SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 250578, September 07, 2020 ]BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ v. PEOPLE +
BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ v. PEOPLE +
BERT PASCUA Y VALDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 13, 2019 and the Resolution[3] dated November 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 160653 which upheld the Orders dated January 29, 2019[4] and February 26, 2019[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 18805, allowing petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez (Pascua) to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," but declared him "ineligible to apply for probation."[7]
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations[8] filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[9] Upon arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. However, he later filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12,[10] Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases.[11] The prosecution filed its Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department Circular No. 027-18,[12] the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser offense.[13]
The RTC Ruling
On January 29, 2019, the RTC issued separate Orders[14] allowing Pascua to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806. However, it was expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the Order pertaining to Criminal Case No. 18805 that Pascua was "ineligible to apply for probation."[15]
Accordingly, Pascua applied for probation as regards Criminal Case No. 18806, which the RTC acted upon issuing an Order[16] dated February 26, 2019 which, among others, directed the Bataan Parole and Probation Officer to conduct an investigation on Pascua in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 968,[17] as amended,[18] otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976" (Probation Law).
On the other hand, Pascua moved for reconsideration[19] as to the Order made in Criminal Case No. 18805, particularly for declaring him ineligible for probation. He argued that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC[20] only prohibits probation if the accused is actually found guilty of sale of illegal drugs (Section 5), and not when he is found guilty to the lesser offense of "possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs" (Section 12).[21]
In an Order[22] dated February 26, 2019, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The RTC held that probation is not a matter of right but a special privilege which is discretionary upon the court.[23] It held that the framers of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC clearly intended that persons charged with sale of illegal drugs would not be qualified for probation if they choose to plead guilty to a lesser offense.[24]
Aggrieved, Pascua filed a petition for certiorari[25] with the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated September 13, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that a reasonable interpretation of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC would lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court intended for drug trafficking and pushing (Section 5) to still be covered by the "no probation rule" under Section 24, Article II of RA 9165.[27] It rejected Pascua's contention that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC should apply to the lesser offense allowed instead of the offense actually charged.[28] The CA opined in this wise: "[t]his interpretation will result to absurdity, since Section 5 is not among the enumerated lesser offenses to which an accused can admit guilt to in lieu of being convicted of a higher offense. If this was really the intention of the Supreme Court, it would not have included this provision since there is no acceptable plea to which this exception to the general rule would be applicable. It is therefore rational and logical to conclude that persons charged [with] violating Section 5 who subsequently avail of plea bargaining may not apply for probation[,] x x x it would mean that every person accused of sale of illegal drugs would simply have to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, apply for probation, then be released scot-free."[29] It likewise held that even assuming Pascua was eligible for probation, the same is still within the discretion of the lower court.[30]
Pascua moved for reconsideration[31] but was denied in a Resolution[32] dated November 21, 2019; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that Pascua is ineligible for probation in Criminal Case No. 18805 after pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has partial merit.
"[G]rave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law."[33] In this regard, case law instructs that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act: (a) is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias; or (b) manifestly disregards basic rules or procedures.[34]
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in declaring Pascua ineligible for probation after pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
To recall, plea bargaining in cases involving drugs cases was recently allowed through the Court's promulgation of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo,[35] which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly disallowing plea bargaining in drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,[36] Article II, unconstitutional for contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. Following this pronouncement, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, which was required to be adopted by all trial courts handling drugs cases.[37]
In A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Court enumerated, in table format, several violations of RA 9165 which could be subject to plea-bargaining.[38] Included therein is violation of Section 5, Article II thereof, particularly for the sale, trading, etc. of shabu weighing less than 1.00 gram. The rationale for this particular exception was explained by the Court in its Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association,[39] to wit:
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC also provides, among others, in the "Remarks" column of the aforesaid offense that "if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to [Section] 24 thereof, then the law on probation apply."[40] Notably, Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as disqualifying persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but were convicted of the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law – such as Pascua – from applying for probation.
However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act"[41] shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view is not supported neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal consequences of plea bargaining.
