EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 211089, July 11, 2023 ]
SPOUSES DR. JOHN O. MALIGA AND ANNIELYN DELA CRUZ MALIGA, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES ABRAHIM N. TINGAO AND BAI SHOR TINGAO, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 211135]
SPOUSES DR. JOHN O. MALIGA AND ANNIELYN DELA CRUZ MALIGA, PETITIONERS, VS. DIMASURANG UNTE, JR., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
ZALAMEDA, J.:
The Case
Before the Court are consolidated Petitions[1] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Order[2] dated 08 July 2013 and Order[3] dated 13 December 2013 of the 5th Shari'a District Court (SDC), Cotabato City, in the consolidated cases for Accounting, Restitution or Reimbursement with Damages and Attorney's Fees (Complaint), docketed as SDC Civil Case No. 2013-187 and SDC Civil Case No. 2013-188.
Antecedents
Between February 2009 and October 2012, petitioner Annielyn Dela Cruz Maliga (Annielyn) obtained a series of loans from respondent Dimasurang Unte, Jr. (Unte). The verbal contract of loan was initially for P110,000.00, with a monthly interest of 15%. The proceeds of the loan received by Annielyn was P93,000.00 after Unte deducted the first monthly interest of 15% in advance. Thereafter, Annielyn obtained further loans from Unte. Even as Unte increased the interest to 25% per month, Annielyn continued to pay until she could no longer do so even the interest. Despite Annielyn's predicament, Unte continued to demand payments from her.[4]
In 2009, Annielyn also obtained a loan from respondent spouses Abrahim N. Tingao and Bai Shor Tingao (Spouses Tingao). The verbal loan transaction was for P330,000.00 with an agreed monthly interest rate of 10%. Spouses Tingao released the proceeds of the loan after deducting the advance interest for one month amounting to P33,000.00. Annielyn tried her best to religiously pay the interest on said loan.[5]
Sometime in early 2013, however, petitioner Dr. John O. Maliga (Dr. Maliga), Annielyn's husband, discovered the alleged usurious loan transactions of his wife. Dr. Maliga also learned that Annielyn had been using his personal checks and the checks of his pharmacy to pay the loans to Unte and Spouses Tingao (collectively, respondents).[6]
By Dr. Maliga's computation, Annielyn's total payments to Unte had already reached P8,660,250.00 for interests alone, despite the principal amount of her loan being only P1,965.000.00.[7] On the other hand, Annielyn's payments to Spouses Tingao had supposedly reached the amount of P1,452,000.00 on interest alone.[8]
Dr. Maliga thus asked his wife to stop paying Unte and Spouses Tingao. However, respondents continued to demand payments from Dr. Maliga and Annielyn (collectively, petitioners), prompting them to file separate complaints before the SDC against respondents.[9] Petitioners prayed, in the main, for the extinguishment of the loans contracted by Annielyn, as well as the refund or restitution by respondents of all excess payments she had made.[10]
Unte filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] SDC Civil Case No. 2013-187. He argued that the subject of the complaint was a verbal contract of loan involving the amount of more than P500.00, which called for the application of the Statute of Frauds under the New Civil Code. Hence, the regular courts, not the SDC, have jurisdiction over the complaint.[12]
Ruling of the SDC
Initially, the SDC issued an Order[13] dated 08 July 2013, dismissing the complaint in SDC Civil Case No. 2013-187. The court agreed with Unte that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it involves the application of Act No. 2655[14] or the Usury Law. The SDC held that while a motion to dismiss is disallowed under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, the same admits of an exception, such as when it is palpable that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as in this case. Also, while the parties are Muslims, the transactions involved lending on usury or interest (riba), which is prohibited under the Shari'a.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[16] However, the resolution of the motion was held in abeyance as petitioners and Unte tried to amicably settle their dispute. After settlement efforts fell through, the parties jointly moved for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, Spouses Tingao filed their own Motion to Dismiss[17] in SDC Civil Case No. 2013-188, essentially raising the same argument as Unte.
