EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-10-2250 (Formerly A.M. No. 08-08-460-RTC), October 15, 2019 ]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE OFELIA TUAZON-PINTO, AND OFFICER-IN-CHARGE/LEGAL RESEARCHER RAQUEL L.D. CLARIN, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60, ANGELES CITY, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
No trial judge is ever justified to disobey for the sake of convenience or expediency the rules of procedure instituted by the Supreme Court to safeguard the right to be heard on the part of any of the parties, including the Government, especially in proceedings held for the annulment of marriage, or declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
The Case
This administrative case arises from the results and findings by the judicial audit conducted in 2008 on the pending cases of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Angeles City, presided by former Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto. Branch 60 has been designated to take cognizance of family-court cases.
Antecedents
On June 23, 2008, the Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its first partial report[1] indicating many irregularities and procedural lapses committed in relation to proceedings brought for annulment of marriage and in several criminal cases pending before Branch 60.
Among the irregularities and procedural lapses uncovered by the Judicial Audit Team were that several respondents in the proceedings brought for annulment of marriage had invoked the defense of improper venue based on the petitions having been filed in a "friendly court/forum;" that respondent Judge Pinto had inconsistently ruled on the admissibility of the barangay certifications submitted as proof of the places of residence of the petitioners concerned; the she had not been consistent in ordering the petitioners to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) with copies of the petitions; that she had allowed substituted service of the summons without strictly complying with the requirement to the effect that the sheriffs should resort to several attempts to cause personal service upon the respondents at least thrice on two different dates; that summons by publication had also been ordered without proof showing that the respondents had been served with the copies of the petitions; that she had been overly lenient in allowing the petitioners to avail themselves of the taking of depositions under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, and the depositions had been normally treated as the petitioners' testimonial evidence; that she had also directed the public prosecutor to conduct investigations despite the respondents not having yet filed their answers, or despite the periods for filing the answers not having yet expired; that she had proceeded without pre-trial and without issuing the orders requiring the public prosecutor to investigate and file reports; that there were several cases in which the respondents had not been duly served with copies of the orders or notices of pre-trial conference copies of the pre-trial brief, or notices of hearing; that in some other cases, she had proceeded with the pretrial in the absence of the parties themselves despite their counsels not being armed with special powers of attorney; that some decisions had appeared to have been hastily rendered; and that in all the decided cases, the RTC had simultaneously issued certificates of finality and decrees of absolute nullity of marriage.
Acting on the partial report, the OCA recommended on July 29, 2008 as follows:[2]
On October 22, 2008, the Judicial Audit Team submitted its additional report to include other cases that had undergone similar irregularities.[5]
On October 2008, the OSG submitted its compliance[6] stating that it had been informed and notified by Branch 60 of the family-court cases listed in the September 10, 2008 resolution of the Court, except as to 19 of them that the OSG listed therein.
On December 5, 2008, Clarin filed her partial compliance/explanation[7] clarifying that her issuance of commitment orders and orders of release without the written authority from Judge Pinto as the Presiding Judge had been the practice of her predecessors; and that she had only followed the practice in the exigency of the service.[8]
Judge Pinto sent her partial compliance/explanation on December 10, 2008,[9] and she stated therein that she did not issue the commitment orders in several criminal cases because the accused thereat had already been arrested and detained;[10] that she had at times allowed Clarin as her Officer-In-Charge to issue the commitment orders for purposes of expediency;[11] that there was no prohibition against any judge issuing any order to furnish the OSG with copies of the petitions for annulment of marriage because the petitioners in such proceedings had the duty to furnish the OSG;[12] that the summonses were properly served upon the respondents or defendants;[13] that her court allowed the taking of the testimonies of the petitioners or plaintiffs in advance for valid reasons subject to their recall as witnesses once their presence was needed;[14] that under the Rules of Court, the taking of the early testimony of witnesses through deposition could be allowed for valid reasons and without prejudice to requiring their appearance as witnesses whenever the need therefor should arise or the circumstances warranted;[15] that pre-trial notices were actually sent to the parties, including the respondents and the OSG;[16] that her court directed the public prosecutor to investigate in order to determine whether or not collusion between the parties existed;[17] and that she was not informed beforehand of the audit and the physical inventory of records, and was not furnished with the result and required to explain the lapses.[18]
On December 15, 2008, the Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation, and for the OCA to submit its report and recommendation within 15 days from receipt of the records.[19]
On January 28, 2009, Judge Pinto submitted her final compliance and explanation,[20] wherein she reiterated the arguments and explanations contained in her partial compliance/explanation.
In its memorandum dated June 2, 2010,[21] the OCA issued a final evaluation and report, and recommended therin as follows:
On October 11, 2010,[23] the Third Division of the Court resolved to formally docket this case as an administrative complaint against Judge Pinto and OIC/Legal Researcher Clarin; and required them to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings and other records already filed.
In their joint manifestation dated November 30, 2010, [24] the respondents manifested that they were submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings and other records on file.
Issue
Are the respondents administratively liable for the irregularities discovered by the Judicial Audit Team?
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings and recommendationd of the OCA.
I
Liability of Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto
The judicial audit conducted on Branch 60 uncovered many procedural violations committed by Judge Pinto in cases involving petitions for nullity and annulment of marriages that were in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Accordingly, we entirely agree with the OCA's recommendation that Judge Pinto was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and of gross inefficiency.
