Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Petition) assailing the constitutionality of the "lump-sum discretionary funds" in the 2014 General Appropriations Act^[1] (GAA), including, among others, the Unprogrammed Fund, the Contingent Fund, the E-Government Fund, and the Local Government Support Fund (collectively, the specifically assailed appropriations).

The Facts

On November 19, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.^[2] (2013 Belgica case), declaring certain provisions of the 2013 GAA unconstitutional. The dispositive portion of the Court's Decision in the 2013 Belgica case reads:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund [(PDAF)] Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and [Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)] Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators - whether individually or collectively organized into committees - to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.^[3]

In fine, the Court's Decision in the 2013 Belgica case abolished the "pork barrel system" in its latest iteration as the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article in the 2013 GAA, and similar informal practices that allowed individual legislators to participate in the execution of the budget through post-enactment measures of identification of projects, for violation of the separation of powers - by impinging on the authority of the Executive to implement the national budget.

As well, the 2013 Belgica case declared as unconstitutional the broad standards of "other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President," and "priority infrastructure development projects" for the use of the President's Social Fund and the Malampaya Fund, respectively, for being insufficient standards to check the President's discretion as to the use of these lump-sum funds.

Republic Act No. (RA) 10633 or the 2014 GAA was subsequently passed on December 27, 2013. It appropriated funds for the operations of the government for fiscal year 2014.

On January 13, 2014, Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica (Petitioner) filed the instant Petition, seeking to declare all lump-sum appropriations in the 2014 GAA unconstitutional, including the specifically assailed appropriations. Petitioner asserts that the lump-sum discretionary funds in the 2014 GAA were passed in violation of the Constitution, since these funds are of the same character as the pork barrel funds which were declared unconstitutional in the 2013 Belgica case, and should thus be prohibited.

Petitioner sought the issuance of a status quo ante order to prevent the use and disbursement of the specifically assailed lump-sum funds pending resolution of this Petition. However, status quo ante order was issued by the Court.

Subsequently, the parties submitted their respective pleadings.

The Issues

Based on the issues submitted by the parties in their pleadings, the Court is called upon to determine whether the lump-sum appropriations found in the 2014 GAA are unconstitutional for:

1. violating the doctrine on non-delegability of legislative power;
   
   
2. violating the essence and purpose of separation of powers (i.e., checks and balances) and the democratic process; and
   
   
3. failing to comply with the requirements of a valid appropriation, the line-item veto power of the President, and Executive Order No. (EO) 292,^[4] otherwise referred to as the Administrative Code of 1987.
   

Procedural Issues

In resorting to the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, Petitioner implores the Court to exercise its power of judicial review to secure the reliefs sought.

The Court's power of judicial review-specifically its power to review the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government^[5] - is subject to well-defined limitations, to wit: "(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, [or,] otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."^[6]

Actual case or controversy

The requirement of an actual case or controversy stems from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes within the sphere of judicial power "the duty x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Jurisprudence defines an actual case or controversy as "one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.'"^[7] Subsumed in the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, and "[f]or a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action."^[8] To be sure, the Court may not wield its power of judicial review to address a hypothetical problem.^[9] "Without any completed action or a concrete threat of injury to the petitioning party, the act is not yet ripe for adjudication."^[10]

The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Budget, the Senate, and the House of Representatives (collectively, Respondents), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), aver that unlike the 2013 Belgica case, which had been prompted by the "findings of irregularities by the Commission on Audit [(COA)] over the use of the PDAF," no such findings have been alleged by Petitioner so as to warrant judicial intervention.^[11]

By challenging the validity of the specifically assailed appropriations, Petitioner questions the implementation of what he characterizes as unconstitutional provisions of the 2014 GAA. Such a challenge has been deemed by the Court as sufficient to afford ripeness to a controversy, involving as it does the possible misapplication of public funds which cause "injury or hardship to taxpayers."^[12]

Hence, the requisite of an actual case or controversy to allow the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review is satisfactorily met.

Mootness

The Petition assails what it considers lump-sum discretionary funds in the 2014 GAA. In view of the lapse of the said year and the enactment of GAAs for subsequent years, this may raise questions on mootness.

Suffice it to state, however, that the Court may resolve cases otherwise moot and academic, when: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.^[13] The Petition falls under the last three exceptions.

Undoubtedly, this case involves paramount public interest as it deals with the constitutionality of appropriations of public funds. Moreover, the case involves issues concerning significant constitutional principles such as separation of powers, valid delegation, and appropriation.

The constitutional issues raised by Petitioner also require the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Executive, the Legislative, and the public. While the 2013 Belgica case drew a conceptual distinction between the two kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds, (i.e., the "Congressional Pork Barrel"^[14] and the "Presidential Pork Barrel"), the Court therein "delimit[ed] the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund."^[15] Hence, there is a need to determine the scope of the Executive's authority with respect to the utilization and management of lump-sum discretionary funds.

Moreover, the Petition presents a case that is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In 2013 Belgica case, the Court ruled:

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF-free budget for 2014." The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners' claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar." In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "[t]o prevent similar I questions from re-emerging." The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.^[16] (Emphasis supplied)

The same reasoning applies squarely in this case. In fact, the GAAs enacted since the filing of the Petition contained appropriations for the Unprogrammed Fund, Contingent Fund, and Local Government Support Fund. Failing the formulation of controlling principles, petitions assailing these subsequent appropriations may likely be filed again.

Substantive Issues
           

The rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case

At the outset, it must be noted that Petitioner heavily anchors the present challenge on his literal reading of the rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case which purportedly invalidated lump-sum appropriations that he characterizes as "Presidential Pork Barrel." As well, Petitioner vacillates between claiming that the decision therein made a wholesale declaration of unconstitutionality of lump-sum appropriations,^[17] and conceding that lump-sum appropriations are not unconstitutional per se.^[18]

Thus, it is necessary to begin the discussion by resolving Petitioner's foremost premise that the 2013 Belgica case ruled upon the general question of constitutionality of lump-sum appropriations per se. Petitioner bases this premise upon the following quoted portion of the Court's Decision therein which, according to him, amounts to a wholesale declaration of unconstitutionality of all lump-sum discretionary funds:

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence -meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25 (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 25 (6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money" and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non- delegability.^[19] (Additional emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's heavy reliance on the 2013 Belgica case as precedent to argue that lump-sum appropriations are unconstitutional per se is erroneous. The rule on singular correspondence therein distinguished what is a prohibited lump-sum. Identifying the Calamity Fund, the Contingent Fund, and the Intelligence Fund as valid appropriations, the Court explained that:

x x x Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. x x x^[20] (Additional emphasis supplied)

The requirement of singular correspondence does not mean that all lump-sum appropriations are unconstitutional per se; hence, the specifically assailed appropriations are constitutional.

As explained in the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, the ponente in the 2013 Belgica case, for as long as the lump -sum amount is meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects, or activities that may all be clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose, the lump-sum appropriation is valid:

Again, it should be reiterated that the Court's disquisition regarding "line-item" and "lump-sum" appropriations all hearken to compliance with the constitutional postulates on separation of powers and Presidential item veto. Relatedly, the rule on singular correspondence, as discussed in the 2013 Belgica case, was therefore meant to subserve these principles. That being said, not all "lump-sum" amounts defy this rule should observance of these principles be preserve. It is hence, my opinion that a lump-sum amount may still be considered as a valid item subject to the President's item veto power for as long as the lump-sum amount is meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects, or activities that may all be clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose. In this sense, the "lump-sum" effectively functions as a "line- item" that is compliant with the doctrine of singular correspondence as amply discussed in the 2013 Belgica Decision.

x x x x

At the risk of belaboring the point, a valid item is one characterized by singular correspondence - meaning, an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose. A lump-sum, albeit meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects and activities, may effectively function as a proper "line-item" for as long as these multiple programs, projects or activities are clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose. This singular purpose may be as general or specific as the legislative department deems it to be, provided that such generality or specificity does not negate the President's proper exercise of his item veto power. This danger was what was clearly contemplated and showcased by the 2013 PDAF Article because the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion was treated as a funding source for multiple unrelated purposes such as, as noted in the case, "scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc." Worse, these multiple unrelated purposes were all made to fall under the vague and amorphous term "Priority Development Assistance Fund," which ultimately allowed those who were disbursed the funds (i.e., individual legislators) to decide whatever public purpose they deemed as a "priority." As such, this created a budgeting setup wherein there is no more discernible item left for the exercise of the President's veto power and hence, constitutionally infirm.^[21]

Directly traversing the challenges to the constitutionality of the specifically assailed appropriations, the Court finds that the assailed appropriations comply with the rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case, and are thus, constitutional.

Unprogrammed Fund

The appropriation for the Unprogrammed Fund in the 2014 GAA reads:

XLVI. UNPROGRAMMED FUND

New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating Expenses	Capital Outlays	Total
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS	P418,800,000	P16,602,744,000	P122,882,215,000	P139,903,759,000

Special Provision(s)

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22,^[22] Article VII of the Constitution, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the release of Unprogrammed Fund shall be subject to Section 63^[23] of the General Provisions of this Act.

Implementation of this provision shall be subject to guidelines to be jointly issued by the DBM, DOF and BTr.

2. Recording of Relent Loans. The appropriations authorized under Purpose I shall be used to record the proceeds of National Government loans in the amount of Thirty Six Million Two Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (P36,268,000) relent to GOCCs. The SARO/s to be issued shall be the basis of recording the GOCCs' loans payable to the National Government.

In addition, the amount of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000) chargeable against Purpose 6 shall be used for the government's Debt Management Program that will allow access to lower cost of borrowings and better maturity structure for GOCCs: PROVIDED, That availment under this Program shall require favourable endorsement by the DOF upon evaluation of the following criteria: (i) the GOCC's capacity to service the debt to the National Government; and (ii) the GOCC's operational requirements. Implementation of this provision shall be subject to guidelines jointly issued by the DBM, DOF and BTr.

3. Risk Management Program. In order to manage the National Government's fiscal risks and enhance the country's credibility among potential Public-Private Partnership (PPP) proponents, the amount of Twenty Billion Pesos (P20,000,000,000) authorized under Purpose 7 shall be used for the government's Risk Management Program to cover commitments made by, and obligations of, the National Government in the concession agreements relative to PPP projects, subject to the pertinent provisions of laws, rules and regulations.

Implementation of this provision shall be subject to guidelines to be jointly issued by the DBM, DOF and BTr.

4. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program. The amount of Eighty Billion Pesos (P80,000,000,000) appropriated herein for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program shall be released in accordance with a rehabilitation plan and shall be subject to Section 63 of the General Provisions of this Act: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets, proceeds from grants, loans for the repair and rehabilitation of calamity stricken areas, and subject to the approval of the President, savings generated from the programmed appropriations in this Act may be released to cover the appropriations herein provided.

5. Use of Income. In case of deficiency in the appropriations for the following business-type activities, departments, bureaus and offices enumerated hereunder and other agencies as may be determined by the Permanent Committee are hereby authorized to use their respective income collected during the year: PROVIDED, That said income shall be deposited with the National Treasury, chargeable against Purpose 3: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That it shall be used exclusively by the agency for purposes indicated herein or such other purposes authorized by the Permanent Committee: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That it shall cover only the requirements of said agency until the end of the year:

DEPARTMENT/AGENCY		SOURCE OF INCOME	PURPOSE
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES		Proceeds from Sales of Maps and Charts	For reproduction of maps and charts and printing publications
	NAMRIA
FINANCE
	BOC	Sale of Accountable Forms	For the printing of accountable forms
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
	Office of the Secretary	Issuance of Passport Booklets	For the procurement of additional passport booklets
JUSTICE
	National Bureau of  Investigation	Urine Drug Testing and DNA Analysis	For the purchase of reagents, drug testing kits and other consumables
		Issuance of Clearance	For procurement of additional materials and payment of rentals for the laser photo system used in the issuance of NBI clearance
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
	Land Transportation Office	Issuance of Driver's License, Plates, Tags and Stickers	For the production of additional driver's licenses, plates, tags and stickers
	Maritime Industry  Authority	Issuance of Seafarer's Identification and Record Books (SIRBs), Seafarer's Identification Booklets (SIBs) and other statutory certificates	For the production of additional SIRBs, SIBs, and other statutory certificates

Releases from said income shall be subject to the submission of a Special Budget pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987.

Implementation of this provision shall be subject to the guidelines issued by the DBM.

[6.] Use of Excess Income. Departments, bureaus and offices authorized to collect fees and charges as shown in the FY 2014 BESF may be allowed to use their income realized and deposited with the National Treasury: PROVIDED, That said income shall be in excess of the collection targets presented in the BESF: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That it shall be chargeable under Purpose 3: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE, That it shall only be used to augment their respective current appropriations during the year: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That said income shall not be used to augment Personnel Services appropriations including payment of discretionary and representation expenses.

Releases from said income shall be subject to the submission of a Special Budget pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Implementation of this provision shall be subject to the guidelines issued by the DBM.

[7.] Augmentation within the Unprogrammed Fund. In case the total amount appropriated under any of the Purposes in the Unprogrammed Fund has been fully utilized, the deficiency in the amount needed to cover programs, projects and activities still to be implemented under said Purpose may be augmented by the appropriations authorized for other purposes except Purpose 1 - Budgetary Support to Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations - and Purpose 2 - Support to Foreign Assisted Projects, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines.

[8.] Reportorial Requirement. The DBM shall submit, either in printed form or by way of electronic document, to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance separate quarterly reports stating the releases from the Unprogrammed Fund, the amounts released and the purposes thereof, and the recipient departments, bureaus and offices, including GOCCs and GFIs, as well as the authority under which the funds are released under Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Fund.^[24]

Petitioner claims that the appropriation for the Unprogrammed Fund is unconstitutional because it merely provides for a lump-sum figure without any enumerated purposes for which these funds should be used.^[25]

Further, it is alleged that the Unprogrammed Fund lacks the requirements of a valid item of appropriation and has no discernible purpose outlined. In contrast to the 2013 GAA, the 2014 GAA supposedly has no purpose.^[26] According to Petitioner, the Unprogrammed Fund has been noted as susceptible to abuse because it avoids the appropriations procedure. Petitioner insists that if there is excess revenue, then it should undergo the budgetary process and await a supplemental budget.^[27]

The Respondents, on the other hand, aver that Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA provides the specific purposes for which the Unprogrammed Fund may be used: (1) Budgetary Support to Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations; (2) Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects; (3) General Fund Adjustments; (4) Support for Infrastructure Projects and Social Programs; (5) AFP Modernization Program; (6) Debt Management Program; (7) Risk Management Program; (8) Disaster Relief and Mitigation Fund; (9) Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program; (10) Total Administrative Disability Pension; and (11) People's Survival Fund. Such identified purposes serve to constrain executive discretion.^[28]

Contrary to Petitioner's claim, the appropriation for the Unprogrammed Fund under the 2014 GAA, similar to those in previous GAAs, sufficiently identifies the public purposes for which the funds may be used, the only difference being that the GAA for the preceding years consisted of one volume, whereas the specified public purposes and the amounts therefor for the Unprogrammed Fund are found nestled in Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA. Both Petitioner and the OSG fatally overlooked that there is Annex "A" to the Unprogrammed Fund. Annex "A" specifies the amount for each specific purpose, thus it is not the prohibited lump-sum mentioned in the 2013 Belgica case.

With respect to the test of compliance with the rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case, the Unprogrammed Fund stands square. It has a clearly discernible singular appropriation purpose of providing standby appropriation to be sourced from unexpected or windfall revenues to fund the specific programs and projects.

Considering the foregoing, the appropriation in the 2014 GAA for the Unprogrammed Fund is constitutional.

Programmed Special Purpose Funds

The Court now proceeds to resolve the challenges against the Programmed Special Purpose Funds (SPFs) specifically assailed in the Petition, namely: the Contingent Fund, the E-Government Fund, and the Local Government Support Fund.

Contingent Fund

The appropriation for the Contingent Fund in the 2014 GAA reads:

XXXVII. CONTINGENT FUND

New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures 
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS		P740,000,000	P260,000,000	P1,000,000,000

New Appropriations, by Central/Regional Allocation

Current Operating Expenditures 
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
Regional Allocation		P740,000,000	P260,000,000	P1,000,000,000
Nationwide		740,000,000	260,000,000	1,000,000,000
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS		P740,000,000	P260,000,000	P1,000,000,000

Special Provision(s)

1. Administration and Use of Fund. The amount of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000) appropriated herein for the Contingent Fund shall be administered by the Office of the President and shall be used exclusively to fund the requirements of new and/or urgent projects and activities that need to be implemented during the year. It may likewise be used to augment the existing appropriations for local and foreign travels of the President: PROVIDED, That in no case shall said Fund be used for the purchase of motor vehicles.

No amount under the Contingent Fund shall be released and disbursed without the prior approval of the President of the Philippines.^[29]

Anent the Contingent Fund, Petitioner claims that it fails as an item of appropriation because Congress failed to identify the kinds of contingencies for which the fund may be used. Petitioner also argues that there is no discernible specific purpose or guidelines for which the Contingent Fund may be used;^[30] thus, the President is allegedly given unbridled discretion in its disbursement.^[31] As well, the Contingent Fund is also assailed as violative of the President's power of item veto because the President is left only to accept the policy that funding must be provided to meet contingencies, without having the opportunity to decide which contingencies should be given funding.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the uses of the Contingent Fund cannot be itemized precisely because it is allocated for projects and activities that may need funding during the fiscal year but were not previously anticipated whether in terms of amount or object.

The Court agrees again with Respondents. The untenability of Petitioner's stance that the contingencies that may be funded by the Contingent Fund must be identified is self-evident. The purpose of the Contingent Fund is precisely to cover the funding requirements of new or urgent projects that need to be implemented during the year.

