For their part, respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. also maintain that the Petition is already moot since the extended period of the Freeze Order had already lapsed. Therefore, there exists no justiciable controversy for this Court to decide.^[152]

Respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. then proceed to what they call "the heart of the Petition," that is, the interpretation of Anti-Money Laundering Act on the freezing of monetary instrument or property.^[153]

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, had provided that a freeze order "shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court"; and that a court "must resolve [a motion to lift freeze order, if filed] before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day original freeze order." During the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals, Section 10 was further amended in 2012 by Republic Act No. 10365 to say that a freeze order "shall be effective immediately, and which shall not exceed six (6) months depending upon the circumstances of the case"; and that a court "must resolve [a motion to lift freeze order, if filed] before the expiration of the freeze order." Respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. argue that this amendment should retroactively apply in their favor. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' action of resolving the Motions before the extended six-month period expired was lawful. In any case, they argue that petitioner cannot impute error on the Court of Appeals for resolving the Motions after the original 20-day period, considering that it filed a Motion to Extend Freeze Order.^[154]

Respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. also contend that the colatilla in the Court of Appeals' ruling was valid. To them, all that the law requires is that a freeze order's effectivity may be extended for up to six months. This does not mean that the Court of Appeals should exhaust the whole six months before lifting the freeze order. Therefore, the Freeze Order, even if extended to six months, may be lifted even before this period expired.^[155]

Respondents also contend that the Court of Appeals did not err in jointly hearing the proceedings for the issuance of the freeze order and the application for bank inquiry. While conceding that a freeze order and a bank inquiry application are "distinct provisional remedies[,]"^[156] respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. argue that "nothing in the law requires that a freeze order and an authority to conduct bank inquiry must be treated separately and independently."^[157] On the contrary, they say, deconsolidating the cases would violate the Rules of Court on the prohibition on multiplicity of suits.^[158]

In requiring further presentation of evidence, the Court of Appeals allegedly did not err because, respondents Sto. Tomas, et al. argue, the finding of probable cause for the issuance of a freeze order is "preliminary and provisional"^[159] and is "not conclusive for any purpose, and is certainly not conclusive to establish a link between a frozen account and an unlawful activity."^[160] This, they point out, is why a bank account owner may still file a motion to lift freeze order. The account owner may present evidence and prove that the account is not at all related to an unlawful activity, which evidence petitioner may still refute.^[161]

Respondents David and Romero similarly maintain that the case is already moot by the time they were ordered to comment on July 17, 2013, since the Freeze Order's effectivity was only up to June 26, 2013.^[162]

As to the resolution of the Motions to lift the Freeze Order beyond the original 20-day period, respondents David and Romero simply argue that the Court of Appeals was empowered to extend the Freeze Order's effectivity under Title VIII, Section 53(b)^[163] of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, or the Rules of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, As Amended.^[164]

As to the consolidation of the proceedings for a freeze order and bank inquiry, respondents David and Romero assert that the Court of Appeals did not err in hearing the cases jointly. They note that both cases proceed from the same Ombudsman Resolution and involve the same respondents and bank accounts.^[165] Even the quantum of proof required in both cases is the same—probable cause that the accounts sought to be frozen and inquired into are related to the alleged unlawful activity.^[166]

Finally, respondents David and Romero maintain that there was no probable cause to freeze their accounts. Specifically with respondent Romero, the Court of Appeals found no link between his accounts and the transaction between Deltaventure and DBP. This finding of lack of probable cause, they submit, must allegedly bind this Court.^[167]

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the present Petition is moot;

Second, whether or not the Freeze Order was deemed lifted when the Court of Appeals failed to resolve the Motions to lift it within the original 20-day period;

Third, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in jointly hearing the proceedings on the Petition for Freeze Order and the proceedings on the Ex Parte Application for Bank Inquiry;

Fourth, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council to continue presenting evidence to justify the continued freezing of the accounts despite finding probable cause that the bank accounts are related to an unlawful activity; and

Finally, whether or not there was probable cause to believe that the frozen accounts were related to an unlawful activity.

The Petition must be denied.

I

A case becomes moot when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."^[168] Generally, courts do not take cognizance of moot cases, but there are exceptions to the rule: "(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review[.]"^[169]

Here, the Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed on May 24, 2013. Upon this Court's directive in its July 17, 2013 Resolution, respondents filed their Comments, with Sto. Tomas, et al. first doing so on October 7, 2013. Ongpin, Torres, and Manalo followed suit, filing theirs on October 9, 2013. David and Romero last filed their Comment on October 14, 2013. By then, the extended Freeze Order had already expired, the sixth month falling on June 26, 2013. The Petition is, therefore, already moot.

Nevertheless, despite the Freeze Order's expiration, this Court holds that the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest, warranting a resolution on the merits.

A review of the cases decided by this Court via signed decision or resolution reveals that only a handful squarely involve freeze orders or bank inquiries under the Anti-Money Laundering Act.^[170] Most of those cases were decided during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9160 before it was amended by several statutes, including Republic Act No. 10167 which governs this case. This case should, therefore, be resolved on the merits despite its mootness.

II

Under Republic Act No. 1405, or the Bank Secrecy Law, bank accounts and deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines are "considered as of an absolutely confidential nature"; they "may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person[.]"^[171] Any bank official or employee who discloses any information concerning deposits may be prosecuted and penalized.

The notion of confidentiality of bank accounts is premised on human autonomy or, in the words of Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, "the right to be let alone[.]"^[172] The numbers representing money in a person's bank account reflect a personal narrative, either of abundance or scarcity, of success or failure, that a person would want to keep private. These numbers likewise represent a person's assets, and money in the bank is considered a personal belonging. It is in these senses that information on a person's bank account is considered "life" and "property" protected by the due process clause and part of a person's "effects" within the meaning of the unreasonable searches and seizures clause of the Constitution:

Nothing in the structure of the due process clause limits the protected sphere of individual existence or autonomy only to the physical or corporeal aspects of life. After all, as we have long held, life is not limited to physical existence. Property can be incorporeal. Liberty denotes something more than just freedom from physical restraint.

More fundamentally, the reservation of a very broad sphere of individual privacy or individual autonomy is implied in the very concept of society governed under a constitutional and democratic order. The aspects of our humanity and the parts of our liberty surrendered to the government, in order to assure a functioning society, should only be as much as necessary for a just society and no more. While the extent of necessary surrender cannot be determined with precision, our existing doctrine is that any state interference should neither be arbitrary or unfair. In many cases, we have held that due process simply means that regulation should both be reasonable and fair.

