A petition for declaratory relief is a viable remedy for questioning the constitutionality of a statute. However, just because a legal remedy is a viable procedural vehicle to assail the constitutionality of a law does not mean courts are constrained to delve into this issue when the remedy is filed. In accordance with this Court's policy of deference, the requirements of justiciability must first be met, regardless of the remedy invoked.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] assailing the Decision^[2] of the Regional Trial Court, which denied the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by Universal Robina Corporation (Universal Robina) for failing to show the invalidity of the laws and executive issuances it assails, and for being premature.

On May 25, 2010, Atty. Victorio Mario A. Dimagiba (Director Dimagiba), the then director of the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection, wrote Universal Robina to ask why its ex-mill flour prices had not been reduced despite the decrease in certain cost factors, such as the price of wheat in the international market, freight cost, foreign exchange rate, and the imposition of zero tariff.^[3]

Director Dimagiba wrote similar letters to other local flour millers, including Delta Milling Industries, Inc., Morning Star Milling Corporation, Philippine Foremost Milling Corporation, San Miguel Mills, Inc., General Milling Corporation, Liberty Flour Mills, Inc., Philmico Foods Corporation, Philippine Flour Mills, Republic Flour Milling Corporation, and Wellington Flour Mills, inquiring about their flour prices.^[4]

Universal Robina responded that "the difference in the price of our flour bag within a span of three (3) years (comparing the period of Jan-May 2007 and Jan-May 2010) reflects the price movement of wheat in the world market and covers our other costs of operation, which involve increases in our labor costs."^[5] Director Dimagiba replied, reminding Universal Robina that the wheat prices in the international market from January 2007 to September 2007 on one hand, and from January 2010 to May 2010 on the other, were almost the same despite the retail and ex-mill prices in 2007 being lower than the prices in 2010. He noted that the wheat price in the international market constituted 75% of flour production, while the operating cost and power constituted about 5% of the production cost.^[6] He thus instructed Universal Robina to reduce its ex-mill prices to P630.00 to P680.00 per bag of flour.^[7]

Later, before the Department of Trade and Industry, Director Dimagiba filed Complaints against Universal Robina and the other local flour millers for profiteering.^[8] The Complaint-Affidavit against Universal Robina narrated Director Dimagiba's exchange of letters with it and stated the basis for instructing it to reduce its ex-mill prices. It alleged that Universal Robina's flour price at P790.00 per bag constituted profiteering under Republic Act No. 7581, or the Price Act, for not representing the true worth of the flour per bag. It prayed that Universal Robina be fined and ordered to sell from P630.00 to P680.00 per bag.^[9]

On June 15, 2010, before the hearing on the profiteering charge, Universal Robina received a copy of a Preliminary Order^[10] issued by the Department of Trade and Industry adjudication officer to reduce the selling price of flour from the P770.00 to P790.00 range down to the P630.00 to P680.00 range while the case was pending. Universal Robina was also required to explain why the Preliminary Order should be revoked.^[11]

The Preliminary Order was soon lifted after the Philippine Association of Flour Millers had declared to the Department of Trade and Industry that it had lowered its flour prices, and had made a press statement advising that "the flour milling industry believes it is in the consuming public's interest that the [Department of Trade and Industry's] instruction be followed."^[12]

The Complaint against the local flour millers was later dismissed for lack of a certification against forum shopping.^[13]

Meanwhile, the Department of Trade and Industry wrote Universal Robina, noticing that the company's ex-mill prices were higher than expected, and inviting Universal Robina to meet regarding its prices:

It is observed that ex-mill prices of flour are increasing despite the peso appreciating trend. Your first increase of P25 on Grade 1 hard flour happened during the 2^nd week of August 2010 and another increase of P50 in the 3^rd week of September 2010.

Using your actual importation data (copy attached), which we got from the Bureau of Import Services and the 3-month flour cycle (importation to production), BTRCP's computation for the ex-mill price of your Grade 1 hard flour is P876.34 for August 2010, P657.83 for September 2010 and P536.49 for October 2010 as against your declared ex-mill price ranging from P725.00 – P750.00 for August and September 2010 and P775.00 – P800.00 for October 2010.

Further, on a year to year basis the peso had appreciated by an average of 11% versus the US dollar.

In this connection, please submit to us within five (5) days upon receipt of this letter, your comment/son the price evaluation of BTRCP.

We are ready to sit down with you to discuss the matter on an agreed date and time.^[14]

In response, Universal Robina filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief^[15] before the Regional Trial Court. It prayed that the following be declared invalid: (1) the provision in the Price Act prohibiting profiteering, as the Price Act failed to clearly define what it was; (2) Executive Order No. 913 and Rule IX, Section 5 of DTI Administrative Order No. 07^[16] for being an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power and violating due process; and (3) all issuances, acts, or proceedings based on these issuances.^[17]

After an exchange of pleadings and the submission of Memoranda,^[18] the Regional Trial Court issued a Decision^[19] on April 3, 2012 dismissing the Petition. It found that no justiciable controversy existed, and that the Petition was prematurely filed:

After a careful and judicious consideration of the arguments of the parties and the evidence presented the court finds no justiciable controversy that would justify the grant of the petition.

Anent the other issues raised as to whether profiteering as defined under the price act is unconstitutional and whether Section 5 of Department [O]rder No. 7, as well as Executive Order No. 913 are invalid, is not for this court to adjudicate. Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The arguments or evidence presented by the petitioner failed to justify the invalidity of the same. Furthermore, it appears that present petition [has] been prematurely filed, there being no present or actual case or controversy between the parties herein.

. . . .

Petitioner's anticipation that the [sic] a flood gate [sic] of lawsuits against it in case of failure to abide, not only from DTI, but also from various sectors of the public which may even lead to a cessation of business operation that will affect hundred[s] of employees and the irreparable damage to [its] good will is unfounded or a mere speculation.

Again, in the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, "[a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby denied.^[20]

Universal Robina moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 28, 2012 Order.^[21]

Thus, Universal Robina filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari^[22] before this Court. Public respondent Department of Trade and Industry and its impleaded officials filed their Comment^[23] through the Office of the Solicitor General. To this, petitioner filed a Reply.^[24] Later, upon being required by this Court,^[25] the parties filed their respective Memoranda.^[26]

Petitioner argues that there is an actual legal controversy that calls for judicial review.^[27] It maintains that the dismissal of the profiteering case against the local flour millers does not negate the existence of a conflict of legal right.^[28] As the profiteering case was dismissed due to a technicality, petitioner says that the legal controversy created by public respondents' acts was not resolved by any competent authority, and therefore, remains an actual legal controversy.^[29]

Even if the case did become moot, petitioner argues that this Court should nonetheless resolve the case since: (1) there is grave violation of the Constitution; (2) paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; and (4) the matter is capable of repetition yet evading review, as the profiteering case was dismissed without prejudice to its refiling.^[30]

Petitioner insists that it had the right to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5(2) of the Price Act, as it was applied when the Department of Trade and Industry initiated the Complaint against it. Thus, petitioner submits that this Court can, based on the Complaint, decide whether the act of "profiteering" is so vague that petitioner could not reasonably understand the acts it allegedly engaged in to be subject of the charge.^[31] Even assuming that the provision cannot be questioned as applied, petitioner insists that the provision may also be facially challenged, as penal statutes may be nullified on a facial challenge based on vagueness.^[32]

On the substance, petitioner claims that the definition of profiteering under the Price Act, "the sale or offering for sale of any basic necessity or prime commodity at a price grossly in excess of its true worth[,]" is void for vagueness.^[33] Petitioner insists that no standards and guidelines were provided to determine a commodity's "true worth," or a price grossly in excess of it.^[34] Thus, it submits that a person selling basic necessities or prime commodities may be threatened with penalty under this provision, without them realizing that they are profiteering.^[35] Petitioner notes that penalizing profiteering without sufficiently defining what constitutes it violates one's right to due process and the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against them.^[36]

Petitioner also argues that Executive Order No. 913 and Rule IX, Section 5 of DTI Administrative Order No. 07, which contain rules on the Department of Trade and Industry's issuance of preliminary orders, are invalid exercises of quasi-legislative power.^[37] Pertinently, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 913 provides:

SECTION 10. Preliminary orders. — As soon as a formal charge is instituted by the Minister, and even prior to the commencement of the formal investigation, the Minister may, motu prop[r]io or upon verified application of any person, issue a preliminary order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act or to perform a particular act, if the Minister is satisfied that the commission or continuance of the act complained of during the formal investigation of the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the complainant; or that the respondent is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the complainant's rights respecting the subject of the formal investigation and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. The Minister shall provide by rules and regulations the other qualifications, restrictions, and procedure for the issuance of such preliminary orders.