These multifarious projects that are necessary but were not anticipated during budget preparation and legislation and had to be funded out of Contingent Funds had historically included the following: initial operational requirements of newly-created offices,^[32] initial funding requirements to carry out provisions of newly-enacted laws,^[33] additional funding requirements of the use of automated election system in national and local elections,^[34] for plebiscites in the creation, merger or division of local government units,^[35] as appropriation for Y2K readiness compliance,^[36] for the expenses of the National Organizing Council for the Philippine hosting of the 2015 APEC Meetings,^[37] and additional funding requirement for election related activities.^[38]

These new or urgent projects and the level of travel expenses that will be incurred during the year are necessarily unknown at the time the budget is prepared the year prior. To even attempt to identify these "contingencies" almost two years before they are expected to arise is a perversion of the purpose of the Contingent Fund amounting to the deprivation of the Legislature's authority to amply provide for contingencies and of the Executive's power to address them. Such interpretation amounts to, at best, a very fatuous budgetary policy.

The Contingent Fund is likewise assailed as one which precluded the President from exercising his line-item veto power.

As to whether the structure of the Contingent Fund violated the line -item veto power of the President, it is noteworthy that the appropriation for the Contingent Fund already passed the Court's approval as an item of appropriation in the same case relied upon by Petitioner to argue against its constitutionality.

In the 2013 Belgica case, the Court explained:

x x x Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item.^[39] (Emphasis omitted)

The language of the Contingent Fund appropriation in the 2013 GAA, found by the Court as a valid line-item appropriation in the 2013 Belgica case, was adopted as the language of the Contingent Fund appropriation in the 2014 GAA.

In this sense, and as already validated in the 2013 Belgica case, the Contingent Fund complies with the rule on singular correspondence - the clearly specified singular purpose encompassing these seemingly unrelated purposes is the purpose of meeting contingencies.

In fine, the appropriation in the 2014 GAA for the Contingent Fund is constitutional.

E-Government Fund

The appropriation for the E-Government Fund in the 2014 GAA reads:

XXXIX. E-GOVERNMENT FUND

New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS		P1,889,204,000	P589,696,000	P2,478,900,000

New Appropriations, by Central/Regional Allocation

Current Operating Expenditures
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
Regional Allocation		P1,889,204,000	P589,696,000	P2,478,900,000
Nationwide		1,889,204,000	589,696,000	2,478,900,000
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS		P1,889,204,000	P589,696,000	P2,478,900,000

Special Provision(s)

1. Strategic Information and Communication Technology Projects. The amount of Two Billion Four Hundred Seventy Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,478,900,000) appropriated herein for strategic information and communication technology projects shall be used exclusively to finance: (i) on-going E-Government funded projects; and (ii) strategic information and communication technology projects in public financial management, basic and higher education, health, justice, peace and order, transport, land use, open government/open data, climate change, and citizen frontline delivery services: PROVIDED, That such projects strictly comply with all the criteria and guidelines jointly prescribed by the Information and Communications Technology Office, DBM and NEDA. In no case shall said amount be used for any other purpose.

Releases from said amount shall be subject to the submission of a Special Budget pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987.

2. Appropriations for the Medium-Term Information and Communication Technology Harmonization Initiative. The amount appropriated herein for strategic information and communication technology projects includes Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000) to be used to finance the activities of the steering committee tasked to ensure the effective implementation of the Medium-Term Information and Communication Technology Harmonization Initiative, in accordance with DOST-DBM-NEDA Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2012-01 dated November 28, 2012.

GENERAL SUMMARY
E-GOVERNMENT FUND

Current Operating Expenditures

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
A. E-Government Fund		P1,889,204.000	P589,696,000	P2,478,900,000
Total New Appropriations, E -Government Fund		P1,889,204.000	P589,696,000	P2,478,900,000[40]

In arguing against the constitutionality of the E-Government Fund, Petitioner claims that instead of enumerating the strategic information and communication technology projects that would be financed, the 2014 GAA simply identifies a lump-sum amount to be allocated again depending on the whims of the executing authority.^[41] Furthermore, Petitioner posits that the determination of which department or agency's information and communication technology project is more important or crucial so as to merit funding is a choice that should have been afforded the President; instead he is left with a policy choice. Each project to be funded should have been specified so the President can choose which projects should proceed or should be discontinued.^[42]

In answer to these arguments, Respondents assert that the provisions of the E-Government Fund already provide the standards for the disbursement of the same: (i) on-going E-Government funded projects; and (ii) strategic information and communication technology projects in public financial management, basic and higher education, health, justice, peace and order, transport, land use, open government/open data, climate change, and citizen frontline delivery services.

When it was first created, the E-Government Fund was under the control and management of the Information Technology and E-Commerce Council (ITECC) which was then the highest policy making body on ICT matters. In 2004, EO 269^[43] created the Commission on Information and Communications Technology (CICT) under the Office of the President. Under Section 4(e) of said executive order, the CICT was mandated to "oversee the identification and prioritization of all e-government systems and applications as provided for in the Government Information Systems Plan, manage and/or administer the e-Government Fund." Subsequently, the ITECC was abolished by EO 334^[44] and its budgets, assets, personnel, programs and projects were transferred to CICT.

The GAA for fiscal year 2010 mandated the CICT to make guidelines for the release of the E-Government Fund. Pursuant to this, the CICT issued CICT Memorandum Order No. 001-10 entitled "Guidelines on Projects to be Funded by the E-Government Fund" which serves as the reference for proposals of government agencies and the basis for evaluation and implementation of approved projects.

In 2011, pursuant to EO 47,^[45] the CICT was reorganized and renamed as the Information and Communications Technology Office (ICTO) and was transferred to the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). The ICTO is mandated under Section 2(e) of EO 47 to "[f]ormulate the Government Information System Plan and administer the E-Governance Fund." Subsequently, CICT Memorandum Order No. 001-10 was issued.

Clearly, therefore, the argument that there exists no standard for the use and prioritization of the E-Government Fund fails.

Administrative rules, as in the case of the CICT Memorandum Order No. 001-2010 which sets the E-Government Fund Guidelines, are the extant and discernible standards by which the use of the E -Government Fund to support strategic information and communication technology projects is subject. This administrative rule making is recognized because:

[a]dministrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. x x x^[46]

Further:

[t]he grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law. x x x^[47]

From its inception, the E-Government Fund has been intended as alternative funding for cross-agency information and communication technology projects. Its nature as a cross-agency fund requires that the Fund is kept lump-sum, subject to the determination by the administrative agencies of which are ongoing strategic information and communication technology projects in the priority sectors identified by the Legislature in the budget. It is noteworthy that these standards are already in place in existing executive issuances predating the contested E-Government Fund provision, which the Court must assume the Legislature is aware of at the time of budget authorization.

Based on the language of the 2014 appropriation and of its special provisions, it is clear that the E-Government Fund is intended and treated as a funding source for E-Government programs of different government agencies or end-users. Following the program budgeting scheme followed by the Executive and Legislative in preparing and enacting the national budget, the specific purpose that constitutes the item of appropriation is the E -Government Program, which is specific enough for the exercise of the President's item veto power.

Hence, in the proper interpretation of singular correspondence, the E -Government Fund has a clearly specified singular purpose - funding the E- Government Program consisting of strategic ICT programs of various agencies of government. In fine, the appropriation in the 2014 GAA for the E-Government Fund is constitutional.

Local Government Support Fund (LGSF)

The appropriation for the LGSF in the 2014 GAA reads:

XXXVI. ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
x x x x

D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FUND (FORMERLY FINANCIAL SUBSIDY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS)

New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses	Capital Outlays	Total
Total New Appropriations		P405,000,000		P405,000,000

New Appropriations, by Central/Regional Allocation

Current Operating Expenditures
 

	Personnel  Services	Maintenance and Other  Operating  Expenses	Capital  Outlays	Total
Regional Allocation		P405,000,000		P405,000,000
Nationwide		405,000,000		405,000,000
Total New Appropriations		P405,000,000		P405,000,000

Special Provision(s)

1. Local Government Support Fund. The amount of Four Hundred Five Million Pesos (P405,000,000) appropriated herein for financial assistance to LGUs, including One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for the City of Manila, Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000) for the City of Caloocan and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000) for the Municipality of Lal-lo, Cagayan shall be used to support the various priority programs and projects of LGUs and shall be released in accordance with the guidelines issued bv the DBM. (CONDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION-President's Veto Message, December 20, 2013, page 1109, R.A. No. 10633)^[48]

x x x x

F. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FUND

The earmarking of specific appropriations for selected local government units (LGUs) under the ALGU-Local Government Support Fund, Special Provision No. 1 "Local Government Support Fund," page 850, may not be consistent with the objectives and prioritization of the Local Government Support Fund. Accordingly, I hereby direct the DBM to issue the guidelines in the equal availment of the Fund by LGUs. Indeed, National Government support ought to be responsive to the actual requirements of LGUs in the interest of genuine local development.^[49] (Emphasis in the original)

Petitioner brands the LGSF as a purely discretionary fund given to the President to be disbursed to LGUs without any legislative guidelines in place.^[50] Hence, due to the supposed unfettered discretion granted to the President in disbursing funds favor of LGUs and the purported lack of guidelines in the disbursement of such funds, Petitioner deems the LGSF contained in the 2014 GAA, unconstitutional.

In determining the constitutionality of the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, the Court in the 2013 Belgica case explained that while the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of: (1) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule -making; or (2) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. Thus, in order to appraise the merits of Petitioner's proposition with respect to the LGSF, the Court must examine the LGSF provision of the 2014 GAA vis-a-vis the two jurisprudential tests that are used to measure the sufficiency of legislative guidelines for purposes of delegating rule-making authority.

The first test is called the "completeness test." A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. The second test is called the "sufficient standard test." A law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.^[51]

With respect to the first test, it is easily discernible that the LGSF satisfies the completeness test. It is clear from the 2014 GAA that the policy consideration for the institution of the LGSF is "genuine local development and the assistance of LGUs". While couched in general terms, this policy consideration effectively sets forth the purpose for which the LGSF should be carried out. To be sure, the Court has recognized the validity of similarly worded policy considerations such as "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare", and "simplicity, economy and welfare."^[52]

With respect to the second test, contrary to the argument of Petitioner, the President is not granted unfettered and unabated discretion in disbursing the LGSF. The 2014 GAA provides adequate guidelines and limitations to map out the boundaries of the Executive's authority in disbursing the LGSF. On this score, the Court finds that the 2014 GAA contains sufficient limitations that prevent the Executive from running riot in disbursing the LGSF, thereby satisfying the sufficient standard test.

The Court notes that the amount allotted for the LGSF is specifically identified, i.e., Four Hundred Five Million Pesos (P405,000,000.00). Not only is the amount allotted for disbursement specifically determined, the nature of the fund was likewise defined with sufficient specificity. The LGSF, in the aforesaid specified amount, is limited to the expenditure of "Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses" or MOOEs.

The 2014 GAA specifies that the disbursement of the LGSF shall be subject to applicable DBM guidelines, embodied in DBM Local Budget Circular No. 104,^[53] as amended by DBM Local Budget Circular No. 105.^[54] These guidelines, in turn, identify the programs and projects for which the LGSF may be expended in connection with the specific purpose detailed in the 2014 GAA.

As precisely mandated by the 2014 GAA, the projects that may be financed through the LGSF are limited to specific initiatives laid down in the applicable DBM guidelines and are likewise reserved to cover MOOEs incurred in relation to these aforesaid specific initiatives.

In fine, the LGSF, as structured under the 2014 GAA, identifies not only the specific purpose for which the same may be expended, but effectively limits, through applicable DBM guidelines, the projects for which the said fund may be utilized.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the 2014 GAA sufficiently: (1) specifies the standards which set the limits of the Executive's authority to disburse the LGSF; (2) determines the legislative policy behind the fund; and (3) identifies the conditions under which the fund may be utilized. Proceeding therefrom, the Court finds that the LGSF satisfies both the completeness and sufficient standard tests, and is thus, valid and constitutional.

As well, the LGSF complies with the rule on singular correspondence because it has the discernible singular appropriation purpose of providing funds for the support of local governments.

Conclusion

In sum, the Court rules upon the question of the constitutionality of the specifically assailed appropriations in the 2014 GAA as follows:

All specifically assailed appropriations are valid items with discernible singular appropriation purpose in compliance with the rule on singular correspondence - the Unprogrammed Fund, to fund the identified programs; the Contingent Fund, to provide funding to meet contingencies or programs yet inexistent and unforeseen during budget authorization; the E-Government Fund, to fund the E-Government Program that subsumes the strategic ICT projects of various government agencies; and the Local Government Support Fund, to provide financial assistance to LGUs.

The Unprogrammed Fund is constitutional as it specifically identifies the public purposes for which the fund may be used and contains singularly corresponding purposes.

The Contingent Fund is also constitutional. Its purpose is to cover the funding requirements of new or urgent projects that need to be implemented during the year, and the foreign travel expenses of the Office of the President which were not and could not have been anticipated during budget preparation and authorization. Hence, the same cannot be itemized. Further, the Court has already previously held in the 2013 Belgica case that the Contingent Fund is a valid line-item appropriation.

Likewise, the E-Government Fund is constitutional. Its nature as a cross-agency fund requires it to be subject to the determination by the administrative agencies of the ongoing strategic information and communication technology projects in the priority sectors identified by the Legislature in the budget. Notably, these standards are already in place in existing executive issuances predating the assailed E-Government Fund provision, which the Court assumes the Legislature to have been aware of.

Lastly, the LGSF provision of the 2014 GAA is constitutional as it provides sufficient standards which set the limits of the Executive's authority to disburse the LGSF, determines the legislative policy behind the fund, and identifies the conditions under which the fund may be utilized.

While the Court applauds the vigilance with which Petitioner guards public funds, the mere possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of power as there is no power that is not susceptible to abuse.^[55] In cases involving the exercise of political departments of textually committed powers and a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards with which to test the level of specificity and singularity of purpose of appropriations, Petitioner's bid to prohibit the specifically assailed appropriations in the national budget must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., See Separate Opinion.
Peralta, J., I join J. Carpio's opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., See Separate Opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., See separate opinion.
Inting, J., on official business.

---

^[1] Republic Act No. (RA) 10633, entitled "APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTEEN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

^[2] 721 Phil. 416 (2013).

^[3] Id. at 582.

^[4] INSTITUTING THE "ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987", July 25, 1987.

^[5] See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 149 (2016).

^[6] See Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, 686 Phil. 357, 369 (2012).

^[7] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067, 1090 (2017).

^[8] Id. at 1090. Emphasis and underscoring omitted.

^[9] See Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 5, at 146-147.

^[10] Id. at 146.

^[11] Memorandum of Respondents, p. 18, rollo, p. 170.

^[12] On the issue of ripeness, see generally Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, supra note 6, at 370.

^[13] Manalo v. Calderon, 562 Phil. 281, 292-293 (2007).

^[14] Understood in the 2013 Belgica case as appropriated funds subject to post-enactment legislator approval.

^[15] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 2, at 533.

^[16] Id. at 524-525.

^[17] Petition, pp. 14-15, rollo, pp. 16-17.

^[18] Reply, p. 3, id. at 75.

^[19] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 2, at 551-553.

^[20] Id. at 552.

^[21] J. Bernabe's Reflections; citations omitted.

^[22] Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

^[23] Section 63 of the General Provisions states:

SEC. 63. Lump-Sum Appropriations. Release of lump-sum appropriations shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and shall only be made upon compliance with the requirements under the applicable special provisions and submission by the agency concerned to DBM of the complete details of the programs, projects and activities covering the lump-sum appropriations, including the sub-programs/activities or sub-projects with the corresponding cost up to the lowest level, i.e., provincial, city or municipal level, as the case may be. The complete details shall include: (i) the rationale and objectives of the program, project or activity; (ii) the full components with cost estimates of the program, project or activity; (iii) the implementation strategy to be adopted; (iv) the targeted results or expected outputs; (v) the status of implementation for ongoing programs or projects; and (vi) such other information as may be required by the DBM: PROVIDED, That a copy of the abovementioned requirements, including any subsequent revisions/amendments shall likewise be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance.

The agency head and the agency's web administrator of his/her equivalent shall be responsible for ensuring that the said list of projects is posted in the official website of the agency/LGU concerned.

PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in the case of lump-sum appropriations covering major infrastructure programs and projects, such as irrigation projects, farm-to-market roads, airports, seaports, fish ports and other ports, health care facilities, Basic Educational Facilities, and housing projects, release of the said appropriations shall be further subject to the submission by the agency concerned to DBM of the following additional details: (i) amount allocated for each infrastructure project; (ii) location/site with covered area in square kilo meters; (iii) list of targeted beneficiaries/recipients; (iv) program of work; (v) such other information as may be required by the DBM. (2014 GAA, pp. 1095-1096)

^[24] 2014 GAA, pp. 876-877.

^[25] Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 8.

^[26] Petition, p. 17, id. at 19.

^[27] Petition, pp. 16-17, id. at 18-19.

^[28] Comment, p. 14, id. at 58.

^[29] 2014 GAA, p. 853.

^[30] Petition, p. 16, rollo, p. 18.

^[31] Petition, p. 17, id. at 19.

^[32] Initial operational requirements for the implementation of Credit Surety Fund Department under the Cooperative Development Authority (RA 10744, Credit Surety Fund Cooperative Act of 2015 and the Implementing Rules and Regulations [IRR] of RA 10744, Rule 3, Sec. 6, June 20, 2017); for the initial operations of the regional government in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under Article XIX, Section 9 of the ARMM Law (RA 6734, An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, August 1, 1989); for the conduct of the election and plebiscite in the Cordillera Autonomous Region under Art. XXI, Secs. 1 and 13 of RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, October 23, 1989); for the initial operation of the Governance Commission for Government-Owned or -Controlled Corporations under Chapter VI, Section 29 of RA 10149 (GOCC Governance Act of 2011, June 6, 2011); as initial operating fund for the National Anti-Poverty Commission under Rule IV, Art. 21 of the IRR of RA 8425 (Rules and Regulations Implementing the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act of 1998, December 23, 1998) and under Title III, Sec. 18 of RA 8425 (Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act, December 11, 1997); for the initial expenses of the Legal Education Board under Sec. 13 of RA 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, December 23, 1993); for the initial funding requirements of the Joint Enforcement and Monitoring Committee (JEMC) operational expenses of the JEMC and its Secretariat under Sec. 6 of EO 117 (Reconstituting the Joint Enforcement and Monitoring Committee to Implement the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade, Repealing Executive Order No. 335 dated January 4, 2001 and for Other Purposes, August 20, 2002).

