Fear is an unpleasant emotion inherently personal to an individual. Indeed, we can never profess to know for a fact the intensity and depth of a person's fear. However, this is the heavy task brought upon us by a person who claims to have fled his home country due to his fear that his religious belief will cost him his life. Confronted with the determination of the petitioner's refugee status, the Court will be guided by this precept: while the State strives to uphold its commitment to protect displaced persons uprooted from their countries as a result of persecution, it must first determine if a person requesting its protection satisfies the criteria provided under the definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, i.e., a well-founded fear of persecution.

In cases for refugee status determination, there is a shared and collaborative burden between the applicant and the protection officer. While the applicant has the duty to provide an accurate, full, and credible account or proof of his or her case, the protection officer is expected to provide assistance in clarifying and understanding the applicant's claims. Likewise, in carrying out status determination, the protection officer must consider the subjective and objective elements of the applicant's claim of well-founded fear of persecution. Thereafter, the protection officer must determine whether the applicant has established to a reasonable degree a risk of persecution.

The Case
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] (petition) is the Decision^[2] dated 31 January 2019 and Resolution^[3] dated 10 September 2019 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 153799 affirming the Decisions dated 10 March 2017^[4] and 25 May 2017^[5] of the Secretary of Justice, through the Department of Justice – Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU).

Antecedents
The following are petitioner's allegations, as summarized by DOJ-RSPPU and cited by the CA in the assailed Decision, to wit:

The Applicant Rehman Sabir is a Pakistani national seeking protection as a refugee under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees on account of alleged religious persecution.

His claim to refugee status has been examined within the context of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol ("1951 Convention").

CLAIMS and EVIDENCE

The following account is based on Applicant's application and interview:

1. Applicant is a Pakistani national born on 8 July 1994, in Lahore, Pakistan to a Christian family. Applicant's father is Sabir Ehsan Khokhar. His step-mother is Saira Sabir. His birth mother died when he was younger. Applicant has an older brother, Roni Sabir, and a two-year old half-sister, Daneen Sabir. About five years ago, his father converted his religion from Christian to Muslim and married Saira Sabir, his step-mother, a Muslim. Sometime thereafter, his step­mother moved in with them.
   
   
2. His father works at Punjab Automobile Services while his step-mother is a professor of Islamic Studies.
   
   
3. Applicant studied and finished only up to 10^th grade at St. Peter's School in Lahore, Pakistan. He was not able to pursue higher education due to high costs.
   
   
4. The applicant had never worked. He claims that no one in his country gives Christians work.
   
   
5. Initially, Saira Sabir was kind to him and his brother. It was never mentioned that Saira Sabir is a Muslim neither was it mentioned that his father had already converted to Muslim. The Applicant only found out when he saw his step-mother praying and reading the Quran. About one (1) month after finding out that their step-mother is a Muslim his brother left the house. His brother warned him that it is not good for them to live with a Muslim and urged him to leave as well. This is also around the time they found out that their father had converted to Muslim.
   
   
6. Saira Sabir's brother, Raja, is a "Mulana" (preacher) at the Mosque. He visits them about two or three times a week. Raja persuades him to convert to Muslim every time he visits. Raja's methods were initially acceptable but became aggressive as time went by.
   
   
7. Sometime after Christmas in 2016, Saira Sabir and Raja forced him to read the Quran. According to the Applicant, Raja was handing him the Quran but he refused to accept it and that while he was being forced to accept the Quran, the Quran accidentally dropped. Raja said that the Applicant insulted the Quran and is (sic) that he is now dead. Raja then grabbed a knife from the kitchen. This prompted the Applicant to run away. On that same day, the Applicant ran away from his home bringing nothing.
   
   
8. The Applicant said that he called his house after the incident to talk to his father. However, his father refused to hear his explanation of the incident and told him that he, his father, cannot do anything about it.
   
   
9. According to the Applicant, anyone who is accused of insulting the Quran in Pakistan can be criminally charged with section 295-C of their criminal laws, a Blasphemy law, the penalty of which is death. Further, the Applicant had stated that as soon as he is accused of insulting the Quran he was already in danger of being killed. He explained that this accusation will be reported to the local Muslim community and that the community will likely gang up on him to kill him. The Applicant further stated that the Government cannot do anything about it.
   
   
10. After the incident, the Applicant slept at a friend's house for a few days until he was referred to a Non-Governmental Organization ("NGO") in Pakistan named "Save and Serve Christ". This NGO helped the Applicant to get to the Philippines for the purpose of seeking asylum.
    
    
11. The Applicant arrived in the Philippines on 2 February 2017 and applied for refugee status on 8 February 2017. This is the first time that the Applicant had gone out of Pakistan.
    
    
12. The Applicant explained that he does not want to return to Pakistan because he will be killed if he does return.^[6]

Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
On 10 March 2017, the Secretary of Justice, through the DOJ-RSPPU, issued a Decision denying petitioner's application, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, REHMAN SABIR is NOT a REFUGEE within the context of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

SO ORDERED.^[7]

The DOJ-RSPPU concluded that petitioner is not a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention). It was stated that, while Christians in Pakistan are a religious minority suffering discrimination in general, being a Christian is not sufficient to amount to a risk of persecution. Christians are able to practice their faith, attend church, and have their own schools and hospitals. Risk of blasphemy allegations is generally not enough to make out a claim under the Refugee Convention, unless there is evidence that the charge is pursued. Based on petitioner's allegations, there was no persecution due to his religion.^[8]

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was later denied through a Decision^[9] dated 25 May 2017. The DOJ-RSPPU took note of petitioner's answer during the interview where petitioner answered that he was neither forced nor compelled to change religion; he was merely persuaded.^[10]

Ruling of the CA
Petitioner elevated the matter via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the CA. In its Decision^[11] dated 31 January 2019, the CA dismissed the Petition for Review filed by petitioner, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[12]

The appellate court found that the DOJ-RSPPU, in representation of the Secretary of Justice, has the special knowledge and expertise in the determination of refugee status of a person. Its factual findings are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts. A review of the Decisions of the DOJ-RSPPU shows that it took cognizance of petitioner's submissions and carefully evaluated his case. Since the findings in this case are supported by substantial evidence, the CA concluded that there is no reason to overturn the decision of the DOJ-RSPPU.^[13]

In its Resolution^[14] dated 10 September 2019, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Thus, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court through this Petition which raised the lone issue:

Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming the DOJ-RSPPU's denial of petitioner's application for recognition as refugee, despite substantial evidence showing petitioner's qualification under Department Circular No. 058 in relation to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Issue
The primordial issue for resolution of the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the DOJ-RSPPU declaring that petitioner is not a refugee.

Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly granted.

Refugee protection has been an ongoing global concern. Characterizing the refugee problem as perennial, Dr. Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart, the first United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), articulated that "[s]o long as the world remains split in half and over the face of the earth there are frontiers dividing systems based on freedom from systems based on compulsion, men and women living under the latter will cross over to the lands where freedom reigns, and so become 'refugees'".^[15] As predicted, the UNHCR, the refugee agency of the United Nations, recorded 26.6 million refugees as of mid-2021 with most of them hosted in developing countries.^[16] With the already staggering number, a refugee crisis looms as one million refugees have reportedly fled Ukraine with the recent conflict with Russia.^[17] In response, the Philippines expressed its commitment to welcome refugees in the country.^[18] This commitment continues the country's long history of providing safe haven to refugees, with 795 hosted herein as of 18 January 2021.^[19]

The Philippines' Humanitarian
Tradition

The UNHCR has recognized the Philippines' strong humanitarian tradition as exemplified in the so-called nine waves of refugees.^[20] Classified according to nationality, these waves overlapped and moved with the political upheavals of the times.

In October 1922, at the end of World War I, the first wave consisted of 800 "White Russians" who fled persecution from "Red Russians" or supporters of the 1917 Socialist Revolution. They wandered the seas to look for a safe port before eventually arriving in Manila. Some of the White Russians stayed in the Philippines while others resettled in the United States and Australia.^[21]

The second wave consisted of European Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. President Manuel L. Quezon admitted 1,200 refugees in 1934, and up to 30,000 in 1937. This second wave also became the basis for the issuance of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (CA 613), or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.^[22]

Following this, the third wave was composed of Spanish republicans fleeing from the new nationalist government at the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939. The Philippines was among the few countries who granted visas to the Spanish refugees.^[23]

About 30,000 Chinese refugees also sought refuge in the Philippines in the same period. This fourth wave was comprised of Kuomintang members who wished to evade the grasp of the communist People's Republic of China.^[24] The number of refugees who settled in Manila, Baguio, the Province of Rizal, and the Mountain Province were such that in 1937, President Quezon, through Proclamation No. 173, asked for the cooperation of every inhabitant of the Philippines in "extending whatever aid may be necessary for the safety and care of these refugees."^[25] He also prohibited, for this purpose, the raise in house rentals and prices of foodstuff and other prime necessities.

President Elpidio Quirino welcomed the fifth wave from 1949 to 1953. A second wave of 6,000 White Russians from Shanghai, China found refuge in a camp in Tubabao Island, Guian, Eastern Samar. They eventually resettled in countries like Australia, the United States, Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, and Belgium.^[26]

From 1975 to 1992, the sixth wave of refugees came from Vietnam and arrived in the Philippines. These refugees lived in the refugee processing center in Palawan before relocating to other countries such as Canada. Some opted to stay in the Philippines.^[27]

The seventh wave was composed of Iranian students who chose to remain in the Philippines in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution at the close of the 1970s. The Iranian refugees remained in the Philippines either by integrating into the local Muslim community or by marrying Filipinos and undergoing naturalization.^[28]

From 1980 to 1994, the eighth wave was made up of 400,000 refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. They were admitted and then processed for relocation to other countries like the United States, Canada, France, and Australia.^[29] The Philippine Government entered into an agreement with the UNHCR on 12 November 1979 for the establishment of refugee processing centers.^[30]

Most recently, the ninth wave of refugees was made up of 600 East Timorese who fled their country during its struggle for independence from Indonesia. They were repatriated after security was restored in their country.^[31]

Verily, the foregoing demonstrates the historical tradition and commitment of the Philippines to provide a safe haven for those who have left their homes due to wars, conflicts, discrimination, and persecution.

International Framework on Refugees
and Stateless Persons: The 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967
Protocol

The 1951 Refugee Convention consolidated various international agreements to address the problem of the legal status of refugees after the Second World War, and to lay down minimum standards for the treatment of refugees without prejudice to the grant of a more favorable treatment by acceding States. It is founded on Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of persons to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.^[32] The 1967 Protocol amended the 1951 Refugee Convention by removing its geographical and temporal limits. In 2001, States parties issued a Declaration reaffirming their Commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.^[33]

Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, the term "refugee" is defined as a person who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."^[34]

The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol define who is a refugee, but do not specifically regulate the identification or determination of refugee status. States parties to the Convention and to the Protocol are left to establish the procedure they consider most appropriate, having regard to their respective constitutional and administrative structures.^[35] In view of the varying procedures for refugee status determination among States parties, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme recommended that procedures satisfy certain basic requirements:

(i) The competent official (e.g., immigration officer or border police officer) to whom the applicant addresses himself at the border or in the territory of a Contracting State should have clear instructions for dealing with cases which might come within the purview of the relevant international instruments. He should be required to act in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher authority.

(ii) The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to the procedure to be followed.

(iii) There should be a clearly identified authority – wherever possible a single central authority – with responsibility for examining requests for refugee status and taking a decision in the first instance.

(iv) The applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including the services of a competent interpreter, for submitting his case to the authorities concerned. Applicants should also be given the opportunity, of which they should be duly informed, to contact a representative of UNHCR.

(v) If the applicant is recognized as a refugee, he should be informed accordingly and issued with documentation certifying his refugee status.

(vi) If the applicant is not recognized, he should be given a reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system.

(vii) The applicant should be permitted to remain in the country pending a decision on his initial request by the competent authority referred to in paragraph (iii) above, unless it has been established by that authority that his request is clearly abusive. He should also be permitted to remain in the country while an appeal to a higher administrative authority or to the courts is pending.^[36]

Corollary to this, the UNHCR summarized the process of ascertaining and evaluating the facts as follows:

(a) The applicant should:

(i) Tell the truth and assist the examiner to the full in establishing the facts of his case.

(ii) Make an effort to support his statements by any available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence. If necessary he must make an effort to procure additional evidence.

(iii) Supply all pertinent information concerning himself and his past experience in as much detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. He should be asked to give a coherent explanation of all the reasons invoked in support of his application for refugee status and he should answer any questions put to him.

(b) The examiner should:

(i) Ensure that the applicant presents his case as fully as possible and with all available evidence.

(ii) Assess the applicant's credibility and evaluate the evidence (if necessary giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt), in order to establish the objective and the subjective elements of the case.

(iii) Relate these elements to the relevant criteria of the 1951 Convention, in order to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the applicant's refugee status.^[37]

The Philippines' International
Commitments and Issuances Relating
to Refugees and Stateless Persons

As demonstrated earlier, the Philippines has already admitted refugees and incorporated in its immigration law a favorable treatment to refugees, even prior to accession to any international convention on the protection of refugees. Section 47(b) of CA 613, as amended, allows the admission of aliens "for humanitarian reasons, and when not opposed to the public interest, xxx who are refugees for religious, political, or racial reasons."

The Philippines is also among the few countries in the Asia Pacific region which acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol on 22 July 1981.^[38] By accession to the 1967 Protocol, the Republic undertook to apply the substantive provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention to refugees as defined in said Convention but without the 1951 dateline.^[39]

By reason of the above commitments, the DOJ, through DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12^[40] (DOJ Circular No. 058-12), created the DOJ-RSPPU to facilitate the identification, determination and protection of refugees and stateless persons under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1954 United Nations Convention.^[41] The DOJ acted pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 47 dated 18 August 1976, where then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos delegated to the DOJ the authority over immigration matters, including the admission of aliens. The creation of the DOJ-RSPPU also finds basis under Section 7,^[42] Title III of the Administrative Code of 1987, allowing the Legal Staff of the DOJ to perform such functions as may be assigned by the Secretary of Justice.

The Philippines' continuing commitment towards streamlining the provision of services for refugees is further evidenced by the Inter-Agency Agreement on the Protection of Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Stateless Persons. Signed on 12 October 2017, the Agreement involved the DOJ, this Court, the Department of Education, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of Health, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, the Bureau of Immigration, the Public Attorney's Office, the Commission on Higher Education, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and the Professional Regulation Commission.^[43]

In recognition of the need for an evolving national legal and operational framework for refugees, there have been notable efforts on the part of Congress to establish an exhaustive system and a uniform set of standards for status determination of refugees and stateless persons. During the 18^th Congress, Senate Bill No. 379 and House Bill No. 3425 were filed, seeking to fill the gaps in our existing legal framework by legislating a determination procedure for refugees and stateless persons as well as a central authority in matters relating thereto. Quite recently, Executive Order No. 163, s. 2022 was promulgated to institutionalize access to protection services for refugees, stateless persons, and asylum seekers.

On the part of the judiciary, the Court approved on 15 February 2022 Administrative Matter No. 21-07-22, or the Rule on Facilitated Naturalization of Refugees and Stateless Persons, providing a simplified and expedited procedure for petitions for naturalization of refugees and stateless persons.

The refugee determination procedure
before the DOJ-RSPP pursuant to
DOJ Department Circular No. 058-
12

It bears reiterating that the procedure for the determination of refugee status was not provided under international refugee instruments. The same has been left to the contracting states who will ultimately assess and determine if the applicant is a refugee as defined under the 1951 Refugee Convention.^[44]

As previously stated, the determination procedure is laid out in DOJ Circular No. 058-12. Section 2, Article I thereof describes the proceeding as non-adversarial, which is intended to facilitate identification, treatment, and protection of refugees. Article II provides the details of the procedure, including, but not limited to, the application, the suspensive effect of the application in relation to deportation, exclusion, or release in case of detention, the priority of refugee status determination, burden of proof, interview, decision, and the appeals process.

It is readily discernible that this type of proceeding is sui generis. It belongs to a class by itself, which is neither purely civil nor criminal in nature. It is a status determination process which may result in the recognition of the refugee status of an applicant, thus enabling such person to enjoy and exercise rights and privileges accorded by the 1951 Refugee Convention,^[45] the most enduring of which is naturalization.^[46] Notably, the Court has previously characterized cases involving issues on citizenship as sui generis.^[47]

The importance of determination proceedings cannot be overemphasized. The recognition of refugee status gives rise to a bundle of rights,^[48] including the right to residence, entitlement to appropriate visas and other immigration documents, and other rights and privileges accorded by the Convention. On the other hand, if the application is denied with finality, the applicant is afforded sufficient time to leave the country unless he or she holds another immigration status or his or her continued stay is authorized.^[49]

Further, the sui generis nature of refugee determination cases is more pronounced when We consider the concept of shared burden of proof. This peculiar concept is provided under DOJ Circular No. 058-12, thus:

SECTION 9. Burden of Proof. – The responsibility of proving a claim to refugee or stateless status is a shared and collaborative burden between the Applicant and the Protection Officer.

The Applicant has the obligation to provide accurate, full and credible account or proof in support of his/her claim, and submit all relevant evidence reasonably available.

A finding that the Applicant is a refugee is warranted where he or she has met the definition of the refugee. xxxx

The shared and collaborative burden means that the protection officer, who is a DOJ-RSPPU officer, should actively assist and help the applicant clarify his or her claims and allegations in support of the application. This assistance could be in the form of helping elucidate the claims of the applicant, requesting the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to contact foreign States,^[50] providing the applicant with translation services,^[51] and extending assistance in gathering evidence in support of the application, among others. The shared burden of proof is in recognition of the possibility that some applicants may have left their country in haste, and as such, may not have any evidence to prove their claims. Moreover, there may be other factors which may hinder applicants from fully discussing their allegations, including language barriers and personality differences. In these cases, the protection officer is expected to assist and help the applicant clarify his or her account.

Meanwhile, the applicant must provide accurate, full, and credible account or proof in support of his or her claim. The applicant must also submit relevant evidence reasonably available. After all, the substantive basis for the application will come from the applicant.

The foregoing finds support in UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection (UNHCR Handbook), which, although not binding upon state parties, may serve as a guide for decision-makers, thus:

195. The relevant facts of the individual case will have to be furnished in the first place by the applicant himself. It will then be up to the person charged with determining his status (the examiner) to assess the validity of any evidence and the credibility of the applicant's statements.

196. It is a general legal principle that the burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim. Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his [or her] statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his [or her] statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from prosecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequent even without personal documents. Thus, while the burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application. Even such independent research may not, however, always be successful and there may also be statements that are not susceptible of proof. In such cases, if the applicant's account appears credible, he should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the benefit of the doubt.^[52]

In its Note on the Burden and Standard of Proof dated 16 December 1998, the UNHCR explained that the shared burden of the examiner or adjudicator is discharged by "being familiar with the objective situation in the country of origin concerned, being aware of relevant matters of common knowledge, guiding the applicant in providing the relevant information and adequately verifying facts alleged which can be substantiated."^[53]

Thus, due to the shared burden between the applicant and the protection officer, the latter assumes a more active role in ascertaining the truth. The protection officer shares the responsibility of untangling inconsistencies and contextualizing the applicant's claims. The Handbook elucidates, thus:

199. While an initial interview should normally suffice to bring an applicant's story to light, it may be necessary for an examiner to clarify any apparent inconsistencies and to resolve any contradictions in a further interview, and to find an explanation for any misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. Untrue statements by themselves are not a reason for refusal of refugee status and it is the examiner's responsibility to evaluate such statements in the light of all the circumstances of the case.

200. An examination in depth of the different methods of fact-finding is outside the scope of the present Handbook. It may be mentioned, however, that basic information is frequently given, in the first instance, by completing a standard questionnaire. Such basic information will normally not be sufficient to enable the examiner to reach a decision, and one or more personal interviews will be required. It will be necessary for the examiner to gain the confidence of the applicant in order to assist the latter in putting forward his case and in fully explaining his opinions and feelings. In creating such a climate of confidence it is, of course, of the utmost importance that the applicant's statements will be treated as confidential and that he be so informed.^[54]

The foregoing neither controls nor limits the discretion of the DOJ-RSPPU in status determination proceedings. Rather, We lift these passages from the Handbook to highlight the difference between ordinary administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, on the one hand, and cases for recognition of refugee status, on the other. In the latter, the DOJ-RSSPU acts not only as an adjudicator. The protection officer is expected to assist and collaborate with the applicant in presenting the latter's claims and allegations and in gathering supporting evidence. At the same time, the protection officer is also expected to maintain a certain level of objectivity to determine and assess whether a finding of refugee status is warranted. After all, the protection officer has a duty to "evaluate the application or the request for reconsideration and eligibility of protection after considering all relevant evidence."^[55] The shared and collaborative burden on the part of the protection officer does not mean that it is the latter's duty to ensure the grant of the application.

The determination of refugee status
will primarily require an evaluation
of the applicant's statements.
Nonetheless, the allegations of the

applicant must be contextualized
based on the situation prevailing in
his or her country of origin

As a matter of procedure, the UNHCR Handbook provides two stages in the determination of refugee status: (1) the determination of the relevant facts of the case; and (2) the application of the facts ascertained to the definition of refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.^[56]

This two-step process necessitates the assessment of the credibility of the claims and allegations of the applicant, as well as the evidence and documents presented in support of the application. The protection officer should make the assessment while assisting the applicant in clarifying and explaining his or her claims as may be required. The facts ascertained should then be measured against the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention and DOJ Circular No. 058-12.

As regards the definition of the phrase "well-founded fear of being persecuted," which is the most essential phrase in the definition of a refugee, the UNHCR Handbook specifies the subjective and objective elements of the said phrase, to wit:

xxx Since fear is subjective, the determination involves a subjective element in the person applying for recognition as a refugee. Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgement on the situation prevailing in his country of origin.

38. To the element of fear – a state of mind and a subjective condition – is added the qualification "well-founded". This implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation. The term "well-founded fear" therefore contains a subjective and an objective element, and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken into consideration. (Emphasis supplied.)

Anent the subjective element, the UNHCR Handbook explains:

Due to the importance that the definition attaches to the subjective element, an assessment of credibility is indispensable where the case is not sufficiently clear from the facts on record. It will be necessary to take into account the personal and family background of the applicant, his [or her] membership of a particular racial, religious, national, social or political group, his [or her] own interpretation of his situation, and his [or her] personal experiences – in other words, everything that may serve to indicate that the predominant motive for his [or her] application is fear.^[57]

As regards the objective element, the UNHCR Handbook clarifies that, while not a primary objective, it is necessary to consider the conditions in the country of origin in order to assess the credibility of the applicant, thus:

[I]t is necessary to evaluate the statements made by the applicant. The competent authorities that are called upon to determine refugee status are not required to pass judgement on conditions in the applicant's country of origin. The applicant's statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and must be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation. A knowledge of conditions in the applicant's country of origin –while not a primary objective – is an important element in assessing the applicant's credibility. In general, the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.^[58] (Emphasis supplied.)

In sum, the protection officer has to assess and determine the credibility of the applicant by considering his or her statements, the evidence presented, if any, and the applicant's demeanor and responses to questions and clarifications propounded. The protection officer should also consider the objective situation in the country of origin of the applicant.


The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol did not specify any threshold of evidence to warrant a finding that an applicant is a refugee. There is likewise no specific mention of a quantum of proof in DOJ Circular No. 058-12. In relation to Section 9, Article II, however, it is provided that a finding of refugee status is warranted where the applicant has met the definition of a refugee. The definition referred to is a substantial reproduction of the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, thus:

SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. – xxx

d. "Refugee" is a person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence".

On the basis of the definition of the term refugee, as well as the humanitarian nature of the Refugee Convention and the Protocol, We determine the necessary parameters and quantum of proof in the refugee status determination process in the Philippines.

