EN BANC
[ A.C. No. 13082. November 16, 2021 ]PAULINE S. MOYA v. ATTY. ROY ANT S. ORETA +
PAULINE S. MOYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROY ANTHONY S. ORETA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PAULINE S. MOYA v. ATTY. ROY ANT S. ORETA +
PAULINE S. MOYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROY ANTHONY S. ORETA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Pauline S. Moya sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Roy Anthony Salameda Oreta for immorality, gross misconduct, and acts of violence. She essentially alleged:
Complainant and respondent were high school batchmates. Years after their graduation, they met again in December 2002. By then, she was already a mother of four (4). They started going out as friends, but their relationship eventually grew deeper and amorous. In November 2003, respondent moved in with her because he supposedly could no longer bear being away from her even for a moment. Her children warmly welcomed him and even called him "Daddy Roy." Back then, however, they were still legally married to their respective spouses. The nullity of respondent's marriage with his wife became final only in July 2004 while her marriage with her husband Jun Carlos Moya (Carlos) never got annulled.
They started a smooth, loving, and caring relationship, but it did not last long. In no time, respondent became verbally and physically abusive not only toward her, but toward her children, too. He would hit, slap, and spank her youngest child and shout at her daughters up until they broke into tears. He never shared the responsibilities of parenthood – financially, morally, and emotionally. Sans any initiative from him, she even had to ask if her children could ride with him in the morning since their school was just along the way going to his office. He initially agreed but later on complained of having to wake up early on a daily basis just so he could drop off her children to school. Aside from having to pay for all the household expenses alone, she even covered for respondent every time his mother would pay them a visit, asking for financial assistance.[1]
Compared to how irresponsible he was toward her and her children, he showed extravagance to other people. Oftentimes, he would treat his friends and officemates and spend thousands of pesos on them without blinking an eye. Each time, he would brag about it to her. He would tell her how much he spent for these people, the idea being for her to stop bothering him about financial matters.
It came to a point where her children called him "Hari'' because he acted like one at home. Each time he would come home, he would change his clothes, eat dinner, and go straight to their bedroom. On weekends, he would just play on his laptop, browse the internet all day, or watch DVD movies while enjoying the comfort of their air-conditioning unit.[2]
By July 2009, she already asked him to let her go, but he begged her not to leave. He even promised to save their relationship and address his shortcomings. She opted to give him another chance because she still loved him very much. But just a few months later, she got shocked when he started calling her ''puta" in front of her children and friends. She could only cry out of embarrassment.[3]
On March 14, 2010, he repeatedly slammed her against the wall during a heated argument. He only stopped beating her up when she cried out loud because of her bruises. He then left only to return three (3) days later to beg her anew for forgiveness. This time, her forgiveness came with conditions: he should stop verbally and physically abusing her, and he had to talk to her children as they saw her bruises. That same day, he showed her photos of bruises he claimed he also sustained during their last fight. She asked why he took those photos, but he simply smirked. While browsing the photos on his phone, she saw nude photos of hers and videos of their lovemaking, all taken without her consent.
Their worst fight happened on April 22, 2010. He physically attacked her again, hitting her in different parts of her body. This, he did, though she already got bruised the night before when he forced her to have sex with him. A few days later, she asked to have a serious talk with him since she wanted to save their dying affection for each other. But she found out he had been telling his friends and officemates that she was the one who was beating him up. She then realized that he had been collecting stories and proofs so he could eventually break up with her and blame her for it. She suffered sleepless nights and anxiety thinking if she could ever find a man who would love her children unconditionally.
Since their separation, respondent had been going around spreading derogatory words against her, i.e., she was a "puta" or ''pokpok," had no money of her own, dependent on him, and had numerous men around her. To prevent him from further physically abusing her, she applied for, and was issued, a Barangay Protection Order[4] (BPO) on August 19, 2010:
ORDER
She later initiated before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, a petition for issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) docketed as Civil Case No. Q-10-67984.
On September 23, 2010, the trial court granted her prayer for Temporary Protection Order (TPO):
Their similar situations allowed them to find solace and support in each other. They started off as friends as they were then both married to their respective spouses. He eventually became her confidant. She confided in him her misgivings about her husband Carlos. According to her, Carlos was an alcoholic, watched DVDs extensively, and smoked like a chimney. He readily understood her sentiments, so he gave up his own smoking and drinking vices.
She told him Carlos left her for no reason. But he got convinced later on that Carlos left her since he could no longer stomach her extramarital affairs. It turned out she was already in secret romantic relationships with other married men even before they had their own. Once, he drove her to Oakwood Hotel in Makati just so she could break up with one of her paramours whom she discreetly called "HB." But he found out she never let go of her other lovers. He got hurt but chose to just let her be since he unconditionally loved her.[13]
Then they decided to live together. Complainant made it a point to make his presence felt by her children who at first called him "Tito" till eventually, they grew fond of him and started calling him "Daddy Roy." He gladly assumed the responsibilities of a good husband to complainant and a good father to her children.[14]
It was not true that he never shared in the expenses at home. In fact, he defrayed the expenses for electricity, water, telephone, and internet. It was his idea to have a phone line and internet installed in their house for a monthly bill of P1,349.00 which he regularly paid. He also purchased two (2) brand new cars for the family – a Nissan Livina and a Nissan Sentra. He contributed to the grocery expenses which ran from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 a month. Though his parents taught him to save for rainy days, he set aside his thriftiness for complainant and her children because he considered them his own family. He paid for the children's tuition fees and other educational needs. He bought the appliances they were using in the house.[15]
During their cohabitation, complainant exhibited the so-called "Youngest Child Syndrome" characterized by being spoiled, obnoxious, attention-seeking, demanding, sensitive, dependent, absent-minded, and flaky. The eldest among siblings like him typically falls in love with people of such character traits.[16]
During their arguments, he never verbally abused complainant. He tenderly loved her and would often give in to her whims just to end a fight with her. Once, following a fight, she deleted all the female contacts listed on his cellphone, but again, he just let it pass because she was his boss.[17]
During those times he could not readily accommodate her demands, she would threaten to leave him to find another man: "Iwanan mo lang ako at marami papalit sa iyo, ang daming offers dyan. lwanan mo lang ako at magkakaroon na ako ng bagong bahay, condo pa, at bagong kotse, may kasama pang driver. May monthly allowance pa ako!" His consistently bruised ego left him emotionally and psychologically scarred. Lest it be forgotten, "Men have feelings too!''[18]
Among her sweethearts was Police Officer 1 Emmanuel Lugartos (PO1 Lugartos). This man would message and call her even during late hours of the day. One evening, he blurted out "Maawa ka naman. Tigilan mo na yang pagtetext. Gabi na. Madaling araw na nga eh. Matulog na tayo, please! Feeling ko tatlo tayo dito sa kama eh." After her breakup with PO1 Lugartos, she also charged the latter with violation of the VAWC Law. She indeed had the propensity to file VAWC cases against her former boyfriends to exact revenge or win them back.[19]
He never raped her. It was he who refused to have sexual congress with her after she admitted to him that she was sleeping with different men including PO1 Lugartos. He could have his cellphone inspected to prove he did not take nude photos of her nor took videos of their love making.[20]
He also never laid a hand on her; in truth, it was he who would turn black and blue whenever they had a fight. She would hit him with a metal decor, a pan, or anything she would get her hands on. He never laid a hand on her children either since he considered them his own. Toward the end of their relationship, her father even thanked him for being a father to her children.[21]
Before he finally bade her goodbye, he asked her for one last serious talk but all she uttered was "P***** i** m*! Wala kang kwenta! Wala ka sa mga kakilala kong lalaki!" Then she proudly broadcast how she had rough sex with a hot man the night before. To this, he unabashedly wailed like a baby, then drove miles and miles away, and just completely got lost.[22]
Complainant's accusations against him are intended solely to spite and take revenge on him because he bade her goodbye for good in April 2010.[23] She later wanted to reconcile with him, but it will never happen. Not now, not ever.[24]
He is filled with remorse for his indiscretion and apologizes for his moral weakness and momentary lapse of judgment. He promises to be more circumspect in his future private dealings.[25]
On August 1, 2014, respondent manifested that the Office of the City Prosecutor - Quezon City dismissed the criminal complaint against him.
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP–CBD)
By its Report and Recommendation[26] dated December 12, 2014, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
It held that complainant and respondent openly admitted their cohabitation as husband and wife while they were still legally married to their respective spouses. The fact that both of them were then separated de facto from their respective spouses was inconsequential.
As for the charges of sexual, physical, psychological, economic abuse, and unconsented taking of her nude pictures and videos of their lovemaking, the IBP-CBD found that complainant failed to substantiate the same.
Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines –
Board of Governors (IBP–BOG)
By Resolution[27] dated April 19, 2015, the IBP–BOG recommended the penalty of disbarment.
In respondent's subsequent motion for reconsideration, he prayed to reduce the penalty to reprimand or fine. He posited that although his indiscretion was something he would regret forever, it was he who ended the adulterous relationship in 2010. Since then, he had returned to the fold of decency and had been living a moral and upright life completely remorseful for his past indiscretion. Thus, rather than blame him, he should be praised for taking the first big step towards moral rehabilitation. He again signified his apologies to his brethren for his moral weakness and momentary lapse in judgment. He already has a new family whom he dearly loves.[28]
Under Resolution[29] dated October 28, 2017, the IBP–BOG resolved to reduce the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
It opined that while respondent's cohabitation with complainant was immoral, it did not amount to gross immorality considering that he already ended the relationship and expressed remorse and apologies for his indiscretion.
Per verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of May 28, 2021. The IBP, nevertheless, elevated the entire case records to the Court since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory.
Our Ruling
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar may be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of essential qualifications[30] including good moral character.
Indeed, good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact to maintain one's standing in this exclusive and honored society. There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[31]
A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the Bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[32] The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which respondent vowed to uphold, clearly affirms this kind of conduct,[33] viz.:
Complainant sufficiently proved her
claim of physical abuse.
In disbarment cases, the complainant bears the burden of proof to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his or her complaint through substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[35]
Here, the Court does not agree with the finding of the IBP–CBD that complainant failed to prove her accusation of physical abuse against respondent.
