Expropriation, the procedure by which the government takes possession of private property, is outlined primarily in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. It undergoes two phases. The first phase determines the propriety of the action. The second phase determines the compensation to be paid to the landowner, x x x

[In the first phase, the trial court] is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint x x x."

x x x x^[4] (Emphases supplied)

The power of eminent domain is an inherent competence of the state. It is essential to a sovereign. Thus, the Constitution does not explicitly define this power but subjects it to a limitation: that it be exercised only for public use and with payment of just compensation. Whether the use is public or whether the compensation is constitutionally just will be determined finally by the courts.^[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation." It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of the whole community."

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.^[6] (Emphasis supplied)

[T]his "Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public." Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed "use by the public" as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time. Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society. Accordingly, when this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as "public purpose." Thus, in a case upholding a mining company's use of an aerial bucket line to transport ore over property it did not own, Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court stressed "the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test." Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 531 (1906). We have repeatedly and consistently rejected that narrow test ever since.^[10] (Emphasis supplied)

The most natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever. At the time of the founding, dictionaries primarily defined the noun "use" as "[t]he act of employing any thing to any purpose." 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 2194 (4th ed. 1773) (hereinafter Johnson). The term "use," moreover, "is from the Latin utor, which means 'to use, make use of, avail one's self of, employ, apply, enjoy, etc." J. Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain §165, p. 224, n. 4 (1888) (hereinafter Lewis). When the government takes property and gives it to a private individual, and the public has no right to use the property, it strains language to say that the public is "employing" the property, regardless of the incidental benefits that might accrue to the public from the private use. The term "public use," then, means that either the government or its citizens as a whole must actually "employ" the taken property. See id., at 223 (reviewing founding-era dictionaries).^[15] (Emphases supplied)

In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.^[18] (Emphasis supplied)

In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.

Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]." If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were— allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government's retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is offensive to our laws.

A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play.^[25] (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 10. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires, and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted x x x: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid[.]

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

A second line of this Court's cases also deviated from the Public Use Clause's original meaning by allowing legislatures to define the scope of valid "public uses." United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896), involved the question whether Congress' decision to condemn certain private land for the purpose of building battlefield memorials at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, was for a public use. Id., at 679-680. Since the Federal Government was to use the lands in question, id., at 682, there is no doubt that it was a public use under any reasonable standard. Nonetheless, the Court, speaking through Justice Peckham, declared that "when the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation." Id., at 680. As it had with the "public purpose" dictum in Bradley, supra, the Court quickly incorporated this dictum into its Public Use Clause cases with little discussion. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546, 552 (1946); Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 66 (1925).

There is no justification, however, for affording almost insurmountable deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a "public use." To begin with, a court owes no deference to a legislature's judgment concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the taken property. Even under the "public purpose" interpretation, moreover, it is most implausible that the Framers intended to defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of Rights. We would not defer to a legislature's determination of the various circumstances that establish, for example, when a search of a home would be reasonable, see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 589-590 (1980), or when a convicted double-murderer may be shackled during a sentencing proceeding without on-the-record findings, see Deck v. Missouri, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), or when state law creates a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Castle Rock v. Gonzales, post, at _______; Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262-263 (1970).

Still worse, it is backwards to adopt a searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional property interests, such as welfare benefits, see, e.g., Goldberg, supra, while deferring to the legislature's determination as to what constitutes a public use when it exercises the power of eminent domain, and thereby invades individuals' traditional rights in real property. The Court has elsewhere recognized "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic," Payton, supra, at 601, when the issue is only whether the government may search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to "second-guess the City's considered judgments," ante, at 18, when the issue is, instead, whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners' homes. Something has gone seriously awry with this Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not. Once one accepts, as the Court at least nominally does, ante, at 6, that the Public Use Clause is a limit on the eminent domain power of the Federal Government and the States, there is no justification for the almost complete deference it grants to legislatures as to what satisfies it.^[26] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

SECTION 10. Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient establishment, improvement, upgrading, rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of its services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles wires, and other facilities over, under, and across public property, including streets, highways, parks, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted, including, but not limited to poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used, or intended to be used, or have been abandoned, unused or underutilized, or which obstructs its facilities, for the operation of a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in its franchise area: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid:

Provided, further, That upon the filing of the petition for expropriation, or at any time thereafter, and after due notice to the owner of the property to be expropriated and the deposit in a bank located in the franchise area of the full amount of the assessed value of the property or properties, the grantee shall be entitled to immediate possession, operation, control, use and disposition of the properties sought to be expropriated, including the power of demolition, if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of other issues before the court, including the final determination of the amount of just compensation to be paid. The court may appoint a representative from the ERC as a trial commissioner in determining the amount of just compensation. The court may consider the tax declarations, current audited financial statements, and rate-setting applications of the owner or owners of the property or properties being expropriated in order to determine their assessed value. (Underscoring provided)

[A]cquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted, including, but not limited to poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used, or intended to be used, or have been abandoned, unused or underutilized, or which obstructs its facilities, for the operation of a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in its franchise area[.]

SECTION 4. It is expressly provided that in the event the Government should desire to operate and maintain for itself the system and enterprise herein authorized, the grantee shall surrender its franchise and will turn over to the government all equipment therein at fair market value.

Mactan Electric   Company, Inc. [Republic Act No. 10890 (2016)]	Tarlac Electric, Inc.   [Republic Act No.   10795 (2016)]	Angeles Electric Corporation [Republic Act No. 9381 (2007)]
SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires, and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.   the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That  proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and        just compensation paid.	SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires, and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves, and other similar property of the Government of Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.	SEC. 10. Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.