Anent gross ignorance of the law and procedure, the audit report copiously detailed how Judge Pinto had disregarded the law and procedure in handling the cases pending before her sala. The observations and findings contained in the audit report stood unrefuted by her. Among her gross errors and blunders were omitting to furnish to the OSG copies of the decisions she had rendered; granting motions to take advance testimonies and depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala; accepting pretrial briefs on the same days of the holding of the pre-trial conferences, and permitting the lawyers to take part in the pre-trial conferences despite not being authorized to do so through special powers of attorney; acting on and admitting formal offers of exhibits even before the respondents or the State could comment thereon;[25] and not giving notifications to the OSG regarding the progress of proceedings in at least 19 cases.[26] We should observe that any of these gross errors and blunders was sufficient to render her administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
The OCA listed other irregularities committed by Judge Pinto, namely: (a) the issuance of a certificate of finality without proof that the respondent was already furnished a copy of the decision; (b) the issuance of a copy of the decision despite the fact that the copy of the decision supposedly sent to the respondent had been returned for the reason of "wrong address"; (c) the issuance of an order declaring her decision final and executory despite the fact that a copy of the decision had been returned with the marking "respondent unknown;" (d) the failure to act on the OSG's motion seeking to be furnished with a copy of the decision; (e) her amending in one case of her original decision by inserting a new date and place of the marriage in question, and such amended decision was not furnished to the respondent; (f) her admitting the formal offer of evidence of the petitioner without first giving the respondent and the public prosecutor the opportunity and time to comment thereon; (f) the acceptance of the pre-trial brief of the petitioner on the same day the pretrial conference was held; and (g) the issuance of the summons to the parties on May 8, 2006 although the case was raffled to her sala only on May 9, 2006.[27] Such other irregularities, singly or collectively, were themselves gross and blatant violations of the rules of procedure and the basic guidelines for ensuring that proceedings initiated to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of a marriage are insulated from vice and fraud.
Although Judge Pinto sought to justify her having granted motions to take advance testimonies and depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala by contending that she had seen nothing wrong in so doing if the cases were bound to end up in her sala anyway because her court was the only family court in the area,[28] such justification was still unacceptable because her doing so rather evinced her unconcealed partiality that was the very antithesis of her oath to do justice. No judge in her shoes should grant such motions prematurely and rashly because acting thereon before the records have been brought to her official cognizance revealed an injudicious and cavalier attitude towards the judicial functions and office.
Judge Pinto was clearly guilty of gross ignorance oflaw and procedure. It is not debatable that when the law or rule of procedure is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. This is because a judge is expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Indeed, Judge Pinto was expected to keep abreast of our laws, changes therein, as well as with the latest jurisprudence and rules of procedure, for she owed it to the public to be legally knowledgeable because ignorance ofthe law and procedure is the mainspring of injustice. By virtue of the delicate position that she occupied in society, she was duty bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity.[29]
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of the judicial office. Judge Pinto's flagrant disregard of laws and the rules of procedure affected her competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of her official functions. She thereby ignored that the rules of procedure have been instituted to guarantee the speedy and efficient administration of justice, such that the failure to abide by said rules weakens the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. According, all judges should ensure strict compliance with the rules of procedure at all times in their respective jurisdictions.[30]
The blatant and unwarranted disregard by Judge Pinto of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and other rules rendered her guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.[31] In Office of the Court Adminstrator v. Castaneda,[32] the penalty of dismissal from the service was imposed on the respondent judge for the serious disregard of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC because the disregard amounted to gross ignorance of the law and procedure.[33] Citing Pesayco v. Layague,[34] the Court pointed out therein that-
The justification of Judge Pinto for Clarin's actions on the commitment or release orders was flimsy. No law or rule permitted or authorized Judge Pinto to abdicate her essential judicial responsibilities by delegating them to her clerical subordinate, even if the latter was her designated Officer-in-Charge. The task of issuing the commitment or release orders required the exercise of judicial discretion and was not merely clerical or administrative. It pertained to Judge Pinto, and could not be transferred to her subordinate even for a brief moment. As a result, Judge Pinto's failure to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure seriously compromised her ability to be an effective magistrate.[37] The convenience of any party cannot ever justify the flagrant disregard of such laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure.
The sum of Judge Pinto's lapses and irregularities warranted the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, in Re: Anonymous Letter dated August 12, 2010, Complaining against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga,[38] we already imposed on her the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[39] Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service as recommended by the OCA is no longer feasible. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to impose the penalty of fine in the maximum, i.e., P40,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if any.
II
Liability of Officer-in-Charge/
Legal Researcher Raquel D.L. Clarin
As regards the liability of respondent Clarin, the OCA's recommendation is similarly well-taken.
Based on the judicial audit conducted by the OCA, Clarin miserably failed to meet the standards required of her designation as the Officer-in-Charge. She thereby discharged functions that could not be validly discharged by her, and at the same time did not perform the duties incumbent upon her to do. Her excuse that she had merely continued the practice followed prior to her designation as the Officer-in-Charge did not absolve her. She was all too aware that upon accepting such designation she would be assuming duties and responsibilities that would require utmost efficiency and fidelity on her part. That her predecessor had done the work contrary to the prevailing administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks of court at hand did not warrant her disregarding such guidelines.
In Ortiz, Jr. v. De Guzman,[40] the issuance of a release order was emphasized to be a judicial function, not an administrative one. Hence, a clerk of court is not authorized to order the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses. Ortiz, Jr. reminded that respondent had arrogated to himself the authority to exercise judicial discretion and overstepped the boundaries of his function.[41] Similarly, Clarin exceeded her authority in issuing the commitment orders and release orders. She must be meted the penalty of suspension from the service. As held in Nones v. Ormita, Clerk of Court II,[42] a misconduct of the same nature is punished with suspension of three months and one day.