In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant recalled the harrowing incidents she suffered in the abusive hands of respondent:
She, too, initiated before the Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, Quezon City a petition for issuance of a PPO via Civil Case No. Q-10-67984. We refer to the factual findings of the trial court, as borne in its Decision dated January 5, 2012, thus:
There is no cogent reason why the Court should depart from these factual findings which are matters of judicial record. The same speak volumes of respondent's repeated physical abuse not only toward complainant but her children, as well. Notably, the trial court heard the parties' respective positions and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and determine their credibility up close. We also note that respondent chose not to refute the damning inculpatory evidence of his physical and verbal abuse toward complainant and her family despite ample opportunity given him. At any rate, the decision in the civil case already attained finality, a fact which respondent does not deny.
To be sure, the issuance of a protection order requires preponderance of evidence[39] or that evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.[40] Preponderance of evidence in civil cases is greater than substantial evidence required in disbarment proceedings such as the case at bar.[41] Thus, the judicial truths established by the trial court should also be deemed established here.
The principle remains true despite the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA 9262.[42] Indeed, administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[43] In other words, there need not be a predicate crime for the Court to impose its disciplinary action on erring lawyers. The rationale is clear:
If at all, the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent only meant that complainant failed to muster the required quantum of proof in that particular case alone. But the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not automatically mean complainant could not prove, by substantial evidence, respondent's abusive behavior toward her and her children. For administrative cases only require substantial evidence to prove a claim. We emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.[47]
Thus, in Tucay v. Tucay,[48] the Court resolved to disbar Atty. Manuel Tucay for carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman despite the pendency of a separate bigamy charge against him. According to the Court, complainant sufficiently proved in the disbarment proceeding that respondent had been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, though the trial court has yet to render a verdict of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case.
In any event, Resolution dated March 12, 2013 of the Office of the City Prosecutor's Office – Quezon City left much to be desired. We quote:
The investigating prosecutor simply concluded that the issuance of the BPO, without more, did not prove respondent's abusive behavior. He in fact reduced the evidentiary value of the BPO as a mere scrap of document not worthy of credence. To emphasize though, complainant was under oath when she applied for the issuance of the BPO. More, to side with the prosecutor's disregard of the BPO is anathema to the very State policy[49] of RA 9262 – the protection of the dignity of women and children and guaranteed respect for human rights. If the very mechanism and refuge accorded by law to women and children are reduced to a mere scrap of paper, the following questions linger – are we really instruments for the protection of women and children's rights? Or did we just devise a formal mechanism to provide a picture of protection on paper?
In any case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent precludes the refiling thereof based on whatever additional evidence may later on be mustered and presented by the complainant against him. The dismissal of the criminal complaint cannot therefore be regarded as an accurate measure of the state of the relationship between complainant and respondent.
On the contrary, the fact that respondent repeatedly abused her and her children which as shown, had already been established with finality by preponderance of evidence, more than the required quantum of substantial evidence in administrative cases against members of the bar. Hence, in accordance with the trial court's ruling in Civil Case No. Q-10-67984, we find respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01[50] and 7.03[51] of the CPR for repeatedly abusing complainant and her children.
As for respondent's own claim of physical abuse he suffered in the hands of complainant, suffice it to state that mere allegation, without more, cannot be given credence. At any rate, respondent's claim of physical abuse, even if true, does not grant him the license to become abusive of complainant and her children.
Complainant failed to substantiate her
claim of sexual and economic abuse.
The Court nevertheless adopts the recommendation of the IBP to dismiss complainant's accusation of sexual and economic abuse for lack of substantiating evidence.[52] The trial court's Decision dated January 5, 2012 does not bear any finding of sexual or economic abuse against respondent either.
At any rate, the receipts for groceries, provisions, utility bills, transportation, and tuition fees submitted by respondent show that he did share in the living expenses and gave financial support to complainant's family during their cohabitation.
But being financially supportive of complainant's family does not give respondent the right to lay a hand on complainant and her children. Violence is never a normal occurrence in any family set up. To justify the same is egregious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society.[53] The Court will never tolerate this kind of attitude or practice.
Respondent's illicit relationship with
complainant eroded the sanctity of marriage
As a member of the Bar and officer of the Court, respondent is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses, but also to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is a member of its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles, but must also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.[54]
Here, both complainant and respondent openly admitted to cohabiting as husband and wife from November 2003 until April 2010. At the start of their cohabitation, they were still legally married to their respective spouses. In fact, the nullity of respondent's marriage became final only in July 2004 while complainant's marriage to Carlos has not been dissolved at all.
By living together as husband and wife despite the subsistence of their respective marriages, both complainant and respondent openly gave the impression that a married man or woman may very well cohabit with individuals beside their lawful spouses. And although the decree of nullity of respondent's marriage became final in July 2004, his continuous cohabitation with complainant until April 2010 did not diminish his liability. For he knew full well that complainant's marriage with Carlos has not been severed at all.
Nor did his covetous desires for complainant, nay, his so-called unconditional love for her justify his flagrant violation of our penal laws on adultery and concubinage. His illicit relationship with complainant undeniably eroded the sanctity of marriage and the protection accorded to such vital institution by the Constitution itself.
Respondent attempts to throw all the blame on complainant by painting her as a gold digger and woman of ill-repute. But complainant's moral fitness is simply not what is at stake here; it is respondent's fitness to continue as a member of the Bar which hangs in the balance.
In Samaniego v. Ferrer,[55] respondent claimed he was not entirely to blame because complainant knew he was married, yet, she chose to continue their illicit affair. The Court ruled, however, that complainant's complicity in the immoral act could not mitigate, let alone, negate respondent's liability. Whether complainant was in pari delicto with respondent is wholly immaterial to the issue of respondent's liability here.
For cohabiting with a married woman for almost seven (7) years, respondent violated Rule 1.01,[56] Canon 7,[57] and Rule 7.03[58] of the CPR. His liability, therefore, is not diminished just because during their first year of cohabitation, his own marriage got annulled. He may have become single again but complainant with whom he cohabited remained married to her husband all throughout their cohabitation.
Respondent must be sanctioned for using
offensive language and insolence.
Lastly, we remind respondent that lawyers must refrain from using offensive language not only in writing pleadings but also in their public and private dealings.[59] Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR decrees:
Respondent's use of double entendre does not escape us, and we are offended. Such distasteful language is not welcome. True, a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, but it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.[60]
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. To emphasize, lawyers are licensed officers of the court who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly at all times, in all places.[61]
The use of intemperate and highly derogatory language in pleadings is punishable by direct contempt. In fact, offensive and disrespectful observation is an act of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae which could be summarily punished without hearing.[62]
The power to punish for contempt, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory idea of punishment.[63] The Court, therefore, resolves to admonish respondent to deter him from using uncalled for derogatory remarks.
In the same vein, respondent must also be held accountable for displaying insolence in his pleadings. Although he signified his remorse for his indiscretion, he continues to exude a high degree of arrogance just the same. In fact, we find his so-called apology to the legal profession to be less than sincere. He even had the temerity to claim that he is worthy of commendation and praise for ending his illicit relationship with complainant. But the Court does not give medals to philanderers, abusers, and cheats. Nor do we exalt those who gaslight and manipulate their respective partners. Quite the reverse, we have consistently upheld the high moral standard required of all members of the bar. For a lawyer's moral fiber is a thread that tethers him or her to the legal profession.
In Washington v. Dicen, (Washington)[64] the Court found Atty. Dicen guilty of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR for his use of language which not only maligned complainant's character, but also imputed a crime on her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was, at the time, living in the United States. In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty. Dicen referred to complainant as a "lunatic'' who was on a "crazy quest for revenge" against him. In the same pleading, Atty. Dicen also called complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of her paramour Martin.
Similarly, we find respondent guilty of violating Canon 8[65] and Rule 8.01[66] of the CPR for his insolence and use of offensive language in his pleadings.
Penalties
a. Violation of Rules 1.01[67] and 7.03[68] of the CPR – Physical Abuse
In recent years, domestic violence has begun to emerge from behind closed doors and drawn shades which have traditionally hidden it from public scrutiny. With its severity and pervasiveness now known, all elements of government must play its role to eradicate this social ill.[69] For its part, Congress has enacted the VAWC law to guarantee protection to women and children who are among the most vulnerable sectors of society. But we, too, have a role to play in this lofty campaign. We are uniquely positioned to mold behavior and culture through the cases we resolve. With the prompt and proper resolution of domestic abuse cases, we send a strong message that acts of abuse against women and children will not be tolerated but condemned.
No person should be subjected to physical abuse. The VAWC law, nonetheless, gives special protection to women and children who are the "usual victims" of violence and abuse which flows from the unequal power relationship between women and men and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women.[70] The State's policy of affording special protection to women and children who are victims of violence and child abuse is unequivocal and is a policy that the Court fully supports.[71]
The most protection, though, goes to children as their growth and development may be negatively affected by such trauma brought about by physical abuse on their person. But bearing witness to abuse carries the same risk of harm to children's mental health and have the same serious and life changing effects as being abused directly.[72] The abuses suffered by complainant are therefore comparable to the psychological trauma inflicted on her children who bore witness thereto. For nothing could be more painful than seeing one's beloved mother being subjected to physical abuse and verbal degradation by none other than the man whom she considered as her partner in life.
Indeed, the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder from domestic violence is high because it is a betrayal by someone who is supposed to be a protector; it happens in a place which is supposed to be safe; and is usually done at a time when children are totally dependent on their parental figures, hence, powerless.[73] This type of trauma is a double-edged sword that cuts deep. Aside from scarring the impressionable minds of children, it also imprints the idea that violence is a normal set up in families. Then such abuse breeds a new generation of abusers, ad infinitum. This should not be the case.
The Court's full support to the protection of women and children extends to the cleansing of its ranks of officers with audacity to lay their hands on women and children. Even without a conviction for violation of the VAWC Law, the Court can make the hammer fall, and heavily[74] when, as in this case, complainant sufficiently established by substantial evidence, her claim of abuse not only on her person, but also on her children.
Indeed, lawyers and judges alike should be at the forefront in combatting domestic abuse and mitigating its effects. But rather than become a vanguard against violence on women and children, respondent chose to be the perpetrator thereof. The Court, therefore, deems it proper to impose the supreme penalty of disbarment on respondent for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR, for repeatedly laying his hand not only on complainant but on her children, too – an act which the Court abhors the most.
The noble legal profession is simply no place for abusers. We do not coddle violators of the VAWC law, nor do we allow them to tarnish our collective dignity. We have all vowed to uphold the protection of women and children when we took our sacred oath. This involves the imposition of administrative penalties, including the supreme penalty of disbarment, when our own officers of the Court violate this sworn duty.
b. Violation of Rule 1.01,[75] Canon 7,[76] and Rule 7.03[77] of the CPR – Immoral Conduct
Complainant and respondent were high school batchmates. Years after their graduation, they met again in December 2002. By then, she was already a mother of four (4). They started going out as friends, but their relationship eventually grew deeper and amorous. In November 2003, respondent moved in with her because he supposedly could no longer bear being away from her even for a moment. Her children warmly welcomed him and even called him "Daddy Roy." Back then, however, they were still legally married to their respective spouses. The nullity of respondent's marriage with his wife became final only in July 2004 while her marriage with her husband Jun Carlos Moya (Carlos) never got annulled.