SECTION 17. Transition of Operations. — In the public interest and to ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity, the current operator, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO), shall in the interim be authorized to operate the existing distribution system within the franchise area, as well as implement its existing power supply agreements with generation companies that had been provisionally or finally approved by the ERC until the establishment or acquisition by the grantee of its own distribution system and its complete transition towards full operations as determined by the ERC, which period shall in no case exceed two (2) years from the grant of this legislative franchise.

Upon compliance with its rules, the ERC shall grant PECO the necessary provisional certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) covering such interim period. The applicable generation rate shall be the provisional or final rate approved by the ERC.

This provisional authority to operate during the transition period shall not be construed as extending the franchise of PECO after its expiration on January 18, 2019, and it shall not prevent the grantee from exercising the right of eminent domain over the distribution assets existing at the franchise area as provided in Section 10 of this Act. During such interim period, the ERC shall require PECO to settle the full amount which the ERC has directed to refund to its customers in connection with all the cases filed against it.

To reduce the length of the transition period, the ERC and all agencies issuing the requisite licenses shall prioritize all applications relevant to the establishment and operation of the distribution system under its franchise.

The grantee shall, as far as practicable and subject to required qualifications, accord preference to hiring former employees of PECO upon commencement of business operations.

An information dissemination campaign regarding public services and operations of the grantee shall be made to all end-users in the franchise area.

The grantee and PECO shall jointly ensure that employees not hired by the grantee shall receive all separation and/or retirement benefits they are entitled to in accordance with applicable laws.

The DOE shall, during the transition, ensure that there will be uninterrupted supply of electricity in the existing franchise area.

SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.

Corollarily . . . the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.^[40] (Citations omitted)

ARTICLE XII
National Economy and Patrimony

SECTION 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.

ARTICLE XIII

Social Justice and Human Rights

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments.

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

SECTION 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

. . . .

Urban Land Reform and Housing

SECTION 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.

[u]nder the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e. given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the process.^[72]

In moving away from our decisions sanctioning the condemnation of harmful property use, the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But nearly any lawful use of real private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the public. Thus, if predicted (or even guaranteed) positive side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional, then the words "for public use" do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.^[73] (Emphasis in the original)

Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result. "[T]hat alone is a just government," wrote James Madison, "which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own"^[74] (Emphasis in the original)

"When we depart from the natural import of the term 'public use,' and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession and occupation, that of public utility, public interest, common benefit, general advantage or convenience. . . we are afloat without any certain principle to guide us." . . . Once one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent principle limits what could constitute a valid public use. . . It is difficult to imagine how a court could find that a taking was purely private except by determining that the taking did not, in fact, rationally advance the public interest. . . The Court is therefore wrong to criticize the "actual use" test as "difficult to administer." ... It is far easier to analyze whether the government owns or the public has a legal right to use the taken property than to ask whether the taking has a "purely private purpose" - unless the Court means to eliminate public use scrutiny of takings entirely.^[75]

There is no justification, however, for affording almost insurmountable deference to legislative conclusions that a use serves a "public use." To begin with, a court owes no deference to a legislature's judgment concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the taken property. Even under the "public purpose" interpretation, moreover, it is most implausible that the Framers intended to defer to legislatures as to what satisfies the Public Use Clause, uniquely among all the express provisions of the Bill of Rights.^[76]

It is true that many decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that the question that whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislature may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature, unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislature might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character. Blackstone in his Commentaries on the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great necessity therefor.^[79] (Emphasis in the original)

SEC. 10. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient establishment, improvement, upgrading, rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of its services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles wires, and other facilities over, under, and across public property, including streets, highways, parks, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted, including, but not limited to poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used, or intended to be used, or have been abandoned, unused or underutilized, or which obstructs its facilities, for the operation of a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in its franchise area: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid:

Provided, further, That upon the filing of the petition for expropriation, or at any time thereafter, and after due notice to the owner of the property to be expropriated and the deposit in a bank located in the franchise area of the full amount of the assessed value of the property or properties, the grantee shall be entitled to immediate possession, operation, control, use and disposition of the properties sought to be expropriated, including the power of demolition, if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of other issues before the court, including the final determination of the amount of just compensation to be paid. The court may appoint a representative from the ERC as a trial commissioner in determining the amount of just compensation. The court may consider the tax declarations, current audited financial statements, and rate-setting applications of the owner or owners of the property or properties being expropriated in order to determine their assessed value.

x x x x

SEC. 17. Transition of Operations. — In the public interest and to ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity, the current operator, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO), shall in the interim be authorized to operate the existing distribution system within the franchise area, as well as implement its existing power supply agreements with generation companies that had been provisionally or finally approved by the ERC until the establishment or acquisition by the grantee of its own distribution system and its complete transition towards full operations as determined by the ERC, which period shall in no case exceed two (2) years from the grant of this legislative franchise.

Upon compliance with its rules, the ERC shall grant PECO the necessary provisional certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) covering such interim period. The applicable generation rate shall be the provisional or final rate approved by the ERC.

This provisional authority to operate during the transition period shall not be construed as extending the franchise of PECO after its expiration on January 18, 2019, and it shall not prevent the grantee from exercising the right of eminent domain over the distribution assets existing at the franchise area as provided in Section 10 of this Act. During such interim period, the ERC shall require PECO to settle the full amount which the ERC has directed to refund to its customers in connection with all the cases filed against it.

To reduce the length of the transition period, the ERC and all agencies issuing the requisite licenses shall prioritize all applications relevant to the establishment and operation of the distribution system under its franchise.

The grantee shall, as far as practicable and subject to required qualifications, accord preference to hiring former employees of PECO upon commencement of business operations.