^[33] For implementation of the Labor Code, under Book Three, Rule VII, Chapter IV, Sec. 3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (May 27, 1989); for the conduct of information campaign on the Local Government Code, under Sec. 533(e) (RA 7160, Local Government Code of 1991, October 10, 1991); for the implementation of the Climate Change Act under Rule XIX, Sec. 1 of the IRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Climate Change Act of 2009, as Amended by RA 10174, Climate Change Commission Resolution No. 3, November 13, 2015) and under Sec. 21 of RA 9729 (Climate Change Act of 2009, October 23, 2009); Art. XVIII, Sec. 10 for the initial operation requirements of the regional government, and for the conduct of plebiscite, respectively under RA 9054 (Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, March 31, 2001); for the initial implementation of RA 7470 under Sec. 15 (National Economic Research and Business Assistance Center of the Philippines Act of 1992, April29, 1992) and the Operating Guidelines of the National Economic Research and Business Assistance Center (NERBAC) of the Philippines under Rule V, Section 17 (Operating Guidelines in the Implementation of RA 7470, DTI Administrative Order No. 04-09, May 11, 2009); additional funding for the implementation of RA 6939 under Sec. 16 (Cooperative Development Authority Law, March 10, 1990); for the initial implementation of The Initiative and Referendum Act under Sec. 21 (The Initiative and Referendum Act, August 4, 1989); for the implementation of the provisions of RA 6724 under Sec. 11 (Organizing a Joint Legislative-Executive Foreign Debt Council, April 17, 1989).

^[34] Sec. 32 of RA 8436, December 22, 1997.

^[35] Under Sec. 6 of RA 6714 (Merger, Division and/or Revival of Different Barangays in Caloocan City, February 28, 1989); Sec. 6 of RA 7155 (Creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa, Camarines Norte, September 6, 1991); Sec. 5 of RA 6851 (Creation of the Municipality of Kalawit in Zamboanga del Norte, February 10, 1990); Sec. 3 of RA 6842 (Creation of the Municipality of San Jose in Tarlac, January 5, 1990).

^[36] Under Sec. 13 of RA 8747 (An Act Requiring Disclosure of Year 2000 Statements and Readiness of Computer-Based Systems and Products, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, June 1, 1999).

^[37] Sec. 12 of Administrative Order No. 36 (Creating the National Organizing Council for the Philippine Hosting of the 2015 APEC Meetings, November 28, 2012).

^[38] Sec. 25 of RA 8046 (An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Conduct a Nationwide Demonstration of a Computerized Election System and Pilot-Test it in the March 1996 Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for Other Purposes, June 7, 1995).

^[39] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 2, at 552.

^[40] 2014 GAA, pp. 858-859.

^[41] Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 8.

^[42] Petition, p. 18, id. at 20.

^[43] CREATING THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, January 12, 2004.

^[44] ABOLISHING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE COUNCIL AND TRANSFERRING ITS BUDGET, ASSETS, PERSONNEL, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS TO THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, July 20, 2004.

^[45] REORGANIZING, RENAMING AND TRANSFERRING THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ATTACHED AGENCIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DIRECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, June 23, 2011.

^[46] People v. Maceren, 169 Phil. 437, 447 (1977), citing Director of Forestry v. Mu oz, 132 Phil. 637, 653-654 (1968); Geukeko v. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712-713 (1957), and People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, 1129 (1957).

^[47] Id. at 447, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 732 (1940); People v. Rosenthal and Osme a, 68 Phil. 328, 343 (1939).

^[48] 2014 GAA, p. 850.

^[49] President's Veto Message, December 20, 2013, 2014 GAA, p. 1109.

^[50] Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 8.

^[51] ABAKADA GURO Party List (formerly AASJS) v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 272 (2008); citations omitted.

^[52] See id. at 275, citing Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 533 Phil. 590, 609 (2006). See also Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 248 Phil. 762, 774 (1988).

^[53] GUIDELINES ON THE RELEASE AND UTILIZATION OF FUNDS CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FUND FOR FY 2014, March 7, 2014.

^[54] AMENDING LOCAL BUDGE CIRCULAR (LBC) NO. 104 DATED MARCH 7, 2014, ENTITLED, "GUIDELINES ON THE RELEASE AND UTILIZATION OF FUNDS CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FUND FOR FY 2014," October 29, 2014.

^[55] Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 177 (1936).

---

CARPIO, J.:

I vote to dismiss the petition on the ground that the assailed appropriations in the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) are not the lump-sum appropriations for multiple purposes prohibited in the landmark Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr.^[1] (Belgica I), an En Banc decision of this Court.

In Belgica I, decided on 19 November 2013, this Court struck down the entire Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) article in the 2013 GAA and in effect abolished the "pork barrel system" for being unconstitutional. Belgica I held that lump-sum appropriations with multiple purposes are unconstitutional because they deprive the President of his veto power.

In Belgica I, the Court, speaking through Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, defined the "pork barrel system" as follows:

x x x the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund's utilization through various post -enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.^[2] (Emphasis supplied)

Given this definition, the Court ruled that the Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional because it "allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution," violating the principle of separation of powers. The principle of non-delegability of legislative, power was also violated since the system "conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine."^[3] Considering that the items in the budget are not textualized into the appropriations bill, the system denied the President the power to veto items.

Insofar as the President's line item-veto power is concerned, the Court explained in Belgica I that there should be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. In defining "item," the Court cited Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,^[4] where the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.

The Court pointed out that "an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a 'line-item.' This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a 'specific appropriation of money' but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund, and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as 'line-item' appropriations which are rightfully subject to line-item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item."^[5]

In my separate opinion, concurred in by the majority in Belgica I, I stated that a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power. Also, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would be constitutional for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence.

The Court further ruled in Belgica I that what is constitutionally infirm are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be used as a source of funding multiple purposes. These appropriations require the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law. Therefore, with such kind of appropriations in the law, it cannot be said that there is a "specific appropriation of money," and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. This arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would have to determine both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability if the implementing authority is allowed to determine either the actual amount or the specific purposes or both.

In the case of the PDAF, it is constitutionally infirm since it operated as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. The lump-sum amount of P24.79 billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This arrangement left the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, did not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President's Item-veto power.

To repeat, in Belgica I, the Court did not declare that all lump-sum appropriations are unconstitutional. The Court expressly declared unconstitutional lump-sum appropriations which are single but divisible sums of money to fund multiple purposes requiring further determination by the individual legislator or concerned implementing agency of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Such lump sum appropriations violate the principle of separation of powers and non-delegability. Likewise, such lump-sum appropriations are unconstitutional for depriving the President of his constitutional line item-veto power because there is no specific appropriation of money for a specific project in the appropriations law that he could veto. In short, Belgica I already settled the issue of the constitutionality of lump-sum appropriations to be used for multiple purposes.

After Belgica I, Republic Act No. 10633 or the General Appropriations Act for 2014 was enacted on 27 December 2013.

In the present case (Belgica II), petitioner challenges the constitutionality of certain provisions of the 2014 GAA, for being of "the same character as the pork barrel funds" in Belgica I, and thus should be struck down as well. Therefore, to resolve the principal issue raised in Belgica II, which is the constitutionality of the alleged lump-sum appropriations in the 2014 GAA, specifically, the Unprogrammed Fund, the Contingent Fund, the E-Government Fund, and the Local Government Support Fund, it is imperative for the Court to apply its ruling in Belgica I.

The issues in this case are whether the alleged lump-sum appropriations in the 2014 GAA violate the doctrine on non-delegation of legislative power and the principle of separation of powers, and fail to comply with the requirements of a valid appropriation, the line-item veto power of the President, and the Administrative Code.^[6]

The majority in Belgica I expressly declared that "an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a 'line-item.'"^[7]

I reiterate my position in Belgica I that lump-sum appropriations for multiple purposes negate the President's exercise of the line-item veto power, and are thus unconstitutional. On the other hand, lump-sum appropriations with specified and single purpose that allow the President to exercise his line item veto power is constitutional.

In Belgica I, I further explained the definition and character of the constitutionally prohibited lump-sum appropriations, that are single but divisible sums of money which are the sources to fund several purposes in the same appropriation. I reiterate, thus:

Section 27, Article VI of the Constitution provides for the presentment clause and the President's veto power:

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

In Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., the Court explained the President's veto power, thus:

Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

In Gonzales, the Court defined the term "item" as used in appropriation laws as "an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." The amount in an item is "indivisible" because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item. The item must be for a specific purpose so that the President can determine whether the specific purpose is wasteful or not. This is the "item" that can be the subject of the President's line-item veto power. Any other kind of item will circumvent or frustrate the President's line-item veto power in violation of the Constitution.

In contrast, a lump-sum appropriation is a single but divisible sum of money which is the source to fund several purposes in the same appropriation. For example, the 2013 PDAF provision appropriates a single amount - P24.79 billion - to be divided to fund several purposes of appropriation, like scholarships, roads, bridges, school buildings, medicines, livelihood training and equipment, police surveillance and communication equipment, flood control, school fences and stages, and a variety of other purposes.

x x x x

For the President to exercise his constitutional power to veto a particular item of appropriation, the GAA must provide line-item, instead of lump-sum appropriations. This means Congress has the constitutional duty to present to the President a GAA containing items, instead of lump sums, stating in detail the specific purpose for each amount of appropriation, precisely to enable the President to exercise his line-item veto power. Otherwise, the President's line-item veto power is negated by Congress in violation of the Constitution.

The President's line-item veto in appropriation laws is intended to eliminate "wasteful parochial spending," primarily the pork-barrel. Historically, the pork-barrel meant "appropriation yielding rich patronage benefits." In the Philippines, the pork-barrel has degenerated further as shown in the COA Audit Report on the 2007-2009 PDAF. The pork-barrel is mischievously included in lump-sum appropriations that fund much needed projects. The President is faced with the difficult decision of either vetoing the lump-sum appropriation that includes beneficial programs or approving the same appropriation that includes the wasteful pork-barrel. To banish the evil of the pork-barrel, the Constitution vests the President with the line-item veto power, which for its necessary and proper exercise requires the President to propose, and Congress to enact, only line-item appropriations.

The President should not frustrate his own constitutional line- item veto power by proposing to Congress lump-sum expenditures in the NEP. Congress should not also negate the President's constitutional line-item veto power by enacting lump-sum appropriations in the GAA. When the President submits lump-sum appropriations in the NEP, and Congress enacts lump-sum appropriations in the GAA, both in effect connive to violate the Constitution. This wreaks havoc on the check-and-balance system between the Executive and Legislature with respect to appropriations. While Congress has the power to appropriate, that power should always be subject to the President's line-item veto power. If the President exercises his line-item veto power unreasonably, Congress can override such veto by two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives and the Senate voting separately. This constitutional check-and-balance should at all times be maintained to avoid wastage of taxpayers' money.

The President has taken a constitutionally prescribed oath to "preserve and defend" the Constitution. Thus, the President has a constitutional duty to preserve and defend his constitutional line-item veto power by submitting to Congress only a line-item NEP without lump-sum expenditures, and then by demanding that Congress approve only a line- item GAA without lump-sum appropriations. Congress violates the Constitution if it circumvents the President's line-item veto power by enacting lump-sum appropriations in the GAA. To repeat, the President has a constitutional duty to submit to Congress only a line-item NEP without lump-sum expenditures, while Congress has a constitutional duty to enact only a line-item GAA without lump-sum appropriations.^[8] (Emphasis supplied)

The power of the purse belongs exclusively to Congress. The power of Congress to appropriate means that Congress alone determines the specific amount and the specific purpose of the appropriation. The President cannot usurp the legislative power of the purse, and Congress cannot share this exclusive power to appropriate with the President. Corollarily, Congress cannot abdicate this power by allowing the President to cherry pick the purpose or purposes of the appropriation among a myriad of purposes, and to determine the amount to be spent for that purpose. To allow the President, in a lump-sum-appropriation with multiple purposes, to determine what amount to allocate for a particular purpose, and to determine what purposes shall not be allocated any funding, would be an abdication by Congress of its power to appropriate.

To allow Congress to provide a lump-sum appropriation with multiple purposes will mean that the President cannot exercise his line-item veto power, making such lump-sum appropriation unconstitutional. Such lump- sum appropriation cannot be saved from unconstitutionality by allowing the President to determine which purposes are to be funded, and to determine the specific amount to be allocated for the purposes that the President has determined must be funded. This will mean an abdication of the power of Congress to determine the amount and purpose of every appropriation. To sanction this usurpation of legislative power by the President will wreak havoc to the finely crafted check and balance instituted in the Constitution and will violate the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

I strongly disagree with Justice Caguioa's position that "[a]t their core, all appropriations in the general appropriations acts are discretionary appropriations x x x. In this sense, the exercise of discretion in determining whether to spend and the level of spending for discretionary appropriations is in line with the exercise of constitutional powers of the political departments in their respective roles in setting fiscal policy and executing the national budget."^[9]

First, this view suggests that appropriations in the general appropriations acts (GAA), which are laws, can still be diminished, amended, revised or withheld by the President because the exercise of discretion is in line with the President's power to implement the budget. This dangerous theory in effect sanctions Presidential pork barrel, which is precisely the evil struck down in Belgica I. In fact, this dangerous theory makes the entire GAA one big pork barrel of the President.

Presidential pork barrel is defined as that kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. Allowing the President to tinker with the approved budget as contained in the GAA, because he has supposedly the executive discretion to do so, clearly violates the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

The Legislature appropriates, fixes the purpose and amount of appropriation; the Executive executes the budget. Otherwise stated, it is Congress that appropriates, and it is the President that spends what Congress has appropriated. The power to appropriate is the power to determine the amount and purpose of the appropriation. After Congress exercises its power to appropriate, the President's power to spend begins. This Court is constitutionally mandated to maintain this separation of powers.

There is no provision in the Constitution, or in any existing law, declaring as theorized by Justice Caguioa, that "appropriations in the general appropriations law are discretionary appropriations." Neither is there any decision of this Court supporting such theory. No textbook writer on constitutional law has ever espoused such theory. To repeat, the general appropriations law is a law that the President is sworn to uphold and faithfully execute. The President has no discretion to reduce or withhold appropriations in the general appropriations law.

Second, Justice Caguioa confuses the National Expenditure Program (NEP) with the GAA. The NEP is submitted to assist Congress in the review and deliberation of the proposed national budget for the legislation of the annual appropriations measures for the next fiscal year. It contains the details of the government's proposed programs.^[10]

On the other hand, GAAs are laws which must be implemented faithfully by the Executive. The President has sworn to faithfully execute the laws of the land. All appropriations, once approved by Congress, and enacted into law, can no longer be amended, diminished or withheld by the President. In short, all appropriations in the general appropriations acts are not subject to the discretion of the President to reduce or withhold except as allowed by the Constitution under the power of the President to realign savings.^[11]

Third, for fiscally autonomous entities, appropriation is released automatically and regularly pursuant to the express provisions of the Constitution. The Executive exercises no discretion insofar as the appropriations of the Judiciary and other constitutional bodies are concerned. For instance, the appropriation for the Supreme Court cannot be amended, diminished, or withheld by the President, without running afoul with the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy and independence enshrined in the Constitution. The appropriations for the Judiciary cannot be subject to the discretion of the President. The budget of the Judiciary has always been released automatically and regularly.

To amend, diminish, or withhold the release of the appropriations for the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions will certainly result to a grave violation of the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions as enshrined in the Constitution.

Section 3, Article VIII and Section 5, Article IX of the Constitution provide:

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

These Constitutional provisions on fiscal autonomy ensure and safeguard the independence of the Judiciary and other constitutional bodies. The framers of the Constitution emphasized the importance of fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, thus:

MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.

When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and former Chief Justice Felix Makasiar discussed this matter with the Committee on the Judiciary, both of them strongly recommended that in order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary, the annual budget allocated for it should be determined and fixed and should be automatically released regularly without the necessity of the chief magistracy of the land lobbying in the executive and in the legislative departments, which is not only demeaning to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but violative of the principle of independence of the three departments. (Boldfacing and italicization supplied)

In Bengzon v. Drilon,^[12] the Court defined the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in this wise:

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy as an important aspect of its independence. Fiscal autonomy means, among others, that the budget of the Judiciary must be released "automatically" after the General Appropriations Act becomes law. The President cannot reduce, withhold, delay, or in any manner tinker with, in the guise of budget execution, the appropriations for the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions. The President cannot amend, change, supplant, deduct, diminish or add to the budget of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions as approved in the General Appropriations Act. The President cannot decide, as part of "budget execution," what purposes to fund, and by how much, after the General Appropriations Act becomes a law. To rule otherwise will compel the Chief Justice to lobby with the President to allocate specific amounts for specific purposes - the very evil that the fiscal autonomy provisions of the Judiciary, and of the Constitutional Commissions, were designed to prevent to preserve the very independence of the Judiciary and of the Constitutional Commissions. This very evil that the fiscal autonomy provisions were designed to outlaw was clearly explained in the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution.

To repeat, there are no discretionary appropriations, or appropriations subject to the discretion of the President in the appropriations for the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions. To rule otherwise is a clear and present danger to the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary and of the Constitutional Commissions. It directly contravenes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary and of the Constitutional Commissions as expressly mandated in Section 3, Article VIII and Section 5, Article IX of the Constitution. The simultaneous effect of this violation is an impairment of independence of the Judiciary and of the Constitutional Commissions. This impairment of judicial independence will destroy the check and balance between the Judiciary and the Executive. This Court must nip in the bud any attempt to subvert its fiscal autonomy and judicial independence, as well as the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Constitutional Commissions.

Moreover, the automatic release of appropriations to constitutional bodies is one of the reasons why the Government now and then float bonds, that is borrow from the market, to fund current government expenditures while taxes are still being collected. The Government policy is not to suspend vital government operations until taxes or other revenues have been collected but to fund such vital operations through short-term borrowings. No Government can afford a break in its vital operations.

Fourth, the Internal Revenue Allotment of local government units must also be released automatically. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them." This is also one of the reasons why the Government now and then float bonds. Again, if the President has the discretion to amend, change, supplant, deduct, diminish or withhold the tax share due the local government units, as part of budget execution, then such exercise of discretion violates this specific constitutional provision.