They started a smooth, loving, and caring relationship, but it did not last long. In no time, respondent became verbally and physically abusive not only toward her, but toward her children, too. He would hit, slap, and spank her youngest child and shout at her daughters up until they broke into tears. He never shared the responsibilities of parenthood – financially, morally, and emotionally. Sans any initiative from him, she even had to ask if her children could ride with him in the morning since their school was just along the way going to his office. He initially agreed but later on complained of having to wake up early on a daily basis just so he could drop off her children to school. Aside from having to pay for all the household expenses alone, she even covered for respondent every time his mother would pay them a visit, asking for financial assistance.[1]
Compared to how irresponsible he was toward her and her children, he showed extravagance to other people. Oftentimes, he would treat his friends and officemates and spend thousands of pesos on them without blinking an eye. Each time, he would brag about it to her. He would tell her how much he spent for these people, the idea being for her to stop bothering him about financial matters.
It came to a point where her children called him "Hari'' because he acted like one at home. Each time he would come home, he would change his clothes, eat dinner, and go straight to their bedroom. On weekends, he would just play on his laptop, browse the internet all day, or watch DVD movies while enjoying the comfort of their air-conditioning unit.[2]
By July 2009, she already asked him to let her go, but he begged her not to leave. He even promised to save their relationship and address his shortcomings. She opted to give him another chance because she still loved him very much. But just a few months later, she got shocked when he started calling her ''puta" in front of her children and friends. She could only cry out of embarrassment.[3]
On March 14, 2010, he repeatedly slammed her against the wall during a heated argument. He only stopped beating her up when she cried out loud because of her bruises. He then left only to return three (3) days later to beg her anew for forgiveness. This time, her forgiveness came with conditions: he should stop verbally and physically abusing her, and he had to talk to her children as they saw her bruises. That same day, he showed her photos of bruises he claimed he also sustained during their last fight. She asked why he took those photos, but he simply smirked. While browsing the photos on his phone, she saw nude photos of hers and videos of their lovemaking, all taken without her consent.
Their worst fight happened on April 22, 2010. He physically attacked her again, hitting her in different parts of her body. This, he did, though she already got bruised the night before when he forced her to have sex with him. A few days later, she asked to have a serious talk with him since she wanted to save their dying affection for each other. But she found out he had been telling his friends and officemates that she was the one who was beating him up. She then realized that he had been collecting stories and proofs so he could eventually break up with her and blame her for it. She suffered sleepless nights and anxiety thinking if she could ever find a man who would love her children unconditionally.
Since their separation, respondent had been going around spreading derogatory words against her, i.e., she was a "puta" or ''pokpok," had no money of her own, dependent on him, and had numerous men around her. To prevent him from further physically abusing her, she applied for, and was issued, a Barangay Protection Order[4] (BPO) on August 19, 2010:
Ms. Pauline S. Moya applied for a BPO on August 18, 2010 under oath stating that the [she] is economically, mentally, emotionally [and] sexually abused & [sic] her children were also emotionally, [and] physically abused by her live-in partner, one, [sic] Roy Anthony O. Salameda [which] incident transpired at [her] given address from 2003 to April 2010.On August 31, 2010, she also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor - Quezon City a complaint against respondent for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262),[6] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.
After having heard the application and the witnesses and evidence[,] the undersigned hereby issues the BPO ordering you [Oreta] to immediately [cease] and desist from causing or threatening to cause economically [sic], mentally [sic], and sexually[sic] abused (sic) [to complainant] and/or her children namely AAA, BBB, CCC, and DDD.[5]
She later initiated before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, a petition for issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) docketed as Civil Case No. Q-10-67984.
On September 23, 2010, the trial court granted her prayer for Temporary Protection Order (TPO):
Finding the verified allegations in the instant petition to be sufficient in form and substance[,] and that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger and threat against the petitioner exists, this [c]ourt hereby resolves to issue, ex-parte, a Temporary Protection Order, to wit:After due proceedings, the TPO was made permanent per Decision[9] dated January 5, 2012, viz.:
1. PROHIBITING the respondent ATTY. ROY ANTHONY SALAMEDA ORETA from threatening to commit, or committing personally[,] or through another, any of the acts of violence mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 against the petitioner Pauline Sanchez Moya and her children AAA, BBB, CCC, and DDD;
2. RESTRAINING the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting[,] or otherwise communicating with the petitioner and the said children, directly or indirectly; and
3. DIRECTING respondent to stay away from petitioner and her children at their place of residence at No. XXX,[7] school of the children[,] and place of employment of petitioner at a radius of five hundred (500) meters.
4. PROHIBITING the respondent from carrying or using any firearm or deadly weapon and ordering him to surrender the same to the Court;
5. PROHIBITING the respondent from showing to any person[,] the naked pictures of petitioner in his cellphone; and
6. DIRECTING the respondent to surrender to the [c]ourt[,] the sex videos he recorded showing him and petitioner having sex which were recorded without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner,.
This Temporary Protection Order shall be effective for THIRTY (30) DAYS from service on the respondent and shall be ipso facto renewed upon each expiration unless sooner revoked by this [c]ourt.[8]
WHEREFORE, the Temporary Protection Order issued on September 23, 2010, under Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004" is hereby made PERMANENT with some modifications, to wit.:In his Answer,[11] respondent countered he never intended to disgrace the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. He was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. When he and complainant got reconnected in 2002, he was in a state of emotional devastation caused by his recent separation from his wife; on the other hand, complainant was in a celebratory state for being single again. He was morally vulnerable when complainant presented herself as a shelter and shoulder he could lean on. That time, even a saint would have been tempted at the sight of an open door.[12]
1. PROHIBITING the respondent ATTY. ROY ANTHONY SALAMEDA ORETA from threatening to commit, or committing personally[,] or through another, any of the acts of violence mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 against the petitioner Pauline Sanchez Moya and her children AAA, BBB, CCC, and DDD;
2. RESTRAINING the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting[,] or otherwise communicating with the petitioner and the said children, directly or indirectly; and
3. DIRECTING respondent to stay away from petitioner and her children at their place of residence at No. XXX, school of the children[,] and place of employment of petitioner at a radius of five hundred (500) meters.[10]
x x x x
Their similar situations allowed them to find solace and support in each other. They started off as friends as they were then both married to their respective spouses. He eventually became her confidant. She confided in him her misgivings about her husband Carlos. According to her, Carlos was an alcoholic, watched DVDs extensively, and smoked like a chimney. He readily understood her sentiments, so he gave up his own smoking and drinking vices.
She told him Carlos left her for no reason. But he got convinced later on that Carlos left her since he could no longer stomach her extramarital affairs. It turned out she was already in secret romantic relationships with other married men even before they had their own. Once, he drove her to Oakwood Hotel in Makati just so she could break up with one of her paramours whom she discreetly called "HB." But he found out she never let go of her other lovers. He got hurt but chose to just let her be since he unconditionally loved her.[13]
Then they decided to live together. Complainant made it a point to make his presence felt by her children who at first called him "Tito" till eventually, they grew fond of him and started calling him "Daddy Roy." He gladly assumed the responsibilities of a good husband to complainant and a good father to her children.[14]
It was not true that he never shared in the expenses at home. In fact, he defrayed the expenses for electricity, water, telephone, and internet. It was his idea to have a phone line and internet installed in their house for a monthly bill of P1,349.00 which he regularly paid. He also purchased two (2) brand new cars for the family – a Nissan Livina and a Nissan Sentra. He contributed to the grocery expenses which ran from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 a month. Though his parents taught him to save for rainy days, he set aside his thriftiness for complainant and her children because he considered them his own family. He paid for the children's tuition fees and other educational needs. He bought the appliances they were using in the house.[15]
During their cohabitation, complainant exhibited the so-called "Youngest Child Syndrome" characterized by being spoiled, obnoxious, attention-seeking, demanding, sensitive, dependent, absent-minded, and flaky. The eldest among siblings like him typically falls in love with people of such character traits.[16]
During their arguments, he never verbally abused complainant. He tenderly loved her and would often give in to her whims just to end a fight with her. Once, following a fight, she deleted all the female contacts listed on his cellphone, but again, he just let it pass because she was his boss.[17]
During those times he could not readily accommodate her demands, she would threaten to leave him to find another man: "Iwanan mo lang ako at marami papalit sa iyo, ang daming offers dyan. lwanan mo lang ako at magkakaroon na ako ng bagong bahay, condo pa, at bagong kotse, may kasama pang driver. May monthly allowance pa ako!" His consistently bruised ego left him emotionally and psychologically scarred. Lest it be forgotten, "Men have feelings too!''[18]
Among her sweethearts was Police Officer 1 Emmanuel Lugartos (PO1 Lugartos). This man would message and call her even during late hours of the day. One evening, he blurted out "Maawa ka naman. Tigilan mo na yang pagtetext. Gabi na. Madaling araw na nga eh. Matulog na tayo, please! Feeling ko tatlo tayo dito sa kama eh." After her breakup with PO1 Lugartos, she also charged the latter with violation of the VAWC Law. She indeed had the propensity to file VAWC cases against her former boyfriends to exact revenge or win them back.[19]
He never raped her. It was he who refused to have sexual congress with her after she admitted to him that she was sleeping with different men including PO1 Lugartos. He could have his cellphone inspected to prove he did not take nude photos of her nor took videos of their love making.[20]
He also never laid a hand on her; in truth, it was he who would turn black and blue whenever they had a fight. She would hit him with a metal decor, a pan, or anything she would get her hands on. He never laid a hand on her children either since he considered them his own. Toward the end of their relationship, her father even thanked him for being a father to her children.[21]
Before he finally bade her goodbye, he asked her for one last serious talk but all she uttered was "P***** i** m*! Wala kang kwenta! Wala ka sa mga kakilala kong lalaki!" Then she proudly broadcast how she had rough sex with a hot man the night before. To this, he unabashedly wailed like a baby, then drove miles and miles away, and just completely got lost.[22]
Complainant's accusations against him are intended solely to spite and take revenge on him because he bade her goodbye for good in April 2010.[23] She later wanted to reconcile with him, but it will never happen. Not now, not ever.[24]
He is filled with remorse for his indiscretion and apologizes for his moral weakness and momentary lapse of judgment. He promises to be more circumspect in his future private dealings.[25]
On August 1, 2014, respondent manifested that the Office of the City Prosecutor - Quezon City dismissed the criminal complaint against him.