Reasonability and fairness is tentatively captured in the twin legal concepts of substantive and procedural due process respectively. Substantive due process is usually, though not in all cases, a nuanced means-to-end test. Basically, this means that the regulation which impinges on individual autonomy is necessary to meet a legitimate state interest to be protected through means that can logically relate to achieving that end. Procedural due process is succinctly and most descriptively captured in the idea that in the kinds of deprivation of rights where it would be relevant, there should be an opportunity to be heard.

In the due process clause, there is the requirement of "deprivation" of one's right to "life, liberty or property." . . . [T]his means more than the occasional and temporary discomforts we suffer, which is consistent with the natural workings of groups of human beings living within a society. De minimis discomfort is a part of group life, independent of the workings of the State. The deprivation that may trigger a judicial inquiry should be more than momentary. It must be fundamentally disruptive of a value that we protect because it is constitutive of our concept of individual autonomy.

For instance, a person who chooses to walk down a public street cannot complain that a police officer glances or even stares at him or her. The discomfort of being the subject of the observation by others, under those circumstances, may be too fleeting and trivial that it should not cause any constitutional query. That we look at each other in public spaces is inherently a part of existing within a society. After all, one of the worst human indignities may be that we are rendered invisible to everyone for all time within public spaces.

On the other hand, the uninvited and unwelcome peering eyes of the State's agents as we reside in our most private spaces presumptively violates our right to life, liberty, and even our property. In such cases, even the most fleeting act of voyeurism can cause substantial disruption of our collective values. Certainly, there is reason to trigger judicial inquiry. If the intrusion is unreasonable, it violates the constitutional protection of the due process clause.

Examining [a person's] bank accounts is analogous to the situation involving the uninvited and unwelcome glance. For some, their financial worth contained in the bank's ledgers may not be physical, but it is constitutive of that part of their identity, which for their own reasons, they may not want to disclose. Peering into one's bank accounts and related transactions is sufficiently disruptive as to be considered a "deprivation" within the meaning of the due process clause. It may be short of the physical seizure of property but it should, in an actual controversy such as this case at bar, be subject of judicial review.^[173] (Citations omitted)

Exceptions to the rule of confidentiality of bank accounts are likewise provided in Republic Act No. 1405. Deposits may be inquired "upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."^[174]

Further, to combat the use of our banking institutions as a money laundering site for the proceeds of any unlawful activity,^[175] Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, provides the remedies of a petition for freeze order and application for bank inquiry to inquire into accounts probably related to an unlawful activity.

A freeze order "is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the [Court of Appeals] to prevent the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the proceeds of, or related to, unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of [Republic Act] No. 9160, as amended."^[176] Its primary objective is:

. . . to temporarily preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful activity or money laundering, by preventing the owner from utilizing them during the duration of the freeze order. The relief is preemptive in character, meant to prevent the owner from disposing his property and thwarting the State's effort in building its case and eventually filing civil forfeiture proceedings and/or prosecuting the owner.^[177] (Citation omitted)

Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act has governed the issuance of freeze orders since the statute's enactment in 2001. Section 10 has since been amended four times: Republic Act No. 9194, enacted in 2003; Republic Act No. 10167, enacted in 2012; Republic Act No. 10365, enacted in 2013; and Republic Act No. 10927, enacted in 2017.

Section 10, as originally worded in Republic Act No. 9160, provided:

SECTION 10. Authority to Freeze. — Upon determination that probable cause exists that any deposit or similar account is in any way related to an unlawful activity, the AMLC may issue a freeze order, which shall be effective immediately, on the account for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days. Notice to the depositor that his account has been frozen shall be issued simultaneously with the issuance of the freeze order. The depositor shall have seventy-two (72) hours upon receipt of the notice to explain why the freeze order should be lifted. The AMLC has seventy-two (72) hours to dispose of the depositor's explanation. If it fails to act within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the depositor's explanation, the freeze order shall automatically be dissolved. The fifteen (15)-day freeze order of the AMLC may be extended upon order of the court, provided that the fifteen (15)-day period shall be tolled pending the court's decision to extend the period.

No court shall issue a temporary restraining order or writ of injunction against any freeze order issued by the AMLC except the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.

The original Section 10 vested the Anti-Money Laundering Council with the power to issue freeze orders. Once issued, the freeze order is effective immediately, and the account holder, who is notified of the freeze order, is given 72 hours to move for the freeze order's lifting. The motion to lift must be resolved within 72 hours from its filing. Unless extended by the court, the freeze order is effective for 15 days. Only the Court of Appeals and this Court may issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the freeze order.

Republic Act No. 9194, enacted in 2003, amended Section 10 to read as follows:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.

Republic Act No. 9194 transferred the jurisdiction to issue freeze orders from the Anti-Money Laundering Council to the Court of Appeals. This exclusive original jurisdiction has remained with the Court of Appeals since then. For a freeze order under Republic Act No. 9194 to be issued, the Anti-Money Laundering Council must file an ex parte application (meaning, without notice to the account holder) before the Court of Appeals. Once it determines that the accounts sought to be frozen are probably related to any of the predicate crimes under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order, which shall be effective for 20 days.

Notably, Republic Act No. 9194 removed the provision on the filing of a motion to lift the freeze order and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

Section 10, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194, remained effective for about nine years until Republic Act No. 10167 amended it in 2012 to read as follows:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — Upon verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order, which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. In any case, the court should act on the petition to freeze within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the petition. If the application is filed a day before a nonworking day, the computation of the twenty-four (24)-hour period shall exclude the nonworking days.

A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day original freeze order.

No court shall issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction against any freeze order, except the Supreme Court.

Republic Act No. 10167 retained the ex parte nature of the application for a freeze order. However, it further required that the application must be verified; that is, accompanied by an affidavit where the Anti-Money Laundering Council attests to reading the application and that, to its knowledge and belief, the allegations in the application are true and correct.^[178] The Court of Appeals was also explicitly required to determine within 24 hours from the application's filing if probable cause exists. Once issued, the freeze order is effective immediately and for 20 days, unless extended by the court. The remedies of a motion to lift the freeze order before the Court of Appeals and for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before this Court were reinstated.