Acting on the incidents, the SDC issued the now assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration in the first case, Civil Case No. 2013-187, is DENIED. The complaint in the second case, Civil Case No. 2013-188, is DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling before the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The SDC ruled that, since the parties are Muslims, they may invoke Article 143(2)(b)[19] of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1083,[20] or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. However, the SDC ratiocinated that, while the contract was lending on usury or interest, a prohibited act under the Shari'a or Muslim laws, Annielyn and respondents nevertheless agreed on the same; hence, the agreement binds them. Corollarily, unlike the New Civil Code, PD 1083 has no provision regarding transactions involving payment of interest and the issue must thus be resolved under the Usury Law, the Civil Code, and other special laws by the civil courts, not by the SDC.[21]
Consequently, petitioners filed the instant consolidated petitions before this Court.
Issue
For the Court's resolution is whether or not the SDC correctly dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling of the Court
The Court GRANTS the Petition.
Petitioners bewail the abrupt dismissal of their complaints, contending that the SDC palpably erred in concluding that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints because of the lack of applicable law under PD 1083 to adjudicate the consequences of the usurious nature of the transactions between the parties.
We agree with petitioners.
Jurisdiction of the court is conferred by law and is determined from the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought |
Jurisdiction is the power of a court, tribunal, or officer to hear, try, and decide a case.[22] It is conferred by law. Absent a statutory grant, the actions, representations, declarations, or omissions of a party will not serve to vest jurisdiction over the subject matter in a court, board, or officer.[23]
In Foronda-Crystal v. Lawas Son,[24] the Court categorically stated that:
In law, nothing is as elementary as the concept of jurisdiction, for the same is the foundation upon which the courts exercise their power of adjudication, and without which, no rights or obligation could emanate from any decision or resolution.[25]
It is settled that to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. The nature of an action, and which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations in the complaint, regardless if the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are controlling.[26] "Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of their claims."[27]
Jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts
Matters over which Shari'a District Courts have original jurisdiction were enumerated in PD 1083.[28] Art. 143 thereof provides:
Article 143. Original jurisdiction.
(1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;
x x x x
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.[29]
Notably, with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 11054,[30] otherwise known as the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, those actions where the SDC had concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts have already been considered as within the exclusive and. original jurisdiction of the SDCs in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, Section 6, Article X of said RA provides:
Section 6. Jurisdiction of the Shari'ah District Courts. - The Shari'ah District Courts in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases where either or both are Muslims: Provided, That the non-Muslim party voluntarily submits to its jurisdiction:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, and paternity and filiation arising under Presidential Decree No. 1083;
x x x x
(d) All actions arising from customary and Shari'ah compliant contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they failed to specify the law governing their relations;
x x x x
(f) Petition for the constitution of a family home, change of name, and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(g) All other personal and real actions not falling under the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Circuit Courts wherein the parties involved are Muslims, except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court;
(h) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims residing in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslim and is located in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region;
(i) All civil actions under Shari'ah law enacted by the Parliament involving real property in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region where the assessed value of the property exceeds Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00); and
(j) All civil actions, if they have not specified in the agreement which law shall govern their relations where the demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
Generally, jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the commencement of the action, unless a statute provides for retroactive application.[31] Once jurisdiction attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated.[32] Since this case was filed prior to the effectivity of RA 11054 on 10 August 2018,[33] and RA 11054 did not provide for retroactive application, PD 1083 remains to be the applicable law of this case insofar as jurisdiction is concerned.
| The SDC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint |
Under Art. 143(1) of PD 1083 the SDC has original jurisdiction over the complaint if it is sufficiently alleged that: (1) the action arose from a customary contract; (2) the parties are Muslims; and (3) the parties have not specified which law shall govern their relations:
As to actions not involving customary contracts, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 provides that these may still be adjudicated by SDCs provided that the parties are Muslims. Thus, the SDC may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the civil court when the following conditions are met: (1) the complaint is a personal or real action, but not one for forcible entry or unlawful detainer; (2) the parties are Muslims; and (3) the action does not fall under Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083.[34]
In effect, Art. 143(2)(b) of PD 1083 acts as a catch-all provision that primarily hinges jurisdiction on the parties involved, and does not limit the jurisdiction of SDCs to specific kinds of action. Thus, regardless of the subject matter of the action, the SDC may exercise jurisdiction so long as the parties are Muslims.