It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the provisions of the Probation Law apply. "Probation" is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as "a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer."[42] Section 9 thereof, which lists the disqualified offenders, also highlights that the disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions meted out to the prospective applicant:
It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law that in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge."[43]
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se make Pascua eligible for probation. This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement that Pascua is "ineligible to apply for probation", thereby allowing him to file such application. If he files for the same, the grant or denial thereof will then lie in the sound discretion of the RTC after due consideration of the criteria laid down in the Probation Law, e.g., Section 8[44] thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160653 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated January 29, 2019 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 18805 is hereby MODIFIED, in that the sentence: "Make it of record that the accused is ineligible to apply for probation" is DELETED. Petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision within which to file his application for probation before the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Inting, J., on official leave.
Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-33.
[2] Id. at 40-51. Penned by Acting Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, concurring.
[3] Id. at 53-55.
[4] Id. at 83-85. Penned by Judge Angelito I. Balderama.
[5] Id. at 87-89.
[6] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[7] Rollo, p. 85.
[8] Id. at 91 and 93-94.
[9] Id. at 42.
[10] "Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs."
[11] Rollo, p. 42.
[12] "RE: AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" issued on June 26, 2018.
[13] See rollo, pp. 42-43.
[14] Id. at 83-85 and 102-103.
[15] Id. at 85.
[16] Id. at 106.
[17] Entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (July 24, 1976).
[18] Republic Act No. 10707, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'PROBATION LAW OF 1976,' AS AMENDED," approved on November 26, 2015.
[19] Dated Febraury 4, 2019. Rollo, pp. 107-111.
[20] Entitled "ADOPTION OF THE PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" dated April 10, 2018.
[21] See rollo, pp. 43 and 108.
[22] Id. at 87-89.
[23] Id. at 88.
[24] Id.
[25] See id. at 60-81.
[26] Id. at 40-51.
[27] Id. at 48.
[28] Id. at 48-49.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 50.
[31] Dated October 9, 2019. Id. at 131-138.
[32] Id. at 53-55.
[33] University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, 809 Phil. 212, 220 (2017), citing Quebral v. Angbus Construction, Inc.,, 798 Phil. 179, 188-189 (2016).
[34] See Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413, 244415-16, February 18, 2020, citations omitted.
[35] 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
[36] Section 23, Article II of RA 9165 reads:
[37] See OCA Circular Nos. 90-2018, subject: "PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" issued on May 4, 2018 and 104-2019 subject: "COURT EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED 4 JUNE 2019 IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: ADOPTION OF PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUG CASES)" issued on July 5, 2019.
[38] See Resolutions issued on April 10, 2018 and June 4, 2019.
[39] See also OCA Circular No. 80-2019, subject: "MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 02 APRIL 2019 IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ON THE SUGGESTED PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK SUBMITTED BY THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION)" issued on May 30, 2019.
[40] See Resolution dated June 4, 2019.
[41] Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[42] Emphasis supplied.
[43] Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008).
[44] Section 8 of the Probation Law reads:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations[8] filed before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806, respectively charging Pascua with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling 0.024 gram and possessing 0.054 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[9] Upon arraignment, Pascua pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. However, he later filed a Motion to Allow Accused to Enter into Plea Bargaining Agreement wherein he offered to enter a plea of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12,[10] Article II of RA 9165 for both criminal cases.[11] The prosecution filed its Comment and Opposition thereto, stressing that, per Department of Justice Department Circular No. 027-18,[12] the State's consent is necessary before the accused can plead to a lesser offense.[13]
On January 29, 2019, the RTC issued separate Orders[14] allowing Pascua to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 in both Criminal Case Nos. 18805 and 18806. However, it was expressly stated in the dispositive portion of the Order pertaining to Criminal Case No. 18805 that Pascua was "ineligible to apply for probation."[15]
Accordingly, Pascua applied for probation as regards Criminal Case No. 18806, which the RTC acted upon issuing an Order[16] dated February 26, 2019 which, among others, directed the Bataan Parole and Probation Officer to conduct an investigation on Pascua in accordance with Sections 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No. 968,[17] as amended,[18] otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976" (Probation Law).