An information dissemination campaign regarding public services and operations of the grantee shall be made to all end-users in the franchise area.

The grantee and PECO shall jointly ensure that employees not hired by the grantee shall receive all separation and/or retirement benefits they are entitled to in accordance with applicable laws.

The DOE shall, during the transition, ensure that there will be uninterrupted supply of electricity in the existing franchise area.

1. Mactan Electric Company, Inc. started its initial operations in 1967. Per its website, it was issued a franchise to operate an electric light and power for 25 years from 1973 until 1991.^[21] It obtained a congressional franchise in 2016 through R.A. 10890.^[22]
   
   
2. The franchise subject of R.A. 10795^[23] clearly states in its title that it is an extension of the franchise of Tarlac Electric, Inc., previously covered by R.A. 7606.^[24]
   
   
3. R.A. 9381^[25] also clearly states in its title that it is an extension of the franchise of Angeles Electric Corporation issued under R.A. 2341.^[26]
   
   
4. While COTELCO-PPALMA operates under a new franchise (i.e., R.A. 11322^[27]), it appears from its website that it was operating under COTELCO's franchise even before it was granted its own franchise in 2019.^[28]

1. Copy of the House Bill for the grant of franchise.
   
2. Certificate of Registration from the Securities and Exchange Commission or Department of Trade and Industry.
   
3. Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the applicant corporation.
   
4. Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of a holding company which owns the applicant, if any.
   
5. Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of the corporate stockholder of the applicant, if any.
   
6. Latest General Information Sheet of the applicant and the corporate stockholder/holding company of the applicant, if any.
   
7. Resume of major stockholders/officers of the applicant, including their income tax returns for the last three (3) years.
   
8. Market feasibility study, five-year development plan, and plans and designs for the project.

ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD No. 771. Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971], per Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.

It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court. (Id. at 677-678.)

SECTION 10. Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient establishment, improvement, upgrading, rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of its services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles wires, and other facilities over, under, and across public property, including streets, highways, parks, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted, including, but not limited to poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used, or intended to be used, or have been abandoned, unused or underutilized, or which obstructs its facilities, for the operation of a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in its franchise area: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid:

Provided, further, That upon the filing of the petition for expropriation, or at any time thereafter, and after due notice to the owner of the property to be expropriated and the deposit in a bank located in the franchise area of the full amount of the assessed value of the property or properties, the grantee shall be entitled to immediate possession, operation, control, use and disposition of the properties sought to be expropriated, including the power of demolition, if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of other issues before the court, including the final determination of the amount of just compensation to be paid. The court may appoint a representative from the ERC as a trial commissioner in determining the amount of just compensation. The court may consider the tax declarations, current audited financial statements, and rate-setting applications of the owner or owners of the property or properties being expropriated in order to determine their assessed value.

SECTION 17. Transition of Operations. — In the public interest and to ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity, the current operator, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO), shall in the interim be authorized to operate the existing distribution system within the franchise area, as well as implement its existing power supply agreements with generation companies that had been provisionally or finally approved by the ERC until the establishment or acquisition by the grantee of its own distribution system and its complete transition towards full operations as determined by the ERC, which period shall in no case exceed two (2) years from the grant of this legislative franchise.

Upon compliance with its rules, the ERC shall grant PECO the necessary provisional certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) covering such interim period. The applicable generation rate shall be the provisional or final rate approved by the ERC.

This provisional authority to operate during the transition period shall not be construed as extending the franchise of PECO after its expiration on January 18, 2019, and it shall not prevent the grantee from exercising the right of eminent domain over the distribution assets existing at the franchise area as provided in Section 10 of this Act. During such interim period, the ERC shall require PECO to settle the full amount which the ERC has directed to refund to its customers in connection with all the cases filed against it.

To reduce the length of the transition period, the ERC and all agencies issuing the requisite licenses shall prioritize all applications relevant to the establishment and operation of the distribution system under its franchise.

The grantee shall, as far as practicable and subject to required qualifications, accord preference to hiring former employees of PECO upon commencement of business operations.

An information dissemination campaign regarding public services and operations of the grantee shall be made to all end-users in the franchise area.

The grantee and PECO shall jointly ensure that employees not hired by the grantee shall receive all separation and/or retirement benefits they are entitled to in accordance with applicable laws.

The DOE shall, during the transition, ensure that there will be uninterrupted supply of electricity in the existing franchise area.

ON reviewing the U.S. Constitution, it is easy to assume that the document contained no takings protection language prior to the addition of the Fifth Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights. In reality, however, a takings protection was inserted directly into the body of the Constitution in 1787. This was the ban on bills of attainder, found in Article I, Sections 9 and 10. A bill of attainder is an egregious taking of life or property by an arbitrary legislative act, and the ban on bills of attainder was primarily meant to protect the people from such arbitrary takings by the government. During the antebellum period, construing the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection was well known, and lawyers and judges frequently referred to this ban. It was only after the Civil War that this commonly understood takings protection faded gradually into disuse, primarily because of the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation doctrine. Today, this protection is all but forgotten.

Recognizing the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection greatly aids in understanding several constitutional issues that have otherwise not been fully understood. For example, seeing the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection helps in understanding why the Eleventh Amendment's passage was in large measure a reaction to potential attainder lawsuits against the states. We also better understand why the ban on ex post facto laws only needed to apply to criminal matters, and more clearly see how takings law/attainders were a driving force for separating governmental powers, particularly between the legislature and the judiciary. Finally, we can better understand why many of the founders - particularly James Madison - so greatly feared factions as the greatest threat to the new republic. In short, the ban on bills of attainder illuminates the early workings of the new constitutional republic in America.