The most important element of the definition is the existence of a "well-founded fear" of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. While the definition uses the phrase "well-founded fear," this cannot be taken to mean proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal cases. To require such a high threshold will be contrary to the humanitarian purpose of the convention, and the acknowledgment that there may be no other evidence available to the applicant, especially if he or she had to immediately leave the country of origin.

As such, We hold that there is a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" if the applicant can establish, to a reasonable degree, that he or she would have been persecuted had the applicant not left his or her country of origin, or would be persecuted if the applicant returns thereto. So, decision-makers would have to answer the question: "Is there a reasonable chance that the applicant would have been persecuted had he or she not departed from his or her country of origin, or would be persecuted upon return to his or her country?"

The term "reasonable degree" as a threshold of evidence is consistent with that laid out under DOJ Circular No. 058-12 as regards the determination of the stateless status of a person, thus:

SECTION 9. Burden of Proof. – xxx

The finding that the Applicant is stateless is warranted where it is established to a reasonable degree that he or she is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its laws. This involves the examination of the nationality laws of the country with which the Applicant has relevant link (by birth, descent, marriage or habitual residence).^[59]

The reasonable degree threshold further finds support in the UNHCR Handbook, which states that, in general, the applicant's fear should be considered wellfounded if he or she can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his or her continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.^[60]

Other jurisdictions have also provided their interpretations of quantum of proof in their respective refugee determination processes.

In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,^[61] the SCOTUS ruled that the requirement of fear of persecution being "well-founded" does not alter the focus on the individual's subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a "more likely than not" one. One can have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. In interpreting the definition of "refugee," the SCOTUS made reference to the UNHCR Handbook and stated that the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his or her country of origin has become intolerable for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he or she returned there. So long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution; it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.

The House of Lords of United Kingdom, in Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and Others,^[62] rejected the use of the "balance of probabilities" test, which is similar to a "more likely than not" determination. It was elucidated that the mentioned test cannot find application as "there is no general rule of English law that when a court is required to take account of what may happen in the future and to base legal consequences on the likelihood of its happening, it must ignore any possibility of something happening merely because the odds on its happening are fractionally less than evens." As a matter of common sense and humanity, the decision must depend on the gravity of the consequences of permitting, as opposed to refusing, the return of the individual to his or her country. A lesser degree of likelihood that the individual will face detention or restriction should be sufficient (i.e., reasonable chance, substantial grounds for thinking, a serious possibility).

In Joseph Adjei v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,^[63] the Federal Court of Canada stated that the question to be asked in determining whether there is reasonable chance is: "Is there a reasonable chance that persecution would take place were the applicant returned to his country of origin?" It was explained that the evidence need not necessarily show that he or she has suffered or would suffer persecution. On one hand, it need not be more than a 50% chance, and on the other hand, there must be more than a minimal possibility. The applicant must show he or she has good grounds for fearing persecution.

Mason C.J. of the High Court of Australia, in Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (Chan Case),^[64] explained that a fear of prosecution is considered well-founded if there is a real chance that the refugee will be persecuted if he or she returns to his or her country of origin. This is equivalent to "a reasonable degree of likelihood" that the individual will be persecuted, or "a real and substantial risk of persecution".

The High Court of Australia appears to impose a higher standard compared to other countries. It bears stressing, however, that the Chan Case referred to the US case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, explaining that a similar opinion was expressed therein, to wit:

A similar opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987) 94 L Ed 2d 434 where Stevens J., with reference to a statutory provision (which reflected the language of Art. 1(A)(2) of the Convention), in delivering the majority opinion, and citing Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic (1984) 467 US 407, at p 425, observed (at p 453) that the interpretation favoured by the majority would indicate that "it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility". I do not detect any significant difference in the various expressions to which I have referred. But I prefer the expression "a real chance" because it clearly conveys the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of persecution occurring and because it is an expression which has been explained and applied in Australia: see the discussion in Boughey v. The Queen [1986] HCA29; (1986) 161 CLR 10, at p 21, per Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ. If an applicant establishes that there is a real chance of persecution, then his fear, assuming that he has such a fear, is well-founded, notwithstanding that there is less than a fifty percent chance of persecution occurring. This interpretation fulfils the objects of the Convention in securing recognition of refugee status for those persons who have a legitimate or justified fear of persecution on political grounds if they are returned to their country of origin.

J. Dawson of the High Court of Australia likewise opined that a real chance of persecution is necessary before fear of persecution could be considered well-founded. He expounded that "a real chance is one that is not remote, regardless of whether it is less or more than fifty percent."^[65]

The standard of proof in the Chan Case was also adopted in a 2019 case before the Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand involving the claim for refugee status of Turkish nationals.^[66] The Tribunal stated that, in determining what is meant by "well-founded" under the convention, the fear of persecution must be "real, as opposed to a remote or speculative, chance of it occurring."^[67]

To be sure, the foregoing decisions are generally consistent with the reasonable degree threshold made applicable in our jurisdiction, only that the High Court of Australia in the Chan Case preferred to use term "real chance" to convey the notion of a substantial, as distinguished from a remote, chance of persecution.

After a careful perusal of the records of this case, We resolve that the DOJ-RSPPU failed to observe the foregoing procedure and principles in its resolution of petitioner's application.

A re-examination of the subjective
and objective elements of petitioner's
claim as against the reasonable
degree threshold is warranted

To reiterate, an applicant in a refugee status determination case must provide an accurate, full, and credible account or proof to support his or her claim.^[68] Nonetheless, the protection officer is expected to take on a more active role, by exerting efforts to clarify or understand the applicant's claims. In other cases, the protection officer may even go as far as using the means at his or her disposal to obtain evidence which may help the applicant's case.^[69] Ultimately, the responsibility of proving a claim to a refugee status is a shared and collaborative burden between the applicant and the protection officer,^[70] and the latter must consider both the subjective and objective elements of the claim.

In relation to the subjective element, petitioner provided the following information on his filled-out and signed Registration^[71] and Application Questionnaire:^[72]

a. He is a Pakistani national^[73] and a Christian.^[74] He arrived in the Philippines under a Pakistani passport and a visa.^[75]

b. He came to the Philippines to save his life from Muslims. They want him to accept their religion.^[76]

c. His mother died and his father married a Muslim woman. His father then converted to Islam. He is being forced to change his religion; if he does not accept their religion, then he will be killed.^[77]

d. This problem started four (4) years ago when his father married a Muslim woman. He characterized them as "not good". In several instances, they also told him to convert or he will be killed; they tried to do it but he ran away.^[78]

e. He and his brother faced the problem. His brother gave him money and helped him run away from Pakistan to save his life.^[79] His brother does not have money to come with him.^[80]

f. He also attributes the problem to his father and stepmother.^[81]

Petitioner states in the petition that, years after the death of his mother, petitioner's father converted to Islam and married a Muslim woman. Soon thereafter, his stepmother, who is a professor of Islamic Studies, moved in with them. At first, the stepmother was kind to him and his brother. His stepmother's brother, who is a mulana (preacher), visited the family trying to persuade petitioner to convert to Islam, and in time, became aggressive. Sometime after Christmas in 2016, his stepmother and her brother, forced petitioner to read the Quran by forcibly handing it to him, but the latter refused to accept it. As a result, the Quran accidentally dropped. The brother of his stepmother told petitioner that he insulted the Quran and that he is dead, and the former grabbed a knife and petitioner ran away. He states that he brought nothing and slept in a friend's house until he was referred to a non-governmental organization in Pakistan named "Save and Serve Christ," which helped him leave Pakistan for the Philippines.^[82]

In denying petitioner's application, the DOJ-RSPPU explained in its 25 May 2017 Decision that there is only a perceived notion of being prosecuted, not persecuted.^[83] Further, the DOJ-RSPPU expressed doubts as to petitioner's credibility. It highlighted that as regards the claim of "being forced to convert from being a Christian to Muslim", petitioner during his interview stated that he was not forced but merely persuaded,^[84] viz:

"During the applicant's interview, he was specifically asked whether he was being forced or compelled to convert his religion from Catholic to Muslim. The applicant replied that he was not being forced nor compelled but he was being persuaded. The applicant cannot now change his statement to further his claim. Changing his statement now only dampens his credibility."

As discussed, the subjective element of fear in the mind of the applicant is a fundamental matter. The protection officer is primarily required to evaluate the applicant's statements, as the non-presentation of additional evidence cannot be taken against him or her. After all, the proceeding for refugee status determination is non-adversarial and intended to facilitate identification of refugees, with the protection officer taking on a shared and collaborative burden in proving the applicant's claims.

Here, records do not show that the DOJ-RSPPU attempted to clarify the supposed inconsistency in petitioner's statements. Indeed, if the denial of an application would be hinged on the applicant's choice of words, it behooves the State to ensure that the applicant deliberately and intelligently chose the words used.

However, when asked about his proficiency in speaking and understanding English, petitioner ticked the box "not easily" – within a range of "easily," "not easily," and "none" – in his Registration with the DOJ-RSPPU.^[85] Records do not show whether petitioner was provided with an interpreter despite his right to have one, if necessary, "at all stages of the refugee status determination and for the purposes of the preparation of the written application and for the interview."^[86] The DOJ-RSPPU failed to consider that the change in petitioner's statement, from "being persuaded" to "being forced" to convert to Islam and vice versa, may have been due to a language barrier, given his difficulty in speaking and understanding the English language. Not being proficient in English, petitioner may not have accurately portrayed the nuances of his situation in Pakistan.

To clarify petitioner's allegations, the DOJ-RSPPU should have considered his original statement of "being persuaded" to convert to Islam together with the rest of his claims. Notably, he was constant in relaying his fear of religious persecution. As mentioned, in his Registration, petitioner already claimed that he is being forced to change his religion, and he would be killed if he does not convert to Islam.^[87] As also stated in the Handbook, even assuming that there are inconsistencies in petitioner's account, a further interview may be conducted to clarify and resolve any contradictions in his statements.^[88]

Applying by analogy the respect given by the Court to trial courts in cases heard before them, the DOJ-RSPPU is in the best position to ascertain and measure the credibility of the applicant through their actual observation of their statements and demeanor. However, given the sui generis nature of refugee determination cases, more is expected from the DOJ-RSPPU. In fact, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, the DOJ-RSPPU is even called to give an applicant the benefit of the doubt.^[89] The records of this case would show that the DOJ-RSPPU fell short of its duty to have a shared and collaborative burden with petitioner, by exerting efforts to clarify and understand his statements.

As regards the objective element, petitioner also claims that the DOJ-RSPPU erred in ruling that petitioner is not subject to persecution under Pakistan's blasphemy laws for dropping the Quran.^[90] Petitioner asserts that the DOJ-RSPPU's ruling is grounded on speculation, having been made without considering the real situation in Pakistan where there is a strong possibility that petitioner, a Christian, may be subjected to persecution under Pakistan's stringent and rigid blasphemy laws.^[91] Petitioner then cites instances of blasphemy allegations in Pakistan.^[92]

A review of the ruling of the Secretary of Justice through the DOJ-RSPPU shows that it relied solely on the United Kingdom's Country Information and Guidance on Christian and Christian Converts in Pakistan (UK Country Guidance),^[93] which in turn cited AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG [2014]^[94] (AK and SK Case). The AK and SK Case involves Christians in Pakistan who seek to establish that they would be at real risk from extremist groups if returned to their home area or their country. There, the Upper Tribunal declared the following as country guidance, which the DOJ-SPPU quoted in the assailed Decisions:

i. Christians in Pakistan are a religious minority who, in general, suffer discrimination but this is not sufficient to amount to a real risk of persecution.

ii. In general, Christians are able to practice their faith, can attend church, participate in religious activities and have their own schools and hospitals.

iii. Although Christians, as with other faiths, may be at risk of blasphemy allegations, this in itself is not generally enough to make out a claim under the Refugee Convention unless there is evidence that the charge is pursued.^[95]

We find the reliance of the DOJ-RSPPU solely on the UK Country Guidance and the AK and SK Case improper.