In 2013, Republic Act No. 10365 amended Section 10 to read as follows:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — Upon a verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately, and which shall not exceed six (6) months depending upon the circumstances of the case: Provided, That if there is no case filed against a person whose account has been frozen within the period determined by the court, the freeze order shall be deemed ipso facto lifted: Provided, further, That this new rule shall not apply to pending cases in the courts. In any case, the court should act on the petition to freeze within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the petition. If the application is filed a day before a nonworking day, the computation of the twenty-four (24)-hour period shall exclude the nonworking days.

A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the expiration of the freeze order.

No court shall issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction against any freeze order, except the Supreme Court.

Republic Act No. 10365 greatly extended the effectivity of a freeze order. From the relatively short 20 days, a freeze order lasted up to six months depending on the circumstances of the case. When no case against the account holder is filed within the six-month period, the freeze order is deemed automatically lifted.

Section 10 was last amended by Republic Act No. 10927 in 2017. It now reads:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — Upon a verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately, for a period of twenty (20) days. Within the twenty (20)-day period, the Court of Appeals shall conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity. The total period of the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals under this provision shall not exceed six (6) months. This is without prejudice to an asset preservation order that the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the appropriate anti-money laundering case or civil forfeiture case may issue on the same account depending upon the circumstances of the case, where the Court of Appeals will remand the case and its records: Provided, That if there is no case filed against a person whose account has been frozen within the period determined by the Court of Appeals, not exceeding six (6) months, the freeze order shall be deemed ipso facto lifted: Provided, further, That this new rule shall not apply to pending cases in the courts. In any case, the court should act on the petition to freeze within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the petition. If the application is filed a day before a nonworking day, the computation of the twenty-four (24)-hour period shall exclude the nonworking days.

The freeze order or asset preservation order issued under this Act shall be limited only to the amount of cash or monetary instrument or value of property that the court finds there is probable cause to be considered as proceeds of a predicate offense, and the freeze order or asset preservation order shall not apply to amounts in the same account in excess of the amount or value of the proceeds of the predicate offense.

A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the expiration of the freeze order.

No court shall issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction against any freeze order, except the Supreme Court.

Currently, Section 10 provides an initial 20-day period for the effectivity of the freeze order. Within this period, the Court of Appeals should conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether to lift the freeze order. Should it decide to extend the freeze order, the extended period may not exceed six months. Further, Section 10, as it now reads, specifies that the freeze order shall be limited to the value of the money or property found to be related to a predicate crime and shall not apply to amounts in the same account in excess of the value of the proceeds of the predicate crime.

Section 10 now also mentions "asset preservation order." Although appearing for the first time in statute in 2017, the remedy has been provided as early as 2005 in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.^[179] Akin to a freeze order, the remedy of an asset preservation order is provisional, issued upon probable cause to "[forbid] any transaction, withdrawal, deposit, transfer, removal, conversion, concealment or other disposition of the subject monetary instrument, property, or proceeds."^[180] However, unlike a freeze order, it is issued by the executive judge of the regional trial court or, in their absence, the vice executive judge. If ever the vice executive judge is absent, any regional trial court judge available in the same station may do so.^[181]

Another remedy under the Anti-Money Laundering Act is an ex parte application for a bank inquiry order. A bank inquiry order authorizes the examination of particular deposits or investments in banks or non-bank financial institutions.^[182] "The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions."^[183] Moreover, records that are to be inspected "cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder."^[184]

The remedy of bank inquiry order is provided in Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act. Section 11, as originally worded in Republic Act No. 9160, provided:

SECTION 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments involved are in any way related to a money laundering offense: Provided, That this provision shall not apply to deposits and investments made prior to the effectivity of this Act.

In 2003, Section 11 was amended by Republic Act No. 9194 to read:

SECTION 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof; except that no court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)(1), (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into or examine any deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution when the examination is made in the course of a periodic or special examination, in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP.

Like a freeze order, a bank inquiry order is issued upon a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments sought to be inquired into are in any way related to a predicate crime or money laundering offense. However, at least under Republic Act No. 9194, it was generally not issued ex parte. The non-ex parte nature of bank inquiry proceedings was extensively discussed in the 2008 case of Republic v. Eugenio,^[185] thus:

It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as a general rule, the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order. . . .

. . . .

Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder. Since such special circumstances do not apply in this case, there is no need for us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice it to say, the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which presently confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes said proviso.

In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued that this silence does not preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.

. . . .

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.

Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same time, through the passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always then required, without exception, an order from a competent court. It was through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of the freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would have been convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of a bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the available legislative record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.

That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte, but no similar clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11. These implementing rules were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, and if it was the true belief of these institutions that inquiry orders could be issued ex parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would have been incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because the implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather because the framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex parte applications.

Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC to enforce the provisions of the AMLA specifically authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders under Section 10 but make no similar authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under Section 11.

The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing the same under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at preserving monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3 (i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited from utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.^[186] (Citations omitted)

The application and issuance of a bank inquiry order was made ex parte in 2012 via Republic Act No. 10167. Section 11 was amended to read:

SECTION 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791; and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment, including related accounts, with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon order of any competent court based on an ex parte application in cases of violations of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments, including related accounts involved, are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under Section 4 hereof; except that no court order shall be required in cases involving activities defined in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12) hereof, and felonies or offenses of a nature similar to those mentioned in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and (12), which are Punishable under the penal laws of other countries, and terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 9372.

The Court of Appeals shall act on the application to inquire into or examine any depositor or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the application.

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas may, in the course of a periodic or special examination, check the compliance of a covered institution with the requirements of the AMLA and its implementing rules and regulations.

For purposes of this section, 'related accounts' shall refer to accounts, the funds and sources of which originated from and/or are materially linked to the monetary instrument(s) or property(ies) subject of the freeze order(s).

A court order ex parte must first be obtained before the AMLC can inquire into these related Accounts: Provided, That the procedure for the ex parte application of the ex parte court order for the principal account shall be the same with that of the related accounts.

The authority to inquire into or examine the main account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which are hereby incorporated by reference.