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP–CBD)
It held that complainant and respondent openly admitted their cohabitation as husband and wife while they were still legally married to their respective spouses. The fact that both of them were then separated de facto from their respective spouses was inconsequential.
As for the charges of sexual, physical, psychological, economic abuse, and unconsented taking of her nude pictures and videos of their lovemaking, the IBP-CBD found that complainant failed to substantiate the same.
Board of Governors (IBP–BOG)
By Resolution[27] dated April 19, 2015, the IBP–BOG recommended the penalty of disbarment.
In respondent's subsequent motion for reconsideration, he prayed to reduce the penalty to reprimand or fine. He posited that although his indiscretion was something he would regret forever, it was he who ended the adulterous relationship in 2010. Since then, he had returned to the fold of decency and had been living a moral and upright life completely remorseful for his past indiscretion. Thus, rather than blame him, he should be praised for taking the first big step towards moral rehabilitation. He again signified his apologies to his brethren for his moral weakness and momentary lapse in judgment. He already has a new family whom he dearly loves.[28]
Under Resolution[29] dated October 28, 2017, the IBP–BOG resolved to reduce the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
It opined that while respondent's cohabitation with complainant was immoral, it did not amount to gross immorality considering that he already ended the relationship and expressed remorse and apologies for his indiscretion.
Per verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of May 28, 2021. The IBP, nevertheless, elevated the entire case records to the Court since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar may be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of essential qualifications[30] including good moral character.
Indeed, good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact to maintain one's standing in this exclusive and honored society. There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[31]
A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the Bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[32] The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which respondent vowed to uphold, clearly affirms this kind of conduct,[33] viz.:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.It is thus, expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be of good moral character, but must also be seen to be leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.[34] Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to these standards.
x x x x
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
x x x x
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Complainant sufficiently proved her
claim of physical abuse.
In disbarment cases, the complainant bears the burden of proof to satisfactorily prove the allegations in his or her complaint through substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[35]
Here, the Court does not agree with the finding of the IBP–CBD that complainant failed to prove her accusation of physical abuse against respondent.
In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant recalled the harrowing incidents she suffered in the abusive hands of respondent:
68. [On] March 14, 2010[,] me and Roy had an argument that ended up to our very first physical fight then. I incurred bruises in this fight, and it was my very first physical abuse in my entire life. My parents never hit me or slap me, nor did Jun. I was never traumatized until this earth-shattering clay with Roy. We already had some misunderstanding[s] those days because of the tremendous throwing of foul words of Roy with me in front of my kids and friends. Then, we started to argue more because Roy wanted to leave the house with his mother without telling me that he will leave, nor tell me where they will proceed on that day. So, I went to my room and tried to change my clothes. Plain and simple. Roy followed me and locked the door and pulled the pants I was half wearing already. Making me f[a]ll [to] the floor, with my hands, then became reddish and painful. I picked up my pants again and tried to wear it for several times, but Roy kept on pulling my pants, thus making me f[a]ll to the floor so many times. I decided to get a new pants or shorts or anything that I can wear so that I can leave my room instantly. But, [sic] Roy started to throw me against my bed and bed frame for several times. I asked Roy to stop hurting me and let me leave my room at once. I also asked Roy to stop throwing me or else I will start fighting back too.To prevent respondent from further laying his hand on her and her children, she applied for and after due proceedings before the barangay, was issued a BPO. Notably, the issuance of a BPO is not ministerial in nature. It is issued only after the punong barangay is convinced that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur.[37]
69. x x x He held my hands so tightly so that I cannot fight him back after I showed Roy the reddish hands I had and the bruises I got from the throwing he did to me. I would try to get my hands freed from his hard grip on my hands and arms. x x x Contrary to what he claims that he never hit me nor slap me, there was a second time on April 22, 2010 which I will recap later on.
70. x x x My kids saw my bruises, my friends Daisy, Jay[,] and Susie came over and saw themselves the bruises too. My father and brother saw the bruises too on that very agonizing and upsetting day for us. The next day, even our batchmates saw the said bruises. Three days after, Roy came back and begged for my kids to leave me in my bedroom so he can talk to me. At first, my kids[,] specially AAA and BBB were hesitant to leave my room for Roy might be hitting me again. x x x
x x x x
73. [On] April 22, 2010[,] Roy left early this day [while] I stayed in the house for I will be having a meeting nearby. I had a meeting with some of our batchmates regarding our past activities and since I was an officer[,] I needed to attend this meeting. And this was the reason why I wanted Roy to just tell the so-called no partner party that he cannot attend, for we will have a meeting, or we can only stay for a while in that party. x x x Anyway, as expected[,] Roy went to that party without me x x x When I went home, I slept at the living room initially, but he pulled my cell phone from me to the extent that it fell into pieces. He just want to read my cell phone that time, so I left him with my phone and went to my kids['] room because I could already smell that he would be violent again.
74. x x x We argued and I reiterated why he can afford to still attend the party I was doubting so much and even attended without me. He attended this party without even prioritizing our relationship that was in a bad condition at that time. On the other hand, I attended our own meeting wherein Roy was also supposed to be present as part of the team. He said that, why am I angry for attending the party. I reiterated that it was not because he attended the party but I was mad because of the manner the message was sent to him. It is as if I was the only one not invited, because both the parts of the women cannot really attend and that the wife of the other man was out of town. x x x. In addition, the text message contained that Roy has to pick up the other woman and bring her home too. Such a surprising lines [sic] that I know any partner or wife would ask why that kind of text message.
75. x x x Then to my shock, Roy slapped me on my face. I was astonished. I cried and tried to leave the room due to fear that he might do hit me again. He pulled me and threw me on the bed again but I stood up and then he slapped me again. I stood up once more and went to the door. He blocked the doorway, so I tried to pull his left hand by my left hand while my right hand tried to push his elbow too. Unfortunately, since we were both perspiring due to our fight, I slipped my right hand and accidentally scratched his left arms[sic] by my right finger nails. I apologized and said that he knew my hand only slipped and I did not mean to scratch him. Besides, I was never physical with him at all. I was shocked again that Roy got his cellphone beside the drawer and took a photo shot on his left arms. I asked what was his purpose and why the shot? [H]e never replied but instead he slapped and threw me again for the third time.[36]
x x x x
She, too, initiated before the Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, Quezon City a petition for issuance of a PPO via Civil Case No. Q-10-67984. We refer to the factual findings of the trial court, as borne in its Decision dated January 5, 2012, thus:
The facts are undisputed. Respondent inflicted physical harm not only to petitioner but also to the latter's youngest child as well.Verily, respondent slapped complainant, repeatedly slammed her against the wall and on the bed, and threw her to the floor. Complainant suffered bruises which were seen by her friends and children who could only feel sorry for her. Respondent, too, would call complainant "puta" or ''pokpok" and brazenly declare "nanlalake kasi mommy mo" in front of her children. These are established facts.
The incidents that transpired on March 14, 2010 and April 23, 2010 cannot be discounted. Respondent slapped petitioner for no reason at all. She was thrown against the wall and into her bed by respondent. The arguments that ensued on those dates led to physical abuse as petitioner incurred bruises. The bruises were seen by Susan Salumbides and petitioner's daughter, BBB.
Also, not only did respondent commit violence against petitioner in contemplation of RA 9262, but likewise commit the same to petitioner's children. BBB experienced [firsthand] the temerity of respondent to unleash verbal abuses. She likewise witnessed how respondent inflicted "harm" on her youngest sibling, DDD.
The Barangay Protection Order dated August 8, 2010 issued by Barangay Sangandaan, Quezon City bolstered petitioner's contention that she suffered abuses in the hands of respondent. Petitioner narrated in full the abuses she experienced in the hands of respondent for the last seven (7) years, culminating [i]n the physical abuses inflicted to her on April 23, 2010.
Until the last moment, petitioner considered talking things over with respondent. However, the incident that transpired in respondent's office, wherein he shouted for no reason at all towards petitioner upon seeing her, and eventually blaming her for his performance at work, broke the camel's back. Petitioner was humiliated by respondent in front of other people. Not knowing what to do, petitioner just cried and left.
These instances, to say the least, added emotional and psychological stress not only to petitioner but to her children as well. The acts of violence employed by respondent to petitioner caused the latter physical, emotional[,] and psychological distress that made her and her family paranoid and wary upon the sight of respondent. These cannot be countenanced for the same violate the basic precepts enshrined in Section [2] of RA 9262, that is, guaranteeing full respect to human rights and valuing the dignity of women and children.
Respondent was given the chance to refute the allegations imputed against him. His counsel thoroughly examined every witness and piece of evidence presented by petitioner. However, when the time to present his evidence came, he opted not to. This actuation of respondent prevented the court from hearing his side of the story.
WHEREFORE, the Temporary Protection Order issued on September 23, 2010, under Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as "Anti Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004" is hereby made PERMANENT with some modifications, x x x
x x x x
SO ORDERED.[38]
There is no cogent reason why the Court should depart from these factual findings which are matters of judicial record. The same speak volumes of respondent's repeated physical abuse not only toward complainant but her children, as well. Notably, the trial court heard the parties' respective positions and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and determine their credibility up close. We also note that respondent chose not to refute the damning inculpatory evidence of his physical and verbal abuse toward complainant and her family despite ample opportunity given him. At any rate, the decision in the civil case already attained finality, a fact which respondent does not deny.
To be sure, the issuance of a protection order requires preponderance of evidence[39] or that evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.[40] Preponderance of evidence in civil cases is greater than substantial evidence required in disbarment proceedings such as the case at bar.[41] Thus, the judicial truths established by the trial court should also be deemed established here.
The principle remains true despite the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA 9262.[42] Indeed, administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[43] In other words, there need not be a predicate crime for the Court to impose its disciplinary action on erring lawyers. The rationale is clear:
x x x disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[44]To repeat, the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA 9262 should not therefore preclude the imposition of disbarment on respondent for violation of Rules 1.01[45] and 7.03[46] of the CPR. Disbarment on ground of final conviction of crime involving moral turpitude is one thing; disbarment on ground of violation of CPR is another. They are separate grounds for disbarment which the Court may deal with separately.
x x x x
If at all, the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent only meant that complainant failed to muster the required quantum of proof in that particular case alone. But the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not automatically mean complainant could not prove, by substantial evidence, respondent's abusive behavior toward her and her children. For administrative cases only require substantial evidence to prove a claim. We emphasize the well-settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.[47]
Thus, in Tucay v. Tucay,[48] the Court resolved to disbar Atty. Manuel Tucay for carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman despite the pendency of a separate bigamy charge against him. According to the Court, complainant sufficiently proved in the disbarment proceeding that respondent had been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, though the trial court has yet to render a verdict of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case.