It is observed that in contrast to the DOJ-RSPPU's Decisions, the Upper Tribunal in the AK and SK Case did not rely solely on one source. Instead, the Upper Tribunal considered several resources to formulate a comprehensive country-of-origin information, which was used together with the submissions of the parties and the evidence of experts and other witnesses to make its findings and give country guidance. While the AK and SK Case may be used as a resource material, We wish to emphasize that a determination of refugee status ought to be carefully prepared using "reliable, accurate, up-to-date, and country- or region- specific as well as branch- or sect-specific information". Relevantly, in the 2017 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan,^[96] it was concluded that "members of the Christian community, including in particular those targeted by militant groups or charged with criminal offenses under the blasphemy provisions, victims of bonded labour, severe discrimination, forced conversion and forced marriage, as well as Christians perceived as contravening social mores, may, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion."^[97]

Further, proper context is necessary in the utilization of UK Country Guidance in our refugee status determination cases. In this regard, it is worth stressing that the AK and SK Case based its determination of AK and SK's refugee status on the establishment of a real risk of persecution based on the country guidance and evidence presented by the parties. As pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, the circumstances in the AK and SK Case are not on all fours with the case at hand.^[98] In the AK and SK Case, AK and SK made claims which were later found to lack credibility with regard to the events in Pakistan. The lack of documents to support the alleged attacks by extremists against AK and SK coupled with the presence of evidence contradicting their claims, were considered by the Upper Tribunal in dismissing the appeal of AK and SK. The Upper Tribunal also concluded that AK and SK have a home and family to return to and are educated enough to find employment on their return.

Unlike in the AK and SK Case, the DOJ-RSPPU established that the forced conformity with religious practice and threat of death came from a relative by affinity, i.e., his stepmother's brother. Further, aside from the supposed inconsistency in the statement of petitioner on whether he was being forced or merely persuaded to convert, there is nothing in the records that contradict the claims of petitioner. There also was an alleged threat of death such that petitioner left home immediately and went into hiding. At the time of his departure, petitioner, who was only able to finish 10^th grade, was dependent on his father for material support. Given the significant differences of said case from the case at bar, it is erroneous to heavily rely on the AK and SK Case.

A remand of the case to the DOJ-
RSPPU is necessary

At this juncture, We reiterate that the Court is not a trier of facts. We are not capacitated to receive and appreciate evidence of the first instance. Considering the factual issues that still need to be threshed out in light of the clarifications on the refugee status determination process, We find it prudent to remand the case back to the DOJ-RSPPU.^[99]

The DOJ-RSPPU is urged to actively discharge its burden in assisting petitioner to elucidate his claim. Reception of further evidence, conduct of additional interviews, in-depth study of country-of-origin information, and assessment of petitioner's averments to a greater extent are thus encouraged. Thereafter, the evidence should be assessed based on the reasonable degree threshold We laid down in this case.

In this regard, We provide the following guidelines for refugee status determination proceedings:

1. To discharge the shared and collaborative burden between the applicant and the protection officer: (a) the applicant must provide accurate, full, and credible account or proof in support of his or her claim, and submit all relevant evidence reasonably available; and (b) the protection officer must assist and aid the applicant in explaining, clarifying, and elucidating his or her claim.

2. Notwithstanding the protection officer's shared burden, it is also the duty of the protection officer to assess the credibility of the statements of the applicant and the evidence on record.

3. The facts, as ascertained, should be applied to the definition of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, considering the subjective and objective elements of the phrase "well-founded fear". The protection officer should determine if the applicant has established, to a reasonable degree, that he or she would have been persecuted had the applicant not: left his or her country of origin or would be persecuted if the applicant returns thereto.

Ultimately, in as much as we want to extend the mantle of our country's protection to an applicant., we cannot do so without first being convinced that the applicant is unable, or unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of his home country due to a well-founded fear of religious persecution. The humanitarian nature of international refugee law requires us to offer a helping hand to those who have satisfied the requirements for recognition of refugee status. But the same cannot be offered indiscriminately with our finite resources. Care must be taken if we are to provide home and solace to those who truly need it so they can rest their fearful hearts.

Thus, the case should be remanded to the DOJ-RSPPU in order to re­evaluate petitioner's application in accordance with the evidentiary threshold and guidelines established in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 31 January 2019 and Resolution dated 10 September 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Department of Justice – Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines stated in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., I concur. See separate opinion.

Caguioa, J., see concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier,^* Kho, Jr.,^* and Singh,^* JJ., no part.

---

^* No part due to prior participation.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 13-22.

^[2] Id. at 34-56; penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob.

^[3] Id. at 58-60; penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Maria Filomena D. Singh (now a Member of this Court).

^[4] Id. at 101-107; penned by Ricardo V. Paras III, Chief State Counsel and Head, RSPPU.

^[5] Id. at 115-119; penned by Ricardo V. Paras III, Chief State Counsel and Head, RSPPU.

^[6] Id. at 35-37.

^[7] Id. at 107.

^[8] Id. at 104-106.

^[9] Id. at 115-119.

^[10] Id. at 116.

^[11] Supra note 2.

^[12] Id. at 55.

^[13] Id. at 43-55.

^[14] Id. at 58-60.

^[15] Speech made by Dr. Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the meeting of Swiss Aid to Europe held in Berne, on 19 February 1953, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fb630/speech-made-dr-gerrit-jan-van-heuven-goedhart-united-nations-high-commissioner.html> (visited 25 July 2022).

^[16] UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/> (last accessed on 22 April 2022). Based on the data from UNHCR, 39% of the refugee population are hosted in Turkey, Colombia, Uganda, Pakistan, and Germany.

^[17] See <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/3/1-million-refugees-flee-ukraine-in-week-since-russian-invasion> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[18] Philippines to welcome Ukrainian refugees – DOJ, available at <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/03/03/2164637/philippines-welcome-ukrainian-refugees-doj> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[19] UHNCR Fact Sheet – Philippines, available at <https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Philippines%20fact%20sheet%20January%202021.pdf> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[20] Laurice Peñamante, Nine Waves of Refugees in the Philippines, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/ph/11886-9wavesrefugees.html> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[21] Id.

^[22] Id.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Proclamation No. 173, 21 August 1937.

^[26] Supra, note 18.

^[27] Id.

^[28] Id.

^[29] Id.

^[30] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Agreement under the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Philippines, 12 November 1979, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ee6f89b4.html> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[31] Supra, note 25.

^[32] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at < https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[33] Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3c2306cc4/declaration-states-parties-1951-convention-andor-its-1967-protocol-relating.html> (visited 22 April 2022). This was adopted on 13 December 2001 in Geneva at the Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

^[34] Article I(A)(2), 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at < https://www.unhcr.org/5d9ed32b4> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[35] UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, February 2019 (hereinafter, UNHCR Handbook), p. 42, par. 189, available at < https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[36] UNHCR Handbook, p. 43, par. 192; Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty second Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/32/12/Add.1), para. 53 (6) (e), available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N77/214/08/PDF/N7721408.pdf?OpenElement> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[37] UNHCR Handbook, par. 205, p. 45.

^[38] Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report, Universal Periodic Review: 3^rd Cycle, 27^th Session, available at <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/591984589.pdf> (last accessed on 22 April 2022); 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at < https://www.unhcr.org/5d9ed32b4> (visited 22 April 2022). The Philippines also signed the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons on 22 June 1955 and ratified it on 22 September 2011. See <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[39] UNHCR Handbook, pp. 13-14, pars. 7-9.

^[40] ESTABLISHING THE REFUGEES AND STATELESS STATUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURE. Approved: 18 October 2012.

^[41] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12, Sec. 5.

^[42] SECTION 7. Legal Staff. — The Legal Staff shall have the following functions:
(1) Assist the Secretary in the performance of his duties as Attorney General of the Philippines and as ex-officio legal adviser of government-owned or controlled corporations or enterprises and their subsidiaries;
(2) Prepare and finally act for and in behalf of the Secretary on all queries and/or requests for legal advice or guidance coming from private parties, and minor officials and employees of the government;
(3) Maintain and supervise the operation of the Department Law Library as well as its personnel; and
(4) Perform such other functions as are now or may hereafter be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary.

^[43] See Ph Gov't Agencies Sign Agreement to Protect Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Stateless Persons, available at < https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/dfa-releasesupdate/14318-ph-gov-t-agencies-sign-agreement-to-protect-asylum-seekers-refugees-and-stateless-persons> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[44] UNHCR Handbook p. 42, par. 189; UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, 16 December 1998, p. 1, available at <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3338.pdf> (visited 22 April 2022).

^[45] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12, Article II, Sec. 15.

^[46] 1951 Refugee Convention, Chapter V, Article 34.

^[47] See Go v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, 761 Phil. 223 (2015), and Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451 (2009). These cases involve deportation proceedings where citizenship was raised as an issue.

^[48] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12, Article II, Sec. 15.

^[49] Id. at Article II, Sec. 14.

^[50] Id. at Article VII, Sec. 31.

^[51] Id.

^[52] UNHCR Handbook, p. 43, pars. 195-196.

^[53] UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, 16 December 1998, supra, note 41, p. 2.

^[54] UNHCR Handbook, p. 44, pars. 199 and 200.

^[55] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12, Article VII, Sec. 31.

^[56] UNHCR Handbook, p. 17, par. 18.

^[57] UNHCR Handbook, p. 19, par. 41.

^[58] Id. at 19-20, par. 42.

^[59] Emphasis supplied.

^[60] Id. at 19-20, par. 42.

^[61] 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

^[62] Fernandez v. Government of Singapore and Others, United Kingdom: House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 25 May 1971.

^[63] R.S.C. 1976, C. 52, 27 January 1989.

^[64] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379.

^[65] Id.

^[66] BP (Turkey), [2019] NZIPT 801453-456, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 30 October 2019, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,5f69ef274.html> (visited 22 April 2022). See also AH (Turkey), [2015] NZIPT 800665-666, New Zealand: Immigration and Protection Tribunal, 28 April 2015, available at: < https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZ_IPT,55b0b0704.html> (visited 05 April 2022).

^[67] Id.

^[68] DOJ Circular No. 058-12, Article II, Sec. 9.

^[69] UNHCR Handbook, p. 43, pars. 195-196.

^[70] DOJ Circular No. 058-12, Article II, Sec. 9.

^[71] Rollo, pp. 88-95.

^[72] Id. at 96-99.

^[73] Id. at 89, 96.

^[74] Id. at 89.

^[75] Id. at 92, 97.

^[76] Id. at 88.

^[77] Id. at 93.

^[78] Id.

^[79] Id. at 93 and 97.

^[80] Id. at 99.

^[81] Id. at 93.

^[82] Id. at 66-67.

^[83] Id. at 118.

^[84] Id. at 80.

^[85] Id. at 89.

^[86] DOJ Circular No. 058-12, Article II, Section 10.

^[87] Id.

^[88] UNHCR Handbook, p. 44, pars. 199 and 200.

^[89] Id. at 43, pars. 195-196.

^[90] Rollo, p. 20.

^[91] Id.

^[92] Id. at 21-22.

^[93] United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Pakistan: Christians and Christian converts, May 2016, v 2.0, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5732cd444.html> (visited July 2022).

^[94] AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2014] UKUT 00569 (IAC), United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 15 December 2014, available at: < https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,549962d94.html> (visited 21 April 2022).

^[95] Rollo, pp. 105-106. Also, AK & SK Case, pars. 240, 241 and 245.

^[96] Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan (HCR/EG/PAK/17/01), January 2017, p. 45, available at: < https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5857ed0e4.pdf> (visited 25 July 2022).

^[97] Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/04/06), available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/40d8427a4/guidelines-international-protection-6-religion-based-refugee-claims-under.html> (visited 25 July 2022).

^[98] Reflections of J. Leonen, p. 9.

^[99] See Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, 07 December 2021; Spouses Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Sunia, 683 Phil. 239 (2012); Syjuco v. Bonifacio, 750 Phil. 443 (2015).

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CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I agree with the ponencia that this case must be remanded for a proper disposal. The determination of refugee status is a sui generis proceeding, where the protection officer shares the burden with the applicant in establishing their claim for protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention).^[1] I wish to emphasize the rigor required in evaluating applications for refugee status determination.

The Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless' Persons Protection Processing Unit (DOJ-RSPPU) is mandated to assist and protect asylum seekers.^[2] Each protection officer must meet the demands of their duties. Their analysis cannot be limited to the words used by applicants in their statements. They should show sufficient knowledge and understanding of why the applicant is fleeing their home countries, refusing to avail of protection there, and seeking refuge in a foreign land. To do this, a protection officer must examine the profiles, personalities, and motivations of each applicant and understand their subjective fears. They must assess the credibility of these fears against the objective situation of those similarly situated in the country of origin. Only then can we be confident that necessary assistance and protection have been extended to those fleeing persecution.

Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, refugee status is generally given to a person who is outside their country of nationality or habitual residence, but who is unable to return or avail of its protection, because of a well-founded fear of persecution "for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion[.]"^[3] The most important element in an application for refugee status is a well-founded fear of persecution. The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection^[4] provides that an applicant must show a good reason why they fear persecution.

Fear is highly subjective. It requires assessing the credibility of an applicant's state of mind, personality, and other psychological factors.^[5] To be well founded, it must be supported by objective evidence, which generally comprises the conditions in the country of origin. Its coverage is not limited to those who were actually persecuted, but also extends to those who wish to avoid the risk of persecution.^[6] Also, persecution need not be based on personal experience, and may be drawn from the experience of others similarly situated.^[7] The applicant's statements should be understood within the context of the conditions of their country of origin.^[8]

As held in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca,^[9] the standard required to establish a well-founded fear is only a reasonable possibility. While a foreign case, it is persuasive and serves as a useful guide in our reading of the well-founded-fear requirement.

In Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the immigration judge's ruling that the Nicaraguan asylum seeker had to establish a clear probability of being subjected to persecution upon deportation. It interpreted the "well-founded fear" standard in Article 208(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952^[10] in line with the intent of the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol).

Based on this, the United States Supreme Court held that an asylum seeker need not establish that they would actually be persecuted upon deportation. It was sufficient "that, so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility."^[11]

Here, petitioner Rehman Sabir applied for refugee status based on religion-based persecution due to his Christianity and refusal to accept the Qur'an.

Religion has no universally accepted definition. It is not limited to traditional religions and includes beliefs with similar institutional characteristics or practices.^[12] A well-founded fear from persecution due to religion may include restrictions in the exercise of religious freedom, discrimination, forced conversion, or forced compliance or conformity with religious practices.^[13] Due to the complex nature of applications grounded on religion-based persecution, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. It provides the relevant inquiries that may be asked to the asylum seeker:

14. Each claim requires examination on its merits on the basis of the individual's situation. Relevant areas of enquiry include the individual profile and personal experiences of the claimant, his or her religious belief, identity and/or way of life, how important this is for the claimant, what effect the restrictions have on the individual, the nature of his or her role and activities within the religion, whether these activities have been or could be brought to the attention of the persecutor and whether they could result in treatment rising to the level of persecution. In this context, the well-founded fear "need not necessarily be based on the applicant's own personal experience". What, for example, happened to the claimant's friends and relatives, other members of the same religious group, that is to say to other similarly situated individuals, "may well show that his [or her] fear that sooner or later he [or she] also will become a victim of persecution is well-founded". Mere membership of a particular religious community will normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. As the UNHCR Handbook notes, there may, however, be special circumstances where mere membership suffices, particularly when taking account of the overall political and religious situation in the country of origin, which may indicate a climate of genuine insecurity for the members of the religious community concerned.^[14] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In response to the continuing sectarian and religiously motivated violence among religious minorities in Pakistan, the UNHCR also issued the Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan (Eligibility Guidelines).^[15] It identified Christianity as one of the vulnerable minority groups that may need international refugee protection:

UNHCR considers that members of the Christian community, including in particular those targeted by militant groups or charged with criminal offences under the blasphemy provisions, victims of bonded labour, severe discrimination, forced conversion and forced marriage, as well as Christians perceived as contravening social mores, may, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion, ethnicity, (imputed) political opinion, and/or other relevant grounds.^[16] (Citations omitted)

Notwithstanding the UNHCR's recognition of the vulnerability of Christians in Pakistan, in AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,^[17] the Upper Tribunal on Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the United Kingdom denied the application for refugee status of two siblings who fled from Karachi, Pakistan due to risk of persecution from extremist groups. AK angered his students while discussing Jesus and Prophet Mohammed in relation to Charles Dickens's novel entitled, "A Christmas Carol."

In evaluating the applicants' claims, the tribunal examined the history of Pakistan, its people, its system of government, its constitution, and relevant laws affecting the practice of religion, especially on blasphemy. It then assessed the risk of persecution that Christians and their supporters faced using the existing country information and reported data from local and international groups. After a careful examination of the objective data, the applicants' subjective claims were evaluated.

The tribunal concluded that the applicants' fears of persecution were not well founded. It did not find their statements credible and did not give weight to the documents they presented, as these appeared to be fabricated and belatedly introduced. Moreover, the applicants were educated and from a well-off family, and did not fall within the vulnerable categories of Christians in Pakistan. The tribunal held that "Christians in Pakistan are a religious minority who, in general, suffer discrimination but this is not sufficient to amount to a real risk of persecution."^[18]

AK and SK shows that mere membership in a particular religious community is generally insufficient to successfully claim refugee status. Each religion-based claim must be carefully evaluated based on the circumstances of the applicants.^[19] The Eligibility Guidelines provides that an asylum claim from a member of a religious minority from Pakistan requires a careful examination of the possible risks using a "fair and efficient status determination procedures and up-to-date and relevant country of origin information."^[20]

In this case, however, the protection officer's evaluation of the application is sorely lacking. The protection officer relied on petitioner's use of words, without a deeper examination of his meaning when, as the ponencia pointed out, petitioner has indicated that he does not easily understand English.^[21] Moreover, the protection officer neglected petitioner's personal situation. He alleged that he was economically dependent on his family. He was unemployed because he was a Christian who only finished up to 10th grade due to financial constraints.^[22]

Additionally, the protection officer should not literally interpret petitioner's characterization of his step-uncle Raja's attempts to convert him to Islam as merely persuasion. Petitioner narrated that Raja was trying to convert him to Islam at least twice or thrice a week, each time he visited his house.^[23] The frequency of these attempts to convert him culminated in an aggressive confrontation, with threats to his life. The cumulative impact of these persuasions amount to a forceful conversion to Islam, or at least a forceful compliance with its practices, amounting to religion-based persecution.

The protection officer also did not seem to have examined the objective situation of Christians in Pakistan. The ponencia noted that the DOJ-RSPPU's ruling only relied on one source, which was the United Kingdom's Country Information and Guidance on Christians and Christian Converts in Pakistan.^[24] Hence, I agree with petitioner that there was no objective determination of the Christians' situation in Pakistan.

It also does not appear that the risk that petitioner could face should he be deported to Lahore, Pakistan was considered. The protection officer did not consider the gravity of the accusation, the identity of his accuser, and all the other relevant allegations relating to his forced conformity or conversion to Islam.

Significantly, the protection officer missed the identity of petitioner's accuser. Raja was not merely his step-uncle, but was alleged to be a maulana or a preacher in the mosque.^[25] A maulana is a form of address to a learned Muslim scholar.^[26] If petitioner's allegation is found credible, it may increase the risk of his persecution given that a maulana occupies an esteemed and respected status in the community.

Similarly, the gravity of the accusation against petitioner cannot be discounted. Raja accused him of insulting the Qur'an after he had accidentally dropped it on the floor while rejecting his step-uncle's attempts to accept it. This may be considered a grave offense, especially by Raja, a maulana. The Qur'an is the primary source of Islamic law and the very foundation of the religion.^[27] It is the most sacred text for Muslims, one that they consider to be a miracle.^[28] Raja's display of violence when he grabbed the kitchen knife and told petitioner that "he is now dead"^[29] is consistent with the attitude of the predominantly Muslim population against blasphemy of religious minority groups.

Pakistan's blasphemy laws are strongly criticized internationally for "fuelling extremist violence and targeted attacks against individuals from religious minority groups."^[30] Aside from criminal prosecution under Section 295-C of Pakistan's criminal laws, which punishes one with death, as petitioner alleged,^[31] an accusation of blasphemy exposes a religious minority to serious risk of violence from non-state actors:

Accusations of blasphemy may carry serious risks for the person accused as well as their families, irrespective of whether the person concerned is subsequently charged with an offence against the blasphemy laws. Individuals accused of blasphemy have reportedly been subject to death threats, assaults, including mob attacks, and assassinations by community members or members of the security forces, either before they are arrested and tried in court, or even after they have been acquitted, forcing some to go into hiding or to flee in fear of their lives. Some persons accused of blasphemy are reportedly tortured or killed while in police custody or detention. Prison officials have reportedly stated that detainees accused of or convicted of blasphemy are at high risk of attacks by other detainees or even prison staff. In many cases, individuals are reportedly kept in solitary confinement or isolation as a form of protection, sometimes for many years at a time.^[32] (Citations omitted)

The UNHCR identified Christians in serious risk of mob violence especially in petitioner's community in Lahore, Pakistan:

b) Treatment of Christian Individuals by Non-State Actors

Attacks and in[cid]ents of mob violence targeting Christians reportedly continue to occur throughout the country; analysts attribute the violence in part to the growing influence of Sunni extremist ideology. Militant groups have conducted attacks in particular during church services or religious processions. In September 2016, four armed men reportedly attacked a Christian residential area in Peshawar, known as Christian Colony, leaving one man dead; police reportedly intervened, killing the four militants. In March 2016, a suspected suicide bomber killed at least 72 people in a local park in Lahore on Easter Sunday; a splinter group of the Pakistani Taliban reportedly claimed responsibility and announced that the attack had targeted Christians, although there were many Muslims among the victims. On 15 March 2015, a militant group reportedly bombed two Christian churches in Lahore while the churches were full of worshippers participating in a Sunday service, killing an estimated 14 to 17 people and wounding at least 70. In response to the attack, Christians protested on 16 March 2015; the protest reportedly became violent and the Christian protestors reportedly killed two Muslims; civil society groups estimated that the police arrested more than 500 Christians alleged to have participated in the killings. Residents of the Christian neighbourhood Youhanabad in Lahore reported fearing retaliation and further violence.

Christians have also reportedly been subject to targeted attacks and killings by members of society.

Christians reportedly continue to face illegal occupation and desecration of their places of worship and graveyards, and in some cases their stores and businesses. For example, in January 2016, two churches on the outskirts of Lahore were reportedly subject to arson attacks. In November 2015, Gawahi Television, a Christian Web TV station in Karachi was reportedly the target of an arson attack, and its studios and equipment completely destroyed in the fire; the station had reportedly informed the authorities that it had received threats prior to the attack. In May 2015, an armed group reportedly vandalized a Christian church in Punjab, and injured six people, including the pastor.^[33] (Citations omitted)

This is consistent with petitioner's narration of his fears when he explained that his step-uncle's "accusation will be reported to the local Muslim community and that the community will likely gang up on him to kill him."^[34] He added that "the [g]overnment cannot do anything about it."^[35] The protection officer should have assessed the credibility of these statements based on the objective situation in the local community in Lahore, Pakistan.

I recognize that the DOJ-RSPPU has the primary jurisdiction to evaluate applications for determining refugee status. However, this Court should not hesitate to compel the agency to properly discharge its duties, especially to asylum seekers fleeing violence. Again, in refugee status applications, the burden of proof is shared between the applicant and the protection officer.^[36]

Here, the DOJ-RSPPU did not examine the subjective and objective components of petitioner's fears within the context of Christians' situation in Pakistan. There was no indication that petitioner's account on this matter was not credible. It bears emphasis that actual persecution, or the actual filing of blasphemy charges, is not always required to conclude that one's fear of religion-based persecution is well founded. Immigration and Naturalization Service teaches that once an objective situation has been established by the evidence, the threshold of the persecution required is only a reasonable possibility, not actual persecution.

In any case, should petitioner not obtain refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, there is no basis to immediately deport him.

There is a growing state practice toward preference for voluntary, rather than forced, returns.^[37] On October 10, 2003, the UNHCR Executive Committee reached a consensus on unsuccessful asylum seekers, or those "found not to be in need of international protection":

(a) Reaffirms the right of everyone to leave any country, including his or her own, and to return to his or her own country as well as the obligation of States to receive back their own nationals, including the facilitation thereof, and remains seriously concerned, as regards the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection, that some countries continue to restrict the return of their own nationals, either outright or through laws and practices which effectively block expeditious return;

....

(c) Reiterates that return of persons found not to be in need of international protection should be undertaken in a humane manner, in full respect for human rights and dignity and, that force, should it be necessary, be proportional and undertaken in a manner consistent with human rights law; and emphasizes that in all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration[.]^[38]

The Philippines, through DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12, displays this preference for voluntary returns of asylum seekers who were denied refugee status. Section 14 provides that upon the application's denial with finality, the applicant shall be given sufficient time to leave the country.^[39] This provision should be read in its plain and literal meaning. We should not engage in unnecessary construction when the words of a statute or rule are clear.^[40]

Thus, while I agree that the State has an inherent power to deport an alien from its territory, the power to remove an asylum seeker must be exercised with caution, and as a last resort.

Deportation is an exercise of police power to remove "undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people."^[41] While it is not criminal in nature, it is an extraordinary and harsh administrative proceeding with severe and cruel consequences, amounting to punishment.^[42] The grounds for deportation are enumerated under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act.^[43] The denial of an asylum claim does not fall under any of these grounds. There is also no showing that petitioner's presence in the country offends public order. Even if his refugee status application should be denied, there is simply no basis to order his deportation.

I agree with Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa that international human rights law and international customary norms provide our non-refoulement obligations, which apply even to unsuccessful asylum seekers.^[44] Following the principle of non-refoulement, before removal measures are implemented, we have a positive duty to ensure that the unsuccessful asylum seeker will not be exposed to danger of serious human rights violations or to irreparable harm or risk of torture and other cruel treatment.^[45] Before they are removed, we must ensure that they are prepared to return to their country of origin or to a third state.^[46]

This duty primarily falls on the DOJ-RSPPU, whose mandate is to find durable solutions for refugees and stateless persons.^[47] This extends even to those whose applications are pending and those who were denied refugee status with finality. However, DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12 does not provide the mechanisms for the removal of the asylum seeker after their application has been denied with finality. The Department of Justice and other relevant agencies need to formulate the rules on the effective return process and mechanisms for unsuccessful asylum seekers, accounting for our obligations under relevant international human rights instruments and customary norms.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur that this case should be remanded to the Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless' Persons Protection Processing Unit for proper disposal in accordance with the guidelines outlined in the ponencia.

---

^[1] Ponencia, pp. 13-15.

^[2] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12 (2012), sec. 5.

^[3] 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(2), July 22, 1981, available at < https://www.unhcr.org/4ae57b489.pdf> (last accessed on August 1, 2022) states:
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well[-]founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

^[4] Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Handbook), p. 12, par 45.

^[5] Id. at 11-12, pars. 38-41.

^[6] Id., pars. 38 & 45.

^[7] Id. at 12, par. 43.

^[8] Id., par. 42.

^[9] 480 U.S. 421 (1986).

^[10] The United States Congress adopted the "well-founded" fear standard under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and intended its refugee law to conform to these international instruments.

^[11] Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1983).

^[12] Guidelines on International Protection No. 6: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Guidelines On International Protection No. 6), item no. 4, April 28, 2004, available at < https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/40d8427a4/guidelines-international-protection-6-religion-based-refugee-claims-under.html> 3 (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[13] Id. at 4-5, item no. 12.

^[14] Id. at 5, item no. 14.

^[15] Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan, January 2017, HCR/EG/PAK/17/01 (Eligibility Guidelines), available at < https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5857ed0e4.pdf> 4 (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[16] Id. at 45.

^[17] UKUT 00569 (IAC), United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), December 15, 2014, available at <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,549962d94.html> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[18] Id. at 75, par. 240.

^[19] Guidelines On International Protection No. 6, p. 137, item no. 14.

^[20] Eligibility Guidelines, p. 4.

^[21] Ponencia, p. 24.

^[22] Id. at 3.

^[23] Id.

^[24] Id. at 25.

^[25] Ponencia, p. 3.

^[26] MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, "Maulana," < https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maulana> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[27] Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 39 (2002).

^[28] Id. at 44-45.

^[29] Ponencia, p. 3.

^[30] Eligibility Guidelines, p. 11.

^[31] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[32] Eligibility Guidelines, p. 17.

^[33] Id. at 41-43.

^[34] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[35] Id.

^[36] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12 (2012), sec. 9 states:
SECTION 9. Burden of Proof. — The responsibility of proving a claim to refugee or stateless status is a shared and collaborative burden between the Applicant and the Protection Officer. The Applicant has the obligation to provide accurate, full and credible account or proof in support of his/her claim, and submit all relevant evidence reasonably available.
A finding that the Applicant is a refugee is warranted where he or she has met the definition of the refugee.
The finding that the Applicant is stateless is warranted where it is established to a reasonable degree that he or she is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its laws. This involves the examination of the nationality laws of the country with which the Applicant has a relevant link (by birth, descent, marriage or habitual residence).

^[37] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The removal of failed asylum seekers: international norms and procedures, December 1, 2007, available at < https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c2472eb0.html> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[38] Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Conclusion on the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection No. 96 (LIV) - 2003, No. 96 (LIV), October 10, 2003, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f93b1ca4.html> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[39] DOJ Department Circular No. 058-12 (2012), sec. 14 states:
SECTION 14. Finality of Decision. — Where the application is denied with finality, the Applicant shall be afforded sufficient time to leave the country unless he/she holds another immigration status or the Commissioner has authorized his/her continued stay. Any immigration proceeding that has been suspended pursuant to Section 7 hereof may be reactivated.

^[40] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc., 604 Phil. 547 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division].

^[41] Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 274 Phil. 1157, 1206 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc] citing Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 1247 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].

^[42] Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235, 283 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Second Division].

^[43] Commonwealth Act No. 613 (1940), as amended, sec. 37 states in part:
SECTION 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:
(1) alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry;
(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
(3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his entry to the Philippines, or who, at any time after such entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;
(4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law governing prohibited drugs;
(5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of prostitution, or is a procurer;
(6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant;
(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to organized government or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines.
(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix and approved by the Department Head;
(10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine Commonwealth Act Numbered Six Hundred and Fifty-Three, otherwise known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941, or who, at any time after entry, shall have been convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought against him;
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
(13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating properties to prevent them from being attached or executed[.]

^[44] J. Caguioa, Concurring Opinion, p. 11.

^[45] UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[46] UNHCR, The removal of failed asylum seekers: international norms and procedures, December 1, 2007, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c2472eb0.html> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).

^[47] DOJ Department Circular No. 58-12 (2012), sec. 5.

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CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA, J.:

The instant petition seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision^[1] dated January 31, 2019 and Resolution^[2] dated September 10, 2019 in CA-G.R. SP No. 153799. The CA affirmed the decisions^[3] of respondent Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU) (respondent) which denied the application of petitioner Rehman Sabir (petitioner), a Pakistani national, for recognition as a refugee under the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees^[4] (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ^[5] (1967 Protocol). The ponencia partly grants the petition by reversing the CA but remanding the case to respondent for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines set in the ponencia.^[6] In so doing, the ponencia recognizes in the main that respondent failed to actively discharge its shared and collaborative burden in assisting petitioner to elucidate his claim.^[7] In particular, respondent failed to clarify the supposed inconsistency in petitioner's statements which may have been borne by the language barrier.^[8]

The ponencia also observed that respondent's reliance on the United Kingdom's Country Information and Guidance on Christians and Christian Converts in Pakistan^[9] (UK Country Guidance) and the AK and SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan CG v. Secretary of State for the Home Department^[10] (AK and SK (Christians: risk)) case was improper.^[11] On this score, the ponencia expresses that reception of further evidence, conduct of additional interviews, in-depth study of country-of-origin information, and assessment of an applicant's averments to a greater extent should thus be encouraged from respondent.^[12]

I agree with the above-stated disposition of the ponencia. Indeed, respondent is obliged to render a determination in applications for a refugee status that is consistent with the 1951 Convention, the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees^[13] (the Handbook) issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the DOJ's own Department Circular No. 058^[14] (DOJ-DC No. 058). The assailed decisions of respondent, however, as correctly held by the ponencia, fell short of what these instruments require from the examining authority. On this note, I write this separate Concurring Opinion for the sake of expounding on the obligations of a State party to these main international legal instruments, as well as other complementary international legal instruments, governing the determination of refugee status. In an attempt to give a holistic view of the entire proceedings, I also wish to add to the discussion the mechanisms in play when the application for a declaration of refugee status has been denied and the applicant has to consequently leave the country.

The commitment of the Philippines
under the 1951 Convention and its
1967 Protocol

As correctly observed by the ponencia, as early as 1940, Commonwealth Act No. 613^[15] had authorized the President to allow "aliens who are refugees for religious, political, or racial reasons" to be admitted in the Philippines for humanitarian interests and when not opposed to the public interest.^[16] The term "refugees," ostensibly, was not defined under the Act and was used rather loosely. The Act also provided of mere admission and not of recognition or determination of a status as a refugee.

For the longest time, there was no domestic law governing the determination of a refugee or stateless status of a person. This was so even with the accession by the Philippines to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol in July 1981. It was in the 1951 Convention when the term "refugee" was first defined or when the question on who qualifies as a refugee was first laid down in a global legal instrument, along with the kind of legal protection, other assistance and social rights a refugee is entitled to receive.^[17] The 1951 Convention initially restricted its application to persons who became refugees due to events occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951 or after the aftermath of World War II. It was, in other words, limited in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before January 1, 1951 and within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these geographic and temporal limitations, thereby giving the 1951 Convention universal coverage.^[18]

Notwithstanding the lack of a counterpart in our domestic laws, the Philippines remained obliged under its accession to honor the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol as part of the laws of the land and which, henceforth, it should act upon to the extent already allowed under Philippine laws.^[19] The 1951 Convention is notably grounded on Article 14^[20] of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948^[21] to which the Philippines, as a member of the UN, had likewise bound itself.^[22]

Significantly as well, as a sign of the country's commitment to the Convention, the DOJ issued DOJ-DC No. 058 entitled Establishing the Refugee and Stateless Status Determination Procedure on October 18, 2012. DOJ-DC No. 058 was issued precisely to strengthen the procedure to determine eligibility of protection for refugees and to establish a procedure to determine eligibility of protection for stateless persons consistent with the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. It was also issued pursuant to the delegated power vested by the President to the DOJ through Letter of Implementation No. 47 dated August 18, 1976 over immigration matters, including the admission of aliens.

In 2022 through Executive Order (EO) No. 163 entitled Institutionalizing Access to Protection Services for Refugees, Stateless Persons and Asylum Seekers, the existing legal framework and mechanisms for the protection of refugees, stateless persons and asylum seekers in the country under DOJ-DC No. 058 were further strengthened and their need for protection, especially in times of public emergencies, addressed.^[23]

It is likewise noteworthy that the term "refugee" was first defined in a domestic issuance through DOJ-DC No. 058 and later in EO No. 163, with both definitions being lifted almost verbatim from the 1951 Convention:

[DOJ-DC No. 058:]

SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. – x x x

x x x x

d.

"Refugee" is a person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence".