The constitutionality of Section 11, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, was challenged in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals.^[187] In that case, the Republic, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, filed an ex parte application for bank inquiry over the bank accounts of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices as part of the investigation of then Vice President Jejomar Binay's allegedly disproportionate wealth, including his family's. His daughter Abigail Binay, now the mayor of Makati City, was a former partner in the law firm. Contending that Section 11 violated its constitutional rights to due process and privacy, the law firm filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare Section 11 unconstitutional.^[188]

This Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 11, as currently worded under Republic Act No. 10167. It was ruled that the ex parte application and issuance of a bank inquiry order do not involve any physical seizure of property. Thus, there could be no violation of due process. This Court also found no violation of the right to privacy, because the law provides "safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts":

We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:

(1) The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its [ex parte] application for bank inquiry order;

(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;

(3) A bank inquiry court order [ex parte] for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order [ex parte] for the principal account which court order [ex parte] for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and

(4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA's denial of SPCMB's letter request for information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.^[189]

The concurring opinion in that case expounds on why "[t]he absence of notice to the owner of a bank account that an ex parte application as well as an order to inquire has been granted by the Court of Appeals is not unreasonable nor arbitrary":^[190]

It is reasonable for the State, through its law enforcers, to inquire ex parte and without notice because of the nature of a bank account at present.

A bank deposit is an obligation. It is a debt owed by a bank to its client-depositor. It is understood that the bank will make use of the value of the money deposited to further create credit. This means that it may use the value to create loans with interest to another. Whoever takes out a loan likewise creates a deposit with another bank creating another obligation and empowering that other bank to create credit once m[o]re through providing other loans.

Bank deposits are not isolated information similar to personal sets of preferences. Rather, bank deposits exist as economically essential social constructs. The inherent constitutionally protected private rights in bank deposits and other similar instruments are not absolute. These rights should, in proper cases, be weighed against the need to maintaining the integrity of our financial system. The integrity of our financial system on the other hand contributes to the viability of banks and financial intermediaries, and therefore the viability of keeping bank deposits.

Furthermore, we are at an age of instantaneous financial transactions. It would be practically impossible to locate, preserve, and later on present evidence of crimes covered by the Anti-Money Laundering Act if the theory of the petitioner is correct. After all, as correctly pointed out by the majority opinion, the right to information accrues only after a freeze order is issued. It is then that limitations on the ability to transact the value of the bank account will truly affect the depositor.^[191]

III

Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, was in effect when the Petition for Freeze Order was filed on December 3, 2012. Section 10 then stated:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. – Upon verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order, which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court. In any case, the court should act on the petition to freeze within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the petition. If the application is filed a day before a nonworking day, the computation of the twenty-four (24)-hour period shall exclude the nonworking days.

A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day original freeze order.

No court shall issue a temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction against any freeze order, except the Supreme Court.

Here, petitioner contends that by extending the Freeze Order without resolving the Motions to lift it within the original 20-day period, the Motions were deemed denied. Thus, it says that the Court of Appeals erred in placing the colatilla in its December 26, 2012 Resolution stating that the Freeze Order extension was "without prejudice to [its] action/s on the individual motion[/s] to lift as soon as it considers the motion/s submitted for resolution."^[192] In other words, petitioner claims that there were no more Motions to act on, so the subsequent post-issuance hearings requiring petitioner to further present evidence of probable cause had no basis in law.

The contention is only partly correct. By extending the effectivity of the Freeze Order, the Court of Appeals is deemed to have denied the Motions to lift it. However, contrary to petitioner's argument, the colatilla was not void.

Proceedings involving petitions for freeze order were clarified in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, or the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended. Though it was promulgated before the amendatory Republic Act No. 10167, its provisions unaffected by the amendment remain effective. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, in the nature of the Rules of Court, has the force of law.^[193] Since implied repeals are not looked upon with favor, its provisions should be read together and harmonized with existing laws.^[194]

One such provision is Section 53 under Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, which provides that a summary hearing must be conducted within the 20-day period of the freeze order, after which, the court has three courses of action: (1) modify the freeze order; (2) lift it; or (3) extend its effectivity. Section 53 states:

SECTION 53. Freeze Order. —

(a)	Effectivity; post-issuance hearing. – The freeze order shall be effective immediately for a period of twenty days. Within the twenty-day period, the court shall conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity as hereinafter provided.
(b)	Extension. – On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order, the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months. (Emphasis supplied)

Reading the provisions of Republic Act No. 10167 and A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC together, the Court of Appeals, upon the filing of the ex parte petition for freeze order, determines whether there is probable cause that the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to or involved in any unlawful activity. If it does find probable cause, the Court of Appeals shall issue the freeze order, after which it shall conduct a post-issuance hearing within the 20-day period.

This post-issuance hearing is with notice to the parties. It is also during this summary hearing when the parties are given the opportunity to be heard and for the respondents, specifically, to move and argue for the lifting of the freeze order. The Court of Appeals then determines whether to modify, lift, or extend the effectivity of the freeze order.

It is true that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, once a motion to lift the freeze order is filed, it must be resolved before the 20-day period expires. Nevertheless, when the Court of Appeals extends a freeze order's effectivity, it necessarily resolves the motions to lift it—that is, the Court of Appeals denies them. Extending the freeze order could not have meant automatic lifting; on the contrary, its extension assumes its existence.

This interpretation is reflected in the present law on freeze orders, now provided in Republic Act No. 10927. Under the current Section 10(1), the Court of Appeals is required to conduct a summary hearing within 20 days from the freeze order's issuance, after which it may modify, lift, or otherwise extend the freeze order:

SECTION 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — Upon a verified ex parte petition by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof. the Court of Appeals may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately, for a period of twenty (20) days. Within the twenty (20)-day period, the Court of Appeals shall conduct a summary hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its effectivity. The total period of the freeze order issued by the Court of Appeals under this provision shall not exceed six (6) months. This is without prejudice to an asset preservation order that the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the appropriate anti-money laundering case or civil forfeiture case may issue on the same account depending upon the circumstances of the case, where the Court of Appeals will remand the case and its records: Provided, That if there is no case filed against a person whose account has been frozen within the period determined by the Court of Appeals, not exceeding six (6) months, the freeze order shall be deemed ipso facto lifted: Provided, further, That this new rule shall not apply to pending cases in the courts. In any case, the court should act on the petition to freeze within twenty-four (24) hours from filing of the petition. If the application is filed a day before a nonworking day, the computation of the twenty-four (24)-hour period shall exclude the nonworking days.

Here, the Freeze Order was issued on December 6, 2012. The Resolution extending its effectivity was issued on December 26, 2012, which was within the original 20-day period. The Court of Appeals, therefore, resolved the Motions to lift the Freeze Order within the 20-day period required by law. Specifically, the Motions were denied when the Court of Appeals resolved to extend the Freeze Order.