In any event, Resolution dated March 12, 2013 of the Office of the City Prosecutor's Office – Quezon City left much to be desired. We quote:
After analysis of the allegations and the evidence adduced by the complainant and the respondent in relation to the provisions material to this complaint, it appears that there is no sufficient basis to indict respondent for sexual, physical, psychological[,] and economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262. Respondent could not be charged for economic abuse since the evidence proves that he gave financial support to the complainant and her children while they were living together. x x x Neither could respondent be charged for psychological and physical abuse as the complainant's allegations relative thereto appear to be not in accordance with common experience and observations of mankind that is probable under the circumstance[s]. x x x The same is true with the alleged sexual abuses – x x x. Even if complainant has secured a Barangay Protection Order, it does not necessarily prove that the respondent is a violent person since the alleged threat on her life could either be imagined or real considering that the Barangay issues the Order summarily and ex-parte or merely on the basis of the application.As can be gleaned, the investigating prosecutor did not show how he was supposed to have logically and reasonably processed the case in consideration of the applicable law and the evidence on record.
x x x x
The investigating prosecutor simply concluded that the issuance of the BPO, without more, did not prove respondent's abusive behavior. He in fact reduced the evidentiary value of the BPO as a mere scrap of document not worthy of credence. To emphasize though, complainant was under oath when she applied for the issuance of the BPO. More, to side with the prosecutor's disregard of the BPO is anathema to the very State policy[49] of RA 9262 – the protection of the dignity of women and children and guaranteed respect for human rights. If the very mechanism and refuge accorded by law to women and children are reduced to a mere scrap of paper, the following questions linger – are we really instruments for the protection of women and children's rights? Or did we just devise a formal mechanism to provide a picture of protection on paper?
In any case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent precludes the refiling thereof based on whatever additional evidence may later on be mustered and presented by the complainant against him. The dismissal of the criminal complaint cannot therefore be regarded as an accurate measure of the state of the relationship between complainant and respondent.
On the contrary, the fact that respondent repeatedly abused her and her children which as shown, had already been established with finality by preponderance of evidence, more than the required quantum of substantial evidence in administrative cases against members of the bar. Hence, in accordance with the trial court's ruling in Civil Case No. Q-10-67984, we find respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01[50] and 7.03[51] of the CPR for repeatedly abusing complainant and her children.
As for respondent's own claim of physical abuse he suffered in the hands of complainant, suffice it to state that mere allegation, without more, cannot be given credence. At any rate, respondent's claim of physical abuse, even if true, does not grant him the license to become abusive of complainant and her children.
Complainant failed to substantiate her
claim of sexual and economic abuse.
The Court nevertheless adopts the recommendation of the IBP to dismiss complainant's accusation of sexual and economic abuse for lack of substantiating evidence.[52] The trial court's Decision dated January 5, 2012 does not bear any finding of sexual or economic abuse against respondent either.
At any rate, the receipts for groceries, provisions, utility bills, transportation, and tuition fees submitted by respondent show that he did share in the living expenses and gave financial support to complainant's family during their cohabitation.
But being financially supportive of complainant's family does not give respondent the right to lay a hand on complainant and her children. Violence is never a normal occurrence in any family set up. To justify the same is egregious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society.[53] The Court will never tolerate this kind of attitude or practice.
Respondent's illicit relationship with
complainant eroded the sanctity of marriage
As a member of the Bar and officer of the Court, respondent is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses, but also to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is a member of its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles, but must also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.[54]
Here, both complainant and respondent openly admitted to cohabiting as husband and wife from November 2003 until April 2010. At the start of their cohabitation, they were still legally married to their respective spouses. In fact, the nullity of respondent's marriage became final only in July 2004 while complainant's marriage to Carlos has not been dissolved at all.
By living together as husband and wife despite the subsistence of their respective marriages, both complainant and respondent openly gave the impression that a married man or woman may very well cohabit with individuals beside their lawful spouses. And although the decree of nullity of respondent's marriage became final in July 2004, his continuous cohabitation with complainant until April 2010 did not diminish his liability. For he knew full well that complainant's marriage with Carlos has not been severed at all.
Nor did his covetous desires for complainant, nay, his so-called unconditional love for her justify his flagrant violation of our penal laws on adultery and concubinage. His illicit relationship with complainant undeniably eroded the sanctity of marriage and the protection accorded to such vital institution by the Constitution itself.
Respondent attempts to throw all the blame on complainant by painting her as a gold digger and woman of ill-repute. But complainant's moral fitness is simply not what is at stake here; it is respondent's fitness to continue as a member of the Bar which hangs in the balance.
In Samaniego v. Ferrer,[55] respondent claimed he was not entirely to blame because complainant knew he was married, yet, she chose to continue their illicit affair. The Court ruled, however, that complainant's complicity in the immoral act could not mitigate, let alone, negate respondent's liability. Whether complainant was in pari delicto with respondent is wholly immaterial to the issue of respondent's liability here.
For cohabiting with a married woman for almost seven (7) years, respondent violated Rule 1.01,[56] Canon 7,[57] and Rule 7.03[58] of the CPR. His liability, therefore, is not diminished just because during their first year of cohabitation, his own marriage got annulled. He may have become single again but complainant with whom he cohabited remained married to her husband all throughout their cohabitation.
Respondent must be sanctioned for using
offensive language and insolence.
Lastly, we remind respondent that lawyers must refrain from using offensive language not only in writing pleadings but also in their public and private dealings.[59] Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR decrees:
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.Here, respondent described complainant as a woman of ill-repute who lent him a hand to hold and shoulder to lean on. Given his vulnerable state at that time though, he could not resist complainant as "even a saint would [have been] tempted at the sight of an open door."
RULE 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Respondent's use of double entendre does not escape us, and we are offended. Such distasteful language is not welcome. True, a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, but it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.[60]
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. To emphasize, lawyers are licensed officers of the court who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly at all times, in all places.[61]
The use of intemperate and highly derogatory language in pleadings is punishable by direct contempt. In fact, offensive and disrespectful observation is an act of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae which could be summarily punished without hearing.[62]
The power to punish for contempt, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory idea of punishment.[63] The Court, therefore, resolves to admonish respondent to deter him from using uncalled for derogatory remarks.
In the same vein, respondent must also be held accountable for displaying insolence in his pleadings. Although he signified his remorse for his indiscretion, he continues to exude a high degree of arrogance just the same. In fact, we find his so-called apology to the legal profession to be less than sincere. He even had the temerity to claim that he is worthy of commendation and praise for ending his illicit relationship with complainant. But the Court does not give medals to philanderers, abusers, and cheats. Nor do we exalt those who gaslight and manipulate their respective partners. Quite the reverse, we have consistently upheld the high moral standard required of all members of the bar. For a lawyer's moral fiber is a thread that tethers him or her to the legal profession.
In Washington v. Dicen, (Washington)[64] the Court found Atty. Dicen guilty of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR for his use of language which not only maligned complainant's character, but also imputed a crime on her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was, at the time, living in the United States. In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty. Dicen referred to complainant as a "lunatic'' who was on a "crazy quest for revenge" against him. In the same pleading, Atty. Dicen also called complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of her paramour Martin.
Similarly, we find respondent guilty of violating Canon 8[65] and Rule 8.01[66] of the CPR for his insolence and use of offensive language in his pleadings.
Penalties
a. Violation of Rules 1.01[67] and 7.03[68] of the CPR – Physical Abuse
In recent years, domestic violence has begun to emerge from behind closed doors and drawn shades which have traditionally hidden it from public scrutiny. With its severity and pervasiveness now known, all elements of government must play its role to eradicate this social ill.[69] For its part, Congress has enacted the VAWC law to guarantee protection to women and children who are among the most vulnerable sectors of society. But we, too, have a role to play in this lofty campaign. We are uniquely positioned to mold behavior and culture through the cases we resolve. With the prompt and proper resolution of domestic abuse cases, we send a strong message that acts of abuse against women and children will not be tolerated but condemned.
No person should be subjected to physical abuse. The VAWC law, nonetheless, gives special protection to women and children who are the "usual victims" of violence and abuse which flows from the unequal power relationship between women and men and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women.[70] The State's policy of affording special protection to women and children who are victims of violence and child abuse is unequivocal and is a policy that the Court fully supports.[71]
The most protection, though, goes to children as their growth and development may be negatively affected by such trauma brought about by physical abuse on their person. But bearing witness to abuse carries the same risk of harm to children's mental health and have the same serious and life changing effects as being abused directly.[72] The abuses suffered by complainant are therefore comparable to the psychological trauma inflicted on her children who bore witness thereto. For nothing could be more painful than seeing one's beloved mother being subjected to physical abuse and verbal degradation by none other than the man whom she considered as her partner in life.
Indeed, the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder from domestic violence is high because it is a betrayal by someone who is supposed to be a protector; it happens in a place which is supposed to be safe; and is usually done at a time when children are totally dependent on their parental figures, hence, powerless.[73] This type of trauma is a double-edged sword that cuts deep. Aside from scarring the impressionable minds of children, it also imprints the idea that violence is a normal set up in families. Then such abuse breeds a new generation of abusers, ad infinitum. This should not be the case.
The Court's full support to the protection of women and children extends to the cleansing of its ranks of officers with audacity to lay their hands on women and children. Even without a conviction for violation of the VAWC Law, the Court can make the hammer fall, and heavily[74] when, as in this case, complainant sufficiently established by substantial evidence, her claim of abuse not only on her person, but also on her children.
Indeed, lawyers and judges alike should be at the forefront in combatting domestic abuse and mitigating its effects. But rather than become a vanguard against violence on women and children, respondent chose to be the perpetrator thereof. The Court, therefore, deems it proper to impose the supreme penalty of disbarment on respondent for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR, for repeatedly laying his hand not only on complainant but on her children, too – an act which the Court abhors the most.