This article mostly draws from the founders' comments at the Constitutional Convention and the antebellum case law that treats the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection. The jurists' and practitioners' statements in these early cases - including comments from such luminaries as John Marshall and Daniel Webster - demonstrate their understanding of the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection, independent of the Fifth Amendment or any other state takings language. Likewise, their statements about the ban on bills of attainder clarify the other constitutional doctrines discussed in this article.

Even though the antebellum era has long since passed, the concept that the ban on bills of attainder is a takings protection and its clarification of other constitutional doctrines has value for us today. There is no compelling reason why the antebellum understanding of bills of attainder is any less legitimate now than back then. To be sure, the Fifth Amendment protections now apply to state takings due to the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation doctrine. But this application in no way negates the ongoing potential effectiveness of using the ban on bills of attainder in the Constitution as a takings protection. Indeed, there will be times that the ban on bills of attainder will be a better fit for a particular judicial problem than the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. Examples could include legislation targeting unpopular groups or groups holding property which the government wants. Accordingly, courts today should consider applying this provision of the Constitution as a takings protection, just as the courts formerly did. If they do, the courts will discover that it will not only serve to protect the innocent from arbitrary takings, but that it will also help clarify constitutional doctrines today as it did in former times. Indeed, this is one of the greatest benefits that can come from using the ban on bills of attainder as a takings protection, since many constitutional doctrines today are often confused and misunderstood.^[5]

§1. ...By continuing to operate steam generators known to be defective, and thereby increasing the risk of a radioactive release and/or an expensive plant outage, the Consolidated Edison Company failed to exercise reasonable care on behalf of the health, safety and economic interests of his customers. Therefore it would not be in the public interest for the company to recover from ratepayers any costs resulting from the February 15, 2000 outage at the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Facility.

(1)    whether it fell within the historical meaning of legislative punishment,

(2)    whether, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, it could reasonably be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes, and

(3)    whether it evinced an intent to punish.

(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment (historical test of punishment); (2) whether the statute, "viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes" (functional test of punishment); and (3) whether the legislative record "evinces a [legislative] intent to punish" (motivational test of punishment). Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348. All three factors need not be satisfied to prove that a law constitutes "punishment;" rather, "th[e] factors are the evidence that is weighed together in resolving a bill of attainder claim." Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 350.

"A grave imbalance or disproportion between the burden and the purported nonpunitive purpose suggests punitiveness, even where the statute bears some minimal relation to nonpunitive ends." Id.; accord Con. Edison, 292 F.3d at 350 ("Where a statute establishing a punishment declares and imposes that punishment on an identifiable party ... we look beyond simply a rational relationship of the statute to a legitimate public purpose for less burdensome alternatives by which the legislature could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive objectives."

If the clauses of the second article of the constitution of Missouri, to which we have referred, had in terms declared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be held guilty, of having been in armed hostility to the United States, or of having entered that State to avoid being enrolled or drafted into the military service of the United States, and, therefore, should be deprived of the right to preach as a priest of the Catholic Church, or to teach in any institution of learning, there could be no question that the clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, instead of mentioning his name, had declared that all priests and clergymen within the State of Missouri were guilty of these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and hence be subjected to the like deprivation, the clauses would be equally open to objection. And, further, if these clauses had declared that all such priests and clergymen should be so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they did not, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, they would be no less within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution.

In all these cases there would be the legislative enactment creating the deprivation without any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen in the administration of justice by the established tribunals.

The results which would follow from clauses of the character mentioned do follow from the clauses actually adopted. The difference between the last case supposed and the case actually presented is one of form only, and not of substance.

The existing clauses presume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and adjudge the deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the presumption be first removed by their expurgatory oath - in other words, they assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment conditionally. The clauses supposed differ only in that they declare the guilt instead of assuming it. The deprivation is effected with equal certainty in the one case as it would be in the other, but not with equal directness. The purpose of the lawmaker in the case supposed would be openly avowed; in the case existing it is only disguised. The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.

If a legislature or state agency wants to take property, the proper procedure entails designating the property to be taken, filing a lawsuit identifying the property and its owners, and allowing the owners to contest the compensation that the legislature or state agency offers. This procedure essentially refers the consummation of the taking to the judiciary. This process happens all the time today and is relatively well understood. Other than the initial designation of land to be taken, the entire procedure takes place in the judicial branch.

A bill of attainder seeks to bypass this procedure. It identifies the property to be taken, and then brazenly takes it, frequently with the excuse that the legislature is merely punishing an unworthy individual or group. No meaningful procedure is allowed for protest, and compensation is ignored. A structural check on legislative aggrandizement is the very heart and soul of the ban on bills of attainder and the essence of the separation of powers. As Justice Chase said in Calder v. Bull:

These acts [of attainder] were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power ... The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punishment, of the offender: as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure! With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder.

Justice Chase's articulation corresponded with the understanding of his fellow jurists and practitioners during the antebellum period. Attorneys making arguments to the courts during this time often identified the ban on bills of attainder as a legislative intrusion into the judicial sphere, and as a takings protection.

The quality of service of PECO has been wanting. Among the complaints against PECO are: overbilling/overcharging, arrogant personnel/poor customer relations, distributor related outages, inadequately maintained lines, inadequate investment in distribution facilities, and inordinate delay in the restoration of power services, among others.

In fact, he said, any legislator could seek a review of Meralco's franchise as part of Congress' oversight authority even before the power distributor could apply for an extension.

"Based on our experience with ABS-CBN, the sins of the past can come and haunt you. In other words, during the deliberations of its franchise, this type of violation can be a basis for the revocation or non- extension of (Meralco's) franchise," Gatchalian said.

