EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 248985*, October 05, 2021 ]PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL +
PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ROSANNA VERGARA VERGARA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL +
PHILIP HERNANDEZ PICCIO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND ROSANNA VERGARA VERGARA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J:
The Facts
Vergara is a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born to Filipino parents, Leopoldo Lucas Vergara and Francisca L. Garcia, on November 5, 1963 in the City of Manila. In 1994, she moved to Cabanatuan City where she married her husband and later established their family home.
On May 20, 1998, prompted by her desire to pursue job opportunities, Vergara moved to the United States of America (USA), obtained a Certificate of Naturalization as an American citizen, and was thereby issued an American passport.[4]
Sometime in November 2006, Vergara filed with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration (BI) a Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate (IC) pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9225[5] for the retention/reacquisition of Philippine citizenship (R.A. 9225 Petition). The same was docketed as CRR No. 06-11/28-11184, No. AFF-06-10552.[6] As part of the documentary requirements supporting her R.A. 9225 Petition,[7] Vergara took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 26, 2006.[8]
Finding that Vergara had complied with all the requirements of R.A. 9225 and BI Memorandum Circular No. (BI M.C.) AFF-05-002,[9] the BI Task Force on the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (BI-TFCRRA), through Manuel Ferdinand C. Arbas (Arbas), issued a Memorandum dated November 28, 2006, recommending the approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and the issuance of an IC in her favor.[10] In an Order dated November 30, 2006,[11] BI Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. (Commissioner Fernandez) granted Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition, holding that, upon a careful review of her submitted documents, she had taken her Oath of Allegiance and, so, thereby deemed to have re-acquired her Philippine citizenship. The Order further stated that Vergara had complied with all the requirements of R.A. 9225 and directed the issuance of an IC in her favor.[12]
Hence, Vergara was issued IC No. 06-12955 likewise dated November 30, 2006, recognizing her as having re-acquired her Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.[13] Subsequently, Vergara executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 4, 2015.[14]
Proceedings before the Commission on Elections
On October 15, 2015, Vergara filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections.[15]
On October 19, 2015, Piccio, as registered voter, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (Section 78 Petition) against Vergara, alleging her failure to comply with the citizenship, residency, and voter registration requirements for Members of the House. In her Verified Answer to the Section 78 Petition, Vergara asserted her eligibility, as she had long re-acquired Philippine citizenship.[16]
In the May 11, 2016 elections, Vergara won and was proclaimed as duly-elected Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija. On June 30, 2016, she took her oath of office and assumed her position as Member of the House.[17]
In a Resolution dated June 7, 2016, the COMELEC dismissed the Section 78 Petition for lack of merit. It found, inter alia, that, prior to Vergara's filing of a CoC, she had already re-acquired her Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225. The COMELEC likewise found Vergara to be a natural-born Filipino citizen, a legitimate resident and registered voter of the Third District of Nueva Ecija.[18] Piccio filed an MR. Later, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order dated September 8, 2016, noting Piccio's ex-parte Manifestation stating that he earlier filed a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam against Vergara before the HRET and that, in view thereof, his petition before the COMELEC should then be considered withdrawn.[19]
The incidents leading to the present controversy |
Meanwhile, Piccio tried to secure from the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Manila a certified true copy of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance. The Assistant Clerk of Court, Clemente M. Clemente, issued a Certification dated May 24, 2016, stating that Atty. Alejandro B. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) — the Notary Public before whom Vergara's Oath of Allegiance was acknowledged on November 26, 2006 — did not submit Book IV of his Notarial Report, corresponding to the period from February 2006 to December 2007, which supposedly contained said Oath of Allegiance. The Certification read:
Atty. Alejandro B. Cinco submitted his Notarial Report for the months of February 2006 to December 2007 consisting of Pages 1-68 of Book 1 (one) only. This office could not issue a certified true copy of the document denominated as "Oath of Allegiance" executed by Rosanna Garcia Vergara, alleged to have been acknowledged before said Notary Public on November 26, 2006 with Doc. No. 115; Page No. 42; Book No. IV, Series of 2006, inasmuch as Book No. IV is not among those submitted to this Office.[20]
On May 16, 2016,[21] Piccio wrote a letter to the BI asking for certified true copies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents, which documents she had submitted to the COMELEC in support of her CoC. However, then BI Commissioner Ronaldo A. Geron (Commissioner Geron), in his Letter dated May 20, 2016, informed Piccio that the requested certified true copies could not be issued because the BI's Record's Section only had photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.[22]
On May 23, 2016, Piccio wrote another letter, this time requesting for a certification from the BI on the existence of Vergara's IC No. 06-12955.[23] In response, Commissioner Geron wrote Piccio a Letter dated June 2, 2016, again refusing to issue a Certification, albeit offering a different reason this time — that based on existing records of the BI, no R.A. 9225 Petition in favor of Vergara was received or processed by the BI and that no record of IC No. 06-12955 exists in the BI's files.[24]
In a third Letter dated May 25, 2016, Piccio wrote Commissioner Geron, seeking an explanation why the BI only has in its records a photocopy of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance.[25] However, the latter, in a Letter dated June 29, 2016, merely reiterated his June 2, 2016 Letter regarding the non-existence of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents with the BI.[26]
Upon learning of the conflicting replies of Commissioner Geron, Vergara wrote the BI a Letter dated July 4, 2016, asking for clarification on the matter. In her letter, Vergara narrated that she had filed with the BI the original copies of the required documents in support of her R.A. 9225 Petition, that said petition was granted, and that she was accordingly issued IC No. 06-12955. She further stated that, upon her request on December 15, 2015 and June 27, 2016, she was, in fact, issued certified true copies of her IC, together with its relevant documents, which issuances were accompanied by official receipts attached as enclosures to her letter.[27]
In response to Vergara, then newly-appointed Commissioner Jaime H. Morente (Commissioner Morente), in a Letter-Reply dated August 10, 2016, stated that the Acting Chief of the Board of Special Inquiry (BI-BSI) confirmed that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition had been duly received, processed, and approved by the BI and that she had been issued IC No. 06-12955. Further, her R.A. 9225 records reportedly containing photocopied documents were borrowed by Commissioner Geron on May 16, 2016. Commissioner Morente likewise declared that he had ordered the conduct of an investigation on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 records.[28]
Proceedings before the HRET
On July 11, 2016, Piccio filed a quo warranto petition against Vergara before the HRET,[29] averring that Vergara is ineligible to sit as a Member of the House, as she remained to be an American citizen, not having complied with the requirements of R.A. 9225 for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship. He cited, as basis: 1) the Certification dated May 24, 2016 of the Manila City OCC and 2) Commissioner Geron's three letters. Umali basically only adopted the position of Piccio.
Vergara, on the other hand, denied Piccio's allegations and maintained that she had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship in compliance with R.A. 9225.[30]
On July 27, 2017, Pre-trial Conference was held.[31] Later, the HRET issued the Pre-Trial Order dated July 28, 2017. Thereafter, trial on the merits followed.[32]
The Ruling of HRET
In the assailed Decision, the HRET found no merit in the quo warranto petitions of Piccio and Umali, and disposed of the case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions for quo warranto are DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the proclamation of respondent ROSANNA VERGARA as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives representing the Third District of Nueva Ecija in the May 2016 National and Local Elections is AFFIRMED.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[33]
The HRET held that Piccio and Umali utterly failed to establish their claims that Vergara remained to be an American citizen.[34] The HRET ruled that, to the contrary, the evidence unmistakably show that she had duly filed her R.A. 9225 Petition and had submitted the required documents therefor, resulting in the grant of said petition and the issuance of an IC.[35]
Piccio's MR was denied in the assailed Resolution. Thus, the present Petition.
Here, Piccio alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it declared that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, despite the fact that both she and the BI only have photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.[36] He insists that Vergara failed to sufficiently explain the loss of her original documents, hence, incapacitating her to validly present in evidence the photocopies of her documents.[37] He likewise bewails the failure of the BI to explain the missing originals and asserts that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions may no longer work to its advantage.[38]
Piccio further alleges that the HRET plagiarized the assailed Decision because most, if not all, of its contents can be found in Vergara's Answer and Memorandum filed before it. Allegedly, this casts suspicion as to the HRET's fairness, impartiality, and integrity.[39]
On the other hand, Vergara, in her Comment[40] dated October 28, 2019, alleges that the Petition suffers from serious procedural infirmities which warrant its outright dismissal.[41] In any case, she avers that the Petition must fail on its merits as all of the issues raised therein were already correctly ruled upon by the HRET. She maintains that she had proven her compliance with R.A. 9225 to re-acquire her Philippine citizenship. Finally, she submits that Piccio's allegations of plagiarism by the HRET must be stricken down for being misleading and contrary to Piccio's own cited case law.[42]
In turn, public respondent HRET, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment[43] dated January 8, 2020, avers that the Petition must be dismissed outright for being moot and academic, as Vergara had already fully served her 2016-2019 term as Representative of Nueva Ecija.[44] At any rate, the OSG maintains that the HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its dismissal of the quo warranto petitions was supported by the evidence on record.[45] Moreover, it refers to a number of resolutions from various quasi-judicial bodies which had ruled on the same issues as the present case, and attached copies thereof to its Comment.[46] Finally, the OSG submits that as petitioners before it failed to prove their allegations, the dismissal of the quo warranto petitions was warranted and the general rule that the HRET's judgment is beyond judicial interference must be upheld.[47]
In Piccio's Reply to Comment[48] dated February 23, 2020, he argues against the OSG's submission that the present case is mooted by the expiration of Vergara's first term as Member of the House. He cited cases which the Court still resolved on the merits although supervening events have rendered them moot, and reiterates the exceptional character of the present case as one being capable of repetition yet evading review.
Issues
The issues raised by the parties may be summarized as follows:
1) Whether the Petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic; 2) Whether the Petition should be dismissed for procedural lapses; 3) Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the quo warranto petitions and ruled that Vergara is qualified to sit as a Member of the House; and 4) Whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion by committing plagiarism in its assailed Decision.The Court's Ruling
The Petition fails. The Petition is dismissed.
The case cannot be dismissed for being moot and academic. |
The HRET seeks the outright dismissal of the Petition for being moot and academic, in light of the completion of Vergara's 2016-2019 term as Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija.[49]
The present case is not moot.
A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.[50] Here, the issue of Vergara's eligibility to sit as a Member of the House on the ground of her citizenship is not mooted by the expiration of her 2016 term, nor by the passing of the 2019 elections. There is no dispute that Vergara was re-elected in 2019 as Representative of Nueva Ecija's Third District, hence, continues to serve as an incumbent Member of the House to this day.
The 1987 Constitution requires Members of the House to be natural born citizens of the Philippines.[51] Likewise, the Local Government Code (LGC)[52] requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for an elective local official.[53] Hence, Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office.[54] Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed, not only at the time of election or assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.[55] The Court has held in Limkaichong v. COMELEC:[56]
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.[57]
Hence, the resolution of the present case remains relevant as Vergara's continued tenure as a Member of the House hinges on the resolution of the issue of whether she had validly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship. Stated differently, should the Court find that she is ineligible for not being a Philippine citizen, she must be removed from office. Needless to say, the issue of her citizenship remains to be a justiciable controversy, hence, the case is not rendered moot and academic.
At any rate, the present case is capable of repetition yet evading review, thus exempting it from the mootness rule, as held in Vilando v. HRET,[58] which bears facts similar to the present case, thus:
It should be noted that Limkaichong's term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The question on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.[59]
In light of the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to resolve the Petition.
Under the circumstances, while the failure of the Petition to comply with the Material Data Rule may be excused, its failure to attach vital annexes is fatal. |
Vergara submits that the Petition must be dismissed outright for failing to state the date when Piccio received the assailed Decision, pursuant to the Court's Revised Circular No. 1-88[60] which states:
Considering the provisions of Section 12, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandating the adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court and complementing further the Court's Resolution of April 7, 1988, implementing Administrative Circular No. 1 of January 28, 1988, the Supreme Court, effective January 1, 1989, will entertain only petitions that comply strictly with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, more particularly the following:
x x x x
(4) Verified statement of material dates. — A petition under Rule 45 or 65 shall in all cases contain a verified statement of the date when notice of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received; otherwise, the petition may be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale behind the requirement to state the material dates in a petition is to enable the appellate court to determine whether such petition was filed within the period fixed in the rules.[61] In Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals,[62] the Court deferred to the CA's exercise of its discretion when it gave due course to the petition therein and held that the same was filed on time.
Similarly, the Court defers to the HRET which took cognizance of Piccio's MR filed before it on June 20, 2019.[63] Further, a copy of the MR is attached to the present Petition and the same states that Piccio received the assailed Decision on June 10, 2019 and that the filing of such MR is, thus, timely.[64] Finally, while the Court's Revised Circular No. 1-88 mandates strict compliance with the Rules, its use of the words "may be dismissed" nevertheless shows that the Court retains the discretion to observe liberality and excuse procedural missteps, as the circumstances may warrant.
The more serious procedural defect pointed out by Vergara is the failure of the Petition to attach its declared annexes, some of which constitute vital evidence to support its claims.[65]
Specifically, Vergara assails the failure of Piccio to attach Annexes "A" to "L" of the Petition for Quo Warranto (marked as Annex "C" of the Petition)[66] and Annexes "1" to "8-g" of the Verified Answer of Vergara (marked as Annex "E" of the Petition),[67] as a violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules,[68] which requires a petition for certiorari to "x x x be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, and copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto x x x."[69]
While the rules of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice,[70] this should not mean that the Rules may be ignored at will to the prejudice of the orderly administration of justice.[71] Hence, there must be a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural rules and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just disposition of his cause.[72]
Not all pleadings and parts of the records are required to be attached to a petition — only such as would give the reviewing body enough documentary and evidentiary bases to resolve the issues and, ultimately, the case before it.[73] The crucial question to consider, then, is whether the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations therein.[74]
This is evident from the "guideposts" laid down in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora[75] (Air Philippines) to determine the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the records in a Rule 65 petition, thus:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also be found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.[76]
Here, the records reveal that the crucial and relevant documentary evidence that can substantiate petitioner's arguments are among those he failed to attach to the Petition. These include all of the exhibits enumerated in his Pre-trial Brief with the HRET, thus:
1) Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy filed before the COMELEC last October 19, 2015. (Exhibit "A"); 2) Certification issued by [the] Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City [of] Manila dated May 24, 2016. (Exhibit "B"); 3) Oath of Allegiance of [Vergara] purportedly subscribed and sworn to before a notary public for Manila [ — ] Notary Public Atty. Alejandro B. Cinco, under Document No. 115, Page No. 42, Book IV, Series of 2006. (Exhibit "B-1"); 4) Notarial Commission and attachments of Atty. Alejandro B. Cinco for the year 2006 to 2007. (Exhibit "B-2" and "series") 5) A sample Notarial Register/Book (Exhibit "C") 6) Letter dated May 16, 2016 of [Piccio] addressed to former Immigration Commissioner Geron; Answer letter by then Immigration Commissioner Geron; Follow-up Letter dated May 16, 2016 of [Piccio] addressed to former Immigration Commissioner Geron; Answer letter by then Immigration Commissioner Geron; Letter dated May 25, 2016 of [Piccio] addressed to former Immigration Commissioner Geron (Exhibits "D" and "series") 7) The Oath of Allegiance dated 26 November 2006; Memorandum dated 28 November 2006; Order dated 30 November 2006; and Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 [(sic)] all of Respondent Vergara (Exhibits "E" and "series").[77]
Nonetheless, the Court has held in Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano[78] (Spouses Cordero) and Air Philippines that if the material contents of the relevant documents omitted are substantially summarized in the assailed decision accompanying the petition, then the omission to attach said documents must be excused. Unfortunately, this doctrine cannot save the Petition.
It appears that the assailed Decision of the HRET,[79] while quoting or substantially summarizing some key evidence of the Petition, nevertheless fails to sufficiently reflect others, either because it merely mentions the same or completely omits mentioning them. These documents which the Petition fails to adequately summarize include Vergara's Oath of Allegiance itself; items 3 to 5 of the above exhibits in his Pre-trial Brief; some of the letters in item 6; and all four of the documents in item 7.
Verily, the peculiarities of the present Petition demand a higher sense of diligence from Piccio to ensure the sufficiency of its supporting evidence.
First, the Petition is one for certiorari, thus, requiring proof of, not mere error or abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET, but grave abuse of discretion.
Second, unlike in an appeal where the records with the lower tribunal are elevated to the appellate court, a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action. Hence, the petition must be accompanied by all evidence necessary to support its arguments. In this sense, the present case differs from Spouses Cordero where the Court noted the option of the CA to direct the clerk of court of the trial courts, whose decisions were appealed, to elevate the original records of the case.
Third, the issues of the case are factual and evidentiary in nature, hence, the pleadings and attachments must be sufficient to support the Court's conclusions as it is, generally, not a trier of facts and does not conduct hearings.
Hence, the failure of Piccio to comply with procedural rules, under the circumstances, renders the Petition dismissible. Nevertheless, even if the Court excuse these technical blunders, the Petition still fails on its merits.
Guiding principles in resolving Rule 65 petitions involving electoral tribunals |
In resolving the merits of the case, the Court is guided by basic principles in electoral tribunal cases brought to it on petition for certiorari.
First, the burden to prove the ineligibility of a duly elected public official is upon the person asserting such ineligibility.[80] A petitioner in a quo warranto case must first prove the very fact of disqualification of the candidate by substantial evidence.[81] Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the candidate who should now defend himself or herself with countervailing evidence.[82] A taint of doubt is not enough to discharge the burden.[83]
Hence, Piccio and Umali have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, their allegations that Vergara failed to re-acquire her Filipino citizenship.
Second, the Court, in determining whether a quo warranto petitioner has discharged his or her burden of proving the ineligibility of an elected official, must resolve "all possible doubts x x x in favor of [a winning] candidate's eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the true will of the electorate, x x x [which is] paramount."[84] Election laws are liberally and equitably construed to give fullest effect to the manifest will of the people.[85] In the landmark case of Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee,[86] the Court pronounced:
x x x To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. x x x[87]
Hence, the Court must exercise utmost caution before disqualifying a winning candidate who has been shown to be the clear choice of the constituents that he or she represents.[88]
Here, it is uncontroverted that Vergara was the duly-elected and proclaimed Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija, not just in the 2016 elections, but likewise in the 2019 elections. The people of Nueva Ecija twice exercised their will to install Vergara as their Representative in the House.
Third, the HRET is made by no less than the Constitution to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the members of the House.[89] The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred.[90] The authority conferred upon it is full, clear and complete[91] and its jurisdiction is original and exclusive.[92] The Court has said:
x x x [S]o long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court x x x, [T]he power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.”[93]
Hence, the judgments of the HRET are, as a rule, beyond judicial interference, and the only exception is in the exercise of the Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction.[94] The Court meddles only upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process.[95]
Fourth, a petition for certiorari — the only vehicle to challenge a decision of the HRET by a finding of it having gravely abused its discretion in so deciding — may not be used to correct mere errors in the HRET's evidence and factual findings.[96] By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative body like the HRET over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such matters. Thus, its findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts.[97]
The only exception is when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such factual findings.[98] This means that there are manifestly gross errors in the HRET's factual inferences such that critical evidence which have been introduced by the parties are ignored or not accounted for.[99] It means that the conclusions are founded on a gross misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence.[100] The Court has succinctly explained the extent of the Court's power in reviewing factual findings of the HRET, thus:
An inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence is not within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. "Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari." This rule applies to decisions by the HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has consistently been upheld by this Court.[101]
Another well-settled rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts, and factual issues are beyond its authority to review, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion by the lower tribunal challenged.[102]
Here, the present Petition challenges the findings of the HRET on Vergara's compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225 — specifically, whether she took her oath of allegiance thereunder. Without a doubt, this is an issue that is factual in nature. In essence, the present Rule 65 petition seeks a re-examination by this Court of the evidence presented before the HRET. Hence, the Court must observe utmost caution, bearing in mind that it is not a trier of facts and can do no more than to abide by the HRET's appreciation of the facts in cases within its unquestioned exclusive jurisdiction.[103]
In sum, the Court is called to assess, in the present Petition, whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners before it failed to clearly demonstrate, by substantial evidence, the ineligibility of Vergara. The showing of ineligibility must be clear, for all doubts must necessarily be resolved in favor of retaining her as Representative of Nueva Ecija's Third District, having been installed as such by the will of the people, twice expressed through the ballots. A taint of doubt cannot nearly suffice as substantial evidence.
"Gravely abused its discretion" means that the HRET — which has the sole constitutional prerogative to judge the qualifications of Vergara to sit in the House, and whose factual and evidentiary findings are generally beyond the Court's powers to review — had absolutely no evidence or substantial evidence to support its factual finding that Vergara is so qualified.