It follows that the colatilla placed by the Court of Appeals in its December 26, 2012 Resolution extending the Freeze Order is not void. To recall, the colatilla provided that the extension was "without prejudice to the [Court of Appeals'] action/s on the individual motion[/s] to lift as soon as it considers the motion/s submitted for resolution."^[195]

By placing the colatilla, what the Court of Appeals truly meant was that the Freeze Order's extension could be reconsidered. In other words, the December 26, 2012 Resolution was without prejudice to the filing of motions for reconsideration by respondents, and the effectivity of the extended Freeze Order may be shortened or modified based on the substantial arguments respondents may raise should they move to have the Resolution reconsidered.

This interpretation is consistent with the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in proceedings involving the freezing of monetary instruments, property, or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or money laundering. Under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration may be filed if the findings or conclusions in the assailed order are not supported by the evidence or are contrary to law.^[196]

Furthermore, allowing the filing of a motion for reconsideration in freeze order proceedings is consistent with the policy of generally allowing motions for reconsideration, the exception being when expressly prohibited either by law or the rules. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC does not expressly prohibit the filing of motions for reconsideration, unlike, for instance, the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which expressly does so.^[197]

Specifically, on freeze orders, giving a party the opportunity to move for reconsideration allows the Court of Appeals to correct any errors it may have made in issuing the freeze order. Besides, considering that a freeze order is effective immediately, moving for reconsideration will not result in delay. The Court of Appeals may also lift the freeze order should it realize that the action for the freeze order was maliciously filed.

All told, when the Court of Appeals extended the Freeze Order's effectivity, the Motions to lift it were deemed denied. However, the Court of Appeals did not err in placing a colatilla in the December 26, 2012 Resolution extending the Freeze Order.

IV

Petitioner further argues that under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, the proceedings for a bank inquiry order should remain ex parte, including the very conduct of the inquiry. Thus, it says that the action cannot be heard jointly with that for the freeze order, which is commenced ex parte but "must eventually be conducted with notice to all concerned parties including the holders of the frozen monetary instruments, properties or proceeds."^[198]

To jointly hear the proceedings, petitioner argues, would allegedly "depriv[e] [the remedy of bank inquiry] of its character as a discovery tool and would be rendered wholly inutile as a measure to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the [Anti-Money Laundering Act]."^[199]

In so arguing, petitioner cites Republic v. Eugenio,^[200] decided in 2008, before Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160 was amended by Republic Act No. 10167 in 2012. Eugenio examined the history and rationale of the original Section 11, under which an application for bank inquiry was still filed with notice to the account holder. However, realizing that the notice requirement defeats the purpose of the bank inquiry order—it allows the account holder to conceal or cleanse the account even before the Anti-Money Laundering Council could inquire into it—Section 11 was amended to make both the application and the court order ex parte. Section 11 is reproduced below:

We agree with petitioner that the entirety of the proceedings for a bank inquiry order should be confidential and ex parte. Under the amended Section 11, "ex parte" modifies "application" and "court order." The bank inquiry proceedings, therefore, are ex parte beginning with the filing of the application, to the issuance of the bank inquiry order, until the very conduct of the inquiry, being the most vital part of the proceedings that requires utmost confidentiality.

However, nothing in the law provides that the purely ex parte bank inquiry proceedings cannot be conducted jointly, albeit subsequently, with the proceedings for the freeze order. To recall, a bank inquiry "authorizes the examination of particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions."^[201] Its function is to allow the Anti-Money Laundering Council to acquire information on the movement of funds into and from a bank account, but it does not prevent further deposits or withdrawals from the account. A freeze order is needed precisely to freeze, that is, to prevent movement of funds from and into the account. It keeps a bank account intact to allow forfeiture should it be found related to any of the predicate crimes under the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

Considering the functions of a bank inquiry order and a freeze order, a joint hearing is inevitable when the subjects of a bank inquiry and of a freeze order are the same account. The results of the bank inquiry are usually used in the freeze order proceedings. The bank inquiry can be "preliminary to the seizure and deprivation of . . . property as in a freeze order"^[202] and "a preparatory tool for the discovery and procurement, and preservation — through the subsequent issuance of a freeze order — of relevant evidence of a money laundering transaction or activity."^[203] This is supported by the fourth paragraph of the amended Section 11, which defines the term "related accounts" as "accounts, the funds and sources of which originated from and/or are materially linked to the monetary instrument(s) or property(ies) subject of the freeze order(s)." The fourth paragraph referred to "accounts . . . subject of the freeze order(s)," meaning, that any information obtained during the bank inquiry may be used to support a petition for freeze order.

Further, reading the law, it is possible that a freeze order is first filed before an application for bank inquiry is availed of, as what petitioner did here. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No. 10167, does it state that a petition for freeze order may be filed only after an application for bank inquiry has been previously availed of. In other words, the Anti-Money Laundering Council may file a petition for freeze order without the benefit of a bank inquiry if it is confident that the information it has at hand is sufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. In the end, it is a matter of strategy on what it should file first.

Here, petitioner chose to first file the Petition for Freeze Order on December 3, 2012. The Freeze Order was then issued on December 6, 2012, after which it filed the Application for Bank Inquiry on December 11, 2012.

What happened here was an error in strategy. Because the application for bank inquiry was filed after the Freeze Order had been issued, notably with notice to the parties, the ex parte nature of the bank inquiry proceedings was rendered useless. Through the Freeze Order, respondents were notified of the ongoing money laundering investigation involving their accounts. As expected, and as will be discussed more fully later, the bank inquiry done after the Freeze Order had been issued revealed that most of the frozen accounts were already closed.

At any rate, while the remedies of freeze order and bank inquiry are distinct, the Court of Appeals has the discretion to jointly hear "actions involving a common question of law or fact," especially if it will "tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Rule 31, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 31
Consolidation or Severance

SECTION 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

For the Court of Appeals, cases may be consolidated and assigned to one justice if they "involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law." Rule III, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provides:

RULE III
Procedure in Receiving, Assigning and Distributing Cases

SECTION 3. Consolidation of Cases. — When related cases are assigned to different Justices, they shall be consolidated and assigned to one Justice.