We reiterate that the conduct of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Thus, they must be reminded that the Court will not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of anyone involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[43] This Court has always valued high standards in judicial service. Time and time again, this Court has reminded that the behavior of all officials and employees involved in the administration of justice is bounded with a heavy burden of responsibility; hence, their conduct should, at all times, embody propriety, prudence, courtesy and dignity in order to maintain public respect and confidence in the judicial service.[44]
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES:
1. JUDGE OFELIA TUAZON-PINTO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Angeles City, Branch 60, Angeles City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW/PROCEDURE and GROSS INEFFICIENCY, and PUNISHES her with a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave benefits, if any; and
2. MS. RAQUEL D.L. CLARIN, Officer-in-Charge/Legal Researcher, RTC of Angeles City, Branch 60, Angeles City, GUILTY of MISCONDUCT, and hereby SUSPENDS her from the service for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and, Zalameda, JJ., concur.
J. Reyes, Jr., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 92-207.
[2] Id. at 1-20.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 208-259.
[5] Id. at 2783.
[6] Id. at 301-305.
[7] Id. at 353-367.
[8] Id. at 353-354.
[9] Id. at 761-812.
[10] Id. at 763-764.
[11] Id. at 764
[12] Id. at 764-765.
[13] Id. at 771-776.
[14] Id. at 784.
[15] Id. at 786-788.
[16] Id. at 788-794.
[17] Id. at 795.
[18] Id. at 810.
[19] Id. at 328-332.
[20] Id. at 830-893.
[21] Id. at 2782-2799.
[22] Id. at 2795.
[23] Id. at 2801.
[24] Id. at 2803.
[25] Id. at 2796.
[26] Id. at 2795.
[27] Id. at 2789-2793.
[28] Id. at 2796.
[29] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lerma, A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2077, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2079 & RTJ-07-2080, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 698, 716-717.
[30] Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2465 (Notice), March 13, 2018.
[32] A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 321.
[33] Id. at 339-340.
[34] A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.
[35] Id. at 459.
[36] Id. at 764.
[37] Office of the Court Administrator v. Yu, A.M. Nos. MTJ-12-1813, 12-1-09-MeTC, MTJ-13-1836, MTJ-12-1815, OCA IPI Nos. 11-2398-MTJ, 11-2399-MTJ, 11-2378-MTJ, 12-2456-MTJ & A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, November 22, 2016, 809 SCRA 399, 509.
[38] A.M. No. RTJ-11-2289, October 2, 2012, 682 SCRA 146.
[39] Id. at 152.
[40] A.M. No. P-03-1708 (Resolution),February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 392.
[41] Id. at 401.
[42] A.M. No. P-01-1532, 9 October 2002, 390 SCRA 519.
[43] Office of the Court Administrator v. Buencamino, A.M. Nos. P-05-2051 & 05-4-118-MeTC, January 21, 2014, 714 SCRA 322, 334-335.
[44] In re: Partial Report on the Results of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1572, January 30, 2008, 543 SCRA 105, 129-130.
This administrative case arises from the results and findings by the judicial audit conducted in 2008 on the pending cases of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, in Angeles City, presided by former Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto. Branch 60 has been designated to take cognizance of family-court cases.
On June 23, 2008, the Judicial Audit Team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its first partial report[1] indicating many irregularities and procedural lapses committed in relation to proceedings brought for annulment of marriage and in several criminal cases pending before Branch 60.
Among the irregularities and procedural lapses uncovered by the Judicial Audit Team were that several respondents in the proceedings brought for annulment of marriage had invoked the defense of improper venue based on the petitions having been filed in a "friendly court/forum;" that respondent Judge Pinto had inconsistently ruled on the admissibility of the barangay certifications submitted as proof of the places of residence of the petitioners concerned; the she had not been consistent in ordering the petitioners to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) with copies of the petitions; that she had allowed substituted service of the summons without strictly complying with the requirement to the effect that the sheriffs should resort to several attempts to cause personal service upon the respondents at least thrice on two different dates; that summons by publication had also been ordered without proof showing that the respondents had been served with the copies of the petitions; that she had been overly lenient in allowing the petitioners to avail themselves of the taking of depositions under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, and the depositions had been normally treated as the petitioners' testimonial evidence; that she had also directed the public prosecutor to conduct investigations despite the respondents not having yet filed their answers, or despite the periods for filing the answers not having yet expired; that she had proceeded without pre-trial and without issuing the orders requiring the public prosecutor to investigate and file reports; that there were several cases in which the respondents had not been duly served with copies of the orders or notices of pre-trial conference copies of the pre-trial brief, or notices of hearing; that in some other cases, she had proceeded with the pretrial in the absence of the parties themselves despite their counsels not being armed with special powers of attorney; that some decisions had appeared to have been hastily rendered; and that in all the decided cases, the RTC had simultaneously issued certificates of finality and decrees of absolute nullity of marriage.