Rule IX, Section 5 of DTI Administrative Order No. 07 provides:

Section 5. Preliminary Order. – (a) At any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment, the Adjudication Officer may motu proprio or upon verified application by the complainant, or by the officer who signed the formal charge, issue a preliminary order requiring any person to refrain from a particular act or to perform a particular act, if the Adjudication Officer is satisfied that the commission or the continuance of the act complained of during the pendency of the action or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the complainant or the general public; or that the respondent is doing, threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the complainant's or the general public's rights respecting the subject of the administrative action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

(b) The Adjudication Officer may require the complainant to file with the office of the Adjudication Officer, a bond executed to the respondent, in an amount to be fixed by the Adjudication Officer, to the effect that the complainant will pay to such party all damages which he may sustain by reason of the preliminary order if the Adjudication Officer should finally decide that the complainant was not entitled thereto: Provided, That no bond shall be required in cases initiated by formal charge.

(c) The preliminary order may be granted with or without prior notice and hearing on the application for issuance of preliminary order, at the sound discretion of the Adjudication Officer.

(d) The preliminary order may be dissolved fully or partially at any time by the Adjudication Officer motu proprio, or upon application by the respondent with or without prior notice and hearing on the application for dissolution thereof, at the sound discretion of the Adjudication Officer. The grounds for objecting to, or for a motion for dissolution, of any injunctive relief under Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court shall be applicable.

Petitioner argues that, to be valid, an administrative issuance must be: (1) "authorized by the [L]egislature"; (2) "promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure"; (3) "within the scope of the authority given by the [L]egislature"; and (4) reasonable.^[38] Petitioner points out that the Consumer Act and the Price Act do not grant the Department of Trade and Industry the power to issue injunctive relief motu proprio, without notice and hearing, and without limit as to the duration of effectivity.^[39] Thus, it argues that both Executive Order No. 913 and DTI Administrative Order No. 07, which may have sought to implement various trade and industry laws, were unilateral acts by the Executive^[40] that exceeded the authority granted by the Legislature.^[41]

Petitioner further argues that the promulgation of DTI Administrative Order No. 07 is unreasonable.^[42] The power granted is motu proprio injunctive relief, without notice and hearing, for a duration left to the discretion of the adjudication officer.^[43] Petitioner insists that this is beyond what is reasonably necessary to prevent the acts intended.^[44]

Since Executive Order No. 913 and DTI Administrative Order No. 7 do not emanate from law, and no adequate guidelines or limitations determine the boundaries of the Department of Trade and Industry's power under these rules, petitioner claims that the issuances fail the completeness test and sufficient standard test.^[45]

Finally, assuming that Executive Order No. 913 was a legislative act that lent basis to Rule IX, Section 5 of DTI Administrative Order No. 07, petitioner claims that DTI Administrative Order No. 07 cannot apply to the implementation and enforcement of the Price Act. The Price Act, issued later than Executive Order No. 913, provides for injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order for no more than 10 days, a provision that petitioner claims impliedly amended Section 10 of Executive Order No. 913.^[46] Accordingly, Rule IX, Section 5 of DTI Administrative Order No. 07 is an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power as it failed to follow the standard set by the Price Act.

On the other hand, public respondents argue that the Petition was premature since petitioner was not facing any administrative or criminal cases filed before the Department of Trade and Industry.^[47] They say that petitioner was not suffering any injury under the Price Act, given that it was actually distributing flour based on its own computed flour prices.^[48] They refute petitioner's claim that the case was an exception to the mootness rule.^[49]

Public respondents also assert that Section 5(2) of the Price Act is presumed valid, stressing that every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.^[50] They claim that the Price Act is an exercise of police power promoting the general welfare, as it ensures the availability of a prime commodity at reasonable prices.^[51]

Public respondents assert that a facial challenge against Section 5(2) is impermissible, as the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines only apply to free speech cases, and not to cases involving penal statutes.^[52] Neither can it be assailed as applied, they say, as there is no actual profiteering charge against petitioner. They stress that judicial power does not contemplate speculative counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios.^[53]

Finally, public respondents belie petitioner's claim that Section 5(2) is vague for providing no standard of what the phrase "grossly in excess of its true worth" means. To them, the words can be understood in their ordinary meaning.^[54] They explain that the standard is whether the price set is so much higher than its "correct value" such that the profit or income that manufacturers, suppliers, and investors will earn is exorbitantly greater than what is reasonable.^[55]

The issues for this Court to resolve are:

First, whether the Petition for Declaratory Relief is the proper remedy for challenging Section 5(2) of the Price Act; and

Second, whether the provision penalizing profiteering under the Price Act is void for vagueness.

We deny the Petition.

I

Under Rule 63, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a person whose rights are affected by a statute may, before breach:

. . . bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

A petition for declaratory relief is a viable remedy to challenge the constitutionality of a law, provided that it meets the requisites of justiciability. That it is a viable remedy does not guarantee that relief can, or will, be granted.

I (A)

When the constitutionality of a statute is raised through a petition for declaratory relief, the standard rules of justiciability apply. Further,

The general rule with respect to justiciability is one of constitutional avoidance. . . .

. . . .

The doctrine of avoidance is palpable when we refuse to decide on the constitutional issue by ruling that the parties have not exhausted administrative remedies, or that they have violated the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts. These are specific variants or corollaries of the rule that the case should be ripe for constitutional adjudication.^[56] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, before delving into the constitutionality of a law, a court must satisfy itself that the following requisites are met:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.^[57]

Jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief lie with the regional trial courts. However, such jurisdiction does not require that the court resolve the issue of the constitutionality of a statute. Courts have mechanisms of avoidance. The requisites of justiciability are themselves anchored on the well-established policy of deference, in recognition of the Judiciary's role as distinct from the political roles of the Legislative and the Executive.^[58]

I (B)

An actual case or controversy exists when there are actual facts to enable courts to intelligently adjudicate the issues.^[59]

There is also an actual case and controversy when there is a clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of legal rights.^[60] In Belgica v. Ochoa,^[61] this Court explained:

Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute." In other words, "[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."^[62] (Citations omitted)

In Calleja v. Executive Secretary,^[63] this Court explained that a contrariety of legal rights is one:

. . . that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. All these are in line with the well-settled rule that this Court does not issue advisory opinions, nor does it resolve mere academic questions, abstract quandaries, hypothetical or feigned problems, or mental exercises, no matter how challenging or interesting they may be. Instead, case law requires that there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts.^[64] (Citations omitted)

In Belgica, this Court also explained that the actual-case requirement is closely related to the ripeness requirement:

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."^[65] (Citations omitted)

Thus, in Belgica, where the parties asserted opposing legal claims regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system, this Court deemed itself satisfied that a contrariety of legal rights existed.

This was reiterated in Roy III v. Herbosa:^[66]

Regarding the first requisite, the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa stressed anew that an actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," and a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.^[67] (Citation omitted)

Thus, for the exercise of judicial review, actual facts resulting from the assailed law, as applied, may not be absolutely necessary in all cases. A clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of legal rights may suffice.

I (C)

As an exception to the requirement of actual facts, there are three instances when a facial review of a law is permissible:

First, in cases involving freedom of expression and its cognates,^[68] a facial challenge of a law may be allowed. This contemplates cases where a law: (1) exerts prior restraint on free speech;^[69] and (2) is overbroad, creating a chilling effect on free speech.^[70] Thus, where no chilling effect is alleged, courts should exercise judicial restraint.