(a)	Upon motion of a party with notice to the other party/ies, or at the instance of the Justice to whom any of the related cases is assigned, upon notice to the parties, consolidation shall ensue when the cases involve the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.

Petitioner's actions for freeze order and bank inquiry order irrefutably involve the same parties, the same questions of fact, and the same question of law: whether there is probable cause to believe that respondents' frozen accounts are related to the alleged unlawful activity of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. If at all, the Court of Appeals erred in not assigning different docket numbers to the actions. Nonetheless, it did not err in jointly hearing the cases.

V

Contrary to petitioner's claim, it was well within the Court of Appeals' discretion to require progress reports to justify the continued freezing of the accounts.

It is true that by issuing the Freeze Order and even extending it, probable cause that the frozen accounts are related to the alleged unlawful activity was already established. This finding, however, was not final since respondents Ongpin, Manalo, and Torres moved for reconsideration.

In moving for reconsideration, respondents put forward evidence to prove that the funds in their accounts came from legitimate sources. The burden of evidence shifted back to petitioner to prove that there was probable cause to justify the Freeze Order's extension.

Contrary to petitioner's argument, the burden of proof has never shifted to respondents. It confused "burden of proof" with "burden of evidence." "Burden of proof" refers to "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish [their] claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."^[204] In actions for the issuance of a freeze order, the burden of proving probable cause always rests with the Anti-Money Laundering Council.

Once it has established a prima facie case against the owner of the accounts sought to be frozen, the "burden of evidence" shifts to the owner to present counterevidence and prove that their accounts are funded by legitimate sources. If the counterevidence balances the evidence of probable cause, the burden of evidence shifts back to the Anti-Money Laundering Council to justify the continued freezing of the accounts.^[205] Unfortunately, here, petitioner miserably failed to do so.

VI

We agree with the Court of Appeals that among the 179 bank accounts frozen, only Boerstar's Bank of Commerce Account No. 900000028241 was probably related to the alleged unlawful activity.

Before a freeze order is issued, the Anti-Money Laundering Council must put forward evidence of probable cause, or "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious [person] to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense."^[206] This requirement is consistent with the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizure, our bank accounts and information about them being properties and effects within the meaning of the Constitution.^[207]

Furthermore, as clarified in Ligot v. Republic,^[208] the probable cause required to issue a freeze order is different from the probable cause determined in a preliminary investigation. The former is judicial in nature, focusing on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other money instruments sought to be frozen are related to the predicate crimes under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, not whether there is probable cause to believe that a predicate crime was committed. Meanwhile, the latter sense of probable cause belongs to the government's prosecution arm.^[209]

In Ligot, this Court found that there was probable cause to issue a freeze order over the bank accounts of retired Lieutenant General Jacinto C. Ligot and his family. As the Office of the Ombudsman has found, he and his family had as much as P54,000,000.00 in bank accounts, investments, and properties, an amount grossly disproportionate to his income.^[210] This gross discrepancy showed the relation between the bank accounts and the crime of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Here, the Court of Appeals tabulated the bank accounts^[211] related to Ongpin and their statuses upon the issuance of the Freeze Order on December 6, 2012 until its expiration on June 26, 2013:

As for respondent DBP officers, the statuses of their bank accounts^[226] upon the issuance of the Freeze Order until its expiration are as follows:

The tables show that most of the frozen accounts were either closed or had minimal deposits. There were few accounts found to have been involved in covered or suspicious transactions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

A covered transaction involves cash or other equivalent monetary instrument valued at more than P500,000.00 in one banking day.^[227] On the other hand, a suspicious transaction involves any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 3(b-1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act:

1.	there is no underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose or economic justification;
2.	the client is not properly identified;
3.	the amount involved is not commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the client;
4.	taking into account all known circumstances, it may be perceived that the client's transaction is structured in order to avoid being the subject of reporting requirements under the Act;
5.	any circumstance relating to the transaction which is observed to deviate from the profile of the client and/or the client's past transactions with the covered institution;
6.	the transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act that is about to be, is being or has been committed; or
7.	any transaction that is similar or analogous to any of the foregoing.[228]

Among those accounts involving suspicious transactions was respondent Sto. Tomas's Robinsons Savings Bank Account No. 113200005091. The bank account was found involved in significant transactions during the critical dates of "April 2009 or earlier and 2009 or thereafter."^[229]

Another account owned by respondent Sto. Tomas, Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan Association Account No. 011-1000-7134-2, has existed as early as April 14, 2008. As the Court of Appeals found, three deposits were made before April 2009 for a total of P5,220,412.77. Subsequent deposits totaling P6,463,145.56 were made from July 2009 to January 5, 2010, and another deposit of P1,200,000.00 was made on December 5, 2010.^[230]

When the original Freeze Order was issued, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation Account No. 333675 and Special Investment Management Account No. 62508615, both related accounts of respondent Guevara, involved suspicious transactions. Based on petitioner's report, the account was a trust account and only had an average balance starting July 19, 2010, with debit from the account of P2,000,000.00 and a corresponding credit of P1,800,000.00.^[231]

Some of the accounts under respondent Soleta's name also involved suspicious transactions. Union Bank Account No. 109566283270 only had a balance of P5,561.89 at the time the Freeze Order was issued, but on June 16, 2010, P728,996.94 was deposited in the account as credit proceeds. As for DBP Account No. 455352273030, it had a balance of P7,090.34 when the Freeze Order was issued, but substantial amounts were successively deposited in it: P1,125,000.00 on June 21, 2010 and P182,000.00 on June 22, 2010. Lastly, DBP Account No. 01644012104 was already closed by the time the Freeze Order was issued, but on July 21, 2010, P1,150,000.00 and P6,619,624.39 were deposited in the account. Another P1,619,482.59 was deposited on July 27, 2010.^[232]

As outlined above, the accounts involved covered or suspicious transactions, and petitioner was required under the law to present evidence of probable cause that these accounts are related to the alleged unlawful activity. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to show that these accounts were related to the allegedly irregular loan transactions between Deltaventure and DBP, the predicate crime for which petitioner was authorized to commence freeze order and bank inquiry proceedings against respondents.

For these reasons, we find no error on the Court of Appeals' part in unfreezing the accounts except for Boerstar Corporation's Bank of Commerce Account No. 900000028241, the only account proved to be probably related to the loan transactions between Deltaventure and DBP. This account served as the depository account of the balance of the sale proceeds between Goldenmedia, among others, and Two Rivers.