Acting on the partial report, the OCA recommended on July 29, 2008 as follows:[2]
On September 10, 2008, the Court adopted the recommendations of the OCA, and placed Judge Pinto and respondent Racquel L.D. Clarin under preventive suspension.[4]x x x x
- The designation of the RTC, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga presided over by Judge Ofelia Tuazon[-]Pinto as special court for family court cases, be REVOKED effective immediately from receipt of notice;
- The designation of Ms. Racquel D.L. Clarin as Officer-In-Charge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, be REVOKED immediately from receipt of notice;
- Judge Ofelia Tuazon[-]Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, and Officer-In-Charge Racquel D.L. Clarin, same court, be PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED from office effective immediately from receipt of notice;
x x x x
- Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City be DIRECTED to: EXPLAIN within fifteen (15) days from notice why she should not be administratively dealt with for : (1) FAILURE to issue the Commitment Order when the accused was already arrested and detained in the following criminal cases; Nos. 04-619 (Pp. vs. D. Flores), 07-30355 (Pp. vs. R. Salisi), 05-1301 (Pp. vs. W. Pineda), 01-522 to 53 (Pp. vs. E. Edillor), 03-237 to 38 (Pp. vs. F. Tolentino, et al.), 07-2750 (Pp. vs. R. Marimla), 00-212 (Pp. vs. T. Miranda), 06-2535 (Pp. vs. J. De La Cruz), 02-795 (H. Sanchez), 06-2086 (Pp. vs. N Cayabyab); (2) ALLOWING the issuance of Commitment Order by the Officer-In-Charge or Acting Branch Clerk of Court in the following Criminal Cases Nos. 01-326 (Pp. vs. J. Avaristo), 02-725 to 76 (Pp. vs. C. Marcos), 01-805 (Pp. vs. R. Siron), 03-767 (Pp. vs. Magabilin), 01-750 (Pp. vs. N. Malonzo), 02-033 (Pp. vs. L. Dizon), 03-417 (Pp. vs. J. David), and 01-653 (Pp. vs. A. Panlilio); (3) ALLOWING the issuance of Release Order by the Officer-In-Charge or Acting Branch Clerk of Court in the following Criminal Cases Nos. 03-860 (Pp. vs. H Williams), 02-182 (L. Pineda), 01-516 (Pp. vs. R. Manalang), 03-691 (Pp. vs. B. Edwards), 03-698 (Pp. vs. B. Edwards), 04-242 (Pp. vs. R. Edwards) 96-540 to [5]42 (Pp. vs. H Gill), and 98-489 (Pp. vs. Sical Jr.); and (4) FAILURE to comply with the pertinent rules under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC (Re: Rule on Adoption) and other pertinent rules under the Rules of Court, to wit:
For issuing an order directing the public prosecutor to investigate when the summons was not yet duly served upon the respondent/defendant or when the answer has not yet been filed or submitted in court or the period to file/submit the same has not yet expired in the following cases: Civil Cases Nos. 13556 (Reyes vs. Reyes), 13501 (Figueroa vs. Figueroa), 13563 (Bondoc vs. Bondoc), 13246 (Bonifacio vs. Bonifacio), 13110 (Ocampo vs. Ocampo), 13021 (De Leon vs. De Leon), 12844 (Peralta vs. Peralta), 13580 (Ocampo vs. Ocampo), 13063 (Pinzon vs. Pinzon), 13544 (Mallen vs. Mallen).
For allowing the marking of exhibits in Civil Case No. 13401(Pecson vs. Pecson) by presenting the duplicate copies only and no comparison was made with its original copy particularly the passport of the petitioner which was presented and marked Exhibit "C" and the rest of the other exhibits presented.
- Ms. Racquel Dalida-Clarin, Officer-In-Charge/Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, be DIRECTED to EXPLAIN within fifteen (15) days from notice why she should not be administratively dealt with for:
(a) Issuing the commitment order without the written authority from the presiding judge in the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 01-326 (Pp. vs. J Avaristo), 02-725 to 76 (Pp.vs. C. Marcos), 01-805 (Pp. vs. R. Siron), 03-767 (Pp. vs. Magabilin), 01-750 (Pp. vs. N Malonzo), 02-033 (Pp. vs. L. Dizon), 03-417 (Pp. vs. J David), and 01-653 (Pp. vs. A. Panlilio).
(b) Issuing the Order of Release without the written authority from the presiding judge in the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 03-860 (Pp. vs. H William), 02-182 (L. Pineda), 01-516 (Pp. vs. R. Manalang), 03-691 (Pp. vs. B. Edwards), 03-698 (Pp. vs. B. Edwards), 04-242 (Pp. vs. B. Edwards), 96-540 to 42 (Pp. vs. H. Gill), and 98-489 (Pp. vs. Sical, Jr.)
(c) Failure to issue the Certificate of Arraignment in the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 03-685 to 87 (Pp. vs. J Torres, et al.), 00-683 to 84 (Pp. vs. A. Libu, et al.), 00-534 (Pp. vs. R. Baluyot), 01-574 (Pp. vs. R. Calma), 01-855 (Pp. vs. J Omerga), 06-1780 (Pp. vs. A. Ledesma), 00-732 (Pp vs De Musa, et al.), 06-2591 (Pp. vs. J Cunanan), 94-851 (Pp. vs. Marfilla, Jr.), 03-861 (Pp. vs. R. Castro), 03-877 (Pp. vs. R. Ragasa), 97-192 (Pp. vs. Magtoto), 97-193 (Pp. vs. E. Serrano, et.al.), 03-601 (Pp. vs. J. Rueda), 05-1301 (Pp. vs. W. Pineda), 03-417 (Pp. vs. J. David), 03-834 (Pp. vs. J. Servano, Jr.), 04-045 (Pp. vs. A. Ubay), 01-522 to 53 (Pp. vs. E. Edillor), 07-2810 (Pp. vs. W. Cayanan), and 99-1172 to 73 (Pp. vs. E. David).