On the other hand, Pascua moved for reconsideration[19] as to the Order made in Criminal Case No. 18805, particularly for declaring him ineligible for probation. He argued that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC[20] only prohibits probation if the accused is actually found guilty of sale of illegal drugs (Section 5), and not when he is found guilty to the lesser offense of "possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs" (Section 12).[21]
In an Order[22] dated February 26, 2019, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The RTC held that probation is not a matter of right but a special privilege which is discretionary upon the court.[23] It held that the framers of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC clearly intended that persons charged with sale of illegal drugs would not be qualified for probation if they choose to plead guilty to a lesser offense.[24]
Aggrieved, Pascua filed a petition for certiorari[25] with the CA.
In a Decision[26] dated September 13, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA held that a reasonable interpretation of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC would lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court intended for drug trafficking and pushing (Section 5) to still be covered by the "no probation rule" under Section 24, Article II of RA 9165.[27] It rejected Pascua's contention that A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC should apply to the lesser offense allowed instead of the offense actually charged.[28] The CA opined in this wise: "[t]his interpretation will result to absurdity, since Section 5 is not among the enumerated lesser offenses to which an accused can admit guilt to in lieu of being convicted of a higher offense. If this was really the intention of the Supreme Court, it would not have included this provision since there is no acceptable plea to which this exception to the general rule would be applicable. It is therefore rational and logical to conclude that persons charged [with] violating Section 5 who subsequently avail of plea bargaining may not apply for probation[,] x x x it would mean that every person accused of sale of illegal drugs would simply have to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, apply for probation, then be released scot-free."[29] It likewise held that even assuming Pascua was eligible for probation, the same is still within the discretion of the lower court.[30]
Pascua moved for reconsideration[31] but was denied in a Resolution[32] dated November 21, 2019; hence, this petition.
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that Pascua is ineligible for probation in Criminal Case No. 18805 after pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
The petition has partial merit.
"[G]rave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law."[33] In this regard, case law instructs that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act: (a) is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias; or (b) manifestly disregards basic rules or procedures.[34]
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in declaring Pascua ineligible for probation after pleading guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165.
To recall, plea bargaining in cases involving drugs cases was recently allowed through the Court's promulgation of Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo,[35] which declared the provision in RA 9165 expressly disallowing plea bargaining in drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,[36] Article II, unconstitutional for contravening the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. Following this pronouncement, the Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a plea bargaining framework in drugs cases, which was required to be adopted by all trial courts handling drugs cases.[37]
In A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Court enumerated, in table format, several violations of RA 9165 which could be subject to plea-bargaining.[38] Included therein is violation of Section 5, Article II thereof, particularly for the sale, trading, etc. of shabu weighing less than 1.00 gram. The rationale for this particular exception was explained by the Court in its Resolution dated April 2, 2019 in Re: Letter of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta on the Suggested Plea Bargaining Framework Submitted by the Philippine Judges Association,[39] to wit:
It bears emphasis that the main reason of the Court in stating in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC dated April 10, 2018 that "plea bargaining is also not allowed under Section 5 (Sale, Trading, etc. of Dangerous Drugs) involving all other kinds of dangerous drugs, except shabu and marijuana" lies in the diminutive quantity of the dangerous drugs involved. Taking judicial notice of the volume and prevalence of cases involving the said two (2) dangerous drugs, as well as the recommendations of the Officers of the PJA, the Court is of the view that illegal sale of 0.01 gram to 0.99 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is very light enough to be considered as necessarily included in the offense of violation of Section 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs), while 1.00 gram and above is substantial enough to disallow plea bargaining. The Court holds the same view with respect to illegal sale of 0.01 gram to 9.99 grams of marijuana, which likewise suffices to be deemed necessarily included in the same offense of violation of the same Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, while 10.00 grams and above is ample enough to disallow plea bargaining. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC also provides, among others, in the "Remarks" column of the aforesaid offense that "if accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under R.A. No. 9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation to [Section] 24 thereof, then the law on probation apply."[40] Notably, Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 provides that any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 of the law cannot avail of the benefits of the Probation Law, viz.:
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. — Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
In this case, the CA construed the aforementioned remark in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as disqualifying persons originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 but were convicted of the lesser offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law – such as Pascua – from applying for probation.