The ruling in The Municipality of Tangkal, Lanao Del Norte v. Judge Balindong[35] is instructive:
The matters over which Shari'a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent 'with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.[36] (Citations omitted)
The concurrent jurisdiction of the SDC has practical and legal implications. First, it means that the plaintiff has a choice of forum between the SDCs or the regular civil courts, provided that both or all parties are Muslims.
Second, once a party exercises his or her choice of forum and files an action, such court shall retain jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.[37] This is also known as the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction.[38]
Thus, once acquired, jurisdiction operates to exclude all other courts with concurrent jurisdiction from acting on the same case until a decision is finally rendered and executed. As held by the Court in Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindong,[39] "a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment."[40]
Third, so long as the jurisdictional requirements are met, the SDC may adjudicate cases ordinarily cognizable by regular courts. These include cases where the applicable law may not be found in PD 1083, such as, for instance, an ordinary action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land.[41] In Villagracia v. Fifth Sharia District Court,[42] the Court, in discussing the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDC, stated that the latter, if found to have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, may apply laws of general application like the Civil Code, thus:
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari'a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari'a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.[43]
Similarly, in this case, the supposed lack of applicable provision on interest under PD 1083 per se does not deprive the SDC of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Despite being courts of limited jurisdiction,[44] SDCs are expected to have the same proficiencies and competencies as regular courts. In fact, Article 140 of PD 1083 provides that "[n]o person shall be appointed Shari'a District judge unless, in addition to the qualifications for judges of Courts of First Instance [now Regional Trial Courts] fixed in the Judiciary Law, he [or she] is learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence." This requirement was retained in RA 6734,[45] and likewise, in RA 9054.[46] More recently, RA 11054[47] laid down specific qualifications for SDC judges within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, which are substantially similar to those for Regional Trial Court judges, i.e., Philippine Bar membership with at least ten (10) years of law practice.[48] The law only imposed the additional qualification of completing at least two years of Shari'a or Islamic Jurisprudence.[49]
Thus, in addition to their specific expertise on Muslim law and customary law, the SDCs are equipped with the same capabilities as regular courts. By including a catchall provision on all personal and real actions, the law dearly intended the SDCs to be self-sufficient adjudicatory bodies able to effectively resolve any dispute between and among Muslims. This policy direction is further amplified in RA 11054, which, as mentioned, already vested SDCs with exclusive original jurisdiction over all other personal and real actions involving Muslims.
Notably, the goal of further empowering SDCs was extensively discussed during the 1st National Shari'ah Summit, which was aptly entitled "Forging the Role of Shari'ah in the National Legal Framework." As emphasized by Chief Justice Gesmundo, through the Court's Strategic Plan for Judicial Innovations (SPJI) 2022-2027, the Court endeavors to strengthen the Sharia'ah justice system, not only in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, but also in other areas where members of the Muslim population reside. Thus, further studies will be conducted on the expansion of the mandate of Shari'ah courts, such as the inclusion of both criminal and commercial cases, and the overall performance of the Sharia'ah justice system. The Court will also identify the strengths and weaknesses in various aspects of the Sharia'ah justice system that promote or hinder their efficiency or effectiveness. As further clarified by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Chairperson of the Committee on Access to Justice in Underserved Areas and of the Technical Working Group on Shari'ah, the SPJI includes reforms on the Shari'ah as well as its rules of procedure. The 1st National Shari'ah Summit is only an initial engagement. The Court has a series of programs all aimed at supporting the Shari'ah justice system. These ongoing efforts are consistent with the Court's treatment of SDCs in this ruling.
Circling back to this case, the Court is not in a position to rule whether the contracts in dispute may be considered customary. The records are insufficient to arrive at a definitive ruling on this point. Beyond the instances provided for in the Muslim Code, the applicable Muslim law or ' da is a question of fact.[50]
Here, the parties have yet to present evidence as the assailed ruling involves a resolution of a motion to dismiss. Thus, it would be premature to determine whether the contracts are customary.
Moreover, We are of the view that this is a matter that should first be resolved by the Shari'a courts. Even Muslim scholars have various ways of treating customs as a source of Islamic law. Hence, the Court is ill-equipped to define customary contracts considering the Court's limited viewpoint.