(d) Accepting and consequently attaching to the record of the case the pleading/document in the following cases when such pleading/document has "no stamp received": Civil Case Nos. 13501 (Figueroa vs. Figueroa, Re: Ex-Parte Motion for Leave of Court to take Advance Deposition), 13393 (Siongco vs. Siongco, Re: Motion to Take Deposition of Petitioner, 13510 (Marcelino vs. Marcelino, Re: Petioner's Pre-Trial Brief) and the Special Power of Attorney), 12865 (Martin vs Martin, Re: Petitioner's Pre-Trial Brief).
(e) Failure to maintain a centralized record book of all incoming documents, communication, pleadings and other documents of similar import.
(f) Failure to maintain a control logbook for all registered mails.
(g) Allowing the late release of the copy of the Order dated 10/01/07 (re: the Order submitting the case for decision) in Civil Case No. 13437 (Azuro vs. Azuro) on 10/30/07 or after the decision was rendered on 10/10/07.
(h) Allowing the late release of the copy of the Decision dated 10/24/04 in Civil Case No. 10944 (Lising vs. Lising) on 03/18/05.
(i) Allowing the late release ofthe copy of the Notice setting the pre-trial conference (PTC) in Civil Case No. 12590 (Toledo vs. Toledo) on 05/17/06 when the said PTC was set in the court calendar on 05/18/06 per Order dated 04/27/06.
(j) Allowing the early release of the copy of the Decision dated 12/05/07 in Civil Case No. 13405 (Morales vs. Morales) to the petitioner on 12/07/07 when such decision was officially released on 12/31/07.
(k) Allowing the early release of the copy of the Order dated 01/30/07 in Civil Case No. 13263 (Tuazon vs. Tuazon) to the public prosecutor on 02/04/07 when such Order was officially released on 02/07/07.
(l) Allowing the early release of the copy of the Decision dated 01/04/08 in Civil Case No. 13583 (Atienza vs. Atienza) to the petitioner and respondent on 11/11/08 and the OSG on 01/21/08 when such decision was officially released on 01/30/08.
(m) Allowing the early release of the copy of the Decision dated 12/27/07 in Civil Case No. 13386 (Masamayor vs. Kin Din Tsoi) to the petitioner and the latter's counsel on 01/24/08 when such decision was officially released on 01/30/08.
(n) Allowing the belated preparation of the accompanying Order of the Minutes dated 07/30/07 (re: cross-examination of the petitioner) in Civil Case No. 12896 (Patriarca vs. Patriarca) during the audit.
(o) Allowing the release of the copy of the Decision dated 11/19/07 in Civil Case No. 13349 for petitioner and respondent to one and the same person on 11/29/07 as shown by the identical signature appearing in the attached registry return receipt;
(p) Failure to cause the preparation of the accompanying Order of the Minutes dated 12/17/07 in Civil Case No. 13482 Tiopenco vs. Tiopenco.
(q) Failure to furnish the respondent with the copy of the order or notice of pre-trial conference in the following cases: Civil Cases Nos. 13324 (Masangkay vs. Masangkay), 13067 (Honnald vs. Honnald), 13137 (Mallari vs. Mallari), 11257 (Calma vs. Calma), 13178 (David vs. David), 13246 (Bonifacio vs. Bonifacio), 13110 (Ocampo vs. Ocampo), 12844 (Peralta vs. Peralta), 13342 (Aguilar vs. Aguilar), 13363 (Bustillos vs. Bustillos), 12954 (Reyes vs. Reyes), 12897 (Merlin vs. Merlin), 12460 (Canlas vs. Canlas), 13150 (Canlas vs. Canlas), 13230 (De Le Blanc vs. De Le Blanc), 12443 (Nunga vs. Nunga), 13262 (Rosario vs. Rosario), 13072 (Thong vs. Thong), 12504 (Quirante vs. Quirante), 13053 (Samson vs. Samson), 12779 (Manalastas vs. Manalastas), 12766 (Palean vs. Palean), 13457 (Dalatre vs. Dalatre), 12056 (Mungcal vs. Mungcal), 13112 (Dillon vs Dillon), 13069 (Cabrera vs. Cabrera), 12749 (So vs. So), 12819 (Balonza vs. Balonza), 13136 (Sangil vs. Sangil), 13091 (Lacson vs. Lacson), 12708 (Humphries vs. Humphries), 13278 (Ignacio vs. Ignacio), 12998 (Malig vs. Malig), l13321 (Morales vs. Morales), 13544 (Mallen vs. Mallen), 12766 (Espinosa vs. Espinosa), 13500 (Turia vs. Turia), 13507 (Catacutan vs. Catacutan), 13477 (Patio vs. Patio), 12864 (Cruz vs. Cruz), 13107 (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez), 12534 (Felix vs. Felix), 13523 (Manuntag vs. Manuntag), 12853 (Medina vs. Medina), 12758 (Fernandez vs. Fernandez), 13086 (Bonifacio vs. Bonifacio), 13568 (Barco vs. Barco), 12784 (Garcia vs. Garcia), 12820 (De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz), 13550 (Ramos vs. Ramos), 13158 (Aguilar vs. Aguilar), 13377 (Dogmoc vs. Dogmoc), 13171 (Dumangan vs. Dumangan), 13463 (Salonga vs. Salonga), 12625 (Lacap vs. Lacap), 12918 (Rabe vs. Rabe), 12746 (Relucio vs. Relucio), 13164 (Cunanan vs. Cunanan), 13519 (Ordonez vs. Ordonez), 12775 (Mendoza vs. Mendoza), 12921 (Magat vs. Magat), 13515 (Chan vs .Chan), 13522 (Lumanlan vs. Lumanlan), 13510 (Marcelino vs. Marcelino), 13386 (Lovelle Masamayor vs. Kin Din Tsoi), 12373 (Reyes vs. Reyes).
