EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 242957. February 28, 2023 ]BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION v. YUAN WENLE +
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION v. YUAN WENLE +
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND THE JAIL WARDEN, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTER, PETITIONERS, VS. YUAN WENLE, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
GESMUNDO, C.J.:
"The political liberty of the subject is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his [or her] safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite that the government be so constituted that one man [or woman] need not be afraid of another.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression."
- Baron de Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws)[1]
In the backdrop of our present Constitution, the Court is now confronted with an age-old but unsettled question: Can warrants be issued by authorities other than regular courts?
Case Overview
The case treats of an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the October 22, 2018 Resolution[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16 (RTC), in R-MNL-18-10197-SP. In this Resolution, the RTC, in a habeas corpus proceeding, declared null and void the July 26, 2018 Summary Deportation Order[3] (SDO) issued by the Bureau of Immigration's (Bureau) Board of Commissioners (Board) on the ground that Rule 9 of the Bureau's Omnibus Rules of Procedure[4] (Omnibus Rules) does not accord due process to aliens.
Factual Antecedents
On July 10, 2018, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Embassy) in the Philippines wrote a letter[5] to the Bureau and sought the latter's assistance to arrest and deport Yuan Wenle (respondent), Zhang Hailong, Xu Chongchao, and Cai Miaoling (collectively, companion Chinese nationals) — whose Chinese passports have been cancelled — for their supposed involvement in crimes within China's territory.
On July 17, 2018, the Bureau issued a Charge Sheet[6] against respondent, along with companion Chinese nationals; tagging them as "undocumented foreigners" whose presence in the Philippines "poses a risk to public interest."
On July 20, 2018, the Bureau, through Deputy Commissioner J. Tobias M. Javier, issued a Watchlist Order[7] (WLO) against respondent and companion Chinese nationals.
On July 26, 2018, the Board issued an SDO[8] against respondent and companion Chinese nationals for being undocumented, for posing a risk to public interest, or being undesirable under Section 69,[9] Article II of Act No. 2711.[10] The same Order directed the Bureau personnel to accompany respondent and companion Chinese nationals to prevent the possibility of escape, as well as the Bureau's Management Information System Division to include them in the Blacklist with remarks "SDO: Fugitive" and to lift the WLO.
On August 22, 2018, while on his way to leave for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific Airways, at the airport's pre-departure area,[11] respondent was arrested pursuant to the SDO.[12] While detained, the Bureau's Legal Division wrote a letter[13] to Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, His Excellency Zhao Jianhua, seeking for the latter's assistance pertaining to respondent's deportation.
On September 11, 2018, respondent filed a Petition[14] for habeas corpus with the RTC where he argued that: (1) the SDO was null and void for being issued without notice and hearing, and not by a court of law thereby, making his arrest arbitrary and illegal;[15] (2) he was not served by the Chinese Embassy with documentary copies of the criminal cases he is allegedly facing in China and a foreign warrant, if any, for his arrest cannot be enforced in the Philippines for being outside of its territorial jurisdiction;[16] (3) foreign countries should resort to extradition instead of summary deportation against undocumented aliens for extraterritorial crimes alleged to have been committed by them;[17] (4) he was not detained or committed by virtue of a process issued by a court or judge which amounts to a deprivation of his liberty without due process;[18] (5) the ground relied upon by the Board for his arrest was not among those provided by law;[19] (6) the SDO was unclear with respect to the limitations or conditions for his admission which should supposedly be those indicated in his passport;[20] (7) there was no prior determination by the Board of the ground for his deportation;[21] (8) the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Board was solely for the purpose of investigation and not to effect a final order of deportation;[22] and (9) a "post-entry cancellation of his passport does not operate to divest him of his authorized stay" in the Philippines.[23]
The RTC Ruling
On October 22, 2018, the RTC rendered a Resolution[24] granting respondent's habeas corpus petition. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby GRANTED. For having been issued without due process of law, the Summary Deportation Order dated 26 July 2018 by respondent Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Accordingly, the Jail Warden, Bureau of Immigration Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to RELEASE the body of petitioner YUAN WENLE unless he is being detained for other lawful causes. This ruling is without prejudice to the commencement anew of deportation proceedings by the Bureau of Immigration against petitioner with proper notice and hearing to the latter.
The Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila is hereby directed to release the Sheriff's Trust Fund in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) under O.R. No. 5758174 dated 04 September 2018 to herein petitioner and/or his counsel on record.
SO ORDERED.[25]
In the said Resolution, the RTC explained that: (1) respondent's constitutional and statutory rights to due process had been violated because he was not afforded any hearing at all for him to have a chance to refute the charges; despite the fact that his visitor visa had been extended several times;[26] (2) the Chinese Embassy's communications with the Board supposedly reveal that the former merely alleged that respondent is "suspected" of "illegally controlling computer system crimes in China;"[27] and (3) the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not applicable because Sec. 10, Rule 9 of the Bureau's Omnibus Rules is violative of due process for providing that an SDO "shall be final and executory upon signing/approval thereof;" thereby, making habeas corpus "the proper remedy under the present circumstances."[28]
On November 23, 2018, the Board, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a "Petition for Review on Certiorari"[29] with this Court seeking to reverse and set aside the RTC's October 22, 2018 Resolution.
The Parties' Arguments
The Board ascribes reversible errors on the RTC's part for granting respondent's petition for habeas corpus for the following reasons:
Respondent counters the aforementioned arguments of the Bureau by retorting that:
Issues
The Court's Ruling
I. | On the Propriety of Resorting to Rule 45 in Assailing the RTC's Decision or Final Order Disposing a Habeas Corpus Case |
A. Existence of a Question of Law
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.[44] Moreover, such questions must be of such substance as to be of distinctly significant consequence and value.[45] A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[46] Accordingly, for a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts.[47] Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.[48] Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.[49]
In this case, the Court finds respondent's argument – that the issue on whether he was accorded due process – to be a question of law. The records clearly show that the alleged denial of due process was anchored on the RTC's finding that the SDO's very nature did not give respondent a chance to present or mount his defense. Although the RTC did not pass upon the constitutionality or validity of SDOs, invalidating the July 26, 2018 SDO and its effects on the ground that the Omnibus Rules purportedly do not give arrested aliens any opportunity to assail such issuance amounts to an indirect approach of challenging these procedural rules themselves. Such observations demonstrate that there is no need for this Court to examine anew the probative value of any evidence for the purpose of determining the existence of due process. As it stands now, respondent sufficiently justified its recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by presenting a legal question for resolution.
B. Pursuit of the Proper Remedy
The current version of Sec. 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphases supplied)
The mandatory nature of the 48-hour reglementary period of appeal in habeas corpus cases ensures that no unnecessary time will be wasted before a decision or final order will be re-evaluated.[50] Corollary, the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege, jurisdictional, and mandatory; that is why it should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.[51] Verily, the reason why competent courts in habeas corpus proceedings have no other alternative but to dismiss an appeal filed out of time is that Sec. 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129[52] (B.P. Blg. 129) clearly states:
Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
However, by way of exception, there are other available remedies aside from that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court against an adverse judgment or final order in a habeas corpus case. For one, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and is considered no judgment at all in legal contemplation as it may even be subject to a collateral attack.[53] Since it has been settled that the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain pleas against an SDO issuance in a habeas corpus proceeding for the power to deport aliens is vested with the President through the Bureau,[54] a writ of certiorari – a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction[55] — may also issue in such instance. In some cases, a party may also opt to challenge an adverse judgment or final order not on the basis of factual misappreciation, but of legal misapplication or misinterpretation. Under such circumstance, elevating an adverse RTC decision or final order directly to this Court on appeal by certiorari (Rule 45) is proper.
Even though the Court of Appeals (CA) may, at times, pass upon questions of law in appellate proceedings under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,[56] it has been recognized in Elepante v. Madayag,[57] that an appeal in habeas corpus cases may be taken directly to this Court on pure questions of law.[58] This is also in deference to Sec. 5(2)(e), Art. VIII of the Constitution which empowers this Court to "[r]eview, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in" "[a]ll cases [where] only an error or question of law is involved." Therefore, the OSG did not err in availing the remedial facilities in Rule 45 in place of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court as this case, as pointed out earlier, does not need a re-examination or recalibration of evidentiary weight.
Besides, this Court cannot also allow respondent to disregard the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and of primary jurisdiction for the sake of convenience. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention in order to give an administrative officer every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction.[59] Such doctrine is intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[60] Relatedly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.[61] The objective of this doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.[62] Thus, allowing one to directly resort to a habeas corpus proceeding before the regular courts will be to allow a preemption of the Bureau's statutory duty to determine for itself the issues of legality in all deportation cases specifically and supposedly under its jurisdiction.
II. | On the Validity of the SDO as a Means to Arrest a Prospective Deportee |
The discussions regarding the validity of and the constitutional implications on the Bureau's SDO, as a method of enforcing immigration laws, will be divided into three parts: (1) the justiciability of and necessity of passing upon the validity of administrative warrants; (2) the constitutionality of administrative warrants; and (3) the nature and validity of the SDOs. Since the Bureau's Commissioner may issue warrants of arrest under Sec. 37(a) of the Immigration Act, the Court deems it necessary to pass upon question on whether the power to issue warrants may also extend to adjudicative authorities other than regular courts. Likewise, since SDOs are akin to warrants of arrest, the Court also sees it fit to discuss whether such issuances are compliant or violative of due process guarantees.
The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it; thus, courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.[63] This involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution.[64] Hence, courts should decline jurisdiction when that sought by the parties involve rendering advisory opinions which would provide no practical use or value.[65]
Nonetheless, a matter not raised by the parties may be reviewed if necessary for a complete resolution of the case;[66] as this Court is imbued with sufficient authority and discretion to do so.[67] The following instances include: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.[68]
Here, it appears that both parties do not dispute the constitutional validity of warrants issued by administrative bodies – specifically the Bureau of Immigration. What they are arguing instead is whether SDOs violate a foreign detainee's right to due process. However, a closer look at this issue will reveal that the same cannot be meaningfully resolved without passing upon the constitutional validity of administrative warrants.
Sec. 37(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613[69] (CA No. 613) reads:
The aforecited provision provides that a warrant issued by the Commissioner to implement CA No. 613 may be for the purpose of arrest or for the purpose of deportation. Since an SDO pertains to the arrest of an alien determined as illegally staying in the Philippines, there is a need to closely re-examine the attendant facts which led to respondent's arrest.
Here, a charge sheet was first issued by the Bureau ex parte on the basis of the Chinese Embassy's communication letter informing the Philippine authorities of respondent's involvement in crimes within China's territory. This became the basis for the subsequent issuance of an SDO which was used to effect respondent's arrest. In essence (and as it will be explained in the succeeding discussions), an SDO essentially functions as a warrant issued by the Bureau which is an administrative body. As a necessary consequence, the validity of administrative warrants now becomes integral and necessary – not merely closely related – to the resolution on whether respondent's arrest, pursuant to the subject SDO, is tainted with due process violations. Whether an SDO's nature is such that it violates due process rights of foreign detainees is dependent upon the resolution as regards the constitutional validity of administrative warrants.
Besides, skirting the issue on the constitutional validity of administrative warrants in resolving this case is a form of rendering piecemeal ex post facto "justice." If this Court opts to resolve issues involving administrative issuances of similar nature and effect as administrative warrants without addressing the constitutional validity of such warrants themselves, any doctrine handed out would amount to an ex post facto promulgation of doctrinal policies. This situation would create a judicial atmosphere of instability and unfairness as the parties that would be involved, prior to the resolution of their respective cases, would have no idea of the doctrines that they are supposed to adhere to in order to avoid any adverse legal predicament. They are left to deal with whatever adverse consequences an ex post facto principle would inflict. Hence, resolving the issue of an administrative warrant's constitutional validity now will allow prospective litigants a reasonable opportunity to adjust their future actions to avoid or, at least minimize, any situation where laws or private rights may be breached.
A "writ" is defined as an order or precept in writing issued by a court, clerk or judicial officer.[70] As to the type of proceedings leading to its issuance, writs are classified into the following major categories: (1) inter partes – those which require the participation of all the contending parties for validity; and (2) ex parte – those which require the participation of only the applicant for validity. Inter partes writs, on the one hand, refer to either: (1) those that exist or come, as a matter of course, after a final and executory judgment or order (e.g., execution, demolition, garnishment, etc.); or (2) those that are sought and applied for to remedy extraordinary circumstances (e.g., certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, etc.). Ex parte writs, on the other hand, refer to either: (1) those that are issued to address an exigent need usually of general welfare (e.g., arrest and search warrants, wire-tapping orders,[71] freeze orders,[72] etc.); or (2) those that are issued to prevent an imminent irreparable damage, require the conduct of a preliminary hearing, or enforce a judicially-settled right (e.g., 72-hour temporary restraining order, preliminary citation in habeas corpus cases,[73] writ of possession,[74] etc.). Significant to this case, the focus of the succeeding discussions will center on warrants — writs directing or authorizing someone to do an act; especially one directing a law enforcer to make an arrest, a search, or a seizure[75] — as they pertain to administrative enforcement.
Conventionally, the entrenched idea or principle is that only regular courts, through their magistrates, may issue arrest and search warrants. This was first laid down by Sec. 1(3), Art. III of the 1935 Constitution which explicitly states that probable cause – as the basis for warrant issuances – is "to be determined by the judge." Interestingly, it was also under this Constitution that the Immigration Act was enacted whereby Sec. 37(a) of the same law empowered the Commissioner of Immigration or "any other officer designated by him" to issue arrest warrants against undesirable or unqualified aliens within the Philippine territory. Despite some constitutional challenges, the same provision had not been invalidated because the requirement – that the issue of probable cause should be determined by a judge – "does not extend to deportation proceedings."[76] Even the earlier pronouncement of the Court in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board[77] merely invalidated Executive Order No. 398 (Series of 1951) on the ground that the President cannot delegate to the Deportation Board the power "to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens"[78] — it did not pass upon the very foundational justification for the existence of administrative warrants in the first place.
Significantly, it was under Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution that probable cause, as required for the issuance of arrest and search warrants, may also be determined by "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law." However, when former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed during the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the framers of the present 1987 Constitution voiced out their concerns regarding the determination of probable cause as regards arrest and search warrant issuances by persons other than regular court magistrates during their deliberations as shown in the following exchanges:
The aforementioned exchanges show that the framers' primary concern in allowing authorities or officials of the Executive Branch to issue warrants will expose the people's rights, especially of liberty and of privacy, to the danger of State abuses. This led to the deletion of the phrase "or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" pertaining to the determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest and search warrants. Thus, Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution now reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the Court points out that even the framers, specifically Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas, recognized the need for administrative determination in concerns relating to national security, public safety, and public health — especially in matters relating to the entry of aliens within Philippine borders which affect national security. Such commentary practically justifies why, despite the aforementioned constitutional provision, Sec. 37(a)[81] of the Immigration Act which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue arrest warrants still continues to exist and its constitutionality has yet to be challenged directly, at least as far as this Court is concerned. In fact, this has been affirmed and embodied by the categorical pronouncement in Salazar v. Achacoso[82] (Salazar), with the salient portion of the ruling which reads:
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
The aforementioned ruling, when analyzed in conjunction with and in the context of the exchanges by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, connotes that a person's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is essentially meant to prevent the government from summarily depriving one of his or her liberty and property rights. Meaning, arrest and search warrants have been required by the Constitution as concrete safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. Relatedly, since a "warrant" (whether one of arrest or of search) is basically utilized by regular courts in criminal cases,[84] the nature of such writ logically suggests that the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was definitely intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to strictly apply to criminal cases — where a person's right, liberty, and property is mostly vulnerable to governmental abuses. This is because, as to non-criminal cases where other compulsory processes are utilized (e.g., subpoenas, injunctions, directives, etc.) instead of warrants, the Constitution is silent. It offers some peripheral support to the exception carved out in Salazar where authorities other than judges may issue arrest warrants in proceedings not criminal in nature. Hence, due to this observation, the Court is of the view that the necessity of administrative warrants cannot be disregarded in its entirety — just as the existence of quasi-judicial bodies is imperative to address disputes involving technical matters which justifies the exercise of adjudicative powers by some agencies under the Executive Branch — due to its ability to address some specialized, exigent or important public need.
However, the implied basis pertaining to the Constitution's silence as to the matter of deportation of aliens in Salazar seems to be inadequate in justifying the practice of issuing arrest warrants by authorities other than judges. Aside from the absence of some concrete explanation in Salazar to justify the President or the Commissioner of Immigration's power to issue arrest warrants under the 1987 Constitution's backdrop, the lingering fear — that agencies or officers in the Executive Branch might abuse their powers by summarily depriving private rights or entitlements without due process — cannot be downplayed. Verily, this Court cannot allow a situation where Executive and Judicial powers are absolutely and indistinguishably fused in a single authority for it, as Montesquieu points out, may result in violence and oppression. In this regard, there arises a pressing need to fix a set of guidelines which are unequivocally necessary to prevent an administrative agency or officer from legally performing oppressive acts.
Hence, for administrative warrants to be valid and justified, all of the following conditions must be present and shall be strictly complied with, to wit:
The Court now proceeds to expound on each item of the foregoing guidelines for the understanding of the Bench, the Bar, and the public.
Police power is the power of the State, primarily vested in the legislature,[85] to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property[86] — although it virtually extends to "all public needs"[87] as it is not capable of an exact definition for being comprehensive in order to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus, assuring the greatest benefits.[88] Stated differently, it may be said to be "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."[89] Such power may be delegated to the President and administrative boards, as well as the law-making bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.[90] Upon this power depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property.[91] "The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy."[92]
Concomitant to the foregoing discussions is the principle that police power is not unlimited. For one, the Bill of Rights as enumerated in Art. III of the Constitution recognizes certain several rights which limit the scope of the State's police power. In this context and view, the State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.[93] This is because the protection of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered State, there could be no enforcement of private rights.[94] With these observations, the Court is confronted with this conflict: on one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.[95]
Thus, in order to harmonize the seemingly conflicting objectives of police power and the Bill of Rights, the Court points out that some individual liberties must give way to general welfare or public interest concerns.[96] In other words, no right is absolute.[97] It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.[98] This is in recognition of the fundamental precept that police power has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "the greatest good of the greatest number."[99] Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not an unrestricted license to act according to one's own will — it is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.[100] However, the Court also deems it necessary to stress that: "Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only — and only to the extent — that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare."[101]
To demonstrate the instances where public welfare needs to outweigh private rights, the Court uses by analogy the "close now, hear later" doctrine pertaining to the summary closure of banks in dire straits. It is justified by the grave concern that, "[u]nless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government."[102] This is in recognition of the fact that "[t]he business of banking is imbued with public interest; it is an industry where the general public's trust and confidence in the system is of paramount importance.''[103] Here, police power can be validly asserted to make that change to meet any one of the several great public needs, such as, in that case, regulation of the value of money.[104] What this demonstrates is that the magnitude of injury which the public as a whole may sustain is greater than the temporary (and compensable, in cases other than summary closure of banks) damage or inconvenience caused to a limited number of private parties. It implies that, if public interest is not timely and amply protected, more private rights will sustain injury or will be adversely affected. After all, public interest is basically an aggregate or collection of everyone's private rights. This is also the essence of majority rule which is a necessary principle in this democratic governance.[105] Hence, in litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.[106]
Another compelling reason why private rights may sometimes yield to public welfare concerns is exigency. Self-preservation is the first law of nature.[107] Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation.[108] On the part of the State, protecting public welfare by way of police power is an act of self-preservation.[109] As discussed in the aforementioned example pertaining to the banking industry, "[s]wift, adequate, and determined actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy."[110] Just like in temporary restraining order applications where extreme urgency is an essential prerequisite to preserve clearly-established substantive rights;[111] administrative agencies are justified in issuing warrants to address exigent concerns within their competence or technical know-how. This is akin to summarily abating, under the undefined law of necessity, a nuisance per se for being a direct menace to public health or safety.[112]
Hence, this is the reason why administrative agencies are permitted – under the circumstances presenting a clear and present danger to the general welfare and when the need for expeditious action will justify omission of prior notice and hearing – to summarily: (1) kill on sight a mad dog on the loose for posing an immediate threat to the safety and lives of people; (2) destroy pornographic materials, contaminated meat, and narcotic drugs for being inherently pernicious; (3) cancel the passport of a person sought for a criminal offense and compel his or her return to the country he or she has fled; or (4) padlock filthy restaurants in the interest of the public health or bawdy houses to protect the public morals.[113] In some of these instances, specialized administrative agencies possessing technical knowledge, expertise or experience are in a better position to evaluate the degree of public harm that may likely be caused by a nuisance for purposes of abatement.
However, these general welfare concerns pertain to situations where summarily addressing a nuisance or pressing need is justified. The common denominators in these cases are: (1) that those who perform the summary abatement have immediate personal knowledge of the nuisance or pressing need; and (2) that such knowledge was obtained without violating either constitutional guarantees of privacy,[114] any law pertaining to sensitive information,[115] or an evidentiary rule on confidentiality.[116]
Accordingly, for the purpose of issuing warrants, administrative authorities must first determine from the applicant before issuing any warrant whether: (1) there is a pressing need to implement the law in a swift manner or an immediate need for the prospective respondent to answer for a legal infraction — both to address a public welfare or public interest concern; and (2) the public harm is greater than the damage to be suffered by the person subject of the warrant. Hence, when an immediate need to protect general welfare arises and when damage to be sustained by the public outweighs those of the private parties, the need for an expedient issuance of administrative warrants is justified.
Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." This provision guarantees "the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies."[117] Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.[118] Due process, as it has been accepted, is comprised of two components: (1) substantive due process – which inquires whether the government has a legitimate purpose for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property; and (2) procedural due process – which refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.[119] Both components of due process are intended to secure an individual against any arbitrary and oppressive exercise of governmental powers.[120]
Markedly, before due process protections are triggered, there must in the first place be, at the very least: (1) an existence of a right or "legitimate claim of entitlement;"[121] and (2) a deprivation of such right or entitlement.[122] On the one hand, the first requisite pertains to "rights which are legally demandable and enforceable"[123] as contradistinguished from something "inchoate" or "one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one's own."[124] On the other hand, the second requisite connotes an intentional act of denying something to someone, or, at the very least, a deliberate decision not to act to prevent a loss.[125] What both requisites entail is that due process requirements are activated when there is a deprivation of a legally enforceable right or recognized claim of entitlement. In some instances, these requirements are also set in motion when there exists a risk of an impending deprivation of life, liberty, or property.[126] This implies both things: (1) a person cannot be considered to have been deprived if there is no legally recognized right or claim in the first place; and (2) a right, legally protected entitlement, or its enjoyment thereof not denied to a person by the State constitutes no deprivation at all.
By way of example, due process is not violated when a privilege such as a license or permit is summarily revoked or rescinded by executive action when national or public interest so requires.[127] This is because no enforceable "legitimate claim of entitlement" has been taken away by the State because a privilege is not a demandable right. Comparatively, in damnum absque injuria cases, no rights are said to be deprived if there is no law giving a right of action against a legal wrong inflicted.[128] Also, in custodial investigations where a suspect is merely asked to stand in a police line-up for the victim's identification, a person's right to counsel while under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time as the police investigators start questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation.[129] Here, a denial of the right to counsel when standing in a police line-up will not amount to a deprivation in the context of due process guarantee if no concomitant or immediately succeeding interrogation is conducted by law enforcers.
Accordingly, before one can be deprived of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement, the requisites of procedural due process must be satisfied, which are: (1) prior notice; and (2) an opportunity to be heard by an impartial tribunal.[130] In essence, this demonstrates the basic precept of "a law which hears before it condemns;"[131] thereby requiring the rendition of any judgment only after trial.[132] Such procedural requirement lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness.[133] By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property," the due process clause promotes fairness in such decisions.[134]
In this regard, the Court emphasizes that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process.[135] The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.[136] Due process of law guarantees "no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights."[137] Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved, as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.[138] Its flexibility is in its scope — once it has been determined that some process is due — is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards also call for the same kind of procedure.[139] Thus, in extraordinary situations, where some valid governmental interest is at stake, it justifies postponing the hearing until after deprivation.[140]
The immediately preceding discussions justify a summary but temporary deprivation of liberty or property rights as long as due process guarantees are in place to allow the deprived to justify a recovery of such rights. In the earlier example which demonstrated the necessity of the "close now, hear later" doctrine, financially distressed banks may be summarily closed or liquidated to protect the national economy itself because such closure or liquidation is subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if it is either capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or amounting to a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses under the Constitution.[141] In such case, due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure.[142] This ratiocination is consistent with the essence of administrative due process which was articulately explained in Cornejo v. Gabriel,[143] which reads:
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. x x x In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradictions that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of [special] or summary proceedings affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the granting of preliminary injunctions [ex parte]; and the suspension of officers or employees by the Governor General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an investigation.[144] (Emphasis supplied)
These rationalizations which allow a summary but temporary deprivation of rights also explains why judicial arrest and search warrants, even if they are applied for by law enforcers without the participation of target respondents, are justified by the inherent demands of general welfare and public safety. An accused cannot have an arrest or search warrant quashed on the ground that he or she had not been given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings which resulted in the issuance of such warrant. To hold otherwise and afford the person, who is to be arrested or whose premises is to be searched, an opportunity to be heard would be to grant the same person an opportunity to abscond or conceal the effects of the crime alleged to have been committed. Such absurd scenario would in effect greatly endanger public safety for the "long arm of the law" would be rendered inutile in bringing criminals to justice.
More importantly, when such principle is analyzed in the context of criminal proceedings, a court would not have the ability to bring the person of the accused under its jurisdiction should he or she refuse to enter his or her appearance.[145] As such, a provisional restriction of liberty or movement constitutes a partial surrender of civil liberties which is a necessary sacrifice in exchange for upholding the interests of public welfare and public safety. That is why a search warrant proceeding, for example, is independent of any criminal case — it is ex parte and non-adversarial.[146] Similarly, this is also the reason why it is essential that investigations for Anti-Money Laundering Act offenses (including the proceedings for the issuance of bank inquiry orders) should be kept ex parte, in order not to frustrate the State's effort in building its case and eventually prosecuting money laundering offenses.[147] In these instances, applications for warrants are necessarily ex parte and must be expedited for time is of the essence.[148]
All of the aforementioned instances demonstrate that procedural due process is not violated when the deprivation of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement is just temporary or provisional. When adequate means or processes for recovery or restitution are available to a person deprived of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement are in place, everyone is assured that the State — even in the legitimate exercise of police power — cannot summarily confiscate these rights or entitlements without undergoing a process that is due to all. The only exception where the State can effect a summary but permanent deprivation of a right or entitlement is if the same endangers public safety or public health which is, as earlier pointed out, a nuisance per se.
In the case of administrative warrants, since they are issued and implemented before a respondent has been given an opportunity to ventilate his or her defenses, such deprivations of liberty or property are necessarily temporary or provisional.[149] When due process guarantees are available to restore a liberty or property right being deprived, an executive action generally cannot be considered as oppressive or confiscatory. The reason being is that what has been taken away by the State may be returned to the person deprived after such deprivation has been proven through a process that the same was indeed unjustified.
As long as deprivation is temporary and due process requirements are still available to the one deprived of a right, the Constitution's Due Process clause cannot be considered to have been violated.[150] In essence, warrants under the administrative category should only be a preliminary step towards justified final deprivations of rights. Thus, to prevent an oppressive use of executive power, administrative warrants should: (1) only operate to provisionally deprive a person of a right or entitlement allegedly being exercised to the detriment of public interest or welfare; and (2) provide for a subsequent mechanism to challenge such deprivation.
An ultra vires act is one outside the scope of the power conferred by the legislature;[151] which can also include acts that may ostensibly be within such powers but are, by general or special laws, either proscribed or declared illegal.[152] Concomitantly, there are two types of ultra vires acts: (1) one which is performed utterly beyond jurisdiction; and (2) one performed under an irregular exercise of a basic power.[153] Accordingly, since "jurisdiction" in terms of administrative and law enforcement agencies pertains to "[t]he authority of law to act officially in a particular matter in hand,"[154] ultra vires acts under the first category are null and void and cannot be given any effect for being clearly beyond the scope of one's authority.[155]
To prevent an arbitrary use of executive power, an administrative agency authorized to issue warrants must be clearly authorized by a statute to perform specific acts of implementation which are consistent with the purposes of said law. In other words, an administrative authority's acts must be intra vires and must be consistent with the purposes of the statute or charter creating it before the same authority can be said to have been empowered by law to issue warrants. Such observation alludes to the basic idea on why the Executive Branch is divided into departments, bureaus, and agencies — each of them charged with implementing specific constitutional provisions and laws within their own sphere of authority. This specialization or division of competence to act is in recognition of the obvious reality that it would be extremely challenging and burdensome for a single office to regulate all facets of human activity. In consequence, the authority of administrative bodies to issue warrants must spring from a specific law and must be in furtherance or in pursuit of and in consonance with the regulatory purposes for which these administrative bodies were created.
The need for a specific regulatory statute is consistent with "reasonableness" in judicially scrutinizing the constitutional validity of a warrant. A properly defined scope of statutory authority in the conduct of implementing administrative warrants serves to curtail a "fishing expedition" on the part of law enforcers. Such requirement of particularity as to the governing statute for which a warrant is issued lessens the possibility of arbitrariness. This is because the specificity of a regulatory statute limits the concerned authority's discretion and ensures "reasonableness" in the conduct of implementing administrative warrants. In effect, it prevents agencies and officers in the Executive Branch from performing acts which are beyond their authority. If this guideline is complied with, a warrant would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection: (1) is reasonable under the Constitution; and (2) is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.[156]
The Court begins by showing the facets of judicial power found in second paragraph of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1 . x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases supplied)
As traditionally understood, judicial power is exercised by this Court, as well as all lower courts created by Congress and made part of the Judiciary's framework. Furthermore, such power is the only democratically and constitutionally-recognized means within the government's framework for making final pronouncements in the settlement of conflicting rights and obligations.
However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.[157] The ever-increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts.[158]
In consequence, the Court is impelled to admit that the growing complexities of modern life necessitate the existence of specialized adjudicative bodies. An increase of a governed activity's complexity brought about by its actors' increasing number of interactions means that the knowledge involved appurtenant thereto becomes more advanced and more intricate. As a result, disputes occasionally arising from such activity also become more technical to the point that conflicting rights and obligations can no longer be settled by merely looking at the law with a generic lens before applying the same to an established set of facts. Specialized or highly technical knowledge has to be factored into the law before a just resolution of such disputes can be achieved. As such, it now becomes unreasonable and infeasible to expect regular courts, in determining probable cause, to be well-versed in asking searching questions when evaluating highly technical matters which require specialized knowledge, expertise or experience. As pointed out earlier, this is the reason why quasi-judicial bodies exist in the first place — to address disputes involving highly technical matters that relatively few individuals are competent to handle or address. These specialized administrative bodies are deemed experts on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction.[159] Had regular courts been expected by law to be equipped and competent to handle highly technical matters requiring specialized knowledge, there would have been no need of quasi-judicial bodies in the first place.
Before proceeding with the nature of quasi-judicial powers, it is also crucial for the Court to address the following unsettling questions:
Firstly, whether a particular field is "specialized" enters into the realm of political questions. Determining what subject matters need specialized adjudicative attention is for the Congress — pursuant to its constitutional power to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" — to perform.[160] Such matter cannot be considered as a justiciable issue as this Court, should it determine what the Congress should consider as "specialized" fields requiring special adjudicative attention, would be violating the basic principle of separation of powers by indirectly defining, prescribing or apportioning the jurisdiction of specialized courts. It is up to the wisdom of the Congress to determine what particular matters need specialized adjudicatory functions.
Secondly, in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction; and such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law.[161] However, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are specialized and have narrowly-limited competencies.[162] As a consequence, they cannot issue extraordinary writs (like certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto) which are necessary incidents of judicial power because proceedings corresponding to such writs involve only an examination and direct application of a constitutional provision or law which does not require specialized expertise. In other words, the jurisdiction as regards to extraordinary remedies is inherently judicial and not quasi-judicial. Hence, any statute enacted giving administrative agencies the power to issue extraordinary writs which is intrinsically judicial breaches the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
Having settled the questions pertaining to adjudicatory powers in general, the Court now proceeds to define quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power which is the authority of administrative agencies to adjudicate the rights of persons before it.[163] It involves the authority "to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."[164] Here, the administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.[165] However, such power is limited to the adjudication of the rights of the parties that are incidental to the agency's functions under the law.[166] Thus, the judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial powers, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.[167]
At this juncture, the Court echoes the earlier discussion that a deprivation of liberty and property rights inevitably triggers the requirement of procedural due process which administrative authorities must comply to avoid tainting their official actions with arbitrariness and oppressiveness. For administrative authorities which are either part of or attached to the Executive Branch, any implementing act that they perform which deprives one of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement should necessarily be subjected to procedural due process requirements — whether prior or subsequent to such deprivation. Otherwise, such deprivation would be confiscatory and oppressive. This is the reason why past jurisprudence has expressed that legislature, in granting adjudicative powers to an administrative agency, must state such intention in clear and express terms.[168] In effect, an administrative authority which does not have in its framework any procedural relief or opportunity for one temporarily deprived of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement to assail such deprivation is disenfranchised in effecting such deprivation.
In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[169] If the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.[170] This was already clarified in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights[171] which explained that "investigation" is an act of making an official systematic inquiry or, simply, "to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information;" while "adjudication" is an act of "[settling] finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of the issues raised." Once there is an absence of judicial discretion on the part of the administrative authority seeking to gather facts on a particular person or entity for the purposes of holding him, her or it administratively accountable for a statutory infraction, then such authority cannot issue warrants for being devoid of adjudicative power. This prevents a "fishing expedition" on the part of administrative authorities and law enforcers thereby protecting private rights from undue intrusion. Accordingly, an administrative authority (save in instances where compliance of procedural due process may be dispensed such as abatements of nuisance per se) should be empowered by law to exercise adjudicatory powers along with its auxiliary writs, processes and other procedural means to carry its jurisdiction into effect.[172]
The need for requiring warrants to be issued by administrative authorities with quasi-judicial power is in view of the inescapable fact that they are still part of the Executive Branch's framework. Any deprivation, though temporary, must either be compliant with due process or be under the purview of its exceptions to avoid oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory use of executive power. Thus, requiring administrative authorities to first possess quasi-judicial powers ensures that procedural due process requirements have been complied with before effecting any final deprivation of liberty or property.
Finally, one important beneficial aspect in requiring administrative authorities to first possess adjudicative powers before it may issue warrants is that quasi-judicial acts are susceptible of being brought into the judicial framework either through an appeal or a judicial review. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 – through the facility of Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court – provides that decisions of specified quasi-judicial bodies are reviewable on appeal by the CA. Additionally, for those quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions are final and not reviewable by the CA under the ordinary appeal process, a writ of certiorari assailing an administrative adjudicative issuance (provided that jurisdictional errors or instances of grave abuse of discretion are present) may be filed by an aggrieved party; thereby, bringing the administrative dispute into the judicial framework. This is because discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.[173] Such institutional and systemic assurance that an administrative decision or final order will ultimately be subjected to judicial review (unless waived by the person being deprived of a right or entitlement) strengthens the guarantee that due process requirements are complied with before any final deprivation of rights or entitlements may be effected by the State.
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, as well as the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures (with "arrest" falling under the term "seizure").[174] Notably, the present Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution contains no prohibition of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.[175] This reasonableness requirement is aimed at curtailing arbitrariness.[176] Disregarding this requirement has the effect of rendering inadmissible, for any purpose in any proceeding, any evidence obtained pursuant to such warrant.[177] Furthermore, although primarily applied in criminal cases, it is with more reason that the requirement of reasonableness should also apply to administrative warrants because a person's liberty or property rights may be unduly burdened by unrestricted government intrusions in the form of restraints in movement or, for the purpose of this requirement, boundless inspections. More importantly, all claims of impropriety as to the issuance and implementation of these warrants should be analyzed under the "reasonableness" standard rather than under a "substantive due process" approach because Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution provides an explicit textual source of protection against intrusive governmental conduct.[178]
"Probable cause" is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness.[179] To apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen.[180] Accordingly, for exploratory warrants (such as inspection warrants) to be valid, the following must concur: (1) there must be a substantial government interest that informs or supports the regulatory scheme (e.g., substantial interest in improving health and safety conditions) pursuant to which the search or inspection is made; (2) the search or inspection must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) an advise must be made that the search is being made pursuant to the law and that the search must have a properly defined scope thereby limiting the discretion of implementing officers.[181] These requirements, of course, are also subjected to the "reasonable expectation of privacy"[182] standard which the law enforcers ought to be mindful of. In the case of warrants which restrain the movement of persons, their validity hinges on the following requisites: (1) a law which defines an infraction of administrative concern or a general welfare concern sought to be protected by the State; and (2) probable cause that the person to be restrained of movement committed such infraction or presented a general welfare concern as defined by such law.
These requisites for validity find great significance in instances which are detrimental to public welfare but do not justify a summary abatement. Here, law enforcement agents do not have immediate personal knowledge of certain violations of law committed or continually being committed. Instead, an administrative or law enforcement agency's "knowledge" is acquired by gathering of evidence (including sworn statements of private persons or confidential informants with personal knowledge of such violation) through surveillance or other methods which must not intrude into a person's constitutional right to privacy. Such pieces of evidence may establish a reasonable inference that the person against whom a prospective warrant is to be issued has probably committed or is still committing acts in violation of law.
In criminal cases, one of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.[183] This requirement is especially useful in administrative proceedings to prevent law enforcers from undertaking a "fishing expedition" by conducting a sweeping search; thereby, lessening the chances of abuse. This is comparative to the jurisprudential dictum that "[a] search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime."[184] Thus, for summary deprivations of any right by virtue of a warrant, supporting proof is required to be adduced before an adjudicative body — absent such requirement, a warrant cannot be issued and implemented or considered as valid, if unduly issued.
To understand the reason behind limiting the use and purpose of administrative warrants to non-criminal offenses, the Court must first highlight Sec. 14(2), Art. III of the Constitution which states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." Curiously, nowhere in the Constitution does it state that the quantum of evidence necessary for conviction is "beyond reasonable doubt." However, it has been accepted that the reasonable doubt standard has constitutional stature because the due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he or she is charged.[185] Such acceptance is consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts as aptly pointed out in People v. Moner[186] (Moner) which tersely points out that:
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court. This includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence.[187] (Emphases supplied)
In effect and also due to its long historical use as a necessary component of the constitutional presumption of innocence, the requirement to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt has been engrained with the status of being part of "substantive" due process. In other words, such evidentiary standard now constitutive of what a "sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property"[188] should be. It is indispensable "to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law."[189] Therefore, as it stands now, every fact necessary to constitute the crime with for which an accused is charged must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[190]
As it relates to the fourth guideline requiring agencies or officers of the Executive Branch to first possess adjudicative powers as a condition for the validity of their warrants, the Court points out that the validity of the decisions or final orders promulgated by administrative proceedings hinges on a quantum of evidence different from that of criminal cases. In quasi-judicial and other administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.[191] Consequently, since it is not required in quasi-judicial proceedings that the quantum of proof be greater than substantial evidence, it follows that only regular courts within the Judiciary's framework can take cognizance of criminal cases where the quantum of proof required in order to convict an accused is beyond reasonable doubt. Alternatively speaking, the only adjudicatory body of government that can make final pronouncements in criminal cases — with the use of "beyond reasonable doubt" as a standard of proof to calibrate the legal truth — are regular courts. Such is consistent to the principle that courts of law (as opposed to quasi-judicial bodies' competence to handle matters requiring specialized expertise) are the proper instruments for the adjudication of legal disputes where matters to be resolved pertain to general questions of law.[192]
As to limiting the use and purpose of administrative warrants to non-criminal cases, the Court takes hint from the immediately preceding discussions that only regular courts can make final pronouncements in criminal cases. The ability of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers to make final pronouncements is limited only to their specialized fields of expertise. Consistent with the fourth guideline requiring quasi-judicial bodies to be statutorily-empowered to make final pronouncements in the first place, such ability cannot extend beyond such specialized bounds so as to include criminal cases. Likewise, it cannot be extended to include incidents of criminal proceedings such as warrant applications.
It may be settled that the purpose of obtaining warrants is either "to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him [or her] for trial"[193] or "for discovery and to get possession of personal property" which is made necessary due to public necessity.[194] Be that as it may, administrative agencies with quasi-judicial powers have no business in taking part in the initial stages of criminal proceedings where matters up for subsequent final resolution involve general legal questions—not specialized competencies. This is to prevent any abuse or oppression on the part of the Executive Branch through its administrative agencies, even if they are exercising adjudicatory powers. To permit law enforcers to use administrative warrants for purposes of arresting persons or gathering evidence in view of filing subsequent criminal charges would be to allow administrative agencies to indirectly participate in the adjudication of criminal cases.
Accordingly, if a warrant's intent is to pursue both administrative compliance and criminal enforcement, applications for its issuance — at least, as it pertains to the criminal aspect, — should be filed before regular courts.
As accentuated earlier, warrants and other processes are incidents of the power to make final pronouncements on the conflicting rights and obligations of contending parties. In administrative proceedings, warrants issued aid only in disposing disputes involving specialized matters requiring specialized competencies to resolve. Consistent with the third guideline which renders an administrative warrant unreasonable if it is issued not in pursuant to the law which created such quasi-judicial body, the admissibility in evidence of the things seized pursuant to an administrative search also becomes subject to the reasonableness under Sec. 3(2)[195] in relation to Sec. 2,[196] Art. III of the Constitution. What this means is that a warrant goes beyond the bounds of reasonableness if it is used for purposes other than the enforcement of a specific statute providing for a particular regulation or infraction. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[197]
For administrative warrants, they become unreasonable in the context of the Bill of Rights if the same are used to aid criminal proceedings. Since the authority of quasi-judicial bodies to make final pronouncements is limited only to their specialized fields of expertise, it follows that the utility and evidentiary value corresponding to these warrants and processes should not extend outside of their purposes and specialized competencies. Accordingly, any evidence obtained pursuant to administrative warrants is inadmissible in criminal proceedings for lack of jurisdictional fiat. Conversely, any evidence obtained pursuant to an administrative warrant is admissible only in administrative cases.
It is settled that the Constitution, being the "fundamental paramount and supreme law," is deemed written in every statute.[198] By extension, all established jurisprudential concepts and requirements of the due process clause — a constitutional libertarian guarantee — are also deemed incorporated in all statutes granting administrative authorities the power to issue warrants. Consistent with the second guideline that any deprivation of rights or entitlements effected by administrative warrants shall only be temporary, these warrants lose their validity if their effectivity is not tethered to a mandatory period as regards the filing of formal charges. Without formal charges, the temporariness of such deprivation is placed in limbo and is now subject to the absolute discretion of law enforcers. Resultantly, an indefinite but supposedly temporary deprivation becomes, in essence, a final one and an instrument of summary confiscation; thereby, being anathema to the basic tenets of procedural due process.
As a general rule, the period to bring formal charges after a successful implementation of the subject warrant shall be strictly complied with if due process principles are to be respected and upheld. In other words, if the law — which granted a specific administrative authority the power to issue warrants — also provides a period for the filing of formal charges from the time of temporary deprivation, such period shall govern and determine the warrant's effectivity. This is similar to the periods provided in Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for the delivery of persons to proper judicial authorities.
However, there may be some instances where a statute providing for an administrative warrant fails to provide for a period (prescriptive or otherwise) pertaining to the filing of formal charges. Mindful of the constitutional principle of separation of powers which is likewise deemed written in every statute, this Court cannot preempt the Congress and determine for itself the exact period for the filing of formal charges after the implementation of the warrant. These periods are part of substantive law as their expiration now accords a right in favor of respondents targeted by such warrants to repel consequent initiations of formal charges. Thus, in instances where a statute does not provide for a period of filing formal charges after the implementation of a warrant, the constitutional demands of due process take over and compel adjudicatory bodies to determine for themselves (with due regard to evidence) what "reasonable time" is within which formal charges should be filed before a respondent may undertake steps to dissolve, lift, or quash the subject warrant.
"Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."[199] Although it has been said that the question as to what shall be considered such a "reasonable time" is for the determination of the legislature and is, in no sense, a judicial question;[200] courts may infer — pursuant to the constitutional due process clause — what "reasonable" time is under attendant circumstances in order to determine the validity life and effectivity of an administrative warrant. What is "reasonable" (in cases where a statute fails to provide a period for the filing of formal charges) becomes a factual issue which requires evidence to substantiate — ultimately susceptible of judicial review if the subject dispute is eventually introduced into the judicial framework via appeal or certiorari. The "possibility of loss" in relation to indefinite deprivations of rights or entitlements may be gauged by considering attendant facts that trigger the need to protect due process rights. Such factual evaluation affords adjudicative bodies the proper facility to determine what constitutes "reasonable time" for purposes of determining the validity and life or extent of the effect of a warrant in question. Consistent with the second guideline requiring that a deprivation through an administrative warrant must be provisional, the "reasonable time" requirement for the filing of formal charges prevents administrative authorities from effecting an indefinite deprivation which would virtually amount to a denial of due process for approximating a state of finality.
As regards warrants which restrict the movement of persons, some constitutional principles prevalent in criminal law finds great significance in administrative cases. One of which is the immutable right of an accused to be assisted by a counsel preferably of his or her own choice.[201] The right to the assistance of a competent counsel guarantees that a person has a full opportunity to enjoy all the benefits under the due process clause. This right is granted to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the State; and a recognition that an average person does not have the professional skill to protect himself or herself — as against an experienced and learned prosecutor — before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty.[202] Such serious risk in losing the right to liberty entitles one, being restrained of movement, to have an indelible right of access to a competent counsel in order to properly pursue appropriate legal remedies.
The obvious reason behind this principle is that it is more difficult for a person restrained of movement to seek the assistance of a competent counsel located outside of his or her confinement than for a person unrestricted of movement to engage in the same undertaking. Such realization makes the right of access to a competent counsel part and parcel of the right to liberty itself. Thus, due to the need to protect the basic right of liberty — especially in cases where a non-judicially sanctioned restraint of movement is justified by imminent public welfare or public safety needs — justifies the analogous application of the right of access to a competent counsel in criminal cases to administrative proceedings.
In cases where persons are deprived of liberty by virtue of administrative warrants, this Court is mindful of the constitutional prohibition against "torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will" which detention prisoners are most vulnerable to or "secret detention places solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention."[203] To guarantee that the constitutional and statutory rights of persons detained by virtue of administrative warrants are properly and effectively safeguarded, there needs to be a mechanism where detainees are supervised by the court in accordance with Sec. 25, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Such mechanism, as brilliantly suggested by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, is to require administrative agencies which issued an arrest warrant or any order (ex parte or inter partes) to immediately submit a verified notice to the nearest RTC where the person subject of such warrant is detained. Upon receipt of the verified notice, the RTC shall issue a commitment order (not a judicial arrest warrant as the person subject of the administrative warrant is already under custody of law) so that it may include administrative detainees in the conduct of its supervision. In this way, an administrative detainee's constitutional and statutory rights will be judicially secured.
As discussed under the sixth guideline, this Court, in Moner, had already clarified that "[t]he power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court [which] includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence."[204] In this regard, the Court deems it appropriate and necessary to give force to the foregoing guidelines by establishing an evidentiary rule of accountability on the part of responsible public officer charged with the issuance and implementation of administrative warrants. Since, these responsible officers also enjoy the benefits accorded by the due process clause, a presumptive but balanced (in order to give a reasonable opportunity to mount a defense) evidentiary rule is warranted. In the realm of administrative warrants such rational balance is best served by designating the prima facie standard as a means to hold responsible officers accountable.
Prima facie evidence is defined as that which is "good and sufficient on its face."[205] A quantum greater than probable cause,[206] such standard or quantum denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.[207] To overcome this prima facie presumption of liability, the quasi-judicial officer or law enforcer against whom such presumption is levied must present contrary evidence to overcome what was established by such inference; otherwise, the existence of probable cause cannot be disputed.[208] However, such presumption need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of greater weight, but only such evidence which puts the case in equipoise is sufficient.[209]
Therefore, to avert any likelihood of administrative abuse, as well as to uphold the due process rights of the responsible officers, the Court deems it fit to consider a violation of any item in the foregoing guidelines as prima facie evidence of an administrative infraction or guilt, under applicable laws, against quasi-judicial officers and law enforcers, without prejudice to criminal and civil actions that those aggrieved may pursue.[210] Such standard is to ensure that all items laid out by these guidelines are strictly complied with.
The Court, in applying the aforementioned guidelines — to test the validity of both the July 26, 2018 SDO and the accompanying July 17, 2018 Charge Sheet affecting respondent's detention — finds that the same issuances are well-founded for the following reasons:
First, the danger, harm, or evil to be prevented by the subject SDO and the Charge Sheet pertains to both national security and public safety which outweigh the privilege of aliens to continue their stay in the Philippines.
The salient provisions of the Constitution pertaining to general welfare read as follows:
Article II
Declaration of Principles and
State Policies Principles
x x x x
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
x x x x
Article III
Bill of Rightsx x x x
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the Fundamental Law makes it a "prime duty" on the part of the State to protect the people and promote general welfare for being "essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." More specifically, it is also provided that the right to travel may be impaired by the State's exercise of police power in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
In this regard, such "law" aimed at pursuing the interests of national security, public safety, and public health is embodied in Sec. 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987[211] (Administrative Code), which provides that: "[t]he President shall have the power to deport aliens subject to the requirements of due process." The President's powers and functions as regards to the deportation of aliens are delegated to the Department of Justice which, in turn, exercises the power of control and supervision over the Bureau which has rule-making powers under the law.[212]
Moreover, Sec. 2 of the Alien Registration Act of 1950[213] (Alien Registration Act) provides:
Section 2. The Commissioner of Immigration, with the approval of the Department Head, is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Act, including the registration of alien seamen, aliens confined in institutions in the Philippines, aliens under orders of deportation, and aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, and from time to time, always with the approval of the Department Head, to amend such rules and regulations.
All registration records of every alien shall be forwarded for file and record to the Bureau of Immigration.
Both the Administrative Code and the Alien Registration Act demonstrate that the government has assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its dominion.[214] They affirm and reinforce the fundamental principle that every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest.[215] Such principle was eloquently explained by no less than the first Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano in the early case of In Re: Patterson[216] as follows:
Unquestionably[,] every State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means against any attack. Upon this fundamental right Act 265 of the Legislative Commission of the Philippines is based. Upon this fundamental principle are based many other laws, among them those concerning immigration, emigration, commerce, and international intercourse. But contrary to the various allegations of the parties, Act 265 is not an emigration law, because it does not purport to regulate the conditions upon which the inhabitants of the territory may leave it; nor is it an immigration law, because it is not limited to the entrance into the territory of those who are foreigners, but refers "to persons coming from abroad, or those who are guilty of coming to the Philippines with a certain purpose," without distinction of nationality; neither is it a law of commerce or international communication, because of the precise and positive character of its object, which is no other than to prevent the entrance of those persons who "have aided, abetted, or instigated an insurrection in these Islands against the sovereignty of the United States therein, or against the Government herein established, or such persons as come here with any of these objects." Consequently the arguments adduced by the parties, with citations of authorities pro or con based upon the supposition that Act 265 is an immigration law, or part of the laws of the United States upon this subject, need not occupy the attention of the court. Nor is there merit in the question raised by the petitioner when he invokes the international treaty between England and the United States — that is to say, the law governing commerce and intercourse between the subjects of both nations — because, as we believe, it is a doctrine generally professed by virtue of that fundamental right to which we have referred that under no aspect of the case does this right of intercourse give rise to any obligation on the part of the State to admit foreigners under all circumstances into its territory. The international community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to fix the conditions under which foreigners should be allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may be more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a legitimate manifestation of territorial power and not contrary to law. In the same way a State possesses the right to expel from its territory any foreigner who does not conform to the provisions of the local law. Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty. Therefore[,] it is not strange that this right should be exercised in a sovereign manner by the executive power, to which is especially entrusted in the very nature of things the preservation of so essential a right without interference on the part of the judicial power. If it [cannot] be denied that under normal circumstances when foreigners are present in the country the sovereign power has the right to take all necessary precautions to prevent such foreigners from imperiling the public safety, and to apply repressive measures in case they should abuse the hospitality extended them, neither can we shut our eyes to the fact that there may be danger to personal liberty and international liberty if to the executive branch of the Government there should be conceded absolutely the power to order the expulsion of foreigners by means of summary and discretional proceedings; nevertheless, the greater part of modem laws, notwithstanding these objections, have sanctioned the maxim that the expulsion of foreigners is a political measure and that the executive power may expel without appeal any person whose presence tends to disturb the public peace. The privilege of foreigners to enter the territory of a State for the purpose of travel[l]ing through or remaining therein being recognized on principle, we must also recognize the right of the State under exceptional circumstances to limit this privilege upon the ground of public policy, and in all cases preserve the obligation of the foreigner to subject himself to the provisions of the local law concerning his entry into and his presence in the territory of each State.[217] (Emphases supplied)
As it stands, the temporary stay of aliens in the Philippines is but a privilege, not a right, subject to the dictates of public policy and the appropriate determination by the authorities vested with that power under our Immigration Law.[218] Any legislation aimed at preserving national security and protecting public safety through border control measures is considered a legitimate and compelling state interest. Therefore, SDOs satisfy the requirement of an existence of compelling state interest for them to be used in the enforcement of immigration laws.
Second, the respondent's right to liberty as effectively deprived by the July 26, 2018 SDO is merely temporary.
To give a proper context, the Court replicates Sec. 10, Rule 9 of the Omnibus Rules which reads:
Section 10. Nature of the Summary Deportation Order. – A Summary Deportation Order shall be final and immediately executory upon signing/approval thereof.
Relatedly, Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. – The foreigner shall have three (3) days from receipt of a copy of the Order/Judgment to file two (2) copies of a Verified Motion for Reconsideration before the OCOM Receiving Unit. Only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be filed. No other pleading shall be entertained. Within twenty[-]four (24) hours from receipt, the OCOM Receiving Unit shall immediately forward the Motion for Reconsideration to the Legal Division or the BSI as the case may be. (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, Sec. 7, Rule 10 did not distinguish between a summary and a regular deportation order. The Court cannot accept respondent's argument that such provision should be interpreted to limit its application to regular deportation orders and foreclose his own right to file a motion for reconsideration against an SDO. It is akin to arguing that the rules should be interpreted in such a way as to deny due process to aliens affected by SDOs in order to allow them to nullify such issuances on constitutional grounds. A more reasonable approach consistent with the due process clause and libertarian constitutional protections would be to construe Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules to also cover SDOs.
In this instance, the SDO cannot be considered as a final deprivation of a person's supposed entitlement or privilege to stay within Philippine borders. Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules gives a foreigner arrested or detained up to three days to move for reconsideration from any adverse deportation order or judgment from the Bureau. This negates any insinuation that respondent was being permanently deprived by the SDO of his statutory right to question his imminent deportation. Moreover, as discussed earlier, habeas corpus will not be issued if a person's arrest is by virtue of some legal process which has adequate procedural facilities for the detained to assail his or her confinement. All told, the guarantee of administrative due process is available in the Omnibus Rules which respondent unjustifiably failed to avail.
Third, the Immigration Act empowered the Bureau, through its Board, to issue warrants of arrest and other orders to that effect in aid of deportation proceedings.
Such power of deportation was first provided in Sec. 37(a) of the Immigration Act which reads as follows:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien[.] (Emphases supplied)
Obviously, the aforementioned provision needs no further elucidation as it is self-explanatory. It cements the Bureau's authority to issue warrants of arrest and other orders of similar utility for purposes of implementing the Immigration Act.
Fourth, the Bureau is statutorily authorized to exercise quasi-judicial powers. To start with, Sec. 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code reads as follows:
Section 31. Bureau of Immigration. – The Bureau of Immigration is principally responsible for the administration and enforcement of immigration, citizenship and alien admission and registration laws in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended (C.A. No. 613, as amended). The following units shall comprise the structural organization of the Bureau:
Subject to the provisions of existing law, the Secretary is hereby authorized to review, revise and/or promulgate new rules and regulations to govern the conduct of proceedings in the Board of Commissioners and the Boards of Special Inquiry, including the determination of the size and number of the support staff to be assigned thereat.
The Bureau shall be headed by a Commissioner assisted by two Associate Commissioners, all of whom shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.
The Commissioner and the two Associate Commissioners shall compose the Board of Commissioners, a collegial body hereby granted exclusive jurisdiction over all deportation cases. The Board shall also have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry and shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
Each Board of Special Inquiry shall be composed of a Chairman and two members who shall be appointed by the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Commissioner.
Likewise, the appointment of all the other personnel of the Bureau including the designation of Acting Immigration Officers shall be vested in the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Commissioner. (Emphases supplied)
This is supplemented by Sec. 37(c) of the Immigration Act which states:
The aforequoted provisions, when taken together, demonstrate that the Bureau, through its Board, has been vested with quasi-judicial powers to pass upon questions involving the privilege of an alien's stay in the Philippines. The Board's appellate jurisdiction mentioned in the Administrative Code, as well as the hearing requirement fixed in the Immigration Act both entail an examination of facts before passing upon with finality the status of an alien's privilege to continue his or her stay in the Philippines. In other words, the Board is not only empowered to examine, gather, inquire, probe, study, research, or explore a subject for the purpose of learning, discovering, or obtaining information — it is also empowered to settle or resolve issues relating to the continued existence of an alien's privilege to stay in the Philippines. Essentially, such function of examining facts before a final order of deportation may be validly issued by the Board is in itself adjudicatory for it also requires the exercise of discretion as a necessary step in fixing the rights and obligations of a prospective deportee.
Fifth, the communication of the Chinese Embassy constitutes probable cause as to respondent's status as a foreign fugitive.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[219] It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.[220] The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.[221] Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction — it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.[222]
In deportation cases, Sec. 2(c), Rule 9 of the Omnibus Rules defines a "fugitive from justice" as follows:
Section 2. x x x
x x x x
As pointed out in the preceding discussions, this bears an intimate relation with the probable cause requirement as a component of the due process requirement. Accordingly, as to the charge of lack of due process, Sec. 37(c) of the Immigration Act should be read together with Sec. 37(a)(6) which states:
Section 37. (a) x x x
x x x x
From the aforementioned provision, it is clear that Sec. 37(a)(6) empowers the Bureau's Commissioner to issue warrants against any alien "who becomes a public charge within five years after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to entry;" but only "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against [such] alien" as provided in the preliminary statement of Sec. 37(a). This provision is subject to Sec. 37(c) of the foregoing law which requires that an alien shall be "informed of the specific grounds for deportation" and be "given a hearing" under the Bureau's procedural rules in order for a deportation to be valid.
However, the Court finds that the law does not prescribe a specific procedure as to when hearing requirement is to be observed; either before or after the implementation of the warrant of arrest. As pointed out in the early discussions, due process is flexible and may come before or after a temporary deprivation of right or entitlement. In consequence, the Bureau may provide for a flexible mechanism of due process which they may deem fit depending on the nature and circumstances that such warrants (or orders of similar effect like SDOs) are supposed to address.
As to the July 26, 2018 SDO, the Board cannot be said to have been remiss in informing respondent of the specific grounds for his arrest. The SDO, which also contains all the allegations found in the Charge Sheet, clearly informed the respondent that he is being arrested for being a foreign fugitive. Even if the fact or allegation of being a fugitive was merely communicated to the Bureau by the Chinese Embassy, respondent cannot deny or plead ignorance that such ground was indeed made known to him. The specific grounds found in both the SDO and the Charge Sheet are part of the notice requirement in order to allow prospective deportees to mount their defenses or challenges against warrants of arrest and SDOs. Besides, Sec. 12 of the Immigration Act reads:
Section 12. A passport visa shall not be granted to an applicant who fails to establish satisfactorily his nonimmigrants status or whose entry into the Philippines would be contrary to the public safety. (Emphases supplied)
The aforecited provision should be read together with Sec. 37(a)(6) which authorizes the Bureau's Commissioner to issue warrants against an alien who "becomes a public charge" "after entry from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to [such] entry." Clearly, the knowledge acquired by the government from the Chinese Embassy that respondent may have been a fugitive in the latter's country is sufficient for the Board to conclude that he had become a "public charge" subsequent to his entry into the Philippines. Such allegation of being a fugitive is already constitutive of probable cause which is enough to trigger the issuance of a warrant of arrest or SDO on the Bureau's part in order to protect public safety. The government need not make an inquiry beyond the Chinese Embassy's claim that respondent is wanted for crimes in the latter's home country. It is enough that a reasonable belief has formed in the minds of the Board for them to be able to form an initial finding that respondent has probably violated provisions in the Immigration Act. Such reasonable belief justifies the issuance of an SDO or taking such other necessary steps to implement the Immigration Act by the Bureau through its Board.
Contrary to the RTC's finding that "the Chinese Embassy's communications with the Board supposedly reveal that the former merely alleged that respondent is 'suspected' of 'illegally controlling computer system crimes in China'," the July 10, 2018 letter categorically stated that respondent is one of those tagged as a fugitive of justice for being "involved in crimes in China and being wanted by China's police authority." To require the Philippine government to make its own independent investigation as to the truth or veracity of the Chinese Embassy's allegation that respondent is a fugitive, before the issuance of a warrant or SDO, borders on absurdity. The Philippine government cannot be reasonably expected to conduct an investigation within Chinese territory in order to determine whether respondent is indeed a fugitive of justice. At most, the Philippine government can only retrieve information from its foreign counterparts which is what the Chinese Embassy had offered to the former in the first place through the July 10, 2018 letter.
Besides, the issue — on whether respondent's tagging a fugitive of justice is proper — goes beyond the Philippine courts' power to pass upon. Due process, under the circumstances, is best left for the alien's own government to accord. Requiring additional documents or other pieces of evidence from the Chinese government before a warrant of arrest or SDO will be issued is not covered by any statutory guarantee; certainly not in Sec. 37(a) of the Immigration Act. Worse, it may even be seen as an upfront to the basic practices on international comity.[223] These matters are internal to the Chinese government and appurtenant to the exercise of its own courts' respective jurisdictions.
In the final analysis, the paramount concern that the Philippine government should tackle is the protection of public safety and the preservation of national security. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the SDO was not invalidly issued because respondent is deemed to have violated the Immigration Act for concealing the fact that he was a fugitive in China which justifies his summary arrest.
Sixth, the SDO was issued neither pursuant to a criminal statute nor for the purpose of prosecuting respondent for a criminal offense. It was issued pursuant to an infraction under the Immigration Act and for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over respondent's person in order to initiate deportation proceedings. Here, the records do not indicate that respondent was arrested for the purpose of charging him with any violation relating to Sec. 45 of the Immigration Act which enumerates criminal acts punishable under such law. Besides, had respondent been arrested by the Bureau's agents for the purpose of making him answer for acts committed in violation of Sec. 45, a warrant issued by a competent court would have been needed in order to validate such arrest.
Seventh, no issue arose as the Bureau's timeliness of filing appropriate charges against respondent. It is undisputed that a Charge Sheet was issued before the SDO and was given to respondent upon his arrest. It is also undisputed that the SDO essentially contained all the allegations found in the Charge Sheet. As indubitably demonstrated in the records, respondent even challenged the contents of the SDO (by claiming before the RTC that he was not served by the Chinese Embassy with a copy of the alleged criminal cases he is facing in China. That, in itself, is reason enough for this Court to conclude that respondent actually knew that he is being arrested and detained for the reason that he was tagged as a foreign fugitive.
Accordingly, such actual knowledge equates to understanding the nature and cause of the charges levelled by the Bureau against him; that is why, he was able to timely file his opposition against the SDO. However, respondent made a fatal error in pursing the wrong remedy by prematurely resorting to the courts for relief by filing a petition for habeas corpus; instead of exhausting the administrative process of filing a motion for reconsideration which adequately gave him all the opportunity to defend his claim of continued stay in the Philippines. Given the established factual milieu of the case, the Court finds that formal charges were timely brought against respondent who, in turn, blundered in pursuing the appropriate remedies.
Last, the Bureau's officers who were responsible in issuing and implementing the SDO committed no fault under the circumstances such that it would expose them to legal liabilities and taint the SDO's validity.
It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.[224] This presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid to the effective and unhampered administration of government functions — without such benefit, every official action could be negated with minimal effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge.[225] However, the same stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty.[226] Meaning, such presumption may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.[227] Such evidence must be clear and convincing in order to overturn such presumption.[228]
In this case, the Court cannot find any indication in the records that the Board or the Bureau's agents committed any irregularity in the issuance and implementation of the subject SDO. The RTC's Resolution and respondent's pleadings show that what is being assailed as irregular is the "practice" itself of issuing and implementing SDOs which goes into the heart of the Omnibus Rules. Since it was already clarified earlier that there is nothing constitutionally abhorrent in the practice of issuing SDOs as due process is still accorded to target aliens, it necessarily follows that issuing and implementing officers of the Bureau cannot be held either criminally, civilly, or administratively liable under the circumstances.
As to the nature of SDOs, the following sections of the Omnibus Rules read as follows:
Rule 9
Summary Deportation
Section 10. Nature of the Summary Deportation Order. — A Summary Deportation Order shall be final and immediately executory upon signing/approval thereof.
Section 11. Effect of Summary Deportation Order. — Summary deportation shall bar the foreigner concerned from re-entry into the Philippines and his name shall be included in the BI Blacklist.