Thus, in Calleja, despite the absence of actual facts, a facial review of the law was permitted because the petitioners sufficiently raised "concerns regarding the freedom of speech, expression, and its cognate rights."^[71] This Court held:

As such, the petitions present a permissible facial challenge on the ATA in the context of the freedom of speech and its cognate rights — and it is only on these bases that the Court will rule upon the constitutionality of the law. . . . In fact, the Court is mindful that several of the petitioners have already come under the operation of the ATA as they have been designated as terrorists.^[72]

Second, judicial review is also proper, despite no actual facts, when a violation of fundamental rights is involved—one so egregious or so imminent that judicial restraint would mean that such fundamental rights would be violated. In Parcon-Song v. Parcon,^[73] this Court explained:

The violation must be so demonstrably and urgently egregious that it outweighs a reasonable policy of deference in such specific instance. The facts constituting that violation must either be uncontested or established on trial. The basis for ruling on the constitutional issue must also be clearly alleged and traversed by the parties. Otherwise, this Court will not take cognizance of the constitutional issue, let alone rule on it.^[74]

"Egregiousness" pertains to how prevalent such violations of fundamental rights would be. They should be so widespread that virtually any citizen, properly situated, could raise the issue. An example of a law with such wide coverage was ruled upon in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City,^[75] which reviewed curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas.

Not all constitutional questions are susceptible to fall under this exception. Questions involving the allocation of power among the different branches of government, those pertaining to the constitutional framework of the Philippine economy, and those relating to the amendment and revision of the Constitution are such that this Court can and should exercise judicial restraint. Such questions can await an actual case to be properly threshed out and decided by courts.

Third judicial review is proper, despite no actual facts, when it involves a constitutional provision invoking emergency or urgent measures, and such review can potentially be rendered moot by the transitoriness of the emergency. Thus, the questioned action would be capable of repetition, yet because of the transitoriness of the emergency involved, would evade judicial review and not allow any relief. Under such circumstances, this Court may provide controlling doctrine over the provision.

I (D)

Therefore, declaratory relief as a remedy for constitutional challenge will succeed only when: (1) there is a clear and convincing contrariety of legal rights; or (2) facial review is allowed. Where neither condition exists, declaratory relief is not available, and parties may resort to other remedies, as may be appropriate to the circumstances.

Here, there is a clear and convincing showing that a contrariety of legal rights exists between respondent, the Department of Trade and Industry, which maintains its authority to determine when profiteering has occurred, and petitioner, which maintains that the provision on profiteering is void for vagueness.

Petitioner may not be currently charged with profiteering, but it was again invited to discuss its prices and to explain its ex-mill prices to the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection. This invitation shows respondent's intent to hold petitioner liable for profiteering under the Price Act. Thus, notwithstanding the initial dismissal of the Complaint filed against petitioner, an actual case still exists.

II

Petitioner claims that the definition of profiteering is void for vagueness^[76] and violates the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against them.^[77]

This Court is not convinced.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan^[78] is instructive m cases assailing penal provisions as being void for vagueness:

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.^[79] (Citation omitted)

As Estrada teaches, flexibility is permissible in statutory provisions, for there are situations when it would be impossible for legislators to provide mathematical exactitude.

A statute is vague when:

. . . it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted [sic] by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.^[80] (Citation omitted)

Here, petitioner maintains that the provision on profiteering is vague because what is grossly excessive to one may be reasonable to another.^[81] The law, petitioner says, would leave open the question of whose standards should be used when determining whether a price is grossly excessive and what an item's true worth is.^[82]

While the provision certainly could set forth more exacting standards, petitioner has not established that it is void for vagueness. Petitioner has not shown that the law enforcers have unbridled discretion to determine that profiteering has been committed. Neither has it established that it did not have fair notice of the conduct to be avoided.

Although the Price Act does not define the terms "true worth" or "price grossly in excess" of true worth, our laws recognize that a reasonable price is a question of fact that can be determined based on the circumstances.^[83] Moreover, the Price Act enumerates instances when there can be a prima facie evidence of profiteering, namely where the product:

(a) has no price tag; (b) is misrepresented as to its weight or measurement; (c) is adulterated or diluted; or (d) whenever a person raises the price of any basic necessity or prime commodity he sells or offers for sale to the general public by more than ten percent (10%) of its price in the immediately preceding month: Provided, that, in the case of agricultural crops, fresh fish, fresh marine products, and other seasonal products covered by this act and as determined by the implementing agency, the prima facie provisions shall not apply[.]^[84]

Thus, the law specifies that the 10% increase will be the basis for a prima facie determination of profiteering. This provides some anchor for assessing whether profiteering has occurred, though that determination is inconclusive. The increase may, at the implementing agency's discretion, be used to determine further whether the prima facie presumption will hold.

The purpose of the law is "to ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime commodities at reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return on investment."^[85] The determination of prices "grossly in excess" of the "true worth" would thus be based on a product's availability, reasonable prices, and nondenial of a fair return for legitimate businesses to their investment.

Given the general circumstances before us, petitioner has not shown that the law enforcers have unbridled discretion in implementing the provision on profiteering. This Court is unconvinced that the provision is void for vagueness.

III

Having stated that, a discussion on the rationale for prohibiting profiteering is in order.

Classical economic doctrine normally points to a direct relationship between the quantities of a good demanded and a price increase. Consumers demand fewer goods as the price increases because of a perceived incentive to substitute the demand for a particular good, for something else.

However, basic necessities and prime commodities tend to be price inelastic. They tend to have no viable substitutes without some sacrifice in utility. Sacrifice in utility can mean eating less or a decline in nutrition. As a result, the amount usually in demand by the poorer sectors of our economy is not significantly affected by a change in price.

Based on the Statistical Tables on 2015 Family Income and Expenditure Survey,^[86] 41.9% of the expenditures of Filipino families across all income classes were spent on food. However, the percentage is higher for Filipino families whose total annual income was under PHP 40,000.00, with 60.8% of their annual expenditures going to food:

Region Major Expenditure Group	All Income Classes	Income class
		Under 40,000	40,000 - 59,999	60,000 - 99,999	100,000 - 249,999	250,000 and over
Philippines Total family expenditure (in millions)	4,882,860	12,376	47,947	262,096	1,500,018	3,060,424
Percent to the total expenditure	100.00	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Food expenditures	41.9	60.8	59.9	58.8	51.6	35.3[87]

Thus, wages in the poorer sectors remain at a constant low, and when the prices of basic commodities go up, a greater percentage of their budget must be allocated for these basic commodities. Consequently, they have less money to spend for other things they need to live. The poorer a person is, the greater the impact of price increase is.

This model of behavior becomes more accurate for middle- and high-income families. An increase in the price of a basic necessity, such as rice, corn, or bread, will induce them to either spend for similarly priced substitutes or to diet, without negative consequences. For them, the quantity they purchase is affected by a change in price. In other words, price is elastic.

This difference in elasticity between the poorer and richer sectors has consequences on the overall structure of the Philippine economy. Constant increases in the prices of basic necessities impede the ability of the poor to create the demand for the products they need. With a price increase, they end up paying more for the same quantity of basic necessities, and their disposable income diminishes. Additional goods that they need, they cannot afford. As a result, they opt out of that market entirely. This reduces demand and signals to the producers or entrepreneurs that selling a particular good will not create revenue. On the other hand, alternatives for the middle- and higher-income classes become more attractive to producers and entrepreneurs. Luxury goods demanded by the rich, such as perfumes and cars, will still be attractive.

If this is allowed to continue unregulated, our economy will produce goods and services mostly for middle- and high-income classes, making life difficult for the poor.

Considering this, it is reasonable for the government to closely monitor the prices of basic necessities and prime commodities. This helps define productivity for the goods that matter, which, in turn, provides a better quality of life for all.

This case involves not a luxury good, but a necessity used by all income classes: flour.