Indeed, if the Court were to truly empower SDCs, our jurisprudence on the scope of customary contracts must organically originate from them. This is a part of the Moros' right to self-determination, i.e., to shape their own laws and jurisprudence without the Court imposing our own perspectives even before the SDCs have been given a chance to rule on the issue.
In any event, a perusal of both complaints shows that petitioners sufficiently alleged a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the SDC. The complaints aver that the subject transactions both involve contracts of loan with interest. Petitioners prayed, inter alia, for the extinguishment of the loans contracted by Annielyn and the refund or restitution by respondents of all overpayments.[51] Thus, the case is a personal action as it is founded on privity of contracts and seeks the recovery of personal property.[52] Neither complaint is for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Moreover, the complaints allege that petitioners and respondents are Muslims, which satisfies the requirement in Article 144(2)(6) of PD 1083.
Clearly, the SDC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners' complaints.
The SDC erred in shirking from its responsibility to hear and decide the case based on the perceived absence of applicable Muslim law on the subject controversy |
With the foregoing, the Court finds that the SDC gravely erred in ruling that it is devoid of jurisdiction to hear the cases at bar merely for lack of an applicable provision under PD 1083 to specifically resolve the controversy between the parties, thus:
The parties in the above entitled cases clearly entered into contracts of loan with agreed interest rates. Unlike the Civil Code where there are provisions that govern transactions involving payment of interest, Presidential Decree [No. 1083,] the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[,] does not contain any provision regarding any transaction/contract involving payment of interests. Laws on the matter have yet to be codified and incorporated in the present Muslim Code via an amendment to the same.[53]
As earlier discussed, jurisdiction, once acquired, is retained until the end of litigation. The applicable law or the validity of the contract at issue is immaterial. They do not bear on the issue of jurisdiction, much less divest the SDC of the same. PD 1083 does not limit the SDC's jurisdiction to actions involving the application of this law's provisions. On the contrary, the catchall provision grants SDCs jurisdiction over nearly all personal and real actions between Muslims. Thus, even assuming that the case would require the application of certain civil law concepts and other special laws, the dispute must still be resolved by the SDC.
It is also notable that the SDC contradicted itself in ruling that there is no applicable Muslim law yet emphasizing that the transactions are prohibited under the Shari'a. The supposed prohibition evinces the existence of an applicable Muslim law.
Indeed, that there is no applicable provision in PD 1083 does not mean there is no relevant Muslim law to settle the dispute. The SDC failed to consider that PD 1083 only codified Muslim personal laws, i.e., laws applicable to personal and family matters such as civil personality, marriage and divorce, paternity and filiation, parental authority, support, and succession.[54] This, therefore, explains the obvious lack of a particular provision, not only on payment of interest on loan transactions, but also of other laws governing transactions between one Muslim and another Muslim outside of the family. In fact, it is also possible for parties to point to a relevant Muslim law, not expressly stated in PD 1083, which must be proved in evidence as a fact. Article 5 of PD 1083 recognizes this, to wit:
ARTICLE 5. Proof of Muslim law and ' da. - Muslim law and ' da not embodied in this Code shall be proven in evidence as a fact. No ' da which is contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, this Code, Muslim law, public order, public policy or public interest shall be given any legal effect. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the parties have yet to undergo pre-trial and adduce evidence on the applicable law, it was premature for the SDC to peremptorily rule that Muslim law prohibits the transactions. The existence of such prohibition and its effect on Annielyn's ability to recover overpayments are questions of fact for which evidence must be received. As held by the Court in Mangondaya v. Ampaso[55] the questions whether the customary law or ' da exists and whether it applies to the parties' situation are questions of fact.[56]
In the same case, the Court also found error on the part of the SDC when it summarily dismissed the case based only on the contents of the complaint and answer. In the order assailed therein, the SDC premised the dismissal on laches, prescription, and the invoked ' da's supposed contravention of the Constitution, laws, and public policy. The Court ruled, thus:
Indeed, it was erroneous for the SDC to peremptorily conclude, on the basis of the parties' pleadings and their attachments, that petitioner failed to prove his claim over the land, that prescription and laches have set in, and that the ' da, assuming it exists, is contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy. Had the SDC proceeded with the pre-trial and trial of the case, the parties would have had the opportunity to define and clarify the issues and matters to be resolved, present all their available evidence, both documentary and testimonial, and cross-examine, test and dispel each other's evidence. The SDC would, in turn, have the opportunity to carefully weigh, evaluate, and scrutinize them and have such sufficient evidence on which to anchor its factual findings. What appears to have happened though is a cursory determination of facts and termination of the case without the conduct of full-blown proceedings before the SDC. We affirm the following observation on the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts:
When the plaintiff has evidence to prove his claim, and the defendant desires to offer defense, trial on the merits becomes necessary. The parties then will prove their respective claims and defenses by the introduction of testimonial (shuhud) and other evidence (bayyina). The statements of witnesses submitted at the pre-trial by the parties shall constitute the direct testimony as the basis for cross-examination.