Unprogrammed Fund,
Contingent Fund, E-Government Fund,
and Local Government Support Fund

Petitioner argues that the appropriation for the Unprogrammed Fund is unconstitutional because it merely provides for a lump-sum figure without any enumerated purposes for which this fund should be used. Petitioner contends that the Unprogrammed Fund lacks the requirements of a valid item of appropriation and has no stated discernible purpose. In contrast to the 2013 GAA Unprogrammed Fund, the 2014 GAA Unprogrammed Fund allegedly has no purpose.

It is apparent that petitioner's claim that the Unprogrammed Fund has no discernible purpose is starkly contrary to the actual provisions of the Unprogrammed Fund as found in Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA.

Annex "A"^[13] of the 2014 GAA on the Unprogrammed Fund clearly debunks petitioner's claims, thus:

LVI. UNPROGRAMMED APPROPRIATIONS
For fund requirements in accordance with the purposes indicated hereunder .... P139,903,759,000
New Appropriations, by Purpose
	Current Operating Expenditures
	Personnel Services	Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses	Capital Outlays
	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------
PURPOSE(S)
1. Budgetary Support to Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations	P	P3,000,000,000	P36,268,000000
2. Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects	800,000	3,091,244,000	3,032,447,000
3. General Fund Adjustments	175,000,000	511,500,000	313,500,000
4. Support for Infrastructure Projects and Social Programs			20,000,000,000
5. AFP Modernization Program			5,000,000,000
6. Debt Management Program			1,000,000,000
7. Risk Management Program			20,000,000,000
8. Disaster Relief and Mitigation Fund		3,000,000,000
9. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program		6,500,000,000	73,500,000,000
10. Total Administrative Disability Pension	243,000,000
11. People's Survival Fund		500,000,000
		-----------------------	-----------------------
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS	P418,800,000,000	P16,602,744,000	P122,882,215,000
New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures
(In Thousand Pesos)
Current Operating Expenditures
Personnel Services
Civilian Personnel
Other Compensation for Specific Groups
Lump-sum for Compensation Adjustments	75,000
Lump-sum for Personnel Services	100,800
Total Other Compensation for Specific Groups	175,800
Other Personnel Benefits	243,000
Pension, Veterans
Total Other Personnel Benefits	243,000
	==============
TOTAL PERSONNEL BENEFITS	418,800
	==============
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
	16,091,244
Financial Assistance/Subsidy
Other Maintenance and Operating Expenses	511,500
Other Maintenance and Operating Expenses
TOTAL MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	16,602,744
	==============
TOTAL CURRENT OPERATING EXPENDITURES	17,021,544
	==============
	17,021,544
Capital Outlays
Investment Outlay		20,000,000
Loans Receivable Accounts Outlay		36,268
Loans Receivable Accounts Outlay		21,000,000
Property Plant and Equipment Outlay
Infrastructure Outlay		35,500,000
Buildings and Other Structures		38,313,500
Machinery and Equipment Outlay		8,032,447
TOTAL CAPITAL OUTLAYS		122,882,215
GRAND TOTAL		139,903,759
		==============
GENERAL SUMMARY
UNPROGRAMMED FUND
	Current Operating   Expenditures
	Personnel Services	Maintenance and Other   Operating Expenses	Capital Outlays
	-----------------------	-----------------------	-----------------------
A. UNPROGRAMMED FUND	P418,800,000	P16,602,744,000	P122,882,25,000
TOTAL NEW APPROPRIATIONS, UNPROGRAMMED FUND	P418,800,000 ==========	P16,602,744,000 =============	P122,882,25,000 =============

Clearly, the Unprogrammed Fund in Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA is not a singular lump-sum amount to fund multiple purposes, but consists of specific projects or purposes corresponding to specific amounts, contrary to petitioner's claims. Each item of appropriation in the Unprogrammed Fund is characterized by singular correspondence of a specific amount, which means that there is an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular public purpose.

In other words, the Unprogrammed Fund in Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA complies with the requirements of a valid appropriation, as defined in the Belgica I, and thus, constitutional. It is not a lump-sum appropriation for multiple unspecified purposes without corresponding specific amounts, as erroneously characterized by petitioner. It is also not a lump-sum appropriation with specific purposes but without specific corresponding amounts.

The total amount of P139,903,759,000 Unprogrammed Fund was divided into (1) Personnel Services; (2) Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses; and (3) Capital Outlays as components of Current Operating Expenditures, which refers to the amount budgeted for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal government operations within a budget year.^[14] As I have stated in my Concurring Opinion in Belgica I,^[15] appropriations for personal services need not be itemized further, as long as the specific purpose, which is personal services, has a specific corresponding amount. Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 explains how appropriations for personal services shall be itemized further, thus:

SECTION 35. Special Budgets for Lump-Sum Appropriations. - Expenditures from lump-sum appropriations authorized for any purpose or for any department, office or agency in any annual General Appropriations Act or other Act and from any fund of the National Government, shall be made in accordance with a special budget to be approved by the President, which shall include but shall not be limited to the number of each kind of position, the designations, and the annual salary proposed for which an appropriation is intended. This provision shall be applicable to all revolving funds, receipts which are automatically made available for expenditure for certain specific purposes, aids and donations for carrying out certain activities or deposits made to cover to cost of special services to be rendered to private parties. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, when any Board, head of department, chief of bureau or office, or any other official, is authorized appropriate, allot, distribute or spend any lump-sum appropriation or special, bond, trust, and other funds, such authority shall be subject to the provisions of this section.

In case of any lump-sum appropriation for salaries and wages of temporary and emergency laborers and employees, including contractual personnel, provided in any General Appropriation Act or other Acts, the expenditure of such appropriation shall be limited to the employment of persons paid by the month, by the day, or by the hour.

Thus, appropriations for personal services need not be further itemized or broken down in the GAA as the purpose for such appropriation is sufficiently specific satisfying the constitutional requirement for a valid appropriation. The constitutional test for validity is not how itemized the appropriation is down to the project level but whether the purpose of the appropriation is specific enough to allow the President to exercise his line -item veto power. Section 23, Chapter 4, Book VI of the Administrative Code provides a stricter requirement by mandating that there must be a corresponding appropriation for each program and for each project. A project is a component of a program which may have several projects. A program is equivalent to the specific purpose of an appropriation. An item of appropriation for school-building is a program, while the specific schools to be built, being the identifiable outputs of the program, are the projects. The Constitution only requires a corresponding appropriation for a specific purpose or program, not for the sub-set of projects or activities.

Insofar as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses is concerned, the majority stated in Belgica I, citing my opinion, that "a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power."^[16] Therefore, the appropriations for MOOE need not be itemized further as the purpose for such appropriation is sufficiently specific satisfying the constitutional requirement for a valid appropriation.

Appropriations for Personal Services and Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses are appropriations that have a specific and single purpose but with multiple sub-items. These appropriations are constitutional provided that the specific Programs, Activities, and Projects under these expenses have been submitted to Congress by the Department of Budget and Management. The sub-items may be added after the passage of the GAA with prior approval of the DBM.

Capital Outlays, on the other hand, which refer to "appropriations spent for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of government, and may be broadly classified as follows: infrastructure outlays, equity contributions to government corporations, capital transfers to local government units, and other capital outlays."^[17] First, for budgeting and accounting purposes, these various capital assets cannot be considered as having one purpose. Second, the term Capital Outlays is very broad as it covers "other capital outlays," which may include a road, bridge, dam, airport, seaport, railroad, data center, school building, museum, patrol ship, and any asset with a useful life exceeding one year. These projects necessarily require a substantial amount of appropriation in the national budget, and therefore the specific projects or purposes and their corresponding amounts of appropriation must be identified in the GAA.

To repeat, as shown in Annex "A" of the 2014 GAA, the Unprogrammed Fund identified the programs and projects therefor and the corresponding specific amount allotted for each project. The purpose of the appropriation is specific enough to allow the President to exercise the line-item veto power. Accordingly, the Unprogrammed Fund in the 2014 GAA is not a lump-sum appropriation for multiple purposes, as defined in Belgica I, and therefore is constitutional as it complies with the requirements of a valid appropriation.

As to the Contingent Fund, E-Government Fund and Local Government Support Fund in the 2014 GAA, I do not find any constitutional infirmity in them. The Contingent Fund can cover any kind of calamity, natural or man- made. The Local Government Support fund can cover any expenditure under MOOE. The Local Government Support Fund, like the Contingent Fund, covers any contingency and can help local government units that ran out of funds for their projects. The E-Government Fund can fund any expenditure that will bring government service to the electronic and digital age. The E-Government Fund has actually a single purpose, that is, all activities related to information and communications technology and the digitizing of government agencies. In all these, specific amounts of appropriation will be spent for specific purposes. These appropriations, which are by nature cannot be itemized but still have a single purpose, are constitutional.

To reiterate the rules on lump-sum appropriations, as established in the landmark case of Belgica I:

1. A lump-sum appropriation that allows the President to exercise his line item veto power is constitutional.
   
   
2. A lump-sum appropriation that prevents the President from exercising his line item veto power is unconstitutional.
   
   
3. A lump-sum appropriation that, by its nature cannot be itemized but still has a single purpose, e.g. Calamity Fund and Contingent Fund, is constitutional.
   
   
4. A lump-sum appropriation that has a single purpose but multiple sub-items is constitutional, e.g. Personal Services and Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses. This is constitutional provided that the specific Programs, Activities, and Projects have been submitted to Congress by the Department of Budget and Management. The sub-items may be added after the passage of the GAA with prior approval of the DBM.
   

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petition. I vote to declare the Unprogrammed Fund, Contingent Fund, E-Government Fund, and the Local Government Support Fund in the 2014 General Appropriations Act constitutional since they all comply with the requirements of a valid appropriation, and they are not the singular lump-sum appropriations for multiple purposes constitutionally prohibited in Belgica I.

---

^[1] 721 Phil. 416 (2013).

^[2] Id. at 533.

^[3] Id. at 580-581.

^[4] 299 U.S. 410 (1937).

^[5] Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 1, at 551-552.

^[6] Per Curiam, p. 3.

^[7] Supra note 1, at 551.

^[8] Supra note 1, at 637-640.

^[9] Justice Caguioa's Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 28-29.

^[10] https://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php/dbm-publications/national-expenditure-program (visited 1 October 2019).

^[11] Section 25(5), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

^[12] 284 Phil. 245, 268-269 (1992).

^[13] Annex "A", Volume I, pp. 755-757.

Section 95 of the General Provisions of the 2014 GAA provides:

Sec. 95. Effectivity. The provisions detailed in this Act, including the Details of the FY 2014 Budget appended as Annex A (Volumes 1 and 2) hereof shall take effect on January one, two thousand and fourteen, unless otherwise provided herein.

^[14] https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/BESF/BESF2015/GLOSSARY.pdf (visited 1 October 2019).

^[15] Supra note 1, at 642.

^[16] Supra note 1, at 552.

^[17] https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/PGB-B4.pdf (visited 1 October 2019).

---

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I concur. Based on the reasons herein discussed, the present petition assailing the constitutionality of the 2014 General Appropriations Act (GAA) provisions on the Unprogrammed Fund, the Contingent Fund, the E -Government Fund, and the Local Government Support Fund^[1] should be dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica (petitioner) mainly asserts that all lump-sum discretionary funds - including the foregoing appropriations as provided for under the 2014 GAA - are unconstitutional on the basis of certain pronouncements made in the Court's Decision dated November 19, 2013 in Belgica v. Ochoa^[2] (2013 Belgica).

Petitioner's reliance on the 2013 Belgica Decision is misplaced.

To recount, in the 2013 Belgica case, the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, together with all the legal provisions that "authorize/d legislators - whether individually or collectively organized into committees - to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post -enactment stages of the budget execution," as well as those that "confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine,"^[3] were declared unconstitutional. For its proper context, the pertinent arguments of the parties therein were as follows:

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator's identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting [which] effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.^[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it turned out, the Court agreed with the position of therein petitioners, essentially holding that the P24.79 Billion appropriation in the 2013 PDAF Article was nothing more than a "collective allocation limit" which amount would be later "divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by the legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill, and thus, effectuated without veto consideration."^[5] Accordingly, the 2013 PDAF Article was characterized by the Court as a "lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system x x x which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President's power of item veto x x x[,]"^[6] such that he would be forced "to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda[;] and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects."^[7]

Notably, the Court further held that "even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation x x x above-characterized."^[8] As may be gleaned from the preliminary discussions in the Court's ruling portion, the phrase "prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation x x x above-characterized" pertains to those lump-sum appropriations which negate the President's proper exercise of his item veto power. In this regard, the Court discussed that "an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning, an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a 'line-item.' This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a 'specific appropriation of money' but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same."^[9] In the same light, the Court added that "what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a 'specific appropriation of money' and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto."^[10]

Applying these precepts on a matter directly at issue in the 2013 Belgica case (and hence, not mere obiter dictum), the Court thus ruled that "the lump- sum amount of P24.79 Billion" - again, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature - would remain unconstitutional because it "would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President's power of item veto."^[11]

To note, the above-stated holding is in contrast to the Court's observation, also in the 2013 Belgica case, regarding "the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund[,] and the Intelligence Fund."^[12] These were classified as "appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose"^[13] ; hence, "considered as 'line-item' appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto."^[14] Likewise, the Court pointed out that "an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item."^[15] Moreover, it was further discussed that "a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power."^[16]

Again, it should be reiterated that the Court's disquisition regarding "line-item" and "lump-sum" appropriations all hearken to compliance with the constitutional postulates on separation of powers and Presidential item veto. Relatedly, the rule on singular correspondence, as discussed in the 2013 Belgica, was therefore meant to subserve these principles. That being said, not all "lump-sum" amounts would defy this rule should observance of these principles be preserved. It is hence, my opinion that a lump-sum amount may still be considered as a valid item subject to the President's item veto power for as long as the lump-sum amount is meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects, or activities that may be all clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose. In this sense, the "lump-sum" effectively functions as a "line-item" that is compliant with the doctrine of singular correspondence as amply discussed in the 2013 Belgica Decision.

To elaborate, Section 23, Chapter 4, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987,^[17] requiring the contents of an appropriation law, provides that:

Section 23. Content of the General Appropriations Act. - The General Appropriations Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project, including statutory provisions of specific agency or general applicability. The General Appropriations Act shall not contain any itemization of personal services, which shall be prepared by the Secretary after enactment of the General Appropriations Act, for consideration and approval of the President. (Underscoring supplied)

Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,^[18] "programs" are "functions and activities necessary for the performance of a major purpose for which a government entity is established,"^[19] while "projects" pertain to "component of a program covering a homogenous group of activities that result in the accomplishment of an identifiable output."^[20]

By recognizing the more specific categories of "programs," "projects," and even "activities," our budgeting laws do not prohibit general items of appropriation, which may be classified as lump-sums if they are meant to fund these more specific entries in the appropriation law. On this score, it must be pointed out that the level of generality or specificity of an item falls within the Congress's discretion. After all, as held in Bengzon v. The Secretary of Justice,^[21] the Court had only defined an "item" as "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill[,]" and that "[n]o set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item."^[22]

However, as in all exercises of discretion, the limit of one's authority must always square with the framework of the Constitution. The fact that a matter is within a political department's prerogative - such as determining the generality or specificity of an item - does not, as it should not, preclude the Court from canalizing these powers within the contours of proper constitutional order. Thus, as a limitation on "lump-sum" appropriations, I submit that every lump-sum amount, for the same to be permissible, must be singularly correspondent - and hence, effectively functions as a proper "line- item" - so that it may, in the spirit of the 2013 Belgica ruling, be susceptible to the proper exercise of the President's line-item veto power, and in so doing, preserves the in-built cohesion between checks and balances and separation of powers.

At the risk of belaboring the point, a valid item is one characterized by singular correspondence - meaning, an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose. A lump-sum, albeit meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects or activities, may effectively function as a proper "line-item" for as long as these multiple programs, projects or activities are clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose. This singular purpose may be as general or specific as the legislative department deems it to be, provided that such generality or specificity does not negate the President's proper exercise of his item veto power. This danger was what was clearly contemplated and showcased by the 2013 PDAF Article because the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion was treated as a funding source for multiple unrelated purposes such as, as noted in the case, "scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc."^[23] Worse, these multiple unrelated purposes were all made to fall under the vague and amorphous term "Priority Development Assistance Fund," which ultimately allowed those who were disbursed with the funds (i.e., individual legislators) to decide whatever public purpose they deemed as a "priority." As such, this created a budgeting setup wherein there is no more discernible item left for the exercise of the President's veto power and hence, constitutionally infirm.

On the other hand, an example of a valid lump-sum, because of the overall singularity of its purpose, would actually be the 2014 E-government Fund assailed in the present petition. The said fund is, by nature, "created as a source of funding for strategic ICT^[24] projects of government that are mission-critical, high-impact, and cross-agency in nature."^[25] To note, Section 68 of Republic Act No. 9206 or the "General Appropriations Act of 2003," which first created the E-Government Fund, provides:

Section 68. Establishment of E-Government Fund. - The Secretary of Budget and Management is authorized to establish the E-Government Fund to finance major information and communication technology projects of the government as may be determined by the Information Technology and E-Commerce Council. Said fund may be sourced from appropriations authorized in this Act, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing, it can be gathered that the projects for which the E-government Fund may be utilized will be determined by the Information and Technology and E-Commerce Council (ITECC), which has since been abolished^[26] and replaced by the Commission on Information and Communications Technology^[27] (CICT) under the Office of the President, and thereafter, reorganized and renamed as the Information and Communications Technology Office^[28] (ICTO) and transferred to the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). The annual allocation of the E-government Fund was increased from P1,000,000,000.00 to P2,478,900,000.00 in the 2014 GAA "for strategic [(ICT)] projects in public financial management, basic and higher education, health, justice, peace and order, transport, land use, open government/open data, climate change and citizen frontline delivery services. These projects are bound to strictly comply with all the criteria and guidelines jointly prescribed by the ICTO-DOST, DBM and NEDA."^[29] Hence, the E Government Fund serves as a lump-sum amount for a discernibly singular purpose - that is, for funding of strategic ICT projects that may be thereafter determined as necessary, not by any individual or person, but by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the ICTO-DOST, subject to the criteria and guidelines for validity. As such, the E-Government Fund is constitutional.