However, the CA is mistaken as the said remark should be simply regarded as a recognition and reminder of the general rule provided in Section 24 that "[a]ny person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act"[41] shall be ineligible for probation. Moreover, the CA's view is not supported neither by the very wording of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 nor the provisions of the Probation Law. It likewise disregards the legal consequences of plea bargaining.
It bears stressing that it is only after the trial court arrives at a judgment of conviction can the provisions of the Probation Law apply. "Probation" is defined under Section 3 (a) thereof as "a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer."[42] Section 9 thereof, which lists the disqualified offenders, also highlights that the disqualifications pertain to the nature of the convictions meted out to the prospective applicant:
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
(b) convicted of any crime against the national security;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of not more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof." (Emphases supplied)
It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the provisions of the Probation Law that in applying for probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. According to jurisprudence, "[p]lea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge."[43]
Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the Information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as well as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the law, including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if Pascua was originally charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 18805, he was ultimately convicted of the lower offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of the same law. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua's case from the coverage of Section 24, Article II of RA 9165, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se make Pascua eligible for probation. This ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC's pronouncement that Pascua is "ineligible to apply for probation", thereby allowing him to file such application. If he files for the same, the grant or denial thereof will then lie in the sound discretion of the RTC after due consideration of the criteria laid down in the Probation Law, e.g., Section 8[44] thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision dated September 13, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 21, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 160653 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated January 29, 2019 of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 18805 is hereby MODIFIED, in that the sentence: "Make it of record that the accused is ineligible to apply for probation" is DELETED. Petitioner Bert Pascua y Valdez is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision within which to file his application for probation before the court a quo.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Inting, J., on official leave.
Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-33.
[2] Id. at 40-51. Penned by Acting Presiding Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, concurring.
[3] Id. at 53-55.
[4] Id. at 83-85. Penned by Judge Angelito I. Balderama.
[5] Id. at 87-89.
[6] Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[7] Rollo, p. 85.
[8] Id. at 91 and 93-94.
[9] Id. at 42.
[10] "Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs."
[11] Rollo, p. 42.
[12] "RE: AMENDED GUIDELINES ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,'" issued on June 26, 2018.
[13] See rollo, pp. 42-43.
[14] Id. at 83-85 and 102-103.
[15] Id. at 85.
[16] Id. at 106.
[17] Entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (July 24, 1976).
[18] Republic Act No. 10707, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'PROBATION LAW OF 1976,' AS AMENDED," approved on November 26, 2015.
[19] Dated Febraury 4, 2019. Rollo, pp. 107-111.
[20] Entitled "ADOPTION OF THE PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" dated April 10, 2018.
[21] See rollo, pp. 43 and 108.
[22] Id. at 87-89.
[23] Id. at 88.
[24] Id.
[25] See id. at 60-81.
[26] Id. at 40-51.
[27] Id. at 48.
[28] Id. at 48-49.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 50.
[31] Dated October 9, 2019. Id. at 131-138.
[32] Id. at 53-55.
[33] University of Santo Tomas (UST) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, 809 Phil. 212, 220 (2017), citing Quebral v. Angbus Construction, Inc.,, 798 Phil. 179, 188-189 (2016).
[34] See Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413, 244415-16, February 18, 2020, citations omitted.
[35] 816 Phil. 789 (2017).
[36] Section 23, Article II of RA 9165 reads:
Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. — Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
[37] See OCA Circular Nos. 90-2018, subject: "PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUGS CASES" issued on May 4, 2018 and 104-2019 subject: "COURT EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED 4 JUNE 2019 IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: ADOPTION OF PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK IN DRUG CASES)" issued on July 5, 2019.
[38] See Resolutions issued on April 10, 2018 and June 4, 2019.
[39] See also OCA Circular No. 80-2019, subject: "MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 02 APRIL 2019 IN A.M. NO. 18-03-16-SC (RE: LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ON THE SUGGESTED PLEA BARGAINING FRAMEWORK SUBMITTED BY THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION)" issued on May 30, 2019.
[40] See Resolution dated June 4, 2019.
[41] Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[42] Emphasis supplied.
[43] Daan v. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil. 368, 375 (2008).
[44] Section 8 of the Probation Law reads:
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. — In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: