The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 94253:

1. Decision^[2] dated April 23, 2012 affirming the grant of respondent's petition for correction of entries and the trial court's directive for cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate;

2. Resolution^[3] dated August 30, 2012 denying the Republic's motion for reconsideration.

In his Petition for Correction of Entries^[4] dated July 30, 2007, respondent Charlie Mintas a.k.a. Shirley Mintas Felix essentially alleged that he was born on October 1, 1976 in Itogon, Benguet.  his birth was registered with the Local Civil Registrar (LCR)-Itogin, Benguet where his birth certificate bore the following erroneous entries: his first name "Shirley" instead of "Charlie," his gender "female" instead of "male," and his father's surname "Filex" instead of "Felix".  but he has another birth certificate carried the correct entries" his first name as Charlie, his gender as male, and his father's surname as "Felix".

In all his subsequent official transactions, he used the birth certificate registered with LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija.  But when he subsequently requested for authenticated copy of his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), what it officially released to him was the erroneous birth certificate with LCR-Itogon, Benguet.^[5]

He, thus, prayed for correction of his birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and cancellation of his second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.^[6]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicior General (OSG), prayed for the dismissal of the petition on ground that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet did not have jurisdiction over the LCR-Carranglan, nueva Ecija which ought to implement the directive for cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate,^[7] should be the same be granted by the trial court.

Following compliance with the requisite publication, notices and posting, the case was heard on the merits.  Respondent testified on his petition and offered his two (2) certificates of birth and other documents including the corresponding medical certificate and scrotal ultrasound result indicating that respondent is male.

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision^[8] dated July 23, 2009, the trial court granted the petition, in this wise:

WHEREFORE, there being satisfactory proof that the Order setting the case for hearing was duly published as directed; that the allegations of the petition are true and correct and that it is appearing that there is proper and valid cause for the grant of the relief prayed for.

IT IS HEREBY DECREED that for all legal intents and purposes, the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon, Benguet are ordered to change and correct from its records the following entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Charlie Mintas Felix, viz:

1. His sex/gender from female to MALE;

2. His first name from Shirley to CHARLIE; and

3. His father's surname from Filex to FELIX.

Furthermore, the Local Civil Registrar of Carranglan, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to cancel from its record the registration of the facts of birth of Charlie Mintas Felix.

Furnish copy of this Decision to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon, Benguet to correct its record and to issue an amended Birth Certificate to said Charlie Mintas Felix upon his request after payment of the required fees.

Further, furnish copies hereof to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati city; the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet; the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, Manila; the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet; the petitioner and his counsel.

SO ORDERED.^[9]

The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Republic assailed the trial court for taking cognizance of the case, albeit, it had no jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth registration therewith.^[10]

Respondent, nonetheless, countered that to require him to file another petition to cancel his second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija was unnecessary and would only result in the further clogging of the court docket.^[11]

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

By Decision^[12] dated April 23, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet had jurisdiction over the petition for correction of entries in respondent's first birth certificate with the LRC- Itogon, Benguet. The consequent cancellation of his second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija was merely incidental to and a necessary consequence of his action for correction of entries.^[13]

The Court of Appeals further held that the correction of respondent's NSO officially recognized birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and the consequent cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate with LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija may be joined in the same case for correction of entries. Splitting them violated the rule against multiplicity of suits.^[14]

The Republic's motion for reconsideration was denied through Resolution dated August 30, 2012.^[15]

The Present Petition

The Republic now urges the Court to exercise its discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the dispositions of the Court of Appeals.

The Republic repleads its argument that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet has no jurisdiction over the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, hence, could not have validly ordered the latter to cancel respondent's second birth certificate. According to the Republic, just because the second registration appears to be a mere surplus age does not cure the jurisdictional infirmity which incipiently tainted the proceedings below.^[16]

In refutation, respondent reiterates that the joinder of both actions for correction and cancellation of entries in respondent's birth certificates conformed with the rule against multiplicity of suits.^[17]

Issues

First. Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it rejected the Republic's challenge against the trial court's jurisdiction to direct the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth certificate as a consequence of its order to correct respondent's first birth certificate?

Second. Did Republic Act No. 9048 (RA 9048) as amended by Republic Act No. 10172 (RA 10172) divest the regional trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry?


Ruling

The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth certificate.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and connected therewith under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.

Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over respondent's petition for correction of entries in his first birth certificate on file with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet. The trial court has jurisdiction, as well, to direct the cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija as an incident or as a necessary consequence of the action to correct the entries sought by respondent. Indeed, demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not he within its cognizance.^[18]

Mendez vs. Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District, et al.^[19] is in point:

To rule that the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had decided on the issue of divorce, simply because it appears to contravene Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. "While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance."

Following the doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to resolve the issue of custody, it being a related issue to the main cause of action.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

A distinction must be made between a case for divorce wherein the issue of custody is an ancillary issue and a case where custody is the main issue. Jurisdiction in the former, as discussed above, lies with the ShCC, as the main cause of action is divorce. The latter on the other hand, where the main cause of action is one of custody, the same must be filed with the ShDC, pursuant to Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly affirmed the trial court's directive to cancel respondent's second birth certificate on file with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, as a consequence of the main relief sought by and granted to respondent. To file two (2) separate petitions, one for correction of entries in his first birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and two, for cancellation of his second birth certificate with LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija --- will certainly violate the rule against multiplicity of suits.

More important, a petition for correction is an action in rem. A decision therein binds not only the parties themselves but the whole world, as well. An in rem proceeding entails publication as a jurisdictional requirement--- to give notice to and bring the whole world as a party into the case. Surely, the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija is part of the world and based on the records, was in fact duly notified of the petition. Consequently, it is bound by the judgment rendered there in the case.

RA 9048, as amended does not divest
the regional trial courts of jurisdiction
over petitions for correction of entries
in the civil registry.

Relevant to the issue of jurisdiction, the Court now brings to fore what seems to be an overlap of jurisdictions over petitions for correction of entries under Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, on one hand, and RA Nos. 9048 as amended by 10172 on the other.

Sec. 19 of BP 129 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Deemed included therein are petitions for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, being themselves incapable of pecuniary estimation. Rule 108 states:

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Section 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Section 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Section 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

On April 22, 2001, RA 9048^[20] took effect, thus:

Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

xxx                               xxx                              xxx

Section 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. - Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

xxx                              xxx                             xxx
On August 15, 2012, R.A. No. 9048 was amended by R.A. No. 10172^[21] expanding the scope of the entries in the civil registry which may be administratively corrected, viz:

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9048, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations." (Emphasis supplied)

xxx                                           xxx                                          xxx
Here, respondent resorted to judicial proceedings when he sought the correction of the entries in his birth certificate. For while RA 9048 allowed the administrative correction of respondent's first name and the typographical error in his father's surname, it did not allow correction of the entry pertaining to respondent's biological sex.

For it was only on October 24, 2012 that the amendatory law RA 10172 took effect long before respondent initiated his petition with the court. Had RA 10172 taken effect on or before he initiated his petition, he could have resorted to the administrative process under these twin laws just for the purpose of correcting all at once the three (3) entries in his birth certificate.

He could have then saved a substantial amount of time and expense which precisely what RA Nos. 9048 and 10172 seek to accomplish, among others.

But then again, respondent's petition came before RA 10172 took effect, this time allowing correction of erroneous entries pertaining to one's biological sex. Surely, to pursue the administrative procedure prescribed under RA 9048 with respect to his first name and typographical error in his father's name and a judicial procedure under Rule 108 with respect to the correction of his biological sex is anathema to the proscription against splitting a cause of action under Section 4, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

Section 4, Rule 2. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

The next question is - Does RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 divest the regional trial courts of its jurisdiction over petitions for correction of entries under BP 129 in relation Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court?

Republic v. Gallo^[22] bears the answer, viz:

Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.

xxx                                                         xxx                                                           xxx

However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil register.

xxx                                                         xxx                                                           xxx

Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and later denied.

xxx                                                         xxx                                                           xxx

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.

However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:^[23]

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the administrative remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional trial courts are not divested of their jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for correction of entries "Even the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court."^[24]

So must it be.

Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 23, 2012 and Resolution dated August 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 94253 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., Chairperson, Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see separate opinion.

Hernando,* J., see concurring opinion.

---

^* Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando designated as additional member. Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., recused from the case for having concurred in the assailed Court of Appeals decision.

^[1] Under Rule 45, Rollo, pp. 8-26.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 29-33, penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and concurred by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 35-36.

^[4] Record, pp. 1-3.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Record, pp. 1-3; rollo, p. 31.

^[7] Record, pp. 10-14;

^[8] Id. at 46-48.

^[9] Id. at 47.

^[10] CA rollo, pp. 27-39.

^[11] Id. at 99-108.

^[12] Rollo, pp. 29-33.

^[13] Id. at 32.

^[14] Id. at 33.

^[15] Id. at 35-36.

^[16] Id. at 17-23.

^[17] Id. at 46-52.

^[18] Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al., 291 Phil. 664, 680 (1993).

^[19] 777 Phil. 143, 164-165 (2016).

^[20] Otherwise known as "An Act Further Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or The Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in The Day and Month in The Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in The Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for This Purpose Republic Act Numbered Ninety Forty-Eight", was passed into law on August 15, 2012 and took effect on October 24, 2012.

^[21] An Act Further Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or The Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in The Day and Month in The Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in The Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for This Purpose Repuublic Act Numbered Ninety Forty-Eight.

^[22] See G. R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018

^[23] See Republic v. Gallo citing Soto v. Jareno, 228 Phil. 117, 119 (1986).

^[24] Supra note 22.

---

CAGUIOA, J.:

I concur in the result.

The instant dispute involves a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.^[1] The facts were summarized by the ponencia as follows:

Respondent's birth certificate was registered twice.^[2] In his first birth certificate, which was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Itogon (LCR- Itogon), Benguet, respondent's first name was erroneously registered as "Shirley" instead of "Charlie" his father's surname was erroneously spelled as "Filex" instead of "Felix" and his gender was erroneously entered as "'female" instead of "male"^[3] A second birth certificate was subsequently registered containing all the correct entries, but the same was filed with the Local Civil Registrar of Carrangalan (LCR-Carrangalan), Nueva Ecija.^[4] Respondent thus filed a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet (RTC) in 2007 seeking to correct the erroneous entries in his first birth certificate (filed with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet) and to cancel his second birth certificate (filed with the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija).^[5]

The RTC granted the petition, allowed the corrections, and ordered the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's birth certificate.^[6] On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.^[7]

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thus filed the instant petition alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija to cancel respondent's second birth certificate.^[8] Notably, the OSG made no mention of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9048,^[9] which was already in effect when the petition for correction was filed.

The ponencia dismisses the petition and holds:

1)	The RTC has jurisdiction to order the correction of entries in respondent's first birth certificate.[10] As a necessary incident thereof, the ponencia concludes that the RTC likewise has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate on file with the LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija;[11]
2)	Petitions for correction of entries are incapable of pecuniary estimation and R.A. 9048 did not divest the RTC of its jurisdiction to decide petitions for correction of entries;[12] and
3)	Respondent's direct resort to a judicial procedure is correct because to pursue an administrative procedure for the clerical correction of respondent's first name and his father's surname and a judicial procedure for the correction of his sex would amount to splitting of causes of action.[13]

I concur with the ponencia that the reliefs sought by respondent should be allowed. However, my analysis proceeds differently, as follows:

The correction of respondent's first
name and of his father's surname
are clerical in nature and fall under
R.A. 9048.

When respondent filed his petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in 2007, I note that R.A. 9048, which provides an administrative procedure for changes of first name and corrections of typographical errors, was already in effect. In Republic v. Gallo,^[14] the Court explained:

Under Article 407 of the Civil Code, the books in the Civil Register include "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there.

Entries in the register include births, marriages, deaths, legal separations, annulments of marriage, judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning, legitimations, adoptions, acknowledgments of natural children, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation, voluntary emancipation of a minor, and changes of name.

As stated, the governing law on changes of first name land correction of clerical and typographical errors in the civil register! is currently Republic Act No. 10172, which amended Republic Act No. 9048. Prior to these laws, the controlling provisions on changes or corrections of name were Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code.

Article 376 states the need for judicial authority before any person can change his or her name. On the other hand, Article 412 provides that judicial authority is also necessary before any entry in the civil register may be changed or corrected.

Under the old rules, a person would have to file an action in court under Rule 103 for substantial changes in the given name or surname provided they fall under any of the valid reasons recognized by law, or Rule 108 for corrections of clerical errors.

x x x x

Applying Article 412 of the Civil Code, a person desiring to change his or her name altogether must file a petition under Rule 103 with the Regional Trial Court, which will then issue an order setting a hearing date and directing the order's publication in a newspaper of general circulation. After finding that there is proper and reasonable cause to change his or her name, the Regional Trial Court may grant the petition and order its entry in the civil register.

On the other hand, Rule 108 applies when the person is seeking to correct clerical and innocuous mistakes in his or her documents with the civil register. It also governs the correction of substantial errors in the entry of the information enumerated in Section 2 of this Rule and those affecting the civil status, citizenship, and nationality of a person. The proceedings under this rule may either be summary, if the correction pertains to clerical mistakes, or adversary, if it pertains to substantial errors.

x x x x

Following the procedure in Rule 103, Rule 108 also requires a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court. The trial court then sets a hearing and directs the publication of its order in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. After the hearing, the trial court may grant or dismiss the petition and serve a copy of its judgment to the Civil Registrar.