Similarly constitutional are the 2014 Unprogrammed Fund, Contingent Fund, and Local Government Support Fund.

As for the Unprogrammed Fund, the same was divided into several purposes, i.e., (1) Budgetary Support to Government-Owned and/or- Controlled Corporations; (2) Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects; (3) General Fund Adjustments; (4) Support for Infrastructure Projects and Social Programs; (5) AFP Modernization Program; (6) Debt Management Program; (7) Risk Management Program; (8) Disaster Relief and Mitigation Fund; (9) Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Program; (10) Total Administrative Disability Pension; and (11) People's Survival Fund, which all had specific items of appropriation. It is therefore not considered as a prohibited lump -sum fund because these purposes have specific amounts allocated to each. The specificity of the purposes and the amounts allocated for every item allows the President to exercise the line-item veto power. As such, the Unprogrammed Fund complies with the requirements for a valid appropriation and is therefore constitutional.^[30]

Finally, the constitutionality of the Contingent Fund, same as its 2013 version, had already been upheld by the Court in the 2013 Belgica case as a valid item of appropriation,^[31] and hence, needs no more elaboration. The same goes for the Local Government Support Fund because the entire amount of P405,000,000.00^[32] has been specifically allotted as an expenditure under the MOOE, "in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power,"^[33] as held in the 2013 Belgica Decision.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

---

^[1] See Item XLVI (Unprogrammed Fund), Item XXXVII (Contingent Fund), Item XXXIX (E-Government Fund, and Item XXXVI (D) (Local Government Support Fund) of Republic Act No. (RA) 10633, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTEEN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December 20, 2013.

^[2] 721 Phil. 416 (2013).

^[3] Id. at 582. The dispositive portion thereof partly reads (see id. at 582-584):

"WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators - whether individually or collectively organized into committees - to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

x x x x

SO ORDERED. (Emphases in the original)

^[4] Id. at 553.

^[5] Id. at 554.

^[6] Id.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id.; emphases and underscoring supplied.

^[9] Id. at 551-552; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[10] Id. at 552-553; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[11] Id. at 554.

^[12] Id. at 552; emphasis supplied.

^[13] Id.

^[14] Id.; emphasis supplied.

^[15] Id.; emphasis supplied.

^[16] Id.; emphasis supplied.

^[17] Executive Order No. 292, entitled "INSTITUTING THE 'ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987,'" approved on July 25, 1987.

^[18] Entitled "REVISING THE BUDGET PROCESS IN ORDER TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE BUDGETARY INNOVATIONS OF THE NEW SOCIETY," otherwise known as the "BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977" (July 30, 1977).

^[19] Presidential Decree No. 1177, Section 2 (l).

^[20] Presidential Decree No. 1177, Section 2 (m).

^[21] 62 Phil. 912 (1936).

^[22] Id. at 916.

^[23] 2013 Belgica, supra note 3, at 554.

^[24] "Information and Communications Technology."

^[25] See Section 68 of Republic Act No. 9206, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY -ONE, TWO THOUSAND THREE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2003" (January 1, 2003). See also Department of Information and Communications Technology website, <https://dict.gov.ph/e-government/> (last visited October 7, 2019).

^[26] Per Executive Order No. 334, entitled "ABOLISHING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE COUNCIL AND TRANSFERRING ITS BUDGET, ASSETS, PERSONNEL, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS TO THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY" (July 20, 2004).

^[27] The CICT was created under Executive Order No. 269, entitled "CREATING THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY" (January 12, 2004).

^[28] Per Executive Order No. 47, entitled "REORGANIZING, RENAMING AND TRANSFERRING THE COMMISSION ON INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND ITS ATTACHED AGENCIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DIRECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 23, 2011.

^[29] <https://dict.gov.ph/e-government/> (last visited October 7, 2019). DBM refers to the "Department of Budget and Management," while NEDA refers to the "National Economic and Development Authority."

^[30] See Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio), pp. 10-12.

^[31] See 2013 Belgica, supra note 3, at 551-552. See also Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio in the 2013 Belgica, id. at 645.

^[32] RA 10633, Item XXXVI (D) <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/GAA/GAA2014/ALGU/D.pdf> (last visited October 7, 2019).

^[33] Supra note 3, at 552.

---

LEONEN, J.:

Article VI, Section 29(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Thus, if an item in a budget has no discernable purpose defined in the law, it is paid out to a public official and not pursuant to an appropriation. Such item, lacking a purpose, becomes invalid and subject to presidential veto.^[1]

On the other hand, there are instances where lump sum appropriations, bounded by general purposes, are justified by constitutional or statutory fiscal autonomy. As I stated in my concurring opinion in Belgica v. Ochoa:^[2]

In some instances, the purpose of the funding may be general because it is a requirement of either constitutional or statutory autonomy. Thus, the ideal would be that this Court would have just one item with a bulk amount with the expenditures to be determined by this Court's En Banc. State universities and colleges may have just one lump sum for their institutions because the purposes for which they have been established are already provided in their charter.

While I agree generally with the view of the ponencia that "an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by a singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose," our opinions on the generality of the stated purpose should be limited only to the Priority Development Assistance Fund as it is now in the 2013 General Appropriations Act. The agreement seems to be that the item has no discernible purpose.

There may be no need, for now, to go as detailed as to discuss the fine line between "line" and "lump sum" budgeting. A reading of the ponencia and the Concurring Opinions raises valid considerations about line and lump sum items. However, it is a discussion which should be clarified further in a more appropriate case.

Our doctrine on unlawful delegation of legislative power does not fully square in cases of appropriations. Budgets are integral parts of plans of action. There are various ways by which a plan can be generated and fully understood by those who are to implement it. There are also many requirements for those who implement such plans to adjust to given realities which are not available through foresight.

The Constitution should not be read as a shackle that bounds creativity too restrictively. Rather, it should be seen as a framework within which a lot of leeway is given to those who have to deal with the fundamental vagaries of budget implementation. What it requires is an appropriation for a discernable purpose.^[3] (Citations omitted)

Members of the constitutional fiscal autonomy group may require generality in their appropriations, in accordance with their respective levels of fiscal autonomy:

The budget process in the ponencia is descriptive, not normative. That is, it reflects what is happening. It should not be taken as our agreement that the present process is fully compliant with the Constitution.

For instance, I am of the firm view that the treatment of departments and offices granted fiscal autonomy should be different. Levels of fiscal autonomy among various constitutional organs can be different.

For example, the constitutional protection granted to the judiciary is such that its budget cannot be diminished below the amount appropriated during the previous year. Yet, we submit our items for expenditure to the executive through the DBM year in and year out. This should be only for advice and accountability; not for approval.

In the proper case, we should declare that this constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy means that the budget for the judiciary should be a lump sum corresponding to the amount appropriated during the previous year. This may mean that as a proportion of the national budget and in its absolute amount, the judiciary's budget cannot be reduced. Any additional appropriation for the judiciary should cover only new items for amounts greater than what have already been constitutionally appropriated. Public accountability on our expenditures will be achieved through a resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc detailing the items for expenditure corresponding to that amount.

The ponencia may inadvertently marginalize this possible view of how the Constitution requires the judiciary's budget to be prepared. It will also make it difficult for us to further define fiscal autonomy as constitutionally or legally mandated for the other constitutional offices.

With respect to the discretions in relation to budget execution: The legislature has the power to authorize a maximum amount to spend per item, and the executive has the power to spend for the item up to the amount limited in the appropriations act. The metaphor that Congress has "the power of the purse" does not fully capture this distinction. It only captures part of the dynamic between the executive and the legislature.

Any expenditure beyond the maximum amount provided for the item in the appropriations act is an augmentation of that item. It amounts to a transfer of appropriation. This is generally prohibited except for instances when "upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, [the appropriation for a program, activity or project existing in the General Appropriations Act] is determined to be deficient." In which case, all the conditions provided in Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution must first be met.

The limits defined in this case only pertain to the power of the President - and by implication, other constitutional offices - to augment items of appropriation. There is also the power of the President to realign allocations of funds to another item - without augmenting that item - whenever revenues are insufficient in order to meet the priorities of government.^[4] (Citations omitted)

In my view, the fiscal autonomy of those bodies granted by the Constitution or a statute may be strengthened through the use of lump sum appropriations. As budgets must remain responsive to the realities of implementing plans and programs, they must not be overly restrictive as to shackle the creativity of those who deal with the vagaries of budget implementation.

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit.

---

^[1] Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416 (2013) [J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[2] Id.

^[3] Id. at 700-701.

^[4] Concurring Opinion of J. Leonen, Araullo v. Aquino, 737 Phil. 457, 755-757 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

---

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur.

The Court has decided to limit the disposition with respect to the specifically assailed appropriations, namely, the Unprogrammed Fund, the Contingent Fund, the E-Government Fund (E-Gov Fund), and the Local Government Support Fund (LGSF) (collectively, the specifically assailed lump-sum appropriations). I agree that these lump-sum funds are constitutional.

I nonetheless register my opinion on the arguments presented in the case which had not been touched upon by the majority decision.

To recall, on November 19, 2013, the Court issued its Decision in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr.^[1] (2013 Belgica case), declaring certain provisions of the 2013 GAA unconstitutional. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 [Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)] Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and [Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)] Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators-whether individually or collectively organized into committees - to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court's temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.^[2] (Additional emphasis supplied)

Petitioner anchors the present challenge on a reading of the 2013 Belgica Decision as invalidating lump-sum appropriations that he characterizes as "Presidential pork barrel." In particular, Petitioner asserts that the lump-sum discretionary funds in the 2014 GAA were passed in violation of the Constitution, since these funds are of the same character as the pork barrel funds which were declared unconstitutional in the 2013 Belgica case, and should thus be prohibited.

This is based on the following quoted portion of the Court's Decision in the said case which, according to Petitioner, amounts to a wholesale declaration of unconstitutionality of all lump-sum discretionary funds:

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25 (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 25 (6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money" and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non- delegability.^[3] (Additional emphasis supplied)

Prohibited lump-sums in the 2013 Belgica case - appropriations that violate separation of powers

The Court's decision in the 2013 Belgica case clearly signals that there are prohibited lump-sums and allowable lump-sum appropriations. The Court therein drew the parameters which distinguish those prohibited from those allowed.

In the said case, the standards prescribed by the phrases "other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President," and "priority infrastructure development projects" for the use of the President's Social Fund and the Malampaya Fund, respectively, were struck down because they were found insufficient for purposes of checking and limiting the President's discretion in the use of said funds. Implicit in the holding is its converse - i.e., had the standards been sufficient to curb the President's discretion, the President's Social Fund and Malampaya Fund, despite being appropriated for multiple public purposes, would have been considered as valid items of appropriation.

The Court also affirmed the validity of certain appropriations notwithstanding the generality or multiplicity of their specified purposes. These lump-sum appropriations, which contemplated multiple purposes within them, were deemed valid items of appropriation.

Identifying the Calamity Fund, the Contingent Fund, and the Intelligence Fund as valid appropriations, the Court explained that:

x x x Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. x x x^[4] (Additional emphasis supplied)

This implied dichotomy between allowable and prohibited lump-sums in the Decision is further reinforced by no less than three Justices in their separate opinions in the 2013 Belgica case. These separate opinions sought to make clear that the level of specificity of an appropriation as a test for its constitutionality and the ruling on the constitutionality of lump-sum appropriations per se did not form part of the disposition in the said case.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion stated the following:

Lest this conclusion be misunderstood, I do not per se take the position that all lump sum appropriations should be disallowed as this would be an extreme position that disregards the realities of national life. But the use of lump sums, to be allowed, should be within reason acceptable under the processes of the Constitution, respectful of the constitutional safeguards that are now in place, and understandable to the people based on their secular understanding of what is happening in government.^[5] (Emphasis supplied)

As for Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, she opined:

As it stands now, the conceptual formulations on lump-sums, while not pronouncing doctrine could be premature and confusing. This is evidenced by the fact that different opinions had different definitions of lump-sum appropriations. Justice Carpio cites Sections 35 and 23 of the Administrative Code to say that the law does not authorize lump-sum appropriations in the GAA. But Section 35 itself talks of how to deal with lump-sum appropriations. Justice Brion made no attempt to define the term. Justice Leonen recognized the fact that such discussion needs to be initiated by a proper case.

Even the ponencia itself stated that Article XIV of the 2013 GAA is unconstitutional for being, among others, a "prohibited form of lump-sum," which implies that there are allowable forms of lump-sum. This begs the question: what are allowable forms of lump-sum? In the first place, what are lump-sums? Administrative practice and congressional categories have always been liberal about the definition of lump-sums. Has this Court not neglected to accomplish its preliminary task, by first and foremost agreeing on the definition of a lump-sum?

Both Justice Brion and Justice Leonen warned against the possibility of the Court exceeding the bounds set by the actual case and controversy before us. That a total condemnation of lump-sum funding is an "extreme position that disregards the realities of national life," as Justice Brion stated, and that it is by no means doctrinal and "should be clarified further in a more appropriate case," as discussed by Justice Leonen, are correct. In the same spirit, I separately clarify the import of our decision, so that no unnecessary inferences are made.

As worded in the dispositive portion, the following are unconstitutional: first, the entire 2013 PDAF Article; second, all legal provisions, of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions; and third, all informal practices of similar import and effect. The extent of their unconstitutionality has been defined as follows: (1) these authorize/d legislators - whether individually or collectively organized into committees - to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (2) these confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine.

Given the circumscribed parameters of our decision, it is clear that this Court made no doctrinal pronouncement that all lump-sum appropriations per se are unconstitutional.^[6] (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen elucidated:

In some instances, the purpose of the funding may be general because it is a requirement of either constitutional or statutory autonomy. Thus, the ideal would be that this Court would have just one item with a bulk amount with the expenditures to be determined by this Court's En Banc. State universities and colleges may have just one lump sum for their institutions because the purposes for which they have been established are already provided in their charter.

While I agree generally with the view of the ponencia that "an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by a singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose," our opinions on the generality of the stated purpose should be limited only to the [PDAF] as it is now in the [2013 GAA]. The agreement seems to be that the item has no discernible purpose.

There may be no need, for now, to go as detailed as to discuss the fine line between "line" and "lump sum" budgeting. A reading of the ponencia and the Concurring Opinions raises valid considerations about line and lump sum items. However, it is a discussion which should be clarified further in a more appropriate case.

Our doctrine on unlawful delegation of legislative power does not fully square in cases of appropriations. Budgets are integral parts of plans of action. There are various Ways by which a plan can be generated and fully understood by those who I are to implement it. There are also many requirements for those who implement such plans to adjust to given realities which are not available through foresight.

The Constitution should not be read as a shackle that bounds creativity too restrictively. Rather, it should be seen as a framework within which a lot of leeway is given to those who have to deal with the fundamental vagaries of budget implementation. What it requires is an appropriation for a discernable purpose. x x x^[7] (Emphasis supplied)

To my mind, based on its ratio and fallo (save the rule on singular correspondence which I will discuss later), the decision to strike down the 2013 PDAF Article in the 2013 Belgica case was primarily because the participation of individual legislators in the identification of projects post-enactment, contrary to the well-defined roles of the political branches in the different stages of the budget cycle, violated the principle of separation of powers.

Therefore, from the parameters clearly inferable from the 2013 Belgica case, only those lump-sum appropriations that implicate separation of powers, specifically, the Presidential item veto power and non-delegability and undue delegation of legislative powers are prohibited. There is no blanket declaration of unconstitutionality of lump-sum appropriations per se in the 2013 Belgica case.

Key budgetary concepts

This case and the parties' submissions demonstrate that there remains a gap in jurisprudence to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public, on fundamental constitutional concepts with respect to national budgeting.

Verily, the starting point of any decision involving national budgeting requires a common definition or understanding of certain key concepts, without which, any decision may suffer from ambiguity or imprecision.

Foremost among these are: appropriation, item of appropriation, line- item appropriation, lump-sum appropriation; Funds, Programs, Activities, and Projects (PAPs), and allotment class.

Appropriation

Section 29(1),^[8] Article VI of the Constitution requires that any public expenditure must be made through an appropriation made by law. Such appropriation law may either originate from a bill in the House of Representatives under Section 24^[9] of the same Article or a budget proposal from the President in the form of the National Expenditure Program (NEP) in the case of the national budget, as prescribed by Article VII, Section 22.^[10]

However, while the Constitution identifies the vehicle by which an appropriation should be made (i.e., by law),^[11] the statutory definition of an appropriation is found not in the Constitution, but in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code). Section 2(1), Chapter 1 of Book VI on Government Budgeting defines appropriation as "an authorization made by law or other legislative enactment, directing payment out of government funds under specified conditions or for specified purposes."^[12]

An early case defining an appropriation is Gonzales v. Raquiza,^[13] where the Court held that:

In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined "as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury", while appropriation made by law refers to "the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors."^[14]

Inasmuch as the Constitution adopts the United States (U.S.) budget framework, the definition of appropriation in this jurisdiction remains consistent with that recognized under the U.S. Constitution: Section 9, Article I, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution, otherwise referred to as the "Appropriations Clause."^[15] The U.S. budget authorities take the foregoing clause to mean "that it is up to Congress to decide whether or not to provide funds for a particular program or activity and to fix the level of that funding."^[16] The clause has been characterized as "the most important single curb in the [U.S.] Constitution on Presidential power."^[17]

There being no prescribed form for an appropriation, there is very little sound legal basis to argue that appropriations can only be made through line -items.

Line-item and lump-sum appropriations

Indeed, a line-item and a lump-sum appropriation are conceptually mutually exclusive - a line-item is an appropriation for a single purpose and a lump-sum is an appropriation for multiple purposes. To say that the mere nature of an appropriation as a lump-sum violates the principle of separation of powers or prevents the exercise of the President's item veto is error.

The explicit recognition by certain laws of the function of lump-sum appropriations in the budget belies this haphazard proposition.