Rule 10
Deportation Order/Judgmentx x x x
Section 6. Finality of the Decision. — Except in cases of voluntary deportation and summary deportation, the Order/Judgment directing the Respondent's deportation shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from notice, unless within such period, Respondent files a Motion for Reconsideration or an Appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Justice or the Office of the President. (Emphases supplied)
As astutely pointed out by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (Justice Zalameda), it appears that a foreigner tagged as a fugitive would have no opportunity to be heard prior to and after arrest as an SDO is considered as final and executory. More so, the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration against an SDO appears to be absent in Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules which states:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. — The foreigner shall have three (3) days from receipt of a copy of the Order/Judgment to file two (2) copies of a verified Motion for Reconsideration before the OCOM Receiving Unit. Only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be filed. No other pleading shall be entertained. Within twenty[-]four (24) hours from receipt, the OCOM Receiving Unit shall immediately forward the Motion for Reconsideration to the Legal Division or the BSI as the case may be.
The Motion for Reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the Order/Judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the evidence or provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.
Whenever necessary, the Legal Division or the BSI, as the case may be, may issue an Order directing the complainant to submit a Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Within ten (10) days from submission of the Comment or from the lapse of time to submit the same, the Legal Division or the BSI shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration.
In case the Legal Division or the BSI opted not to issue an Order to submit a Comment, it shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Upon drafting the Resolution, the Legal Division or the BSI shall forward the same with the deportation record to the Board Secretary.
Upon receipt of the draft Resolution, the Board Secretary shall include the same to the next scheduled agenda for the BOC to resolve.
Also pointed out by Justice Zalameda, it seems that the foregoing provision on the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not cover SDOs. Although prospective deportees may file a motion for reconsideration in view of due process rights as interpreted here, the text of the Omnibus Rules makes it susceptible to being misapplied and used as a justification to withhold such remedy. Since Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution explicitly states that "[r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court," this Court disapproves Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules only insofar as it does not explicitly make the remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration available to prospective deportees arrested pursuant to SDOs. Under such circumstance, judicial review is justified and may be wielded to direct the Bureau of Immigration to amend its Omnibus Rules in order to clarify the availability of certain procedural remedies to give full effect on a prospective deportee's due process rights.
Conclusion
It is understandable that some may have strong reservations, such as those justifiably raised by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, against "warrants" issued by administrative agencies instead of regular courts due to the possibility of abuse. Such fear of abuse is rooted on the likelihood that due process rights might be further exposed to governmental breaches. Executive abuses prior to the 1987 Constitution which resulted from the use of warrants, however, were performed pursuant to the prosecutory functions of the administrative agencies concerned. Understandably, one cannot expect total impartiality from an agency whose primary function, after all, is to prosecute or advocate in line with its legally mandated purpose. In other words, their brand of exercising warrant under the 1973 Constitution was active, requiring no complaint to be initiated and proof of probable cause to be presented by an applicant. On the contrary, the type of "warrants" contemplated as valid in this case pertain to those issued pursuant to and as a complement of adjudicative—not prosecutorial—functions; thereby curbing the possibility of abuses since both impartiality and consideration of evidence are inherently required in adjudication. In essence, abuses are curbed because administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers may only issue warrants at the instance of an applicant who is required to present proof of probable cause; meaning, the power being exercised here is passive.
Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier aptly demonstrates (and as graciously recognized by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh) that there may be instances where there is a need to issue administrative warrants. Examples include abatement of dangerous buildings by a Building Official under the National Building Code or summary protective custody of abused children by the Department of Social Welfare and Development under Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7610.
As discussed earlier, the constitutional right to due process is activated when there exists a deprivation of a legally enforceable right or recognized claim of entitlement. Warrants, when implemented, cause some form of deprivation of liberty. For arrest warrants, the deprivation is the restriction on movement; while for search warrants, the deprivation is the invasion of privacy. Since applications and eventual issuances of warrants presuppose that a considerable amount of time has lapsed between the commission of an offense sought to be remedied by a punitive law and the discovery of the same offense, the law enforcers' "personal knowledge" now becomes subjected to judicial scrutiny in order to validly effect a temporary deprivation of movement or privacy rights. Such scrutiny is what determines whether it is "reasonable" to preliminarily intrude on movement and/or privacy rights by virtue of a warrant. This is the essence of why personal determination of probable cause by a judge is required to make searches and seizures pursuant to warrants not unreasonable.
The same personal determination of "probable cause" is no different, at least substantially, from that of valid warrantless arrests conducted by law enforcers as it is based on or "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."[229] The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer.[230] Splitting legal hairs as to the official in whose instance an arrest or search is effected merely creates a "distinction without a difference" as both will be considered "not unreasonable" if based on probable cause.
The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results.[231] To say that only judges of regular courts may issue search and seizure warrants without regard to the nature of the proceedings (and the competencies of the tribunals handling them) in which they are issued would be to say that all searches and seizures are constitutionally infirm even if they satisfy the reasonableness requirement. Reasonable warrantless searches and seizure undertaken by law enforcers would be included in such sweeping statement if this Court would confine the authority of probable cause determinations only to judges of regular courts. Certainly, this makes the "reasonableness" – not the personality of the adjudicator – the determinant factor on whether an arrest, search or seizure undertaking pursuant to a warrant is constitutional.
In this regard, it has long been recognized that there are several exceptions developed by jurisprudence on prior issuance of arrest or search warrants itself on account of reasonableness. As earlier explained in the first guideline, one such indication of "reasonableness" is exigent public need or safety. Stripped of all the verbiage, the threshold to test the validity of governmental searches and seizures is "reasonableness." Such requirement of reasonableness is essentially a safeguard against arbitrary summary deprivations of rights or legitimate claims of entitlement.
Consequently, if the issuance of warrants in itself can be disregarded based on reasonableness, there is no compelling reason why such exception cannot also exist as regards the issuing adjudicative authority; especially when the objective is to rationalize probable cause determinations by allowing quasi-judicial bodies with the appropriate specialized competencies to determine such evidentiary quantum's existence. It is even more dangerous to consider "administrative inspections" – which have not been adjudged by this Court as constitutionally repugnant in previous cases[232] – as an exception to the requirement of search warrants than allow quasi-judicial bodies to determine the existence of probable cause before undertaking any intrusive administrative implementation measure. Allowing the practice of administrative inspections sans some prior determination of probable cause is even more susceptible to executive abuses. Therefore, if the existence of reasonableness is the underlying basis of a warrant's validity, it would be unduly shortsighted for the Court to make such basis entirely dependent on the issuing adjudicative authority instead on the reasonable or competent calibration and resultant determination of probable cause.
On a related note, administrative issuances directing agents or enforcers to conduct inspections function essentially like warrants. As the familiar saying goes: "[I]f it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck."[233] Whether coming from a judicial or administrative officer, an issuance amounts to some form of deprivation when it is adverse or detrimental to the rights or legitimate claims to entitlement of persons or entities. Not equating intrusive administrative issuances (e.g., inspection orders) as warrants and treating them as valid warrantless intrusions will be more detrimental to libertarian rights. Stated differently, it would all the more be violative of the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures if this Court should allow the existence of intrusive administrative arrest, seizure or inspection orders to be conducted sans probable cause. Such is the logic why this Court in Acosta v. Ochoa,[234] even recognized, while taking guidance from American jurisprudence, that an administrative agency's power to conduct warrantless inspections so long as they are: (1) "large interests at stake;" and (2) not unreasonable and arbitrary. It was even held at one point that administrative inspections, duly authorized and reasonably limited by statute and regulation, are examples of inspections sanctioned by the State in the exercise of its police power that, as aforementioned, may be considered as among the instances of valid warrantless searches.[235] In this case, however, the Court has harmonized all the guidelines and, instead of making slippery justifications to warrantless administrative intrusions, has now both classified all intrusive administrative actions as "warrants" and required all of them to follow the same procedure as judicial warrants which is to require the presence of probable cause. Doing so would be more in keeping with the Constitutional requirement of reasonableness, as well as of due process.
A reasonable interpretation which is more in keeping with the "spirit" of the Constitution is to confine the requirement of warrant issuances by judges to criminal cases where evidence "beyond reasonable doubt" is needed for conviction where only regular courts may calibrate. To assuage the public against concerns of executive abuse, it was clarified in the earlier discussions that any evidence obtained or seized by virtue of an administrative warrant that pertains to a criminal offense is automatically rendered inadmissible for being unreasonable. Thus, the nature of allowable administrative warrants as outlined by this Court does not in any way flout the reasonableness requirement of search and seizure warrants in Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Constitution.
All told, the Court is not unaware of the dangers in allowing both the Executive and Judicial powers to fuse in a single authority for such a chimera presents a looming threat of oppression and of arbitrary law enforcement on our fundamental rights. Nonetheless, the growing complexities of modern life necessitate a hybrid approach to implementing the law and resolving disputes; hence, the creation of quasi-judicial bodies whose existence is recognized by the Constitution.[236] The existence of quasi-judicial bodies comes with it all attributes, as long as they have constitutional or statutory fiat, which enable these entities to perform their functions to the fullest. Such set of attributes may include the power to issue warrants and orders of like effect. However, to curtail administrative authorities and law enforcers from abusing their power to issue and implement such warrants, this Court declares that all the aforementioned guidelines should be strictly complied with; otherwise, such warrants will be rendered invalid and such responsible officers will be held liable. Finally, to strike a balance between civil liberties and the pursuit of legitimate or compelling state interests, each of the aforementioned guidelines pertaining to the issuance and implementation of administrative warrants shall not be taken in isolation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the Court:
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. and Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Caguioa, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurrence.
Zalameda, J., please see concurring opinion.
[1] Translated by Thomas Nugent and revised by J.V. Prichard, New York: D. Appleton and Company (1900).
[2] Rollo, pp. 34-47; penned by Presiding Judge Janice R. Yulo-Antero.
[3] Id. at 53-54.
[4] Bureau of Immigration Memorandum Circular No. SBM-2015-010 (2015) as amended by Bureau of Immigration Memorandum Circular No. JHM-2018-002 (2018).
[5] Rollo, p. 48.
[6] Id. at 51.
[7] Id. at 52; WLO No. JTJ/BOC-18-250.
[8] Id. at 53-54; signed by Chairperson Jaime H. Morente, Commissioner J. Tobias M. Javier, and Commissioner Marc Red A. Mariñas.
[9] Section 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. – A subject of a foreign power residing in the (Philippine Islands) Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
[10] Administrative Code (March 10, 1917).
[11] Rollo, p. 59.
[12] Id. at 55-56 (Incident Report).
[13] Id. at 57.
[14] Id. at 58-68.
[15] Id. at 62.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 62-63.
[21] Id. at 62 and 64.
[22] Id. at 64.
[23] Id. at 65.
[24] Id. at 34-47.
[25] Id. at 46.
[26] Id. at 42-43.
[27] Id. at 44.
[28] Id. at 44-45.
[29] Id. at 11-33; signed by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, Assistant Solicitor General Raymund I. Rigodon, and Associate Solicitor Ma. Alexandria Ixara B. Maroto.
[30] Id. at 17-18, citing Chevron Philippines, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, 645 Phil. 84, 96 (2010); Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 587 Phil. 403, 416 (2008).
[31] Id. at 18, citing In Re: Petition for the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 393 Phil. 718, 730 (2000).
[32] Id. at 20-21.
[33] Id. at 22.
[34] Id. at 23-24.
[35] Id. at 24-25, citing Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 408 Phil. 102, 116-117 (2001).
[36] Commonwealth Act No. 613 (August 26, 1940).
[37] Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[38] Id. at 26, citing In Re: Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 471 (2000).
[39] As amended by A.M. No. 01-1-03-SC (June 19, 2001; effective July 15, 2001).
[40] Rollo, pp. 106, 126-127.
[41] Id. at 128.
[42] Id. at 134.
[43] Id. at 111-113.
[44] Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 169 (2016).
[45] Kumar v. People, G.R. No 247661, June 15, 2020.
[46] Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Atty. Escaño, Jr., 672 Phil. 747, 756 (2011), citation omitted.
[47] Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 767 (2013).
[48] Republic v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 638 (2010), citation omitted.
[49] Heirs of Villanueva v. Heirs of Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172, 178 (2017).
[50] See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 483 (2009).
[51] Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol, 672 Phil. 477, 494 (2011).
[52] The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (August 14, 1981).
[53] See Imperial v. Judge Armes, 804 Phil. 439, 459-460 (2017).
[54] See Kiani v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, 518 Phil. 501, 515 (2006).
[55] Dy v. Judge Bibat-Palamos, 717 Phil. 776, 784 (2013), citations omitted.
[56] See Mandaue Realty & Resources Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 801 Phil. 27, 36 (2016), citations omitted.
[57] 273 Phil. 636 (1991).
[58] Id. at 641.
[59] Republic v. Gallo, 823 Phil. 1090, 1121 (2018).
[60] Ongsuco v. Malones, 619 Phil. 492, 505 (2009).
[61] Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 527 Phil. 623, 626 (2006).
[62] Lihaylihay v. Treasurer Tan, 836 Phil. 400, 429 (2018).
[63] Purisima v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 223318, July 15, 2019, 909 SCRA 38, 44.
[64] See Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 210503, October 8, 2019, 922 SCRA 23, 53.
[65] Cf. Express Telecommunications Company, Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 196902, July 13, 2020, 942 SCRA 418, 429-430.
[66] Heirs of Leonilo P. Nuñez, Sr. v. Heirs of Gabino T. Villanoza, 809 Phil. 965, 1004 (2017), citation omitted.
[67] See Agustin v. Alphaland Corporation, G.R. No. 218282, September 9, 2020.
[68] Comilang v. Burcena, 517 Phil. 538, 545 (2006).
[69] The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 (Approved: August 26, 1940).
[70] Henderson v. Dudley, 574 S.W.2d 658 (1978).
[71] See Republic Act No. 4200, Sec. 3.
[72] Ret. Lt. Gen. Ligot v. Republic, 705 Phil. 477, 500 (2013).
[73] See Lee Yick Hon v. Insular Collector of Customs, 41 Phil. 548, 551 (1921).
[74] See LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 725 Phil. 83, 93 (2014), citation omitted.
[75] See Gethers v. State of Florida, 838 So.2d 504 (2003); see also United States v. Block, 927 F.3d 978 (2019); Yith v. Nielsen, 881 F.3d 1155 (2018); Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Tapp, 497 S.W.3d 239 (2016); United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516 (2011).
[76] Morano v. Vivo, 126 Phil. 928, 935 (1967).
[77] 118 Phil. 868 (1963).
[78] Id. at 880.
[79] I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 51-53 (June 4, 1986).
[80] I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 674-677 (July 17, 1986).
[81] Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien[.] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
[82] 262 Phil. 160 (1990).
[83] Id. at 170-171.
[84] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 6 and Rule 126, Sec. 1.
[85] See Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc., 776 Phil. 336, 349 (2016).
[86] Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563, 579 (2007).
[87] JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 93 (1996).
[88] See Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 553 Phil. 120, 132 (2007).
[89] Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).
[90] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 385 Phil. 586, 601 (2000).
[91] United States v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 227 (1915).
[92] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 5.
[93] White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 469 (2009).
[94] Burroughs, Ltd. v. Morfe, 161 Phil. 521, 533 (1976).
[95] New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
[96] See Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 298 (2009).
[97] Cf. Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 726 Phil. 104 122 (2014).
[98] Marcos v. Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 504 (1989).
[99] Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 604 (1915), citation omitted.
[100] Case v. La Junta de Sanidad de Manila, 24 Phil. 250, 281 (1913), citing Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890).
[101] Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 133 Phil. 903, 907 (1968).
[102] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Antonio-Valenzuela, 617 Phil. 916, 938 (2009).
[103] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kho, 789 Phil. 306, 314-315 (2016).
[104] Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 267 Phil. 15, 32 (1990), citation omitted.
[105] Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411, 582 (2003).
[106] Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27, 58 (2004).
[107] Soplente v. People, 503 Phil. 241, 242 (2005), citing Samuel Butler.
[108] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 338 (2001).
[109] See Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 809 Phil. 315, 389 (2017), citing City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 207 Phil. 648, 655 (1983).
[110] Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 716 Phil. 132, 151-152 (2013).
[111] See Manila International Airport Authority v. Powergen, Inc., 568 Phil. 481, 488 (2008), citations omitted.
[112] Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123, 128 (1928), citation omitted; Salao v. Santos, 67 Phil. 547, 550 (1939).
[113] Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 615, 625 (1987).
[114] The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable (Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., 712 Phil. 337, 350 [2013], citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948, 980 [1998], citations omitted); see also CONSTITUTION, Art. 8, Sec. 3(1).
[115] See Secs. 3(1) and 13 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012 (Republic Act No. 10173 [August 15, 2012]).
[116] See REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 130, Sec. 24.
[117] See Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1164 (1957).
[118] See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
[119] City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005).
[120] See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884); Den v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company, 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
[121] See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
[122] See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 26 (1979); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975), citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
[123] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
[124] See Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019, 892 SCRA 370, 446.
[125] See Concurrence in the result of Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
[126] National Telecommunications Commission v. Brancomm Cable and Television Network Co., G.R. No. 204487, December 5, 2019.
[127] See Republic v. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, 470 Phil. 363, 381 (2004).
[128] Cf. City of Bacolod v. Phuture Visions Co., Inc., 823 Phil. 867, 882 (2018), citations omitted.
[129] People v. Martinez, 469 Phil. 558, 571 (2004).
[130] See Saunar v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 822 Phil. 536, 545-546 (2017), citation omitted; see also Makabingkil v. Yatco, 128 Phil. 165, 173 (1967), citation omitted.
[131] Albert v. University Publishing Co., Inc., 121 Phil. 87, 92 (1965), citation omitted.
[132] Flores v. Buencamino, 165 Phil. 934, 940 (1976).
[133] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 397 Phil. 423, 437 (2000).
[134] Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
[135] Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 432 (1968).
[136] Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, 602 Phil. 522, 538 (2009); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972).
[137] Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
[138] Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
[139] See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
[140] See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
[141] See Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 338, 351 (1981).
[142] Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 245 Phil. 263, 278 (1988).
[143] 41 Phil. 188 (1920), citations omitted.
[144] Id. at 193-194.
[145] See Inocentes v. People, 789 Phil. 318, 332 (2016).
[146] People v. Delos Reyes, 484 Phil. 271, 285 (2004).
[147] Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices v. Court of Appeals, 802 Phil. 314, 389 (2016), Concurring Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen.
[148] See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 214 Phil. 332, 350 (1984).
[149] The right to life is not included as there is no such thing as a temporary or provisional deprivation of life.
[150] In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty, as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. (Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 721 Phil. 34, 43 [2013]).
[151] See Pirovano v. De la Rama Steamship, Co., 96 Phil. 335, 360 (1954).
[152] Querubin v. Commission on Elections, 774 Phil. 766, 829 (2015).
[153] See Land Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran, 709 Phil. 819, 832 (2013).
[154] See People v. Villa Gomez, G.R. No. 216824, November 10, 2020.
[155] See Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 674 Phil. 637, 649 (2011), citation omitted.
[156] Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
[157] The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corp. and Offices, 141 Phil. 334, 349 (1969).
[158] Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 751 Phil. 176, 186 (2015).
[159] Cabral v. Adolfo, 794 Phil. 161, 170 (2016).
[160] CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
[161] Garcia v. De Jesus, 283 Phil. 735, 750 (1992).
[162] See Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 816 Phil. 389, 411-412 (2017).
[163] Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., 775 Phil. 238, 248 (2015).
[164] Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 156 (2003).
[165] Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 621 Phil. 498, 511 (2009), citation omitted.
[166] See Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690, 698 (2016).
[167] Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 651 Phil. 374, 452 (2010).
[168] See Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. The Oil lndustry Commission, 229 Phil. 430, 434 (1986), citation omitted.
[169] So v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, 828 Phil. 529, 535 (2018), citation omitted.
[170] Encinas v. PO1 Agustin, Jr., 709 Phil. 236, 257 (2013).
[171] 281 Phil. 547 (1991).
[172] Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 135, Sec. 6.
[173] Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., 708 Phil. 693, 707 (2013).
[174] Pestilos v. Generoso, 746 Phil. 301, 311-312 (2014).
[175] See People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 (1936).
[176] See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
[177] See Pilapil, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 228608, August 27, 2020.
[178] Cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989), citations omitted.
[179] United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972), citations omitted.
[180] Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535 (1967).
[181] Cf. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).
[182] See Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., 712 Phil. 337, 350 (2013).
[183] People v. Pastrana, 826 Phil. 427, 439 (2018).
[184] People v. Francisco, 436 Phil. 383, 396 (2002).
[185] People v. Garcia, 289 Phil. 819, 832 (1992).
[186] 827 Phil. 42 (2018).
[187] Id. at 67.
[188] See Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 265 (2018).
[189] People v. Claro, 808 Phil. 455, 467 (2017).
[190] See People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 335 (1995).
[191] Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau v. Miranda, G.R. No. 216574, July 10, 2019, 908 SCRA 284, 307; Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, 818 Phil. 321, 340 (2017).
[192] See Imperial v. Judge Armes, 804 Phil. 439, 471 (2017).
[193] De Joya v. Judge Marquez, 516 Phil. 717, 724 (2006).
[194] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Mendoza, 686 Phil. 308, 315-316 (2012), citing United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 357 (2005).
[195] Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[196] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[197] People v. Comprado, 829 Phil. 229, 236-237 (2018).
[198] Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, 101 (1997).
[199] Carson Realty & Management Corporation v. Red Robin Security Agency, 805 Phil. 562, 571-572 (2017).
[200] Saladas v. Franklin Baker Company, 108 Phil. 364, 368 (1960), citation omitted.
[201] Inacay v. People, 801 Phil. 187, 191 (2016); see CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Secs. 12(1) and 14(2).
[202] People v. Serzo, Jr., 340 Phil. 660, 670 (1997).
[203] CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 12(2).
[204] People v. Moner, supra note 186, at 67.
[205] Wa-acon v. People, 539 Phil. 485, 494 (2006).
[206] See Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1196 (1999); see also People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640, 659 (1998).
[207] Salonga v. Paño, 219 Phil. 402, 415-416 (1985).
[208] Cf. PCGG Chairman Elma v. Jacobi, 689 Phil. 307, 347 (2012), citations omitted.
[209] Bautista v. Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 186 (1985).
[210] The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. (Ramiscal, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, 819 Phil. 597, 610 [2017]).
[211] Executive Order No. 292 (1987).
[212] See Section 2. The Commissioner of Immigration, with the approval of the Department Head, is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Act, including the registration of alien seamen, aliens confined in institutions in the Philippines, aliens under orders of deportation, and aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, and from time to time, always with the approval of the Department Head, to amend such rules and regulations. (Republic Act No. 562 [1950], Sec. 2), emphases supplied.
[213] Republic Act No. 562, id.
[214] Smith, Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, 148 (1919).
[215] In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Santiago, 245 Phil. 809, 821 (1988).
[216] 1 Phil. 93 (1902).
[217] Id. at 95-97.
[218] Ngo Keh Lin v. Commissioner of Immigration, 123 Phil. 127, 131 (1966).
[219] Hasegawa v. Giron, 716 Phil. 364, 373 (2013).
[220] Sales v. Adapon, 796 Phil. 368, 379 (2016).
[221] Marasigan v. Fuentes, 776 Phil. 574, 584 (2016).
[222] Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 725 Phil. 486, 498 (2014).
[223] Mutuality, reciprocity, and comity as bases or elements. — International Law is founded largely upon mutuality, reciprocity, and the principle of comity of nations. Comity, in this connection, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other; it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the acts of foreign governments and tribunals, having due regard both to the international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The fact of reciprocity does not necessarily influence the application of the doctrine of comity, although it may do so and has been given consideration in some instances. (Sison v. Board of Accountancy, 85 Phil. 276, 282 [1949], citing 30 Am. Jur., 178; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
[224] Bustillo v. People, 634 Phil. 547, 556 (2010).
[225] Yap v. Lagtapon, 803 Phil. 652, 653 (2017).
[226] People v. Arposeple, 821 Phil. 340, 369 (2017).
[227] Iladan v. La Suerte International Manpower Agency, Inc., 776 Phil. 591, 600 (2016).
[228] See Guanzon v. Arradaza, 539 Phil. 367, 375 (2006).
[229] See People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[230] Pestilos v. Generoso, 746 Phil. 301, 322 (2014).
[231] People v. Villanueva, 111 Phil. 897, 899-900 (1961).
[232] See Pilapil, Jr. v. People, supra note 177; Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019, 923 SCRA 451.
[233] Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Ang Nars Party-list v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019, 922 SCRA 186, 302.
[234] Supra at 565.
[235] Pilapil, Jr. v. People, supra note 177.
[236] Several portions of the Constitution mention and acknowledge the existence of quasi-judicial bodies; these are: (a) Sec. 11, Art. III; (b) Sec. 16, Art. III; (c) Sec. 14, Art. VI; (d) Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII; (e) Sec. 12, Art. VIII; and (f) Sec. 12, Art. XVIII.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I concur with the ponencia of the Chief Justice. Respondent Yuan Wenle was being legally detained by virtue of the valid Summary Deportation Order issued by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, it was error for the trial court to grant respondent Wenle's Petition for Habeas Corpus as it had become moot and academic.
Furthermore, I agree with the Court's laying down of guidelines for the issuance of administrative warrants, all of which must be strictly complied with. Indeed, there are instances where administrative agencies, in order to complete or execute a law, must temporarily and provisionally detain persons.
However, with respect to the seventh guideline requiring that the person temporarily detained must be formally charged, I submit that a formal charge is not enough for the administrative warrant to be valid. In my view, apart from the formal charge, the administrative agency must immediately inform the courts, via an application for a judicial warrant, of the detention of the person. This should result in the issuance of a judicial warrant within the same reasonable time a formal charge must be brought.
I
The writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."[1] It extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.[2] Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."[3]
The viability of a petition for habeas corpus to question one's detention and impending deportation has been upheld by this Court,[4] the reason being that a writ of habeas corpus is "thorough and complete"[5] and "affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind and under all circumstances."[6] In the words of this Court in De Bisschop v. Galang:[7]
"[T]he use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens' confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice[.]" This is because habeas corpus, aside from being thorough and complete, affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances. It reaches the facts affecting jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct method, and at once releases the applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized.[8] (Citations omitted)
However, it is equally settled that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.[9] The restraint, which has become legal,[10] renders the remedy of habeas corpus moot and academic.[11] The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is to pursue the orderly course of the proceedings.[12] Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The term "court" in Rule 102, Section 4 includes quasi-judicial bodies, such as the Bureau of Immigration.[13] Hence, in deportation cases, habeas corpus may no longer be availed of when a deportation charge has already been filed against the alien. The proper remedy of the alien is to pursue the ordinary course of the deportation proceedings under the rules of procedure of the Bureau of Immigration.
In Rodriguez v. Bonifacio,[14] agents of the National Bureau of Investigation, in coordination with the Department of Labor and Employment and the Bureau of Immigration, raided night clubs in Ermita, Manila on May 7, 1999. Apprehended were 20 female Chinese nationals, including one Ma Jing, who worked as guest relations officers but had no alien employment permits or alien employment registration certificates. They were subsequently confined at the Bureau of Immigration Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig.
Ten days later, or on May 17, 1999, Ma Jing filed a petition for habeas corpus, contending that she was illegally deprived of her liberty. In particular, she alleged that as of the date of the filing of the petition, "no formal complaint or accusation for any specific offenses has been filed against her or any judicial writ or order for her commitment has [been issued]."[15]
It turns out, however, that on May 13, 1999, four days before Ma Jing filed her petition, a Charge Sheet has been filed against her and the other Chinese nationals apprehended with her for violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The Bureau of Immigration, in its Return of the Writ, thus argued that Ma Jing was being lawfully detained, and her petition for habeas corpus was moot and academic.[16]
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the release of Ma Jing from detention due to her illegal warrantless arrest. However, the Bureau of Immigration refused to release her as it had already issued a summary deportation order against her. This caused Ma Jing to file a "Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt" against then Commissioner of Immigration Rufus B. Rodriguez, among others, for defying the order of the trial court.[17]
The trial court judge, Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio, granted Ma Jing's motion and declared Commissioner Rodriguez guilty of indirect contempt. This caused Commissioner Rodriguez to administratively charge Judge Bonifacio with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
After investigation, this Court suspended Judge Bonifacio from the service for three months without pay. According to this Court, Judge Bonifacio had no authority to order the release of Ma Jing under a writ of habeas corpus because she was being legally detained under a valid process. Notably, said the Court, "[e]ven granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest."[18]
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jing's detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.[19]
In Miranda v. Deportation Board,[20] petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board for having entered the country through fraud. They allegedly misrepresented themselves to be children of Filipinos when, in truth, they were Chinese nationals.
Maintaining that they were Filipino citizens, petitioners filed a motion to quash, which the Deportation Board denied. The latter then set the deportation case for hearing.
With their motion to quash denied, petitioners subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus before this Court to challenge the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board. They insisted that the Deportation Board only has jurisdiction when the deportation case involves those who are "admittedly aliens," not those who have alleged their Filipino citizenship.[21]
Despite their argument, petitioners' petition for habeas corpus was denied by this Court, which held that "'the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the [Deportation Board] of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make 'a showing that the claim is not frivolous[,]' and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens."'[22] In other words, petitioners had to go through the orderly course of the proceedings before the Deportation Board, where they had to prove that they are actually Filipino citizens.
Applying Rodriguez and Miranda in the present case, respondent Wenle's Petition for Habeas Corpus should have been denied by the trial court for being moot and academic. It is undisputed that on July 17, 2018, respondent Wenle was charged before the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, the body with jurisdiction over deportation cases.[23] Nine days later, or on July 26, 2018, a Summary Deportation Order was subsequently issued against respondent Wenle, and only then was he arrested pursuant to the deportation order.
Instead of a petition for habeas corpus, respondent Wenle's proper remedy was to pursue the orderly course of the deportation proceedings. Under Rule 10, Sections 7 and 8 of the Bureau of Immigration Omnibus Rules of Procedure of 2015, respondent Wenle should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order. In case of denial of the motion, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice or Office of the President would still be available.
RULE 10
Deportation Order/Judgment
. . . .
SECTION 7. Motion for Reconsideration. — The foreigner shall have three (3) days from receipt of a copy of the Order/Judgment to file two (2) copies of a verified Motion for Reconsideration before the [Office of the Commissioner] Receiving Unit. Only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be filed. No other pleading shall be entertained. Within twenty four (24) hours from receipt, the [Office of the Commissioner] Receiving Unit shall immediately forward the Motion for Reconsideration to the Legal Division or the [Board of Special Inquiry] as the case may be.
The Motion for Reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the Order/Judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the evidence or provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.
Whenever necessary, the Legal Division or the [Board of Special Inquiry], as the case may be, may issue an Order directing the complainant to submit a Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Within ten (10) days from submission of the Comment or from the lapse of time to submit the same, the Legal Division or the [Board of Special Inquiry] shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration.
In case the Legal Division or the [Board of Special Inquiry] opted not to issue an Order to submit a Comment, it shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Upon drafting the Resolution, the Legal Division or the [Board of Special Inquiry] shall forward the same with the deportation record to the Board Secretary.
Upon receipt of the draft Resolution, the Board Secretary shall include the same to the next scheduled agenda for the [Board of Commissioners] to resolve.
SECTION 8. Appeal. — The appeal shall stay the execution of the decision appealed from unless the Secretary of Justice/Office of the President directs its execution pending appeal.
The alleged lack of notice and hearing before the issuance of the Summary Deportation Order does not render the Summary Deportation Order and his confinement void for violation of due process. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings, such as deportation proceedings, is the opportunity to be heard,[24] which was undisputedly given to respondent Wenle.
All told, the Petition for Habeas Corpus was moot and academic, respondent Wenle having been detained by virtue of a legal process. The trial court, therefore, should have denied the Petition.
II
The ponencia discusses "administrative warrants," which are warrants akin to search warrants or warrants of arrest, but are issued by "adjudicative authorities other than regular courts."[25] It then lays down guidelines for the issuance of these administrative warrants, which must be strictly followed to render these warrants valid.
I agree with the necessity of issuing administrative warrants in certain instances. Indeed, the Executive, in order to effectively enforce and administer the laws,[26] must be empowered to temporarily and provisionally detain persons and affect liberties. This is obvious in deportation proceedings, where the president[27] or the Bureau of Immigration,[28] in order to complete or execute our immigration policies, is given the power to issue arrest warrants for purposes of carrying out a final order of deportation.[29] It is impossible to deport an undesirable alien without first gaining custody of the alien's person.
The examples given by Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier in her Concurring Opinion are likewise enlightening. Under Section 28[30] of Republic Act No. 7610 and Section 22[31] of Republic Act No. 11188, the Department of Social Welfare and Development may immediately take protective custody of children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse, or children involved in armed conflict. This is to expeditiously remove them from the unsafe environment they are living in. Also, under Section 207[32] of the National Building Code, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises to determine compliance with the requirements of the Code, and the terms and conditions of the building permit issued. As Justice Lazaro-Javier pointed out, these powers are in the nature of administrative warrants, allowable for the effective execution and implementation of our laws.
Be that as it may, it is my view that these powers should be subject to due process requirements and, more specifically, a judicial evaluation of the cause, nature, and duration of the detention. This is the balance between Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution on executive power, and Article III, Section 2[33] on the issuance of warrants of arrest being, essentially, a judicial function.
For this reason, I submit that the seventh guideline in the ponencia requiring a formal charge be amended accordingly. Apart from the formal charge, the administrative body must immediately inform the courts, via an application for a judicial warrant, of the detention of the person. The application should be filed before the trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place where the person is detained. This should result in the issuance of a judicial warrant within a reasonable time in order for the administrative warrant to be valid.
It is thus proposed that the seventh guideline be reworded as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The October 22, 2018 Resolution of Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Manila in R-MNL-18-10197-SP must be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by respondent Yuan Wenle must be DENIED for being moot and academic.
[1] In re Salibo v. Warden, 757 Phil. 630 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[2] RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, sec. 1.
[3] In re Salibo v. Warden, 757 Phil. 630, 644 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 790 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[4] See De Bisschop v. Galang, 118 Phil. 246 (1963) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc]. See also Alfonso v. Vivo, 123 Phil. 338 (1966) [Per J. Regala, En Banc].
[5] De Bisschop v. Galang, 118 Phil. 246, 251 (1963) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
[6] Id.
[7] 118 Phil. 246 (1963) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
[8] Id. at 251.
[9] In re Salibo v. Warden, 757 Phil. 630, 648 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Villar v. Director Bugarin, 224 Phil. 161, 170 (1985) [Per C.J. Makasiar, En Banc], Celeste v. People, 142 Phil. 308, 312 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc], Santiago v. Director of Prisions, 77 Phil. 927, 930-931 (1947) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc], Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304, 306 (1930) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], and Carrington v. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134, 138 (1905) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
[10] In re Salibo v. Warden, 757 Phil. 630, 648 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey v. Hon. Santiago, 245 Phil. 809, 816 (1988) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division].
[11] In re Salibo v. Warden, 757 Phil. 630, 648 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division], citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ponce Enrile, 223 Phil. 561, 580 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc]; In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Harvey v. Hon. Santiago, 245 Phil. 809, 816 (1988) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division].
[12] See Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. See also Miranda v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 (1954) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
[13] See Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 471 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[14] 398 Phil. 441 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[15] Id. at 454-455.
[16] Id. at 455.
[17] Id. at 461.
[18] Id. at 471.
[19] Id.
[20] 94 Phil. 531 (1954) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].
[21] Id. at 533.
[22] Id. (Citations omitted)
[23] ADMIN. CODE, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 10, sec. 31. See also Commonwealth Act No. 613 (1940), sec. 37(a).
[24] See Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 479 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
[25] Ponencia, p. 11.
[26] CONST., art. VII, sec. 1.
[27] Act No. 2711 (1917), sec. 69. See also Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868 (1963) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc].
[28] Commonwealth Act No. 613 (1940), sec. 37(a). The Bureau of Immigration is a constituent unit of the Department of Justice as per ADMIN. CODE, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1, sec. 4.
[29] Commonwealth Act No. 613 (1940), sec. 37(a). See Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868 (1963) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc], Morano v. Vivo, 126 Phil. 928 (1967) [Per J. Sanchez, En Banc], Vivo v. Montesa, 133 Phil. 311 (1968) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc], Neria v. Vivo, 140 Phil. 183 (1969) [Per J. Castro, En Banc], In re: Harvey v. Santiago, 245 Phil. 809 (1988) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division], and Board of Commissioners v. De La Rosa, 247 Phil. 1157 (1991) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc].
[30] Republic Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 28. Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act provides:
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. - The offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 603.
[31] Republic Act No. 11188 (2019), sec. 22, Special Protection of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Act provides:
Section 22. Rescue, Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The State shall institute policies, programs and services for the rescue, rehabilitation and reintegration of children in situations of armed conflict. The programs, which shall be provided by civilian local and national government agencies, in partnership with nongovernment organizations shall aim at providing services for children while involving their families, communities and other entities to facilitate the children's reintegration process.
These services shall include psychosocial support, health and nutrition, education, livelihood for families and other basic or legal services, as may be necessary.
Any program intervention shall be designed with due respect to the culture of each child, family and community. The child shall, at all times, be provided with legal assistance and physical security upon rescue.
Regardless of the perceived association of the children to one of the sides of the conflict, they shall benefit from all available medical, psychosocial, legal, shelter and educational response mechanism services for the victims of armed conflict.
The State shall take into account the protocol in the rescue, rehabilitation and reintegration of children specified below:
(a) Rescue. – The State shall provide for adequate measures and mechanisms to facilitate the recovery, either voluntary or involuntary, of children from armed groups or government forces. It shall provide legal and physical security to children involved in armed conflict including services such as family tracing and system of referral or response on various psychosocial services needed by the victims;
(b) Rehabilitation. – The civilian national or local government agencies and civil society organizations shall facilitate the normal development of children victims in their post-involvement phase. It shall provide services including therapeutic counseling, security and protection, educational assistance and livelihood opportunities to their parents, relatives or guardians or to the victims when they become of age;
(c) Reintegration. – The civilian national or local government agencies and civil society organizations shall bring children back to their families or communities whenever possible. This shall involve services including the provision of alternative parental care. Trainings aimed to enhance community readiness in the reintegration of these children shall also be undertaken. Processes to facilitate the reintegration, healing and reconciliation of CIAC with their communities shall also be undertaken. Whenever possible, interventions for children shall be done with respect to their opinion. Interventions for indigenous peoples (IPs) children shall be conducted in recognition of the traditional structures and institutions of their communities.
[32] Presidential Decree No. 1096 (1977), sec. 207, National Building Code of the Philippines provides:
Section 207. Duties of a Building Official.
In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.
When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.
[33] CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This case stemmed from the Summary Deportation Order[1] (SDO) dated July 26, 2018, which the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of petitioner Bureau of Immigration (BI) issued against several Chinese citizens, including respondent Yuan Wenle (Wenle). The SDO was issued following the BI's receipt of an official communication from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Embassy), naming Wenle and the other individuals as wanted fugitives in China. For their involvement in crimes committed in China, the Chinese Embassy informed the BI that the Chinese government had already cancelled the passports of Wenle and the other named individuals.
Under the SDO, Wenle was considered an undocumented foreigner, whose presence in the Philippines posed a risk to public interest. He was ordered deported to his country of origin, and his name was included in the BI's Blacklist.[2] Wenle was later apprehended at the airport and turned over to the BI Legal Division.[3] Aggrieved, he filed a petition for habeas corpus before Branch 16, Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) and challenged the legality of his detention by arguing that the SDO violated his constitutional right to due process.[4] The RTC found this argument meritorious and declared the SDO null and void in a Resolution dated October 22, 2018.[5]
From the RTC's October 22, 2018 Resolution striking down the SDO, the BI directly filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court. The BI maintains that the SDO is valid, arguing that alien fugitives are accorded an opportunity to be heard post-apprehension.[6] More importantly, Wenle did not deny that he is the same person identified in the Chinese Embassy's letter. As such, his detention on the basis of the Charge Sheet and the SDO was lawful.[7]
The ponencia nullifies the October 22, 2018 Resolution of the RTC, and ultimately holds that the practice of issuing SDOs does not violate the due process rights of aliens.[8]
In addition, the ponencia, by virtue of the antecedent facts concerning the arrest and deportation of a foreigner deemed a fugitive from justice, proposes guidelines for the issuance of warrants by administrative agencies. These guidelines are formulated to safeguard the right to due process against unwarranted intrusions, by drawing boundaries on an administrative agency's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers.[9]
I concur in the result, particularly with respect to the nullification of the assailed October 22, 2018 Resolution of the RTC granting Wenle's petition for habeas corpus. I also agree with the ponencia's guidelines insofar as they seek to guard against the arbitrary exercise by an administrative tribunal of its authority.
That said, and with due respect, I do not concur with the ponencia insofar as it premises the guidelines on the authority of administrative agencies to issue warrants. While these "administrative warrants," to a lesser and limited degree, may likewise encroach on protected liberties, the Constitution draws a very bright line against the issuance of warrants of arrest, and warrants for searches and seizures by officers other than judges. The guidelines laid down in this case erroneously fail to concede the exclusive role of the Judiciary in the issuance of warrants, in accordance with Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As well, the "administrative arrest warrants" referred to in this case cannot serve as a precursor for recognizing the validity of search and arrest warrants that are issued by any authority other than a judge. Thus, I respectfully submit this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion to further contextualize the concept of these "administrative warrants."
To be sure, the exercise of adjudicative or administrative functions by administrative agencies may, at times, also result in the compulsion of persons or distraint of property, such as in the case of the BI Commissioner's issuance of an arrest warrant. As well, there may be instances when a quasi-judicial agency vested with contempt powers may direct the imprisonment of a contumacious witness. In recognition that, under these strictly limited circumstances, due process rights are not any less vulnerable to being violated, I respectfully opine that the guidelines in this case should be viewed within these parameters — as safeguards to the right to due process.
I.
The text of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution explicitly and unequivocally states that the issuance of a search warrant or warrant of arrest requires the exercise of judicial discretion. Thus, only a judge may determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant. This is a significant departure from the previous text of the 1973 Constitution which allowed "such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law"[10] to issue search and arrest warrants.
The Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission further establish the deliberate intention of the Framers to discard the phrase "such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" in the current iteration of the provision on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas (Fr. Bernas), the sponsor of the Article on Bill of Rights, explained that the provision reverts to the old phraseology in the 1935 Constitution, thus limiting to judges the authority to issue warrants:
FR. BERNAS: x x x
First, the general reflections: The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
x x x x
The provision on Section 3[11] reverts to the 1935 formula by eliminating the 1973 phrase "or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law," and also adds the word PERSONALLY on line 18. In other words, warrants under this proposal can be issued only by judges. I think one effect of this would be that, as soon as the Constitution is approved, the PCGG will have no authority to issue warrants, search and seizure orders, because it is not a judicial body. So, proposals with respect to clipping the powers of the PCGG will be almost unnecessary if we approve this. We will need explicit provisions extending the power of the PCGG if it wants to survive.[12] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, prior deliberations of the Framers reveal that the wisdom behind deleting the subject phrase is to completely remove from the Executive Branch the power to issue warrants. The Framers recognized that the 1973 version was objectionable because it granted officers other than judges the authority to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest, resulting in the much-abused executive warrants that gravely eroded the protections of the Bill of Rights during Martial Law:
MR. PADILLA: x x x
x x x x
I recall that the President of the Convention, former President Diosdado Macapagal, had sponsored, if not actively supported, a motion or a resolution prohibiting reelection, and that was considered by Malacañang as directly pointed against Mr. Marcos. When the voting came after lengthy debate, the proposal against reelection was lost, which proved that Mr. Marcos had more members supporting him in the 1971 Constitutional Convention than those who had elected Macapagal as President, after its first President, Carlos P. Garcia. For President Macapagal to continue in office as President of the Convention, he had to count on the support of the Marcos members. Indeed, that was a very sad situation. The proceedings went on towards the drafting of the 1973 Constitution, where a number of objectionable provisions, particularly the transitory provisions, were inserted in the 1935 Constitution. I will only mention one — that in the Bill of Rights against warrants of arrest and/or unreasonable searches and seizures, which are essentially judicial in nature to be determined by the judge upon examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The 1971 Convention inserted the objectionable phrase "or any other officer authorized by law," which means that the Executive, like Mr. Marcos, or the Minister of Defense or any other executive officer, if authorized, could issue warrants of arrest. And that unfortunate insertion in the Bill of Rights led to and justified the Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSO), Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) and even the last Presidential Detention Action (PDA).[13] (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, aside from the clear and unequivocal text of Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution, the Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission plainly reveal that the present Constitution does not sanction the issuance of warrants by any other officer aside from judges.