Unlike neoclassical economists who imagine a perfect market, the Consumer Act recognizes some of the imperfections in the market. It recognizes that, at times, there is a power differential between the buyer and the seller. Article 52 provides:

ARTICLE 52. Unfair or Unconscionable Sales Act or Practice. — An unfair or unconscionable sales act or practice by a seller or supplier in connection with a consumer transaction violates this Chapter whether it occurs before, during or after the consumer transaction. An act or practice shall be deemed unfair or unconscionable whenever the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller, by taking advantage of the consumer's physical or mental infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, lack of time or the general conditions of the environment or surroundings, induces the consumer to enter into a sales or lease transaction grossly inimical to the interests of the consumer or grossly one-sided in favor of the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller.

This provision also suggests some factors to consider when determining the existence of an unfair and unconscionable act or practice:

In determining whether an act or practice is unfair and unconscionable, the following circumstances shall be considered:

a)	that the producer, manufacturer, distributor, supplier or seller took advantage of the inability of the consumer to reasonably protect his interest because of his inability to understand the language of an agreement, or similar factors;
b)	that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the price grossly exceeded the price at which similar products or services were readily obtainable in similar transaction by like consumers;
c)	that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the consumer was unable to receive a substantial benefit from the subject of the transaction;
d)	that when the consumer transaction was entered into, the seller or supplier was aware that there was no reasonable probability or payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; and
e)	that the transaction that the seller or supplier induced the consumer to enter into was excessively one-sided in favor of the seller or supplier.

This provision is found in the chapter dealing with deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable sales acts or practices,^[88] under which the law, in Article 48, recognizes the State policy to "promote and encourage fair, honest and equitable relations among parties in consumer transactions and protect the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales acts or practices."

Thus, the law recognizes that the consumer does not have the same access to information that the seller has. Leaving consumers to the predatory tactics of unscrupulous sellers would retard, rather than enhance, the benefits of an economic market. This asymmetry of information is a market imperfection that cannot be corrected without government intervention. Government intervention, then, is justified.

Profiteering is a specific, more insidious form of unscrupulous business practice in relation only to basic necessities and prime commodities. It makes its impact most heavily on the more vulnerable sectors of our economy.

Petitioner essentially believes that the threat of being charged with profiteering is a sword of Damocles to coerce sellers to cooperate with pricing demands from the Department of Trade and Industry. This allegedly violates the laissez-faire principle, which petitioner believes to be adopted by the Constitution.^[89] Petitioner also maintains that the Department of Trade and Industry and the Bureau of Trade Regulations and Consumer Protection have no power to question the pricing of private entities.^[90]

This appreciation of the Philippine legal economic framework is incorrect. The Constitution is not made up of neoclassical economics. It is the basic law.

The laissez-faire principle may appear to be included in Article II of the Constitution, Section 20 of which provides:

SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

But just as the Constitution recognizes the private sector and provides incentives for private enterprise, it also gives the highest priority to social justice and human rights. Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates Congress as such:

SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

Reading these provisions together reveals that the main rationale of Article II, Section 20 is not to give large and powerful actors free reign, but to acknowledge their role in achieving social justice. It is to that extent, and to that end, that the free market is considered within our legal system.

In a perfect world, as contemplated by neoclassical economists, a buyer and a seller transact based on perfect information, in a market with no structural imperfections: The price reflects the value of collective utility, collective costs, and efficiency; parties transact with the possibility of refusing the transaction and availing a substitute product.

But a perfect market does not exist. The self-correcting mechanisms of a free market are illusory: They do not take effect rapidly enough to avoid damage to the poorer sectors of an economy; they do not correct sufficiently due to market imperfections or realities in the market structure.

Even the government does not have perfect information. The most it can do is correct obvious and uncontested market imperfections, or intervene during emergencies, where need and profiteering are the highest. We cannot assume that the government does not have its imperfections, or that its agents are subject to the same laws of behavior as the market.

The Constitution recognizes this reality. It is, therefore, not infected with the abstract and simplified theoretical constructs of the illusory free market, or the neoclassical economist's framework.

In JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,^[91] this Court extensively explained that the Constitution rejects the laissez-faire principle:

The more fundamental reason though why we find ourselves unable to yield deference to such opinion of Justice Montemayor, well-written and tightly-reasoned as it is, is its undue stress on property rights. It thus appears then that it failed to take into account the greater awareness exhibited by the framers of our Constitution of the social forces at work when they drafted the fundamental law. To be more specific, they were seriously concerned with the grave problems of inequality of wealth, with its highly divisive tendency, resulting in the generous scope accorded the police power and eminent domain prerogatives of the state, even if the exercise thereof would cover terrain previously thought of as beyond state control, to promote social justice and the general welfare.

This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire. So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at least two of our subsequent decisions. We had occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided barely two months ago.

This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a policy that finds expression in our fundamental law. So is the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution of which it is an expression, as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras in the Baylosis case. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in the ACCFA decision, the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal. We quote: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice."^[92] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similarly, in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,^[93] this Court again said that the laissez-faire principle is not controlling in our jurisdiction. It alluded to the goals of social justice as the higher purposes of the State:

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted [sic] by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.^[94] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes,^[95] this Court explained the laissez-faire principle vis-à-vis the Constitution, relating the provisions on the private sector back to the requirements of social justice:

The novel provisions of the Charter prescribing private sector participation, especially in the field of economic activity, come, indeed, no more as responses to State monopoly of economic forces which has unfairly kept individual initiative from the economic processes and has held back competitiveness in the market. The Constitution does not bar however the Government from undertaking its own initiatives, especially in the domain of public service, and neither does it repudiate its primacy as chief economic caretaker of the nation.

The principle of laissez faire has long been denied validity in this jurisdiction. In 1969, the Court promulgated Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices, where it was held:

. . . .

. . . The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than in any private individual or group of individuals," continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

The requirements of social justice and the necessity for a redistribution of the national wealth and economic opportunity find in fact a greater emphasis in the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the novel concepts inscribed there. And two decades after this Court wrote it, ACCFA's message remains the same and its lesson holds true as ever.^[96] (Citations omitted)

Far from embracing the doctrine of laissez-faire, the Constitution has enshrined a policy of protecting human rights and social justice, with a view toward rising productivity, full employment,^[97] and improving the quality of life of the people.^[98]

Thus, while the State policy is to establish a free market, it is a free market that regulates itself and is socially conscious, among others.^[99] "A 'free market' that is not a 'fair market' is not truly free."^[100] Therefore, the goal of law is not only to protect the free market, but to promote efficiency and an egalitarian economic structure. The law may provide an additional set of incentives that harnesses the entrepreneurial spirit to pursue nobler goals.

This Court is aware of additional costs to business enterprises as they comply with the requirements of regulation.

Regulatory costs, or the business costs of compliance, are not per se evil. Neither are they per se inefficient. In an environment marked by disparate power between sellers and consumers, asymmetries of information, and the ever-increasing possibility for abuse of market dominance and anti-competitive behavior, regulatory costs contribute to the assurance of efficiency. It is also a cost, properly borne by its most capable market actors—the producers themselves—to assure that the economic structure is appropriate to our domestic market: evolving sustainable demand for products needed by the majority. By doing so, we come closer to the constitutional ideal of a national economy with a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth, enjoying a sustained increase in the goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court's April 3, 2012 Decision in Civil Case No. 72854 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, C.J., see concurring opinion.
Caguioa, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Lazaro-Javier, J., with concurrence and dissent.
Inting, J., with concurring and dissenting opinion.
Zalameda, J., join the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice.
Rosario,^* J., on official leave.

---

^* On official leave.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 3-50. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

^[2] Id. at 51-56. The April 3, 2012 Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161.

^[3] Id. at 62.

^[4] Id. at 380-381.

^[5] Id. at 62.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id. at 85.

^[9] Id. at 65-66.

^[10] Id. at 73.

^[11] Id. at 381-382.

^[12] Id. at 74.

^[13] Id. at 383.

^[14] Id. at 81.

^[15] Id. at 83-103.

^[16] DTI Administrative Order No. 07 (2006). Instituting the Simplified and Uniform Rules of Procedure for Administrative Cases Filed with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for Violations of the Consumer Act of the Philippines and Other Trade and Industry Laws.