(r) Failure to furnish the respondent with the copy of the pre-trial order (PTO) in Civil Cases Nos. 13266 (Lugtu vs. Lugtu, PTO dated 03/05/07), 13510 (Marcelino vs. Marcelino, PTO dated 06/28/07).
(s) Allowing the delay in sending the [N]otices of [H]earing in Civil Case No. 12844 (Peralta vs. Peralta) particularly the Notice setting the trial on 01/24/08 which was received by the respondent's lawyer only on 03/27/08.
(t) Allowing the delay in sending the Notices of Hearing to the respondent due to erroneous address in Civil Case No. 13072 (Thong vs. Thong).
(u) Failure to furnish the respondent with the Order or Notice of Hearing setting the presentation of respondent's evidence in the following cases: Civil Case Nos. 13556 (Reyes vs Reyes), 13324 (Masangkay vs. Masangkay), 12288 (Canlas vs. Canlas), 13246 (Bonifacio vs. Bonifacio).
(v) Failure to furnish the respondent with the copy of the petition and Order (re: Summons by Publication) at the respondent's last known address in Civil Case No. 13417 (Tonogai vs. Tonogai, Re: Order dated 03/28/07), 11965 (Libut vs. Libut, Re: Order dated 03/14/07), 13063 (Pinzon vs. Pinzon, Re: Order dated 02/05/08), 13510 (Marcelino vs Marcelino).
(w)Allowing the belated filing of the Minutes dated 01/10/08 in Civil Case No. 13496 (Sali vs. Sali) in the court record since it appears that it has been "merely inserted" after the decision was rendered in the said case.
(x) Allowing the belated filing of the Order dated 08/08/06 in Civil Case No. 12822 (Espiritu vs. Espiritu) in the court record as it was placed in the record after the Order dated 01/17/07 and before the Minutes dated02/25/07.
(y) For failure to furnish the OSG and/or the respondent with the copy of the decision in the following cases: Civil Case Nos. 13178 (David vs. David), 11405 (De La Pena vs. De La Pena), 13393 (Siongco vs. Siongco), 12653 (Ibanez vs. Ibanez), 13132 (Pineda vs. Pineda), 11900 (Santos vs. Santos), 12324 (Escobar vs. Escobar), 12373 (Reyes vs. Reyes), 13522 (Lumanlan vs. Lumanlan), 12288 (Canlas vs. Canlas).
(z) For failure to furnish the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the marriage was registered with the copy of the decision in the following cases despite the court's directive in the Decision: Civil Case Nos. 12443 (Nunga vs. Nunga), and SP-7680 (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Minor Camille Keith Sebastian), 13470 (Isidro vs. Isidro).
(aa) No Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) was attached to the record of Civil Case No. 13386 (Masamayor vs. Kin Din Q Tsoi).
(bb) No Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) was attached to the record of Civil Case No. 12373 (Reyes vs. Reyes) particularly the petitioner's direct and cross-examination on 03/27/06 and 04/17/06, respectively.
(cc) In all the Minutes of Proceedings/Court Session, she did not affix her signature.
(dd) Failure to cause the pagination and stitching of all court records.
(ee) Failure to cause the chronological arrangement and proper filing of court records according to date or sequence of receipt of records.
(ff) Failure to cause the attachment of registry return receipts/slip in the record of all cases.
(gg) Failure to attach the copy of decided/ terminated cases and complete said list of the said cases in the Monthly Report of Cases for the entire Calendar Year 2007.
(hh) Failure to cause the preparation of the accompanying order on the Minutes of Proceedings/Court Sessions which cancel/postpone/reset the trial or hearing of cases due to the absence of the presiding judge, public prosecutor or one of the parties to the case.[3]
On October 22, 2008, the Judicial Audit Team submitted its additional report to include other cases that had undergone similar irregularities.[5]
On October 2008, the OSG submitted its compliance[6] stating that it had been informed and notified by Branch 60 of the family-court cases listed in the September 10, 2008 resolution of the Court, except as to 19 of them that the OSG listed therein.
On December 5, 2008, Clarin filed her partial compliance/explanation[7] clarifying that her issuance of commitment orders and orders of release without the written authority from Judge Pinto as the Presiding Judge had been the practice of her predecessors; and that she had only followed the practice in the exigency of the service.[8]
Judge Pinto sent her partial compliance/explanation on December 10, 2008,[9] and she stated therein that she did not issue the commitment orders in several criminal cases because the accused thereat had already been arrested and detained;[10] that she had at times allowed Clarin as her Officer-In-Charge to issue the commitment orders for purposes of expediency;[11] that there was no prohibition against any judge issuing any order to furnish the OSG with copies of the petitions for annulment of marriage because the petitioners in such proceedings had the duty to furnish the OSG;[12] that the summonses were properly served upon the respondents or defendants;[13] that her court allowed the taking of the testimonies of the petitioners or plaintiffs in advance for valid reasons subject to their recall as witnesses once their presence was needed;[14] that under the Rules of Court, the taking of the early testimony of witnesses through deposition could be allowed for valid reasons and without prejudice to requiring their appearance as witnesses whenever the need therefor should arise or the circumstances warranted;[15] that pre-trial notices were actually sent to the parties, including the respondents and the OSG;[16] that her court directed the public prosecutor to investigate in order to determine whether or not collusion between the parties existed;[17] and that she was not informed beforehand of the audit and the physical inventory of records, and was not furnished with the result and required to explain the lapses.[18]
On December 15, 2008, the Court referred this case to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation, and for the OCA to submit its report and recommendation within 15 days from receipt of the records.[19]
On January 28, 2009, Judge Pinto submitted her final compliance and explanation,[20] wherein she reiterated the arguments and explanations contained in her partial compliance/explanation.