In the very recent case of Calleja v. Medialdea[14] (Calleja), the Court also referenced the deliberate intention of the Framers in deleting the phrase "or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law:"
An examination of the history of the Constitution's phraseology of the right protected under Section 2, Article III would show a clear intention to limit the authority of issuing warrants of arrests to the courts. Section 1 (3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution categorically stated that only judges can issue warrants of arrest:
x x x x
A significant shift in this policy was introduced in the 1973 Constitution, wherein "such other responsible officer[s]" were also authorized to issue warrants of arrest:
x x x x
When asked which officers were authorized by law to issue warrants, Delegate Rodolfo A. Ortiz answered "that the provision contemplated the 'situation where the law may authorize the fiscals to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.'" It was not until the most notable use of this provision, however, did the danger of allowing other officers authorized by law was realized; for, this provision became the basis for the issuance of the notorious and the much-abused Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) by the Secretary of National Defense during Martial Law.
More aware of the dangers of extending the power to issue warrants of arrest to executive officials, and having traumatically experienced its grievous implementation to the detriment of fundamental rights, the framers of the 1987 Constitution decided to discard the phrase "or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" from the provision to be adopted under the new Constitution. x x x
x x x x
That the Constitution only permits a judge to issue warrants of arrest — not an officer of the legislative or the executive department — is not an accident. It is corollary to the separation of powers and the mandate under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution that no person should be deprived of his [or her] property or liberty without due process of law. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, on which Section 2, Article III of our Constitution is based, was borne out of colonial America's experience with "writs of assistance" issued by the British authorities in favor of revenue officers, empowering them to search suspected places of smuggled goods based only on their discretion. It has been described as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book" since they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer." It is because of this that the Court vigilantly guards against any attempt to remove or reallocate the judiciary's exclusive power to issue warrants of arrest.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
In this connection, I respectfully take exception to the ponencia's interpretation of the Framers' deliberations that there was a recognition on their part that administrative warrants may be issued with respect to matters concerning national security, public safety, and public health.[16] The portion of the deliberations quoted by the ponencia, which was cited to lend support to its conclusion, actually refers to the Framers' discussion concerning the provision on the liberty of abode and travel — not Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, when Commissioner Jose Nolledo (Commissioner Nolledo) asked whether administrative authorities are the ones who determine the presence of interests involving national security, public safety, or public health, he was asking the question to clarify the limits of the liberty of abode and the right to travel. In this regard, Fr. Bernas' affirmative answer to Commissioner Nolledo's query cannot be interpreted to mean, as the ponencia posits, that "administrative warrants cannot be disregarded in [their] entirety."[17]
From these premises, it is clear that administrative agencies cannot issue warrants of arrest, and searches and seizures warrants within the contemplation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The Constitution textually commits only to judges the power and authority to issue arrest and search warrants upon a finding of probable cause. Any warrant emanating from a non-judicial officer that directs an arrest, a search, or a seizure of persons or property is therefore constitutionally infirm.[18]
In this regard, these guidelines cannot therefore be regarded to be, as they are not, carte blanche for administrative agencies to arrogate unto themselves the power to order the arrest of persons, or the search and seizure of persons or property. Neither do these guidelines sanction or imply a statutory grant of these powers to administrative agencies. To be clear, the appropriate action for the Court under these circumstances is to strike down these warrants, or the statutory grant of such power, for violating the Constitution.
II.
Furthermore, subject to my Separate Opinion in Calleja,[19] a survey of the functions delegated to several administrative agencies reveals that the BI Commissioner is the only agency explicitly granted the authority to issue an arrest warrant, albeit to a limited degree. The boundaries of the warrant issued by the BI Commissioner under Section 37(a)[20] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,[21] as amended, is narrowly confined — i.e., to merely carry out a deportation order that has already become final.
Thus, in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board[22] (Qua Chee Gan), the Court held that the BI Commissioner cannot issue warrants of arrest in aid of his or her investigatory power, but only for the purposes of carrying out a deportation order that has already become final:
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. vs. Villamiel, et al. (65 Phil. 230, 239), this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he [or she] may produce. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him [or her], by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
While Qua Chee Gan was promulgated during the 1935 Constitution, it should be emphasized that the provision against unreasonable searches and seizures under the 1935 Constitution is similar to that of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — "such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" are not authorized to issue warrants. Just the same, the Court did not deviate from this ruling even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. In Salazar v. Achacoso[24] (Salazar), the Court reiterated that the President or the BI Commissioner may order the arrest of "illegal and undesirable aliens x x x [only] following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation."[25] Likewise, in Board of Commissioners (Commission on Immigration and Deportation) v. Dela Rosa,[26] the Court clarified that if the BI Commissioner issues a warrant for the ostensible purpose of investigating suspected individuals, the warrant is null and void for being unconstitutional:
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong v. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin v. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To v. Galang, 10 SCRA 411); see also Santos v. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On this point, it must be emphasized that the warrant in this case at bar, which the ponencia refers to or describes as an administrative warrant, does not involve any exercise of discretion on the part of the BI Commissioner. To be sure, the warrant issued by the BI Commissioner in this case was preceded by a prior determination that the alien is undesirable and a threat to public safety. Simply put, it is not the BI Commissioner that makes a personal determination of probable cause prior to issuing the warrant. Rather, the BI Commissioner's issuance of an arrest warrant was merely to implement a final order of deportation. This situation clearly distinguishes this from the definition of the term "arrest" under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SECTION 1. Definition of Arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[28]
As may be gleaned from this definition, an arrest involves effecting a restraint on a person in order that he or she may answer for the commission of an offense. In contrast, the warrant here issued by the BI Commissioner is only a preliminary step or preparatory to the deportation of the undesirable alien.
To be sure, the BI Commissioner may issue warrants for the arrest of undesirable aliens.[29] This authority is integral to the State's sovereign power to exclude non-Filipino citizens from its territory upon such grounds it may deem proper for the public interest. As the Court clarified in Salazar, the power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for the sole purpose of deportation is the exception, rather than the general rule. This authority is valid only because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. Needless to state therefore, as a function peculiar to the BI, recognition of the BI Commissioner's limited authority cannot extend to other administrative agencies or executive departments. Again, there is no showing of any other agency that has the same function or has been granted the authority to issue warrants of a similar nature.
As well, a survey of the powers of administrative agencies reveals that there are administrative agencies vested with contempt powers as a consequence of their quasi-judicial powers. A witness cited in contempt may be punished with imprisonment, or a fine, or both.[30] But similar to the very narrow context in which the arrest warrant of the BI Commissioner is issued, the contempt power granted to quasi-judicial agencies is limited only to "making effective the power to elicit testimony."[31] More importantly, since an administrative agency derives its authority from the enabling statute, there should be an explicit grant of the power to punish for contempt.[32]
Based on the foregoing, administrative warrants clearly do not function in the same manner as judicial warrants. The legislature cannot confer purely judicial powers to an administrative agency, and the Court should not sanction any encroachment on its exclusive authority.
III.
All that being said, in line with the objective of formulating guard rails to ensure against arbitrary intrusions of administrative agencies into private rights, I concur with the guidelines in the ponencia.
Indeed, there are instances when the exercise of an administrative agency's authority results in some form of intrusion into the protected guarantees of liberty and property. This may stem from the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, as when agencies prescribe rules or regulations pursuant to a statutory delegation; or its quasi-judicial power, as when agencies conduct hearings to determine questions of fact and decide in accordance with the standards laid down in the relevant statute.[33]
To be sure, administrative agencies necessarily require information pertinent to the exercise of their mandate.[34] Thus, corollary to the exercise of an administrative agency's adjudicatory function, it has inquisitorial or investigatory power "to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise."[35] Inasmuch as rights of specific persons are affected in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power, safeguarding the right to due process all the more becomes imperative.
This is the prism through which the guidelines should be properly viewed. As in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[36] (Ang Tibay), any standard for administrative agencies in the exercise of its adjudicatory function should be predicated on the right to due process guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[37] The exercise of an administrative agency's quasi-judicial power affects the rights of specific persons, and as such, there should be no doubt that due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.[38] Furthermore, since the requirements in Ang Tibay are limited to the procedural aspect of due process, the ponencia's proposed guidelines, which also provide for the protection of substantive due process, are appropriate.
Again, I respectfully reiterate that administrative agencies cannot be authorized to issue search and arrest warrants by law. This inference plainly contravenes the constitutional precept that only judges may issue warrants. Jurisprudence is replete with cases that upholds the exclusive role of judges in issuing warrants. In such cases, the Court does not hesitate to strike down such warrants or the authority to issue the same, as this runs counter to the Constitution.[39]
Framing the guidelines on the protection of the right to due process is, to my mind, essential in maintaining the separation between the powers strictly committed to the courts, and those that Congress may validly grant to administrative bodies. In this way, the Judiciary is not, by any means, delegating the function of issuing warrants under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution to administrative tribunals.
There is no argument that administrative agencies are mandated to implement the law within their specialized competencies. While they cannot exceed the limits of the enabling statute, it is recognized that they may also exercise such powers as may be necessary to discharge their assigned statutory duties.[40] For this purpose, some administrative agencies may be granted with adjudicative powers with the corollary power to investigate. Administrative agencies may likewise issue writs or warrants, as contemplated by the ponencia, pursuant to their powers.
That administrative agencies may conduct inspections, issue cease and desist orders, seize items that may be harmful to public,[41] or otherwise burden property rights,[42] does not necessarily empower them under the Constitution with the authority to issue arrest and search warrants. Rather, they do so only to fulfill their mandate under their respective charters, and only to ensure the faithful execution of the laws they are designated to implement.[43] Outside of the express and implied powers granted to them, they cannot unduly encroach on judicial functions such as the issuance of arrest and search warrants.
In other words, the Court cannot concede that administrative agencies may issue warrants in the same manner as judges merely because these administrative warrants, as referred to in the ponencia, may, to a lesser degree, produce the same effect as arrest or search warrants.[44] The orders or administrative warrants are primarily circumscribed by the enabling act, the policies of which these agencies are tasked to execute. These are not within the contemplation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as the warrants therein partake the nature of a criminal process.[45] All things considered, the limits of an administrative agency's exercise of quasi-judicial functions necessarily include the prohibition against the issuance of warrants of arrest, search, or seizure, or any writ analogous thereto.
Bearing these in mind, I respectfully agree with the guidelines of the ponencia, as long as they do not venture into the realm of searches and seizures.
In all, I agree with the stated purpose of the ponencia to define the boundaries of an administrative agency's exercise of its quasi-judicial power. As well, I agree that the Court should exercise an active role in the protection of the due process rights of individuals. It should be emphasized, however, that the text of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the Framers' deliberations, and the related jurisprudence on this matter, have drawn a very bright line so as to exclude the Executive Branch, its agencies, or instrumentalities from issuing warrants for the arrest, search, or seizure of a person or property. It is not within the Court's authority to modify the text of the Constitution or construe its provisions in a manner that deviates from its true meaning. Rather, it is the Court's solemn duty under the Constitution to ensure that the delimitations of powers between the different branches of government remain sacrosanct.
From these premises, I CONCUR only in the result. I DISSENT insofar as the ponencia implies the authority of administrative agencies to issue warrants of arrest, and warrants for searches and seizures.
[1] Rollo, p. 53.
[2] Id. at 53-54.
[3] Id. at 55-56, Incident Report dated August 22, 2018.
[4] Id. at 58-68, Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated September 10, 2018.
[5] Id. at 34-46.
[6] BI OMNIBUS RULES OF 2015, Rule 10, Sec. 7, cited in the Petition, id. at 23.
[7] Id. at 24-27.
[8] Ponencia, p. 62.
[9] Id. at 20.
[10] SECTION 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (The 1973 CONSTITUTION [Amended], Art. IV)
[11] N. B. Under Proposed Resolution No. 486 (Resolution to Incorporate in the New Constitution An Article on the Bill of Rights), Section 3 refers to the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, now found in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution.
[12] II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 674-675 (July 17, 1986).
[13] I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 50-51 (June 4, 1986).
[14] G.R. Nos. 252578, 252579, 252580, 252585, 252613, 252623, 252624, 252646, 252702, 252726, 252733, 252736, 252741, 252747, 252755, 252759, 252765, 252767, 252768, 16663, 252802, 252809, 252903, 252904, 252905, 252916, 252921, 252984, 253018, 253100, 253118, 253124, 253242, 253252, 253254, 254191 & 253420, December 7, 2021, accessed at <
[15] Id.
[16] Ponencia, p. 18.
[17] Ponencia, p. 19.
[18] See Calleja v. Medialdea, supra note 14, where the Court ruled that there was a deliberate intention of the Framers in deleting the phrase "or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law." See also Salazar v. Achacoso, 262 Phil. 160, 170 (1990).
[19] Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa in Calleja v. Medialdea, supra note 14, in which it was argued that the written authority issued by the Anti-Terrorism Council under Sec. 29 of the Anti-Terrorism Act is a disguised judicial warrant because it authorizes the detention of a person suspected of committing terrorism.
[20] SECTION 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien x x x.
[21] Commonwealth Act No. 613 titled AN ACT TO CONTROL AND REGULATE THE IMMIGRATION OF ALIENS INTO THE PHILIPPINES, dated August 26, 1940.
[22] 118 Phil. 868 (1963).
[23] Id. at 877-878.
[24] Supra note 18.
[25] Id. at 171. See also Calacday v. Vivo, 144 Phil. 277, 282 (1970).
[26] 274 Phil. 1157 (1991).
[27] Id. at 1197-1198.
[28] RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule 113, Sec. 1.
[29] Morano v. Vivo, 126 Phil. 928, 934-936 (1967).
[30] Among these agencies are: (1) the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (2) the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission under the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development; (3) the Department of Migrant Workers; (4) the Securities and Exchange Commission.
[31] Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268, 278 (1958).
[32] See Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 239 Phil. 403, 412-413. See also Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, 116 Phil. 355, 357-358 (1962).
[33] Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 156-157 (2003).
[34] Hector S. De Leon & Hector M. De Leon, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TEXT AND CASES (2016 ed), pp. 88-89.
[35] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 198 (2000); see also Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, supra note 33, at 157.
[36] 69 Phil. 635 (1940), cited in the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier, p. 1.
[37] "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
[38] DOLE Phils., Inc. v. Esteva, 538 Phil. 817, 860-861 (2006), citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1018-1019 (1996).
[39] See Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 344 (1989); Ponsica v. Ignalaga, 236 Phil. 691 (1987); Salazar v. Achacoso, supra note 18. See also Calleja v. Medialdea, supra note 14.
[40] Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 275 Phil. 914, 921 (1989). See Antipolo Realty Corporation v. NHA, 237 Phil. 389, 395-396 (1987).
[41] See Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7394 titled THE CONSUMER ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES, dated April 13, 1992, where Art. 10 allows the concerned departments to, after due notice and hearing, order the recall, prohibition, and seizure of injurious, unsafe, or dangerous consumer products.
[42] See R.A. No. 9160 titled AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING, PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 dated July 23, 2001, as amended by R.A. No. 11521 titled AN ACT FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING LAW, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT OF 2001", AS AMENDED, dated January 29, 2021, in which Sec. 7(15) grants the Anti-Money Laundering Council the authority to ex parte freeze all funds and assets by individuals under the United Nations Security Council Resolution Numbers 1718 of 2006 and 2231 of 2015 and their successor resolutions as well as any binding resolution of the Security Council; See also R.A. No. 4136 titled AN ACT TO COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC RULES, TO CREATE A LAND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, approved on June 20, 1964, wherein Sec. 60 authorizes the Land Transportation Commission to issue a warrant for constructive or actual distraint or levy to any owner of a motor vehicle with unpaid balance for registration.
[43] N.B. For instance, the Optical Media Board (OMB) is specifically vested with the power to "apply for or obtain search warrants from any court of law" [R.A. No. 9239, Sec. 10(e), dated February 10, 2004] and to "act as complainant in the criminal prosecution of violators of the [Optical Media Act]" [R.A. No. 9239, Sec. 10(f)]. These powers are consistent with the OMB's mandate to protect and promote intellectual property rights, by regulating the manufacture, mastering, replication, importation, and exportation of optical media.
[44] Ponencia, p. 71.
[45] See Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 302 Phil. 273, 285 (1994).
CONCURRENCE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The ponencia of the Chief Justice, most especially his proposed Guidelines is a forward-thinking project long overdue.
For the first time, the Court is able to integrate a sensible framework for assessing the constitutionality of administrative actions that deprive our peoples of their rights in the name of peace, order, and good government. It matches in terms of theoretical and practical impact and historical significance if not much more the oft-cited Court's ruling in Ang Tibay v. Commissioner of Industrial Relations[1] on the requisites of administrative due process.
More, the proposed Guidelines is not as a whole dogmatic and inflexible. Rather, the framework is flexible. It considers every fact or circumstance relevant to the administrative agency's specific mandates and objectives for the common good. Yet the Guidelines makes sure that the rights or interests of affected persons are calibrated in the otherwise opaque administrative processes. The framework is truly both inclusive and exhaustive to accommodate, and not discriminate against, myriads of governmental interests while simultaneously securing the individual and collective rights of our peoples. The resulting balancing of rights, positions and interests would understandably result in a case-by-case approach and the enhanced scrutiny of administrative actions, but this disadvantage, if it would be called that, is the only way we can rationally accommodate these competing matters.
Allow me to illustrate in actual terms how the proposed guidelines could possibly impact other administrative concerns outside the immigration matter before us.
Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7610 (1992)[2] and Section 22 of Republic Act No. 11188[3] authorize the protective custody of abused children by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. These provisions empower administrative agencies to issue the type of administrative warrant similar to what is contemplated here for the purpose of preventing parents or anyone standing in their place from exercising parenting time, decision-making responsibilities, and/or contact with their children.
The same administrative warrant may be issued by a Building Official in exercise of his or her authority to abate dangerous buildings under the National Building Code and its implementing rules.
In both cases, however, the aggrieved party may now challenge such administrative warrant not only on the basis of procedural due process as outlined in the relevant laws and implementing rules concerned but also using the Guidelines set forth in the ponencia. The framework ensures utmost protection of the rights of our people without sacrificing the legitimate goals of our regulatory mechanisms.
A survey of jurisprudence reveals that administrative warrants have continued to exist under the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process.[4] The power to deport shall be exercised in the following manner:
Section 69. Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.[5]
The Immigration Commissioner is also vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,[6] as amended,[7] which provides:
SECTION 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: x x x
As such, the Court in Gan, et al. v. Deportation Board,[8] recognized that the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation under Section 69 of Act No. 2711, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Indeed, as the ponencia points out, Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613 continues to exist and its constitutionality has yet to be challenged directly.[9] In In re Harvey, et al. v. Commissioner Defensor-Santiago,[10] Secretary of Justice v. Koruga[11] and Tze Sun Wong v. Kenny Wong[12] the Court upheld the order of deportation issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of Commissioners against undesirable aliens pursuant to Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. In Tze Sun Wong the Court ordained:
[T]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this jurisdiction courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.[13]
In In re Harvey, Koruga and Tze Sun Wong, cases resolved under the framework of the 1987 Constitution, the Court upheld the arrest and deportation of undesirable aliens although the determinations were made without judicial intervention. The Court has even categorically declared that in deportation cases, resort to court is proper only after a decision is rendered by the BOI Board of Commissioners.[14]
The power to order arrests incidental to deportation without prior judicial imprimatur finds support in American jurisprudence, which the Court generally finds to be persuasive,[15] viz.:
[I]n the immigration context, federal law enforcement officers have a long history of using administrative warrants and arrests for purposes of deportation, dating back to 1798. Administrative warrants differ significantly from warrants in criminal cases because they do not require a detached and neutral magistrate. Instead, executive officers may issue an administrative warrant upon probable cause to believe a civil infraction has occurred. That is precisely what happens when ICE agents issue administrative warrants charging that there is probable cause to believe that an individual is not legally within the United States.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
The power to arrest and deport undesirable aliens is necessary for the sovereign's self-protection, thus:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive.
The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of congress is purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Further:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority, and through the proper departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.
The question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the constitution over this subject.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures, finds no application in deportation cases simply because there is no deprivation of liberty (unreasonable arrest) or deprivation of property (unreasonable searches and seizures)[19] to speak of.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur with the ponencia of the Chief Justice who thereby has opened the long-awaited conversation on how courts can meaningfully and sensibly approach via judicial review any allegation of overreach against peoples' rights vis-à-vis the interests and values sought to be protected by our administrative agencies.
[1] 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel].
[2] Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
[3] Special Protection of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Act.
[4] Mison v. Gallegos, 761 Phil. 658, 674 (2015) [Per J. Perez, En Banc] citing Kiani v. BID, 518 Phil. 501 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
[5] Act No. 2711, March 10, 1917.
[6] Commonwealth Act No. 613, August 26, 1940.
[7] Mison v. Gallegos, supra citing Kiani v. BID, supra.
[8] G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963.
[9] Draft Decision, p. 16.
[10] G.R. No. 82544 [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division].
[11] 604 Phil. 405 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
[12] 749 Phil. 206 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
[13] Id. at 221 citing Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo, 477 Phil. 891 (2004) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].
[14] Dwikarna v. Hon. Domingo, supra.
[15] See People v. Ang, G.R. No. 231854, October 6, 2020 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc]; Dimal and Castillo v. People, 830 Phil. 309 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
[16] Lopez-Lopez v. County of Allegan, 321 F.Supp.3d 794, July 13, 2018, citations omitted.