Mercadera clarified the applications of Article 376 and Rule 103, and of Article 412 and Rule 108, thus:

The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above. Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."

However, Republic Act No. 9048 amended Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code, effectively removing clerical errors and changes of the name outside the ambit of Rule 108 and putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil registrar.

In Silverio v. Republic:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) [xxx]

x x x x

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

In Republic v. Cagandahan:

The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect. Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.

In Republic v. Sali:

The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other grounds, if the new first name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.

Republic Act No. 9048 also dispensed with the need for judicial proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the civil register or changes in first names or nicknames.

x x x x

Thus, a person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or her name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the administrative petition has been filed and later denied.^[15]

Considering that the corrections and cancellations sought with respect to respondent's first name and his father's surname are clerical^[16] in nature, the petition to correct the same should have been filed, under R.A. 9084, with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

Under present jurisprudence,^[17] when an entry falls within the coverage of R.A. 9048, a person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is first filed and later denied.^[18] Failure to comply with the administrative procedure generally renders the petition dismissible for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to comply with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.^[19]

The correction of respondent's sex
and the cancellation of respondent's
second birth certificate do not fall
under R.A. 9048.

It bears emphasis that R.A. 9048 was amended by R.A. 10172^[20] in 2012. The latter law expanded the coverage of the administrative procedure provided under R.A. 9048 to include clerical corrections in the day and/or month (but not the year) in the date of birth, or in the sex of the person, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, viz.:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9048, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations." (Underscoring supplied)

Hence, the foregoing entries may now likewise be changed without judicial proceedings, "by filing a subscribed and sworn affidavit with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept."^[21]

As aptly observed by the ponencia, however, R.A. 10172 was enacted after respondent's Rule 108 petition was filed in 2007. Hence, under the laws prevailing in 2007, respondent would have had to file separate proceedings to effect (1) the corrections sought as regards his first name and his father's surname (administrative proceeding) and (2) the corrections sought as regards his sex (judicial proceeding).^[22]

In addition, I find that the civil registrar would have no authority to cancel respondent's second birth certificate (filed with LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva Ecija) under R.A. 9048. Notably, the registration of respondent's second birth certificate is not a typographical error, i.e., "a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records," which may be corrected through the administrative procedure. Given this complicated situation, it appears that respondent would have had to file (in addition to the administrative proceeding already discussed above) two separate judicial proceedings as the correction in respondent's sex had to be undertaken in Benguet while the cancellation of the second birth certificate had to be undertaken in Nueva Ecija, pursuant to Rule 108, Section 1.^[23] This is absurd and could not have been the intention of the law and the rules.

In this regard, I agree with the ponencia that (1) R.A. 9048 as amended was enacted precisely to expedite the process of effecting corrections of entries in the civil registry and to make the same more efficient and cost effective for the people,^[24] and (2) requiring respondent to file two or even three separate petitions results in delays and in a multiplicity of suits.

I disagree, however, that complying with the procedure laid down by R.A. 9048 in 2007 and Rule 108 would amount to splitting a cause of action.^[25] In Chu v. Spouses Cunanan,^[26] the Court explained:

xxx Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions, x x x^[27]

In special proceedings like the instant petition, a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.^[28] Thus, there is technically no "cause of action" under Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.^[29] Even if there were, the law itself divides and delineates the matters covered by the administrative and the judicial proceedings. It is my position, therefore, that compliance with the law cannot be considered a violation of the rules.

Nevertheless, I vote to grant the reliefs sought by respondent in the interest of speedy and substantial justice, given that the Republic never raised the issue of non-compliance with R.A. 9048 in the proceedings before the lower courts and that in any event, the LCR-Carrangalan was duly notified of the petition.^[30]

While I am aware that a "person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in the administrative proceedings is filed and later denied,"^[31] I find that allowing the corrections and cancellation sought would better serve the apparent purpose of the law, which is to expedite the process of effecting corrections of entries in the civil registry and to decongest court dockets.

The corrections sought and the
cancellation of respondent's second
birth certificate may be undertaken
through a single judicial proceeding
under Rule 108.