In view of the foregoing, we remand the case to the SDC for the conduct of pre-trial and further proceedings for the reception of evidence in order for it to thoroughly examine the claims and defenses of the parties, their respective evidence and make its conclusions after trial on the merits. (Emphasis supplied.)
We arrive at the same conclusion here. Further proceedings are necessary to thresh out the applicable law, the validity and enforceability of the contracts, as well to determine whether respondents are liable for the alleged excess payments. It was therefore erroneous to dismiss the case based merely on a perceived lack of applicable Muslim law.
As aptly observed by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, petitioners invoked the Last Sermon in praying for a reimbursement of their alleged excess payments to respondents.[57] In this Last Sermon, Prophet Muhammad (image supposed to be here) said "Allah (image supposed to be here) has forbidden you to take usury, therefore all interest obligation shall henceforth be waived. Your capital is yours to keep. You will neither inflict nor suffer any inequality. Allah (image supposed to be here) has judged that there shall be no interest and that all interest due to Abbas Ibn 'Aal-Muttalib be waived."[58] Moreover, in proscribing riba, the Qur'an mentions:
(image supposed to be here)
"O believers! Do not consume interest, multiplying it many times over. And be mindful of All, so you may prosper. " (Al-Qur'an 3:130)
At this stage, it is premature to adjudicate the applicability of the cited doctrines. However, the SDC should have granted petitioners the opportunity to present evidence on the invoked Last Sermon and to argue its relevance to their case, As also emphasized by Justice Dimaampao, "the grounds relied upon by petitioners call for the application of a specialized knowledge in the field of Shari'ah which judges of conventional civil courts are not equipped with." This required expertise supports the continued exercise of jurisdiction by the SDC.
Lastly, even assuming that the transactions are prohibited under Muslim law or the contracts are unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, the cases should still be adjudicated by the SDC. The SDC's acquisition of jurisdiction is not dependent on the merits of petitioners' complaints but on the allegations therein. Since the requisites for the SDC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint were sufficiently alleged by petitioners, the SDC must hear and decide the consolidated cases, regardless of whether or not petitioners can ultimately prove their causes of action since jurisdiction remains vested irrespective of whether petitioners are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[59]
From the foregoing, the Court finds that the SDC erred in dismissing the complaints below for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, a remand is in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated Petitions are GRANTED. The Order dated 13 December 2013 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The consolidated cases are REMANDED to the court of origin for continuation of proceedings. The 5th Shari'ah District Court, Cotabato City, is DIRECTED to hear the consolidated cases with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., and Dimaampao, J., see separate concurring opinion.
[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 211135, pp. 4-17.
[2] Id. at 96; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong.
[3] G.R. No. 211089, pp. 41-42; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G. Balindong.
[4] G.R. No. 211135, pp. 21-30.
[5] G.R. No. 211089, pp. 21-22.
[6] Id. at 22.
[7] G.R. No. 211135, pp. 22-31.
[8] G.R. No. 211089, pp. 23-24.
[9] Id. at 22-23.
[10] Id. at 24-25.
[11] G.R. No. 211135, pp. 77-81.
[12] Id. at 77-80.
[13] Id. at 91.
[14] Entitled "AN ACT FIXING RATES OF INTEREST UPON LOANS AND DECLARING THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING OR TAKING USURIOUS RATES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Enacted: 24 February 1916.
[15] G.R. No. 211135, p. 91.
[16] G.R. No. 211089, pp. 41-42.
[17] Id. at 29-33.
[18] Id. at 42.
[19] All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court.