As early as 1937, Commonwealth Act No. 246^[18] or the Budget Act already mentioned lump-sum appropriations and provided the guidelines for the use thereof.^[19] In 1972, the Integrated Reorganization Plan had mentioned lump-sum appropriations and identified certain independent and autonomous agencies whose budgets should be lump-sum appropriations.^[20]

In the same manner, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1177^[21] and Book VI, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code allowed lump-sum appropriations for coordinating bodies.^[22]

Lump-sum appropriations are also mentioned in Section 40 of PD 1177, which provides:

SECTION 40. Special Budgets for Lump-Sum Appropriations. - Expenditures from lump-sum appropriations authorized for any purpose or for any department, office or agency in any annual General Appropriations Act of other Act and from any fund of the National Government, shall be made in accordance with a special budget to be approved by the President, which shall include but shall not be limited to the number of each kind of position, the designations, and the annual salary proposed for which an appropriation is intended. This provision shall be applicable to all revolving funds, receipts which are automatically made available for expenditure for certain specific purposes, aids and donations for carrying out certain activities, or deposits made to cover the cost of special services to be rendered to private parties. Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, when any Board, head of department, chief of bureau or office, or any other official, is authorized to appropriate, allot, distribute or spend any lump-sum appropriation or special, bond, trust, and other funds, such authority shall be subject to the provisions of this section.

In case of any lump-sum appropriation for salaries and wages of temporary and emergency laborers and employees, including contractual personnel, provided in any General Appropriation Act or other Acts, the expenditure of such appropriation shall be limited to the employment of persons paid by the month, by the day, or by the hour. (Emphasis supplied)

This provision on the use of lump-sum appropriations in the budget was reiterated in Section 35 in Title II, Book VI, Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code.

To be sure, neither the Constitution nor applicable statutes require that an appropriation only cover a single purpose. Apart from the rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case relied upon by Petitioner, there is no other jurisprudence which can be read to mean that all kinds of lump -sum appropriations are unconstitutional. Similarly, there is no jurisprudence setting the limit of executive or legislative discretion in terms of the constitutionally acceptable level of specificity or singularity of public purpose of a proposed expenditure in the NEP and an appropriation in the GAA.

This is again consistent with the following interpretation of the General Administration Office (GAO), the U.S. budget authority:

A lump-sum appropriation is one that is made to cover a number of specific programs, projects, or items. (The number may be as small as two.) In contrast, a line-item appropriation is available only for the specific object described.^[23]

It is well-settled that the contemporaneous interpretation of administrative officials with respect to a law they are duty bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight.^[24] The contemporaneous interpretation of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and the GAO, being the administrative bodies tasked to implement and interpret the budgetary laws of the Philippines and the U.S., respectively, command great weight in the determination of what constitutes a valid appropriation as contemplated in the Constitution, considering the American origins of the Philippines' budget framework.

While it is conceded that the contemporaneous interpretation of administrative bodies is not necessarily binding or conclusive on the courts,^[25] the hesitation to accord great weight to such interpretation only relates to those that "distort or in any way change [the] natural meaning [of a constitutional provision]" and exempts those matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department.^[26]

Here, the contemporaneous interpretation of the DBM with respect to appropriations being allowed to take the form of either line-item or lump-sum in laws and executive issuances predating the Constitution, taken together with the silence of the Constitution as to the form of appropriation and the level of specificity required, leads to the inevitable conclusion that valid items of appropriations may take the form of either a line-item or lump-sum.

The budget process is textually committed to the political departments. Several facets of this power and duty are clear political questions, primarily the use and the propriety of line-items and lump-sum items in the national budget.

There is nothing in the Constitution, law, or jurisprudence that requires a budgeting modality that only accepts line-item appropriations as valid items of appropriation. As implied by law and supported by administrative practice, lump-sum appropriations are considered valid items of appropriation. In this regard, both line-item and lump-sum appropriations are susceptible to the test for compliance with the item veto and valid delegation.

PAPs v. allotment class

Petitioner claims that only line-item appropriations are valid items of appropriation so that there can only be line-items in the GAA, based on the language of Section 23, Chapter 4, Book VI of the Administrative Code, which provides:

SEC. 23. Content of the General Appropriations Act. - The General Appropriations Act shall be presented in the form of budgetary programs and projects for each agency of the government, with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project, including statutory provisions of specific agency or general applicability. The General Appropriations Act shall not contain any itemization of personal services, which shall be prepared by the Secretary after enactment of the General Appropriations Act, for consideration and approval of the President.

Verily, Section 23 makes mention of "budgetary programs and projects x x x with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project."

Predating the provision in the Administrative Code, these terms have already been defined as early as 1977. In Section 2 of PD 1177, paragraph (1) provides that "[p]rogram" refers to the functions and activities necessary for the performance of a major purpose for which a government entity is established; while paragraph (m) provides that "[p]roject" means a component of a program covering a homogeneous group of activities that result in the accomplishment of an identifiable output. These are the very definition of "program"^[27] and "project"^[28] reenacted under Section 2 of Book VI, Chapter 1 of the Administrative Code.

These definitions clearly indicate that even specific programs and projects can contemplate several or/multiple related activities and components.

In increasing level of specificity, appropriations may be made for a certain program, project, or activity. A program is comprised of several projects and activities;^[29] a project is composed of several activities. Therefore, even adopting the language of Section 23 and Petitioner's contention that the budget must contain "budgetary programs and projects x x x with the corresponding appropriations for each program and project," the core question redounds to the level of specificity with which the validity of a certain appropriation can be tested.

Since the identification of such level of specificity falls within the scope of the Congress and Executive's joint prerogative to determine the contours of the budget-and both singular and multiple purposes are contemplated by law in the terms "programs" and "projects," it can easily be discerned that the level of specificity or multiplicity of purposes of an appropriation falls squarely within the first three badges of a political question: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. The only limit to this discretion is the principle of separation of powers, specifically in this case, that the item does not constitute undue delegation or violate the President's item veto power.

Item of appropriation

As regards the item veto power of the President over an appropriation bill, an item of appropriation must be defined. In Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice,^[30] deciding a question of the exercise of the Governor General of his item veto power, the Court defined an item, thus:

x x x An appropriation is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item.^[31] (Citations omitted.)

This was again defined in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon,^[32] thus:

The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990]).

We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:

"The terms item and provision in budgetary legislations and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared 'that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill." (id. at page 465).^[33]

The definition of an item - the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill - was again brought to the fore as one of the issues decided by the Court in the Araullo v. Aquino III^[34] (Araullo) cases.

In the Araullo cases, the petitioners claimed that the funds from the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) were used to support PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the respective GAAs. In other words, the claim was that augmentation was done for non-existent items of appropriation.

In the Araullo Decision,^[35] the Court agreed with the petitioners. It found, among others, that the Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project did not have an appropriation in the GAA. It ratiocinated:

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority areas identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by Congress in enacting the GAAs. x x x^[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics omitted)

Thus, the Court held in its dispositive portion that "[t]he funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act" as one of the "acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers."^[37]

Later, however, reconsidering this point, and quoting Justice Carpio's position as adopted by the majority in the 2013 Belgica case and reiterated in his Separate Opinion in this case, Chief Justice Bersamin in the Araullo Resolution^[38] clarified:

After a careful reexamination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we find merit in the respondents' argument.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item- veto power of the President, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not be only general provisions, thus:

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence - meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President's item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. x x x

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense categoy belongs to.^[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Araullo Resolution therefore ruled that an "item" that can be subject of augmentation under Section 25(5) does not mean allotment class or expense category - Personal Services (PS), Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), and Capital Outlay (CO), meaning these are not the constitutional conception of an "item" - but the program, activity or project (PAP) to which these allotment classes pertain. So again, this shows that for the purpose of determining the constitutional specificity of an item, either by compliance with standards of non-delegability or item veto power, the Court has recognized the interpretation of the administrative agency responsible for executing the budget - that the item is the PAP for line-items or the Fund or one of the component purposes with a specific amount in case of lump-sum appropriations.

While a valid item of appropriation may have several related purposes which incidentally are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose (which is ultimately grouping by allotment class^[40] or expense category) so as to be acceptable under the rule of singular correspondence as affirmed in the 2013 Belgica case, this standard is permissive and can serve as a badge of a valid item. However, this is not necessarily the new standard of a constitutional "item" of appropriation as defined in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice^[41] and subsequently developed in the Araullo Resolution.

In the Araullo Resolution, the "item" that needs to be extant in the GAA to trigger the availability of the power to augment under Article VI, Section 25(5) of the Constitution is not the allotment class but the PAP itself. Nothing in the development in law and jurisprudence or the arguments in this Petition presents a compelling reason to reconsider this constitutional conception of an "item," over which the President can exercise his item veto.

To my mind, this is where much of the disconnect occurs. We have a decision that requires a rule on singular correspondence (read literally to mean a singular amount for a singular purpose) and designates the Contingent Fund (demonstrably a true lump-sum appropriation) as a valid "line-item."

Hence the need to clarify:

A Fund, as a designation or aggrupation of moneys based on source, purpose, or some other standard, does not automatically constitute an appropriation. In the same manner, a Fund is not automatically a lump-sum appropriation. There are several permutations as to the budgeting of these Funds that can be illustrated by provisions of the 2014 GAA.

Singular Fund intended for multiple component purposes with corresponding component amounts. In this case, the component purposes function as line-items in themselves. An example of this is the 2014 GAA provision for the Unprogrammed Fund that has specific purposes with corresponding specific amounts under Annex A. The President can exercise his item veto power over any of the component purposes because they are items (i.e., a fund designated for a specific purpose), or over the entire Fund that will carry with it the veto of all sub- or component items within the Unprogrammed Fund. Another example of this is the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefit Fund in the 2014 GAA.

Singular Fund intended for multiple component purposes without corresponding component amounts. In this case, the Fund is a true lump-sum appropriation. An example of this is the 2014 GAA provision for the Contingent Fund. It appropriates the entire amount of P1,000,000,000.00 as funding source for: (1) new and/or urgent projects and activities that need to be implemented during the year; and (2) augmentation of existing appropriations for local and foreign travels of the President. As held in the 2013 Belgica case, the Fund is susceptible to item veto power because it has a corresponding amount. The purposes, being part of the provisions, while not subject to direct veto, may be subjected to conditional implementation during budget authorization. Again, the Contingent Fund in its true lump-sum formulation has been accepted by the Court as a valid item susceptible to item veto.

Rule on singular correspondence

In this regard, I differ from the opinion of Justice Bernabe when she states that "a lump-sum amount may still be considered as a valid item subject to the President's item veto power for as long as the lump-sum amount is meant as a funding source for multiple programs, projects, or activities that may be all clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose. In this sense, the 'lump-sum' effectively functions as a 'line-item' that is compliant with the doctrine of singular correspondence."^[42]

As well, I differ with the position taken by Senior Associate Justice Carpio when he "reiterate[s] his position in [the 2013 Belgica case] that lump -sum appropriations for multiple purposes negate the President's exercise of the line-item veto power, and are thus unconstitutional. On the other hand, lump-sum appropriations with specified and single purpose that allow the President to exercise his line[-]item veto power is constitutional."^[43] He also adverts to "a lump-sum appropriation that has a single purpose but multiple sub-items" and "singular lump-sum appropriations for multiple purposes."

To reiterate, line-item appropriations and lump-sum appropriations are distinct. A line-item designates a fund intended for a singular purpose; a lump sum appropriation, for multiple purposes. Thus, there can be a singular fund intended for multiple purposes (a lump-sum appropriation), but there cannot be a "singular lump-sum" or a "singularly correspondent lump-sum." While much of the difference may be considered semantics, it is important for the Court to be precise in making a rule that has far-reaching implications in the operations of government.

In line with the discussion above that there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that requires a specific form of appropriation or an item, including its singularity or multiplicity of purpose, the exercise of item veto only requires the existence an item, that is, an appropriation severable from other parts of the appropriations bill and not a provision. To my mind, this requirement is met by a correspondence of a fund and a stated public purpose (as in line-items) or purposes (as in true lump-sum appropriations like the Contingent Fund provisions in the 2013 and 2014 GAAs).

In this formulation, consistent with the rule on singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case and the conception of an "item" in the Araullo Resolution, it is the last and indivisible PAP (or purpose, in the case of lump- sum appropriations) in the GAA and the amount allocated for the same as the last indivisible purpose and sum of money that constitute an item - for purposes of not offending the Presidential item veto power. This then harmonizes squarely with the ruling in the 2013 Belgica case that the Contingent Fund is a valid appropriation subject of item veto for being an amount intended for a program despite being lump-sum intended for two distinct purposes, and does not strictly follow the rule of singular correspondence or even the requirement of "clearly classified as falling under one singular appropriation purpose."

As already shown, the language of the 2013 Contingent Fund appropriation was enacted as the 2014 Contingent Fund appropriation verbatim, containing two purposes: (1) for funding new and urgent projects that have to be implemented during the year; and (2) for travel expenses of the President. These two purposes are clearly not disaggregated into two separate specific amounts, but are considered two authorized public purposes serving a clearly classified singular appropriation purpose, which is to meet contingencies, for which the single Contingent Fund will be tapped. This is a clear deviation if the rule on singular correspondence for the purpose of determining the validity of lump-sum appropriations is to be taken to strictly mean single highly specific purpose for a single fund or only line-items as Petitioner claims the rule to be.

As well, as shown above, the uses of the Contingent Fund based on the formulation that already passed judicial approbation show that they are varied purposes that cannot be considered as "several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice," clearly negating the standard of a valid item at the level of an allotment class or expense category. Ultimately, the level of disaggregation and multiplicity of purpose implicate the non- delegability issue and not the item veto power, because items of appropriation can take the form of lump-sum.

This analysis again is consistent with the examination which was made in the 2013 Belgica case for the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (both demonstrably intended for multiple purposes). Again, based on the Court's holding on the validity of those Funds as appropriation, the reason the purposes of "priority infrastructure development projects" and "such other purposes as the President may determine" were struck down was ultimately a finding of insufficient standards, and not because the Presidential Social Fund and the Malampaya Funds did not follow the rule on singular correspondence.

Challenges against lump-sum appropriations in the budget

Lump-sum appropriations and non-delegability or undue delegation

On the allocation of the power to prepare, enact, and implement the national budget, the Constitution provides:

Article VI

Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

x x x x

Section 27. x x x

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

x x x x

Article VII

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

This textual commitment of the budgetary operations for the government to the political branches translates to broad constitutional authority, subject only to the standards set by the Constitution. Therefore, the formulation of the national budget through the balancing of competing demands for public funds in the operation of the government is a political question, subject only to judicial review to test for grave abuse of discretion (i.e., violations of the Constitution).

In the case of Baker v. Carr^[44] which laid down the classic formulation of the political question doctrine, the Court declared that a case involves a political question when there is: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue; (3) an impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; (4) an impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.^[45]

The political departments are responsible for setting the country's fiscal policy - the interplay of the taxing and spending functions of the government in order to affect the economy. This fiscal policy is largely visible in a national budget that requires a delicate balancing of competing demands for public funds consistent with the country's development goals.

The delineation of tasks between the Executive and Legislative is as much a consequence of the principle of separation of powers as it is of necessity since, under the current structure of the Philippine government, it is the Executive that is equipped to determine the operational aspects incidental to the implementation of the national budget.

That said, there are laws and jurisprudence that determine the contours of allowable discretion of the political departments in budget preparation.

Section 13, Book VI, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code provides:

SEC. 13. Budget Levels. - The ordinary income of government shall be used primarily to provide appropriations for current operations, except in case of a national emergency or serious financial stress, the existence of which has been duly proclaimed by the President.

The level of aggregate revenue expenditure and debt shall be jointly recommended to the President by the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of Finance, the National Economic and Development Authority and the Central Bank of the Philippines, acting within the Development Budget Coordination Committee of the National Economic and Development Authority.

No appropriations for current operations and capital outlays of the Government shall be proposed unless the amount involved is covered by the ordinary income, or unless it is supported by a proposal creating additional sources of funds or revenue, including those generated from domestic and foreign borrowings, sufficient to cover the same. Likewise, no appropriation for any expenditure, the amount of which is not covered by the estimated income from the existing sources of revenue or available current surplus, may be proposed, unless it is supported by a proposal creating an additional source of funds sufficient to cover the same.

Proposals creating additional sources of funds shall be prepared in the form of revenue bills.

The provisions of this section shall not be construed as impairing in any way the power of the Congress to enact revenue and appropriation bills, nor the authority of the President to propose special revenue and appropriation bills after the submission of the budget. (Emphasis supplied)

This requirement of a correspondence between spending and source of revenue has been imposed as early as the Budget Act.^[46] Verily, it is contrary to the prevailing balanced budget policy to program appropriations without a corresponding source of revenue to fund the same. Hence, the creation of the Unprogrammed Fund as a standby appropriation and the identification of the programs to be funded by it constitute a prior determination on the part of the Executive (in their inclusion in the NEP) and the Legislature (in the retention of the identification in the enacted GAA) to allot unexpected, excess, or windfall revenue for the specific programs identified thereunder. Therefore, the provision for the Unprogrammed Fund is consistent with the national budget policy and cannot therefore be characterized as avoiding the appropriation procedure.

In the case of Araullo, the Court nullified the release of the Unprogrammed Fund for not having complied with the conditions contained in the GAA (i.e., Special Provision No. 1 on the release of funds under the Unprogrammed Fund appropriation). Implicit in this pronouncement is the recognition that the Executive and Legislative are given sufficient discretion in the budgetary process, consistent with the prevailing balanced budget or surplus policy of the government, not to propose and authorize - not to program, respectively, appropriations that are not supported by expected sources of revenue or financing. The practical effect of the exercise of this discretion is the provision of the Unprogrammed Fund to cover unexpected, excess, or windfall revenue that may only be used to fund the specified public purposes upon compliance with the conditions for its release.

Extent of executive discretion

At budget preparation, the Executive exercises discretion as it makes macro-economic assumptions and determines budget ceilings and fiscal targets at the beginning of budget preparation. In line with these assumptions and targets, it crafts a budget through allocation of corresponding amount of revenue and sources of financing to the existing programs and obligations of agencies, and thereafter allocates the remaining fiscal space to new programs that are consistent with national priorities.

Section 22,^[47] Article VII of the Constitution requires the President to submit the budget to Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session. These budget documents include the Budget of Expenditures and Sources Financing (BESF) and the NEP, which are products of the exercise of Executive budget preparation.

