that Sanchez or any other concerned persons claiming the bodies at St. Peter's were all under general investigation[20] and may possess information vital to the ongoing anti-insurgency operations.[21] To gain such information is within police duty, and to withhold the same may constitute probable cause for obstruction of justice.
In fine, to sanction this case with a grant of a writ of amparo may set a dangerous precedent and will have a crippling effect upon legitimate police operations such as monitoring, surveillance, and interviewing. To repeat, Section 1 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo states that the writ of amparo is a remedy against an unlawful act or omission of a public official, or of a private individual or employee. To grant the petition for writ of amparo is to declare that the police operations such as monitoring, surveillance, and interviewing are unlawful acts.
We step into the shoes of the investigating police officers. What would be their natural course of action upon sighting Sanchez in the funeral parlor, asking to look at the bodies of the slain suspected NPA members and declining to explain her purpose when asked?
Besides, it is settled that mere threat of legal action against Sanchez, i.e., charging her with the offense of obstruction of justice, was proper under the circumstances and is not an actionable wrong. It was not a threat to unjustly deprive her of her liberty.
Also note that Presidential Decree No. 1829 (PD 1829)[22] penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates, or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Stubborn and unjustified refusal (as against initial hesitation) to reveal identities of suspected NPA members may give rise to a punishable act under PD 1829.
Withal, respondents' defenses were not a mere blanket denial. All these enabled the RTC to judiciously determine that respondents' efforts to verify the existence of the alleged threat were sincere and sufficient.[23]
It is also necessary to state that the evidentiary rules on privileged communication will not insulate Sanchez or her children from any inquiries regarding Labinghisa's purported membership in the NPA. The pertinent provisions under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court state:
Section 22. Disqualiflcation by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.However, there was no indication in the records that Sanchez or any of her children were being made to testify against Labinghisa. It is a long stretch to claim that respondents' alleged surveillance of Sanchez and her children is tantamount to making them act as witnesses against Labinghisa, which is a State incursion into their privileged wife-husband and children -father relationships and thus correctible by a writ of amparo.
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
xxxx
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
Also, the marital privilege rule is inapplicable in the case at hand. As already mentioned, there was never an instance that Sanchez or any of her children were being forced to testify against Labinghisa or against each other. In any case, and in view of Labinghisa's demise, the preservation or disturbance of domestic tranquility or marital peace is no longer feasible.
At any rate, mere personal identification as one's spouse cannot be considered as equivalent to adverse testimony. There is also nothing inimical under the law if Sanchez admits before the investigating police officers her relationship with a suspected NPA member. There is simply an unjust inconsistency between alleging fear of being tagged as a spouse of a communist and, at the same time, banking upon the same legal status to support her petition for a writ of amparo.
It also bears emphasizing that all these rules on evidence enjoy relevance only in matters covered by judicial proceedings. Section 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Emphasis supplied.)Plainly, the alleged acts committed by public respondents against Sanchez and her children transgressing upon their purported privileges were committed out of court. Hence, the rules on evidence should not apply here.
The RTC had meticulously considered and carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the parties. There is, in my mind, no reason for this Court, even after its own review of the evidence on record, to disturb the findings of fact of the court a quo, especially considering that the latter had an opportunity to observe the behavior of the witnesses in the course of their testimony and was in a better position to gauge their veracity.
Even applying the minimum of the totality of evidence standard, which would have allowed the admission and appreciation of hearsay and circumstantial evidence, Sanchez still failed to discharge the burden of proof necessary for the grant of a writ of amparo in her favor. There is just a dearth of evidence adduced by Sanchez, hence, falling short of substantial evidence necessary to establish any actual violation or threat to her right to life, liberty, or security. Her apprehensions did not rise to the level that must be necessarily protected by a writ of amparo. Otherwise stated, mere acts of surveillance or monitoring, as part of legitimate police operations, could not and should not be characterized as acts indicative of or preparatory to extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances falling under the protective mantle of a writ of amparo. At most, these are indications of instinctive fear, trauma even, naturally brought out by her connections with a person slain by the police authorities. On its lonesome, this fear does not impel the issuance of the writ of amparo. The writ cannot be issued on mere inferences or deductions.