"This could be a 'bad record' against (Meralco) ... It could be a hindrance (for securing a new franchise)," he cautioned.^[19]

In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the expropriation.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one's property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.

Daniel Webster was one of the most articulate critics in opposing legislative attempts to justify bills of attainder with the claim that whatever the legislature did satisfied due process or the law of the land. Webster gave his views on this issue in the cases involving Dartmouth College. Webster acted as counsel for the college in arguments before both the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1817 and on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1819. As described in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the New Hampshire legislature passed a law that fundamentally altered the college's corporate form. It is significant that this was not a state college, but a wholly private one. The legislature expanded the number of trustees from 12 to 21, transferred college property to the new trustees, and authorized the treasurer to retain and hold college property against the will of the original trustees. Webster decried the legislation as unauthorized. He noted that in passing this bill, the legislature had targeted a single entity for improper treatment, passing sentence upon the college as if the legislature were a court promulgating a judgment. Webster alluded to Blackstone, noting that the New Hampshire acts "have no relation to the community in general, and which are rather sentences than laws."

In response to New Hampshire's claim that its acts satisfied due process because the legislature created the law of the land, Webster noted:

Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man's estate to another, legislative judgments, decrees and forfeitures, in all possible forms, would be the law of the land. Such a strange construction would render constitutional provisions, of the highest importance, completely inoperative and void. It would tend directly to establish the union of all powers in the legislature.

Therefore, when the legislature acts in a judicial capacity and passes a bill of attainder taking private property, and then seeks to proclaim itself above challenge in doing so, the legislature denies due process and engages in the most egregious of takings. The ban on bills of attainder was designed specifically to protect private property from such an eventuality. For Webster, New Hampshire's actions in respect to the college and the taking of its property constituted a due process/law of the land violation, and defied the separation of powers precisely because the legislature exceeded its authority and acted as a judicial body.

The 1838 Maryland case Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams forcefully restated this point. In this case, the court decried state legislation whereby the university's property was taken and given to a new board of trustees, just as in Dartmouth College. The court commented on the legislature's improper intrusions on judicial power in these words:

If the transferring one person's property to another, by a special and particular act of the legislature, is a [sic] depriving him of his property, by or according to the law of the land, then any legislative judgment or decree, in any possible form, would be according to the law of the land, although there existed at the time no law of the land upon the subject, and that too by a tribunal possessing no judicial power, and to which all such power is denied by the constitution. Such a construction would tend to the union of all the powers of the government in the legislature, and to impart the attribute of omnipotency to that department, contrary to the genius and spirit of all our institutions; and the office of courts would be not to declare the law or to administer the justice of the country, but to execute legislative judgments and decrees, not authorized by the constitution.^[23]

In sum, the ban on bills of attainder is, in many ways, the quintessential declaration of the need for a separation of powers. If bills of attainder are allowed, then the legislature is supreme, and neither the judiciary nor any other body can question or set aside the legislature's acts. The ban on bills of attainder bridged the gap between the separation of powers embodied by the Constitution's framework and takings law as described in the Fifth Amendment. Bills of attainder are judicial acts by the legislature, in which the legislature defies takings law by taking property without following the proper method. A taking needs to be consummated in a certain way, and a bill of attainder is the wrong way. A legislature may not sit as a judicial body and declare whatever it does as satisfying due process or the law of the land. Hence, a proper understanding of the intent and scope of the ban on bills of attainder clarifies the separation of powers and increases an understanding of its true meaning as an unbreachable dividing line separating the reach of the different branches of government.^[24]

Well, the other option is definitely MORE Power is ready to build its own distribution assets, 'no. We can provide our own personnel and, well, again, as also mentioned during the last, I think, during the last two hearings, 'no, we were saying that personnel is not really that difficult to source, 'no, since it is readily available in the market."

As of March, Meralco had 6.4 million residential accounts, or 92 percent of the total in its franchise area in Metro Manila and neighboring provinces. Commercial customers accounted for 530,864 (8 percent) connections and industrial customers, 10,580 (0.2 percent).

"I'm pleased with the swift resolution (of the ERC) to impose a fine ... But the penalty of P19 million, for me, is just a drop in the bucket for Meralco," Gatchalian said.

"I think the almost P300 million in penalty is reasonable enough because their violation is nonconformity to the orders of the ERC," the senator said.

"If they still resist, I will advise ERC to mete out heftier fines and find other ways to penalize (Meralco)," he said in a separate radio interview.

No breakdown of charges

Gatchalian assailed Meralco and other power distributors for their continued failure to clearly explain to their customers the breakdown of monthly charges, such as the collection of environmental fee and feed-in- tariff allowance and a universal tax on all electric consumers.

He said the recent decision of the House of Representatives to deny ABS-CBN's application for a new franchise should be a lesson to all holders of legislative licenses.

In fact, he said, any legislator could seek a review of Meralco's franchise as part of Congress' oversight authority even before the power distributor could apply for an extension.

"Based on our experience with ABS-CBN, the sins of the past can come and haunt you. In other words, during the deliberations of its franchise, this type of violation can be a basis for the revocation or non- extension of (Meralco's) franchise," Gatchalian said.

"This could be a 'bad record' against (Meralco) ... It could be a hindrance (for securing a new franchise)," he cautioned.^[25]

3. The legislative intent is to ascribe public use and genuine public necessity to the condemnation of PECO's properties and to peg the amount of just compensation, regardless of a court proceeding.

We have just seen the danger that arises when a legislature acts in a judicial capacity and enacts bills of attainder to take private property, while simultaneously asserting that its actions are consistent with the law of the land. That discussion was missing only one important ingredient - motive. This section discusses factions as the motive for legislative defiance of due process. Once again, the ban on bills of attainder is by far the best aid in understanding why factions are so dangerous.