^[17] Rollo, pp. 92-98.

^[18] Id. at 12.

^[19] Id. at 51-56.

^[20] Id. at 55.

^[21] Id. at 57.

^[22] Id. at 3-50.

^[23] Id. at 311-344.

^[24] Id. at 347-367.

^[25] Id. at 368-368-A.

^[26] Id. at 375-423, petitioner's Memorandum; 431-468, respondents' Memorandum.

^[27] Id. at 387.

^[28] Id. at 20.

^[29] Id. at 389.

^[30] Id. at 390.

^[31] Id. at 407.

^[32] Id. at 407-408.

^[33] Id. at 394.

^[34] Id.

^[35] Id. at 398.

^[36] Id. at 397.

^[37] Id. at 411.

^[38] Id. at 414.

^[39] Id. at 415.

^[40] Id. at 414.

^[41] Id. at 415.

^[42] Id. at 417.

^[43] Id.

^[44] Id. at 419.

^[45] Id. at 419-420.

^[46] Id. at 420.

^[47] Id. at 436.

^[48] Id. at 438.

^[49] Id. at 439.

^[50] Id. at 440.

^[51] Id. at 441.

^[52] Id. at 441-442.

^[53] Id. at 447-448.

^[54] Id. at 450.

^[55] Id. at 453.

^[56] J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019 [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].

^[57] Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 892 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[58] Parcon-Song v. Parcon, G.R. No. 199582, July 7, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; Tarrosa v. Gabriel C. Singson, 302 Phil. 588 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc]; Palencia v. People, G.R. No. 219560, July 1, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[59] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc]; Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[60] Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 481 (2008) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[61] 721 Phil. 416, 519 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[62] Id. at 519.

^[63] G.R. Nos. 252578 et al., December 7, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].

^[64] Id. at 60-61. This pinpoint citation refers to a copy of the decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[65] Belgica v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416, 519-520 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[66] 800 Phil. 459 (2016) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[67] Id. at 490-491.

^[68] See CONST., art. III, sec. 4.

^[69] J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 727 Phil. 28 (2014) (Per J. Abad, En Banc].

^[70] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[71] Id. at 61.

^[72] Id. at 61-62.

^[73] G.R. No. 199582, July 7, 2020 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[74] Id. at 20.

^[75] 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[76] Rollo, p. 394.

^[77] Id. at 397.

^[78] 421 Phil. 290 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

^[79] Id. at 352-351.

^[80] People v. Nazario, 247-A Phil. 276, 286 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

^[81] Rollo, p. 396.

^[82] Id. at 397.

^[83] CIVIL CODE, art. 1474.

^[84] Republic Act No. 7581 (1992), sec. 5(2).

^[85] Republic Act No. 7581 (1992), sec. 2.

^[86] Statistical Tables on 2015 Family Income and Expenditure Survey, <https://psa.gov.ph/content/statistical-tables-2015-family-income-and-expenditure-survey> (last accessed on March 16, 2022).

^[87] Philippine Statistics Authority, Table 9 Total Annual Family Expenditure by Major Expenditure Group, by Income Class and by Region: 2015, PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY WEBSITE <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/article/TABLE%209%20%20Total%20Annual %20Family%20%20Expenditure%20by%20Major%20Expenditure%20Group%2C%20by%20Income %20Class%20and%20by%20Region%202015.pdf> (last accessed on March 16, 2022).

^[88] Republic Act No. 7394 (1992), Title III, Chapter 1.

^[89] Id. at 384.

^[90] Id. at 396.

^[91] 142 Phil. 393 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].

^[92] Id. at 412-414.

^[93] 246 Phil. 393 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

^[94] Id. at 406.

^[95] 269 Phil. 210 (1990) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

^[96] Id. at 216-217.

^[97] CONST., art. XIII, sec. 3 provides:

Labor
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

^[98] CONST., art. XII, sec. 1 provides:

National Economy and Patrimony
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.

^[99] Republic Act No. 8799 (2000), The Securities Regulation Code.

^[100] Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, 588 Phil. 651, 723 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

---

CONCURRING OPINION

GESMUNDO, C.J.:

I fully concur with the ponencia. Nevertheless, I write to share my perspective on whether an action for declaratory relief, as a general rule, may be availed of before breach or violation of the assailed statute.

I respectfully answer in the affirmative.

Factual Background

The Director of the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP) sent a letter to Universal Robina Corporation (URC) seeking an explanation on its ex-mill flour prices and directing it to reduce such prices. BTRCP then filed a complaint against URC before the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) for profiteering under the Price Act,^[1] but the complaint was dismissed due to lack of certification against forum shopping. DTI later invited URC to meet regarding its prices. Thereafter, URC filed a petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) praying that these issuances be declared invalid: (1) Section 5(2) of the Price Act which prohibits profiteering; (2) Executive Order No. 913 (EO 913) and Sec. 5, Rule IX of DTI Administrative Order No. 7 (DTI AO 7) for being an invalid exercise of quasi-legislative power and for violating due process; and (3) all issuances, acts, or proceedings based on these issuances.^[2]

In its April 3, 2012 Decision, the RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory relief on the ground that it was prematurely filed because no justiciable controversy existed. URC moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, URC filed the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the RTC's Decision.

URC argued that it had the right to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 5(2) of the Price Act because DTI had initiated a complaint against it. It further argued that the provision may be facially challenged, considering that penal statutes may be nullified on a facial challenge based on vagueness.

The core issues are: (a) whether Sec. 5(2) of the Price Act, which penalizes profiteering, is void for vagueness; (b) whether EO 913 and Sec. 5, Rule IX of DTI. AO 7 are invalid exercises of quasi-legislative power; and (c) whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for declaratory relief for having no justiciable controversy. This opinion will focus on the third issue.

The ponencia held that the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court (Rule 63) because there is an actual case or controversy. On the merits, it upholds the constitutionality of Sec. 5(2) of the Price Act.

It was discussed in the ponencia that an actual case or controversy exists when (1) there are actual facts to enable courts to intelligently adjudicate the issues;^[3] (2) or when there is a clear and convincing showing of a contrariety of rights.^[4] Discussing this concept of contrariety of rights, which does not require actual facts, the ponencia cited Calleja v. Executive Secretary^[5] (Calleja). It states that contrariety of legal rights is one that "can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Corollary thereto, the case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. All these are in line with the well-settled rule that this Court does not issue advisory opinions, nor does it resolve mere academic questions, abstract quandaries, hypothetical or feigned problems, or mental exercises, no matter how challenging or interesting they may be. Instead, case law requires that there is ample showing of prima facie grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act in the context of actual, not merely theoretical, facts."^[6]

It was further held that there are other instances when actual facts need not be required before the review of the law is permissible: (a) in cases involving free expression and its cognates, where a facial challenge may be allowed; (b) when a violation of fundamental rights is so egregious or imminent; and (c) in cases involving constitutional provisions where emergency or urgent measures are invoked.^[7]

Thus, declaratory relief as a remedy for constitutional challenge may succeed (1) when there is a clear and convincing contrariety of rights, or (2) in those instances when facial review is allowed. In this case, since there is a clear and convincing showing that a contrariety of rights exists between DTI and petitioner, then the action for declaratory relief is proper.

I agree with the ponencia that an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 is the correct remedy. The RTC erred in dismissing the petition for declaratory relief. I likewise agree that Sec. 5(2) of the Price Act is constitutional.

The discussion-below will center on the issue of whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for declaratory relief for having no justiciable controversy.

At the outset, it bears recognizing that the introduction and evolution of the expanded judicial power in the constitutional framework has altered the plane of constitutional adjudication in Our jurisdiction. Before such innovation, an action for declaratory relief has long been available to assail the constitutionality of a statute even when no breach has been committed. When a breach does occur, a litigant may resort to the ordinary remedies under the law. Despite these changes, and regardless of the remedy invoked, courts can only entertain cases when there is a justiciable controversy, consistent with the role of the Judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power in government. Hence, a reexamination of what actual or justiciable controversy covers in our current constitutional regime seem essential. Notably, the understanding of justiciable controversy slightly varies when used in the traditional mode and expanded mode, especially when the constitutionality of a statute is assailed. Hence, the jurisprudential understanding of the actual or justiciable controversy element must, thus, be reviewed and harmonized.