It is against the backdrop of the foregoing basic legal principles and settled facts, that the Court had judiciously examined the records, and hereby resolves to dismiss the Petition for lack of merit.
The evidence on record shows that Vergara duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225. |
The twin requirements for natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Philippine citizenship, and to qualify for public office are provided in R.A. 9225, thus:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic x x X.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
x x x x
Hence, in order that a natural-born Filipino citizen, who has lost his or her Filipino citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad, may qualify to run for elective public office in the Philippines, must 1) re-acquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
It is beyond dispute that Vergara, a natural-born Filipino citizen who was later naturalized as an American citizen, had complied with the second requisite. The contest lies as to whether she had observed the first.
The HRET found that the pieces of evidence adduced in the case unmistakably show that Vergara had duly filed a petition for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 and sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law,[104] and that this resulted in the granting of such petition by the BI and the corresponding issuance in her favor of an IC. In short, the HRET found that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship by observing the requirements of the law, foremost of which is the taking of the Oath of Allegiance.
The Court agrees.
Vergara took her Oath of Allegiance in accordance with R.A. 9225. The Oath exists and was duly executed. Petitioner failed to prove any defect in its notarization or that such defect, if any, renders the document void. |
Vergara presented a copy of her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated November 26, 2006. Nevertheless, Piccio challenges the existence and due execution thereof, in particular, by attempting to establish defects in its notarization. A reading of his quo warranto petition filed before the HRET shows that he presented in evidence, the signatures of Atty. Cinco — the Notary Public before whom Vergara's Oath of Allegiance was acknowledged on November 26, 2006 — as appearing on said document and on Atty. Cinco's 2006 Notarial Commission;[105] as well as 2) the Certification issued by the Manila City OCC dated May 24, 2016 which stated that Atty. Cinco's Book IV of notarial records which contained the entry for Vergara's Oath of Allegiance was not among those he submitted with the said office.[106]
On the documents showing Atty. Cinco's signatures, Piccio claimed that a comparison thereof would show that the same were "absolutely contradistinctive."[107] The Court cannot agree.
As intimated earlier, Piccio failed to attach the documents he refers to and merely vaguely reproduced in the present Petition pages 8 and 9 of his quo warranto petition. Said printouts cannot be sufficient and reliable bases for a reasonable comparison of signatures — a process that requires meticulousness because of the numerous factors involved and its highly technical nature.[108]
Moreover, forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and the burden rests upon the claimant thereof to prove the same by clear, positive, and convincing evidence.[109] The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is claimed to have been forged.[110] In Republic v. Harp,[111] the Court ruled that a finding of forgery must be based on an examination of the original document and cannot be supported by an examination of a mere photocopy thereof, thus:
From Senate Committee Report No. 256 dated 7 August 2003, it appears that the supposed discovery of alterations was based on a mere photocopy of Manuel's Certificate of Live Birth. Since the original document was not inspected, the committees could not make any categorical finding of purported alterations. They were only able to conclude that Manuel's birth certificate appeared to be "simulated, if not, highly suspicious." The Court cannot rely on this inconclusive finding. In the same way that forgery cannot be determined on the basis of a comparison of photocopied instruments, the conclusion that a document has been altered cannot be made if the original is not examined.[112]
Hence, Piccio is burdened to prove that Atty. Cinco's signature on the Oath of Allegiance of Vergara was forged and is patently dissimilar to his specimen signatures as a notary public. This may only be demonstrated by a presentation to the Court of competent documents that can enable it to arrive at a reasonable conclusion. Unlike a recital or reproduction of a document in a certified true copy of an assailed decision of a lower court or tribunal, which suffices to prove the existence and contents of such document.[113] a reproduction in a photocopy of a self-serving pleading simply cannot suffice.
The second evidence, the OCC Certificate dated May 24, 2016, states:
Atty. Alejandro B. Cinco submitted his Notarial Report for the months of February 2006 to December 2007 consisting of Pages 1-68 of Book 1 (one) only. This office could not issue a certified true copy of the document denominated as "Oath of Allegiance" executed by Rosanna Garcia Vergara, alleged to have been acknowledged before said Notary Public on November 26, 2006 with Doc. No. 115; Page No. 42; Book No. IV, Series of 2006, inasmuch as Book No. IV is not among those submitted to this Office.[114]
This is invoked by Piccio to prove the spuriousness of Vergara's Oath.
On this point, the Court completely agrees with the HRET — that the Certification pertains only to the failure of the Notary Public Atty. Cinco to submit to the court the book supposedly containing Vergara's Oath. It is not proof of the non-existence of the Oath itself, nor does it prove the Oath's invalidity.[115] Such conclusion cannot be taken from the language of the Certification. In Vitangcol v. People[116] (Vitangcol), the Court rejected a similar Certification issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar (OCR), thus
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina.
x x x x
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.[117]
A defect in the notarization of a document or the failure of the notary public to comply with his or her duty to submit his or her notarial reports does not, as it cannot, render such document void. A different interpretation would be unjust to the parties relying upon them in good faith, and who cannot be expected to ensure that the notary public observes his or her administrative duties. In a similar case, the Court ruled:
At the outset, the ruling of the CA was correct. Indeed, the notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila. It is the swearing of a person before the Notary Public and the latter's act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report.
Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law. x x x[118]
Hence, the negligence or failure of Atty. Cinco to comply with his duty to deliver his notarial reports should not affect the validity, much less the existence, of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance. If any, it merely exposes Atty. Cinco to administrative liabilities, in light of his failure to perform his duties as a notary public. Likewise, the authenticity of his signatures cannot be judiciously determined from the present documents available to the Court.
In sum, the existence, due execution and genuineness of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance stand as the same were not successfully refuted.
Vergara's presentation of the original of her IC No. 06-12955, the existence and genuineness of which are not contested, is prima facie proof that she complied with the requirements of R.A. 9225 to re acquire her Philippine Citizenship. |
Vergara presented before the HRET her original IC No. 06-12955, the genuineness and existence of which are not contested.[119] Under R.A. 9225 in relation to Administrative Order (AO) No. 91, Series of 2004 and the BI M.C. AFF-05-002, a petition for the Issuance of an IC (for the retention/acquisition of Philippine citizenship) requires, as part of the documentary support to the petition, the submission of a duly accomplished Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.[120] Piccio, in the present Petition, likewise makes an admission that the "Certificate is given after application, verification and approval of the petition as required by [R.A.] 9225."[121] Moreover, the BI officials presented as witnesses before the HRET testified that the original documents are required to be submitted for an R.A. 9225 Petition to be approved, and the same is likewise admitted by Piccio.[122]
Hence, the mere issuance and existence of the genuine and authentic IC of Vergara, while not conclusive proof as correctly pointed out by Piccio,[123] is, at the very least, prima facie proof of Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225, including the submission of the petition therefor and its supporting documents as well as their due processing and approval by the BI.
The photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents were validly introduced in evidence, as she had sufficiently established and explained the loss of their originals. |
Piccio maintains that the acquisition by Vergara of the IC was irregular because of her failure to produce the original documents supporting her R.A. 9225 Petition in accordance with the Rules on Evidence, and the concomitant failure of the BI to explain why it only has photocopies of the documents in its records. Piccio further faults Vergara for omitting to offer a plausible explanation why she only has photocopies in her possession and the original cannot be produced or found.[124]
The contentions fail.
At the outset, the Court clarifies that the absence of the original documents is not fatal to Vergara's case. To emphasize, the issue in the present case pertains to the existence and due execution of these documents — and not their contents. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule, requiring the production of the original document, does not apply.
The Best Evidence Rule is embodied in Section 3,[125] Rule 130 of the Rules, and stipulates that "in proving the terms" of a written document, the original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence, other than the original writing, to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.[126]
In Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez[127] (Heirs of Prodon) the Court explained that the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the issues concern external facts like the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, the Rule cannot be invoked and secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. Thus:
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.[128] (Italics in the original)
In Heirs of Prodon, the Court had occasion to mention the following:
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao's belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.[129]
Hence, what Heirs of Prodon held were as follows: (1) although secondary evidence is admissible if the issue is not the terms of the document even without first accounting for the original, it is a matter of good trial tactics that the loss of the original document still be established and explained; (2) such proof of loss will be subjected to less stringent standards than if the Best Evidence Rule applies; (3) to prove such loss, there must be evidence submitted that the original document cannot be found in the possession of its alleged custodian, either by the latter or his or her representatives, and efforts should be made to obtain a duplicate original from the concerned Notary Public, if any; and (4) proof that consists of products of ministerial acts, such as registration of instruments for purposes of notice, may be rejected.
Applying the foregoing here, there is no question that Vergara (1) submitted proof that her documents could not be found in the possession of its last custodian — the BI. The BI itself, through several testimonies, documents and letters, admitted that the original documents are not in its custody, while likewise admitting that they were duly filed by Vergara; (2) the original of the Oath of Allegiance cannot likewise be found with the Notary Public, as shown by the Certificate dated May 24, 2016 of the OCC of Manila. Stated differently, the fact of loss of the original Oath of Allegiance and Vergara's other R.A. 9225 documents was duly proven.
Vergara had likewise reasonably explained such loss. She narrated that she submitted said original documents to the BI, together with her R.A. 9225 Petition, when she applied for re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship.[130] This is confirmed by: (1) the BI itself through its officials; (2) the BI General Instructions for Petitions for Retention/Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. 9225[131] (General Instructions) which requires two originals of the Oath as supporting documents for R.A. 9225 petitions, and provides that such originals "will not be returned to the petitioner and will be part of the Bureau's record;" and (3) AO No. 91, Series of 2004 designating the BI as the "repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance."
Moreover, unlike the registration of a deed, the issuance of the IC is not a ministerial act by the BI. This requires careful exercise of discretion. Indeed, as may be drawn from the law and evidence, including the testimonies of the BI officials presented before the HRET, a thorough investigation is conducted — which in the case of Vergara was actually done by the BI Task Force on the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003[132] — after which the investigating body makes a recommendation to the BI. The BI then exercises its own discretion by considering the investigation report and recommendation, after which it approves the petition and orders the issuance of an IC, or disapproves the same. In fact, the BI General Instructions advises applicants and petitioners to seek legal advice from lawyers and/or BI accredited entities in applying under R.A. 9225.[133]
Hence, applying Heirs of Prodon, Vergara more than sufficiently observed the requirements of the law for the admission of her secondary evidence, specifically the photocopies of her R.A. 9225 documents.
In any case, as pointed out in the assailed Decision,[134] the Revised Rules of the HRET (HRET Rules) provides that the Rules is applicable only by analogy or in a suppletory character.[135] The HRET "is not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure" as "[it] may suspend [them] in the higher interest of justice and apply other rules of procedure as may be applicable at its discretion."[136]
Indeed, legal technicalities aside, from the facts of the case, it was virtually impossible for Vergara to produce her original R.A. 9225 documents after she had filed them with the BI. With good reason, Vergara believed that the presentation of the original IC was sufficient to prove the existence of the documents which were required for its issuance. Hence, upon learning of Commissioner Geron's letters stating that her R.A. 9225 files purportedly do not exist in the BI records, she immediately sought clarification from the BI through incumbent BI Commissioner Morente.[137] In response to this letter query, Commissioner Morente confirmed that her R.A. 9225 Petition was received, processed, and approved by the BI as a result of which she was issued an IC.[138]
The Court deems these efforts as more than reasonable under the circumstances, considering that, in the end, Vergara was assured by the BI that its records reflect the existence and due processing of her R.A. 9225 documents. From these facts, there is nothing more that she could have done or was supposed to do. To be sure, it is established by the evidence that the original documents are not with the BI, as it only has possession of their photocopies. To the Court's mind, this only confirms the hopelessness of Vergara's situation — there was no way for her to produce said original documents because they went missing from the BI's custody. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. The law does not require the impossible.[139]
Hence, the HRET was more than correct when it considered and gave due weight to the following R.A. 9225 documents of Vergara, despite the absence of originals of the following:
1. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated November 26, 2006; 2. Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 issued by the BI-TFCRRA through Arbas, recommending the approval of her R.A. 9225 Petition; and 3. Order dated November 30, 2006 issued by the BI through Commissioner Fernandez, recognizing that she had taken an Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that she had complied with all the requirements of R.A. 9225 for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship and thereby granting her R.A. 9225 Petition.
That the original documents are not with the BI — their official custodian — does not mean that they never existed or that they were never filed, processed, and granted. |
That the original documents do not appear to exist in the BI's records at the time when they were sought does not mean that they never existed. It does not — as it logically cannot — lead to a conclusion that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents were never filed, duly processed, and granted.
In the Vitangcol case mentioned above — a Bigamy case against a husband who produced a Certification from the OCR, stating that it has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in the husband's and his first wife's favor — the Court ruled that such Certification does not prove that there was no marriage license, thus:
This Certification does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.
Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina. The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner's first marriage. This "should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]"
x x x x
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.[140]
Like Vitangcol, none of the evidence presented in the present case categorically stated that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents do not exist. On the contrary, all of the BI officials declared that the BI has photocopies of such documents in its records. In fact, the BI admitted that the original documents existed, and were filed, processed and approved by it, according to its investigation, on the basis of its records, formal hearings conducted and the reports and comments of its relevant offices. Hence, the effective admission by the BI that the originals of the documents are presently not in its records cannot be taken to mean that such documents never existed.
Moreover, similar to Vitangcol's marriage certificate (a document bearing the signature of the adverse party which he admitted to be authentic), the genuineness and existence of Vergara's IC are also not disputed. Hence, it must likewise be treated as positive evidence of the existence and due processing of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.
The pieces of evidence coming from the BI officials are competent proof of Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225. The conclusions reached therein are duly substantiated and are not solely reliant on the presumption of regularity. Under the circumstances, only the two June letters of Commissioner Geron are anomalous, hence, only these letters should not be given credence by the Court. |
Both Piccio and Vergara presented in evidence several BI documents and testimonies of BI officials during the HRET trial, thus:
A. BI official documents:
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B. Pertinent testimonies of BI officials during the HRET trial:
1) Atty. Santos, Chief, BI Legal Division and Chairman, Investigation Committee, who testified that: a) an investigation was conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 records and the Investigation Report concluded that the files therein were duly received and processed, resulting to the issuance of IC No. 06-12955;[156] b) the Investigation Committee conducted formal hearings and several meetings, and required relevant officials to submit their comments and reports which they did;[157] c) the investigation centered on whether Vergara applied for re-acquisition of citizenship, if the same was approved and if there was tampering of the documents during that process;[158] and d) during the investigation in 2016, Vergara's records contained only photocopies of documents.[159] Atty. Santos likewise confirmed under oath that because the original documents are required to be submitted, the presumption is that these original documents are in the custody of the BI.[160] 2) Atty. Canta, member of the BI-BSI, who testified that: a) there were entries in the electronic database of the dual citizenship office which indicates the processing of Vergara's documents;[161] b) that Vergara's documents have been implemented with Transaction Number/Entry Reference No. 1 0552;[162] c) the BI database records all transactions including the processing of documents;[163] d) tampering (of the BI electronic database) is highly unlikely (and will not go unnoticed) because any change will be reflected and all entries would be affected;[164] and e) original documents are required to be submitted in an application for re-acquisition of citizenship, especially the Oath of Allegiance.[165] 3) Acting Records Officer Maria Graciella Maceda (Maceda) who testified that: a) the mandate of the Records Section is to safekeep records transmitted officially by the several BI offices, regardless of whether said documents transmitted are original or photocopies;[166] and b) the Records Section merely receives such transmitted documents, after which they conduct inventories and prepare record statistics. The documents are then stored in the BI warehouse.[167] Maceda likewise confirmed a statement that she made in a session of the Committee on Good Governance and Public Accountability of the House on August 16, 2017 to the effect that in the years 2005 and 2006, before the BI established a Verification and Compliance Division, it was not unusual that only photocopies of the original filings for R.A. 9225 were transmitted to the Records Section but that the same were considered valid documentation.[168]
Piccio challenges the conclusions of the BI officials in Vergara's favor for relying solely on the presumption of regularity.[169] Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando (Justice Hernando), during the case deliberations, likewise raised the concern that the BI Investigation Committee, in concluding that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition was duly received, processed, and approved, merely based such finding on the photocopies of Vergara's documents and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. He opines that the material contradictions coming from BI Commissioners Geron and Morente, cast doubt upon the reliability of Commissioner Morente's letter and defeats the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the BI.
The Court must differ.
Foremost, the records clearly show that, in reaching their conclusions that suggest Vergara's valid re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship, the BI officials did not rely on the presumption of regularity alone. From the clear language of the BI Investigation Report and the testimonies of the BI officials before the HRET, the BI's position is supported by the available records, the BI electronic database, the Dual Citizenship Office database, several meetings, formal hearings and investigations, as well as certifications, reports and comments from relevant BI offices.[170]
From this, it becomes clear that only the June 2016 letters of Commissioner Geron are suspect, but these need not taint the credibility and evidentiary value of the numerous other pieces of evidence from the BI officials presented by the parties which are consistent, logical and supported by other evidence on record.
First, the very letters coming from Commissioner Geron contradict one another. As pointed out by the HRET, in his May 20, 2016 letter, Commissioner Geron narrated that the BI had photocopies of Vergara's documents and even enumerated the nature of these documents therein, thus:
Dear Mr. Piccio,
This refers to your letter dated 16 May 2016 requesting for certified true copies of the [R.A.] 9225 dual citizenship documents of ROSANNA VERGARA VERGARA.
Please be advised that upon verification, it was found that the Records Section only has photocopies of the following documents:
- Oath of Allegiance dated 26 November 2006;
- Memorandum dated 28 November 2006;
- Order dated 30 November 2006; and
- Identification Certificate No. 06-12955.
x x x x[171]
Commissioner Geron thereafter directly contradicted his statements in the foregoing letter when he issued his succeeding June 2, 2016 letter which then stated that no record of IC No. 06-12955 exists in the BI's files (including photocopies thereof), and that based on existing records, Vergara's petition was never received and processed by the BI, thus:
Dear Mr. Piccio,
x x x [P]lease be informed that based on existing records of the Bureau of Immigration, no Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate in favor of ROSANNA VALERIANA GARCIA VERGARA @ ROSANNA VERGARA (VERGARA) was received or processed by the Bureau. Further, no record of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 allegedly issued to Vergara exists in the Bureau's files.
x x x x[172]
The latter message is reiterated in Commissioner Geron's letter dated June 29, 2016.[173]
Second, the June letters were apparently written with knowledge that, contrary to what they stated, the BI does have records of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents. To recall, per the Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda, Commissioner Geron borrowed Vergara's R.A. 9225 files on May 16, 2016, which thus accounts and substantiates the first letter dated May 20, 2016 where Commissioner Geron unequivocally stated the fact that the BI has photocopies of the documents. This leads to no other conclusion than that the subsequent issuance of the June letters, which contradicted the May letter and are inconsistent with Maceda's Certification, was deliberate and tainted with malice.
Therefore, the Court agrees with the HRET's conclusion that the obvious contradictions in the statements of Commissioner Geron impeaches his credibility in writing the June letters.[174] In truth, it is difficult to see how the contradictions of Commissioner Geron's positions can impair the reliability of Commissioner Morente's letters.
Third, Commissioner Geron's June letters are belied by the subsequent letter of Commissioner Morente dated August 10, 2016, written in response to Vergara's letter, which sought to clarify the statements of Commissioner Geron that the BI has no records of her R.A. 9225 documents. Commissioner Morente therein declared that Vergara's petition "has been duly received, processed and approved by the [BI] and that [she has] been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955,"[175] thus:
x x x x
Dear Congresswoman Vergara:
This is in response to your 04 July 2016 and 03 August 2016 letters seeking assistance and clarification regarding the 02 June 2016 letter of former Commissioner Ronaldo A. Geron (Annex "A") stating that no record of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 exists in the Bureau's files.
The Acting Chief, Board of Special Inquiry confirmed that your petition for Reacquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship under R.A. 9225 has been duly received, processed[,] and approved by the Bureau of Immigration and that you have been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 pursuant thereto (Annex "B").
We wish to inform you that based on our inquiry, we learned that on 16 May 2016, the Records Section brought to the Office of Commissioner Geron your [R.A.] 9225 records reportedly containing photocopied documents. On the same date, your [R.A.] 9225 records were returned to the Records Section in the same condition as [they] were borrowed according to the certification issued by Acting Chief, Records Section (Annex "C").
I have ordered for the conduct of an investigation as to the allegations that your [R.A.] 9225 records were tampered.
x x x x[176]
Moreover, unlike the June letters of Commissioner Geron, Commissioner Morente's letter was based on two certifications, duly issued by the concerned BI offices:[177] (1) Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda;[178] and (2) Certification of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta.[179] These certifications were attached to Commissioner Morente's letter. For obvious reasons, between Commissioner Geron's June letters — which contradict his own May 20, 2016 letter, and fails to cite any reasonable basis for his contradictory statements — and that of Commissioner Morente's letter, the latter deserves greater credence.