[17] 2 AM Jur., p. 517, cited in Morano, et al. v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-22196, June 30, 1967.
[18] Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, May 15, 1983; Emphasis supplied.
[19] See United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, August 23, 2007.
CONCURRING OPINION
ZALAMEDA, J.:
I concur.
The formulation of the guidelines by the ponencia is a welcome step toward tempering the ever-expanding powers of quasi-judicial bodies. Indeed, the Court has long acknowledged the unique role that administrative agencies play in modern society, in light of their specialized knowledge and technical expertise.[1] Such distinct capability rationalized the general policy of non-interference with matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies.[2]
However, Our deference ends where Our constitutional duty begins. It is incumbent upon the Court to ensure the Executive's observance of basic due process rights. The guidelines achieve this by affording the agencies sufficient leeway to meet exigent public needs, but requiring an opportunity to be heard before the deprivation of a right or legitimate claim is made permanent.[3]
The due process requirement imposed by the guidelines has statutory mooring. Specific to deportation proceedings, the Administrative Code of 1987 vests upon the President "the power to deport aliens subject to the requirements of due process."[4] Such power is exercised by the President through the Board of Commissioners (Board), a collegial body comprised by the Immigration Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, which has "exclusive jurisdiction over all deportation cases."[5]
In turn, the Board's authority is circumscribed by the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.[6] Section 37 (a) thereof provides for the categories of foreigners who may be "arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged." Meanwhile, Section 37 (c) of the law provides that "[n]o alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration."
Notably, there is no law prohibiting summary deportation, as provided in the Bureau of Immigration's (Bureau) Omnibus Rules of Procedure[7] (Omnibus Rules). To that extent, We defer to the Executive's determination of the propriety of, and grounds for, summary deportation. Those are matters falling within the Bureau's discretion. However, the summary nature of the proceedings cannot dispense with the requirement of an opportunity to be heard.
Thus, a distinction must be made between a potential deportee's arrest and actual deportation. As extensively discussed in the ponencia, the conduct of arrests prior to any hearing is justified by the inherent demands of general welfare and public safety.[8] In certain instances, the danger of a fugitive absconding or escaping the authorities outweighs all other considerations.[9] However, all potential deportees should be given a post-apprehension opportunity to be heard prior to actual deportation. This is required by the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 and the general guarantees of due process. As such, those arrested must have a mechanism to challenge their arrest and possible deportation.
In this regard, I wish to further elucidate the implications of the ponencia on the interpretation of the Omnibus Rules and the remedies available to a foreigner brought under its operation, particularly to those who are considered fugitives from justice.
Under the Omnibus Rules, summary deportation proceedings shall apply when the foreigner is: (1) overstaying; (2) undocumented; (3) a fugitive from justice; (4) has fully served the sentence in a crime which carries with it the penalty of deportation after service of sentence; or (5) has fully served the sentence for crimes mentioned in Sections 37 (a) (3) and 37 (a) (10) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.[10]
A fugitive from justice is defined as one: (a) who has been tagged as such by the authorized personnel of a foreign embassy or by the International Police; or (b) whose passport is cancelled by his/her embassy/consulate.[11] Respondent Yuan Wenle falls under this definition, as he was tagged as a fugitive by the Chinese Embassy and his Chinese passport had been cancelled.
When a foreigner is overstaying or undocumented, the rules on preliminary investigation shall apply.[12] Thus, once a complaint is received and found sufficient in form, the Bureau's Legal Division, through the Special Prosecutor, shall conduct a preliminary investigation.[13] The Special Prosecutor shall "determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a violation of the immigration law has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty and should be charged."[14]
If the complaint deserves due course, the Special Prosecutor shall issue an order requiring the respondent-foreigner to submit an answer in the form of a counter-affidavit or memorandum within ten (10) days from notice.[15] If there is sufficient evidence warranting deportation, the Special Prosecutor shall issue a Charge Sheet, which is an accusation in writing charging a foreigner with violation of immigration laws.[16] Thereafter, the Legal Division shall draft a Summary Deportation Order (SDO), which shall be forwarded to and resolved by the Board.[17]
The process is different if the foreigner is considered a fugitive from justice or one who has fully served his/her sentence, as classified under (4) and (5) above. There shall be no preliminary investigation. Instead, the Bureau's Intelligence Division shall immediately coordinate with law enforcement for the arrest or turn-over of the foreigner.[18] At the same time, the Bureau's Legal Division shall immediately draft and submit to the Board the SDO and warrant of deportation. The Omnibus Rules further provides that the SDO shall be final and immediately executory once approved by the Board, and has the effect of barring the foreigner concerned from re-entry into the Philippines and including his/her name in the Bureau's blacklist.
The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules state, thus:
SECTION 8. Duties of the Legal Division When a Foreigner is a Fugitive or Has Served His Sentence. — Within forty eight (48) hours from receipt of the fugitive/criminal file from the [Office of the Commissioner], the Legal Division shall draft and submit to the Office of the Board Secretary the following documents for appropriate action:
The Legal Division shall ensure that the relevant immigration information of the foreign fugitive/criminal shall be attached to the records such as but not limited to: (1) travel records, (2) foreigner registration records; and/or (3) derogatory records. The same shall form part of the fugitive/criminal file.
SECTION 9. Duties of the Board Secretary When a Foreigner is a Fugitive or Has Served His Sentence. — Within forty eight (48) hours from receipt of the SDO attached to the case records; the Board Secretary shall schedule a special agenda for the [Board] to resolve the summary deportation of the foreign fugitive/criminal.
SECTION 10. Nature of the Summary Deportation Order. — A Summary Deportation Order shall be final and immediately executory upon signing/approval thereof.
SECTION 11. Effect of Summary Deportation Order. — Summary deportation shall bar the foreigner concerned from re-entry into the Philippines and his name shall be included in the BI Blacklist.
x x x x
SECTION 6. Finality of the Decision. — Except in cases of voluntary deportation and summary deportation, the Order/Judgment directing the Respondent's deportation shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from notice, unless within such period, Respondent files a Motion for Reconsideration or an Appeal before the Office of the Secretary of Justice or the Office of the President.[19]
Thus, based on the quoted provisions, it may appear that a foreigner tagged as a fugitive would have no opportunity to be heard prior to and after arrest. The SDO would be issued without due proceedings, and shall be considered final and immediately executory upon approval. This interpretation contravenes the express requirement of Section 37 (c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
However, as aptly pointed out by the ponencia, the provisions of the Omnibus Rules should be construed in a manner consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution.[20] This is in consonance with the rule that "when a law is susceptible of two constructions[,] one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former," even if "the construction which is adopted does not appear to be as natural as another construction."[21]
Here, the Board itself argued and admitted that a motion for reconsideration may be filed against an SDO.[22] The Board cited Section 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules, which provides:
SECTION 7. Motion for Reconsideration. — The foreigner shall have three (3) days from receipt of a copy of the Order/Judgment to file two (2) copies of a verified Motion for Reconsideration before the OCOM Receiving Unit. Only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be filed. No other pleading shall be entertained. Within twenty four (24) hours from receipt, the OCOM Receiving Unit shall immediately forward the Motion for Reconsideration to the Legal Division or the BSI as the case may be.
The Motion for Reconsideration must point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the Order/Judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the evidence or provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions.
Whenever necessary, the Legal Division or the BSI, as the case may be, may issue an Order directing the complainant to submit a Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Within ten (10) days from submission of the Comment or from the lapse of time to submit the same, the Legal Division or the BSI shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration.
In case the Legal Division or the BSI opted not to issue an Order to submit a Comment, it shall draft the Resolution deciding the Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt.
Upon drafting the Resolution, the Legal Division or the BSI shall forward the same with the deportation record to the Board Secretary.
Upon receipt of the draft Resolution, the Board Secretary shall include the same to the next scheduled agenda for the BOC to resolve.
As Section 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules does not provide that it does not apply to SDOs, then it should be construed to be applicable to summary deportation proceedings. This is the reasonable construction that would make the Omnibus Rules valid and in accord with the Constitution and the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, especially in case of fugitives from justice. Indeed, while the provision on the finality and immediate execution of the SDO may be valid as against other foreigners subjected to preliminary investigation, as they had already been given an opportunity to be heard, the same is not true with respect to the others. As to the latter, a post-apprehension proceeding must be conducted where they can raise their respective defenses.
Notably, Our interpretation here is consistent with jurisprudence applying and interpreting the old rules of the Bureau, which also provided for summary deportation.[23] In these cases, We held that a foreigner may file a motion for reconsideration assailing the SDO and the warrant of deportation.[24]
A deportee has other remedies aside from a motion for reconsideration. Upon denial of the motion, the deportee may exhaust administrative remedies within the executive machinery, i.e., file an appeal with the Secretary of Justice and, then, before the Office of the President.[25] The Office of the President's decision may then be assailed before the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.[26] In the alternative, under exceptional circumstances and strictly on jurisdictional grounds, the deportee may directly file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[27] Conversely, We have ruled that a petition for habeas corpus and a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo are not the proper remedies to assail an SDO and a warrant of deportation.[28]
With the foregoing clarifications on the remedies available to a potential deportee, it would best serve the interests of the public if the Omnibus Rules were to be amended to reflect Our disquisition in this case. This way, deportees would be readily apprised of the remedies they have under the law and effectively raise their defenses. Moreover, as aptly pointed out by the ponencia, the text of the Omnibus Rules is susceptible of being misapplied so as to withhold a post-apprehension opportunity to be heard. Thus, I concur with the ponencia's directive to amend the Omnibus Rules.
All told, I concur with the ponencia.
[1] Drugstores Association of the Philippines Inc. v. National Council on Disability Affairs, 795 Phil. 166 (2016):
x x x Settled is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. As a matter of policy, We accord great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledge, ability, and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
[2] Id.; See also Republic v. Apex Mining Co., Inc., G.R. No. 220828, 07 October 2020; Garcia v. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 224831, 15 September 2021.
[3] See guideline nos. 1 and 2: (1) "[t]he danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent and must be greater than the damage or injury to be sustained by one who will be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property;" and (2) "[t]he warrant's resultant deprivation of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement must be temporary or provisional aimed only at suppressing imminent danger, harm or evil and such deprivation's permanency must be strictly subject to procedural due process requirements."
[4] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III.
[5] ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book IV.
[6] Commonwealth Act No. 613.
[7] BI Memorandum Circular No. SBM-2015-010 dated 08 October 2015, as amended by BI Memorandum Circular No. JHM-2018-002 dated 26 March 2018.
[8] Ponencia, p. 28.
[9] Id.
[10] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 1, Rule 9.
[11] Omnibus Rules, as amended, Sec. 2 (c), Rule 9.
[12] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 4, Rule 9.
[13] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 7, Rule 2 and Sec. 1, Rule 3.
[14] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 1, Rule 3.
[15] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 2, Rule 3.
[16] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 1, Rule 4.
[17] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 5, Rule 9.
[18] Omnibus Rules, Sec. 7, Rule 9.
[19] Emphasis supplied.
[20] Ponencia, p. 50.
[21] Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925).
[22] Ponencia, p. 6.
[23] See Memorandum Order No. 04-92 dated April 1992 and BOI Office Memorandum No. ADD-01-004 dated 07 June 2001.
[24] See Mison v. Gallegos, 761 Phil. 657 (2015); Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004); See also Omnibus Rules, Section 7, Rule 10.
[25] Tze Sun Wong v. Wong, 749 Phil. 206 (2014).
[26] Id.
[27] Id.; see Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004); Secretary of Justice v. Koruga, 604 Phil. 405 (2009).
[28] Mison v. Gallegos, 761 Phil. 658 (2015); Kiani v. Bureau of Immigration, 518 Phil. 501 (2006).
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
SINGH, J.:
In this case, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila (RTC) in a Resolution,[1] dated October 22, 2018, granted the Petition[2] for Habeas Corpus filed by the respondent Yuan Wenle (Wenle), and declared as null and void the July 26, 2018 Summary Deportation Order[3] (SDO) issued by the petitioner Bureau of Immigration's (BI) Board of Commissioners (Board), reasoning that the said Order, in relation to Rule 9 of the Bureau's Omnibus Rules of Procedure[4] (Omnibus Rules) was issued without affording due process to Wenle.[5]
The SDO issued by the Board of the BI against the respondent Wenle was pursuant to a letter[6] from the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Philippines (Chinese Embassy), seeking assistance from the BI for his arrest in relation to his alleged crimes in the PRC.[7] Wenle was subsequently arrested by immigration officers of the BI on August 22, 2018 prior to his departure for Hongkong.[8]
Consequently, Wenle filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus[9] under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, before the RTC, which granted it.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Board, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari[11] to assail the RTC Resolution,[12] dated October 22, 2018.
The ponencia nullified the assailed Resolution of the RTC,[13] through the lens of its proposed guidelines in determining the validity of an administrative warrant issued by a non-judicial agency:
- The danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent and must be greater than the damage or injury to be sustained by the one who shall be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property.
- The warrant's resultant deprivation of a right or legitimate claim of entitlement must be temporary or provisional, aimed only at suppressing imminent danger, harm, or evil and such deprivation's permanency must be strictly subject to procedural due process requirements.
- The issuing administrative authority must be empowered by law to perform specific implementing acts pursuant to well-defined regulatory purposes.
- The issuing administrative authority must be necessarily authorized by law to pass upon and make final pronouncements on conflicting rights and obligations of contending parties, as well as to issue warrants or orders that are incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.
- The issuance of an administrative warrant must be based on tangible proof of probable cause and must state a specific purpose or infraction allegedly committed with particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
- The warrant issued must not pertain to a criminal offense or pursued as a precursor for the filing of criminal charges and any object seized pursuant to such writ shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding.
- The person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time if no such period is provided by law and shall not be denied any access to a competent counsel of his or her own choice.
- A violation of any item of these guidelines is a prima facie proof of usurpation of judicial functions, malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or graft and corrupt practices on the part of the responsible officers.[14]
The aforementioned guidelines, the ponencia adds, must all be strictly complied with, to sustain the validity of an administrative warrant.[15]
The ponencia found that the assailed RTC Resolution must be nullified, reasoning that Wenle's detention by the BI was lawful and justified, which meant that his recourse through habeas corpus proceedings should be denied.
However, principally, I strongly believe that now is not the time to determine the validity of non-judicial warrants in general because it is not an issue raised by either party. In the ponencia's summary of the contentions of the parties, and the issues culled therefrom,[16] nowhere is the question of whether a warrant issued by an officer other than a judge is constitutionally impermissible even posed. The guidelines, therefore, in my view, amount to obiter and an advisory opinion on the matter, the BI's power to issue an arrest warrant pursuant to deportation proceedings not having been directly challenged in this case. Moreover, the power of other agencies to issue such orders or warrants that hew closely to the language of Article III, Section 2 is also not within the frame of issues raised by the parties. The facts do not pertain to any other agency except the BI. Finally, the Petition filed by the BI is a review of the Resolution of the RTC in a habeas corpus proceeding, the only question is the correctness of the said Resolution considering that Rule 102 of the Rules of Court allows the issuance of the remedy in all cases of illegal confinement or detention.[17]
That being said, I nevertheless see the wisdom in the proposed guidelines. Thus, while it is my position that the guidelines amount to an advisory opinion on an issue not squarely raised before this Court, I would like to offer my own thoughts regarding administrative warrants issued by non-judicial agencies merely for academic discourse.
Due process considerations in favor of foreigners |
The Fundamental Law is categorical: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The Court has repeatedly stressed that the ambit of protection of the due process clause extends even to foreigners in the Philippines.[18]
This same protection is enshrined in the BI's own Omnibus Rules:
Part II
Procedure in Deportation
Rule 2
Commencement of Deportation Proceedings
Section 2. Nature and Conduct. – Deportation proceedings are administrative in character. Subject to the requirement of due process, the deportation proceedings shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules of judicial proceedings.[19] (emphasis supplied)
Corollarily, even the President's statutorily granted power to deport foreigners is subject to the due process clause.[20]
This paradigm of affording due process to foreigners in the Philippines governs even considering the settled rule that the entry or stay of foreigners in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace and consequently may be revoked.[21] In Secretary of Justice, et al. v. Koruga,[22] the Court emphasized that such foreigners "may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto."[23]
Qua Chee Gan, et al. v. Deportation Board[24] (Qua Chee Gan), a case that predates both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, was categorical that the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures is a right extended to all, citizens or foreigners.[25] The Court took particular note that the said right, as expressed in Section 1, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, was vastly different from the Jones Law of 1916,[26] where such guarantee was expressly reserved as a right of an accused.[27] Conformably, the Supreme Court further noted that the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings:
As observed by the late Justice Laurel in his concurring opinion in the case of Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al., this provision is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law, wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, a notable innovation in this guarantee is found in our Constitution in that it specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course, it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.[28] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The doubt expressed by the Court in Qua Chee Gan was settled in Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso[29] (Salazar), where it ruled that such a power to arrest and deport a foreigner is exceptional in character owing to the constitutional power of the President as the architect of the State's foreign policy:
The Solicitor General’s reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held:
….
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them."
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified.
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.[30] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
The Court, in Salazar, further clarified that:
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search;
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.[31] (underscoring supplied)
It should be noted, however, that the issue in Salazar was with respect to the power of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) (or the Secretary of Labor and Employment) to validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.[32] Thus, in answering the said issue, the Court carved out as an exception to the constitutional requirement that warrants be determined solely by a judge, the power of the President or the BI to arrest foreigners to effect an order of deportation. This much is evident from Salazar's use of Qua Chee Gan:
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas. Be that as it may, it is not imperative for us to rule, in this proceeding — and nothing herein said is intended to so decide — on whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of deportation has been issued. We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board.[33] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Attention should be given to the fact that the Court in Qua Chee Gan sustained the validity of the arrest of a foreigner if and only if a deportation order has been issued. Moreover, it is well-settled that the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted if the person is detained under process issued by a court,[34] which includes quasi-judicial bodies such as the BI.[35] Applied in this case, it is clear that Wenle is the subject of the SDO issued by the BI after he was charged on July 17, 2018.[36]
The burgeoning question now is whether Wenle was afforded due process before the SDO was issued? In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus before the RTC, Wenle alleged that the BI issued the SDO without notice and hearing, contrary to Section 37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.[37]
The ponencia noted the position of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda that "a foreigner tagged as a fugitive would have no opportunity to be heard prior to and after arrest as an SDO is considered final and executory."[38] Moreover, the Omnibus Rules failed to clarify whether a motion for reconsideration is applicable to the SDO.[39] This is notwithstanding the position of the BI, represented by the OSG, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari, that respondent may file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 10, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules.[40] In fact, Wenle contends that such a remedy was not expressly stated to apply to SDO's. Thus, it directed the BI to amend the Omnibus Rules "to clarify the availability of certain procedural remedies to give full effect on a prospective deportee's due process rights."[41]
At first blush, it appears that Wenle was indeed deprived of an opportunity to dispute the Charge Sheet[42] and the Mission Order,[43] the Omnibus Rules prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[44] With the noted ambiguity of the Omnibus Rules with respect to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, Wenle thus filed his petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus before the RTC.
The undersigned finds that Wenle was most certainly afforded due process before the RTC when he filed his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Precisely, the question that the RTC should have resolved was whether Wenle was illegally detained.
Evidence that Wenle's arrest and deportation is justified is amply supported by the record. His identity as "Yuan Wenle" with revoked Passport No. E75457683,[45] as pinpointed by the Chinese Embassy,[46] was confirmed by the BI.[47] Having been declared an as "undocumented foreigner" whose presence in the country according to the BI "poses a risk to public interest,"[48] Wenle's arrest and detention is justified. In his Petition, Wenle failed to rebut the findings of the BI: (1) that he was involved in crimes and was wanted by authorities in the PRC; and (2) that his passport had already been cancelled.
Indeed, as correctly argued by the OSG,[49] the Court in Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez[50] ruled that:
We likewise reject petitioner's reliance on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien, having used a passport which had already been cancelled, there is no showing that he was informed about it."
Other than petitioner's bare allegations, however, we find no sufficient basis to overturn the presumption that the Bureau of Immigration conducted its proceedings in accordance with law.
In any event, when petitioner filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus before the RTC, he was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and to assail the legal and factual bases of the Board of Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order. Moreover, he could have raised the same points in the proceedings before the CA and even before this Court. Indeed, an alien has the burden of proof to show that he entered the Philippines lawfully. Petitioner has not discharged this burden. He has not controverted – either before the RTC, the CA or this Court – the Board of Commissioners' ruling that he was in fact Chen Kuan-Yuan, who was "sentenced to 8 years and 2 months imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation of controlling guns, ammunition and knives law" and was holding a passport cancelled by the Republic of China in 1995.
Just as unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that "at the time of his detention, there was no deportation charge filed against him." Assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal, supervening events bar his subsequent release. In this case, when the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed, petitioner had already been charged and ordered deported by the Board of Commissioners.
In sum, we hold that petitioner's confinement was not illegal; hence, there is no justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, he has not shown any cogent reason to warrant the nullification of the Board of Commissioners' Summary Deportation Order. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Thus, "[i]f it appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint."[51] The RTC Resolution, therefore, was issued without basis and must be reversed, as held by the ponente.
Jurisdiction over the issues and the proposed guidelines |
Even though I concur in the ruling, I have serious reservations regarding the promulgation of the proposed guidelines. As previously stated, neither of the parties raised the issue of a non-judicial officer or agency, such as the BI, issuing an arrest warrant.
As found in the ponencia, the arguments are as follows:
The Parties Arguments
The Board ascribes reversible errors on the RTC's part for granting respondent's petition for habeas corpus for the following reasons:
- Administrative issuances have the benefit of being presumed valid and constitutional which, in turn, place a heavy burden upon any party assailing such government regulation in a direct proceeding before a competent court - a crucial requirement that respondent failed to undertake.
- Habeas corpus is not a remedy for the correction of errors that led to the judgment of a person's detention; thereby, making the determination on the constitutionality of certain sections of the Omnibus Rules pertaining to SDOs outside the RTC's competence.