Nothing in this Decision should be read as affecting the criminal case filed against respondents. Furthermore, better diligence is expected from petitioner for the Republic to put up a meaningful fight against money laundering and its pernicious effects.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The May 7, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00066 is AFFIRMED. The Freeze Order, except as to Boerstar Corporation's Bank of Commerce Account No. 900000028241, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[2] Id. at 119-196. The May 7, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00066 was issued by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[3] As amended by Republic Act No. 10167.

^[4] Rollo, pp. 119-196.

^[5] Id. at 151.

^[6] Id. at 152.

^[7] Id. at 149.

^[8] Id.

^[9] Id. at 150.

^[10] Id. at 152.

^[11] Id.

^[12] Id. at 153.

^[13] Id. at 148.

^[14] Id. at 373, Offering Ticket No. RMC MM-09-156 dated November 4, 2009.

^[15] Id. at 153.

^[16] Id. at 152.

^[17] Id. at 153.

^[18] Id.

^[19] Id.

^[20] Id. at 20, Petition for Review on Certiorari, uncontroverted allegation.

^[21] Id. at 148.

^[22] Republic Act No. 8791 (2000), sec. 40 provides:

SECTION 40. Requirement for Grant of Loans or Other Credit Accommodations. — Before granting a loan or other credit accommodation, a bank must ascertain that the debtor is capable of fulfilling his commitments to the bank.
Toward this end, a bank may demand from its credit applicants a statement of their assets and liabilities and of their income and expenditures and such information as may be prescribed by law or by rules and regulations of Monetary Board to enable the bank to properly evaluate the credit application which includes the corresponding financial statements submitted for taxation purposes to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Should such statements prove to be false or incorrect in any material detail, the bank may terminate any loan or other credit accommodation granted on the basis of said statements and shall have the right to demand immediate repayment or liquidation of the obligation.
In formulating rules and regulations under this Section, the Monetary Board shall recognize the peculiar characteristics of microfinancing, such as cash flow-based lending to the basic sectors that are not covered by traditional collateral.

^[23] The New Central Bank Act.

^[24] Republic Act No. 3019 (1960), sec. 3 partly provides:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officer, already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
. . . .
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
. . . .
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

^[25] Rollo, pp. 11, 15, and 17, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

^[26] Id. at 11, 15, and 18.

^[27] Id.

^[28] Id. at 18.

^[29] Id. at 11, 15, and 18.

^[30] Id. at 12, 15, and 18.

^[31] Id. at 12, 15-16, and 18.

^[32] Id. at 12, 16, and 19.

^[33] Id. at 12 and 16.

^[34] Id. at 16 and 19.

^[35] Id. at 12, 16, and 19. In other parts of the rollo, Guevera is spelled Guevarra. The former is adopted.

^[36] Id. Some of the cited pages spell Cresenciana as Cresencia or Crescenciana. The first is adopted.

^[37] Id. at 16, 18, and 19.

^[38] Id. at 15, 16, and 20.

^[39] Id. at 17 and 20. In some parts of the rollo, Cerezo had the suffix "Jr."

^[40] Id. at 277-280.

^[41] Id.

^[42] Id. at 281-339.

^[43] Republic Act No. 3019 (1960), sec. 3 partly provides:

SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
. . . .
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

^[44] Rollo, pp. 305-319.

^[45] Id. at 72-97.

^[46] Id. at 82.

^[47] Id. at 82-83.

^[48] Id. at 83.

^[49] Id. at 84.

^[50] Id.

^[51] Id. at 84-85.

^[52] Id. at 87-88.

^[53] Id. at 88-97.

^[54] Id. at 201-276.

^[55] Id. at 202-215.

^[56] Id. at 101-114. The December 6, 2012 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real­ Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari R. Carandang (now a member of this Court) and Ricardo R. Rosario of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[57] Id. at 113-114.

^[58] Id. at 458-524.

^[59] Id. at 554-562.

^[60] Id. at 555-556.

^[61] Id. at 564-574. The December 13, 2012 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[62] Id. at 864.

^[63] Id. at 575-591.

^[64] Id. at 592-597.

^[65] Id. at 578.

^[66] Id. at 579.

^[67] Id. at 585-586.

^[68] Id. at 580-581.

^[69] Id. at 598-637.

^[70] Id. at 599-600 and 603.

^[71] Id. at 601.

^[72] Id. at 601-603.

^[73] Id. at 606.

^[74] Id. at 627.

^[75] Id. at 605.

^[76] Id.

^[77] Id. at 608.

^[78] Id. at 617.

^[79] Id. at 629.

^[80] Id. at 608.

^[81] Id. at 611.

^[82] Id. at 658-665.

^[83] Id. at 661-662.

^[84] Id. at 662.

^[85] Id. at 663.

^[86] Id.

^[87] Id. at 715-740, Motion to Lift Freeze Order; 791-802, Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Unfreeze Some Bank Accounts.

^[88] Id. at 724.

^[89] Id. at 795-796 and 801.

^[90] Id. at 759-766.

^[91] Id. at 762.

^[92] Id. at 765.

^[93] Id. at 767-777.

^[94] Id. at 772.

^[95] Id. at 778-787.

^[96] Id. at 779.

^[97] Id. at 781.

^[98] Id. at 783.

^[99] Id.

^[100] Id. at 840-854.

^[101] Id. at 843.

^[102] Id. at 846.

^[103] Id. at 863-869. The December 21, 2012 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[104] Id. at 870-877. The December 21, 2012 Resolution was likewise penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[105] Id. at 878-881. The December 26, 2012 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court or Appeals, Manila.

^[106] Id. at 887-880.

^[107] Id. at 918.

^[108] Id. at 892-916.

^[109] Id. at 908.

^[110] Id.

^[111] Id. at 908-909.

^[112] Id. at 917-922.

^[113] Id. at 930-935. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members of this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[114] Id. at 933.

^[115] Id. at 934.

^[116] Id. at 44, Petition for Review on Certiorari and rollo, pp. 1074-1075, Comment.

^[117] Id. at 145-146, May 7, 2013 Resolution.

^[118] Id. at 119-196. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario (now members or this Court) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[119] Id. at 127.

^[120] Id. at 124.

^[121] Id. at 126.

^[122] Id. at 135.

^[123] Id. at 136-142.

^[124] Id. at 159.

^[125] Id. at 162.

^[126] Id.

^[127] Id.