The noble legal profession is simply no place for abusers. We do not coddle violators of the VAWC law, nor do we allow them to tarnish our collective dignity. We have all vowed to uphold the protection of women and children when we took our sacred oath. This involves the imposition of administrative penalties, including the supreme penalty of disbarment, when our own officers of the Court violate this sworn duty.
b. Violation of Rule 1.01,[75] Canon 7,[76] and Rule 7.03[77] of the CPR – Immoral Conduct
Maintaining an illicit relationship is an immoral conduct punishable by either suspension or disbarment depending on the circumstances of the case. For a lawyer to be disbarred on ground of immorality, the conduct complained of must be grossly immoral or so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[78]
In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza,[79] respondent got disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR for abandoning his legitimate family in order to live with another married woman. His children pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour in public but their pleas went unheeded. This caused one of his children to suffer depression and attempt suicide. Despite the pain he had caused his family, respondent showed no remorse for his actions.
In Narag v. Atty. Narag,[80] Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,[81] Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty. Alejandro,[82] and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala,[83] the Court resolved to disbar respondents for abandoning their legitimate spouses and maintaining illicit affairs.
Another. In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,[84] Villatuya v. Atty. Tabalingcos,[85] Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Celera,[86] and Dr. Perez v. Atty. Catindig,[87] the Court has invariably imposed the penalty of disbarment against lawyers who entered into bigamous marriages.
Yet in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., (Ferancullo)[88] the Court merely suspended Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. from the practice of law for two (2) years for his intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife. We held that in the absence of any exacerbating circumstance such as abandonment of the lawful spouse, the ultimate penalty of disbarment would not be imposed.
Ferancullo applies here. Notably, when complainant and respondent started living together in November 2003, respondent was already separated from his wife, so was complainant from her husband. There is, therefore, no issue of abandonment or bigamous relationship here. As in Ferancullo, we also find that in the absence of any of these exacerbating circumstances, respondent's two (2) year suspension from the practice of law would suffice.
In view of the earlier imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment, however, the penalty of suspension here is rendered nugatory. A disbarred lawyer may no longer be suspended from the practice of law.
c. Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR – Insolence and Use of Derogatory Language
In accordance with Washington,[89] respondent is admonished for his insolence and use of derogatory remarks against complainant and use of indecent language in his pleadings in the present case.
Let this be a reminder to all lawyers to resist the temptation brought about by the sight of an open door no matter how vulnerable they are, lest they live a life of regret like herein respondent. Indeed, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. They are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny like respondent have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized.[90]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta liable for:
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On official leave.
M. Lopez, J., On official leave.
Caguioa, J., Please See Dissent.
[1] Rollo, p. 4.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Id. at 6-7.
[4] Id. at 577.
[5] SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings - All hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy, (Re: Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[6] Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004.
[7] SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings. - All hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy, (Re: Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04- 10-11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[8] Rollo, p. 527.
[9] Id. at 540-551.
[10] Id. at 550-551.
[11] Id. at 219-223.
[12] Id. at 221.
[13] Id. at 272.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 276-280.
[16] Id. at 270.
[17] Id. at 274.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 275-276.
[20] Id. at 284.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 282.
[23] Id. at 222.
[24] Id. at 270.
[25] Id. at 221.
[26] Id. at 842-847.
[27] Id. at 841.
[28] Id. at 859-861.
[29] Id. at 873.
[30] See Garrido v. Garrido, 625 Phil. 347, 366 (2010).
[31] See Tapucar v. Tapucar, 355 Phil. 66, 72 (1998).
[32] Mendoza v. Deciembre, 599 Phil. 182, 191 (2009).
[33] See Villarente v. Villarente, Jr., A.C. No. 8866, September 15, 2020.
[34] See Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 112 (2016).
[35] See Domingo-Agaton v. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021.
[36] Rollo, pp. 251-254.
[37] See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 69 (2013).
[38] Rollo, pp. 549-551.
[39] Section 34. When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with the civil action for damages. - (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a civil action for damages arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the civil action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may consolidate the petition with the civil action. (Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04-10- 11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[40] See Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 742 (1998).
[41] In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order, See Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 290 Phil. 311, 323 (1992).
[42] Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004.
[43] See Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 481-482 (2006).
[44] See Rico v. Salutan, 827 Phil. 1, 6-7 (2018).
[45] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[46] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[47] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011).
[48] See Tucay v. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336, 340 (1999).
[49] Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. x x x x (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004).
[50] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[51] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[52] See Vitug v. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615, 631 (2006).
[53] Cristobal v. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12702, November 08, 2020.
[54] Supra note 33.
[55] 578 Phil 1, 5 (2008).
[56] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[57] Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[58] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[59] See Dimaculangan v. Jurado, A.C. No. 12359, April 8, 2019, [Unsigned Resolution].
[60] See Spouses Nuezca v. Villagarcia, 792 Phil. 535, 540 (2016).
[61] Id.
[62] See Calo, Jr. v. Tapucar, 177 Phil. 72, 78 (1979).
[63] See Yangson v. Salandanan, 160-A Phil. 691, 693 (1975).
[64] 835 Phil. 837, 842-843 (2018).
[65] Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
[66] Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
[67] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[68] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[69] Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Raising the Standard of Practice, John M. Burman, University of Wyoming College of Law; Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2003.
[70] Supra note 37 at 91.
[71] Re: Recommendation of Victoria, A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC, September 4, 2012.
[72] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2019/01/29/domestic-violence-research-children-abuse-mental-health-learning-aces/2227218002/.
[73] Id.
[74] See Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad. 283 Phil. 400,410 ( I 992).
[75] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21. 1988).
[76] Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988)
[77] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[78] See Panagsagan v. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 7733, October 1, 2019.
[79] A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019.
[80] 353 Phil. 643, 648 (1998).
[81] 482 Phil. 64, 71 (2004).
[82] 467 Phil. 139, 145 (2004).
[83] 555 Phil. 713, 719 (2007).
[84] Supra note 48.
[85] 690 Phil. 381, 388-389 (2012).
[86] 724 Phil. 141, 152 (2014).
[87] 755 Phil. 297, 304 (2015).
[88] 538 Phil. 501, 517 (2006).
[89] Supra note 64 at 841.
[90] Supra note 30 at 362.
In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza,[79] respondent got disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR for abandoning his legitimate family in order to live with another married woman. His children pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour in public but their pleas went unheeded. This caused one of his children to suffer depression and attempt suicide. Despite the pain he had caused his family, respondent showed no remorse for his actions.
In Narag v. Atty. Narag,[80] Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,[81] Bustamante-Alejandro v. Atty. Alejandro,[82] and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala,[83] the Court resolved to disbar respondents for abandoning their legitimate spouses and maintaining illicit affairs.
Another. In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,[84] Villatuya v. Atty. Tabalingcos,[85] Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Celera,[86] and Dr. Perez v. Atty. Catindig,[87] the Court has invariably imposed the penalty of disbarment against lawyers who entered into bigamous marriages.
Yet in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., (Ferancullo)[88] the Court merely suspended Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. from the practice of law for two (2) years for his intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife. We held that in the absence of any exacerbating circumstance such as abandonment of the lawful spouse, the ultimate penalty of disbarment would not be imposed.
Ferancullo applies here. Notably, when complainant and respondent started living together in November 2003, respondent was already separated from his wife, so was complainant from her husband. There is, therefore, no issue of abandonment or bigamous relationship here. As in Ferancullo, we also find that in the absence of any of these exacerbating circumstances, respondent's two (2) year suspension from the practice of law would suffice.
In view of the earlier imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment, however, the penalty of suspension here is rendered nugatory. A disbarred lawyer may no longer be suspended from the practice of law.
c. Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR – Insolence and Use of Derogatory Language
In accordance with Washington,[89] respondent is admonished for his insolence and use of derogatory remarks against complainant and use of indecent language in his pleadings in the present case.
Let this be a reminder to all lawyers to resist the temptation brought about by the sight of an open door no matter how vulnerable they are, lest they live a life of regret like herein respondent. Indeed, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. They are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fail this scrutiny like respondent have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized.[90]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta liable for:
1) Physical abuse in violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this Decision, and his name ORDERED stricken off in the Roll of Attorneys;Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
2) Gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, hence, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. Considering, however, that respondent has already been disbarred, this penalty may no longer be imposed;
3) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his derogatory and indecent remarks in his pleadings for which he is ADMONISHED; and
4) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for displaying insolence and arrogance in his pleadings for which he is ADMONISHED.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., On official leave.
M. Lopez, J., On official leave.
Caguioa, J., Please See Dissent.
[1] Rollo, p. 4.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Id. at 6-7.
[4] Id. at 577.
[5] SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings - All hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy, (Re: Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[6] Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004.
[7] SEC. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings. - All hearings of cases of violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy, (Re: Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04- 10-11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[8] Rollo, p. 527.
[9] Id. at 540-551.
[10] Id. at 550-551.
[11] Id. at 219-223.
[12] Id. at 221.
[13] Id. at 272.
[14] Id.
[15] Id. at 276-280.
[16] Id. at 270.
[17] Id. at 274.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 275-276.
[20] Id. at 284.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 282.
[23] Id. at 222.
[24] Id. at 270.
[25] Id. at 221.
[26] Id. at 842-847.
[27] Id. at 841.
[28] Id. at 859-861.
[29] Id. at 873.
[30] See Garrido v. Garrido, 625 Phil. 347, 366 (2010).
[31] See Tapucar v. Tapucar, 355 Phil. 66, 72 (1998).
[32] Mendoza v. Deciembre, 599 Phil. 182, 191 (2009).
[33] See Villarente v. Villarente, Jr., A.C. No. 8866, September 15, 2020.
[34] See Advincula v. Advincula, 787 Phil. 101, 112 (2016).
[35] See Domingo-Agaton v. Cruz, A.C. No. 11023, May 4, 2021.
[36] Rollo, pp. 251-254.
[37] See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 69 (2013).
[38] Rollo, pp. 549-551.
[39] Section 34. When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with the civil action for damages. - (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a civil action for damages arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the civil action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may consolidate the petition with the civil action. (Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, A.M. No. 04-10- 11-SC, October 19, 2004).
[40] See Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 742 (1998).
[41] In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that order, See Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 290 Phil. 311, 323 (1992).
[42] Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004.
[43] See Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 481-482 (2006).
[44] See Rico v. Salutan, 827 Phil. 1, 6-7 (2018).
[45] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[46] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[47] Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011).
[48] See Tucay v. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336, 340 (1999).
[49] Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. x x x x (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004).
[50] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[51] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[52] See Vitug v. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615, 631 (2006).
[53] Cristobal v. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12702, November 08, 2020.
[54] Supra note 33.
[55] 578 Phil 1, 5 (2008).
[56] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[57] Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[58] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[59] See Dimaculangan v. Jurado, A.C. No. 12359, April 8, 2019, [Unsigned Resolution].