For the 2014 GAA, the budget documents had to be submitted sometime in July 2013. It must be noted, however, that the entire budget preparation process begins as early as the budget call two years before the year for which the annual budget is prepared. As an exemplar, the budget preparation for the 2014 GAA began with a budget call in December 2012, followed by the holding of budget forums and the setting of indicative budget ceilings, macroeconomic assumptions and fiscal targets in January 2013. The deadline for agencies to submit their respective budget proposals was set in mid-April, with technical budget hearings ending in May 2013.^[48]

There is, therefore, a very real possibility that a change of circumstances may lead to the requirement of higher or lower funding for the stated public purposes, programs, or projects proposed by the President to be authorized by the Legislature, and the appropriations thus enacted by the Legislature. In fact, in accordance with the national developmental and budget framework, the President may even be constrained, during budget execution, as he is statutorily authorized, to suspend, discontinue, or abandon a program.^[49] It is with the recognition of this level of budget certainty that the Executive's power of apportionment or allocation is not only allowed as a corollary to the power to implement laws, specifically, to implement the national budget, but also as a requirement of the realities of the operations of the national government.

Recognizing this reality, the Court in the Araullo Decision laid down the scope of the Executive's power during the budget execution phase:

We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing conditions. In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the [programs, activities or projects] set by Congress in the GAA.

Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs, particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts. It is assumed that the agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader appropriation items. This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase. The [Disbursement Acceleration Program] - as a strategy to improve the country's economic position - was one policy that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.

Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power, Prof. Louis Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:

[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable for Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound management of public funds.

x x x x

x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion, but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.^[50] (Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, allowance for executive discretion does not per se constitute a violation of the principle of separation of powers in the context of the budget process if: (1) the function entrusted by the Legislative to the Executive requires it to exercise such acts which fall within the sphere of powers properly allocated to it under the Constitution; and (2) such acts are accordingly exercised during the proper phase of the budget process.

The Legislature's check on the President's power to execute the budget

The enforcement of law is a specific power that is textually committed to the Executive, and not merely one that is granted to the Executive "by default" (i.e., a power that is not specifically allocated by the Constitution to the Executive, but is deemed executive in nature as it is neither inherently legislative nor judicial in nature).^[51]

Moreover, the Executive's discretion in implementing the budget, while resting on constitutional grounds, is also sufficiently canalized by the policy and limits found in budgetary laws. Among these are those that provide the budget policy and the manner of preparation, form, and content of the budget.

PD 1177, promulgated in 1977, is one of the oldest budgetary laws that remains effective. It set the government's budget policy, thus:

SECTION 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to formulate and implement a National Budget that is an instrument of national development, reflective of national objectives, strategies and plans. The budget shall be supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic development plan and shall be oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that funds are utilized and operations are conducted effectively, economically and efficiently. The national budget shall be formulated within the context of a regionalized government structure and of the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and borrowings of all levels of government and of the government-owned or controlled corporations. The budget shall likewise be prepared within the context of the national long -term plan and of a long-term budget program. (Emphasis supplied)

This was largely retained and reenacted in the Administrative Code:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - The national budget shall be formulated and implemented as an instrument of national development, reflective of national objectives and plans, supportive of and consistent with the socio-economic development plans and oriented towards the achievement of explicit objectives and expected results, to ensure that the utilization of funds and operations of government entities are conducted effectively; formulated within the context of a regionalized governmental structure and within the totality of revenues and other receipts, expenditures and borrowings of all levels of government and of government-owned or controlled corporations; and prepared within the context of the national long-term plans and budget programs of the Government.^[52]

Finally, as to the form of the budget, the Budget Act, as reenacted in PD 1177 and the Administrative Code, provides:

SEC. 3. Form of the Budget. - The Budget, which shall be prepared and submitted to the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of section 19 Article VI of the Constitution, shall comprise the general fund and all classes of special and trust funds under the care and control of the different branches or offices of the National Government.

The receipts accruing to any fund and the expenditures therefrom shall be shown in detail in conformity with the classification of accounts prescribed by the Auditor General, segregated into ordinary and extraordinary income and expenditures.

The appropriations for salaries and wages shall specify the positions, the number of each class, the respective designations, the salary rates authorized for the current year and those proposed for the ensuing year, and the items shall be grouped by bureaus and offices. The items of appropriations for each class of sundry expenses, furniture and equipment, and those for special purposes for the different bureaus and offices shall be consolidated for each corresponding department. Together with the proposed appropriations for each department, there shall be shown the amount of the actual expenditures for the preceding year and the estimated expenditures for the current and ensuing years from appropriations that are authorized by existing laws and from the special and trust funds.^[53]

x x x x

SECTION 8. Form and content. - The Budget shall consist of two parts - (1) the current operating expenditures, and (2) the capital outlays. - Each part of the Budget shall comprise the general fund and all classes of special, operating trust funds, and bond funds under the care and control of the different departments and agencies. The Budget shall embody as appendices the proposed General Appropriation Act, the Public Works Act, and other appropriation Acts to cover the budget proposals.

The Budget shall also contain:

(a)	a budgetary message setting forth in brief the significance of the appropriations proposed;
(b)	a brief summary of the functions and activities of the Government; and
(c)	summary of financial statements setting forth:
	(1)	the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations necessary for the support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year;
	(2)	the estimated receipts during the ensuing fiscal year under laws existing at the time the Budget is transmitted, and under the revenue proposals, if any, contained in the Budget;
	(3)	the actual appropriations, expenditures, and receipts during the last completed fiscal year;
	(4)	the estimated expenditures and receipts and actual or proposed appropriations during the fiscal year in progress;
	(5)	balanced statements of the condition of the National Treasury at the end of the last completed fiscal year, the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year in progress, and the estimated condition of the Treasury at the end of the ensuing fiscal year, if the financial proposals contained in the Budget are adopted, showing, at the same time, the unencumbered and unobligated cash resources;
	(6)	all essential facts regarding the bonded and other long-term obligations and indebtedness of the Government; and
	(7)	such other financial statements and data as are deemed necessary or desirable in order to make known in all practicable detail the financial conditions of the Government.[54]
x x x x

SECTION 15. Allotment of appropriations. - To prevent the incurrence of deficits, authorized appropriations shall be allotted in accordance with the procedure outlined hereunder:

(a)	No appropriation authorized for any department and agency of the Government shall be available for expenditure until the head of each department or agency shall have submitted to the Budget Commissioner a request for allotment of funds showing the estimated amounts needed for each function, activity, or purpose for which the funds are to be expended during the applicable allotment period and until the request shall have been approved by the Commissioner as hereinafter provided. The form of the request for allotment shall be prescribed by the Commissioner and shall be submitted to him at least twenty-five days prior to the beginning of the fiscal year showing the proposed quarterly allotments of the whole authorized appropriation for the department or agency.
(b)	For purposes of the administration of the allotment system herein provided, each fiscal year shall be divided into four quarterly allotment periods beginning, respectively, on the first day of July, October, January, and April: Provided, That in any case where the quarterly allotment period is found to be impracticable, the Commissioner may prescribe a different period suited to the circumstances but not extending beyond the end of the fiscal year.
(c)	Each request for allotment shall be reviewed by the Budget Commissioner and the respective amounts therein shall be allotted for expenditures, provided the estimate therein is within the terms of the appropriations as to amount and purposes, having due regard for the probable future needs of the bureau, office or agency for the remainder of the fiscal year or other term for which the appropriation was made, and provided the bureau, office or agency contemplates expenditure of the allotment during the period. Otherwise, the said Budget Commissioner shall modify the estimate so as to conform with the terms of the appropriation and the prospective needs of the bureau, office or agency, and shall reduce the amount to be allotted accordingly. The Budget Commissioner shall act promptly upon all requests for allotment and shall notify every bureau, office or agency of its allotments at least five days before the beginning of each allotment period. The total amount allotted to any bureau, office or agency for the fiscal year or other term for which the appropriation was made shall not exceed the amount appropriated for said year or term. The notification, which will be sufficient authority for the Chief Accountant to enter the allotment in the books, shall include an explanation for any decrease or increase in the request of the head of the department or agency.
(d)	At the end of each quarter, each department or agency must report to the Commissioner the current status of its appropriations, the cumulative allotments, obligations, expenditures, and unliquidated obligations and unobligated and unexpected balances; and the results of expended appropriations. Such department or agency may, at any time, initiate or request for a change in allotments in order to adopt its functions or activities to altered conditions.
(e)	The Commissioner shall have authority also at any time to modify or amend any allotment previously made by him. In case he shall find at any time that the probable receipts from taxes or other sources for any fund will be less than were anticipated and that as a consequence the amount available for the remainder of the term of the appropriations, or for any allotment period will be less than the amount estimated or allotted therefor, he shall with the approval of the President, and after notice to the department or agency concerned, reduce the amount or amounts to be allotted so as to prevent deficits.
(f)	The Commissioner shall promptly transmit records and modifications thereof to the Auditor General, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations and Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of Finance.
(g)	The Commissioner shall maintain control records showing quarterly by funds, accounts, and other pertinent classifications, the amounts appropriated, the estimated revenues, the actual revenues or receipts, the amounts allotted and available for expenditures, the unliquidated obligations, actual balances on hand, and the unencumbered balances of the allotments for each agency of the Government.[55] (Emphasis supplied)

Even assuming that the power to apportion or allocate is not inherently executive as a facet of budget execution, and only a product of delegation by the legislative, the mere nature of an appropriation as lump-sum does not automatically constitute undue delegation.

In determining the constitutionality of two lump-sum funds administered by the Executive (i.e., the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund), the Court in the 2013 Belgica case explained that while the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of: (1) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making; or (2) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.^[56]

The first test is called the "completeness test." According to the 2013 Belgica case, a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.^[57]

The second test is called the "sufficient standard test." A law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.^[58]

Verily, as shown in the analysis in the 2013 Belgica case, lump-sum appropriations, like line-item appropriations, are susceptible to the completeness and sufficient standards tests.

Discretionary v. non discretionary appropriations

At their core, all appropriations in the general appropriation acts are discretionary appropriations because these are subject to the projected level of funds to support agency programs, activities, and projects that are evaluated according to the budget priorities set by the Executive to be included in the NEP during budget preparation, and then the evaluation by the Legislature during the budget legislation stage. The exception is automatic appropriations^[59] which are statutorily required to be appropriated without latitude for discretion on the part of either the Executive or the Legislative departments during their respective stage of the budget process (e.g., debt servicing, internal revenue allotments, payment of retirement and life insurance premiums, and special accounts in the general fund).^[60]

In this sense, the exercise of discretion in determining whether to spend and the level of spending for discretionary appropriations is in line with the exercise of constitutional powers of the political departments in their respective roles in setting fiscal policy and executing the national budget. This is the proper context of discretionary appropriations during budget preparation and budget authorization.

Appropriation vis-a-vis apportionment

These premises, as budgetary concepts and as realities of the operations of government, show where the constitutional lines are drawn between the discretionary prerogatives of the Executive and Legislative in the budget process. As discussed above, the power to appropriate is legislative, while the power to apportion is executive. The exercise of executive discretion by apportionment of lump-sum appropriations does not violate separation of powers and non-delegability.

Now, as to Executive discretion after budget authorization and during budget execution, we distinguish apportionment of lump-sum appropriations and appropriation.

The implementation of the budget by the Executive includes not only implementation of the programs, activities, and projects of the Executive department, but also the timing and making of allotments and releases in favor of all agencies of the funds required to pay for government obligations authorized by the appropriations.

An appropriation is an authorization to pay out public funds for a specific public purpose. To be clear, an appropriation is not a directive to pay funds, but in reality, a setting of ceiling or higher limit of spending for a specific public purpose or aggregation of public purposes corresponding to the amount. By appropriating a specific amount, the Legislature sets the policy (e.g., that a certain program deserves a part of public funds, to the maximum determined amount). It does not, through the appropriation, direct an agency to spend the entire amount for the public purpose. It only means that the agency is allowed to obligate (meaning enter into obligations and thereafter pay for these obligations) up to the set ceiling. In fact, even if an appropriation is made by the Legislature, with well-defined exceptions, the implementing agency cannot obligate or spend the same unless the DBM issues allotment authorization (SARO or ABM), cash allocation (NCA) and money is certified as actually available and allotted to a specific program or project.^[61]

As well, it must be understood that an appropriation does not mean that the amount appropriated is actually already supported by available funds at the time of the passage of the GAA. The only assumption for appropriations is that they will be supported by revenue or receipts expected to be realized within the same fiscal year. This is true for all programmed appropriations in the national budget, except for those that are in the nature of trust funds, which are already segregated from the mass of funds in the general fund by virtue of the provisions of the law which created them. On the other side of the spectrum are standby appropriations (i.e., the specific items in the special provisions of the Unprogrammed Fund) which allows unexpected or excess income or receipts to be spent for predetermined public purposes.

Therefore, by necessity, the Executive, or an agency with respect to its own agency-specific budget,^[62] must exercise discretion to allocate or apportion (i.e., to determine which of the appropriations should be funded ahead of others, or how the resources will be distributed among the specified public purposes authorized to be funded) as funds become available. This executive power or discretionary authority to allocate takes place at budget execution.

The law authorizes the Executive's exercise of discretion from the early budget laws and their latest re-enactment in the Administrative Code with respect to the issuance or modification of allotments as a function of apportionment during budget execution.^[63]

In interpreting the federal budget, the GAO defines apportionment as "[t]he action by which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) distributes amounts available for obligation, including budgetary reserves established pursuant to law, in an appropriation or fund account."^[64] It continues:

x x x An apportionment divides amounts available for obligation by specific time periods (usually quarters), activities, projects, objects, or a combination thereof. The amounts so apportioned limit the amount of obligations that may be incurred. An apportionment may be further subdivided by an agency into allotments, suballotments, and allocations. x x x

The apportionment process is intended to (1) prevent the obligation of amounts available within an appropriation or fund account in a manner that would require deficiency or supplemental appropriations and (2) achieve the most effective and economical use of amounts made available for obligation. x x x^[65]

Petitioner decries this executive exercise of apportionment within appropriations as "Presidential pork" which he asks the Court to declare as unconstitutional for constituting "[an] informal [practice] of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the 2013 Belgica case.^[66] Contrary to his claims, however, this practice of apportionment rests on solid constitutional and statutory grounds.

The implementation of the national budget consistent with the long- term economic and development plans of the government properly belongs to the President as a facet of executive power.^[67] This power is exercised through the DBM as provided in several laws.

In 1976, the Budget Commission (now DBM) was tasked to "assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget; preparation, execution and control of the national budget; preparation and maintenance of accounting records and reports of the national government and design of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process; achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations; administration of compensation and position classification systems; and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications."^[68]

A year later, the power of the Budget Commission to administer lump- sum funds was recognized in PD 1177:

SECTION 53. Administration of Lump-Sum Funds. - The Budget Commission shall administer the Lump-Sum Funds appropriated in the General Appropriations Act, except as otherwise specified therein, including the issuance of Treasury Warrants covering payments to implementing agencies or other creditors, as may be authorized by the President.

In 1978, the Budget Commission was converted into the Ministry of Budget through PD 1405,^[69] and later, the Office of Budget and Management by virtue of Executive Order No. 711^[70] in 1981. Finally, the Office of Budget and Management was renamed as the DBM through the Administrative Code. Despite these changes in nomenclature, however, the DBM's powers and functions, including the power to administer lump-sum funds, have remained intact.^[71]

Therefore, the mere nature of an appropriation as lump-sum does not automatically offend the principle of separation of powers and non- delegability of legislative power, or automatically constitute Presidential pork barrel.

While Congress has the power of the purse, i.e. power to authorize the expenditure of public funds for public purposes, the President has the power to implement the budget, i.e., fill in the details, allot and apportion the funds authorized to be expended in the appropriation law. Thus, when Congress passes an appropriation law that taps a single funding source for multiple purposes, it does not restrict or otherwise compel the President to equally fund a purpose he considers wasteful vis-a-vis that which he considers useful. This is because he has the power to allot and apportion public funds during budget execution, a power recognized by the Legislature when it passes a budget that contains lump-sum appropriations. Allowing agency discretion over lump-sum appropriations has been recognized in American jurisprudence, when the US Supreme Court in Lincoln v. Vigil^[72] (Lincoln) stated:

The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion. After all, the very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Donovan, 241 U.S. App. D. C. 122, 128, 746 F. 2d 855, 861 (1984) (Scalia, J.) ("A lump-sum appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees fit") (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Automobile Workers v. Brock, 474 U. S. 825 (1985); 2 United States General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 6-159 (2d ed. 1992). For this reason, a fundamental principle of appropriations law is that where "Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee reports and other legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on" the agency. LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Compo Gen. 307, 319 (1975); cf. American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991) (statements in committee reports do not have the force of law); TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 191 (1978) ("Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress"). Put another way, a lump-sum appropriation reflects a congressional recognition that an agency must be allowed "flexibility to shift x x x funds within a particular x x x appropriation account so that" the agency can make necessary adjustments for "unforeseen developments" and "'changing requirements.'" LTV Aerospace Corp., supra, at 318 (citation omitted).

Like the decision against instituting enforcement proceedings, then, an agency's allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires "a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise": whether its "resources are best spent" on one program or another; whether it "is likely to succeed" in fulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a particular program "best fits the agency's overall policies"; and, "indeed, whether the agency has enough resources" to fund a program "at all." Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831. As in Heckler, so here, the "agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities." Id., at 831-832. Of course, an agency is not free simply to disregard statutory responsibilities: Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative statutes (though not, as we have seen, just in the legislative history). See id., at 833. And, of course, we hardly need to note that an agency's decision to ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political consequences. But as long as the agency allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory objectives, 701(a)(2) gives the courts no leave to intrude. "[T]o [that] extent," the decision to allocate funds "is committed to agency discretion by law." 701(a)(2).^[73]

Therefore, by no stretch of imagination may it be considered that the President therefore colludes with the Congress, when it submits a NEP with lump-sum appropriations and the Congress on the other hand passes the appropriation law retaining these lump-sum appropriations.

These are exercises of constitutionally-committed powers of budget authorization and budget execution that requires a delicate balancing of competing public interests and available public funds. Unlike the clear infirmity in a situation where legislators are given post-enactment authority to identify projects during budget execution, the preparation, passage, and execution of a general appropriations act that contains multi-purpose funds or lump-sum appropriations subject to apportionment by the Executive during budget execution do not violate any constitutional provision.