Why would a legislature be tempted to defy due process, take property without compensation, and declare that its acts are above judicial review? What possible motive could elected officials have for such misguided behavior? Factions are the answer. For a surprisingly clear statement as to why this is so, we turn to governmental genius James Madison. If anyone understood the workings and dangers of government, he did. Madison directly linked property takings, governmental factions, and rogue legislatures acting in a judicial capacity.

The occasion for Madison's interweaving of these topics was The Federalist No. 10. This is perhaps the single most famous of the Federalist papers penned by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, and is best known for discussing the dangers of factions. What is less known is that this essay also related directly to bills of attainder and eminent domain takings as well.

In the middle of The Federalist No. 10, Madison made the seemingly innocent comment that "no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause." This seems self-evident. How can a man judge whether he is worthy of punishment? But Madison then took this simple concept one step further and applied it to the workings of government - more specifically, the legislature. He said: "[A] body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?" In other words, Madison raised the very point discussed by Webster and Hamilton above. The legislature is tempted constantly to step into the judicial sphere, unless something prevents it from doing so. While Webster and Hamilton spoke in terms of individualized legislation, such as bills of attainder targeted at persons or small groups of people, Madison spread the canvas farther. Was not the same principle true when large groups were targeted for unfair treatment as well? Could not such far-reaching laws also be bills of attainder?

And just what were the groups that comprised opposing factions? Madison gave the answer in no uncertain terms: "The most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." Madison was no communist, however, and he was not in any way criticizing an unequal distribution of property or asserting that there should be a redistribution of the same to make everyone equal. For him, such a proposition would be impossible, since the acquisition of property was derived from the very unique personalities of individual men. He referred to this concept as "the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate." Then came his key point - that it was the government's job to protect and preserve such individual faculties, which in turn would forever preserve factions:

The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

What type of government would preserve property factions as necessary and unavoidable elements of society, while at the same time preventing them from controlling the legislature and exceeding its powers through bills of attainder? A large republic, answered Madison in The Federalist No. 10 - a republic in which small groups of representatives from large and distant population centers would effectively hold each other in check.

Of course, Madison believed that the most effective way the Congress could accomplish this task was through a legislative veto, as he had originally proposed. This legislative veto, however, had been overturned and replaced with a judicial veto over unacceptable state acts, such as the ban on bills of attainder. Madison still hoped and believed that the structure of the federal republic, combined with the limits in Article I, Section 10, would provide the needed protection against factions. He stated in the Federalist No. 44:

Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation... Very properly, therefore, has the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights ... The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators ...

Madison was not the only one who said that the ban on bills of attainder was the chief vehicle to overcome the dangers of factions. Justice Iredell in Minge v. Gilmour said:

In times of violent faction or confusion of any kind, men are often prompted, if they can, to destroy their adversaries under the color of the law. The numerous acts of attainder in England, and other arbitrary parliamentary punishments, show how necessary it was for a wise people, forming a constitution for themselves, to guard against tyrannies like these.

In sum, the greatest fear of the founding generation was that the factions - which are always present in society, and which arise because of unavoidable differences in property ownership - would use the government itself to oppress their fellow citizens. The founders hoped that the nature of America's large republic would overcome this problem. But if the republic failed to do so fully, a very specific ban on egregious, faction- based takings legislation could also be used as a protection. This protection was the ban on bills of attainder.^[30]

The ban on bills of attainder still stands as a bulwark of liberty to those whose property is arbitrarily taken by an unjustified legislative act. The provision itself has not changed, but only our understanding of it. The provision can protect both persons and groups who for a time are unpopular - such as those of Japanese descent in World War II, suspected communists in the 1950s, or suspected terrorists today - as well as persons or groups that own property the government wants, and then exerts pressure to obtain. Courts today should not be afraid to apply this unique and powerful tool as it was applied in the days of our early history. And when they do, courts will discover that it clarifies many other constitutional principles as well.^[31]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class....

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification....

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are....

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."

Well, the other option is definitely MORE Power is ready to build its own distribution assets, 'no. We can provide our own personnel and, well, again, as also mentioned during the last, I think, during the last two hearings, 'no, we were saying that personnel is not really that difficult to source, 'no, since it is readily available in the market.

... since I think capital is not a problem for us, if let's say, we're given at least a year, I mean I think we can ... we can actually come up with the system. Because like, let's say, substations, there are mobile standby substations that we can use immediately, deploy immediately while, let's say, building the permanent substations, 'no. So, I guess, again, I mean, since capital is not a problem for us then, I think at least a year would be more or less right...

The ponencia admits:

x x x x

At the same time, Section 17 expressly provides that, even as PECO is operating the distribution system, this interim arrangement shall not prevent MORE from acquiring the system through the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Thus, after R.A. No. 11212 took effect on March 9, 2019, MORE filed on March 11, 2019 a Complaint for Expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 37 (Iloilo RTC), over the distribution system of PECO in Iloilo City.

x x x x

xxxx Ownership was co-existent with the franchise, xxxx

Expropriation by MORE of the distribution system of PECO is for a genuine public purpose

The next legal issue is whether expropriation by MORE of PECO's distribution asset under Section 10 and Section 17 of R.A. No. 11212 is for a genuine public purpose. To reiterate, while it is Congress that defines public necessity or purpose, the Court has the power to review whether such necessity is genuine and public in character, by applying as standards the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection.