Finally, the June letters of Commissioner Geron are belied, not only by his own letter dated May 20, 2016, by the Certification dated August 4, 2016 of Records Section Chief Maceda, by the letter dated August 10, 2016 of Commissioner Morente, but also by all the other documents, letters, and testimonies coming from all the other BI officials submitted in evidence during the hearings before the HRET.
The contents and statements in these pieces of evidence may be summarized as follows:
1) In 2006, the BI officials who evaluated Vergara's application for re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship determined that she had taken her Oath of Allegiance, thereby resulting to her having reacquired her Philippine citizenship; that Vergara had complied with the requirements of R.A. 9225; that her R.A. 9225 Petition must be/was approved; and that, accordingly, an IC was issued in her favor.[180] 2) In 2016, the BI's Records Section only has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.[181] 3) Based on the series of investigations, meetings and formal hearings, the comments and reports of relevant BI officials, the entries in the BI electronic database and the database of the BI Dual Citizenship Office, as well as the available BI records, Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its accompanying documents were all received, processed, and approved by the BI on November 30, 2016, as a consequence of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955.[182] 4) The filing, processing, and approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents in 2006 are recorded and reflected in the BI electronic database, which records all BI transactions including any changes in the entries therein. Hence, tampering of records will likewise be shown.[183] 5) The BI requires the submission of original documents in an R.A. 9225 application.[184] However, in the years 2005 and 2006, before the BI established a Verification and Compliance Division, it was not unusual that only photocopies of the original filings for R.A. 9225 were transmitted to the Records Section but that the same were considered valid documentation.[185]
In short, the BI officials, including Commissioner Geron himself in his May 10, 2016 letter to Piccio, are consistent in saying that 1) the BI has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents and 2) that such documents were duly filed, processed, and approved by the BI, as a consequence of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955.
Directly contradicting this substantial body of evidence are only the identical June letters of Commissioner Geron, which stated that 1) based on the records, no R.A. 9225 Petition was received or processed in favor of Vergara and 2) no record (photocopy or original) of IC No. 06-12955 exists in the BI's files.[186]
Hence, the proper way to view the serious irregularities heavily relied upon by Piccio and Justice Hernando is this: it was Commissioner Geron ALONE who, by his June letters to Piccio, contradicted not only himself but likewise all of the BI officials called to testify, under oath, and all of the documents and letters coming from the BI. Viewed from this angle, it would be absurd to conclude from this that the Court should now question Commissioner Morente's reliability. The facts, established during trial and through testimonies made under oath, show that it is Commissioner Geron 's June letters, in response to Piccio, that should be doubted and not be given credence. In this light, given that all of the BI's officials were consistent in their statements before the HRET and on the documents they submitted, then it is Commissioner Geron's June letters that can be said to be "anomalous."
The rulings of other government bodies which resolved, in Vergara's favor, the same issues as the ones raised in the present case, regarding her compliance with R.A. 9225 and tampering and irregularities in the processing of her R.A. 9225 Petition, deserve great respect. |
The records reveal that, as pointed out in the OSG's Comment,[187] Piccio had filed several suits against Vergara, before different quasi-judicial and administrative agencies, based on the same main issue and collateral issues as the ones raised in the present case — Vergara's compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225 to re-acquire her Philippine citizenship, and the alleged tampering, fraud, and irregularities surrounding her R.A. 9225 records with the BI.[188] All of these suits were resolved in Vergara's favor and, hence, against Piccio, thus:
First, the said issue was already determined by the [BI] – the government agency tasked to implement [R.A.] 9225 – in favor of [Vergara] when it issued the Order on November 30, 2006 or more than thirteen (13) years ago, granting her Petition for the Issuance of Identification Certificate to reacquire Filipino citizenship. x x x
Second, when [Piccio] opposed the candidacy of [Vergara], he raised the same issue that the latter did not comply with [R.A.] 9225. However, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution dated June 7, 2016, DISMISSED for lack of merit [Piccio's] petition x x x. It found that [Vergara] had complied with the requirements of [R.A.] 9225.
Third, [Piccio] also filed x x x a deportation complaint against [Vergara] for allegedly tampering with her [R.A.] 9225 records. The complaint x x x was dismissed for lack of merit by Order dated October 7, 2016 issued by BI Commissioner [Morente]. It affirmed the Investigation Committee's findings that, "based on the Bureau's available records, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties," it appears that [Vergara's] petition x x x "was duly processed and approved by the [BI]."
Fourth, the Joint Resolution dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated November 7, 2017 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in NPS No. XV-07-INV-17C dismissing the complaints for falsification filed by [Piccio] against [Vergara], x x x involving the very same documents in the instant case x x x. The City Prosecutor found no probable cause for the imputations against [Vergara].[189]
To emphasize, the BI (twice), the COMELEC, the City Prosecutor of Manila and the HRET — all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies tasked to enforce the relevant laws and charged with technical knowledge of the matters falling within their primary jurisdiction — all dismissed the different suits filed by Piccio against Vergara concerning the very factual issues brought before the Court at present, and involving the same R.A. 9225 documents of Vergara.
At this juncture, the Court quotes, with approval, the HRET's assailed Decision where it stated: "[t]o contradict the findings of these quasi-judicial bodies would run counter to the elementary principle that findings of administrative agencies deserve great respect, if not finality, by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said bodies over matters falling under their primary jurisdiction."[190]
In sum, there is overwhelming competent evidence proving Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225 for the re-acquisition of her Philippine citizenship. |
The foregoing discussion shows that the records are replete with competent evidence, offered by both Piccio and Vergara, supporting the conclusion that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship, in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225.
First, Vergara's original and genuine IC No. 06-12955. This establishes prima facie that the documents required for its issuance, including her Oath of Allegiance, were all duly submitted to the BI. As testified to by the BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos and BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, these submissions should have been in their original form.[191]
Second, the photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents[192] including her Oath of Allegiance itself. To emphasize, these secondary pieces of evidence are competent and admissible to prove the existence and due execution of the original documents.
Third, the letters, documents, and testimonies of different BI officials which, except only the June letters of Commissioner Geron, are all consistent in saying that: 1) Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its attachments were duly received, processed, and approved by the BI, as a result of which she was issued IC No. 06-12955; and 2) the BI has photocopies of Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents.
These conclusions were based on the BI records, the BI electronic database, several formal hearings, investigations, and meetings conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's R.A. 9225 files, as well as on certifications, reports, and comments from the relevant BI offices.
Fourth, the rulings and decisions of other quasi-judicial bodies and government agencies, resolving the same issues as those raised in the present case, regarding Vergara's compliance with R.A. 9225, and the collateral issues of tampering, forgery, and irregularities in the processing of her R.A. 9225 Petition. These rulings — which dismissed all such suits filed — coming from administrative agencies possessing special knowledge and experience over the matters under their primary jurisdiction, deserve great respect, if not finality, by the Court.
Fifth, the BI electronic database and the Dual Citizenship's Office database, which record all BI transactions, showing that Vergara's R.A. 9225 application was duly received, supported by the required documents, processed and granted. As testified to by BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta, any tampering of records will reflect in the database. As pointed out by the HRET, these recordings are entries in official records under Section 44,[193] Rule 130 of the Rules, hence, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[194]
On the other hand, Piccio's scant pieces of evidence fail, not just because Vergara's own evidence is overwhelming, but likewise because they are inherently defective for being inadequate, tangential and anomalous.
First, the poor reproductions of Notary Public Atty. Cinco's signatures as appearing on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance and Atty. Cinco's notarial commission are gravely inadequate to prove Piccio's theory of forgery. It is settled that comparison of signatures requires the presentation of original documents.
Second, the Certification of the Manila City OCC merely demonstrates the failure of Atty. Cinco to comply with his duty to submit his notarial books to the court. It cannot be taken to prove that Vergara's Oath of Allegiance that was notarized by Atty. Cinco does not exist.
Third, the June 2016 letters of Commissioner Geron, as earlier discussed, are highly suspicious and cannot be given any credence. They are refuted by all the other BI officials as well as an earlier letter of Commissioner Geron himself. Moreover, they were maliciously written and lack any reasonable basis.
Piccio 's evidence is tainted by a circumstance of suspicion, hence, deserves little credence, if any. |
In the earlier-discussed case of Vitangcol, the Court rejected, as proof of the alleged non-existence of marriage between petitioner (the husband charged with Bigamy) and his first wife, the OCR Certification stating that the marriage license cannot be located. Apart from the lack of a categorical declaration in the Certification that no such marriage license exists, the Court likewise appreciated the "circumstance of suspicion" that the petitioner fraudulently caused the issuance of the document to evade conviction for Bigamy.
Vitangcol differentiated itself from Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro[195] (Castro) — a case involving an action for declaration of nullity of a marriage, wherein the plaintiff presented a similar certification from the OCR that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license x x x does not appear from [the local civil registrar's] records".[196] Thus:
This court held [in Castro] that "[t]he certification x x x enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due search and inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license x x x to the contracting parties."
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.[197]
Hence, proof presented by a party with a "circumstance of suspicion" may be rejected by the Court in favor of more credible evidence produced by the opposing party, even when such rejected proof was issued by an official custodian of the document allegedly missing. In Castro, the Court explained that the doctrine is based on Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules,[198] which provides:
SEC. 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (26a)
Here, the party who can be said to have a "circumstance of suspicion" is Piccio, who not only filed multiple suits regarding the same issues which were all dismissed by the different concerned administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, but likewise maliciously presented the contradicting and misleading letters he secured from Commissioner Geron. To stress, the contradictions between Commissioner Geron's May 20, 2016 letter, on the one hand, and his two June letters, on the other, are so flagrant, that their presentation in evidence can hardly be said to have been innocently done. Hence, the fraudulent circumstances surrounding Piccio renders his already measly evidence all the weaker and less credible.
On the other hand, unlike petitioner in Vitangcol who had the primordial interest to escape criminal liability for Bigamy, Vergara had no interest at all in the non-existence or loss of her documents with the BI. In fact, that is the very reason why her disqualification is being sought — her original R.A. 9225 documents cannot be located with the BI where it was filed and which is its official repository under the law. Far from having such interest, Vergara vigorously tried to prove — as she did prove — the existence of her original Oath.
On the other hand, the BI, which admitted through its officials that the originals are not in its custody despite their submission by Vergara, has no motive to forge documents or make misrepresentations. In fact, it is against its own interest to admit that Vergara did file her original documents but that the same are not in its custody. It would have been so easy for the BI to "evade" censure by confirming Piccio's theory that Vergara did not at all submit her original documents. This way, the BI washes its hands of any liability which it may incur in the wrong handling of said documents. That it admitted that it did not have the originals speaks volumes about the credibility of the BI.
The official custodian of public records bears the responsibility of safekeeping such documents which were duly filed with it. Hence, its failure to preserve such public records should not prejudice the public, who filed the same and relied, in good faith, on the custodian's safekeeping as mandated by law. |
It is uncontroverted that the BI is the official repository of documents — including oaths of allegiance — relating to applications for retention of re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225. Indeed, this is categorically provided in AO No. 91, entitled "Designating the Bureau of Immigration as the Implementing Agency of Republic Act No. 9225 otherwise known as the 'Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,"' thus:
SEC. 2. Functions – The Bureau of Immigration, shall:
a. Promulgate and issue rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; b. Prescribe appropriate forms and documentary requirements as well as required fees for the processing of applications for retention and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the law; c. Act as repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance, Applications for Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, supporting documents and other pertinent documents in pursuance with the requirements of the law and its implementing rules and regulations;x x x x
The same is also reflected in the BI General Instructions, which declares that sworn statements, the original of which must be filed with the BI as part of the R.A. 9225 petition, shall be retained by the BI and be made part of its record, thus:
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
To avoid summary dismissal/delay in the processing of your
application/petition, please be advised of the following:
x x x x
2. All documents required for submission must be complied with, arranged in the order as listed in the Checklist of Documentary Requirements (CDR), compiled in a legal size (8 ½ x 14 in.) folder and shall be submitted within the prescribed period, if applicable. Otherwise, your application or petition shall not be accepted. 3. All sworn statements or affidavits must be original, signed and duly notarized. x x x x 8. All original documents submitted as part of the petition will not be returned to the petitioner and will be part of the Bureau's record. x x x x 10. It is recommended that you seek legal advice from lawyers and/or BI-accredited entities.[199]
On the other hand, the BI General Instructions' R.A. 9225 Checklist[200] (R.A. 9225 Checklist) requires the submission of two original copies of the Oath of Allegiance, taken before an authorized BI Legal Officer or otherwise.[201]
Finally, the BI General Instructions form contains a Certification required to be filled up by the pertinent BI Officer that the supporting documents of the R.A. 9225 petitions filed are complete and complies with the requirements, thus:
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the documents submitted in support of the application/petition of (Name of Applicant) are complete and in accordance with the provided checklist.
Central Receiving Unit Evaluator:
_______________________
Signature over Printed Name _______________
Date[202]
As extensively discussed, there is overwhelming evidence — and the BI itself had admitted through several of its officers — that Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition and its supporting documents, including the original copy of her Oath of Allegiance, were duly filed and processed, resulting in the petition being granted by the BI which, in turn, resulted to the issuance of IC No. 06- 12955 in her favor on November 30, 2006. Hence, the same is established. This means that the BI, by law, should have in its records, these documents. However, as it appears, it only has photocopies of some of such documents and it cannot account for the apparent loss of the originals.
Piccio would have the Court believe that Vergara's inability to present the original documents and BI's failure to offer reasonable explanation for their absence in its records — in 2016, when Vergara's citizenship became the object of the public's attention after she filed her CoC for the 2016 elections — are proof that she did not re-acquire her Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225.
As earlier intimated, the Court disagrees.
At the outset, it bears clarifying that Vergara's R.A. 9225 documents, which were filed with the BI, are public records, defined under R.A. 9470,[203] thus:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall hereby apply:
x x x x
(w) "Public records" refers to record or classes of records, in any form, in whole or in part, created or received, whether before or after the effectivity of this Act, by a government agency in the conduct of its affairs, and have been retained by that government agency or its successors as evidence or because of the information contained therein.
(x) "Records" refers to information, whether in its original form or otherwise, including documents, signatures, seals, texts, images, sounds, speeches, or data compiled, recorded, or stored, as the case may be:
(1) In written form on any material;
(2) On film, negative, tape or other medium so as to be capable of being reproduced; or
(3) By means of any recording device or process, computer or other electronic device or process.
x x x x
R.A. 9470 likewise mandates the State to "give utmost priority for the safeguard, protection and preservation of its public documents and records, x x x as fundamental instruments for efficient and effective governance x x x."[204]
Piccio challenges the evidentiary value of Vergara's IC No. 06-12955, although he does not contest its existence and genuineness, because of allegedly evident irregularities uncovered in the BI, such as its failure to explain the absence in its records of Vergara's documents, and the conflicting statements of its officials.
To recall, among the numerous statements from the BI, only Commissioner Geron's June letters, which were submitted by Piccio to refute Vergara's IC, conflicted with the rest and seemed anomalous. Hence, only these pieces of evidence deserve no credence.
In any case, assuming arguendo that the BI or its officials are guilty of indiscretions in the custody of Vergara's documents, such may not be imputed against Vergara, absent any showing that she participated therein. Allowing such prejudice violates the basic legal maxim, res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules which states:
SEC. 28. Admission by third-party. — The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
This is founded on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience — a man's own acts are binding upon himself or herself and are evidence against him or her. So are his or her conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man or woman should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers. And if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him or her.[205]
Among the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule are: (1) admission by third party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by privies.[206] None of these exceptions apply. There is neither allegation nor proof presented that Vergara had any hand in whatever irregularity the BI had committed, if any.
Hence, to prejudice Vergara with the acts, declarations or omissions of the BI or its officials would be to violate not only the res inter alios acta rule under the Rules but likewise the principles of good faith, mutual convenience, and justice that the rule is founded on.
Moreover, the allegations of irregularity on the part of the BI are premised solely on its failure to produce Vergara's original R.A. 9225 documents, without reasonable explanation, when they were sought in 2016, or 10 years after they were admittedly filed by Vergara in 2006. In other words, any such irregularities attended the documents' custody and safekeeping, after they were received by the BI. The conclusion that such irregularities likewise attended the receipt and processing of the documents which, again, occurred some 10 years prior, is non sequitur. More importantly, as repeatedly discussed, there is overwhelming evidence proving that these latter processes were above board and the same was admitted by the BI.
Further, from a practical and doctrinal standpoint, the failure of the BI to comply with its mandate under the law to safekeep said documents should not be imputed to Vergara who cannot be expected to regularly police the BI, and ensure that her documents are safely in the BI's custody. That there is a law mandating the BI to keep said documents safe must be enough basis for Vergara's trust that the documents are indeed safe in the possession of the agency.
A contrary interpretation — that Vergara must bear the consequence of BI's negligence or fault in safekeeping her files — would be grossly unjust to Vergara. More concerning is the dangerous precedent that the Court will then set, that is, that documents duly filed but have gone missing while in the custody of the receiving agency, without fault or even knowledge of the persons filing, will be rendered useless and void, as if they never existed at all. This will bestow great injustice, not just upon Vergara or other similarly situated public officials, but likewise upon the general public who, in the first place, is powerless to prevent such mishaps.
On the other hand, placing the burden on the erring government agency would encourage prudence and vigilance on the part of such agency and its officials and employees to safekeep documents entrusted to them by the public in accordance with the standards set by law.
The foregoing is consistent with the policy of the State to hold the government accountable in ensuring the maintenance and preservation of public records in its custody, and to strengthen public confidence on the safekeeping and preservation of such public records.
The Court cannot uphold Piccio's allegation that the HRET gravely abused its discretion in committing mosaic plagiarism. |
Piccio submits that the assailed Decision is an "obnoxious example of simple and mosaic plagiarism."[207] He quotes portions of the assailed Decision and compares them to quoted portions of Vergara's Verified Answer and Memorandum, and concludes that as they are the same, the HRET had committed "mosaic plagiarism/patchwork plagiarism."[208] He submits that this is "unacceptable, unethical[,] and open[s] [the HRET] to suspicion as to its fairness, impartiality[,] and integrity."[209] He alleges that "such callous and dishonest conduct endangers the credibility and integrity of the Tribunal,"[210] and then cites the case of In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, Etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo[211] (In re Del Castillo).
The Court rejects these submissions.
Foremost, it bears stressing that the charge of plagiarism in the In re Del Castillo case cited by Piccio was dismissed for lack of merit. In essence, the Court found therein that Justice Del Castillo (and his researcher) lacked any motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to their authors.[212] The Court stressed the element of fraudulent intent in plagiarism which it defined as "'to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one's own.' The passing off of the work of another as one's own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism."[213]
In the subsequent Resolution of the petitioners' motion for reconsideration in In re Del Castillo,[214] the Court had occasion to clarify and distinguish judges from the academe where the element of malicious intent in plagiarism is disregarded — in the academe, original scholarship is highly valued because the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor or distinction. In contrast, court decisions are not written to earn merit as an original piece of work or art. Rather, deciding disputes is a service rendered for the public good.[215]
Moreover, as accuracy of words in law is foremost, the tendency to copy of judges and lawyers is explicable. Hence, the Court recognized the right of judges to use legal materials which belong to the public domain, even without attribution, including liftings from a party's pleading, thus:
"A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party's brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism."
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary's more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
x x x x
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.[216] (Emphasis omitted)
The Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (SAJ Carpio) in In re Del Castillo is more instructive for cases involving judges quoting or copying from pleadings of parties:
b. Copying from Pleadings of Parties
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper attribution is not actionable.
Pleadings are submitted to the court precisely so that the pleas, or the arguments written on the pleadings, are accepted by the judge. There is an implied offer by the pleader that the judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. If the judge accepts the pleader's arguments, he may copy such arguments to expedite the resolution of the case. In writing his decision, the judge does not claim as his own the arguments he adopts from the pleadings of the parties. Besides, the legal arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely reiterations of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done to mislead the parties or the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge "should perform official duties honestly." Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law.[217]
Hence, from the foregoing, failure of judges to make proper attributions when quoting pleadings of parties filed before them is not actionable. What can be said to be an exception is when there is twisting of such passages from pleadings done with intent to mislead the parties or the public. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning of."[218]
In the present case, the Court does not find any misquoting or twisting of passages from Vergara's pleadings. Neither is there any showing of intent to mislead the parties by the HRET. Hence, there is no basis for the Court to sustain Piccio in this respect.
On this note, the Court takes exception to the rather callous language of this portion of Piccio's Petition, and its strong suggestion of partiality by the HRET — a constitutional body charged with the important mandate of resolving all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the country's legislators.[219] Piccio's counsel is reminded to observe and maintain the respect due the HRET, as the same is essential to the orderly administration of justice.[220]
The Court had enjoined lawyers, in the assertion of their clients' rights, to "rein up their tempers," even as it understands the frustration brought by a court's dismissal of one's cause, the merit of which he or she so passionately believes in, thus:
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines [v.] Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967) [221]
The ascription of improper motives to the HRET is especially alarming for it implies that the HRET was moved by considerations other than its sense of justice and fair play, and calls into question its integrity and impartiality. This chips away at the public's confidence on the overall judicial and quasi-judicial system in its fair dispensation of justice. Such tone cannot be countenanced especially as the accusation of plagiarism, as discussed, lacks merit.
It bears noting that the Petition quotes a small portion of In re Del Castillo, leading to the fair assumption that the whole Decision and Resolution thereon were read and understood by Piccio's counsel. To stress the obvious, In re Del Castillo is the very case which declared the afore-discussed exceptional rules applying to plagiarism charges against courts and lawyers. These are the very doctrines applied by the Court herein, leading to the dismissal of Piccio's accusations of "mosaic plagiarism" by the HRET. It is, thus, curious that the Petition still fiercely insists on its claim, to the point of calling the HRET "unethical," "dishonest," and "callous," when a simple reading of the Court's discussion in In re Del Castillo would show its clear lack of merit.
The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Decision. Piccio and Umali failed to discharge their burden before the HRET to prove the ineligibility of Vergara by substantive evidence. |
To recall, the present case is one for certiorari, which means that no less than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET is needed for the Petition to prosper.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. Time and again, this Court has held that mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The abuse of discretion must be grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[222]
However, as mentioned earlier, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.[223] By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of an administrative body like the HRET over matters falling under its jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such matters. Thus, its findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts,[224] except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.[225]
Hence, a determination of whether the HRET gravely abused its discretion in the present case necessarily requires a prior determination of the merits of the quo warranto petitions filed before it. On this note, the starting point is determined by the party who bears the burden of proof. In the case of a petition for quo warranto, that party is he or she who alleges the ineligibility or disqualification of the elected official.[226]
Thus, Piccio and Umali, bore the burden of proving Vergara's ineligibility before the HRET. The creation of mere doubt is insufficient to discharge such burden.[227]
In light of the above discussion, petitioners before the HRET clearly and utterly failed to prove their assertion that Vergara did not comply with the requirements of R.A. 9225 for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship. All of the evidence they adduced have been, and are, debunked by contrary evidence presented by Vergara and the relevant laws.
At this juncture, the Court qualifies Justice Hernando's point that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it. This burden of evidence shifts to the candidate if, and only if, the party challenging the elected official's citizenship and, hence, his or her eligibility, had adduced substantial evidence to prove such ineligibility.
Nevertheless, Vergara, while not carrying any burden of evidence as the burden of proof had not shifted from Piccio, proved, by sufficient and substantial evidence, that she had duly taken her oath and duly executed an affidavit of renunciation in compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9225.
Hence, the HRET — far from having committed grave abuse of discretion — was actually very correct in the issuance of its assailed Decision and Resolution, and in ruling that Vergara is qualified to continue sitting as a Member of the House. There is abundant evidence to support this conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 23, 2019 and Resolution dated June 27, 2019 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Inting, J., Zalameda, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Hernando, J., dissent. See Dissenting Opinion.
Carandang, J., join the dissent of J. R. Hernando.
Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurrence.
M. Lopez, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando.
Gaerlan, J., join the dissent of J. Ramon Hernando.
Dimaampao, J., concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Ramon Paul Hernando.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., no part.
Leonen, J., on official leave.
* The present case was previously consolidated with G.R. No. 236113 entitled "Vergara v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al." However, the petition in G.R. No. 236113 was subsequently withdrawn.
[1] Captioned "Petition for Review on Certiorari" rollo, pp. 3-36.
[2] Rollo, pp. 37-64. Penned by then Associate Justice and Chairperson of the HRET Diosdado M. Peralta and signed by then Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Gavini C. Pancho, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr., Wilter Wee Palma II, and Abdullah D. Dimaporo Associate Justice and then HRET Member Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe took no part.
[3] Id. at 65.
[4] Id. at 38.
[5] Otherwise known as the "CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," approved on August 29, 2003.
[6] Rollo, p. 38.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 70.
[9] REVISED RULES GOVERNING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) No. 9225 AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER (A.O.) No. 91, SERIES OF 2004. See Whereas Clause designating the BI as the Implementing Agency of R.A. 9225; rollo, p. 38.
[10] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[11] Id. at 40.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 41.
[14] Id. at 41-42.
[15] Id. at 42.
[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 43.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 44. Underscoring in the original.
[21] Id. at 74.
[22] Id. at 44.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at 45.
[25] Id.
[26] Id. at 45-46.
[27] Id. at 46.
[28] Id. at 46-47.
[29] Id. at 49.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 160.
[32] Id.
[33] Id. at 6.
[34] Id.
[35] Id. at 52.
[36] Id. at 8-9.
[37] Id. at 13.
[38] Id. at 9.
[39] Id. at 20-31.
[40] Id. at 276-301.
[41] Id. at 278-280.
[42] Id. at 293-298.
[43] Id. at 314-336.
[44] Id. at 322-323.
[45] Id. at 324.
[46] Id. at 330.
[47] Id. at 332-334.
[48] Id. at 379-387.
[49] Id. at 322-323.
[50] De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 149, 155.
[51] CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Sec. 6 provides:
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines x x x.
[52] R.A. 7160 entitled, "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991," approved on October 10, 1991. See Section 39.
[53] Section 39 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines x x x .
[54] Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 105111 and 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 308.
[55] Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.
[56] G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 434.
[57] Id. at 447.
[58] G.R. Nos. 192147& 192149, August 23, 2011, 656 SCRA 17.
[59] Id. at 23-24.
[60] Entitled, "SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. 12, ART. XVIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND COMPLEMENTING ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1 OF JANUARY 28, 1988 ON EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSITION OF CASES PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT," dated July 1, 1991.
[61] Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158703, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 112, 127.
[62] Id.
[63] Rollo, p. 65.
[64] Id. at 254.
[65] Id . at 279-280.
[66] Id. at 66-84.
[67] Id. at 90-114.
[68] Id. at 271-280.
[69] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1 provides:
SEC. 1. x x x The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
[70] Union Industries, Inc. v. Vales, G.R. No. 140102, February 9, 2006,482 SCRA 17, 21.
[71] Id.
[72] Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020, accessed at <
[73] Id.
[74] Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 10, 21.
[75] G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59.
[76] Id. at 69-70.
[77] Rollo, p. 117.
[78] Supra note 72.
[79] Rollo, pp. 37-64.
[80] Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee, 327 Phil. 521, 574-575 (1996). See also Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733; Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744; Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016, 786 SCRA 1; David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016, 803 SCRA 435.
[81] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, id. at 475.
[82] Id. at 509.
[83] Id. at 510.
[84] Sinaca v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 282.
[85] Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753.
[86] Supra note 55.
[87] Id. at 574-575.
[88] Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 753.
[89] See CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.
[90] Lerias v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 97105, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 808, 841.
[91] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92 & 92202-03, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692, 699.
[92] Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, No. L-84297, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 391, 401.
[93] Id. at 403-404.
[94] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, supra note 91, at 700.
[95] Id.
[96] Domalanta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 555, 573.
[97] See Malabaguio v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 142507, December 1, 2000, 346 SCRA 699, 706.
[98] Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013, 708 SCRA 197, 226.
[99] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 472, citing Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 670 Phil. 136, 151 (2011).
[100] Mitra v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80, at 778.
[101] Locsin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 635, 644.
[102] Id.
[103] In Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 654, the Court upheld the authority of the COMELEC to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it, as a consequence of its constitutional power to settle all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, thus:
As enunciated, the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it is charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe.
The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative body, whose scope of decision-making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests. (Id. at 670.)
Similarly, the HRET, which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, wields the same power to determine factual questions relative to the election contests before it, such as the issue, in the present case, of Vergara's compliance with the requirements for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
[104] Rollo, p. 52.
[105] Id. at 156-157.
[106] Id. at 142-143.
[107] Id. at 73.
[108] Gepulle-Garbo v. Sps. Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 856-857 (2015).
[109] Heirs of the Late Felix Bucton v. Sps. Go, 721 Phil. 851, 860 (2013).
[110] Id.
[111] 787 Phil. 33 (2016).
[112] Id. at 51. Citations omitted.
[113] Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano, supra note 72.
[114] Rollo, p. 44. Underscoring omitted.
[115] Id. at 53-54.
[116] G.R. No. 207406, January 23, 2016, 780 SCRA 598.
[117] Id. at 604-608.
[118] Destrezua v. Atty. Riñoza-Plazo, et al., 619 Phil. 775, 782-783 (2009).
[119] Rollo, p. 53.
[120] Id. at 38.
[121] Id. at 14.
[122] Id. at 14-15.
[123] Id. at 14.
[124] Id. at 10.
[125] Under the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M . No. 19-08-15-SC), this Rule now reads:
1. Original Document Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures; (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and (e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)Sec. 4. Original of document. –
(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device. any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original." (b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording. or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original. (c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a) (Underscoring in the original)
[126] Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 577, 584-585.
[127] G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465.
[128] Id. at 479. Citations omitted.
[129] Id. at 483-484. Citations omitted.
[130] Rollo, p. 38.
[131] BI FORM 2014-01-004 Rev 1, accessed at <
[132] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[133] Supra note 131. See General Instructions, Item No. 10.
[134] Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[135] 2015 REVISED RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Rule 3.
[136] Id.
[137] Rollo, p. 55.
[138] Id.
[139] Hughey v. JMS Development Corporation, 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996); Black's Law Dictionary 1844 (9th ed. 2009).
[140] Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 608-610.
[141] Rollo, pp. 38-39; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara.
[142] Id. at 40; common evidence of Piccio and Vergara.
[143] Id. at 44; Offered in evidence by Piccio.
[144] Id. at 45; Offered in evidence by Piccio.
[145] Id. at 45-46; Offered in evidence by Piccio.
[146] Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[147] Id. at 55; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[148] Id. at 56; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[149] Id. at 170-171.
[150] Id. at 48, 167; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[151] Id. at 46-47; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[152] Id. at 168; Offered in evidence by Vergara.
[153] Id. at 16.
[154] Id. at 61.
[155] Id.
[156] Id. at 22.
[157] Id. at 195-197.
[158] Id. at 190.
[159] Id.
[160] Id. at 59.
[161] Id. at 60.
[162] Id.
[163] Id.
[164] Id. at 60-61.
[165] Id. at 204-207.
[166] Id. at 15-17.
[167] Id. at 15-16.
[168] Id. at 61.
[169] Id. at 9.
[170] Id. at 60, 195-197.
[171] Id. at 44. Underscoring omitted.
[172] Id. at 45. Underscoring omitted.
[173] Id.
[174] See Rule 132, Section 11, Rules on Evidence which states:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. — A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense. (15) (Emphasis supplied)
[175] Rollo, p. 47.
[176] Id. Underscoring omitted.
[177] Id. at 47, 55-56.
[178] Id. at 55.
[179] Id. at 56.
[180] As stated in: 1) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas; and 2) Order dated November 30, 2006 of BI Commissioner Fernandez.
[181] As stated in 1) Letter dated May 20, 2016 of BI Commissioner Geron; 2) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 3) Certification dated August 4, 2016 signed by BI Records Section Chief Maceda; 4) Testimony of BI Legal Division Chief Atty. Santos; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta.
[182] As stated in 1) Letter dated August 10, 2016 of BI Commissioner Morente; 2) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; 3) BI Investigation Report dated August 28, 2016 of the BI Investigation Committee headed by Atty. Santos; 4) Testimony of Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 5) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET.
[183] Rollo, pp. 60-61. As shown in the 1) BI electronic database; 2) Dual Citizenship Office database; 3) Certification dated August 11, 2016 of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta; and 4) Testimony of Atty. Canta before the HRET.
[184] As stated in 1) Testimony of BI Investigation Committee headed Atty. Santos before the HRET; and 2) Testimony of BI-BSI Chief Atty. Canta before the HRET.
[185] As stated in the Testimony of Records Section Chief Maceda before the HRET.
[186] As stated in the Letters dated June 2 and June 29, 2016 of Commissioner Geron.
[187] Rollo, pp. 314-338.
[188] Id. at 328-330.
[189] Id. at 56-57.
[190] Id. at 57.
[191] Id. at 49, 204-207.
[192] 1) Oath of Allegiance; 2) Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 of BI-TFCRA through Arbas, recommending the approval of Vergara's R.A. 9225 Petition; 3) the Order dated November 30, 2006 signed by Commissioner Fernandez, granting her petition; and 4) her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 4, 2015.
[193] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 44 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
[194] Rollo, p. 61.
[195] G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.
[196] Vitangcol v. People, supra note 116, at 609.
[197] Id. at 609-610. Underscoring supplied.
[198] Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro, supra note 195, at 261-262.
[199] Supra note 131.
[200] Checklist Of Documentary Requirements For Petition For Retention/Re-Acquisition Of Philippine Citizenship Under R.A. 9225, id.
[201] Id., Item nos. 3 and 4.
[202] Id.
[203] AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF ARCHIVAL RECORDS, ESTABLISHING FOR THE PURPOSE THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the "NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES ACT OF 2007," approved on May 21, 2007.
[204] R.A. 9470, Sec 2. Declaration of Policy.
[205] People v. Bernardo, G .R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020, accessed <
[206] Tan Siok Kuan v. Ho, G.R. No. 175085, June 1, 2016, 791 SCRA 567, 579.
[207] Rollo, p. 19.
[208] Id. at 20. Emphasis omitted.
[209] Id. at 23.
[210] Id.
[211] A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010, 632 SCRA 607.
[212] Id. at 629.
[213] Id. at 619.
[214] A.M. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011, 642 SCRA 11.
[215] Id. at 20.
[216] Id. at 22-24.
[217] Id. at 36-37. Emphasis in the original.
[218] In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, supra note 212, at 632.
[219] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.
[220] In the Matter of Proceeding for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay, 142 Phil. 353, 371 (1970).
[221] Id. at 372.
[222] Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 573, 587.
[223] Garcia v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 353, 363.
[224] See Malabaguio v. COMELEC, supra note 97, at 706.
[225] Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 98.
[226] David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 80, at 509-510.
[227] See id. at 510.
DISSENTING OPINION
HERNANDO, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by Philip Hernandez Piccio (Piccio) assailing the May 23, 2019 Decision[2] of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW) dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and declaring private respondent Rosanna Vergara (Vergara) not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Third District of Nueva Ecija. The instant petition also assails the June 27, 2019 Resolution No. 19-043[3] of the HRET denying Piccio's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts:
Vergara is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. She was born in the City of Manila on November 5, 1963, of Filipino parents.[4] In 1994, she moved to Cabanatuan City where she and her husband established their family home upon being married in 1995. In 1997, Vergara's application[5] as a registered voter in Cabanatuan City was duly approved.[6]
Prompted by her desire to pursue job opportunities in the United States of America, Vergara applied for naturalization and was issued a Certificate of Naturalization as an American citizen. Correspondingly, she was granted an American Passport on May 20, 1998.[7]
Sometime in November 2006, Vergara filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship[8] pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225), in relation to Administrative Order No. 91 (AO 91), Series of 2004[9] and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002.[10]
On November 28, 2006, Vergara took an Oath of Allegiance[11] to the Republic of the Philippines before a Notary Public in the City of Manila.
Finding that Vergara has complied with all the requirements of RA 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002, the BI Task Force on the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 issued a Memorandum[12] dated November 28, 2006 recommending the approval of Vergara's petition for the issuance of an Identification Certificate. In an Order[13] dated November 30, 2006 signed by BI Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. (BI Commissioner Fernandez, Jr.), the Bureau granted Vergara's petition and ordered the Chief of the Alien Registration Division to issue an Identification Certificate in her favor. Pursuant thereto, Vergara was issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955[14] recognizing her as having reacquired her Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, Vergara executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship[15] on September 4, 2015 before a Notary Public m Cabanatuan City.
On October 15, 2015, respondent filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2016 National and Local Elections to run as Representative for the Third District of Nueva Ecija.[16]
On October 19, 2015, Piccio filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Vergara before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground that she failed to meet the citizenship, residency and voter registration requirements. The case was docketed as SPA No. 15-003 (DC).[17]
In her Verified Answer,[18] Vergara countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to Filipino parents on November 5, 1963. Although she became a naturalized American citizen in 1998, Vergara claimed that the BI had long granted her petition for retention/reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and since 2006 she had effectively renounced her American citizenship. In support thereof, Vergara attached the following documents:
1) her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; 2) the November 28, 2006 Memorandum issued by the BI's Task Force on the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, which recommended the approval of her petition; 3) the November 30, 2006 Order of BI Commissioner Fernandez, Jr. which granted her petition; 4) Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006 issued to her by the BI, which recognized her as having reacquired her Philippine citizenship; and 5) her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
In addition, Vergara presented documentary proofs of her being a natural born Filipino citizen, a legitimate resident and registered voter of the Third District of Nueva Ecija.
On May 16, 2016, Piccio sent a letter[19] addressed to then BI Commissioner Ronaldo A. Geron (Commissioner Geron) requesting for certified true copies of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance dated November 26, 2006, RA 9225 Petition dated November 28, 2006, Order of the BI dated November 30, 2006 and Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, which he will formally offer in evidence in Comelec Case No. SPA No. 15-003 (DC) and Court of Appeals Case No. CA-GR SP No. 144409.
In response thereto, then Commissioner Geron informed petitioner that the BI cannot provide certified true copies of the requested documents since the BI's Records Section only has photocopies of the same.[20]
Not satisfied, Piccio wrote another letter dated May 23, 2016, requesting for a certification from the BI on the existence of Vergara's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 in the Bureau's records.[21]
In a Letter[22] dated June 2, 2016, then Commissioner Geron gave a different reason as to why the BI could not issue the requested certification, thus: "based on the records of the Bureau of Immigration, no Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate in favor of ROSANNA VALERIANA GARCIA VERGARA @ ROSANNA VERGARA (VERGARA) was received or processed by the Bureau. Further, no record of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 allegedly issued to VERGARA exists in the Bureau's files."
In another letter[23] dated May 25, 2016, Piccio sought a categorical explanation as to the non-existence of the original copies of the documents of Vergara in the Bureau's files. In a letter-reply[24] dated June 29, 2016, then Commissioner Geron merely reiterated the contents of his June 2, 2016 letter to petitioner.
Disappointed with the replies of former BI Commissioner Geron to Piccio's inquiries, Vergara wrote a letter dated July 4, 2016 addressed to the newly-appointed BI Commissioner Jaime H. Morente (Commissioner Morente) asking clarification regarding the June 2, 2016 letter. Vergara maintained that she had duly filed with the BI the original copies of the required documents in support of her RA 9225 Petition; that the said petition was granted and that she was thus issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 by the BI. Vergara further contended that she was in fact issued certified true copies of her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 together with its relevant documents pursuant to her requests dated December 15, 2015 and June 27, 2016.[25]
In answer to Vergara's letter, Commissioner Morente confirmed that the petition for reacquisition/retention of Philippine citizenship filed by Vergara under RA 9225 had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI and that she had been duly issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 pursuant thereto, as per the Certification of the Acting Chief of the BI's Board of Special Inquiry. Further, Commissioner Morente disclosed that he had ordered the conduct of an investigation as to the allegations that her RA 9225 records were tampered.[26]
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2016, the COMELEC issued a Resolution[27] dismissing Piccio's Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy for lack of merit. It held that Vergara was eligible to run for public office as she has fully complied with the twin requirements set forth in RA 9225 prior to the filing of her CoC on October 15, 2015. First, she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on March 6, 2006 and second, she executed a personal and sworn renunciation of her foreign citizenship on September 4, 2015. The COMELEC likewise declared that Vergara is a natural-born Filipino citizen, a resident of the place where she sought public office for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the 2016 elections, and a registered voter of the Third District of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
After the 2016 elections, Vergara was proclaimed as the duly elected member of the House of Representatives for the Third District of Nueva Ecija. She assumed office on June 30, 2016.
On July 11, 2016, Piccio instituted against Vergara a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam[28] before the HRET, docketed as HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW), on the ground that she was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives for being an American Citizen. The ad cautelam petition was later converted into a regular petition for quo warranto.
On August 26, 2016, Piccio also filed a Deportation Complaint against Vergara for allegedly tampering her RA 9225 petition records. However, it was dismissed for lack of merit by Commissioner Morente in an Order dated October 7, 2016.[29]
In his Petition for Quo Warranto[30] before the HRET, Piccio averred that Vergara is ineligible to sit as a member of the House of Representatives as she remained to be an American citizen. Citing the Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Manila as well as the June 2, 2016 and June 29, 2016 letters of then Commissioner Geron, Piccio maintained that Vergara failed to comply with the provisions of RA 9225 on the reacquisition/retention of her Philippine citizenship. As such, she was not an eligible candidate at all. Consequently, her proclamation was null and void and without legal effect.
Aurelio Matias Umali (Umali) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. He basically adopted Piccio's position.[31]
In riposte, Vergara argued that she had satisfactorily complied with the requirements under RA 9225. She filed in November 2006, a Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate pursuant to RA 9225; she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; the said petition was approved by the BI on November 30, 2006 and she was issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955; and finally, before she filed her CoC on October 15, 2015, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on September 4, 2015.[32]
Ruling of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal: |
On May 23, 2019, the HRET rendered the assailed Decision[33] dismissing the petition for Quo Warranto and declaring Vergara as the duly elected Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija in the May 2016 National and Local Elections. Respondent HRET upheld the probative value of the documentary and testimonial evidence she presented and declared that Piccio and intervenor Umali have utterly failed to establish their claims in their respective petitions thereby warranting the dismissal thereof for being bereft of merit. The HRET likewise denied Piccio's motion for reconsideration of the Decision in its Resolution dated June 27, 2019.[34]
Piccio thus instituted the present petition assailing the HRET's dismissal of his Quo Warranto petition and motion for reconsideration.
The Petition:
Piccio imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the HRET when it declared that Vergara has duly complied with the requirements of RA 9225 despite clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Petitioner insists that Vergara failed to prove that she exerted reasonable diligence to produce an original copy of the questioned Oath of Allegiance before she can resort to a photocopy of the same. Piccio maintains that Vergara's possession of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 does not serve as conclusive proof of her compliance with the requirements of RA 9225. In short, the existence of the original documents required to be submitted under RA 9225 cannot be presumed.
Piccio further alleges that the HRET committed mosaic/patchwork plagiarism in the questioned Decision. He contends that most, if not all, of what was written in the assailed Decision could be found in Vergara's Answer and Memorandum which cast suspicion as to the tribunal 's fairness, impartiality and integrity.
In her Comment,[35] Vergara seeks the outright dismissal of the extant petition as it suffers from serious procedural as well as substantive infirmities. On the procedural aspect, Vergara avers that petitioner failed to comply with the material data rule when he missed to state the date when he received the May 23, 2019 Decision of the HRET. Moreover, Piccio failed to attach Annexes "C" and "D" of the instant petition which is also a ground for its dismissal. On the substantive side, Vergara reiterates that she has legally and validly applied for the reacquisition/retention of her Philippine citizenship and that the same had been duly processed and approved by the BI based on the evidence on record.
By way of Comment,[36] the HRET, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the petition should be dismissed outright for having been mooted in view of the fact that Vergara had already fully served or completed her term from 2016 to 2019 as the representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija. Further, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the HRET in dismissing the Quo Warranto petition as its decision was duly supported by the evidence on record.
In his Reply,[37] Piccio refutes the OSG's argument that the petition is already moot and academic. He cited numerous cases where the Court still passed upon the issues presented therein although the same have been mooted by supervening events. He reiterates the exceptional character of the instant case such that it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Piccio raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT APPLIED FOR RETENTION/REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF R.A. 9225.
2. WHETHER THE HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT'S RA 9225 DOCUMENTS ARE GENUINE AND AUTHENTIC AND PART OF THE BI RECORDS.
3. WHETHER THE HONORABLE TRIBUNAL ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT FILED HER RA 9225 ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS WITH THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION[38]
The issue now before us is whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's Quo Warranto Petition based on its finding that Vergara, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, has fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225 and thus duly reacquired her Philippine citizenship to qualify her to sit as member of the House of Representatives.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Preliminary Matters.
On the mootness of the petition.
The OSG seeks the outright dismissal of the present petition for being moot and academic as Vergara had already fully served or completed her term for 2016 to 2019 as the representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija. However, the Court has consistently held that as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The ruling of the Court in Vilando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal[39] is in point:
It should be noted that Limkaichong's term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. Thus, the petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be questioned at any time. For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The question on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.[40] (Emphasis supplied)
Conformably with the foregoing, I find that the instant petition is among the exceptional cases that must be adjudicated although the issues have become moot and academic since it is capable of repetition inasmuch as Vergara ran again for public office in the 2019 elections.
I. The Procedural Issues.
Failure to comply with the material date rule. |
Vergara argues that the instant petition must be dismissed outright because Piccio failed to state the date when he received the May 23, 2019 Decision of the HRET. According to Vergara, such allegation is strictly required by the Court in order to establish that Piccio timely filed his motion for reconsideration thereof.
The rationale for requiring a complete statement of material dates is to determine whether the petition is timely filed.[41] In case of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.[42] Accordingly, the petition must show when notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution subject thereof was received; when a motion for reconsideration, if any, was filed; and when notice of the denial thereof was received.[43]
However, this Court may relax strict observance of the rules to advance substantial justice. In Security Bank Corporation v. Aerospace University,[44] the CA denied due course to the petition for failure to state the dates when the assailed order was received and the motion for reconsideration was filed. However, this Court held that "[t]he more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration". Thus, we remanded the case to the CA for resolution on the merits.
The doctrine was reiterated in Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo,[45] where the Court held that the petitioner's failure to state the material dates is not fatal to his cause of action, provided the date of his receipt, i.e. May 9, 2006, of the RTC Resolution dated April 18, 2006 denying his Motion for Reconsideration is duly alleged in his Petition. Similarly, in Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.,[46] the Court emphasized that the petitioner's failure to state the date of receipt of the copy of the NLRC decision is not fatal to her cause since she duly alleged the date of receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
In this case, Piccio clearly stated in the instant petition the date when he received the HRET Resolution dated June 27, 2019 denying his motion for reconsideration. Specifically, Piccio received the said Resolution on July 16, 2019 and timely filed the present petition before this Court on September 13, 2019[47] or within 60-day reglementary period.[48] As such, Piccio is deemed to have substantially complied with the rules.
Moreover, a perusal of the record of the case reveals that Piccio has timely moved for reconsideration of the May 23, 2019 HRET Decision by filing a Motion for Reconsideration[49] with the HRET on June 20, 2019 as evidenced by the date of receipt[50] stamped on the face of the said pleading. In the said motion, Piccio stated that he received the HRET Decision on June 10, 201[9]. Since Piccio filed a motion for reconsideration on June 20, 2019, the same was clearly filed within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days from notice or until June 25, 2019.
Failure to attach the annexes to the Quo Warranto petition. |
Similarly, Vergara submits that Piccio violated paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when he failed to attach Annexes "A" to "L" of the Petition for Quo Warranto (marked as Annex C of the instant petition) as well as Annexes "1" to "8-g" of Vergara's Verified Answer (marked as Annex "D" of the instant petition). The said rule requires that the petition for certiorari "shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46."
A scrutiny of the records, however, shows that the contents of the omitted documents (e.g., Vergara's Certificate of Proclamation, Certificate of Candidacy, Oath of Allegiance, Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, Letters of former BI Commission Geron, etc.), were either quoted in verbatim or substantially summarized by the HRET in its assailed Decision. Verily, the said HRET Decision is already sufficient to enable this Court to pass upon the assigned errors and to resolve the instant petition even if there are missing attachments.
In Spouses Cordero v. Octaviano,[51] this Court ruled:
A perusal of the petition for review, however, reveals that copies of the RTC Order dated June 22, 2017, the MCTC Decision dated May 22, 2013, and the RTC Decision dated December 7, 2016 were in fact attached as Annexes "A," "B," and "C," respectively. Hence, Spouses Cordero complied with the requirement of attaching copies of the judgments and orders of the trial courts. Moreover, these attachments are already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon the assigned errors and to resolve the appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To be sure, the assailed decisions of the trial courts substantially summarized the contents of the omitted records.
The Rules of Court should be applied with reason and liberality to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are used to help secure and not override substantial justice. Thus, the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.[52]
An appeal should not be dismissed outright on a purely technical ground, especially if there is some merit to the substantive issues raised by the petitioner. It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules.[53]
II. The Substantive Issues.
Petitioner comes to the Court invoking our power of judicial review through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He seeks to annul the assailed Decision and Resolution of the HRET, finding that Vergara is qualified to hold a seat as member of the House of Representatives.
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.
In the case at bar, while it is true that under the Constitution,[54] the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, this does not, however, bar the Court from entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of discretion. In Libanan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[55] we explained our assumption of jurisdiction in election-related cases involving the HRET as follows -
. . . In Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780). the Court has explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the exercise of this Courts so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Marrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a determination of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion, that there has to be a remedy for such abuse".
In the old, but still relevant, case of Marrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429), the Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process". The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET (199 SCRA 692), venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,[56] the Court held:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction:
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duly or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be grave.
In this case, I find that the HRET acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its assailed Decision and Resolution.
The HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that respondent Vergara has validly complied with all the requirements for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship. |
Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution[57] spells out the requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he [or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
In this case, Vergara claims that she had duly complied with the requirements of RA 9225. She filed a Petition for the Issuance of an Identification Certificate pursuant to RA 9225. She took her Oath of Allegiance before a Notary Public stationed inside the BI building. Thereafter, she submitted the original copy thereof to the BI in support of her Petition for Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Since she submitted the original copy of the said Oath of Allegiance to the BI, she no longer has the original copy. Hence, what she has in her possession is a mere photocopy.
Piccio, on the other hand, argues that since Vergara failed to adduce an original copy of the Oath of Allegiance, it was incumbent upon her to prove its existence and due execution, which, Vergara failed to do.
For purposes of presenting documents as evidence before courts, documents are classified as either public or private.
Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis Supplied)
Concededly, the Oath of Allegiance of Vergara in this case is a public document having been acknowledged before a notary public. There is no dispute that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. In addition, documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that such presumption is not absolute.
In Spouses Tan v. Mandap,[58] the Court held that even an apparently valid notarization of a document does not guarantee its validity. Having found that the affiant did not personally appear before the notary public, the Court held that "such falsity raises doubt regarding the genuineness of the vendor's alleged consent to the deeds of sale."[59]
Similarly, in Mayor v. Belen,[60] the Court declared that notarization per se is not a guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document. The presumption of regularity of notarized documents cannot be made to apply and may be overthrown by highly questionable circumstances, as may be pointed out by the trial court.[61]
The same ruling holds true in the case of Dizon v. Matti, Jr.,[62] where the Court pronounced that with the existence of highly questionable circumstances that seriously repudiate the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the presumption of regularity that may have been created by the notarization of the said instrument has been shattered.
In the instant case, the existence and due execution of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance had been challenged by Piccio in the proceedings below since Vergara merely submitted a photocopy of the same. In particular, Piccio averred that there was an irregularity in the execution of the said Oath of Allegiance because the signature of the concerned Notary Public (Atty. Cinco) as appearing thereon was dissimilar to that of his specimen signatures for his notarial commission and his oath of office as a notary public.[63] Piccio likewise pointed out the inability of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Manila to issue a certified true copy of the Oath of Allegiance on the ground that Book No. IV of Atty. Cinco's Notarial Report, which allegedly contains the said entry, was not among those submitted by Atty. Cinco to the said office.
I agree with petitioner that these factual circumstances militate against the existence of Vergara's Oath of Allegiance.
For one, the Certification[64] dated May 24, 2016 issued by the Assistant Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Manila stating that "[t]his office could not issue a certified true copy of the document denominated as "Oath of Allegiance" executed by Rosanna Garcia Vergara, alleged to have been acknowledged before said Notary Public on November 26, 2006 with Cod. No. 115; Page No. 42; Book No. IV; Series of 2006, inasmuch as Book No. IV is not among those submitted to this Office", casts serious doubt on the authenticity of the challenged instrument. Apropos, there arises a presumption that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.[65]
Moreover, a comparison of the signature of Atty. Cinco in the impugned Oath of Allegiance[66] with his signatures inscribed on his notarial commission[67] and oath of office as notary public[68] shows that they are demonstrably dissimilar. It does not take one to be a handwriting expert to notice that there is evidently a missing portion of Atty. Cinco's admittedly genuine signature on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance.
In Basilio v. Court of Appeals,[69] the Court conducted its own visual analysis of the questioned document and after doing so, was convinced that the purported signature of the petitioner in the Deed of Absolute Sale was patently dissimilar from his admittedly genuine signatures.
Additionally, it boggles my mind why despite the direct challenge made by petitioner on the signatures of Atty. Cinco on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance, only the thumbmarks of Vergara in her Identification Certificate and her CoC were submitted for authentication before the NBI.
Considering the irregularities pointed out by petitioner with respect to the existence and authenticity of the foregoing Oath of Allegiance, the presumption of validity accorded to public documents cannot be made to apply in this case because its prima facie validity was overthrown by the aforementioned highly questionable circumstances. In short, the impugned instrument cannot be presumed as valid despite its notarization because of the direct challenge posed thereto by petitioner and the concomitant failure of Vergara to satisfactorily explain the irregularities and to present an original copy thereof.
Further, Piccio maintains that the acquisition of Vergara of an Identification Certificate was irregular due to the failure of the BI and Vergara to produce the original documents allegedly submitted by Vergara in support of her RA 9225 petition and the accompanying failure of the BI to satisfactorily explain why they only have photocopies of the said documents. He argues that Vergara's possession of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 does not serve as conclusive proof of her compliance with the requirements of RA 9225.
Petitioner's argument is highly persuasive.
RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 which took effect on September 17, 2003 is the law governing the retention and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship of those who have lost the same through naturalization to a foreign country. Particularly, Section 3 thereof reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
After the enactment of RA 9225, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 91, S. 2004[70] authorizing the BI to promulgate rules and regulations to implement RA 9225. Section 3 thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 3. Procedure – Any person desirous of retaining or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R. A. No. 9225 shall tile his/her application with the Bureau of Immigration if he/she is in the Philippines or the Philippine Foreign Service Posts if he/she is abroad. If his/her application is approved he/she shall take his/her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which he/she shall deemed to have re-acquired or retained Philippine citizenship.
Accordingly, on November 25, 2005, the BI issued Memorandum Circular No. AAF-05-002[71] entitled Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004, (Implementing Rules). The salient provisions of the Implementing Rules are as follows:
Section 8. The Oath of Allegiance. -
Applicants under these Rules shall take and be given their Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines as follows:
I (name of the applicant), solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
x x x x
Section 11. Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. -
Subject to full compliance with these Rules, the Oath of Allegiance shall be the final act to retain/reacquire Philippine citizenship.
In case the applicant is in the Philippines, he may take his Oath of Allegiance before the Commissioner of Immigration or any officer authorized under existing laws to administer oaths. In the latter case, the applicant shall submit the Oath of Allegiance to the BI to form part of his records.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals[72] this Court ruled that:
'"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c).
Conformably with the foregoing, it is undisputed that in this case, the documents submitted by Vergara in support of her RA 9225 petition, e.g., the November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of Vergara's RA 9225 petition, November 30, 2006 BI Order granting Vergara's RA 9225 petition, Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 and Oath of Allegiance, are all public documents as they are written official acts of public officers under Section 19 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court, or acknowledged before a notary public under Section 19 (b) of the same rule. As such, they form part of the public records.
In this connection, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public documents, viz.:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis ours)
As the afore-quoted provisions state, the record of the public documents submitted by Vergara to the BI may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. Such attestation must state in substance that the copy is a correct copy of the original or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
In this regard, it is significant to note that in the present case, no official publication of the public record was presented in evidence. Neither was there evidence to prove that the copies of the supporting documents submitted by Vergara were correct copies of the original simply because the original copies thereof are missing or nowhere to be found.
This is strengthened by the testimony of Atty. Arvin Cesar G. Santos, (Atty. Santos), Chief of the BI Legal Division and Chairman of the BI Investigation Committee. During his cross-examination, Atty. Santos admitted that he never saw the original copies of Vergara's supporting documents on file. I quote the pertinent portions of his testimony:
ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: Was there any instance during the investigation that your committee saw any instance of any original document concerning the 9225 application of Rep. Vergara?WITNESS:
A: Your Honor...Q: The IC, let us enumerate one by one. The IC, was it original or was it photocopy?
A. I believe, it was photocopy.Q. The Oath of Allegiance? Original. ..
x x x x
ATTY. GARCIA:
That was the practice in all government offices. You have two (2) copies. You keep the original and you give the other original but as far as the commission or the Immigration Bureau is concerned, no original is on file, as far as the IC is concerned.
Q: The Oath of Allegiance, the Oath of Allegiance is (sic) supposedly submitted by Rep. Vergara and therefore, presumptively, what is (sic) submitted should be original, is that not correct?HEARING COMMISSIONER:
You required the original?WITNESS:
A: Yes.HEARING COMMISSIONER:
You require original.ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: And therefore, the presumption is, the original should be in the possession of the Bureau of Immigration?
WITNESS:
A: That is correct.ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: And have you seen during the conduct of your investigation any original Oath of Allegiance on tile with the 9225 records?
WITNESS:
A: I don't think so.Q: So, there is no original, it's a mere photocopy?
A: Yes.[73]ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: And, therefore, the committee merely relied on whatever document or documents are currently available in the Bureau''
A: Documents and entries into the system.Q: System, yes and therefore, all of these documents, setting aside the entries, are all photocopies?
A. Yes.Q: In the conclusion, when the committee arrived at that conclusion, the committee said, well, as far as the first question is concerned, as to whether there was a processing of 9225, am I correct to say, for record purposes, that the committee merely used the presumption in law and for record purposes, Mr. witness, sir, would you kindly state, what is that particular presumption?
A: The presumption of regularity.[74]ATTY. GARCIA:
x x x x
My next question is, as to the second question, which was answered by yours truly which says that we cannot make any conclusion as to whether there was falsification because we have not seen the original. Is that correct?
WITNESS:
A: That's true.
It is plain from the testimony of Atty. Santos that the original attachments in support of Vergara's RA 9225 petition do not exist in the Records Section of the BI. To reiterate, what the Bureau have are mere photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents. Consequently, the BI cannot issue a copy of the said documents with an attestation that the same are correct copies of the original as required by the rules, simply because no originals exist on file.
This is precisely the reason why former Commissioner Geron stated in his first letter dated May 20, 2016 addressed to petitioner that the Bureau could not provide certified true copies of Vergara's RA 9225 dual citizenship documents (Oath of Allegiance, the November 28, 2006 Memorandum, the November 30, 2006 Order and Identification Certificate No. 06-12955) because upon verification, it was found out that the Bureau's Records Section only has photocopies of the foregoing documents.[75]
Worst, Vergara miserably failed to produce before the lower tribunal even a photocopy of her alleged Petition for Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.
In her Memorandum[76] before the HRET dated March 1, 2019, Vergara cited the case of Republic v. Harp[77] to stress that the last official act of the government which granted Harp the rights of a Filipino citizen, was the issuance of the order of recognition as well as the Identification Certificate. Thus, according to Vergara, the issuance of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 in her favor is conclusive proof that she complied with the requirements of RA 9225.
Vergara, however missed to point out that in the case of Harp, the Court reversed the ruling of the Department of Justice (DOJ) which ordered the deportation of Harp on the ground that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the DOJ were mere photocopies and thus were not enough to make it conclude that Harp deceived the DOJ and the BI about his citizenship. The Court held that mere photocopies of the documents were inconclusive evidence to warrant a revocation of the recognition of Harp's citizenship. Thus, the Court upheld the citizenship recognition accorded by the Philippines to Harp.
I quote the pertinent portion of the ruling in Harp:
A final word. The Court is compelled to make an observation on the cavalier way by which the BI, the DOJ and the Senate committee handled this matter. The DOJ and the BI relied on inconclusive evidence — in particular, on questionable reports based on photocopied documents — to take away the citizenship of respondent and even justify his deportation. These acts violate our basic rules on evidences and, more important, the fundamental right of every person to due process.[78] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of Harp, the photocopies relied upon by the DOJ were presented for the purpose of revoking Harp's Philippine citizenship. In the same vein, the photocopies of the documents submitted by Vergara in support of her RA 9225 petition were adduced in evidence to prove that she has complied with the submission of the documentary requirements under RA 9225.
In particular, the BI Investigating Committee simply relied on these photocopies in concluding that the RA 9225 petition of Vergara was duly processed and approved by the BI. Such reliance is misplaced.
As held by the Court in Harp, the photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents in this case are not conclusive evidence to prove that she submitted the originals thereof. Neither can we conclude that the issuance of Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 in favor of Vergara is sufficient proof that she complied with the requirements of RA 9225. We cannot draw a conclusion from that single document (Identification Certificate No. 06-12955) considering the highly questionable circumstances under which the same had been issued.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty does not apply favorably to the BI. |
In the case at bar, the BI assumed and concluded that Vergara's RA 9225 petition was duly received, processed and approved based on the available records, in particular, the photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents as well as the record on the data system, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. This was adopted by the HRET when it held that Atty. Santos confirmed that the BI required the submission of the original documents concerning Vergara's RA 9225 application, hence, the presumption that the said original documents are in the possession of the Bureau.[79]
The BI and the HRET are mistaken.
Jurisprudence teaches that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.[80] Further, such presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty. Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity in the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof of irregularity.[81]
Here, there is no doubt that there were indications of irregularity on the part of the BI in the processing of Vergara's petition. This is manifest from the conflicting claims of former Commissioner Geron and now Commissioner Morente. It must be recalled that in the May 20, 2016 letter-reply of former Commissioner Geron to Piccio, he stated that the Bureau only has photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents.
However, in his June 2, 2016 letter, former Commissioner Geron divulged that the BI has no record of Vergara's petition for the issuance of Identification Certificate in her favor as well as Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 allegedly issued to Vergara. On the contrary, Commissioner Morente, in his letter-reply to Vergara dated August 10, 2016, disclosed that Vergara's RA 9225 petition had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI and that she had been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 pursuant thereto.
These material contradictions and inconsistencies coming from both Commissioners of the Bureau cast serious doubt on the reliability of Commissioner Morente's claim that Vergara's RA 9225 petition was duly processed and approved. Significantly, there is evidence to show that former Commissioner Geron exerted efforts to determine the veracity and existence of Vergara's RA 9225 records in the BI files.
This can be shown by the Certification[82] dated August 4, 2016 issued by Acting Records Chief Maceda wherein she certified that the Records Section brought the RA 9225 records of Vergara to the Office of former Commissioner Geron on May 16, 2016. In the same Certification, Acting Records Chief Maceda confirmed that Vergara's RA 9225 records brought to the Office of former Commissioner Geron contain[ed] all photocopied documents. This substantiates former Commissioner Geron's May 20, 2016 letter asserting that the BI only has photocopies of Vergara's RA 9225 records.
However, despite the August 4, 2016 Certification of Acting Records Chief Maceda stating that Vergara's records contain mere photocopied documents, Acting Board of Special Inquiry Chief Canta issued another Certification[83] dated November 8, 2016 categorically declaring that Vergara's RA 9225 petition has been duly received, processed and approved by the Bureau on November 30, 2006 and that Vergara has been issued Philippine Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 pursuant thereto.
According to the HRET, the two Certifications issued by Acting Records Chief Maceda and Acting Board of Special Inquiry Chief Canta together with Commissioner Morente's letter have exposed the falsity of former Commissioner Geron's letters to Piccio.
I do not agree.
To be sure, what these differing certifications and letters have unveiled were serious irregularities in the conduct and processes undertaken inside the Bureau. Thus, it bothers me why the HRET favorably applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to the concerned BI officials when it is apparent that the proceedings held by the BI regarding the RA 9225 petition of Vergara were marred by irregularities.
To stress, the BI is the government agency mandated to act as repository of Certificates of Oath of Allegiance, Applications for Retention or Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, supporting documents and other pertinent documents in pursuance with the requirements of the law and its implementing rules and regulations.[84]
In this case, however, the concerned BI officials were unjustifiably remiss in their duties when they failed to present the original documents of Vergara pertaining to her RA 9225 petition, which they claim, had been submitted to the Bureau. To my mind, this is not a mere hint but is in itself an affirmative proof of irregularity. Thus, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied here because such presumption only works when nothing on the record suggests that there was a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law.
At this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it, for the Court cannot allow a mere presumption of regularity to take precedence over the citizenship requirement of every person seeking public office as provided by no less than the Constitution. To stress, the Constitution specifically requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In the extant case, Vergara miserably failed to prove that she exerted reasonable and diligent efforts in producing the original copies of her supporting documents. Such failure is essentially attributable to her own neglect.
Considering the questionable records of Vergara with the BI and the absence of original documents supporting her RA 9225 petition, it is my conclusion that she has not fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225 and thus did not duly reacquire her Philippine citizenship to qualify her to sit as member of the House of Representatives. Undoubtedly, Vergara, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office.
While it is true that she won the elections, took her oath and began to discharge the functions of Representative of the Third District of Nueva Ecija, her victory cannot cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[85] Winning the election does not cloak one with the qualifications necessary for the elective position. Therefore, the fact that she was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment. As pronounced by the Court in Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections,[86] citing Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections:[87]
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must have his total loyalty to this country alone, abjuring and renouncing all fealty to any other state. (Emphasis ours)
The assailed HRET Decision was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. |
To tailor-fit the petition as one falling under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Piccio imputes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET when it allegedly lifted most if not all of the declarations of Vergara in her Verified Answer and Memorandum, and used the same in the assailed Decision, without attribution and passed them as its own.
Piccio ventures to conclude that said acts amounted to mosaic plagiarism, a grave abuse of discretion. In support of this allegation, petitioner cited the case of In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (Associate Justice Del Castillo). [88]
However, a careful reading of the ruling of the Court in the case of Associate Justice Del Castillo reveals that the plagiarism charge against him was dismissed by the Court for lack of merit. In that case, the Court held:
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.[89]
The pertinent portions of the Dissenting Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in the case of Associate Justice Del Castillo, which petitioner likewise cited, is also worth stressing:
b. Copying from Pleadings of Parties
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper attribution is not actionable.
Pleadings are submitted to the court precisely so that the pleas, or the arguments written on the pleadings, are accepted by the judge. There is an implied offer by the pleader that the judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. If the judge accepts the pleader's arguments, he may copy such arguments to expedite the resolution of the case. In writing his decision, the judge does not claim as his own the arguments he adopts from the pleadings of the parties. Besides, the legal arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely reiterations of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done to mislead the parties or the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge "should perform official duties honestly." Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide that a judge must be faithful to the law, maintain professional competence, and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law.[90]
In the case at bar, I do not find any misquoting or twisting of passage from Vergara's pleading, much more done to mislead the parties or the public. To reiterate, the failure to make proper attribution to the author of the pleading is not actionable because there is an implied offer by the pleader that the Judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case. Thus, I do not subscribe to petitioner's asseveration that the same is grave abuse of discretion.
Be that as it may, I find that the respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned Decision and Resolution for reasons stated above.
I find the HRET's dismissive approach to the apparent absence of Vergara's original supporting documents and the discovered irregularities in the BI unacceptable. The documentary and testimonial evidence only point to one thing, no original copies of Vergara's RA 9225 petition exist in the Bureau's files. However, the HRET took these indicators very lightly and simply concluded that they do not conclusively prove that Vergara did not submit the same to the BI.
Verily, the respondent tribunal arbitrarily ignored the facts and circumstances pointing to the conclusion that Vergara failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. It also disregarded the rules of evidence by giving due credence to mere photocopies of Vergara's RA 9225 supporting documents. Worse, it erroneously relied upon the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the discovered irregularities in the processing of Vergara's RA 9225 petition.
In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,[91] the Court made the following pronouncement:
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.
Moreover, the importance of determining whether Vergara had complied with the requirements of RA 9225 cannot be overemphasized. More than the perceived irregularities in the processing of Vergara's RA 9225 petition, it must be stressed that the controversy involves no less than a determination of whether she met the citizenship requirement for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution.
It is indubitably a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not Vergara is qualified to hold so important and high public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens. Thus, the Court, in this instance, is called to perform a function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of interpreting the law and the Constitution with finality.
In short, to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which required the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.
In fine, I hold that the assailed HRET Decision dated May 23, 2019 and Resolution dated June 27, 2019 in HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW) are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the GRANT of the Petition for Certiorari and the REVERSAL and SETTING ASIDE of the May 23, 2019 Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW).
* This case was consolidated with G.R. No. 236113 (Rosanna V. Vergara v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Philip Hernandez Piccio and Aurelio Matias Umali). However, the Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction in G.R. No. 236113 was subsequently withdrawn.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-36. Captioned as Petition for Review on Certiorari.
[2] Id. at 37-64. Signed by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (then Associate Justice and Chairperson of the HRET), Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, and Representatives Jorge T. Almonte, Gavini C. Pancho, Abigail Faye C. Ferriol-Pascual, Joaquin M. Chipeco, Jr., Wilter Wee Palma II, and Abdullah D. Dimaporo. Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, as then Member of the HRET, took no part.
[3] Id. at 65.
[4] Id. at 38.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 93, Verified Answer to the Quo Warranto Petition.
[8] Id.
[9] Designating the Bureau of Immigration as the Implementing Agency of Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
[10] Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004.
[11] Rollo, pp. 38, 93.
[12] Id. at 39.
[13] Id. at 40.
[14] Id. at 41.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 42.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 90-114.
[19] Id. at 44.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 45.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 46.
[26] Id. at 46-47.
[27] Id. at 340-365.
[28] Id. at 66-85.
[29] Id. at 366-367.
[30] Id. at 66-85.
[31] Id. at 49.
[32] Id. at 90-114.
[33] Id. at 37-64.
[34] Id. at 65.
[35] Id. at 276-303.
[36] Id. at 314-335.
[37] Id. at 379-391.
[38] Id. at 6.
[39] 671 Phil. 52 (2011).
[40] Id. at 531-532.
[41] See Technological Institute of the Philippines Teachers and Employees Organization (TIPTEO) v. Court of Appeals, 608 Phil. 632, 649 (2009).
[42] Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[43] Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-88, July 1, 1991.
[44] 500 Phil. 51, 60 (2005).
[45] 582 Phil. 600, 612 (2008).
[46] 781 Phil. 610, 621 (2016).
[47] Rollo, p. 3.
[48] Id. at p. 4. The pertinent portion of the petition for certiorari states:
TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION
x x x
3. On July 16, 2019, petitioner Piccio received a copy of the HRET Resolution dated June 29, 2019 (sic) (the assailed Resolution) denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner thus has until September 14, 2019 within which to file an appeal via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[49] Rollo, pp. 254-265.
[50] Id. at 254.
[51] G.R. No. 241385, July 7, 2020.
[52] Benguet Corp. v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., 506 Phil. 366, 370-371 (2005).
[53] Mediserv v. Court of Appeals, 631 Phil. 282, 295 (2010).
[54] Sec. 17, Article VI.
[55] 347 Phil. 797, 804-805 (1997).
[56] 795 Phil. 529, 565 (2016).
[57] Article VI
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
[58] 473 Phil. 787, 796-797 (2004).
[59] Id. at 797.
[60] 474 Phil. 630, 640 (2004).
[61] Id.
[62] G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019.
[63] See Quo Warranto Petition, rollo, pp. 73 -74.
[64] Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[65] Dizon v. Matti, Jr., supra.
[66] Supra note 11.
[67] See Quo Warranto Petition, rollo, p. 73.
[68] Id. at 74.
[69] 400 Phil. 120, 125 (2000).
[70] Supra note 9.
[71] Supra note 10.
[72] 650 Phil. 54, 68-69 (2010).
[73] Memorandum for the Petitioner, rollo, p. 184.
[74] Id. at 184-185.
[75] Supra note 20.
[76] Id. at 212-248.
[77] 787 Phil. 33 (2016).
[78] Id. at 55.
[79] Supra note at 58.
[80] People v. Arposeple, 821 Phil. 340, 369 (2017).
[81] Id.
[82] Rollo, p. 55.
[83] Id. at 56.
[84] Section 2(c) of AO 91, S. 2004.
[85] Lopez v. Comelec, 581 Phil. 657, 663 (2008).
[86] 601 Phil. 751, 784-785 (2009).
[87] 255 Phil. 934, 944-945 (1989).
[88] 657 Phil. 11 (2011).
[89] Id. at 43.
[90] Id. at 37-88.
[91] Supra note 56.
CONCURRING OPINION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Facts
In November 2006, respondent applied with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) and its implementing rules. She was then a naturalized citizen of the United States of America.
By end of November 2006, BI finished its investigation of respondent's application. BI reported its favorable action on her application in its Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 and Order dated November 30, 2006. She then took her Oath of Allegiance. BI issued to her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006.
In support of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006, which was the final outcome of her application, she had her petition under RA 9225 and its implementing rules, BI's Memorandum dated November 28, 2006 and Order dated November 30, 2006, and her Oath of Allegiance.
Nine (9) years later, in 2015, she filed her certificate of candidacy for Representative of the third congressional district of Nueva Ecija for the 2016 elections. She also submitted her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Not long after, to prevent respondent from running in the 2016 elections and ever again, only then did petitioner initiate a barrage of complaints against respondent questioning her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
As stressed by the learned ponente, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, quoting the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), these complaints are borne in the following proceedings, thus:
Fifth, the rulings and decisions of other quasi-judicial bodies and government agencies resolving the same issue in the present case regarding the compliance of Vergara with RA 9225 and the collateral issues of tampering, forgery and irregularities in the processing of her RA 9225 petition. These were brought to the fore by the HRET, thus:
First, the said issue was already determined by the [BI] – the government agency tasked to implement RA 9225 – in favor of [Vergara] when it issued the Order on November 30, 2006 or more than thirteen (13) years ago, granting her Petition for the issuance of Identification Certificate to reacquire Filipino citizenship.
x x x x
Second, when [Piccio] opposed the candidacy of [Vergara], he raised the same issue that the latter did not comply with RA 9225. However, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution dated June 7, 2016, DISMISSED for lack of merit [Piccio's] petition x x x. It found that [Vergara] had complied with the requirements of RA 9225.
Third, [Piccio] also filed xxx a deportation complaint against [Vergara] for allegedly tampering with her RA No. 9225 records. The complaint x x x was dismissed for lack of merit by Order dated October 7, 2016 issued by BI Commissioner [Morente]. It affirmed the Investigation Committee's findings that, "based on the Bureau's available records, and considering the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties," it appears that [Vergara's] petition xxx was duly processed and approved by the [BI]."
Fourth, the Joint Resolution dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated November 7, 2017 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in NPS No. XV-07-INC-17C dismissing the complaints for falsification filed by [Piccio] against [Vergara], x x x involving the same documents in the instant case x x x. The City Prosecutor found no probable cause for the imputations against [Vergara].
As shown, aside from HRET itself, the COMELEC, the BI, and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, one after another, consistently affirmed respondent's valid reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and invariably dismissed petitioner's complaints.
The Dissent
The dissenters would like to reverse the ruling of HRET because –
One. The presumption of regularity in the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 dated November 30, 2006 and this certificate itself as the process' confirmative ready-to-hand document can be overcome by a mere suggestion of "a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."[1]
Two. Despite the issuance of an identification certificate under RA 9225 and its implementing rules, which is the final document issued as proof of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under the RA 9225 process, the burden of proof to show strict compliance with the procedure for the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship lies with the person claiming such privilege.[2]
Three. Respondent's Oath of Allegiance is seriously doubtful as to its authenticity or genuineness, notarization, and status as a public document, because of the certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court for the Regional Trial Court in Manila City that it could not issue a certified true copy of her Oath of Allegiance, acknowledged before Notary Public Atty. Cinco on November 26, 2006 with Cod. No. 115, Page No. 42, Book No. IV, Series of 2006, since Book No. IV was not among those submitted to this office.
Four. A comparison by the dissent of the signature of Notary Public Atty. Cinco in respondent's Oath of Allegiance with his signatures inscribed on his notarial commission and oath of office as notary public showed that they were "demonstrably dissimilar."
Further, the dissent also noted that a handwriting expert was not needed to notice that "there [was] evidently a missing portion of Atty. Cinco's admittedly genuine signature on Vergara's Oath of Allegiance."
The dissent cited Basilio v. Court of Appeals[3] to support the comparison it had made and its conclusion from such comparison, thus –
In Basilio v. Court of Appeals, the Court conducted its own visual analysis of the questioned document and after doing so, was convinced that the purported signature of the petitioner in the Deed of Absolute Sale was patently dissimilar from his admittedly genuine signatures.
Five. The November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955 are all public documents under Section 19 (a) and (b) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989).
Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of these public documents in the manner specified by Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989), i.e., by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and by an attestation stating in substance that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
Six. Because BI has only photocopies of the November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, it follows that "no originals [thereof] exist on file."[4]
My Reflections (from the brain)
The following commentaries are intended for our cerebral concerns.
First. According to the dissent, the presumption that public officers performed their official duties regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable laws, in good faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment "only works when nothing on record suggests that there was a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."
With due respect, the correct standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. The dissent itself affirmed this doctrine in Arakor Construction and Development Corporation v. Sta. Maria[5] – the presumption of regularity may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Arakor also stressed that "forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the same."
In Republic v. Apex Mining Corporation,[6] in the context of administrative agencies rendering decisions and performing other quasi- judicial functions, the Court held:
It bears stressing that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. In their evaluation of evidence and exercise of adjudicative functions, administrative agencies are given wide latitude, which includes the authority to take judicial notice of the facts within their special competence.
Additionally, administrative agencies like the DENR enjoy a strong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties; they are vested with quasi-judicial powers in enforcing the laws affecting their respective fields of activity, the proper regulation of which requires of them such technical mastery of all relevant conditions obtaining in the nation. Unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption becomes conclusive.
This presumption of regularity includes the public officer's official actuations in all the phases of their[7] work.[8] It is so well entrenched as a legal doctrine so that "every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness."[9]
In every case to nullify a government action, a petitioner invariably stands against this presumption of regularity. Regardless of the appearance or non-appearance of the respondent agency, regardless of the absence of any testimonial, documentary or object evidence on its behalf, the presumption stands as an obstacle to the petitioner's ultimate prayer. There is no other way of surmounting this legal barrier but by the petitioner successfully discharging his or her burden of proving the contrary by clear and convincing evidence.
Clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof that requires more than preponderance of evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.[10]
In preponderance of evidence, the parties' opposing evidence are matched against each other, and the standard is met if the evidence is able to prove that the proposition is more likely to be true than not true or more probable than improbable, and more likely to be true or more probable than what the opposing pieces of evidence prove, that is, the proof generated by the evidence is any value greater than fifty percent chance that the proposition is true as against what the opposing evidence sought to establish.[11]
On the other hand, clear and convincing evidence means that the evidence presented by a party during the trial must be highly and substantially more probable to be true than not and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or conviction in its factuality.[12] In this standard, under the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be substantially greater than a 50% likelihood of being true.
No matter how we examine petitioner's pieces of evidence, they can never amount to proof substantially greater than a 50% likelihood of being true. There is no clear and convincing evidence refuting the presumption of regularity in the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. More on this below.
Second. With due respect, the dissent has imprecisely assigned the allocation of the burden of proof here. The identification certificate under RA 9225 and its implementing rules is the final document issued as proof of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.[13] It is accepted by various government agencies as such proof.[14]
The identification certificate is the end of the RA 9225 process. It is preceded by the Order of Approval, which under BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004)[15] indicates compliance with all the requisites of RA 9225 and its implementing rules.
Hence, since respondent has been issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12955, she has in her favor the presumption of regularity in all the phases leading to its issuance. Therefore, the burden of proof lies upon petitioner to contradict this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. It is erroneous to allocate the burden of proof upon respondent when she has the presumption in her favor.
For example, we do not presume that a driver's license, passport, government employee ID, or a PhilHealth/GSIS/SSS card is invalid and then assign the burden of proving its validity upon its holder. If the rule were to be as the dissent proposed it, government transactions will halt and the rule of law (which is built to a large extent on the presumption of regularity) will come to a standstill.
Consider this: If I were traversing the intersection of Padre Faura Street and Taft Avenue, and directed by a Traffic Enforcer to stop to give way to vehicles from the opposite side, I cannot disobey this public officer on my belief that his work ID is fake and thus invalid and has no mandate to give such traffic direction order. Law and order demands that I presume the Traffic Enforcer's government ID as valid and all the actions taken by the authority of such ID (as a symbol of the Traffic Enforcer's mandate) as binding. Otherwise, traffic at that busy corner will result in a gridlock.
The burden of proof does not rest upon respondent to prove her compliance with RA 9225 and its implementing rules because she has in her favor Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. As this document itself already indicates, compliance with the requisites, as presumed by both the evidentiary presumption in Section 3 (m) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989) and Section 11 of BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004), the burden is upon petitioner to disprove such compliance by clear and convincing evidence.
Third. I discuss here the first of four pieces of evidence upon which the dissent concluded that respondent had not validly reacquired her Filipino citizenship. I refer to respondent's Oath of Allegiance which the dissent pronounced is not genuine, has not been notarized, and is not a public document simply because the Notary Public Atty. Cinco's Book IV was not submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) in Manila City.
As a matter of logic though, the fact that Book IV was not submitted does not mean that all the notarized documents recorded therein were fake, not duly or even actually notarized, and therefore are not public documents. What the non-submission signified was simply that Book IV was not submitted and is not in the records of the OCC and that as a result, it would not be possible for the OCC to issue certified true copies of the documents registered in Book IV, including respondent's Oath of Allegiance.