This Court on several occasions granted the writ on the basis of indirect and circumstantial proof, but only after a painstaking probe into the totality, strength, and credibility of the entire evidence on record:
In Bautista v. Dannug-Salucon,[24] the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon's petition for a writ of amparo that had been backed up by circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated testimonies. Dannug-Salucon, a founding member of the National Union of People's Lawyers in Isabela and a human rights lawyer representing political prisoners and suspected members of the NPA, alleged that, per information of her clients and employees, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had tagged her as a Red Lawyer and were conducting surveillance on her activities and routine. Numerous incidents transpired leading to the filing of the amparo case: her paralegal, also an activist and human rights defender, was fatally gunned down; one of her clients who was a civilian asset for the PNP Intelligence Section told her that the AFP was tracking her and had included her name on the military's Watch List of so -called terrorist supporters; her confidential informant was cornered by three military operatives who interrogated him regarding the purpose of his visit to Dannug-Salucon's office; different individuals appearing to be soldiers had even approached and questioned the vendors in front of her office as to their observations on Dannug-Salucon's schedule; members of the Criminal Investigation Detection Group and soldiers visited her office with no clearly declared purpose; her driver had been tailed by an unidentified motorcycle rider; and a known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Isabela informed her that she was being watched by the MIG. She also tried reporting the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Isabela but received no positive report identifying the individuals behind the alleged surveillance. In granting the writ, the Court held that the combination of all the foregoing incidents had adequately established that "the threats to her right to life, liberty and security were neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable.No factual circumstances run in common between the present case and the aforecited ones, and all these jurisprudential precepts granting exception to indirect proof do not apply here.
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,[25] a case cited and heavily relied upon by Sanchez, involved a petition for a writ of amparo by Mary Jean Tagitis, the wife of a consultant for the Islamic Development Bank who suddenly disappeared and reportedly fell under custody of police intelligence operatives and was being held against his will in an attempt of the police to implicate him with the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. Colleagues of her husband reported his disappearance to the local police authorities but to no avail. Tagitis thereafter filed complaints with the PNP in Cotabato and Jolo seeking help to find her husband. Her efforts, however, yielded no positive results and she was even chided by the police that her husband was not missing but was on a rendezvous with another woman. It was ruled therein that cases of enforced disappearances pose "evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding,"[26] and that even hearsay testimony may be considered by the amparo court provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.[27] Finding that Tagitis properly pleaded the ultimate facts of her husband's enforced disappearance and the totality of the circumstances met the requirements of substantial evidence, the Court deemed sufficient the hearsay evidence presented by Tagitis.
There is no automatic admissibility of hearsay evidence in all amparo proceedings.[28] In this case, there is no reason to deviate from this rule, as Sanchez's proof consisted only of hearsay that are all too frail, inadequate, and unfounded to stand on its own.
It must be kept in mind that the extraordinary remedy of writ of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.[29]
I therefore vote to DENY the Petition for Writ of Amparo.
[1] 698 Phil 525.
[2] Sec. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
[3] Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183.
[5] Id. at 613.
[6] Id. at 616.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018.
[10] Mamba v. Bueno, 805 Phil. 359, 377 (2017).
[11] Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.
[12] 688 Phil. 266 (2012).
[13] Id. at 279-280.
[14] Rollo, p. 125.
[15] Id. at 127.
[16] Id. at 150-156.
[17] TSN, September 4, 2018, pp. 33-35, id. at 144-146.
[18] Their statements in their Verified Return (rollo, pp. 63-73) and correlative Affidavits, all averred in compliance with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and affirmed in open court, should suffice:
PSCUPT JOHN C BULALACAO[19] Per testimony of PSupt. Darroca, id. at 149.
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "2" is the Affidavit of PSCUPT BULALACAO, attesting that:
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6. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule and Order of the Court, the following are my actions to be undertaken, to wit:
As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Ron. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have to undertake the following:
- To direct PSSUPT LEO ERWIN D AGPANGAN, Provincial Director of Antique Police Provincial Office to validate if there is any record with any office of any alleged threat against the petitioner;
- To direct all personnel of Police Regional Office 6 not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well -being of the rest of the citizens in the community;
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PSSUPT LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "3" is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN, attesting that:
xxxx
5. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule, as regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to .the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Ron. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have undertaken and will undertake the following:
6. To direct all personnel of the Antique PPO not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community;
- Directed PSUPT MARK ANTHONY D DARROCA, Officer-in Charge of the San Jose MPS to validate the alleged threat if there is any against the petitioner.
- To direct the Chief of Police of the Hamtic MPS to validate the alleged: 1) meeting between Vivian A Sanchez and an alleged intel personnel in the house of the former; 2) the alleged passing-by house of the petitioner of the patrol car of the Hamtic MPS;
- To direct the OIC San Jose Mtmicipal Police Station to verify with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) the alleged tinted car with plate number ALL 5385.
PSUPT. MARK ANTHONY D. DARROCA
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "3" is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN attesting that:
xxxx
13. As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Hon. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have ordered my men not to not to [sic] come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community.
[20] Id. at 144-146.
[21] Sanchez made the following allegations per her Petition for Writ of Amparo, par. 8, p. 2 thereof, id. at 36, as reiterated in her present Petition for Review on Certiorari, par. 8, p. 4 thereof, id. at 13:
"The next day, Petitioner went back to St. Peter's Funeral Home to confirm again her husband's body, however three (3) police officers began interrogating her and even threatened to arrest and charge her with obstruction of justice when she refused to answer. xxx"[22] Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders (1981).
[23] Per Republic v. Cayanan, supra note 3.
[24] G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018.
[25] Supra note 4.
[26] Id. at 613.
[27] Id. at 616.
[28] Supra note 4.
[29] Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 73-74 (2010).