Traditional and Expanded Judicial Power under the Constitution

Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines traditional judicial power as the duty of the courts of justice "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." On the other hand, expanded review power is the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,^[8] the Court emphasized that whether in the traditional or expanded mode, the exercise of judicial power requires the presence of an actual case or controversy.^[9]

Courts may pass upon the constitutionality of statutes when the requisites of justiciability are present.^[10] Foremost of these requisites is actual controversy,^[11] viz.:

As a rule, "the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned." A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.^[12]

From the foregoing, it appears that actual controversy is a requirement of justiciable controversy separate from the requirement of standing, among others.

A. In Traditional Review

In its traditional sense, actual controversy is understood as one which involves "a contrariety of legal rights"^[13] (i.e., "conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution"^[14]). Separate but closely linked to the actual controversy requirement is the requirement of ripeness. "A justiciable controversy refers to an existing controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination."^[15] A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a "direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it."^[16] It must be stressed that the conflict should be "ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action."^[17]

Another requisite for justiciability is the legal standing requirement. A person challenging an act must have standing, which means a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."^[18] Without such element, the issue presented would be purely hypothetical and academic.^[19]

Jurisprudence explains that legal standing "sharpens the presentation of issues." Thus, as a rule, a party will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when "(1) he can show that he had personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action."^[20]

In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,^[21] a petition for declaratory relief was filed before the RTC seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging its members to vote for a specific candidate. When the case was elevated, the Court held that the petition failed to show a justiciable controversy, noting that there was no explicit allegation of any legal right sought to be protected. Moreover, there was no factual allegation that the rights of therein petitioners are "being subjected to any threatened, imminent[,] and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief."^[22] It stressed that in a declaratory relief case, "a breach or violation should be impending, imminent[,] or at least threatened."^[23]

Verily, it is worth stressing that in traditional judicial review, an actual injury need not be in existence for there to be a justiciable controversy. Its standing requirement is met when petitioner will sustain, or is threatened to sustain, the injury.

B. In Expanded Review

To reiterate, actual controversy remains to be a requisite in exercising the expanded power of review or the extraordinary jurisdiction of the courts, though it has been effectively simplified to mean "prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of a government act."^[24] Pangilinan v. Cayetano^[25] articulates this point:

In deciding matters involving grave abuse of discretion, courts cannot brush aside the requisite of an actual case or controversy. The clause articulating expanded certiorari jurisdiction requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act which, in essence, is the actual case or controversy. Thus, "even now, under the regime of the textually broadened power of judicial review articulated in Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is not dispensed with."^[26]

Accordingly, as an exception, mere enactment of the assailed law and issuance of its implementing rules, or approval of the challenged action were, in some cases, considered sufficient for a case to be justiciable.

In Imbong v. Ochoa,^[27] the Court held that an actual controversy existed and the case is ripe for adjudication because "the [Reproductive Health] Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed."^[28] It also stressed the duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute "when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution."^[29]

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,^[30] the Court pronounced that "[b]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act."^[31] Hence, the Court took cognizance of the petition assailing the constitutionality of the President's administrative order, which reduced to 5% the amount of internal revenue allotment for the local government units. It stressed that "when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts."^[32]

In Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima,^[33] the Court held that the mere issuance of the implementing rules has led to the ripening of a judicial controversy.^[34] It explained that an actual controversy "may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed [implementing rules] has actually and adversely affected [therein] petitioners."^[35] Besides, there is already a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced based on existing law and jurisprudence. On the one hand, therein respondents stand for the prospective application of the good conduct time allowance, while on the other hand, the petitioners therein argue that such provision violates the Constitution.

At this point, it bears underscoring that even in expanded review, courts are not allowed to issue advisory opinions. The expanded review will be exercised when there is a real conflict between the parties, which means that "there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text,"^[36] to wit:

Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 [of the Constitution] does not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional text.^[37]

To meet the ripeness requirement, "something [must have] been accomplished or performed by either branch [of government] before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself [or herself] as a result of the challenged action."^[38]

In Calleja, an actual controversy was found to exist because in challenging the Anti-Terrorism Act, the consolidated petitions "sufficiently raised concerns regarding the freedom of speech, expression, and its cognate rights."^[39] Further, they had "sufficiently shown that there is a credible and imminent threat of injury, as they may be subjected to the potential destructive consequences"^[40] of the challenged law's provisions.

As seen from this discussion, actual controversy is required in both traditional and expanded judicial review, although its meaning differs depending on the applicable mode. Nevertheless, the other requisites of judicial review somehow have consistent meanings.

The Ponencia's Proposed Framework; Act No. 3736; Rule 63

The main contention in this case circles on the proposed framework of the ponencia regarding the appreciation of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63. This rule is based on Act No. 3736,^[41] quoted as follows:

ACT NO. 3736

AN ACT EMPOWERING THE COURTS TO MAKE DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in a Court of First Instance to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

Section 2. Before Breach. — A contract may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.

Section 3. Discretionary. — The court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case when a decision under it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances.

Section 4. Parties. — When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights or persons not parties to the action.

Section 5. Attorney-General. — In any action which involves the validity of a statute the Attorney-General shall, before judgment is entered, be notified by the party attacking the statute, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.

Section 6. Municipal Ordinance. — In any action which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance the provincial fiscal shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard; and if the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional the Attorney-General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect on its approval. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, even the legislative branch unqualifiedly recognizes that a petition for declaratory relief may be availed of to question the construction or validity of a statute it has enacted. Notably, the law does not unequivocally state that a petition for declaratory relief may, as general rule, only be availed of after breach of the said statute.

The purpose of declaratory relief is to "relieve litigants of the common law rule that no declaration of rights may be judicially adjudged unless a right has been violated."^[42] Justice Moran elucidated on its nature, thus:

Actions for declaratory relief had its roots way back in the Middle Ages. It is permitted on the theory that courts should be allowed to act not only when harm is actually done and rights jeopardized by physical wrongs or physical attach upon existing legal relations, but also when challenge, refusal, dispute, or denial thereof is made amounting to a live controversy. The uncertainty and insecurity which may thereby be occasioned may hamper or disturb the freedom of parties to transact business or to make improvement on their property rights. A situation is thus created wherein a judicial declaration may serve to prevent a dispute from ripening into violence or destruction. Courts thus become an instrument of both curative and preventive justice.^[43] (Emphases supplied)

In this jurisdiction, Rule 63 contains the procedure for an action of declaratory relief. Sec. 1 thereof provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.^[44] (Emphasis supplied)

The statutory anchor for this remedy is Act No. 3736^[45] where persons whose rights are "affected by a statute" may file an action to question its validity and seek a declaration of their rights and duties.^[46] In such actions, the statute entitles the Attorney General (now Solicitor General) to participate.^[47]

Justice Moran expounds that the meaning of the term "cause of action" in a proceeding for declaratory relief is broadened. It is not, as in ordinary civil actions, the wrong or delict by which the plaintiffs rights are violated, but it is extended to a mere denial, refusal, or challenge raising at least an uncertainty or insecurity which is injurious to the plaintiff's rights.^[48] It is clarified that a complaint for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of contract or statute, the construction of which is sought. The law does not even require that there is an actual pending case.^[49] When there is already a breach of the law, it will constitute as a bar to the complaint for declaratory judgment.^[50]

Justice Moran further explains that in an action for declaratory relief, the requisite of justiciability is satisfied by an actual controversy or the ripening seeds of one, which exists between parties all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the controversy. By "ripening seeds" the court means, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of the full-blown battle which looms ahead. It is described as a state of facts indicating "imminent and inevitable" litigation, provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration.^[51]

As stated previously, the philosophy behind actions for declaratory relief is that courts should be allowed to act not only when harm is actually done and rights jeopardized by physical wrongs or physical attack upon existing legal relations, but also when challenge, refusal, dispute, or denial thereof is made amounting to a live controversy. Relief is, thus, confined to a case of actual controversy within the court's jurisdiction which may promulgate a declaratory judgment without need of injunction, execution, or other relief beyond the adjudication of the legal rights which are subject of the controversy between the parties. Basically, the question in each case would be whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interest, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory relief.^[52]

Accordingly, Sec. 1, Rule 63 allows a petition for declaratory relief to question the construction or validity of a statute. It may be availed of before breach or violation thereof.