[60] See Spouses Nuezca v. Villagarcia, 792 Phil. 535, 540 (2016).
[61] Id.
[62] See Calo, Jr. v. Tapucar, 177 Phil. 72, 78 (1979).
[63] See Yangson v. Salandanan, 160-A Phil. 691, 693 (1975).
[64] 835 Phil. 837, 842-843 (2018).
[65] Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
[66] Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
[67] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[68] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[69] Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Raising the Standard of Practice, John M. Burman, University of Wyoming College of Law; Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2003.
[70] Supra note 37 at 91.
[71] Re: Recommendation of Victoria, A.M. No. 12-7-15-SC, September 4, 2012.
[72] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2019/01/29/domestic-violence-research-children-abuse-mental-health-learning-aces/2227218002/.
[73] Id.
[74] See Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad. 283 Phil. 400,410 ( I 992).
[75] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21. 1988).
[76] Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988)
[77] Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
[78] See Panagsagan v. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 7733, October 1, 2019.
[79] A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019.
[80] 353 Phil. 643, 648 (1998).
[81] 482 Phil. 64, 71 (2004).
[82] 467 Phil. 139, 145 (2004).
[83] 555 Phil. 713, 719 (2007).
[84] Supra note 48.
[85] 690 Phil. 381, 388-389 (2012).
[86] 724 Phil. 141, 152 (2014).
[87] 755 Phil. 297, 304 (2015).
[88] 538 Phil. 501, 517 (2006).
[89] Supra note 64 at 841.
[90] Supra note 30 at 362.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I dissent.
There is no question that the Court should fully support the State's policy to protect the vulnerable members of society, including women and children. Neither do I dispute the ponencia's sentiments that the Court should maintain the integrity of the legal profession by expelling members who abuse and assault. women. Indeed, the Court should "not coddle violators of the [Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act (Anti-VAWC Act)]",[1] there being no justification for domestic violence. However, the Court's duty to discipline lawyers is circumscribed by the basic principle that the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and only for clear cases of misconduct.[2] In this regard, the lawyer remains innocent of the charges until the complainant successfully discharges the burden of proof through substantial evidence.[3] This burden cannot be reversed under the misplaced notion of championing women's rights.
The records here clearly show that not only is the complaint unsubstantiated, but respondent was able to refute the allegations against him. This is precisely where this dissent proceeds from — that in this particular case, there is a dearth of evidence to support the factual conclusions of the ponencia. Thus, I dissent from the majority in ruling to disbar Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta (Atty. Oreta) for his purported acts of violence. I submit that for his illicit affair during the subsistence of his and complainant Pauline S. Moya's (Moya) respective marriages, the more appropriate penalty is suspension from the practice of law.
In her disbarment complaint, Moya alleges that she was in a relationship with Atty. Oreta. When they started their relationship, she already had four children with her estranged husband while Atty. Oreta, who was also married at that time, was similarly separated from his wife. Despite the subsistence of their respective marriages, Moya and Atty. Oreta started living together in November 2003 until their relationship soured and ended a good seven years after, or sometime in 2010.[4]
According to Moya, their relationship was going well at the beginning. However, their relationship later deteriorated when Atty. Oreta refused to contribute to the payment of the household expenses. She claims that Atty. Oreta also became verbally and physically abusive towards her and her children. The abuse got worse, again according to Moya, constraining her to file a complaint against Atty. Oreta for violation of the Anti-VAWC Act with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP), and to initiate a petition for the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). While the PPO was favorably granted in favor of Moya in a Decision[5] dated January 5, 2012 of the RTC, the OCP, however, dismissed the charges of sexual, physical, psychological, and economic abuse against Atty. Oreta in a Resolution[6] dated March 12, 2013.[7]
After due proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines–Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the Investigating Commissioner recommended to suspend Atty. Oreta from the practice of law for six months, for cohabiting with Moya while they were still married to their respective spouses. With respect to the allegations of abuse, the Investigating Commissioner found that these were unsubstantiated.[8]
The IBP-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) adopted the factual findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified the recommended penalty to disbarment since Atty. Oreta had an illicit affair with Moya during his marriage.[9] Upon the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Oreta, the recommended penalty was reduced to suspension from the practice of law for three years. Among the considerations of the IBP-BOG in lowering the penalty were the expression of remorse and the apology of Atty. Oreta, as well as the fact that Atty. Oreta and Moya had already parted ways.[10]
The ponencia disagrees with the findings of the IBP and finds Atty. Oreta guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for his acts of physical violence towards Moya and her children, and for gross immorality. With respect, however, to the allegation of sexual and economic abuse, the ponencia finds no evidence to substantiate the allegations of Moya, there being contrary evidence to support Atty. Oreta's claim that he defrayed some expenses to support Moya and her children.[11] Lastly, the ponencia admonishes Atty. Oreta for his use of intemperate language in his pleadings, and for his "insolence" and arrogance.[12]
The ponencia orders the disbarment of Atty. Oreta not because he cohabited with Moya while he was married, but for physically abusing Moya and her children.[13] The ponencia likewise finds Atty. Oreta liable for immoral conduct and imposed the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.[14] The ponencia ultimately deems it unnecessary to suspend Atty. Oreta in light of the imposition of disbarment.[15]
The imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment on Atty. Oreta is completely unwarranted. The majority, in agreeing with the ponencia, lost sight of the basic postulate that the power to disbar must be exercised in the preservative, and not vindictive principle. Bearing in mind the serious consequences of disbarment, it is well-settled that the Court only penalizes lawyers when the complainant satisfactorily discharges the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. Thus, even if disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and despite the lower quantum of proof, mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[16]
The ponencia relied on Cristobal v. Cristobal[17] (Cristobal), a case which involved a similar allegation of domestic violence committed by the respondent-lawyer. However, the Court in Cristobal did not simply rely on the allegations of the complainant in finding the lawyer administratively liable. There were other pieces of documentary evidence, including a police blotter and a medical certificate, attesting to the injuries sustained by the complainant. There were also pictures of the injuries that the complainant in Cristobal sustained because of the respondent-lawyer's violent acts. The Court then concluded that there was substantial evidence to support at least three incidents of abuse among the numerous allegations of domestic violence in the complaint. These incidents, according to the Court, were enough to hold the respondent-lawyer liable for violating the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The situation in Cristobal simply does not obtain in this case. Here, the ponencia's finding of physical abuse is grounded solely on the RTC's issuance of a PPO, in which it was concluded that Atty. Oreta committed acts of violence towards Moya in separate occasions.[18] The ponencia says, to which the majority agrees, that as "matters of judicial record,"[19] Atty. Oreta is deemed liable for physically abusing Moya and her children. The abuse, continued the ponencia, was "established with finality by preponderance of evidence"[20] because the trial court acted favorably on Moya's application for a PPO. Since the quantum of proof required in disbarment proceedings is substantial evidence, which is of lesser degree than preponderant evidence, the ponencia concludes that Moya was able to establish the allegations in her disbarment complaint.[21]
I disagree. This reasoning arbitrarily disregards the totality of the parties' evidence.
Aside from the PPO, no other corroborative evidence was presented before the IBP to objectively support Moya's claims of abuse.[22] Nor was there any proof substantiating the injuries Moya purportedly sustained when Atty. Oreta supposedly abused her on March 14, 2010[23] and April 22, 2010.[24] In contrast to the case of Cristobal, there were no photographs of the alleged visible injuries, much less a medical record or medical certificate to prove Moya's claims of abuse. The Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence on which the PPO was based - which the complainant noticeably rehashed in the present disbarment complaint - to conclude that Atty. Oreta inflicted physical harm on Moya and her children. Clearly, had the ponencia gone beyond the PPO, the records would readily show that the charges against Atty. Oreta were groundless.
Moreover, a review of the records paints a different picture than what Moya presented. While they were living together, Atty. Oreta provided substantial material support to Moya and her children. Atty. Oreta not only paid for their daily expenses, such as groceries, utility bills and transportation, he also supported the education of Maya's children — children, who are not his own.[25] He did this for the seven-year period he cohabited with Moya. Atty. Oreta also purchased a Nissan Livina and a Nissan Sentra for the use of Moya and her children, as well as appliances for their home.[26] The records likewise established that when they separated, Atty. Oreta was still supporting Moya financially, as she continued to collect the earnings of the salon owned by Atty. Oreta.[27]
During the PPO proceedings, Moya did not deny that Atty. Oreta had been providing her family with financial support.[28] In fact, during the mandatory conference before the Investigating Commissioner, Moya candidly admitted that it was Atty. Oreta who would regularly bring her children to school during the later years of their relationship.[29] Significantly, Moya also admitted having had another romantic relationship with a different man —who she likewise accused later on as abusive. Curiously, it was Atty. Oreta who assisted Moya in filing a complaint for violation of Anti-VAWC Act against her other paramour.[30] But even with Moya's own declarations, which should have been considered by the Court in the assessment of her credibility, the majority opted to turn a blind eye.
The position I am taking in this case is not borne out of an irrational rejection of Moya's allegations of abuse. Rather, a cursory examination of the totality of the parties' evidence reveals to me a different conclusion — the claims of Moya are unsupported and contradicted by the records. That the allegations of Moya were both self-serving and incredibly bare did not escape the attention of the IBP's Investigating Commissioner. In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, the pertinent portion reads as follows:
Based on the evidence, this Commission is not persuaded that the complainant had proved by substantial evidence her claim of physical, psychological or economic abuse including her cry of rape, They are but just bare assertions. The findings in the Decision of RTC Branch 94 (for issuance of Permanent Protection Order) are not controlling in the present administrative case. Besides, this Commission notes that the respondent did not present evidence in that civil case. In the same manner, [Moya's] declaration that [Atty. Oreta] videotaped their lovemaking and took nude pictures of her was not proved [(sic)] with the quantum of evidence required in this proceedings ((sic)].[31]It bears noting that the Investigating Commissioner received the parties' evidence firsthand. In addition to finding the claims of Moya as "just bare assertions", the Investigating Commissioner aptly observed that the PPO was issued on the sole basis of these same assertions. But as the RTC noted in its decision granting the PPO:
Respondent was given the chance to refute the allegations imputed against him. His counsel thoroughly examined every witness and piece of evidence presented by petitioner. However, when time to present his evidence came, he opted not to. This actuation of respondent prevented the court from hearing his side of the story.[32]What all the foregoing clearly implies is that the favorable grant by the RTC of Moya's application for a protection order should not have been made the basis for the disbarment of Atty. Oreta. The majority egregiously erred when it gave more premium to the factual conclusions of the RTC over that of the IBP, without taking into consideration how each tribunal arrived at their findings. In stark contrast with the proceedings for the issuance of the PPO, the IBP had the benefit of receiving controverting evidence from Atty. Oreta. To my mind, therefore, greater weight should have been given to the IBP's factual findings as it was in a better position to assess the veracity of both parties' submissions. At the very least, the evidence presented by Atty. Oreta should call into question Moya's credibility.