In its memorandum dated June 2, 2010,[21] the OCA issued a final evaluation and report, and recommended therin as follows:
According to the OCA, the lapses discovered by the Judicial Audit Team were not mere "isolated incidents;" that procedural blunders had been committed by the respondents; and that the lapses ranged from the subtle to the most glaring.[22]x x x x
- The matter be FORMALLY DOCKETED as an administrative complaint against Judge Ofelia Tuazon-Pinto and Officer-in-Charge/Legal Researcher Raquel D.L. Clarin, both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City;
- Judge Ofelia Tuazon-Pinto be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law/Procedure and Gross Inefficiency;
- Officer-in-Charge/Legal Researcher Raquel D.L. Clarin be SUSPENDED for three (3) months and one (1) day, effective immediately for misconduct with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with separately;
On October 11, 2010,[23] the Third Division of the Court resolved to formally docket this case as an administrative complaint against Judge Pinto and OIC/Legal Researcher Clarin; and required them to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings and other records already filed.
In their joint manifestation dated November 30, 2010, [24] the respondents manifested that they were submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings and other records on file.
Are the respondents administratively liable for the irregularities discovered by the Judicial Audit Team?
The Court adopts the findings and recommendationd of the OCA.
Liability of Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto
The judicial audit conducted on Branch 60 uncovered many procedural violations committed by Judge Pinto in cases involving petitions for nullity and annulment of marriages that were in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Accordingly, we entirely agree with the OCA's recommendation that Judge Pinto was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and of gross inefficiency.
Anent gross ignorance of the law and procedure, the audit report copiously detailed how Judge Pinto had disregarded the law and procedure in handling the cases pending before her sala. The observations and findings contained in the audit report stood unrefuted by her. Among her gross errors and blunders were omitting to furnish to the OSG copies of the decisions she had rendered; granting motions to take advance testimonies and depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala; accepting pretrial briefs on the same days of the holding of the pre-trial conferences, and permitting the lawyers to take part in the pre-trial conferences despite not being authorized to do so through special powers of attorney; acting on and admitting formal offers of exhibits even before the respondents or the State could comment thereon;[25] and not giving notifications to the OSG regarding the progress of proceedings in at least 19 cases.[26] We should observe that any of these gross errors and blunders was sufficient to render her administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
The OCA listed other irregularities committed by Judge Pinto, namely: (a) the issuance of a certificate of finality without proof that the respondent was already furnished a copy of the decision; (b) the issuance of a copy of the decision despite the fact that the copy of the decision supposedly sent to the respondent had been returned for the reason of "wrong address"; (c) the issuance of an order declaring her decision final and executory despite the fact that a copy of the decision had been returned with the marking "respondent unknown;" (d) the failure to act on the OSG's motion seeking to be furnished with a copy of the decision; (e) her amending in one case of her original decision by inserting a new date and place of the marriage in question, and such amended decision was not furnished to the respondent; (f) her admitting the formal offer of evidence of the petitioner without first giving the respondent and the public prosecutor the opportunity and time to comment thereon; (f) the acceptance of the pre-trial brief of the petitioner on the same day the pretrial conference was held; and (g) the issuance of the summons to the parties on May 8, 2006 although the case was raffled to her sala only on May 9, 2006.[27] Such other irregularities, singly or collectively, were themselves gross and blatant violations of the rules of procedure and the basic guidelines for ensuring that proceedings initiated to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of a marriage are insulated from vice and fraud.
Although Judge Pinto sought to justify her having granted motions to take advance testimonies and depositions even before the records of the cases were transmitted to her sala by contending that she had seen nothing wrong in so doing if the cases were bound to end up in her sala anyway because her court was the only family court in the area,[28] such justification was still unacceptable because her doing so rather evinced her unconcealed partiality that was the very antithesis of her oath to do justice. No judge in her shoes should grant such motions prematurely and rashly because acting thereon before the records have been brought to her official cognizance revealed an injudicious and cavalier attitude towards the judicial functions and office.
Judge Pinto was clearly guilty of gross ignorance oflaw and procedure. It is not debatable that when the law or rule of procedure is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. This is because a judge is expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Indeed, Judge Pinto was expected to keep abreast of our laws, changes therein, as well as with the latest jurisprudence and rules of procedure, for she owed it to the public to be legally knowledgeable because ignorance ofthe law and procedure is the mainspring of injustice. By virtue of the delicate position that she occupied in society, she was duty bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity.[29]
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of the judicial office. Judge Pinto's flagrant disregard of laws and the rules of procedure affected her competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of her official functions. She thereby ignored that the rules of procedure have been instituted to guarantee the speedy and efficient administration of justice, such that the failure to abide by said rules weakens the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. According, all judges should ensure strict compliance with the rules of procedure at all times in their respective jurisdictions.[30]
The blatant and unwarranted disregard by Judge Pinto of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and other rules rendered her guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.[31] In Office of the Court Adminstrator v. Castaneda,[32] the penalty of dismissal from the service was imposed on the respondent judge for the serious disregard of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC because the disregard amounted to gross ignorance of the law and procedure.[33] Citing Pesayco v. Layague,[34] the Court pointed out therein that-
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge's hands.[35]Anent the charge of gross inefficiency, Judge Pinto did not refute the audit team's finding that she had allowed respondent Clarin to issue commitment or release orders in some instances. In her partial compliance/explanation, however, she would justify this by insisting on her doing so out of her desire to expedite the proceedings, for in that way the arresting officers and the accused would no longer need to wait for her to be done with her sessions and trials before the release of the accused could be ordered.[36]
The justification of Judge Pinto for Clarin's actions on the commitment or release orders was flimsy. No law or rule permitted or authorized Judge Pinto to abdicate her essential judicial responsibilities by delegating them to her clerical subordinate, even if the latter was her designated Officer-in-Charge. The task of issuing the commitment or release orders required the exercise of judicial discretion and was not merely clerical or administrative. It pertained to Judge Pinto, and could not be transferred to her subordinate even for a brief moment. As a result, Judge Pinto's failure to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure seriously compromised her ability to be an effective magistrate.[37] The convenience of any party cannot ever justify the flagrant disregard of such laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure.