Nevertheless, to stress, even if there is no breach or violation of a statute yet, it does not necessarily mean that an action for declaratory relief has no actual case or controversy. It must be emphasized that the existence of an actual controversy does not necessarily mean that there must be an actual breach or violation of a statute.

To highlight, an actual controversy is constitutionally required before courts can exercise judicial power. Again, under an action for declaratory relief, actual controversy pertains to the contrariety of legal rights.^[53] Ripeness covers not only actual injury but also "immediate or threatened injury" to the petitioner.^[54] Standing is met not only when petitioner "has sustained direct injury, but also when he "will sustain" or is about to sustain such injury should the challenged action be enforced.^[55]

Actual controversy is required even in actions for declaratory relief. It bears stressing that the introduction of declaratory relief as a judicial remedy has expanded the concept of justiciability (e.g., actual controversy, ripeness, standing). Even when there is no breach yet, a case is already justiciable. Thus, courts can already resolve the action. For the case to be ripe for adjudication, however, the "breach or violation should be impending, imminent, or at least threatened."^[56]

As expounded in the 1966 case of Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar^[57] (Caltex), the existence of justiciable controversy (i.e., actual controversy between persons with adverse interests) in a declaratory relief case is not negated by the lack of breach. Such justiciable controversy already exists when the disagreement is no longer nebulous or contingent, and the issues are clearly defined, even if breach has not yet been committed, thus:

Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety — nay, the necessity — of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead x x x, cannot but be conceded.^[58] (Citations omitted)

The requisites for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.^[59] These requisites were later expanded based on the commentary of Justice Regalado,^[60] thus:

(1)	the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
(2)	the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
(3)	there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
(4)	there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse;
(5)	the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; [and]
(6)	adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.[61]

Relevant for discussion are the fourth and fifth requisites.

The fourth requisite, justiciable controversy, as defined, weaves together the concepts of actual controversy, ripeness, and standing as previously discussed under judicial review. The Court has long held that even in "cases of declaratory relief, there must be an actual and justiciable, not merely theoretical, controversy."^[62] To underscore, an action for declaratory relief based on theoretical or hypothetical questions cannot be filed for our courts are not advisory courts.^[63] Verily, declaratory judgments should not be confused with advisory opinions, which were differentiated by Commissioner Bernas, to wit:

What thus distinguishes a declaratory judgment from an advisory opinion is that the former involves real parties with real conflicting legal interests whereas an advisory opinion is a response to a legal issue posed in the abstract of any case in which it may be presented. As a consequence of this distinction, an advisory opinion binds no one whereas a declaratory judgment is a final one and is forever binding on the parties. The former is thus not a judicial act but the latter is.^[64]

Justice Moran confirms that an action for declaratory relief is a proceeding determinative of the rights of the parties to the case, and as such, exhibits characteristics quite distinct from those of an advisory opinion, rendered at the request of the executive or legislative department of the government to the handling down of which courts in this and jurisdictions have cast a definite aversion.^[65]

The fact that parties must have "real conflicting legal interests" emphasizes the need for legal standing for the controversy to be justiciable. In actions for declaratory relief, the legal interest "is to be found in the danger of loss or of uncertainty of [one's] rights or other jural relations by a failure of the court to make the declaration."^[66] This does not mean, however, that there must have been breach or violation of rights. To reiterate, in the 1966 case of Caltex, the Court held that in a declaratory relief case, the existence of justiciable controversy is not negated by the lack of breach. Justiciable controversy already exists when the disagreement is no longer nebulous or contingent.^[67] The reason of the parties in filing such action is to obtain a declaration that "will help in ending the controversy."^[68]

In fine, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 involves an actual case or controversy even though it is filed before a breach or violation of a statute is committed. Again, for the case to be ripe for adjudication, the "breach or violation should be impending or imminent." Such justiciable controversy already exists when the disagreement is no longer nebulous or contingent, and the issues are clearly defined, even if the breach has not yet been committed.

Accordingly, the benchmark to determine whether an action for declaratory relief has an actual controversy before breach of the statute is when such breach or violation is impending or imminent. Otherwise, there will be no justiciable controversy. This is how an action for declaratory relief is distinguished from a mere advisory opinion. An action for declaratory relief involves real parties with real conflicting legal interests whereas an advisory opinion is a response to a legal issue posed m the abstract of any case in which it may be presented.^[69]

Again, an action for declaratory relief shall only be filed directly with the RTC; it cannot be filed immediately before this Court.

As applied, in this case, the petition filed before the RTC has an actual case or controversy even though there was no breach of the statute yet because of the impending or imminent violation by the parties of Sec. 5(2) of the Price Act.

Standards for delegation of legislative powers

Finally, on the merits, URC argues that the law forms an undue delegation of legislative power as the concept of "true worth" of a basic necessity and prime commodity, as with the "price grossly in excess" of that value, provide no standard for executive discretion.^[70] It insists that the phrase "price grossly in excess" is vague because what is grossly excessive to one may be reasonable to another. It further questions whose standards should be used in determining whether a price is grossly excessive, and what an item's true worth is.^[71]

The ponencia finds URC's arguments to be without merit and holds that the petitioner failed to establish the phrase "price grossly in excess" as void for being vague.

I agree.

In Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita,^[72] it was explained that:

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While certain powers, such as the power to tax, cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.^[73]

In this case, the assailed provision states:

(2) Profiteering, which is the sale or offering for sale of any basic necessity or prime commodity at a price grossly in excess of its true worth. There shall be prima facie evidence of profiteering whenever a basic necessity or prime commodity being sold: (a) has no price tag; (b) is misrepresented as to its weight or measurement; (c) is adulterated or diluted; or (d) whenever a person raises the price of any basic necessity or prime commodity he sells or offers for sale to the general public by more than ten percent (10%) of its price in the immediately preceding month: Provided, That, in the case of agricultural crops, fresh fish, fresh marine products, and other seasonal products covered by this Act and as determined by the implementing agency, the prima facie provisions shall not apply[.]^[74] (Emphasis supplied)

I find that the challenged statute is clear and unambiguous. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.^[75] While the statute does not equivocally define "grossly in excess of its true worth," the law itself provides standards to determine such as when the commodity (a) has no price tag; (b) is misrepresented as to its weight or measurement; (c) is adulterated or diluted; or (d) whenever a person raises the price of any basic necessity or prime commodity he/she sells or offers for sale to the general public by more than 10% of its price in the immediately preceding month. Thus, in implementing this law, the executive branch will not arbitrarily determine for itself the meaning of the phrase "grossly in excess of its true worth."

Further, "true worth" is synonymous to the phrase "true value." The true value of a product, which may include land, has been defined by the Court as early as 1910. In Manila Railway Co. v. Fabie,^[76] it was held:

The value which ought to be shown is the market value of the land in that locality. By market value we mean the price fixed by buyer and seller in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article established or shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property as between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell; the current price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be bought and sold in that locality. Undoubtedly, deeds conveying property in the same locality are of value in determining the market value of land in that vicinity, provided they are shown to have been made in the ordinary course of legal business and competition and that the prices stated therein were real and not affected by unusual conditions. Standing alone, however, they may be very misleading. One person may desire a piece of land in a given locality very much more than any other person. He may, for some special reason, desire it so much that he is willing to pay three or four times its value in order to secure it. A deed exhibiting such a value would be no criterion of the real value of property in that community.^[77] (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, true worth of a product, which is the same as its true value, is determinable due to its market value.

In my mind, the executive branch has a sufficient standard to determine the true worth of a product based on its market value, and whether profiteering is committed. Thus, I agree that the assailed provision is not unconstitutional.