As a matter of law, the non-submission of one of a Notary Public's notarial books does not make the documents recorded in that notarial book fake, unnotarized and unpublic documents. There is no law, jurisprudence, or rule, to that effect.
The dissent cited Dizon v. Matti Jr.,[16] which is based on DECS v. Del Rosario,[17] which in turn cited Bernardo v. Ramos.[18]
Dizon v. Matti Jr. boldly (or respectfully, recklessly) enunciated a rule of presumption –
... the Certification... issued by the notarial records section of the Office of the Clerk of Court... certifying that the alleged notarized Deed... does not exist in the notarial records of the said office... casts very serious doubt on respondent['s]... claim that the notarization of the Deed... was completely in order. In this connection, it is apropos to mention that if there is no copy of the instrument in the notarial records, there arises a presumption that the document was not notarized and is not a public document.
I say boldly and recklessly because –
(i) | The alleged reference of this rule, DECS v. Del Rosario, did not lay down the above-quoted presumption. The complete and correct statement of the rule of presumption in DECS consists of two (2) premises, not a single one as reduced in Dizon – the subject instrument must both be not recorded in the notarial register and not included in the notarial records. Thus, DECS held: |
If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the notarial records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public document. | |
(ii) | The OCC certification in Dizon is different from the certification in the present case. |
The certification in Dizon certified that "the alleged notarized Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist in the notarial records of the said office." | |
On the other hand, the wording of the certification here is that Book IV was not among the submissions by Atty. Cinco to the OCC in Manila City. | |
(iii) | DECS cited Bernardo v. Ramos. But Bernardo did not lay down a presumption as the one made in DECS, much less, the one laid down in Dizon. To be precise, Bernardo held: |
If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in fact it was not. |
The rule in Bernardo is consistent with our holding in Spouses Santiago v. Court of Appeals[19] that -
And surely, the parties to a notarized document are not the persons obligated to furnish a copy thereof to the Records Management and Archives Division, such task being that of the notary. The failure of the notary public to so furnish a copy of the deed to the proper office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
The doubt that Bernardo said was engendered by the faulty notarization of the document should be qualified more leniently (and not harshly) by the above-quoted rule in Spouses Santiago that the non-submission of one of the notary books is not a ground for invalidating the document or the transaction it memorializes. What is important, following Spouses Santiago, is that the notary public who had notarized respondent's Oath of Allegiance was duly and legally commissioned when he notarized respondent's Oath of Allegiance.
Clearly, there is no basis in law for the claim made by the dissent as well as those in Dizon and DECS that a presumption arises if the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no copy of it therein. There is no rule of presumption enunciated in the alleged ultimate source of this rule – Bernardo v. Ramos, and its antecedent, Spouses Santiago.
What Bernardo simply laid down was that such twin facts, and not just one, could (not should) create a doubt but not a presumption.
It is important to distinguish a doubt from a presumption since a doubt in a civil case may be rebutted by preponderant evidence while a presumption requires clear and convincing evidence to refute.
At any rate, here, neither doubt nor presumption arose because the OCC only certified that Book IV was not submitted by the Notary Public. There is no certification that respondent's Oath of Allegiance was not recorded, much less, does not exist in the notarial records of the OCC.
Assuming that the certifications in Dizon and in the present case amount to the same thing, neither doubt nor presumption will still arise because the Oath of Allegiance was in fact recorded on November 26, 2006 in "Cod. No. 115, Page No. 42, Book No. IV, Series of 2006" of Notary Public Atty. Cinco. Evidently, the two premises to generate the presumption in Dizon will not apply to the certification here since only one of these premises is actually present.
Singly or in connection with the three (3) other pieces of evidence canvassed by the dissent, the OCC Certification obtained by petitioner does not amount to clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of respondent's Identification Certificate and the probative value of the evidence offered in the present case supporting this presumption.
Fourth. The comparison between the original specimens of Atty. Cinco's signatures in his notarial commission and oath of office and the copy of his signature on respondent's Oath of Allegiance is not an acceptable procedure for a handwriting examination.
Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman[20] stressed that the use of a mere photocopy of the alleged forged signature to establish forgery is not reliable:
Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and that"[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results."
Loyola Life Plans v. Lumiqued[21] underscored the same ruling:
Noticeably, the language used by Atty. Pagui in his findings is not definitive and cannot be considered a reliable examination of the genuineness of Dwight's signature. While it concludes that the questioned and standard signatures could not have been affixed by one and the same person, this conclusion is made on the assumption that the standard signatures provided by ATR are authentic copies of the originals. Moreover, only the carbon-original copy of Dwight's questioned document was examined, not the original questioned document bearing his signature. Atty. Pagui admitted that the original copy of the document where the questioned signature appears is "preferably the most desired to be examined." Even Mely Feliciano Sora, Chief of the Questioned Document Examination Division of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, opined that it is impossible to conduct a reliable handwriting· examination of Dwight's signature appearing on the Timeplan Application. According [to] her, the Application is a mere carbon original wherein the minute details are not clear.... Given the unreliable quality of the available sample signatures of Dwight in the records, the Court is inclined to refuse conducting an independent examination of the genuineness of his signature in the disputed Timeplan application.
In Republic v. Harp,[22] alterations or forgeries cannot be reliably established when the questioned writing is just a photocopy:
From Senate Committee Report No. 256 dated 7 August 2003, it appears that the supposed discovery of alterations was based on a mere photocopy of Manuel's Certificate of Live Birth. Since the original document was not inspected, the committees could not make any categorical finding of purported alterations. They were only able to conclude that Manuel's birth certificate appeared to be "simulated, if not, highly suspicious." The Court cannot rely on this inconclusive finding. In the same way that forgery cannot be determined on the basis of a comparison of photocopied instruments, the conclusion that a document has been altered cannot be made if the original is not examined.
Another. While the dissent based its conclusion of forgery on alleged "evidently missing portion" of the Notary Public's signature in the Oath of Allegiance, the dissent did not explain what this omission was. This is unfair because it deprives respondent the ability to meet the supposed deficiency, especially when the supposedly forged signature appeared only as a copy of the original.
The analysis in the dissent is contrary to what was done in Civil Service Commission v. Dampilag, where the Court painstakingly itemized the stark differences between the genuine signature and the forged one –
Here, the evidence presented includes certified true copy of the PSP and the PDS. After a careful comparison, we noted stark differences in the structure, strokes, form and general appearance of Dampilag's signatures and handwriting in the PDS and in the PSP. The letters "M," "J," and "N" were written differently and the strokes of the signatures were not similar. It cannot also escape our attention that the purported examinee wrote his name as "HILARIO D. DAMPILAG" in the PSP and not "HILARIO J. DAMPILAG." In the circumstances and based on the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the person who took the December 1, 1996 CSPE is not Dampilag. Someone impersonated Dampilag and took the examination in behalf of him.
Lastly, the dissent's reference to Basilio v. Court of Appeals[23] is most inappropriate since the handwriting examination done by the Court was merely cumulative of the overwhelming evidence adduced that the questioned deed of sale was forged. It is very much unlike the present case where the Court's evidence of forgery was only the dissent's examination of the signature's copy that was compared to the other signatures of the Notary Public:
In this case, petitioners presented handwriting experts and other persons familiar with the handwriting of Dionisio Z. Basilio in order to show that the signature contained in the questioned deed of sale was forged.
According to the report of the handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation, there were "fundamental, significant differences in writing characteristics between the questioned and the standard/sample specimen signatures," particularly, the "movement and manner of execution strokes," "structural pattern of letters/elements," and "minute/inconspicuous identifying details."
Evelyn Basilio, daughter of Dionisio Z. Basilio, confirmed that the signature on the questioned deed of sale was forged, stating that she knew the authentic signature of her father because he used to sign her school report card periodically.
Carmelita Basilio, wife of Dionisio Z. Basilio, stayed beside her husband from the time of his illness until his death. She was certain that from the time of his illness in 1987 until his death in 1988, Dionisio did not have the strength to sign a document much less personally appear before a notary public in the latter's office to acknowledge the execution of a deed of sale.
Moreover, our own analytical study of the questioned document showed that the signature of Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987 was forged. We have examined the signature of Dionisio Z. Basilio on the deed of sale dated March 19, 1987, compared with other documents with his admittedly genuine signature. We find the signatures to be patently dissimilar.
Thus, again, singly or in connection with the three other pieces of evidence identified in the dissent, the questionable and unreliable signature examination done by the dissent cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of respondent's Identification Certificate and the probative value of the pieces of evidence adduced in this case that corroborate this presumption.
Fifth. The dissent inaccurately referred to Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132, Revised Rules of Evidence (1989) as one of respondent's inadequacies in proving her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 and its implementing rules.
This is because the present case has nothing to do with the contents of the requisite documents. Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 are relevant only if the documents' proponent is obliged to produce the original, and this is the case only if the contents of the documents are in issue.
But here, the issue is the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the November 28, 2006 BI Memorandum recommending approval of respondent's RA 9225 petition, the November 30, 2006 BI Order granting respondent's RA 9225 petition, her Oath of Allegiance, and her Identification Certificate No. 06-12955. For this purpose, any probative secondary evidence may be offered by respondent.
As held in Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez,[24] the range of secondary evidence that may be offered to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the requisite documents is wide. Good trial tactics would surely call attention to adducing the original document itself. But this does not mean that if the originals are missing, all is already lost for the proponent. Far from it. As Heirs of Prodon clarified –
.... Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
Secondary evidence may be offered to prove the existence, due execution, and genuineness of documents. The manner of proving these matters is not as stringent as proving the terms of a writing, the process for which is laid down in Sections 5, 6, 7 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence (1989). The less stringent manner of proving the existence, due execution, and genuineness of documents will go through the ordinary procedure for adducing testimonial, object, or documentary evidence.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan[25] spelled out when the originals are necessary and when they are not.
Under the Best Evidence Rule, the original document must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry. The rule is encapsulated in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court....
Why the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are the subject of inquiry are suitably explained in Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez:
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and default. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
Although the application of the Best Evidence Rule may be simple, determining whether the contents or terms of a writing are the subject of the inquiry, or whether a piece of evidence (other than the original document) intends to prove the contents of a writing, is more difficult than it seems. In Railroad Management Company LLC v. CFS Louisiana Midstream Co., the US Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit), which was faced with the complex task of determining whether to admit in evidence the affidavits of certain witnesses that had been submitted in evidence supposedly to prove the existence of an assignment agreement, acknowledged the difficulty in applying the Best Evidence Rule particularly because the party proffering the affidavits had contended that they were not intended to "prove the content" of the document (agreement), but only their "existence." It held that the affidavits were in fact submitted to prove the contents of the agreement, and observed as follows:
The purpose, flexibility, and fact-intensive nature of the application of the best evidence rule persuade us that the following factors are appropriately considered when distinguishing between whether it is the content of the document or merely its existence that a witness intends to testify concerning:
(a) the relative importance of content in the case, (b) the simplicity or complexity of content and consequent risk of error in admitting a testimonial account, (c) the strength of the proffered evidence and the presence or absence of bias or self-interest on the part of the witnesses, (d) the breadth of the margin for error within which mistake in a testimonial account would not undermine the point to be proved, (e) the presence or absence of the actual dispute as to content, (f) the ease or difficulty of producing the writing, and (g) the reasons why the proponent of other proof of its content does not have or offer the writing itself.
Indeed, when the terms or contents of a writing must be proved to make a case or put up a defense, the Best Evidence Rule is controlling. But when the terms or contents are not in issue, and the matter to be proved exists independently of the writing and can be satisfactorily established by parol evidence (or other secondary evidence), the latter is equally primary.
Given the foregoing guidelines, the Best Evidence Rule is not controlling in the case before the Sandiganbayan. None of the issues presented there would be resolved only upon a consideration of the contents of any of the affected exhibits. Specifically, the exhibits (including the letters and memoranda) were presented to establish that either the Marcoses had extended undue and unwarranted influence, advantage and concessions to the respondents, or that the Marcoses had held a close relationship – financial or otherwise – with their alleged cronies. But considering that such facts were matters that could be competently inferred from the mere existence and execution of the documents themselves, the Republic did not need to present the documents to prove the particular transactions or incidents detailed in the documents. Hence, the production in court of the originals of the exhibits was neither crucial nor decisive.
When what is sought to be proved is an external or collateral matter, the original of the exhibit need not be produced in court in order to ensure its trustworthiness for purposes of the case. Such trustworthiness is already safeguarded by the rules on authentication and proof of documents embodied in Section 19 to Section 33 of Rule 132, Rules of Court. The court may safely rely on the documents thus authenticated and proved even without producing their originals, for it was not their terms or contents that were the subject of the inquiry.
Clearly, the original does not have to be produced when a party is simply trying to prove an event or fact that is memorialized in a writing, recording, or piece of photographic evidence, such as the requisite documents for a petition under RA 9225.
For example, a witness may testify about the fact of payment. Oral testimony to this effect may be offered to prove payment. Additionally, the witness may enter the receipt into evidence, but since the contents of the receipt is not in issue, the original copy of the receipt does not have to be offered. But when a party is attempting to prove payment does not recall the experience of making the payment, but has a receipt and wants to testify as to what the receipt shows, the Original Evidence Rule will apply since it is the contents of the receipt that are being offered. The best evidence of what the receipt says is the receipt itself and the original receipt should be entered into evidence.
Here, respondent vividly recalls the execution and submission to BI of the requisite documents. So does BI itself. They therefore do not have to produce the originals of these documents themselves to prove their existence, due execution, and genuineness. Any secondary evidence probative of these facts will do.
More, the factors mentioned in Republic v. Sandiganbayan militate against the application of the original document rule as well the rule on proof of the originals of public documents stated in Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132. Thus:
(a) the relative importance of contents in the case – The contents are not important here. The requisite documents under RA 9225 and its implementing rules are pro-forma documents and their contents are already stipulated by law.
(b) the simplicity or complexity of content and consequent risk of error in admitting a testimonial account – The contents are pro-forma and therefore identical across the board and thus very simple to be testified on by a witness
(c) the strength of the proffered evidence and the presence or absence of bias or self-interest on the part of the witnesses – The proffered evidence are copies themselves of the requisite documents that are in the possession of BI itself as the official repository of these documents; the copies are both in hard copies and electronic entries in BI's database. We also have testimonies of BI officials on the existence, due execution (i.e., absence of fraud and correctness of form and procedure) and authenticity. These witnesses are public officers who pursuant to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees must exhibit neutrality, professionalism, and trustworthiness at all times.
(d) the breadth of the margin for error within which mistake in a testimonial account would not undermine the point to be proved – There is a very small margin of error that the above-mentioned secondary evidence, the hard and electronic copies and testimonies, would undermine proof of the existence, genuineness and due execution of the requisite documents.
(e) the presence or absence of the actual dispute as to contents – There is no issue as to the contents of the requisite documents.
(f) the ease or difficulty of producing the writing – Pursuant to the implementing rules of RA 9225, the original copies of the requisite documents were submitted to BI. Hence, the production or non-production of the originals of these documents depends upon the security of BI's filing system and not upon respondent's vested interest.
(g) the reasons why the proponent of other proof of its content does not have or offer the writing itself – This is because BI had custody of the original copies of the RA 9225 requisite documents.
Taking into account all these factors, the original document rule does not apply to the present case. The contents of the requisite documents are not in issue here. Rather, it is their existence, due execution, and genuineness that must be prove. Proof of these matters does not depend on the production of the original since secondary evidence could competently and reliably account for them.
Consequently, respondent's non-compliance with Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 is a non-issue since she has in her favor the presumption of regularity, and in any event, she called secondary evidence to prove the existence, due execution and genuineness of her documents.
Singly or in connection with the three other pieces of evidence mentioned in the dissent, such non-compliance cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumptive validity of her Identification Certificate and the probative value of the evidence adduced before HRET.
Sixth. The dissent itself is ambivalent on what the BI certification that it only had copies of respondent's requisite documents really meant. Expressly, the dissent concluded the obvious – having only copies of these documents, BI did not have the originals thereof in its files. This of course is logical.
It appears, however, that in relying heavily upon BI's certification that only photocopies of the requisite document were in BI's files at the time BI was asked for a certification, the dissent had to proffer that giant leap and jump in conclusion that no originals of the requisite documents had ever existed. I respectfully submit that this conclusion has no basis both in logic and in law.
Logically, it is fallacious to conclude that because only photocopies were ready-to-hand in year 2016, there were no originals thereof in 2006 when respondent reacquired Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. It is non-sequitur.
Legally, a certification of the type BI issued does not mean that no originals ever existed.
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson,[26] Kho v. Republic,[27] Cariño v. Cariño,[28] among others, held that a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance or non-existence of this license.
But in Vitangcol v. People,[29] a bigamy case, this holding was qualified – the above holding is true only if the certification was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion. If there was any circumstance of suspicion accompanying the certification, Vitangcol held that this certification would not categorically prove that there was no marriage license. This is because a certification that the local civil registrar had no record of the marriage license is not the same as another certification categorically stating that this marriage license did not exist.
Vitangcol explained:
The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.
Here, the applicable rule is not the rule enunciated in Diaz-Salgado, Kho, and Cariño,[30] among others. This is my conclusion for two reasons.
First, it is not the case here that there are no records of respondent's requisite documents in BI's custody. There are.
For one, hard copies of these documents have long existed in BI's files.
Further, there are electronic entries positively indicating the existence of the originals of these requisite documents. As will be discussed below, there is affirmative evidence confirming the reliability and trustworthiness of BI's physical and electronic filing systems to warrant the conclusion that respondent validly went through the process for reacquiring Filipino citizenship in 2006.
Second, following Vitangcol, the probative value of BI's certification that it has only copies of the requisite documents must also be qualified by such factors as the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence.
The BI Certification cannot and does not support petitioner's claim that respondent did not validly reacquire Filipino citizenship. This is because the BI Certification must co-related with the other evidence and circumstances attendant to this case.
As Justice Caguioa painstakingly clarified in his ponencia, the BI Certification is merely a piece but an integral one in the overall conclusion of BI that respondent's "petition had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI and that she had been issued [Identification Certificate] no. 06-12955."
The brilliant ponencia mentioned the other pieces of evidence that supported this BI conclusion:
The ponente is baffled by how Acting Chief Canta and Commissioner Morente arrived at the conclusion that Vergara's RA 9225 petition had been duly received, processed and approved by the BI considering the total absence of the petition with the BI and that it only has photocopies of the supporting documents. The ponente emphasizes that the "only basis" for the conclusion of the BI Investigation Report dated August 28, 2016 that Vergara's RA 9225 petition was duly received, processed and approved, "were mere photocopies of Vergara's documents in support of her RA 9225 petition and the presumption that the original documents are in the possession of the Bureau considering that the BI required these submissions."
Respectfully, this, again, is a wrong postulation. Contrary to the ponente's ruling, the Investigation Report is based, not only on the photocopies of Vergara's documents and the presumption of regularity, but likewise on the entries on the BI's electronic database, formal hearings conducted by the Investigation Committee, and the comments and reports the Committee required from the concerned BI officials. That the Investigation Report was based on all these sources is clear from the testimonies of the BI officials before the HRET which I discussed in my Reflections, thus:
Fourth, the testimonies before the HRET of the following BI officials:
1) Atty. Arvin Cesar G. Santos (Santos), Chief, BI Legal Division and Chairman, Investigation Committee, who testified that: a) an investigation was conducted on the alleged tampering of Vergara's RA 9225 records and the Investigation Report concluded that the files therein were duly received and processed, resulting to the documents for Vergara's petition.
Atty. Santos likewise confirmed under oath that because the original documents are required to be submitted, the presumption is that these original documents are in the custody of the BI.
2) Atty. Estanislao R. Canta, member of the Board of Special Inquiry, BI, who testified that: a) there were entries in the electronic database of the dual citizenship office which indicate the processing of Vergara's documents; b) that Vergara's documents have been implemented with Transaction Number/ Entry Reference no. 10552;34 c) the BI database records all transactions including the processing of documents; and d) tampering (of the BI electronic database) is highly unlikely (and will not go unnoticed) because any change will be reflected and all entries would be affected.
It is in this context that the Court gave weight to the BI Certification that BI has only photocopies of respondent's requisite documents.
This certification did not mean that no originals ever existed much less that respondent's application for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship was not validly processed.
Rather, what the certification clarifies is that BI has records both physical and electronic of respondent's requisite documents and processed in accordance with RA 9225 and its implementing rules respondent's application for citizenship reacquisition.
Therefore, the conclusion that these documents never existed or were never issued is downright false and fallacious.
Clearly, whether singly or in conjunction with the other pieces of evidence, the BI Certification does not make for clear and convincing evidence of irregularities to rebut the presumption of regularity and the probative value of the evidence corroborating this presumption before HRET.