I disagree with the ponencia's conclusion that petitions under Rule 108 and Rule 103 are "incapable of pecuniary estimation."^[32] Be that as it may, I do agree with the ponencia that "by removing clerical errors and changes of name from the ambit of Rule 108 [and Rule 103] and putting them under the jurisdiction of the civil register,"^[33] the law did not divest the RTCs of jurisdiction over the same.

I interpret the provisions of R.A. 9048, as amended, as merely providing for the primary jurisdiction of the civil registrar, that is, "authorizing" or "allowing" the civil registrar to effect changes or corrections which, under the Civil Code, could previously only be done by a court.^[34] R.A. 9048 provides a simpler and speedier administrative remedy for the correction of clerical errors and for changes of first name.^[35] In Samar II Electric v. Seludo,^[36] the Court explained the corollary concepts of "primary administrative jurisdiction" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in this wise:

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.^[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in Republic v. Gallo^[38] the Court explained:

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court.

However, failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction. Thus, the doctrine may be waived as in Soto v. Jareno:

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. (Citation omitted)

Meanwhile, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, if an administrative tribunal has jurisdiction over a controversy, courts should not resolve the issue even if it may be within its proper jurisdiction. This is especially true when the question involves its sound discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In Republic v. Lacap:

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Citation omitted)

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived.^[39]

In both cases, however, the Court recognized that the foregoing principles are not inflexible rules without exception. Republic v. Gallo^[40] holds:

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (1) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (1) in quo warranto proceedings [x x x]^[41]

I find that the public interest is better served by allowing (not requiring) respondent and other persons similarly situated to file a single judicial procedure under Rule 108, to effect multiple corrections and/or cancellations that would have otherwise required two or more separate petitions — administrative and/or judicial. It would be the height of inefficiency (even absurdity) to require respondent to file three separate petitions to obtain the relief sought, i.e., for a single birth certificate to reflect his correct personal information. The same could be said in a situation where a person would have to file (1) an administrative proceeding to correct his or her birth day and birth month, and (2) a separate judicial proceeding to correct his or her birth year.

In this regard, I believe introducing some flexibility may help expedite the process, prevent multiplicity of suits, and prove more cost-effective for the concerned parties. As the ponencia aptly notes, allowing the same will save respondent and other persons similarly situated a substantial amount of time and expense, which was precisely what R.A. 9048, as amended, sought to accomplish.^[42]

When a petition involves local civil registrars located in different places however — as in this case — the Civil Registrar General should be impleaded as a party under Rule 108, Section 3. When directed by the court, the Office of the Civil Registrar General, pursuant to its power of control and supervision, may then effect the necessary corrections/changes in all affected units.

Bartolome v. Republic^[43] summarized the rules regarding changes of name and corrections of errors, as follows:

1.      A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of birth, and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in accordance with the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172. A person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the aforementioned entries after the petition in the administrative proceedings is filed and later denied.

2.      A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both his or her first name and surname may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present.

3.      A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in the civil registry may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed in Lee v. Court of Appeals and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan, R.A. 9048 "removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register."^[44]

I submit, however, my own view that a person compelled by the foregoing rules to file two or more separate petitions (i.e., administrative and judicial) to effect the desired corrections or cancellations may, in the interest of substantial justice, file a single petition for correction/cancellation of entries under Rule 108, provided that all interested parties, including the concerned civil registrars and/or the civil registrar general, as the case may be, are duly notified.

---

^[1] Ponencia, p. 2.

^[2] Id.

^[3] Id.

^[4] Id.

^[5] Id.

^[6] Id. at 3.

^[7] Id. at 4.

^[8] Id.

^[9] Entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," approved on March 22, 2001.

^[10] Ponencia, p. 6.

^[11]  Id. at 5.

^[12] Id. at 10.

^[13] Id. at 9.

^[14] G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018, 851 SCRA 570. Third Division, penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, with the concurrence of then Associate Justice, now Retired Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Retired Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires, and Associate Justice Alexander J. Gesmundo.

^[15] Id. at 587-595. Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[16] R.A. 9048, Section 2(3) holds: "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

^[17] See Republic v. Gallo, supra note 14; Republic v. Sali, 808 Phil. 343 (2017); Bartolome v. Republic, G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019.

^[18] Bartolome v. Republic, id.

^[19] See supra note 17.

^[20] Entitled "AN ACT FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS IN THE DAY AND MONTH IN THE DATE OF BIRTH OR SEX OF A PERSON APPEARING IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED NINETY FORTY-EIGHT," approved on August 15, 2012.

^[21] Republic v. Gallo, supra note 14 at 596. Citations and emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied.