^[128] Id. at 163.

^[129] Id. at 194.

^[130] Id.

^[131] Justice Ricardo D. Rosario registered his concurrence, saying that:

I agree with petitioner that, whatever profit private respondents may have received from the sale of Philex shares will be considered related to an unlawful activity because the sale of these shares would not have been realized if not for the two loans granted by the DBP. It is only because the petitioner failed to provide Us with a definite transaction – or a number of definite transactions – to show that the money from these DBP loans has been transferred to the subject accounts of private respondents that there is a need to lift the freeze order. Again, Our determination of probable cause to issue a freeze order is dependent on the relation of the subject accounts themselves to the unlawful activity and nothing more. (Rollo, p. 200.)

^[132] Rollo, p. 195.

^[133] Id. at 2-71.

^[134] Id. at 1069-1099.

^[135] Id. at 1100-1139.

^[136] Id. at 1487-1505.

^[137] Id. at 48-49.

^[138] Id. at 49.

^[139] RULES OF COURT, Rule 58, sec. 5.

^[140] Rollo, pp. 49-50.

^[141] Id. at 62.

^[142] Id. at 56-59.

^[143] Id. at 54.

^[144] Id. at 1118-1119.

^[145] Id. at 1119-1122.

^[146] Id. at 1134.

^[147] Id. at 1096-1098.

^[148] Id. at 1125.

^[149] Id. at 1125-1126.

^[150] Id. at 1130.

^[151] Id. at 1126.

^[152] Id. at 1077-1079.

^[153] Id. at 1081.

^[154] Id. at 1081-1083.

^[155] Id. at 1088-1090.

^[156] Id. at 1096.

^[157] Id.

^[158] Id.

^[159] Id. at 1092.

^[160] Id.

^[161] Id.

^[162] Id. at 1501-1502.

^[163] A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC (2005), Title III, sec. 53(b) provides:

SECTION 53. Freeze Order. —
. . . .
(b) Extension. – On motion of the petitioner filed before the expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order, the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a period not exceeding six months.

^[164] Rollo, pp. 1498-1499.

^[165] Id. at 1500-1501.

^[166] Id. at 1501.

^[167] Id. at 1496-1498.

^[168] Timbol v. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578, 584 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[169] Id. at 585.

^[170] See Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 836 Phil. 281 (2018) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc]; Republic v. Bolante, 808 Phil. 601 (2017) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division]; Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc]; Ligot v. Republic, 705 Phil. 477 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; and Republic v. Eugenio, Jr. 569 Phil. 98 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[171] Republic Act No. 1405 (1955), sec. 2.

^[172] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 378 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc], citing Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); and Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren & Brandeis, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 703 (1990).

^[173] Id. at 379-385.

^[174] Republic Act No. 1405 (1955), sec. 3.

^[175] Republic Act No. 9160 (2001), sec. 2.

^[176] Ligot V. Republic, 705 Phil. 477, 504 (1013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[177] Id.

^[178] RULES OF COURT, Rule 7, sec. 4 provides:

SECTION 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

^[179] Otherwise known as the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as amended. See Title III of the Rule.

^[180] A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC (2005), Title III, sec. 11.

^[181] A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC (2005), Title III, sec. 11.

^[182] Republic v. Eugenio, 569 Phil. 98, 124 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[183] Id. at 124-125.

^[184] Id. at 125.

^[185] 569 Phil. 98 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[186] Id. at 120-124.

^[187] 802 Phil. 314 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

^[188] Id. at 330.

^[189] Id. at 354-355.

^[190] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 390 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc).

^[191] Id.

^[192] Rollo, p. 879.

^[193] Shoji v. Javier, 43 Phil. 333, 342 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

^[194] See Valdez v. Tuason, 40 Phil. 943, 946 (1920) [Per J. Street, En Banc].

^[195] Rollo, p. 879.

^[196] RULES OF COURT, Rule 37, secs. 1 and 2.

^[197] REVISED RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE (1991), sec. 19(c).

^[198] Rollo, p. 62.

^[199] Id.

^[200] 569 Phil. 98 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[201] Republic v. Eugenio, 569 Phil. 98, 124 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

^[202] Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 340 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

^[203] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 388 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

^[204] RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 1.

^[205] See David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529, 598 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[206] Ligot v. Republic, 705 Phil. 477, 501 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[207] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 378 (2016) [Per J. Perez, En Banc] citing Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) and Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren & Brandeis, 39 Cath. U.L. REV. 703 (1990).

^[208] 705 Phil. 477 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[209] Id. at 501.

^[210] Id. at 487.

^[211] Rollo, pp. 136-142.

^[212] Not among the bank accounts submitted by petitioner but frozen by PBCom as a related account.

^[213] Rollo, pp. 149-150.

^[214] Not among the bank accounts submitted by petitioner but frozen by BDO as a related account.

^[215] Not included in petitioner's list of accounts to be frozen but frozen as a related account.

^[216] PBCom received the Freeze Order on December 7, 2012; Ongpin is co-chair and a major stockholder of PBCom.

^[217] Per Supplemental Return of BDO dated 17 December 2012, UCPB Acct No. 1341710000000223 (UCPB Ref. No.) shows an inward transaction on September 29, 2010 to BDO Acct No. 006860006888 of Ongpin. The same BDO Account reveals transfer of millions of pesos from Acct. No. 0068802858.

^[218] Rollo, pp. 150-151.

^[219] Not among the accounts enumerated by petitioner but considered a related account.

^[220] Not among the accounts enumerated by petitioner but considered a related account.

^[221] Not among the accounts enumerated by petitioner but considered a related account.

^[222] In the Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Freeze Order, the account is listed under the name of Elkhound but per Bank of Commerce Return, the account is in the name of Deltaventure Resources, Inc.

^[223] As corrected per Manifestation and Motion filed by Bank of Commerce and received by the Court of Appeals on January 10, 2013.

^[224] Rollo, pp. 155-156.

^[225] The account is in the name of Deltaventure Resources, Inc.

^[226] Rollo, pp. 171-193.

^[227] Republic Act No. 9160 (2001), sec. 3(b), as amended by Republic Act No. 9194 (2002).

^[228] Republic Act No. 9160 (2001), sec. 3(b-1), as amended by Republic Act No. 9194 (2002).

^[229] Rollo, p. 185.

^[230] Id. at 185-186.

^[231] Id. at 186-187.

^[232] Id. at 189-190.