[EO No. 163:]

Section 2. Definition of Terms. x x x

	x x x x
f.	Refugee shall mean a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Thus, there should no longer be any room for doubt as to the Philippines' commitment to honor its obligations as a State party under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

On the criteria for the determination
of refugee status

I agree with the ponencia in holding that "the determination of refugee status will primarily require an evaluation of the applicant's statements[, which, in turn,] must be contextualized based on the situation prevailing in his or her country of origin."^[24] The Handbook expressly provides this, owing to the element of a "well-founded fear of persecution" being, generally, the only motive recognized as compelling and understandable under the 1951 Convention for one to become a refugee.^[25] I wish to emphasize that the operative word here is "primarily." Since the definition speaks of fear, this necessarily involves a state of mind that is, therefore, subjective. The Handbook instructs that an evaluation of the subjective element is inseparable from an assessment of the personality of the applicant, since psychological reactions of different individuals may not be the same in identical conditions.^[26] The subjective character of fear of persecution requires an evaluation of the opinions and feelings of the person concerned. It is also in the light of such opinions and feelings that any actual or anticipated measures against him or her must necessarily be viewed.^[27]

At the same time, in satisfying the subjective element of the "well-founded fear of persecution" criterion, an assessment of credibility is indispensable where the case is not sufficiently clear from the facts on record. It will be necessary to take into account the personal and family background of the applicant, his or her membership to a particular racial, religious, national, social or political group, his or her own interpretation of his or her situation, and his or her personal experiences. Simply put, everything that may serve to indicate that the predominant motive for the application is fear must be considered by the competent authorities who are called upon to determine the refugee status of the applicant.^[28]

Since, however, the definition likewise qualifies the element of fear being well-founded, the frame of mind of the applicant is not the only consideration in the whole equation. There is also an objective element which must be satisfied. This element is nevertheless similarly anchored on an evaluation of the statements made by the applicant. While the Handbook assures that it is not a requirement to pass judgment on the conditions in the applicant's country of origin, the applicant's statements must still be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation; otherwise, the statements may be improperly rendered in the abstract.^[29] Thus, knowledge of the conditions in the applicant's country of origin, though not absolutely indispensable, is an important element in assessing the applicant's credibility.

Correlatively, the Handbook acknowledges that an applicant may have been subjected to various measures not in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g., discrimination in different forms), in some cases combined with other adverse factors (e.g., general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In such situations, the various elements involved may, if taken together, produce an effect in the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to well-founded fear of persecution on "cumulative grounds." It is not possible, nevertheless, to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can give rise to a valid claim to refugee status as this will necessarily depend on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological context.^[30]

In all, the starting point in any application is the account or statement of the applicant. The success of his or her application hinges on the credibility and coherence of his or her own account, as adequately and strongly supported by the available evidence he or she has submitted. All of these, in turn, are considered and weighed against the context of the situation in his or her country. Again, as the Handbook explains, "[i]n general, the applicant's fear should be considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his [or her] continued stay in his [or her] country of origin has become intolerable to him [or her] for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he [or she] returned there."^[31] After all, the determination of refugee status is a process which takes place in two stages. First, it is necessary to ascertain the relevant facts of the case; and second, the definitions in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol have to be applied to the facts thus ascertained.^[32] Surely, these so-called relevant facts cannot initially come from anywhere or anyone else but from the applicants themselves.

Here, respondent, in its assailed decisions, did not find the statements and evidence proffered by petitioner credible based on an alleged inconsistency between his statements. Specifically, it was highlighted by respondent that as regards the claim of "being forced to convert from being a Christian to Muslim," petitioner during his interview stated that he was not forced but merely persuaded.^[33] As a general principle, the national authorities, the DOJ in our case, are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of asylum claimants since, apart from having the legal mandate to do so, it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanor of the individuals concerned.^[34] Absent a clear showing of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ, the Court should refrain from substituting its own assessment of the facts.^[35] Here, however, respondent's decisions leave much to be desired. I agree that the perceived inconsistency in the statements of petitioner should not have sufficed as to entirely invalidate his claim. As succinctly summarized by the ponencia:

Here, records do not show that the DOJ-RSPPU attempted to clarify the supposed inconsistency in petitioner's statements. Indeed, if the denial of an application would be hinged on the applicant's choice of words, it behooves the State to ensure that the applicant deliberately and intelligently chose the words used.

However, when asked about his proficiency in speaking and understanding English, petitioner ticked the box "not easily" – within a range of "easily," "not easily," and "none" – in his Registration with the DOJ-RSPPU. Records do not show whether petitioner was provided with an interpreter despite his right to have one, if necessary, "at all stages of the refugee status determination and for the purposes of the preparation of the written application and for the interview." The DOJ-RSPPU failed to consider that the change in petitioner's statement, from "being persuaded" to "being forced" to convert to Islam and vice versa, may have been due to a language barrier, given his difficulty in speaking and understanding the English language. Not being proficient in English, petitioner may not have accurately portrayed the nuances of his situation in Pakistan.

To clarify petitioner's allegations, the DOJ-RSPPU should have considered his original statement of "being persuaded" to convert to Islam together with the rest of his claims. Notably, he was constant in relaying his fear of religious persecution. As mentioned, in his Registration, petitioner already claimed that he is being forced to change his religion, and he would be killed if he does not convert to Islam. As also stated in the Handbook, even assuming that there are inconsistencies in petitioner's account, a further interview may be conducted to clarify and resolve any contradictions in his statements.^[36]

Precisely, it is often, if not always, difficult to establish the pertinent facts in cases such as the present one. There can be no gainsaying that an applicant who feels and believes having been persecuted and has left his or her home country out of fear for his or her life would have done so in haste. The Handbook thus instructs that often, an applicant may not be able to support his or her statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all his or her statements will be the exception rather than the rule.^[37] In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without personal documents.^[38] It would be defeating of the humanitarian purpose behind the determination of refugee status to require an applicant to produce every piece of hard evidence to support his or her application. Hence, the examining authority, alongside the applicant, is expected and encouraged to assess all the relevant facts and to even use all the means at its disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the application.^[39]

Moreover, in its endeavor to contextualize the case, respondent relied heavily on the 2014 case decided by the United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), AK and SK (Christians: risk). Respondent concluded that in general, Christians in Pakistan are able to practice their faith, attend church, participate in religious activities and have their own schools and hospitals. Although Christians therein, as with other faiths, may be at risk of blasphemy allegations, this alone will not generally be enough to stake out a claim for international protection under the 1951 Convention, unless there is evidence that the charge is pursued. Evidence of a blasphemy charge being actively pursued by State actors may establish a real risk in the home area and an insufficiency of state protection.^[40]

Again, however, as correctly observed by the ponencia, the heavy reliance on the AK and SK (Christians: risk) case is misplaced. A comparison of the AK and SK (Christians: risk) case with the decisions of respondent even highlights the sheer paucity of a strong basis for the latter's conclusion. The AK and SK (Christians: risk) case made an exhaustive consideration of Pakistan's legal framework, the frequency of blasphemy allegations in the country, and the country information and reports from various reliable sources. It also utilized statements from other experts and witnesses. On the other hand, respondent's decisions evidently did not take this same path. Thus, there is likewise failure to adequately contextualize the case of petitioner in the relevant background situation prevailing in Pakistan.

Parenthetically, it is well to point out that the standard set by the 1951 Convention to establish a "well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution" is, in fact, moderate. This was highlighted in the US case, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca^[41] (INS).

In INS, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) recounted that the Committee that drafted the provision containing the expression "well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution . . ." (Article 1 of the 1951 Convention) explained that the expression means "that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecution."^[42] The SCOTUS then concluded that the standard, as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it as well as those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not require an alien to show that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in order to be classified as a refugee.^[43] If it were indeed otherwise, that would be a more difficult burden to mount.

INS scrutinized the two criteria used in different types of reliefs under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act of 1980 granted to an alien who claims that he or she will be persecuted if deported. Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act required the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his or her "life or freedom would be threatened" on account of one of the listed factors if he or she is deported. This was considered as a stricter requirement since an alien must demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that [he or she] would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he or she would be returned.^[44]

On the other hand, Section 208(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980 authorized the Attorney General, in his or her discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country "because of persecution or a well[-]founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."^[45] This criterion in Section 208(a) was based directly upon the language of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and was intended to be construed consistent with said instruments. Under this more benevolent criterion, the SCOTUS observed, one can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening even when there is less than a 50% chance of it taking place.^[46] As such, "so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility."^[47]

Verily, to employ a stricter standard in the determination of refugee status would defeat the human rights underpinnings of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, which prohibits refoulement, ostensibly refers to a threat to "life and freedom," to wit:

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Reading the above provision together with Article 1(A)(2),^[48] one must conclude that human rights violations are a strong indication of persecution if they occur on grounds laid down in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention. The development of the understanding of human rights norms can therefore impact on the interpretation of persecution.^[49]

The Handbook echoes the foregoing observations as well. It provides that there is no universally accepted definition of "persecution," and various attempts to formulate such a definition have been met with little success. Nonetheless, it may be inferred from Article 33 of the 1951 Convention that a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights — for the same reasons — would also constitute persecution.^[50]

Available relief to an alien whose
application has been denied with
finality

To further stress the human rights impetus behind these proceedings, it is well to point out that an alien, whose application for recognition of refugee status has been denied with finality, is not removed from the host country ipso facto.

Under DOJ-DC No. 058, where the application is denied with finality, the applicant shall be afforded sufficient time to leave the country unless he or she holds another immigration status or the Commissioner has authorized his or her continued stay.^[51] The mere presumption therefore is that the applicant is henceforth removed or returned to his or her country of origin, which may not necessarily be the applicant's country of nationality, but that from which he or she came prior to entering the host country.

DOJ-DC No. 058 must be harmonized, however, with the principle of non-refoulement.

The principle of non-refoulement, as enshrined in the previously cited Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention and which is also binding on States parties to the 1967 Protocol, constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee protection. The principle applies not only to recognized refugees, but also to those who have not had their status formally declared.^[52] The principle does not entail or guarantee a right to an individual to be granted asylum in a particular State; it does mean, however, that where States are not prepared to grant asylum to persons who are seeking international protection on their territory, they must adopt a course that does not result in their removal, directly or indirectly, to a place where their lives or freedom would be in danger on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.^[53]

Significantly, though, Article 33(1) does not extend the right to non-refoulement to everyone who meets the definition of "refugee." Rather, it requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a "refugee," i.e., prove at least a "well-founded fear of persecution;" and second, that the "refugee" show that his or her life or freedom "would be threatened" if deported.^[54] To emphasize, as earlier discussed in INS, this is a more exacting requirement since an applicant has to demonstrate that "it is more likely than not that [he or she] would be subject to persecution" in the country to which he or she would be returned.^[55]

Moreover, the principle of non-refoulement has also found entry and has been developed in international human rights law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and has now become a norm of customary international law.^[56] The threshold requirement, however, as with Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention, also remains high.