It must be emphasized that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. As the Court held in Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:^[78]

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain.^[79]

When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To warrant its nullification, there must be a clear and indubitable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.^[80] As URC failed to establish that the provision is utterly vague and devoid of any hope of interpretation, then it is not unconstitutional.

All told, I join the ponencia in DENYING the petition.

---

^[1] Republic Act No. 7581, "An Act Providing Protection to Consumers by Stabilizing the Prices of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities and by Prescribing Measures Against Undue Price Increases During Emergency Situations and Like Occasions."

^[2] Ponencia, p. 4.

^[3] Id. at 10.

^[4] Id.

^[5] G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021.

^[6] Id.; see ponencia, p. 11.

^[7] Ponencia, pp. 12-13.

^[8] 802 Phil. 116 (2016).

^[9] The rationale for this requirement goes into the role of the Judiciary in the constitutional framework of government. (See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 679 [2008], which states that "[t]he limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.").

^[10] See Lagman v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 197422, November 3, 2020. "This justiciability requirement is 'intertwined with the principle of separation of powers.' It cautions the judiciary against unnecessary intrusion on matters committed to the other branches of the government."

^[11] Note: The phrase "actual controversy" will be used in this Opinion interchangeably with "actual case or controversy." The terms "case" and "controversy" are used in the US Constitution in defining judicial power (See Article III, Section 2). In contrast, the Philippine Constitution uses only "controversies." It is submitted that in the Philippine context, these two terms may be used interchangeably. In the US context, the US Supreme Court held in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (300 U.S. 227, 239 [1937]), that the "term 'controversies,' if distinguishable at all from 'cases,' is so in that it is less comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature."

^[12] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 205, 244 (2018).

^[13] Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines v. Medialdea, 842 Phil. 747, 782 (2018).

^[14] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, supra at 244.

^[15] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 472 Phil. 285, 302 (2004).

^[16] Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, 801 Phil. 472, 486 (2016). The question of ripeness asks "whether a case involves contingent events that may not occur as anticipated and whether there is actual injury to the party" in the suit.

^[17] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, supra at 245.

^[18] Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra at 151.

^[19] Id. at 151-152.

^[20] Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004); Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines v. Medialdea, supra at 784.

^[21] Supra.

^[22] Id. at 303.

^[23] Id. at 305.

^[24] Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra at 141.

^[25] G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021.

^[26] Id.

^[27] 732 Phil. 1 (2014).

^[28] Id. at 124.

^[29] Id.

^[30] 391 Phil. 84 (2000).

^[31] Id. at 107. It held thus: "This is a rather novel theory—that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty." (Citation omitted)

^[32] Id. at 108.

^[33] G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019, 905 SCRA 599, 620.

^[34] As further support, see Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government (supra note 16. at 491), where the Court dismissed the petitions questioning the constitutionality of the un-enacted Bangsamoro Basic Law for lack of actual controversy. It held that "[u]nless enacted into law, any proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not subject to judicial review." The case also cited Montesclaros v. COMELEC (433 Phil. 620, 634 [2002]), where the Court held "that it has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo."

^[35] Id.

^[36] Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Abad, G.R. No. 200418, November 10, 2020.

^[37] Id.

^[38] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067, 1090 (2017); see also Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines v. Medialdea (supra note 13, at 783), where the Court held that consistent with the ripeness requirement, even when the challenged law and implementing rules have been issued, the petition must still allege that "an actual or direct injury as a result of a discretion gravely abused." Absent such "actual and direct injury, any pronouncement by the Court would be purely advisory or sheer legal opinion, in view of the mere hypothetical scenarios" that would be presented in the petition. (Italics supplied)

^[39] Calleja v. Executive Secretary, supra note 5.

^[40] Id.

^[41] Approved on November 22, 1930.

^[42] Calleja v. Executive Secretary, supra note 5. Based on Velarde v. Social Justice Society (supra note 15, at 305), a cause of action ordinarily involves a violation of a right constituting breach. This concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply in the special civil action for declaratory relief. "The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened."

^[43] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1957 ed.), pp. 141-142; for a deeper study of the evolution of declaratory relief in various jurisdictions, see Borchard (1918), The Declaratory Judgment - A Needed Procedural Reform, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 28(1), pp. 1-32.

^[44] Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III (1999 ed.), Special Civil Actions, Rules 57-71, p. 191.

^[45] Notably, it appears that the requirement of "before breach" under Act No. 3736 refers only to the construction of "contracts," and not the other instruments. The "before breach" requirement in the construction of statutes was added only in the 1940 Rules of Court. (Section 2 of Act No. 3736 states thus: "Section 2. Before Breach. — A contract may be construed before there has been a breach thereof. Section 2, Rule 66 of the 1940 Rules of Court states thus: "Section 2. Before Breach. — A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.") It may be argued that this "before breach" requisite only applies when the case involves construction, not validity.

^[46] Section 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in a Court of First Instance to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

* Notably, it appears that the requirement of "before breach" under Act No. 3736 refers only to the construction of "contracts," and not the other instruments. The "before breach" requirement in the construction of statutes was added only in the 1940 Rules of Court. (Section 2 of Act No. 3736 states thus: "Section 2. Before Breach. — A contract may be construed before there has been a breach thereof. Section 2, Rule 66 of the 1940 Rules of Court states thus: "Section 2. Before Breach. — A contract or statute may be construed before there has been a breach thereof.") It may be argued that this "before breach" requisite only applies when the case involves construction, not validity.

^[47] Act No. 3736, Sec. 5.

^[48] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p. 152.

^[49] Id. at 153.

^[50] Id.

^[51] Id. at 154.

^[52] Id. at 154-155.

^[53] See Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima, supra note 33, at 619.

^[54] Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, supra note 38; see also Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines v. Medialdea, supra note 13.

^[55] Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 8, at 151.

^[56] Velarde v. Social Justice Society, supra note 15.

^[57] 124 Phil. 763 (1966).

^[58] Id. at 773.

^[59] Id. at 770, citing Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83, 88 (1951); Delumen v. Republic, 94 Phil. 287, 288 (1954); Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil. 675, 677-678 (1956). The Court held that based on then Rule 66 of the 1940 Rules of Court and Rule 64 of the subsequent rules: "In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination."

^[60] Regalado (2005), Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1 (9^th ed.), pp. 766-767.

^[61] See the enumeration from Regalado (2005), Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, id., as adopted in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Department of Finance v. Dela Cruz, Jr., 767 Phil. 611, 665 (2015); Republic v. Roque, 718 Phil. 294, 304 (2013); Ferrer, Jr. v. Roca, Jr., 637 Phil. 310, 317-318 (2010); Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., 566 Phil. 458, 467 (2008); Jumamil v. Cafe, 507 Phil. 455, 462 (2005).

^[62] Jimenez v. Roa, 148-A Phil. 286, 289 (1971). Back then, the requisites for justiciability of an action for declaratory relief were the following: "an actual controversy, or the ripening of one, exists between parties all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a practical, help in ending the controversy."

^[63] City of Lapu-lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Phil. 473, 513 (2014). Accordingly, the statement in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council (646 Phil. 452, 482 [2010]), that "[w]ithout any justiciable controversy, the [petitions become] pleas for declaratory relief" is inaccurate.

^[64] J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary (2003 ed.), p. 924.

^[65] Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p. 148.

^[66] Borchard (1918), The Declaratory Judgment – A Needed Procedural Reform, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 28(1), p. 18.

^[67] Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Palomar, supra note 57, at 773.

^[68] International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. University of the Philippines, 277 Phil. 636, 652 (1991).

^[69] J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary (2003 ed.), p. 924.

^[70] Ponencia, p. 14.

^[71] Id.

^[72] 506 Phil. 1 (2005).

^[73] Id. at 109, 111-112.

^[74] Republic Act No. 7581, Sec. 5(2).

^[75] Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, supra at 113.

^[76] 17 Phil. 206 (1910).

^[77] Id. at 208.

^[78] 420 Phil. 524 (2001).

^[79] Id. at 530-531.

^[80] Spouses Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749, 755 (2002).