- A hearing is not required prior to the SDO's issuance because a foreign fugitive, having been assumed to be evading law enforcement, may be arrested in flagrante delicto for he or she is "deemed to be violating Philippine immigration laws."
- An alien's stay in the Philippines is a mere privilege and not a right; therefore, "due process accorded in deportation proceedings [has] been calibrated in consideration of [such] privilege being revoked therein."
- Respondent may still file a motion for reconsideration against an SDO under Sec. 7, Rule 10 of the Omnibus Rules considering that a post-apprehension opportunity to be heard is allowed.
- Respondent never controverted the fact that he had been involved in criminal activities as alleged by the Chinese Embassy; thereby, cementing his status as a foreign fugitive.
- Secs. 12 and 37(7) of the "The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940" 36 (Immigration Act), when read together, empowers the Bureau to deport undesirable aliens whose presence poses a risk or threat to public safety under expedited procedures.
- A writ of habeas corpus cannot be directed against detentions under processes of any "court" which includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Bureau.
Respondent counters the aforementioned arguments of the Bureau by retorting that:
- A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not the proper remedy under the circumstances because Sec. 3, 39 Rule 41 appeals from habeas corpus cases "shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of judgment or final order appealed from."
- The issue on whether due process was accorded to him is a factual issue.
- The SDO was issued without notice and hearing; thereby, denying him of due process and dispensing with the supposed requirement for the government who is burdened to prove his "deportability" as "expulsion as a penalty has [purportedly] led to the principle that deportation statutes must be strictly construed, and must be limited to the narrowest compass reasonably extracted from their language."
- Due process was definitely violated because the provisions pertaining to the filing of motions for reconsideration do not apply to SDOs.[52] (citations omitted)
The ponencia synthesizes the aforementioned by stating that the substantive issue in the case is whether the SDO issued by the BI against Wenle is void for violating due process.[53]
It is elementary that a court acquires jurisdiction over the issues only after a joinder thereof.[54] Generally, jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal's power and authority to decide over matters which are either disputed by the parties or simply under consideration.[55] This principle of jurisdiction over the issues traces its origin in the concept that judicial power pertains to the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[56] Hence, the Court "has no authority to pass upon issues of constitutionality through advisory opinions and it has no authority to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests."[57] Indeed, the Court's decision "should not be any broader than is required by the precise facts" and "[a]nything remotely resembling an advisory opinion or a gratuitous judicial utterance respecting the meaning of the Constitution must altogether be avoided."[58]
Wenle's case calls for a review of the legal correctness of the RTC Resolution granting his prayer for a writ of habeas corpus. As the ponente already found, Wenle's detention was lawful and justified, supported by the law, jurisprudence and the evidence. Consequently, the RTC's issuance of the writ is erroneous.
While the dilemma of whether a non-judicial officer or agency may issue a warrant to either arrest a person or search a place and seize an object will for now continually hang, it is a dilemma whose categorical and final adjudication is not called for by the facts as presented. I must, therefore, respectfully disagree that it is "necessary to pass upon [the] question on whether the power to issue warrants may also extend to adjudicative authorities other than regular courts."[59]
Wenle, in particular, did not dispute that the BI may arrest a foreigner under the relevant laws, but only that the SDO was issued in violation of his recognized right to due process. Wenle did not assail the constitutionality of the SDO, in particular, and administrative warrants, in general, under the lens of Section 2, Article III, before the RTC. What concerned him is the SDO's constitutionality as it pertained to his right to due process under Section 1, Article III. Neither did the RTC declare that the SDO was violative of the constitutional requirement that a warrant of arrest be issued only by a judge on the basis of probable cause.
As such, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of a warrant because it was issued by an officer other than a judge. The guidelines clearly attempt to address such problem by providing that "[a] violation of any item of these guidelines is a prima facie proof of usurpation of judicial functions, malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or graft and corrupt practices on the part of responsible officers."[60]
By exercising our constitutionally ordained rule-making power in directing the BI to amend its Omnibus Rules, the Court has already directly addressed the issue raised by Wenle in the earnest hope that a perceived violation of the right to due process in deportation proceedings will no longer add to our considerable dockets.
In any case, Salazar is guidance that, at present, the only exception recognized by the Court is with respect to deportation proceedings, in consonance with its exceptional character involving immigrants and foreigners whose presence in the country may injure societal interests.
Lest I be misunderstood, I, with utmost sincerity, believe that the guidelines are necessary to "prevent an administrative agency or officer from legally performing oppressive acts."[61] But the Court is not at liberty to make pronouncements that rest on issues not presented before it. The doctrine of separation of powers also limits the Court's constitutional power to act and adjudicate, and it must yield to Congress the wisdom in determining whether an administrative agency, particularly one endowed with quasi-judicial powers, should also possess the power to issue a warrant of arrest and/or search and seizure.
Judicial power "does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal question and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."[62] There must be an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.[63]
Administrative warrants and the regulatory framework |
Even with such a position, I would like to humbly share my thoughts regarding the power of administrative agencies to issue warrants of arrest and searches and seizures. To that extent, I join the ponencia in the reasonable construction of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution as being limited only to criminal cases,[64] that is, actions the goal of which is to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused, and which construction permissibly sustains the power of an administrative agency to issue an administrative warrant to "address some specialized, exigent or important public need."[65]
However, I am mindful that we ought to distinguish between administrative orders that restrain liberty and those that authorize the search and seizure of property. Specifically, the issuance of orders that restrain liberty, which are akin to warrants of arrest, are more clearly within the domain of the judiciary and should be subject to judicial warrants, except for cases where warrantless arrests are recognized. Indeed, the detention of persons is a more serious, if not the most serious, and intrusive means of enforcing the law. As to the power of the Executive to arrest persons for purposes of deportation, prevailing jurisprudence already carves out such arrest warrants from the general rule that warrants of arrest can only be issued by judges. In any other case, if an administrative agency finds that there is a necessity to detain a person or restrain his or her liberty, the rule should still be that a judicial warrant should be obtained, unless a warrantless arrest is allowed. In my humble view, there is no necessity to alter these prevailing rules now.
As to the power of administrative agencies to issue orders for the search and seizure of property, these can be characterized as inspection and confiscation orders expressly allowed under specific laws and confirmed in a number of cases decided by this Court. For these types of orders, the guidelines in the ponencia should apply strictly.
The guidelines on validity of administrative warrants can be succinctly divided into three elements: (1) the origin of the power; (2) the grounds for issuance and the standards for determination; and (3) the manner of execution. To be sustained, an administrative warrant must be within the jurisdiction of the administrative agency, which as the guidelines suggest must be pursuant to "well-defined regulatory purposes."[66] Thus, a law must be enacted granting such power to the non-judicial agency, particularly, as the ponencia expressly required, the power to "pass upon and make final pronouncements on conflicting rights and obligations of contending parties."[67]
We must remember that administrative agencies may be broadly classified into two:
The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof." The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.
Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.[68] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
It is in respect of this quasi-judicial power, or the power to determine the rights and liabilities of parties, from where the authority to issue administrative warrants must spring forth. Absent this element, an administrative warrant is constitutionally proscribed.
Such determination of rights and liabilities is typically the province of the judiciary, evident from our Rules of Court in its definition of civil actions, criminal actions, and special proceedings,[69] and the Fundamental Law's definition of judicial power.[70] However, the Court has conceded that "[t]he ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts."[71] The Court has thus clarified that a "quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[72] Stated differently, the administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.[73]
One example is Republic Act No. 10863, or the Customs Modernization and Tariff Act (CMTA). Principally, the power of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) revolves around the protection and enhancement of government revenue, the institution of fair and transparent customs and tariff management that will efficiently facilitate international trade, prevention and curtailment of any form of customs fraud and illegal acts, and modernization of customs and tariff administration.[74] In enhancing government revenue in import and export transactions, the BOC, in turn, is empowered to assess and collect customs revenues from imported goods and other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties accruing under the CMTA.[75] To assess and collect customs revenues, the BOC was granted power to effect search, seizure and arrest, with Congress authorizing certain persons to exercise police authority:
(a) Officials of the Bureau, District Collectors, Deputy District Collectors, police officers, agents, inspectors and guards of the Bureau;
(b) Upon authorization of the Commissioner, officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and national law enforcement agencies; and
(c) Officials of the BIR on all cases falling within the regular performance of their duties, when payment of internal revenue taxes is involved.
All officers authorized by the Commissioner to exercise police authority shall at all times coordinate with the Commissioner.[76]
The authorized officers are required to coordinate with the Commissioner of the BOC. The CMTA likewise provides that "mission orders shall clearly indicate the specific name carrying out the mission and the tasks to be carried out."[77] The CMTA further specifies that such exercise of police authority shall only be within customs premises as defined and identified in Section 303 thereof,[78] and only when the vessel, aircraft, cargo, goods, animal or any other movable property when the same is subject to forfeiture[79] or when they are subject of a fine[80] imposed under the said law.[81]
Searches and seizures under the CMTA are further detailed under Sections 219, 221, 222, and 223.[82] The BOC Commissioner is also empowered to "demand evidence of payment of duties and taxes on imported goods openly for sale or kept in storage," which in case of failure, the BOC Commissioner is authorized to seize the goods and subject them to forfeiture proceedings.[83] The District Collector is similarly authorized to "cause the arrest and bring back [a] vessel or aircraft to the most convenient port with the assistance of other concerned agencies," if it departs or attempts to depart before entry shall have been made, not being thereunto compelled by stress of weather, duress of enemies, or other necessity.[84]
It is well settled that the BOC has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.[85] Thus, the Court has held that trial courts "are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings."[86]
Under the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code), abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission)[87] of a nuisance per se, whether public or private, may be done extrajudicially.[88] But to pursue such extrajudicial abatement, the Civil Code commands that the district health officer "determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance."[89] Further, the Civil Code also provides that:
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
Thus, the district health officer is given the quasi-judicial power to determine whether abatement should proceed.
The Revised Fire Code of the Philippines of 2008 also authorizes the immediate abatement of fire hazards, in the form of notices or orders to comply against the owner, administrator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition of the building or structure by the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and its Chief.[90] Further, any building or structure assessed and declared by the chief, the BFP or his/her duly authorized representative as a firetrap on account of the gravity or palpability of the violation or is causing clear and present imminent fire danger to adjoining establishments and habitations shall be declared a public nuisance, through a notice to be issued to the owner, administrator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition of the building, structure and their premises or facilities.[91] If such persons fail to comply within the prescribed periods, the Chief, the BFP or his/her duly authorized representative may cause the structures summary abatement, defined as all corrective measures undertaken to abate hazards which shall include, but not limited to remodeling, repairing, strengthening, reconstructing, removal and demolition, either partial or total, of the building or structure.[92]
Dangerous buildings, as defined under the National Building Code of the Philippines, may also be abated by the Building Official, who shall order their repair, vacation, or demolition, if possible.[93]
In all these instances, it cannot be denied that there is a seizure of property, which is enforced and determined by an administrative officer through proceedings that partake of a judicial character, hence, quasi-judicial. This quasi-judicial character is what, at the very outset, lends basis to an administrative warrant.
Disallowing these warrants simply because they are not issued by a judge would be, in my humble view, problematic, leaving government without seasonable and sufficient remedies in these spheres of governance.
Another point that must be considered in determining the validity of an administrative warrant is the ground under which it may issue. The guidelines already deal with the same by requiring that "[t]he danger, harm, or evil sought to be prevented by the warrant must be imminent and must be greater than the damage or injury to be sustained by the [person] who shall be temporarily deprived of a right to liberty or property."[94] The guidelines likewise emphasize that the resulting deprivation should be temporary or provisional, in line with the objective of suppressing imminent danger, harm, or evil.[95] With this in mind, Congress must specify that such danger, harm or evil are present in the cases where it grants quasi-judicial power, and subsequently endows the agency with the power to issue administrative warrants.
The harm, danger or evil referred to are not too difficult to discern. In the case of forfeiture proceedings, taxation of dutiable goods, under the lifeblood theory, is too obvious to require microscopic evaluation. For dangerous buildings and fire hazards, the danger to the public is all too real to ignore. The summary abatement and the seizure of these properties is undoubtedly for public safety.
When the objective has been clearly spelled out in the applicable law, the criteria for the determination of the grounds for the issuance of the administrative warrant should, in the same vein, be particularized. The requirements of the Constitution under Section 2, Article III of a probable cause finding, as also suggested by the guidelines,[96] should be extended. Before its issuance, an administrative warrant "must be based on tangible proof of probable cause and must state a specific purpose or infraction allegedly committed with particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the x x x things to be seized."[97]
In so far as execution, the ponencia is also correct in invalidating an administrative warrant if it pertains to a criminal offense or pursued as a precursor for the filing of criminal charges and any object seized pursuant to such writ shall not be admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding.[98] In People v. O'Cochlain[99] (O'Cochlain) the Court sustained the validity of airport searches as a form of administrative searches provided that "the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale."[100] Conformably with the ponencia that the administrative warrant must only seek to prevent an imminent danger, harm, or evil, the Court in O'Cochlain held:
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft. The search cannot also serve unrelated law enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and explosives into a general search for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of passengers who travel through the system. As in other exceptions to the search warrant requirement, the screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for evidence of crime. It is improper that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement objectives" such as uncovering contraband unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." In United States v. $124,570 US. Currency, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping criminal investigatory motives from coloring administrative searches. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in Venus Commercial Co., Inc. v. Department of Health and Food and Drug Administration[101] (Venus) this Court ruled that an administrative search authorized under Republic Act No. 3720 is valid after it found that the administrative search met the requirement for the valid exercise of police power, i.e., the presence of a lawful object and the use of lawful means. The Court in Venus made it clear that searches incident of inspection, supervision and regulation sanctioned by the State in the exercise of its police power, known as administrative searches, do not violate the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Although O'Cochlain and similar cases dealing with administrative searches invariably pertain to "warrantless" searches, the same requirement, that such searches are undertaken with no criminal action already in mind, is equally applicable here.[102] The primary duty of administrative agencies to regulate specific spheres of governance by enforcing the law is what sustains the validity of administrative warrants. When the administrative warrant conflates the administrative liability of a person with his or her criminal liability, Section 2, Article III is transgressed, and such warrant must be struck down for being unconstitutional.
Finally, paragraph (7) of the guidelines, which mandates that a person temporarily deprived of a right or entitlement by an administrative warrant shall be formally charged within a reasonable time if no such period is provided by law, should be clarified. It must be a formal administrative charge because any misinterpretation as to what the charge is, i.e., criminal charges, will confuse the paradigm introduced by paragraph (6).
Summary
In summary, I agree in reversing the assailed RTC Resolution. Wenle was not deprived of his right to due process, even if we concede that the Omnibus Rules was ambiguous as to the remedies available to a foreigner, such as Wenle, detained on the basis of the SDO. Wenle was amply afforded an opportunity to be heard during the proceedings in his petition for habeas corpus.
However, I must express my reservation with respect to the proposed guidelines because the facts do not call for adjudication of the validity of the arrest of Wenle, nor of any other agency empowered to issue an administrative warrant of arrest or search and seizure. The Court has no jurisdiction over such an issue because Wenle never disputed the power of the BI to cause his arrest pursuant to the SDO. In our review of the RTC Resolution, we are bound by the arguments of the parties and the issues they generate once joined, and thus the said Resolution's correctness as to its finding that the SDO violated Wenle's right to due process is the only judicial question we should entertain.
To stress, the proposed guidelines provide an elegant solution to the question of the validity of administrative warrants. I support such proposition, if and when the proper case comes before this Court.
The temptation to resolve this dilemma of whether non-judicial officers or agencies may validly issue warrants of arrest and search and seizure is admittedly strong. But we are constitutionally mandated in every case to adjudicate on the basis of facts adduced and the issues pleaded by the parties.
ACCORDINGLY, I respectfully CONCUR and vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioner Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and nullify the assailed Resolution, dated October 22, 2018, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, in Case No. R-MNL-18-10197-SP.
I likewise CONCUR in ordering the Bureau of Immigration to AMEND its Omnibus Rules of Procedure in conformity with the Decision.
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-47.
[2] Id. at 58-68.
[3] Id. at 53-54.
[4] Bureau of Immigration Memorandum Circular No. SBM-2015-010 (2015), at <
[5] Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[6] Id. at 48.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 59.
[9] Id. at 58-68.
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] Id. at 11-33.
[12] Id. at 34-47.
[13] Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, Ponencia, at 59.
[14] Id. at 18.
[15] Id. at 17.
[16] Id. at 5-7.
[17] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, Sec. 1.
[18] Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004).
[19] Omnibus Rules, note 4, rule 2, Sec. 2.
[20] Adm. Code, Book III, Title I, Chapter 3, Sec. 8.
[21] Sec. of Justice et al. v. Koruga, 604 Phil. 405, at 415 (2009).
[22] Id.
[23] Id. (underscoring supplied)
[24] 118 Phil. 868 (1963).
[25] Id.
[26] United States Pub. L. 64-240, 39 Stat. 545, at <
[27] Supra note 25, at 874.
[28] Id.
[29] 262 Phil. 160 (1990).
[30] Id. at 168.
[31] Id. at 171.
[32] Id. at 160.
[33] Qua Chee Gan et al. v. Deportation Board, supra note 24, at 875.
[34] RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, Sec. 4.
[35] Commissioner Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441 (2000).
[36] Rollo, p. 51.
[37] Id. at 62-63.
[38] Ponencia, p. 54.
[39] Id.
[40] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[41] Ponencia, p. 55.
[42] Rollo, p. 51.
[43] Id. at 50.
[44] Omnibus Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1, Sec. 6.
[45] Rollo, p. 87.
[46] Id. at 48.
[47] Id. at 24.
[48] Id. at 53.
[49] Id. at 24-25.
[50] 408 Phil. 102 (2001).
[51] RULES OF COURT, Rule 102, Sec. 13.
[52] Ponencia, pp. 6-7.
[53] Id. at 7.
[54] See Bernabe et al. v. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676 (1942); Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 (1941).
[55] Denila v. Republic et al., G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020.
[56] CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 1. See also Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 196902, July 13, 2020.
[57] Province of North Cotabato et al. v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 589 Phil. 387 (2008), J. Brion (concurring and dissenting op.), citing JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY (2003 ed.), p. 938.
[58] Id., citing Van Alstyne, W., Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint, at <
[59] Ponencia, p. 11.
[60] Id. at 18.
[61] Id. at 17.
[62] Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12, 2019.
[63] Congressman Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64 (2009).
[64] Ponencia, p. 17.
[65] Id.
[66] Id., particularly paragraph (3).
[67] Id., particularly paragraph (4).
[68] Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines. Inc. et al. v Hon. Garin, 793 Phil. 831 (2017).
[69] RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3 provides:
Sec. 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
[70] CONST., art. VIII, Sec. 1.
[71] Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 751 Phil. 176 (2015).
[72] Id. (underscoring supplied.)
[73] Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690 (2016).
[74] Republic Act No. 10863 (2016), Sec. 101.
[75] Id. Sec. 202.
[76] Id. Sec. 214.
[77] Id.
[78] Id. Sec. 215.
[79] Id. Secs. 1113, 1116, 1117. But see contra Sec. 1114.
[80] See e.g. Sec. 1401 on unlawful importation or exportation.
[81] Id. Sec. 216.
[82] Id. Sec. 219. Authority to Enter Properties. - Any person exercising police authority may, at any time, enter, pass through, and search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store, building or structure not principally used as a dwelling house.
When a security personnel or any other employee lives in the warehouse, store, or any building, structure or enclosure that is used for storage of goods, it shall not be considered as a dwelling house for purposes of this Act.
Id. Sec. 221. Authority to Search Vessels or Aircrafts and Persons or Goods Conveyed Therein. - Any person exercising police authority under this Act may board, inspect, search and examine a vessel or aircraft and any container, trunk, package, box or envelope found on board, and physically search and examine any person thereon. In case of any probable violation of this Act, the person exercising police authority may seize the goods, vessel, aircraft, or any part thereof.
Such power to search includes removal of any false bottom, partition, bulkhead, or any other obstruction for the purpose of uncovering any concealed dutiable or forfeitable goods.
The proceeding herein authorized shall not give rise to any claim for damage caused to the goods, vessel or aircraft, unless there is gross negligence or abuse of authority in the exercise thereof.
Id. Sec. 222. Authority to Search Vehicles, Other Carriers, Persons and Animals. - Upon reasonable cause, any person exercising police authority may open and examine any box, trunk, envelope, or other container for purposes of determining the presence of dutiable or prohibited goods. This authority includes the search of receptacles used for the transport of human remains and dead animals. Such authority likewise includes the power to stop, search, and examine any vehicle or carrier, person or animal suspected of holding or conveying dutiable or prohibited goods.
Id. Sec. 223. Authority to Search Persons Arriving From Foreign Countries. - Upon reasonable cause, travelers arriving from foreign countries may be subjected to search and detention by the customs officers. The dignity of the person under search and detention shall be respected at all times. Female inspectors may be employed for the examination and search of persons of their own sex.
[83] Id. Sec. 224.
[84] Id. Sec. 1209.
[85] Agriex Co., Ltd. v. Hon. Villanueva, 742 Phil. 574 (2014).
[86] Id.
[87] Rana v. Lee Won, 737 Phil. 364 (2014).
[88] CIVIL CODE, Art. 699.
[89] CIVIL CODE, Art. 702.
[90] Republic Act No. 9514 (2001), Sec. 9.
[91] Id.
[92] Id.
[93] Presidential Decree No. 1096 (1977), Sec. 215, in relation to Sec. 214.
[94] Ponencia, p. 17, particularly, paragraph (1).
[95] Id., particularly, paragraph (2).
[96] Id., particularly, paragraph (5).
[97] Id.
[98] Id., particularly, paragraph (6).
[99] 845 Phil. 150 (2018).
[100] Id.
[101] G.R. No. 240764, November 18, 2021.
[102] Id. (The Court differentiated administrative searches because they "primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. Where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 'reasonable."')