To illustrate, the ICCPR imposes upon State parties the duty of non-refoulement that is different from their duty to provide asylum or refugee protection to an alien. Whereas the former prevents a state from removing a person to a situation of danger, the latter describes the act of a state protecting a person by granting her or him refuge on its territory.^[57] If a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person's rights under the ICCPR will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.^[58]

In J.I. v. Sweden^[59] (J.I.), the applicant, a Christian, was denied asylum in Sweden. Thereafter, before his scheduled deportation to Afghanistan, the applicant sought the views of the UNHCR, claiming impediments to the enforcement of his expulsion. Specifically, he claimed that his deportation would amount to a violation by the State Party of Articles 6,^[60] 7^[61] and 18^[62] of the ICCPR, because there was a real and substantiated risk of irreparable harm, even death, due to severe persecution of Christians in Afghanistan. In considering the merits of the communication of the applicant, the UNHCR recalled its General Comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties under the ICCPR not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR.^[63] The perceived risk may either be in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.^[64]

The UNHCR also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author's country of origin. The UNHCR also significantly recalled that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.^[65]

Furthermore, it bears emphasis that the UNHCR noted in J.I. that even when the State party's authorities found that the reported conversion or conviction of an applicant to a certain faith is not sincere, they should nevertheless proceed to assess whether, in the circumstances of the case, the asylum seeker's behavior and activities in connection with his or her conversion or conviction, could have serious adverse consequences in the country of origin so as to put him or her at risk of irreparable harm, as contemplated under Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR.^[66]

Similarly, in Case of A.S.N, and Others v. The Netherlands^[67] (A.S.N.), the Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights was called upon to decide on the rights of aliens whose applications for asylum were denied, but who invoked Article 34^[68] of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,^[69] and alleged that their removal from the Netherlands to Afghanistan would violate their right to life under Article 2^[70] of the said Convention and would expose them to a real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3^[71] thereof. Notably, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Security and Justice of Netherlands decided on both the rights of the applicants under the 1951 Convention and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in this wise:

x x x The Deputy Minister concluded that as the applicants' account had been found to lack credibility, they had failed to make a plausible case for believing that they feared persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("the 1951 Convention"). In assessing the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, he considered that, as the general security situation in Kabul did not amount to one of a most extreme case of general violence, there could not be said to be a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return to that city. It was further concluded that, although the applicants did belong to a minority group which had been designated as vulnerable in the asylum policy in force (see paragraphs 58-60 and 62 below), they had failed to make plausible their fear of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention by submitting "specific individual characteristics" (specifieke individuele kenmerken) within the meaning of that policy, nor had it transpired that human rights violations had occurred in their "immediate circle" (naaste omgeving).^[72] (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in A.S.N, also affirmed that the ill-treatment which an applicant alleges he or she will face if returned to his or her country of origin must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition, and to the extent that the applicants therein should be understood as claiming that the humanitarian conditions to which they would be exposed if removed to Afghanistan would be incompatible with Article 3, the Court held that humanitarian conditions in a country of return could give rise to a breach of that provision only in a very exceptional case where the humanitarian grounds against removal are "compelling."^[73]

The foregoing discussion illustrates that different reliefs may be accorded an alien who has sought refuge in another country owing to a well-founded fear of persecution. Apart from an application for refugee status determination, an applicant is also entitled for protection under the principle of non-refoulement when his or her personal circumstances are determined to warrant the application of said principle. A denial of an application for refugee status determination should not be a hindrance to obtain other forms of reliefs grounded on other binding international legal instruments that would ultimately halt his or her deportation, albeit requiring a more stringent standard or threshold than that provided in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention.

It must be stressed at this juncture that while Article 33(2)^[74] of the 1951 Convention provides for exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement, these do not affect the host State's non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law, which permit no exceptions.^[75] Within the framework of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the principle of non-refoulement constitutes an essential and non-derogable component of international refugee protection.^[76] The central importance of the obligation not to return a refugee to a risk of persecution is reflected in Article 42(1)^[77] of the 1951 Convention and Article 7(1)^[78] of the 1967 Protocol, which list Article 33 as one of the provisions of the 1951 Convention to which reservations are not permitted.^[79]

Torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can never be justified on the basis of a balance to be found between society's interest and the individual's rights under Article 7 of the ICCPR.^[80] No person, without any exception, even those suspected of presenting a danger to national security or the safety of any person, and even during a state of emergency, may be deported to a country where he or she runs the risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.^[81]

Thus, when an applicant who has been rejected claims, for instance, that he or she was persecuted and would be persecuted upon return to his or her home country, the Philippines, through respondent, is duty-bound to establish, prior to implementing any removal measure, that said applicant would not be exposed to a danger of serious human rights violations. If such a risk exists, the Philippines is precluded from forcibly removing the person.^[82]

On the one hand, if the eventual removal or return of a rejected applicant will not be violative of the principle of non-refoulement, then the process should proceed. This is a logical consequence for persons who are found not in need of international protection.^[83] It is recognized that the home country has the obligation to receive back their own nationals, while the host country has the concomitant right to expel aliens while respecting obligations under international refugee and human rights law.^[84] To be sure, while an asylum or refugee claim is being processed, the applicant is inside the refugee protection system. After the final rejection of the claim, he or she passes over into the system of migration control, a prerogative flowing from state sovereignty that manages the inflow, presence and outflow of non-citizens on state territory.^[85]

The removal should be, as a rule, voluntary. This is pursuant to Section 13 of DOJ-DC No. 058 which expressly provides that where the application is denied with finality, the applicant shall be afforded sufficient time to leave the country, unless he or she holds another immigration status or the Commissioner has authorized his or her continued stay. Voluntary compliance with the order to leave is also the ideal.^[86] In our jurisdiction, the rejected applicant may very well be extended the opportunity to avail of the Bureau of Immigration's Assisted Voluntary Return Program provided for under its Rules of Procedure and specifically under its Immigration Memorandum Circular No. SBM-2015-011.

Should a voluntary removal prove infeasible, the government, through appropriate channels or agencies, is not precluded from resorting to the involuntary removal of petitioner. This is also a reserved right of a State, involving force as a last resort, if other measures to secure voluntary return fail.^[87] The lack of any mechanism for such under DOJ-DC No. 058 should be of no moment for the denial of an application for a refugee status, as mentioned above, converts the matter into one of migration control.

As well, it is a recognized concern that the overstaying of persons rightly identified as not in need of international protection may pose many problems to States. The UNHCR is also concerned that the non-removal of such persons may negatively affect the integrity and credibility of asylum systems,^[88] as is the lack of their prompt return.^[89] The investment of time, financial resources and effort into the operation of complex determination procedures is only justifiable if States actually enforce negative decisions.^[90] Moreover, failure to do so could represent a "pull factor," because those with no substantive claim to protection would use asylum procedures as a way of entering the country.^[91]

All told, the matter of determination of refugee status entails considerations of the State's compliance with its international humanitarian obligations and traditions on one hand, and its duty and authority to uphold its state sovereignty and to protect its borders on the other.^[92] It certainly cannot be disputed, however, that between these interests, the protection and respect for human rights always take primacy. A determination of refugee status proceeding that gives a lackadaisical treatment to these core values should not be countenanced.

In view of the foregoing, I concur with the ponencia in partially granting the petition and remanding the case to respondent for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines stated in the ponencia.

---

^[1] Rollo, pp. 34-56. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob.

^[2] Id. at 58-60. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Maria Filomena D. Singh (now a Member of this Court).

^[3] Decisions dated March 10, 2017 and May 25, 2017, id. at 101-107 and 115-119.

^[4] Available at <https://www.unhcr.org/4d934f5f9.pdf>.

^[5] Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/protocolrefugees.pdf>.

^[6] Ponencia, pp. 27-28.

^[7] Id. at 27.

^[8] Id. at 24.

^[9] United Kingdom: Home Office, Country Information and Guidance - Pakistan: Christians and Christian Converts, February 2015, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/54e46a374.html>.

^[10] [2014] UKUT 00569 (IAC), United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), December 15, 2014, available at <https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,549962d94.html>.

^[11] Ponencia, p. 25.

^[12] Id. at 27.

^[13] Available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5cb474b27.html>.

^[14] ESTABLISHING THE REFUGEE AND STATELESS STATUS DETERMINATION PROCEDURE, October 18, 2012, available at <https://www.refworld.org.docid/5086932e2.html>.

^[15] AN ACT TO CONTROL AND REGULATE THE IMMIGRATION OF ALIENS INTO THE PHILIPPINES, otherwise known as "THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940," August 26, 1940.

^[16] Id., Sec. 47(b).

^[17] See "The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," available at <https://www.unhcr.org/asia/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html>.

^[18] See "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," available at <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>.

^[19] See Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536 (2009).

^[20] Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
   
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

^[21] See "Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees," supra note 18.

^[22] See Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra note 19.

^[23] See EO No. 163, Sec. 1.

^[24] Ponencia, p. 16. Italics omitted.

^[25] See HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, par. 39, p. 19.

^[26] Id., par. 40, p 19.

^[27] Id., par. 52, p. 21.

^[28] Id., pars. 41 and 42, p. 19.

^[29] Id., par. 42, pp. 19-20.

^[30] Id., par. 53, p. 21.

^[31] Id., par. 42, p. 20.

^[32] Id., par. 29, p. 17.

^[33] Ponencia, p. 23.

^[34] See Case of A.S.N, and Others v. The Netherlands (Applications nos. 68377/17 and 530/18) ECLI:CE:ECHR:2020:0225JUD006837717, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, February 25, 2020; available at <https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,5e625edf4.html>

^[35] See id.

^[36] Ponencia, p. 24. Citations omitted.

^[37] HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, par. 196, p. 43.

^[38] Id.

^[39] See id.

^[40] Rollo, pp. 105-106.

^[41] 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

^[42] Id. at 438.

^[43] Id.

^[44] Id. at 423. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

^[45] Id.

^[46] Id. at 431.

^[47] Id. at 440. Emphasis supplied.

^[48] Article 1

     DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REFUGEE"

1. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
   x x x x
   

   (2)	As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
   	In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his [or her] nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he [or she] is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his [or her] nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he [or she] has not availed himself [or herself] of the protection of one of the countries of which he [or she] is a national.

^[49] Santhosh Persaud, "Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," available at < https://www.unhcr.org/4552f0d82.pdf>.

^[50] HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, par. 51, p. 21.

^[51] DOJ-DC No. 058, Sec. 14.

^[52] See "Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," available at < https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486029.pdf>

^[53] Id.

^[54] INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra note 41, at 440-441. Emphasis and italics supplied.

^[55] See id. at 423. Underscoring supplied.

^[56] Santhosh Persaud, "Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," supra note 49.

^[57] Id.

^[58] Id., citing Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, § 6.2.

^[59] UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), May 22, 2020, available at < https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,5ede13ff4.html>.

^[60] Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her] life.
x x x x

^[61] Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his [or her] free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.

^[62] Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his [or her] choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his [or her] religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his [or her] freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his [or her] choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

^[63] J.I. v. Sweden, supra note 59.

^[64] General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 May 2004, available at <https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsjYoiC fMKoIRv2FVaVzRkMjTnjRO%2Bfud3cPVrcM9YR0iW6Txaxgp3f9kUFpWoq%2FhW%2FTpKi2tPhZsbEJw%2FGeZRASjdFuuJQRnbJEaUhby31WiQP12mLFDe6ZSwMMvmQGVHA%3D%3D>.

^[65] J.I. v. Sweden, supra note 59.

^[66] Id.

^[67] Supra note 34.

^[68] ARTICLE 34
Individual applications
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.

^[69] A treaty among members of the Council of Europe. Available at < https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf>.

^[70] SECTION I
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
ARTICLE 2
Right to life
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his [or her] life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his [or her] conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained:
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

^[71] ARTICLE 3
Prohibition of torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

^[72] A.S.N, and Others v. The Netherlands, supra note 34. at 5.

^[73] Id. at 41. Emphasis supplied.

^[74] Article 33
PROHIBITION OF EXPULSION OR RETURN ("REFOULEMENT")
x x x x
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he [or she] is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

^[75] See "Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," supra note 52.

^[76] Id.

^[77] Article 42

 RESERVATIONS
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.

^[78] Article 7. Reservations and declarations
1. At the time of accession, any State may make reservations in respect of article IV of the present Protocol and in respect of the application in accordance with article 1 of the present Protocol of any provisions of the Convention other than those contained in articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1) and 33 thereof, provided that in the case of a State Party to the Convention reservations made under this article shall not extend to refugees in respect of whom the Convention applies.

^[79] See "Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," supra note 52.

^[80] See Santhosh Persaud, "Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," supra note 49, at 8.

^[81] Id. at 8-9.

^[82] See "Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol," supra note 52.

^[83] See Background Paper No. 1, Legal and practical aspects of the return of persons not in need of international protection, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/4d948b2c9.pdf>.

^[84] See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "The removal of failed asylum seekers: international norms and procedures," December 1, 2007, ISSN 1020-7473, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c2472eb0.html>.

^[85] Gregor Noll, "Rejected asylum seekers: the problem of return," May 1999, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3ac6a0cd0/rejected-asylum-seekers-problem-return-gregor-noll.html>.

^[86] See id. at 9.

^[87] See UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "The removal of failed asylum seekers: international norms and procedures," supra note 84, at 6.

^[88] Background Paper No. 1, Legal and practical aspects of the return of persons not in need of international protection, supra note 83.

^[89] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "The removal of failed asylum seekers: international norms and procedures," supra note 84, at 9.

^[90] Gregor Noll, "Rejected asylum seekers: the problem of return" supra note 85, at 4.

^[91] Id.

^[92] See Laura Thompson, "Protection of Migrants' Rights and State Sovereignty," September 2013, available at < https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/protection-migrants-rights-and-state-sovereignty>.