To be sure, Moya's own admissions on the support that Atty. Oreta had consistently provided to her and her children during their relationship, markedly runs counter to, and certainly casts doubt on, the narrative Moya sought to establish in her disbarment complaint — that Atty. Oreta was an abusive, selfish, and indolent partner. The majority, however, adopted the allegations of Moya hook line and sinker despite the conspicuous inconsistencies in her testimony and the glaring absence of independent and objective evidence to support her claim. This is grievous error on the part of the Court. We cannot automatically dismiss a respondent's well-founded defense on the pretext of eradicating the social ill of domestic violence. The lower threshold of substantial evidence does not do away with Moya's burden of proving the allegations in the complaint, and in my view, she glaringly failed to discharge this burden.
But that is not all.
The factual basis for the issuance of the PPO are the very same allegations "in the criminal case for violation of the Anti-VAWC Act. On March 12, 2013, the OCP issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found, "[a]fter analysis of the allegations and the evidence adduced by the complainant and the respondent x x x that there is no sufficient basis to indict the respondent for sexual, physical, psychological[,] and economic abuse."[33] The relevant portions of the OCP Resolution provide:
x x x Respondent could not be charged for economic abuse since the evidence proves that he gave financial support to the complainant and her children while they were living together. Such support includes electricity, water, telephone and internet bills of the complainant, among others, which were itemized in his counter-affidavit. Neither could the respondent be charged for psychological and physical abuse as the complainant's allegations relative thereto appear to be not in accordance with common experience and observations of mankind that is probable under the circumstance. Complainant herself averred that a few months after the respondent transferred to her house, he showed his true character by spanking, hitting, [and] slapping her youngest child[,] Don[,] and he also shouted to (sic) her daughters to the point of making them cry and yet, complainant had to wait for several years to seek redress for her grievances, which does not speak well of the veracity of her allegations. The same is true with the alleged sexual abuses – that respondent used to rape her and would force her to have sex with him against her will[,] which was her "dilemma for the longest time." If she and her children were truly suffering abuses from the respondent, she should have evicted (sic) from her house right at the start and need not wait for seven years to pass before she could file this complaint against him. Even if the complainant has secured a Barangay Protection Order, it docs not necessarily prove that the respondent is a violent person[,] since the alleged threat on her life could either be imagined or real[,] considering that the Barangay issues the Order summarily and [ex-parte] or merely on the basis of the application. The law and jurisprudence dictate that "evidence to be believed must be credible in itself such that common observation of mankind can show it as probable under the circumstances.["]Similar to the proceedings before the IBP, both Moya and Atty. Oreta actively participated and presented their respective evidence before the OCP. In both proceedings, Moya's claims were deemed incredible. The ponencia, however, perfunctorily dismisses the factual findings of the OCP, arguing that the disbarment proceeding may proceed independently of a criminal case.[35]
x x x x
By and large, complainant's testimonial evidence, although coming from a credible source, sans any relevant documentary support, does not appear to be credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience tantamount to lack of probable cause.[34]
I respectfully disagree with this kind of skewed reasoning. The Court cannot, on the one hand, argue that the OCP's findings are immaterial to the present case, and om the other, rely on the factual conclusions of the RTC in granting the PPO. We are not engaged in the business of cherry-picking evidence to fit a foregone conclusion. If the Court were to take the position that the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Atty. Oreta is not binding, neither should the Court proceed to hold him liable on the basis of the RTC's favorable issuance of a PPO.[36]
While it is oft-repeated that a disbarment proceeding is sui generis, the question of Atty. Oreta's moral fitness to continue being a member of the bar requires the Court to pass upon Moya's allegations of abuse, and to weigh her claims against the defense of Atty. Oreta. As such, it is of little consequence that a disbarment proceeding has a different objective than the reliefs afforded in a criminal case or a civil action. In arriving at the conclusion that Atty. Oreta violated the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court necessarily must make a factual finding that Atty. Oreta indeed committed acts of violence against Moya and her children. Thus, the perceived distinction among these proceedings is wholly illusory since the factual basis for the lawyer's administrative liability is inextricably intertwined with those already litigated in the civil and criminal actions.
In my Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Laurel v. Delute,[37] I explained the danger of rendering conflicting rulings m different proceedings that arose from the same set of facts:
Facts are facts. There simply cannot be two versions of the same truth. To allow a resolution in this disbarment proceeding of the alleged manipulation of respondent against his client in the execution of the compromise agreement would create a situation where the "facts" as already established before Civil Case No. T-2497 would now be different from the "facts" established here. This would be unacceptable. The ineluctable consequence in such situation would mean having conflicting or contradictory "findings of facts," that would cast a cloud of uncertainty. over Civil Case No. T-2497.Again, regardless of the purpose of the proceedings — to discipline an errant lawyer for disbarment or to prosecute an offense for criminal actions — the case would depend on the same set of facts. Thus, the Court cannot rely on the sole fact that a PPO was issued in favor of Moya (where only Moya participated), and then close its eyes to the conclusions of both the IBP and the OCP (where both Moya and Atty. Oreta actively participated) that there was insufficient basis to establish the claims of abuse. To emphasize, the allegations of Moya rely on the same evidence in these proceedings. However, unlike the action for the issuance of the protection order, both the IBP and the OCP had the benefit of receiving controverting evidence from Atty. Oreta — thus, fully threshing out the issues and the veracity of Moya's assertions. The Court should not discount these findings and unduly place greater weight to the RTC's grant of a PPO.
x x x x
The fear that generating conflicting "findings of facts" will unnecessarily and unwarrantedly foment more litigation between the contending parties (i.e., between complainant and Azucena) and hence, defeat — rather than promote — the tenets of the orderly administration of justice, is legitimate. It is truly not hard to imagine that any "findings of facts" the Court makes in this disbarment proceeding can and will be used by complainant in another civil litigation against Azucena as basis for having the compromise agreement annulled. In fact, in Esquivias v. CA, while the Court held that the factual findings in a disbarment case are conclusive only in said proceedings and not to a related action, it acknowledged, nevertheless, that the judgment in the disbarment case may, at best, be given weight when introduced as evidence in another case. This, in my view, is recognition that the outcome of a disbarment case which involves a crucial issue between other parties may urge any of them to bring an action in court to settle a controversy that rests closely on the said issue.
At the same time, should a subsequent case proceed and the trial court arrive at factual findings that are diametrically opposed to that which the Court has come up with to support its decision in disbarring a lawyer in a disciplinary proceeding, the unfairness against the lawyer is, at once, palpable. In that given scenario, a lawyer would suffer the stinging effects of disbarment on the basis of factual findings that run entirely different from a version in another case — which, I hasten to add, would be more "truthful" if arrived at through a trial with the right of cross-examination being available.[38]
In all, it bears stressing that "[t]he power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."[39] I cannot see why the Court should insist in the disbarment of Atty. Oreta when the evidence paints a totally different picture as to what Moya claims. The Court has consistently ruled that a lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to satisfactorily prove the allegations in the complaint through substantial evidence.[40] Failing this, judiciousness dictates that the Court exercise restraint in imposing the most severe penalty of disbarment.
That Atty. Oreta accepted the children of Moya as his very own, and treated them as his very own, providing them financial support during their formative years, paying for their groceries and utility bills, paying for their education, and even furnishing them with cars — these acts, to me, are acts of love that lead me to believe the finding of the IBP that the charges of abuse were unsubstantiated, if not totally made up and concocted.[41] That Atty. Oreta eventually parted ways with Moya only means that the love that was there had vanished. To me, these acts of love towards children not of his own blood, should have been taken in favor of Atty. Oreta in the Court's determination of the appropriate penalty. To me, a suspension of three years is more than sufficient especially considering the IBP-BOG's finding that Atty. Oreta had expressed remorse.
In all, I dissent from the majority's decision to be heavy handed by imposing the penalty of disbarment on Atty. Oreta. However, for engaging in an illicit affair prior to the nullification of his marriage,[42] I concur with the ponencia that Atty. Oreta should be held liable for gross immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In consideration of his expression of remorse, as well as the subsequent nullity of his marriage to his previous spouse, I vote to suspend Atty. Oreta from the practice of law for a period of three years.
[1] Ponencia, p 21; Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262 entitled, "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," March 8, 2004.
[2] Kara-an v. Pineda, A.C. No. 4306, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 143, 146
[3] Tan v. Alvarico, A.C. No. 10933, November 3, 2020.
[4] Ponencia, pp. 1-3.
[5] Id. at 3; rollo (Vol. II), pp. 54-65.
[6] Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 200-204.
[7] Ponencia, p. 15.
[8] Id. at 8; rollo (Vol. II), p. 146.
[9] Id. at 141.
[10] Id. at 139-140.
[11] Ponencia, p. 16.
[12] Id. at 18-20.
[13] Id. at 20-21.
[14] Id. at 21-23.
[15] Id. at 23.
[16] Cabas v. Sususco, A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016, 793 SCRA 309, 315.
[17] A.C. No. 12702, November 8, 2020.
[18] Ponencia, pp. 12-13.
[19] Id. at 13.
[20] Id. at 16.
[21] Id.
[22] Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 7-11.
[23] Ponencia, p. 3.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 6.
[26] Id.; rollo (Vol. II), pp. 45-47.
[27] Id. at 46.
[28] Id. at 55-57.
[29] Id. at 1.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 5. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[32] Id. at 64. Emphasis supplied.
[33] Rollo (Vol. I), p. 202. As cited in the ponencia, p. 15.
[34] Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 202 and 204. Emphasis supplied.
[35] Ponencia, p. 14.
[36] See Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406.
[37] Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Laurel v. Delute, A.C. No. 12298, September 1, 2020.
[38] Id. Emphasis supplied; underscoring omitted.
[39] Gatmaytan, Jr. v. Ilao, A.C. No. 6086, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 269, 270. Underscoring supplied.
[40] Nocuenca v. Bensi, A.C. No. 12609, February 10, 2020. See also Alag v. Senupe, Jr., A.C. No. 12115, October 15, 2018, 883 SCRA 172, 179.
[41] Ponencia, p. 6.
[42] Id. at 22-23.