In its assailed decision, the RTC held that while R.A. No. 11212 authorizes MORE to expropriate the private property of PECO and to apply the same to the public purpose of power distribution, such identified public purpose is not genuine for ultimately it is the private interest of MORE that will be served by the expropriation. In other words, the expropriation is an ill-disguised corporate takeover.

x x x x

Even without these developments in Western jurisprudence, the genuineness of the public purpose of the expropriation of the distribution system of PECO can be determined from R.A. No. 11212 itself.

Expropriation under Section 10 and Section 17 of R.A. No. 11212 is not only for the general purpose of electricity distribution. A more distinct public purpose is emphasized: the protection of the public interest by ensuring the uninterrupted supply of electricity in the city during the transition from the old franchise to the new franchise. This distinct purpose has arisen because MORE is the new franchise holder in a city whose public space is already burdened by an existing distribution system, and that distribution system cannot continue to serve a public use for it is owned by the old franchise holder.

x x x x

The public necessity of ensuring uninterrupted electricity is implicit in Section 10, which authorizes MORE to expropriate the existing distribution system to enable itself to efficiently establish its service. This distinct public necessity is reiterated in Section 17 under which MORE may initiate expropriation proceedings even as PECO is provisionally operating the distribution system. In fact, this distinct public necessity of ensuring uninterrupted electricity is the very rationale of the ERC in granting PECO a provisional CPCN. The provisional CPCN is the legal basis of PECO's continued operation of the distribution system. PECO cannot deny that such distinct necessity to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply is public and genuine.

x x x x

x x x x In sum, expropriation by MORE of the distribution system of PECO under Sections 10 and 17 serves both the general public interest of conveying power and electricity in Iloilo City and the peculiar public interest and security of ensuring the interrupted supply of electricity. The RTC erred in declaring these provisions unconstitutional.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Justice Javier extends the concept of bill of attainder to cover Sec. 10 and Sec. 17 in that these legislations purportedly single out PECO and subject the latter to punishment without the benefit of trial. This conception bills of attainder is problematic for, as correctly pointed out by Justice Leonen in his dissent, a legislative franchise is not a right but a special privilege the grant, amendment, repeal or termination of which is granted to Congress by no less than the Constitution. Consequently, the termination of a franchise by its expiration is not a deprivation of a right or property that amounts to punishment. There is no question that the franchise of PECO was allowed to lapse because of its failure to render competent public service. No prior judicial trial of the performance of PECO is required before Congress may decide not to renew PECO's franchise. The power of this Court to subject to judicial review the constitutionality of a franchise legislation does not include the power to choose the franchise holder. That is not our place in the constitutional scheme of things.

Justice Javier argues that Sec. 10 and Sec. 17 virtually enable MORE to piggyback on PECO in order to establish and operate its franchise. Every legislative franchise enables the franchise holder to expropriate with the view of building its distribution system. Even PECO obtained the franchise from De La Rama along with the authority to use public spaces for the installation of its distribution system. MORE is authorized to acquire the assets of PECO and any other assets of any other entity that might be available as these are be necessary for the discharge of its public franchise.

When determining the limits of the government's right to take private property, we will defer to the General [***36] Assembly's exercise of those powers. Id. at 543; SWIDA, 199 111. 2d at 236 ("Great deference should be afforded the legislature and its granting of eminent domain authority."). Under SWIDA, that deference evaporates when the public purpose behind the taking is a pretext, when a municipality uses eminent domain as a weapon to forcibly transfer property from one private owner to another. See SWIDA, 199 111. 2d at 240 ("While [SWIDA's] activities here were undertaken in the guise of carrying out its legislated mission, SWIDA's true intentions were not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public use."); Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 478, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 (2005) (noting government would not be allowed "to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow private benefit."); cf. Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 169 (D.C. 2007) (finding "pretext" to be valid affirmative defense to condemnation for economic redevelopment).

Recognizing the difference between a valid public use and a sham can be challenging. But a telling feature of sound public use in the context of economic redevelopment is the existence of a well-developed, publicly vetted, and thoughtful economic development plan. Such a plan was present in Kelo,545 U.S. at 483-84, and Gutknecht, 3 111. 2d at 542-43, but absent in SWIDA, 199 111. 2d at 240 ("SWIDA did not conduct or commission [***37] a thorough study of the parking situation at [the racetrack]. Nor did it formulate any economic plan requiring additional parking at the racetrack "). A taking will likely pass constitutional muster where done in furtherance of a sound economic development plan, rather than [****432] 1**522] the plan retroactively justifying the taking. Cf. Romeo v. Cranston Redevelopment Agency, 105 R.I. 651, 254 A.2d 426, 433 (R.I. 1969) ("governing bodies must either plan for the development or redevelopment of urban areas or permit them to become more congested, deteriorated, obsolescent, unhealthy, stagnant, inefficient and costly" (internal quotation marks omitted)).^[33]

If this taking were allowed to stand, it may be true that spectators at Gateway would benefit greatly. Developing additional parking could benefit the members of the public who choose to attend events at the racetrack, as spectators may often have to wait in long lines of traffic to park their vehicles and again to depart the facility. We also acknowledge that a public use or purpose may be satisfied in light of public safety concerns. See Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n, 16 111. 2d 539, 158 N.E.2d 766 (1959). The public is allowed to park on the property in exchange for the payment of a fee. Gateway's racetrack may be open to the public, but not "by right." Gaylord, 204 111. at 584. It is a private venture designed to [*239] result not in a public use, but in private profits. If this taking were permitted, lines to enter parking lots might be shortened and pedestrians might [***21] be able to cross from parking areas to event areas in a safer manner. However, we are unpersuaded that these facts alone are sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement, especially in light of evidence that Gateway could have built a parking garage structure on its existing property.