A last point. A suspicious circumstance should caution us in considering the BI Certification against respondent's claim of Filipino citizenship.
Respondent reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2006. Yet, petitioner took all of nine long years, in 2015, to start the barrage of complaints against her reacquisition of citizenship.
Thus, the issue raised against respondent is a mere after-thought, that is, after petitioner's realization that she was intent on running in the 2016 elections. Certainly, this after-thought is a tell-tale sign of a hatchet job against respondent.
In the words of Loyola Life Plans v. Lumiqued:[31]
The Court also agrees with the observation of the lower courts that the allegation of forgery is a mere afterthought. It was only on September 22, 2001, or almost 18 months after the death of Dwight, that ATR belatedly assailed for the first time the genuineness of his signature. ATR's timing in raising the allegation of forgery is suspicious and questionable. Thus, the Court is convinced that the signature of Dwight appearing in his Timeplan application is genuine.
My Reflections (from the inner gut)
The following commentaries are not addressed to our cerebral core but to our passion for truth and justice, and equally important, practical sense. At times, the inner gut is a lot more truthful and sensible mechanism than brain cells.
FIRST. Like a child's legitimacy, a challenge to another's citizenship must be done through a direct action. Vazquez v. Kho[32] confirms this doctrine –
We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. A disbarment case is definitely not the proper venue to attack someone's citizenship. For the lack of any ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must be dismissed.
How different is a disbarment case from a quo warranto proceeding?
Both deliberate on one's qualifications to engage in noble callings – the former as a lawyer to engage in the practice of law, the latter is not far different, as a Congress Representative who legislates laws. In both cases, a requirement is Filipino citizenship.
If disbarment is not the proper case to dispute a lawyer's Filipino citizenship absent a court case divesting the lawyer of Filipino citizenship, then a quo warranto proceeding should not also be a proper case for assailing the Filipino citizenship of a Congress Representative prior to the holding and conclusion of a direct action to contest the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
A quo warranto proceeding before HRET, admittedly, is plenary in scope.[33] It, nonetheless, still constitutes a collateral attack upon a person's citizenship, if this is the ground alleged for the quo warranto to proceed.
The purpose of a quo warranto case is to oust a respondent's title to the office, but not to declare their[34] loss, lack or retention of Filipino citizenship. This is obvious from the proposed dispositive portion of the dissent –
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The May 23, 2019 Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16-025 (QW) dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and declaring Rosanna V. Vergara not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the Third District of Nueva Ecija, as well as its June 27, 2019 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent Rosanna V. Vergara is hereby found DISQUALIFIED from HOLDING and EXERCISING the Office of a Member of the House of Representatives. The said elective position is hereby DECLARED VACANT. The Commission on Elections and the House of Representatives shall proceed to FILL the VACANCY pursuant to Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6645.
SO ORDERED.
The irony of the present case is that we debated about respondent's Filipino citizenship as reacquired pursuant to RA 9225 and its implementing rules, reverse HRET's ruling (which for all intents and purposes is the decision of some of our senior colleagues), disqualify respondent from being a legislator (as she is allegedly not a Filipino citizen), yet mention nothing in the dispositive portion that she is no longer a Filipino.
To repeat, the dissent declares nothing about respondent's citizenship. This of course is understandable because a quo warranto proceeding is only a collateral attack upon respondent's citizenship.
As a rule, a collateral attack upon citizenship is allowed where the grant, or here, the re-acquisition, of citizenship is void on its face.[35] But here, the supporting documents for respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship are not void on its face. It appears to have been regularly issued. The only perceived prima facie indicator of fraud, if at all, is the fact that the documents in BI's custody are photocopies and entries in its reliable database. These are not indicators of a void on its face reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
To repeat, we should not allow a quo warranto petition, such as the present one, to proceed merely because the BI only has photocopies and electronic entries in its reliable database of the documents on respondent's re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, since this fact does not make her reacquisition void on its face.
Notably, a collateral attack most especially under the present circumstances is not the proper remedy because –
(i) A collateral attack of one's citizenship is simply unfair and unjust.
It is unjust because it leaves the assailed party's citizenship in limbo. The collateral attack deprives the person the right or privilege subject of the attack, yet, it does not cancel their citizenship or the documents proving their citizenship. The party becomes absolutely marginalized because this individual can claim no protection as a citizen as this status will be constantly under attack.
A collateral attack is also unfair since it denies the individual of being heard by the government agency that knows all the relevant facts and circumstances.
Here, it is BI and the Department of Justice. These government agencies know much better the state of their internal procedures and inadequacies, especially its records management system. These agencies know better institutional history of their capacities and inabilities that occur as a result of lack of resources and at times competent management skills that should not prejudice the agencies' respective clienteles.
We should know because the offices under the Supreme Court at times would have missing records or files. This does not mean anything fraudulent. Far from it. These circumstances merely highlight the need for a more efficient organizational management and provision of adequate resources.
It also bears stressing that the admissibility and relevance of secondary evidence to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the original documents which form the basis of respondent's Identification Certificate and the entirety of her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship, necessarily suggest that the direct action is the more competent forum for this purpose.
The direct action is more competent to delve into matters why, as stated in the dissent, "[respondent's] RA 9225 petition was duly received, processed and approved based on the available records, in particular, the photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents as well as the record on the data system...."
This direct action could very well unearth how then Commissioner Geron could have attested that in 2006, more than ten years ago, BI then did not receive respondent's verified petition but allowed her to re-acquire Filipino citizenship just the same. How did he allegedly come to know of such a fact when BI electronic system had data of respondent's re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship? Indeed, a direct action is more favorable to an accurate and categorical response to this and other queries.
Too, a direct action is more competent in investigating matters that happen more than ten years back in 2006 when respondent processed her application under RA 9225.
Additionally, under both BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 91, Series of 2004 and BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005 (2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) NO. 91, Series of 2004), the oath of allegiance and the Order of Approval are forwarded to the Philippine Statistics Administration (PSA), for recording in the civil registry.
Unfortunately, there is nothing in the dissent to suggest that the PSA has been asked about respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship. A direct action could very well subpoena PSA representatives to shed light on PSA's records if these documents have indeed been forwarded to it.
Clearly, the quo warranto proceeding is a collateral attack that is inappropriate in adjudicating citizenship and should be dismissed to give way to the direct action for challenging RA 9225 citizenship re-acquisition. This direct action is found in Section 19[36] of BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005 (2008 Revised Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 and Administrative Order (A.O.) NO. 91, Series of 2004).
(ii) At present, and this rule governs the present case already, under the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Evidence, photocopies are already considered original copies.
Photocopies are now accorded as much probative value as the originals absent any cogent reason to suspect their reliability and accuracy. As discussed above, there is no cogent reason to deny any probative value to respondent's and BI's photocopies, given the extensive corroboration of these photocopies' weight by the other evidence adduced before HRET.
The 2019 Amendments states:
SECTION 4. Original of Document. —
(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."
(b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a)[37]
This rule applies here because rules of procedure applies to proceedings already pending at the time the rules of procedure took effect.[38]
(iii) As discussed above, the demand for original copies of documents is relevant only if the contents of the documents are at issue. Here, it is not the contents that are at issue but their existence, due execution and authenticity. The originals alone do not prove the existence, due execution and authenticity of documents; their absence alone does not disprove these matters.[39]
The lack of originals is not dispositive of respondent's claims. Neither is it determinative of fraud. It is not the end-all and be-all of the validity or invalidity of respondent's re-acquisition of citizenship. The reason is that secondary evidence is admissible and relevant to prove the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the originals upon which respondent's photocopies were based.
This is especially true when respondent's requisite documents and data have long been entered into BI's reliable electronic data-base, and BI officials themselves testified to confirm categorically the validity of both the process leading to the issuance of respondent's Identification Certificate and her Identification Certificate itself
SECOND. I must stress two things.
One, not only did petitioner fail to discharge his burden of proof by means of clear and convincing evidence, but also respondent has in her favor the corroboration by those pieces of evidence presented at HRET. This is important if only to stress what the ponente has been vigorously pointing to all along that respondent's case is not just about the presumption of regularity which is well and good to establish her Filipino citizenship,· but also the several pieces of evidence above-mentioned supporting her cause.
Two, at the risk of being too annoying because of being too repetitive, petitioner took nine years to complain against respondent's reacquisition of citizenship. His complaint is an after-thought whose bona fide is questionable.
Hence, following the admonition in Vitangcol about weighing the probative value of evidence in relation to the parties' respective circumstances, this after-thought should be carefully weighed vis-à-vis the evidence (especially the copies of her requisite documents) presented both for and against her.
And when petitioner did complain, he was rebuffed not once, not twice, but four times, on basically the same arguments and the same set of evidence. I certainly cannot point to any deficit in the capabilities, intelligence, and sense of regularity of these four government agencies including some senior colleagues in the Court which otherwise could easily move us now to reverse and set aside their decisions. This is especially true in the case of HRET because some of its members who ruled for respondent are senior Justices of the Court. I really cannot see ourselves being now convinced by petitioner on the same arguments and evidence that these four government agencies have already rejected.
THIRD. From the circumstances surrounding respondent's processing of her re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship in 2006, especially the utter absence of motive then to manipulate the process, as she would not have gained anything then from doing so, she indubitably acted in good faith. In any event, her good faith in availing of and resorting to the process is presumed.
It thus behoves the Court to ask, given the equities implicated here, who should bear the consequences of the allegedly missing original documents? Who should bear the consequences of the allegedly discrepant signature of the notary public in the Oath of Allegiance?
The process in the re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and its implementing rules is heavily dependent upon the good faith of and diligent and efficient performance by government agencies of their respective tasks. The individual petitioner has no power over the process after submitting the documents required of them.[40]
Here, BI is responsible for processing the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, confirming and recognizing the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, and keeping the requisite documents. BI is also responsible for transmitting the Oath of Allegiance and Order of Approval to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) for recording in the civil registry. PSA is then responsible for accepting these documents, keeping them in custody, and recording them and the relevant data contained in them in the civil registry. The Office of the Executive Judge and the Office of the Clerk of Court of the second level court in the territorial jurisdiction are responsible for policing the ranks of notaries public and accepting and keeping their filings as required by the relevant rule.
Why then should the lowly applicant, here, respondent, be penalized for the alleged negligence or even supposed fraudulent conduct of these responsible government agencies, to which she was not even a party or proven to be a party?
I have found no rule of law that would unjustly allocate the burden to respondent for any of this alleged malfeasance or misfeasance if any. I also have to stress that BI itself has not repudiated her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship and has in fact confirmed over and over again the validity of her reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
Notably, neither the dissent nor petitioner questions the fact that the notary public of the Oath of Allegiance was duly and legally commissioned as such at time he notarized this document.
To quote again Spouses Santiago v. Court of Appeals:[41]
It is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed. There being absent any direct evidence of bad faith, there is need to examine what respondent Court of Appeals said are indices of bad faith on the part of petitioners.
....
And surely, the parties to a notarized document are not the persons obligated to furnish a copy thereof to the Records Management and Archives Division, such task being that of the notary. The failure of the notary public to so furnish a copy of the deed to the proper office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
FOURTH. The scenario depicted by the dissent is very dangerous not only for public officers but most especially for our ordinary citizens.
To illustrate:
Juan X, an employee at the Supreme Court, brings his son to hospital for treatment. His child is sick with pneumonia. He brings with him his PhilHealth card hoping to get the discounts he is entitled to.
Juan spends three weeks in and out of the hospital to attend and care for his child. As he is about to discharge his child from the hospital, he goes to the billing and cashier section leaving his frail child at a semi-private room.
He patiently stands in a long queue waiting for his turn. Meantime, his frail child awaits his return at the child's semi-private room for the discharge slip.
After a long and patient holdback at the queue, Juan finally reaches the billing and cashier clerk. He presents his PhilHealth card. He is met by a frown on the clerk's forehead and is told by her:
"Sir, pasensya na po, pero yung card nyo bale wala, kasi po, sabi ng PhilHealth, wala daw po kayong application form, nawawala daw po yung original, pati mga payment history ninyo at ng employer niyo, hindi mahanap. Sabi po ni Attorney, ayon sa Piccio v. HRET, pag wala daw original, bale wala po yung card nyo."
Exasperated, Juan replies trying to control his emotions:
"Ang tagal ko na po nag-work sa government, sa Supreme Court. Imposible naman na wala akong originals sa mga documents ko, kasi nga po, nabigyan naman po ako ng PhilHealth Card."
The clerk retorted:
"Yun naman po pala. Taga Supreme Court po pala kayo. Dapat alam nyo po yung kaso ng Piccio v. HRET. Sabi po doon, kesa hodang matagal na kayo, basta walang original sa mga documents nyo sa PhilHealth, walang kwenta po yang PhilHealth card nyo. Kausapin nyo po mga kasamahan nyo sa Supreme Court para ipaliwanag sa inyo ang batas.... Magbayad na lang po kayo ng buo .... Pasensya na po."
And the clerk closes the blinds of the glass divider and leaves behind a despondent Juan gasping for the last breath he could.
Epilogue
This is the take-away we have from the petition and the dissent – respondent has been a Filipino citizen for more than ten years, then all of a sudden, because the originals from which her identification certificate and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship had originated cannot be found more than ten years after, she is no longer a Filipino. The reason – the government agency in charge of these documents could not find the originals of respondent's documents, though it has the photocopies and the entries in the electronic database of these same documents.
We could replicate this holding a hundred times over in similar scenarios – a passport, a driver's license, a GSIS card, etc. If the custodian government agency has none of the originals from which these cards were issued, the validity and efficacy of these cards are forever lost. This will be the unfortunate even if unintended repercussion of the dissent in the instant case.
In 2006, respondent was not eyeing to be a candidate in any elections to motivate her to falsify the RA 9225 process. Her petition was lodged and processed in 2006 but ran only in the elections of 2016. Common sense should comfortably dictate an affirmance of the HRET ruling.
Grave abuse of discretion is not to be lightly ascribed. In Justice Leonen's words[42] –
The invocation of this court's power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" in relation to the Judicial and Bar Council's discretion should be read in context. It should not be read too expansively so as to undermine the constitutional limits of our relation to the Council.
A showing of grave abuse of discretion should refer to a demonstrably clear breach of a constitutional duty that is "arbitrary, capricious and whimsical." Our constitutional duty and power of review is not to accept the arguments of petitioner because it is plausible. Judicial review is also not a license to impose our own plausible interpretation of the rules of the Council over their own. Judicial review requires as an absolute predicate, a showing that the Council's interpretation and application of its rules is so bereft of reason and so implausible. We do not analyze the cogency of the arguments of petitioner or the interpretation that we would have put had we been in the Council. Rather, the mode of analysis in our exercise of judicial review is to scrutinize whether there are no viable reasonable bases for the interpretation, application, and actions of the Judicial and Bar Council.
In other words, the error we need to discover before nullifying a discretionary act of another constitutional organ is not whether there could have been a more reasonable interpretation and application of its rules; rather, it should be that we clearly find that their interpretation and application cannot stand on any legal justification. It is not about which of the arguments posed by petitioner and respondents are better in relation to each other. Rather, judicial review requires an absolute finding that the actions of respondents being reviewed are arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
I cannot concede that my senior colleagues at the HRET were so seriously bereft of reason and so implausible in dismissing petitioner's claims that we should now reverse them. I am aware that this is an argumentum ad verecundiam or argument from respect, but it is what it is because they each deserve the respect they have painstakingly earned.
Magistrates of this Court do not come unprepared – especially not in important cases as this one. For the HRET members, especially those from the Court, I do not think they left practical sense at the door step when they ruled to dismiss the quo warranto petition.
ACCORDINGLY, I join the majority and vote to dismiss the petition and affirm in full the Decision dated May 23, 2019, and Resolution, dated June 27, 2019, in HRET Case No. 16-025.
[1] The dissent states: "Thus, the presumption of regularity cannot be applied here because such presumption only works when nothing on the record suggests that there was a deviation from the standard conduct of official duty required by law."
[2] The dissent states: "At this juncture, it is worth pointing out that the burden to show that the procedure in the retention of Philippine citizenship were strictly followed lies with the person claiming that he or she has complied with it."
[3] 400 Phil. 120, 126 (2000).
[4] The dissent states: "... It is plain from the testimony of Atty. Santos that the original attachments in support of Vergara's RA 9225 petition do not exist in the Records Section of the BI. To reiterate, what the Bureau have are mere photocopies of Vergara's supporting documents. Consequently, the BI cannot issue a copy of the said documents with an attestation that the same are correct copies of the original as required by the rules, simply because no originals exist on file."
[5] G.R. No. 215006, January 11, 2021.
[6] G.R. No. 220828, October 7, 2020.
[7] I use "their" here and elsewhere in this Reflections to stress gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation.
[8] De Chavez v. Ombudsman, 543 Phil. 600, 616 (2007).
[9] Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
[10] G.R. No. 196359, May 10, 2021.
[11] Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372.
[12] Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
[13] BI Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01 (March 10, 2004): Section 11. Approval Procedures - If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating officer shall submit the findings and recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration or Consul-General, as the case may be, within five (5) days from date of assignment. For applications filed under Sections 2 and 4 of these Rules, the Commissioner of Immigration shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, an Order of Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, and further direct the Chief of the Alien Registration Division (ARD) to cancel the subject ACR and/or to issue the corresponding IC to the applicant; BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-07-005 (December 27, 2007): "SECTION 12. Procedures in the Processing of Applications for Recognition as Filipino Citizen. – Applications for recognition as Filipino citizen shall observe the following procedures, to wit: ... 11. Assignment to registration officer, updating of records and preparation of Filipino Identification Certificate; 12. Issuance of Filipino Identification Certificate, picture and fingerprint impression taking; 13. Signing by the Commissioner of the Identification Certificate; 14. Releasing of the Identification Certificate; and 15. Document archiving.
[14] See also e.g., Overseas Voting Act of 2013, the identification certificate or the BI's order of approval is the prima facie evidence of one's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. "Applicants who availed themselves of the 'Citizen Retention and Reacquisition Act' (Republic Act No. 9225) shall present the original or certified true copy of the order of approval of their application to retain or reacquire their Filipino citizenship issued by the post or their identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration;" Revised Implementing Rules of "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunition and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof," accepting the identification certificate as proof of reacquired Filipino citizenship.
[15] As amended in 2008 by BI Memorandum Circular No. MCL-08-005. Section 11 states:
SECTION 11. Approval Procedures. — If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and in substance, the evaluating officer shall submit the findings and recommendation to the Commissioner of Immigration or Consul-General, as the case may be, within five (5) days from date of assignment. For applications filed under Sections 2 and 4 of these Rules, the Commissioner of Immigration shall issue, within five (5) days from receipt thereof, an Order of Approval indicating that the petition complies with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, and further direct the Chief of the Alien Registration Division (ARD) to cancel the subject ACR and/or to issue the corresponding IC to the applicant. Each cancelled ACR shall, however, be attached to the Order of Approval to form part of the records of the applicant...."
[16] G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019.
[17] 490 Phil. 193, 208 (2005).
[18] 433 Phil. 8, (2002).
[19] 317 Phil. 400, 409 (1995).
[20] 802 Phil. 190, 220-221 (2016).
[21] G.R. No. 228402, August 26, 2020.
[22] 787 Phil. 33, 51 (2016).
[23] Supra note 1.
[24] 717 Phil. 54, 70-71 (2013).
[25] 733 Phil. 196, 245-248 (2014).
[26] 791 Phil. 481 (2016).
[27] 786 Phil. 43 (2016).
[28] 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
[29] 778 Phil. 326, 338 (2016).
[30] Supra note 28.
[31] G.R. No. 228402, August 26, 2020.
[32] 789 Phil. 368, 373-374 (2016).
[33] Republic v. Sereno, 833 Phil. 449, 476 (2018).
[34] To stress, I purposely used "their" to indicate gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation.
[35] Manlan v. Beltran, G.R. No. 222530, October 16, 2019.
[36] Exemption from Administrative Review. - Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under these Rules shall not be subject to the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to DOJ Policy Directive of 7 September 1970 and DOJ Opinion No. 108 (series of 1996). However, the Order of Approval issued under these Rules may be revoked by the Department of Justice upon a substantive finding of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the applicant and after an administrative hearing initiated by an aggrieved party or by the BI. Notwithstanding the exemption from administrative review as provided herein, nothing in these rules shall be construed as to diminish the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice over the BI. Consistent with this, the BI shall submit a monthly report to the DOJ of approved petitions for retention/reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
[37] 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Evidence, Rule 130.
[38] Recto-Sambajon v. Public Attorney's Office, 890 Phil. 879, 890 (2017).
[39] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 25, citing Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez, supra note 24.
[40] I also use "them" to indicate gender neutrality, indeterminacy or non-affiliation with traditional gender labels.
[41] Supra note 19.
[42] Dissenting Opinion, 741 Phil. 460 (2014).