^[22] See Republic v. Sali, 808 Phil. 343 (2017).

^[23] RULE 108, Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

^[24] Ponencia, p. 8.

^[25] Id. at 9.

^[26] 673 Phil. 12 (2011).

^[27] Id. at 21.

^[28] RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Section 3 provides:

SEC. 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings.

(a)  A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1 a, R2)

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action, (n)

(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. (n)

(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2)

^[29]  Rule 2, Sections 1 and 2 provide:

SECTION 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of.— Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action, (n)

SEC. 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

^[30] Ponencia, p. 8.

^[31] Supra note 18.

^[32] Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 specifically refers to civil actions while a petition for correction/cancellation of entries is a special proceeding.

^[33] Republic v. Gallo, supra note 14 at 593.

^[34] CIVIL CODE, Article 412 states that:

Art. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.

^[35] See Republic v. Gallo, supra note 14 and Republic v. Sali, supra note 22.

^[36]  686 Phil. 786 (2012).

^[37] Id. at 796. Citations omitted.

^[38] Supra note 14.

^[39] Id. at 606-607. Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[40] Supra note 14.

^[41] Id. at 609; underscoring supplied. Samar II Electric v. Seludo, 686 Phil. 786, 797 (2012) likewise states: "[T]he doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (1) in quo warranto proceedings."

^[42] Ponencia, p. 8.

^[43] Supra note 17.

^[44] Id. at 8. Citations and underscoring omitted.

---

 


LOPEZ, J.:

The ponencia affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to correct the entries in the respondent's birth certificate referring to his sex, first name, and father's surname under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, and to order the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) to cancel his second birth certificate.

I concur.

Notably, it was in 2007 that the respondent sought the correction of his birth certificate before the RTC. The erroneous entries include his sex,^[1] first name,^[2] and father's surname.^[3] At that time, Republic Act (RA) No. 9048^[4] already authorized the administrative change or correction of clerical or typographical errors^[5] in first names or nicknames. However, it was only in 2012 that RA No. 10172^[6] introduced an amendment allowing the administrative change or correction of similar errors in the sex and the day and month in the date of birth of a person. In this circumstance, the filing of a single petition under Rule 108 to correct the erroneous entries in the respondent's birth certificate is justified. Moreover, RA No. 9048, as amended by RA No. 10172, did not divest the trial courts of jurisdiction over petitions for correction of clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate. To be sure, the local civil registrars' administrative authority to change or correct similar errors is only primary but not exclusive.^[7] At any rate, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not absolute and may be dispensed with for reasons of equity. One such instance is the failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine at an opportune time.^[8]

Lastly, the RTC correctly ordered the LCR to cancel the respondent's second birth certificate. Under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, the courts have the power to adjudicate and determine matters in aid of or incidental to the exercise of its original or primary jurisdiction.^[9] This will avoid multiplicity of suits and further litigation between the parties, which is offensive to the orderly administration of justice.

FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to DENY the petition.

---

^[1] "Female" instead of "Male."

^[2] "Shirley" instead of "Charlie."

^[3] "Filex" instead of "Felix."

^[4] An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, amending for this purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[5] Rule 2.8 of the implementing rules and regulations of RA No. 9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records. In Republic of the Philippines v. Merlyn Mercader, G.R. No. 186027, December 8, 2010, we held that a misspelled given name pertains to a mere clerical error. Thus, the correction of petitioner's first name from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" was ruled as a clerical error in spelling.

^[6] An Act Further Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar of the Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in the Day and Month in the Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, amending for this purpose Republic Act Numbered Ninety Forty- Eight.

^[7] It is worth noting that the deliberations on RA No. 9048 did not mention that petitions for correction of clerical errors can no longer be filed with the regular courts, though the grounds upon which the administrative process before the local civil registrar may be availed of are limited under the law. (Re: Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Br. 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, Adm. Matter No. 06-7-414-RTC, October 19, 2007.)

^[8] In Republic of the Philippines v. Michelle Soriano Gallo, GR. No. 207074, January 17, 2018, We held that for reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches. Thus, we allowed that the corrections of clerical errors sought by the petitioner, such as his first name from "Michael" to "Michelle;" her biological sex from "male" to "female;" the entry of her middle name as "Soriano;" middle name of her mother as "Angangan;" middle name of her father as "Balingao;" and, the date of her parents' marriage as "May 23, 1981," despite the filing of a petition under Rule 108, considering the failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to raise the doctrine of primary jurisdiction at the first instance.

^[9] While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of. the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. (City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182, 206.)