We have also recognized that economic development is an important public purpose. See People ex Pel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 79 111. 2d 356, 38 111. Dec. 154, 403 N.E.2d 242 (1980); People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley, 68 111. 2d 62, 11 111. Dec. 307, 368 N.E.2d 915 (1977); People ex rel City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 111. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972). SWIDA presented extensive testimony that expanding Gateway's facilities through the taking of NCE's property would allow it to grow and prosper and contribute to positive economic growth in the region. However, "incidentally, every lawful business does this." Gaylord, 204 111. at 586. Moreover, nearly a century ago, Gaylord expressed the long­standing rule that "to constitute a public use, something more than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contemplated improvement. [***22] " Gaylord, 204 111. at 584.

This case is strikingly similar to our earlier decision in Limits Industrial R.R. Co. v. American Spiral Pipe Works, 321 111. 101, 151 N.E. 567 (1926). In Limits Industrial, this court held that a railroad could not exercise eminent domain authority to acquire property for the purpose of expanding its facilities. Despite a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Illinois Commerce Commission, we found the proposed spur track and public [**10] [****250] freight house provided minimal public benefit and principally benefitted the railroad itself and a few other business entities. Limits Industrial, 321 111. at 109-10. Similarly, it is incumbent upon us to question SWIDA's findings as to the parking situation at Gateway and determine whether [*240] the true beneficiaries of this taking are private businesses and not the public.

We do not require a bright-line test to find that this taking bestows a purely private benefit and lacks a showing of a supporting legislative purpose. As was the case in Limits Industrial, members of the public are not the primary intended beneficiaries of this taking. Limits Industrial, 321 111. at 109-10. [***23] This condemnation clearly was intended to assist Gateway in accomplishing their goals in a swift, economical, and profitable manner.

Entities such as SWIDA must always be mindful of expediency, cost efficiency, and profitability while accepting the legislature's charge to promote development within their defined parameters. However, these goals must not be allowed to overshadow the constitutional principles that lie at the heart of the power with which SWIDA and similar entities have been entrusted. As Justice Kuehn stated in dissent in the appellate court, "If property ownership is to remain what our forefathers intended it to be, if it is to remain a part of the liberty we cherish, the economic by­products of a private capitalist's ability to develop land cannot justify a surrender of ownership to eminent domain." 304 111. App. 3d at 556 (Kuehn, J., specially concurring).

While the activities here were undertaken in the guise of carrying out its legislated mission, SWIDA's true intentions were not clothed in an independent, legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public use. SWIDA did not conduct or commission a thorough study of the parking situation [***24] at Gateway. Nor did it formulate any economic plan requiring additional parking at the racetrack. SWIDA advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of "private developers" for the "private use" of developers. In addition, SWIDA entered into a contract with Gateway to condemn whatever land "may be desired *** by Gateway." Clearly, [*241] the foundation of this taking is rooted not in the economic and planning process with which SWIDA has been charged. Rather, this action was undertaken solely in response to Gateway's expansion goals and its failure to accomplish those goals through purchasing NCE's land at an acceptable negotiated price. It appears SWIDA's true intentions were to act as a default broker of land for Gateway's proposed parking plan.

This point is further emphasized by the fact that other options were available to Gateway that could have addressed many of the problems testified to by Pritchett, Ortbals and others. Gateway could have built a parking garage structure on its existing property rather than develop the land owned by NCE. However, when Gateway discovered that the cost of constructing a garage on land it already owned was substantially higher than [***25] using SWIDA as its agent to take NCE's property for open-field parking, Gateway chose the easier and less expensive avenue.

As a result of the acquisition of NCE's property, Gateway could realize an estimated increase of $ 13 to $ 14 million in projected revenue per year. While we do not deny that this expansion in revenue could potentially trickle down and bring corresponding revenue increases to the region, revenue expansion alone does not justify an improper and unacceptable expansion [* * 11 ] [* * * *251 ] of the eminent domain power of the government. Using the power of the government for purely private purposes to allow Gateway to avoid the open real estate market and expand its facilities in a more cost-efficient manner, and thus maximizing corporate profits, is a misuse of the power entrusted by the public.

The legislature intended that SWIDA actively foster economic development and expansion in Madison and St. Clair Counties. 70 ILCS 520/2(g), 5 (West 1998). However, the actions of SWIDA in this case blur the lines between [*242] a public use and a private purpose. A highway toll authority may justify the use of eminent domain to ensure that motorists have reasonable access [***26] to gas stations. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 16 111. 2d at 546. Does the highway authority's power include the ability to use eminent domain authority to take additional land for a car wash, and then a lube shop? Could the authority then use its power to facilitate additional expansions for a motel, small retail shops, and entertainment centers? The initial, legitimate development of a public project does not justify condemnation for any and all related business expansions.

SWIDA contends that the "wisdom *** of the legislation and 'the means of executing the project' are beyond judicial scrutiny 'once the public purpose has been established.' It is that purpose which controls and not the 'means' or 'mechanics' of how the purpose is carried out." We disagree. The Constitution and the essential liberties we are sworn to protect control. In its wisdom, the legislature has given SWIDA the authority to use eminent domain power to encourage private enterprise and become involved in commercial projects that may benefit a specific region of this state. While we do not question the legislature's discretion in allowing for the exercise of eminent domain power, "the government [***27] does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868, 885, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3178 (1982). The power of eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not abandon.

Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. The takings before us, however, would be executed pursuant to a "carefully considered" development plan. 268 Conn., at 54, 843 A.2d, at 536. The trial judge and all the members of the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case. Therefore, as was true of the statute challenged in Midkiff, 467 U.S., at 245, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186, 104 S. Ct. 2321, the City's development plan was not adopted "to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals."^[35]