The sum of Judge Pinto's lapses and irregularities warranted the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, in Re: Anonymous Letter dated August 12, 2010, Complaining against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga,[38] we already imposed on her the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.[39] Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service as recommended by the OCA is no longer feasible. Nonetheless, we deem it proper to impose the penalty of fine in the maximum, i.e., P40,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if any.
Liability of Officer-in-Charge/
Legal Researcher Raquel D.L. Clarin
As regards the liability of respondent Clarin, the OCA's recommendation is similarly well-taken.
Based on the judicial audit conducted by the OCA, Clarin miserably failed to meet the standards required of her designation as the Officer-in-Charge. She thereby discharged functions that could not be validly discharged by her, and at the same time did not perform the duties incumbent upon her to do. Her excuse that she had merely continued the practice followed prior to her designation as the Officer-in-Charge did not absolve her. She was all too aware that upon accepting such designation she would be assuming duties and responsibilities that would require utmost efficiency and fidelity on her part. That her predecessor had done the work contrary to the prevailing administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks of court at hand did not warrant her disregarding such guidelines.
In Ortiz, Jr. v. De Guzman,[40] the issuance of a release order was emphasized to be a judicial function, not an administrative one. Hence, a clerk of court is not authorized to order the commitment or the release on bail of persons charged with penal offenses. Ortiz, Jr. reminded that respondent had arrogated to himself the authority to exercise judicial discretion and overstepped the boundaries of his function.[41] Similarly, Clarin exceeded her authority in issuing the commitment orders and release orders. She must be meted the penalty of suspension from the service. As held in Nones v. Ormita, Clerk of Court II,[42] a misconduct of the same nature is punished with suspension of three months and one day.
We reiterate that the conduct of all court personnel is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Thus, they must be reminded that the Court will not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of anyone involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.[43] This Court has always valued high standards in judicial service. Time and time again, this Court has reminded that the behavior of all officials and employees involved in the administration of justice is bounded with a heavy burden of responsibility; hence, their conduct should, at all times, embody propriety, prudence, courtesy and dignity in order to maintain public respect and confidence in the judicial service.[44]
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES:
1. JUDGE OFELIA TUAZON-PINTO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Angeles City, Branch 60, Angeles City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW/PROCEDURE and GROSS INEFFICIENCY, and PUNISHES her with a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave benefits, if any; and
2. MS. RAQUEL D.L. CLARIN, Officer-in-Charge/Legal Researcher, RTC of Angeles City, Branch 60, Angeles City, GUILTY of MISCONDUCT, and hereby SUSPENDS her from the service for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and, Zalameda, JJ., concur.
J. Reyes, Jr., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 92-207.
[2] Id. at 1-20.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 208-259.
[5] Id. at 2783.
[6] Id. at 301-305.
[7] Id. at 353-367.
[8] Id. at 353-354.
[9] Id. at 761-812.
[10] Id. at 763-764.
[11] Id. at 764
[12] Id. at 764-765.
[13] Id. at 771-776.
[14] Id. at 784.
[15] Id. at 786-788.
[16] Id. at 788-794.
[17] Id. at 795.
[18] Id. at 810.
[19] Id. at 328-332.
[20] Id. at 830-893.
[21] Id. at 2782-2799.
[22] Id. at 2795.
[23] Id. at 2801.
[24] Id. at 2803.
[25] Id. at 2796.
[26] Id. at 2795.
[27] Id. at 2789-2793.
[28] Id. at 2796.
[29] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lerma, A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2077, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2079 & RTJ-07-2080, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 698, 716-717.
[30] Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2465 (Notice), March 13, 2018.
[32] A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316, October 9, 2012, 682 SCRA 321.
[33] Id. at 339-340.
[34] A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 450.
[35] Id. at 459.
[36] Id. at 764.
[37] Office of the Court Administrator v. Yu, A.M. Nos. MTJ-12-1813, 12-1-09-MeTC, MTJ-13-1836, MTJ-12-1815, OCA IPI Nos. 11-2398-MTJ, 11-2399-MTJ, 11-2378-MTJ, 12-2456-MTJ & A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, November 22, 2016, 809 SCRA 399, 509.
[38] A.M. No. RTJ-11-2289, October 2, 2012, 682 SCRA 146.
[39] Id. at 152.
[40] A.M. No. P-03-1708 (Resolution),February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 392.
[41] Id. at 401.
[42] A.M. No. P-01-1532, 9 October 2002, 390 SCRA 519.
[43] Office of the Court Administrator v. Buencamino, A.M. Nos. P-05-2051 & 05-4-118-MeTC, January 21, 2014, 714 SCRA 322, 334-335.
[44] In re: Partial Report on the Results of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1572, January 30, 2008, 543 SCRA 105, 129-130.