As earlier discussed, all appropriations that are not automatic are in the nature of discretionary appropriations on the part of the Legislature. The discretion of the Executive over lump-sum appropriations administered by the DBM (and the discretion of agencies over their own agency-specific budgets including CFAGs), including the use of the amounts that may be released are merely considered as apportionment or allocation - functions during budget execution over which the Executive (or the agency) has discretionary authority. Taking for example the Unprogrammed Fund, the occasion for the President's exercise of the power to allocate arises from the nature of Unprogrammed Fund. Naturally, the amount of funds that may be utilized for the identified programs and projects will depend on how much revenue windfall was realized. There is no specific amount precisely because it is subject to the production of funds in excess of the projected revenue and other income to be collected in 2014.^[74] If there is unexpected or windfall revenue sufficient to cover all specified purposes, then all these purposes may be funded; if there is not enough revenue, then the Executive discretion to allocate comes into play.

The same is true for Programmed Special Purpose Funds (Programmed SPFs) including the specifically assailed Funds in the Petition: the Contingent Fund, the E-Gov Fund, and the LGSF. Programmed SPFs are budgetary allocations in the GAA allocated for specific purposes, already disaggregated from the mass of funds not otherwise appropriated. After the disaggregation based on purpose, these are still inevitably lump-sum either by necessity or by design, as the recipient departments or agencies and/or the specific programs and projects have not yet been identified during budget preparation and legislation.

These are then made available for allocation to agencies in addition to their built-in appropriations during budget execution, pursuant to special provisions and conditions pertaining to the SPF.^[75] Necessarily, because these are cross-agency or multi-user funds that are not yet part of the agency or end- user budgets, these are administered by the DBM.

This is, in fact, similar to the treatment of the budgets of agencies belonging to the constitutional fiscal autonomous group (CFAGs). Under the Constitution, the annual appropriations of these bodies shall be automatically and regularly released.^[76] In compliance with the Constitution, their budgets are released to the agency after the passage of the GAA through the issuance of cash allocations (NCAs) based on the disbursement program the agency itself. The power to apportion or allocate their own appropriations is committed to the discretion of the CFAGs, similar to that exercised by the Executive over lump-sum appropriations that it administers. This as well is similar to the situation discussed in Lincoln.           

Lump-sum appropriations and item veto power

Lump-sum appropriations do not by their nature as such automatically violate the President's item veto power.

Article VI, Section 27^[77] governing the Presidential item veto power under the Constitution draw its roots from American origins and have been adopted in this jurisdiction through the enactment of the Jones Law of 1916.^[78] The relevant provision thereof state:

SECTION 19 - Procedure for Law-Making

x x x x

(b) The veto on appropriations. - The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The item or items objected to shall not take effect except in the manner heretofore provided in this section as to bills and joint resolutions returned to the Legislature without his approval.

As to what is subject to the President's item veto power, we look again to jurisprudence as to the constitutional concept of an "item." Again, in the Araullo Resolution, the Court had occasion to clarify the constitutional concept of an "item" for purposes of the power to augment, thus:

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.^[79]

With respect to the claim that there must be a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto, Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.^[80] must be understood in the context of distinguishing an item in an appropriation bill from a provision or rider, which is a provision that does not appropriate funds for a specific purpose. This case, interpreted together with the requirement of singular correspondence in the 2013 Belgica case, can hardly now be support to say that lump-sum appropriations cannot be subject of a Presidential item veto.

Again, even as the Court described the 2013 GAA provision for the Contingent Fund as a "line-item" appropriation, its formulation as a true lump-sum appropriation (meaning two purposes without corresponding amounts) already passed the Court's approval as an item of appropriation in the same case relied upon by Petitioner to argue against its constitutionality:

x x x Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line-item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. x x x^[81] (Emphasis omitted)

In practice and interpretation already recognized by the Court,^[82] the President is empowered and has exercised his power of item veto not merely on singular line-item appropriations, but also on lump-sum appropriations and had historically subjected special provisions that earmark certain amounts for specific purposes for conditional implementation.^[83] This must be so, because there is nothing in the Constitution or in jurisprudence that limits the exercise of the Presidential power of item veto to the class of line-item appropriations only.^[84]

In reality, finding infirmity on account of multiplicity of purposes for a specific amount based on the fear that the President will not be able to exercise his power to veto an item over a wasteful purpose that is lumped together with one that he considers useful is an issue more apparent than real.

The Petitioner's fear that "the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes"^[85] is unfounded.

The President therefore, by practice and by law, is not constrained to veto an entire appropriation if he finds a certain purpose in a lump-sum appropriation wasteful, or perhaps less important than others, because during budget authorization, he has the power to veto a lump-sum appropriation in its entirety (when there are no component amounts within the said item), or a single purpose in a lump-sum appropriation (if there are specific amounts appropriated for component items) or subject the provision to conditional implementation. During budget execution, he has the power to allocate resources among the authorized purposes within true lump-sum appropriations under his administration. These purposes are deemed competing interests that the President through the DBM will have to prioritize in terms of allocation, timing, and release of funding.

An example of conditional implementation can be found in the LGSF provision of the 2014 GAA. The earmarking of "One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for the City of Manila, Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000) for the City of Caloocan and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000) for the Municipality of Lal-lo, Cagayan."^[86] This special provision was made subject to conditional implementation by the President.^[87]

In view of the foregoing discussion, lump-sum appropriations are not unconstitutional per se. As well, in line with the 2013 Belgica case:

1. An appropriation, whether line-item or lump-sum, is subject to the item veto power of the President as long it constitutes an item - i.e., a correspondence of amount and purpose or purposes severable from other parts of an appropriation bill.
   
   
2. A lump-sum appropriation that hurdles the completeness and sufficient standards test is constitutional.
   

Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

---

^[1] 721 Phil. 416 (2013).

^[2] Id. at 582-583.

^[3] Id. at 551-553.

^[4] Id. at 552.

^[5] Id. at 728.

^[6] Id. at 586-588. Citations omitted.

^[7] Id. at 700-701. Citations omitted.

^[8] Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

^[9] Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

^[10] Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

^[11] See CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 29(1).

^[12] See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Book VI, Chapter 1, Sec. 2(1); see also Section 2(i) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1177 or the BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977, July 30, 1977.

^[13] 259 Phil. 736 (1989).

^[14] Id. at 743, citing Martin, "New Constitution of the Philippines", p. 399, 1987 edition.

^[15] U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, 9, cl. 7. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law x x x"; see also U.S. CONST., art. I, 29.

^[16] GAO-04-261SP Appropriations Law-Vol. I, p. 1-5.

^[17] Id. at 1-4.

^[18] AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE FORM OF THE BUDGET AND REGULATING THE EXPENDITURE OF AUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS, December 17, 1937.

^[19] SECTION 7. Provisions Governing the Expenditure of Authorized Appropriations. - Unless otherwise expressly provided in the law authorizing an appropriation, the following general and special provisions shall govern the expenditure of appropriations authorized by any annual General Appropriation Act and other acts:

I. General Provisions

x x x x

(4) Allotment of lump-sum appropriations and special and other funds; plantilla of personnel. - The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, expenditures from lump -sum appropriations authorized for any executive department in any annual General Appropriation Act or other act and from all special, bond, trust, and other funds shall be made in accordance with a budget to be approved by the President, which shall include the plantilla of personnel, showing the number of each kind of positions, the designations, the salary proposed for the fiscal year for which the appropriation is intended and the salary actually received. This provision shall be applicable to all revolving funds, receipts which are automatically made available for expenditure for certain specific purposes, aids and donations for carrying out certain activities, or deposits made to cover the cost of special services to be rendered to private parties.

Except when stipulated otherwise as a condition for the expenditure of an aid or donation, and in the case of officers and employees receiving higher rates at the time of the approval of this Act, no officer or employee whose salary, not being fixed by law, is paid from any lump-sum appropriation or from any special, bond, trust, revolving, or other fund, shall receive a compensation of more than twelve pesos per day or more than three hundred pesos per month. This limitation shall not apply to the appropriations for "expert and technical personnel" under the Office of the President and the various executive departments.

In the case of any lump-sum appropriation for salaries and wages of temporary laborers and employees provided in any General Appropriation Act or other act, the expenditure of such appropriation shall be limited to the employment of laborers paid by the month, by the day, or by the hour, and of emergency employees other than laborers, the office of the President, the Bureau of Health, the craftsman, helpers, and other employees of the Bureau of Printing, the justices of the peace, the officers and employees of the Bureau of Public Works whose salaries and wages are payable from appropriations for projects authorized in any act, and the officers and employees of the Bureau of Quarantine Service, shall, in no case, be paid a salary in excess of forty pesos per month, nor shall their employment continue for more than six months. (Emphasis supplied)

^[20] Part I, Chapter I, Article VI (5). The following agencies shall be independent and autonomous: (a) Central Bank; (b) National Economic Development Authority; (c) Economic Development Council; and (d) Office of the Citizen's Counselor. The budgets of these independent agencies shall be in the form of lump sum appropriations and shall not be subject to the usual review and release by the Budget Commission. (Integrated Reorganization Plan, [1972]); See Part VI, Chapter I, Article III (11) and Part XIII, Chapter I, Article II (15) of the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

^[21] REVISING THE BUDGET PROCESS IN ORDER TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE BUDGETARY INNOVATIONS OF THE NEW SOCIETY, June 30, 1977.

^[22] PD 1177, Sec. 21 provides:

SECTION 21. Coordinating Bodies. - The budgets of coordinating agencies, councils, task forces, authorities, committees, or other similar bodies shall be limited to and used to fund only such planning, coordinating and monitoring functions as are assigned to it. Funds for implementation shall be budgeted and released to the line implementing agencies concerned: provided, that the budgets of coordinating bodies may include a lump-sum for purposes related to their assigned functions, which lump-sum shall be sub-allotted to implementing agencies and not used by the agency for its own operations: provided, further, that funds budgeted for a given agency falling within the jurisdiction of a coordinating body, may be subject to release upon approval by the coordinating agency of such release or of the agency's work program.

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book VI, Chapter 3 provides:
SECTION 18. Coordinating Bodies. - The budgets of coordinating agencies, councils, task forces, authorities, committees, or other similar bodies shall be limited to and used to fund only such planning, coordinating and monitoring functions as are assigned to it. Funds for implementation shall be budgeted and released to the line implementing agencies concerned: Provided, That the budgets of coordinating bodies may include a lump-sum for purposes related to their assigned functions, which lump-sum shall be sub-allotted to implementing agencies and not used by the agency for its own operations: Provided, further, That funds budgeted for a given agency falling within the jurisdiction of a coordinating body, may be subject to release upon approval by the coordinating agency of such release or of the agency's work program.

^[23] GAO-06-382SP Appropriations Law-Vol. II, pp. 6-5

^[24] Pascual v. Director of Lands, 119 Phi1. 623, 627 (1964), citing Madrigal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414, 423 (1918) and Government of the P.I. v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915).

^[25] Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Dev't., Inc. (ACORD) v. Zamora, 498 Phil. 615, 635 (2005).

^[26] Ta ada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1075-1076 (1957).

^[27] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book VI, Chapter 1, Sec. 2(12).

^[28] Id., Sec. 2(13).

^[29] Contemporaneous interpretation of the term program as now understood by the executive agencies responsible for setting and implementing the fiscal and development policies of the government (i.e., DBM, DOF and NEDA) further subdivides a program into sub-programs that may in itself have its own projects and activities nestled within them.

^[30] Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912 (1936).

^[31] Id. at 916.

^[32] 284 Phil. 245 (1992).

^[33] Id. at 261-262.

^[34] Araullo Decision, 737 Phil. 457 (2014); Araullo Resolution, 752 Phil. 716 (2015).

^[35] 737 Phil. 457 (2014).

^[36] Id. at 599.

^[37] Id. at 625, 626.

^[38] 752 Phil. 716 (2015).

^[39] Id. at 769-771.

^[40] Object of Expenditures. Refers to a classification under an allotment class, based on type of goods or services consistent with COA Government Accounting Manual (GAM) and Unified Accounts Code Structure UACS) Manual Available at <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp content/uploads/BESF/BESF2019/GLOSSARY.pdf>.

^[41] Supra note 30.

^[42] Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Bernabe, p. 4; emphasis omitted.

^[43] Separate Opinion of Justice Carpio, p. 4.

^[44] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

^[45] Id. at 217.

^[46] COM. ACT No. 246, Sec. 5 provides:

SECTION 5. Budget to be Balanced. - The ordinary income shall be used primarily to provide for the ordinary operating expenses of the Government. Except in case of a national emergency or serious financial stress, the existence of which has been duly proclaimed by the President, the total authorized appropriations for the ordinary expenditures shall not exceed the ordinary income; and, unless extraordinary circumstances justify it, the total estimated ordinary income shall not only cover the total estimated ordinary expenditures, but it shall leave a reasonable surplus besides. No appropriations for the ordinary operating expenses of the Government may be proposed, unless the amount thereof is covered by the ordinary income, and, likewise, no appropriation for any extraordinary expenditure, the amount of which is not covered by the estimated income from the existing sources of revenues or available current surplus, may be proposed, unless it be supported by a proposal creating an additional source of fund sufficient to cover the same.

Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. (RA) 992 (AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR A BUDGET SYSTEM FOR THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, otherwise known as "THE REVISED BUDGET ACT," June 4, 1954) provides:

SECTION 13. Balanced Budget. - The ordinary income shall be used primarily to provide for the current operation of the Government. Except in case of a national emergency or serious financial stress, the existence of which has been duly proclaimed by the President, the total authorized appropriations for the current operations shall not exceed the ordinary income; and, unless extraordinary circumstances justify it, the total estimated ordinary income shall not only cover the total estimated appropriations for current operations and capital outlays but it shall leave a reasonable surplus besides.

No appropriations for the current operations and capital outlays of the Government shall be proposed, unless the amount involved is covered by the ordinary income, or unless it be supported by a proposal creating an additional source of funds or revenue, sufficient to cover the same. Likewise, no appropriation for any other expenditures, the amount of which is not covered by the estimated income from the existing sources of revenues or available current surplus, may be proposed unless it be supported by a proposal creating an additional source of fund sufficient to cover the same.

The proposals creating additional sources of funds shall be prepared in the form of revenue bills which shall be appended to the Budget.

The provisions of this section shall not be constituted as impairing in any way the power of Congress to enact revenue and appropriation bills, nor the authority of the President to propose special revenue and appropriation bills after the submission of the budget.

^[47] CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Sec. 22 provides:

SECTION 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

^[48] See Annex "D" of the National Budget Memorandum No. 115, December 28, 2012.

^[49] See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Chapter V, Book 6, Sec. 38.

^[50] Araullo Decision, supra note 34, at 572-574.

^[51] See CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 17.

^[52] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book IV, Title XVII, Chapter 1.

^[53] COM. ACT NO. 246, December 17, 1937.

^[54] RA 992, June 4, 1954.

^[55] Id.

^[56] Belgica, supra note 1, at 568.

^[57] Id.

^[58] Id.

^[59] See RA 10633, p. 1125.

^[60] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book VI, Chapter 4 provides:

SEC. 26. Automatic Appropriations. - All expenditures for (1) personnel retirement premiums, government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures, (2) principal and interest on public debt, (3) national government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are automatically appropriated: Provided, That no obligations shall be incurred or payments made from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.

^[61] See ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book V, Subtitle B, Chapter 8, Sec. 47; PD 1445, Sec. 86.

^[62] See also the treatment of lump-sum appropriations in the budgets of coordinating bodies and implementing agencies in supra note 22.

^[63] See RA 992, Sec. 15; PD 1177, Sec. 38 and ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Sec. 33.

^[64] GAO-05-734SP Budget Glossary, p. 12.

^[65] Id. at 12-13.

^[66] See Belgica, supra note 1, at 582.

^[67] CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 17.

^[68] PD 899, REORGANIZING THE BUDGET COMMISSION, March 3, 1976, Sec. 1.

^[69] CONVERTING THE BUDGET COMMISSION AND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD INTO MINISTRIES, June 11, 1978.

^[70] RECLASSIFYING CERTAIN AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, July 28, 1981.

^[71] PD 1177, Sec. 53 was reenacted as Section 47 of Book VI, Chapter 5 of the ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.

^[72] 508 U.S. 182 (1993).

^[73] Id. at 192-193.

^[74] Reply, p. 16; rollo, p. 88.

^[75] A BRIEF ON THE SPECIAL PURPOSE FUNDS IN THE NATIONAL BUDGET. Notes by the Department of Budget and Management. Published on October 2013, available at <https://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp content/uploads/DAP/Note on the Special Purpose Funds _Released - Oct 2013.pdf>

^[76] Sec Art. VIII, Sec. 3 for the Judiciary, Art. IX, Sec. 5, Common Provisions for the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, Art. XI, Sec. 14 for the Office of the Ombudsman, Art. XIII, Sec. 17(4) for the Commission on Human Rights; see also Art. X, Sec. 6 requiring the automatic release of the just share of local government units in the national taxes.

^[77] Section 27. (1) x x x
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

^[78] J. Sereno, Concurring Opinion, Belgica, supra note 1, at 606.

^[79] Araullo Resolution, supra note 34, at 771.

^[80] 269 Phil. 472 (1990).

^[81] Belgica, supra note 1, at 552.

^[82] Araullo Decision, supra note 34.

^[83] Which is in fact what was done to the provisions in the 2014 Local Government Support Fund, discussed elsewhere in this Decision.

^[84] CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 27 provides: Section 27. (1) x x x
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Emphasis supplied)

^[85] Rollo, p. 18.

^[86] RA 10633, p. 850.

^[87] President's Veto Message, December 20, 2013, page 1109, R.A. No. 10633, which reads:

F. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FUND
The earmarking of specific appropriations for selected local government units (LGUs) under the ALGU-Local Government Support Fund, Special Provision No. 1 "Local Government Support Fund," page 850, may not be consistent with the objectives and prioritization of the Local Government Support Fund. Accordingly, I hereby direct the DBM to issue the guidelines in the equal availment of the Fund by LGUs. Indeed, National Government support ought to be responsive to the actual requirements of LGUs in the interest of genuine local development. (Emphasis supplied)