[20] Entitled: "A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Dated: 04 February 1977.
[21] G.R. No. 211089, p. 41.
[22] Victoria Manufacturing Corporation Employees Union v. Victoria Manufacturing Corporation, 857 Phil. 673, 680 (2019).
[23] Id. at 683.
[24] 821 Phil. 1033 (2017).
[25] Id. at 1037.
[26] See Padlan v. Dinglasan, 707 Phil. 83, 91 (2013); Emphasis supplied.
[27] Id.
[28] See The Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte v. Judge Balindong, 803 Phil. 207, 215 (2017).
[29] Id. at 215. Emphases supplied.
[30] Entitled: "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIC LAW FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734, ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO," AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9054, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO" Approved: 27 July 2018.
[31] Baritua v. Mercader, 402 Phil. 932, 945 (2001).
[32] Id.
[33] See Dimapanat v. Hataman, G.R. No. 228726, 19 July 2022.
[34] Entitled: "A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Dated: 04 February 1977.
[35] Supra note 27.
[36] Id. at 215-216.
[37] Sumawang v. Engr. De Guzman, 481 Phil. 239, 245-246 (2004).
[38] See The Wellex Group, Inc. v. Sheriff Urieta, 785 Phil. 594, 633 (2016).
[39] 672 Phil. 398 (2011).
[40] Id. at 407.
[41] See The Municipality of Tangkal, Lanao Del Norte v. Judge Balindong, supra note 27; Mangondaya v. Ampaso, 828 Phil. 592 (2018).
[42] 734 Phil. 239 (2014).
[43] Id. at 255.
[44] PD 1083, Sec. 137.
[45] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, Republic Act No. 6734 (1989). Art. IX, Sec. 13, reads:
SECTION 13. The Shari'ah District Courts and the Shari'ah Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein. The judges of the Shari'ah courts shall have the same qualifications as the judges of the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts as the case may be. In addition, they must be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence.
[46] AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734, ENTITLED 'AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO', As AMENDED. Republic Act No. 9054 (2001). Art. VIII, Sec. 18, reads:
SECTION 18. Shari'ah Courts. - The Shari'ah district courts and the Shari'ah circuit courts created under existing law shall continue to function as provided therein. The judges of the Shari'ah courts shall have the same qualifications as the judges of the regional trial courts, the metropolitan trial courts or the municipal trial courts, as the case may be. In addition, they must be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence.
[47] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIC LAW FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734, ENTITLED 'AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO', AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9054, ENTITLED 'AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO.'"
[48] RA 11054, Article X, Sec. 8 (b).
[49] Id.
[50] PD 1083, Art. 5.
[51] G.R. No. 211135, pp. 32-33; G.R. No. 211089, pp. 24-25.
[52] Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, 628 Phil. 252, 262 (2010).
[53] G.R. No. 211089, p. 41.
[54] ARTICLE 7. Definition of terms. - Unless the context otherwise provides:
x x x x
(i) "Muslim Personal Law" includes all laws relating to personal status, marriage and divorce, matrimonial and family relations, succession and inheritance, and property relations between spouses and provided for in this Code.
[55] 828 Phil. 592 (2018).
[56] Id. at 601.
[57] See Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Dimaampao, p. 4.
[58] Id. at 3-4.
[59] See supra note 26, at 91-93.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I commend the ponencia and all the members of the Banc, through Chief Justice Alexander Gesmundo's leadership, for its efforts in strengthening the shari'ah[1] justice system as part of the national legal framework.
This Court ought to revisit its interpretations of Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Muslim Code), and its intended inclusivity when it recognized the Islamic legal system as part of the law of the land. Statutes enacted after the Muslim Code recognizing the Moros' right to self-determination underscore how limited the Muslim Code's scope is in its express codification of a vast legal system it supposedly recognized. "While called shari'a courts in our jurisdiction, they primarily interpret personal and family laws only, which is but one aspect of shari'a."[2] This case presents a unique opportunity to rectify the exclusion of shari'ah as part of the legal framework of our State, starting from a fundamental principle in our justice system, the court's jurisdiction.
The Muslim Code was ambiguous regarding the shari'ah courts' jurisdiction on other aspects of Islamic law that were not expressly codified. Here, what constitutes "customary contracts" were not clearly defined in the law. With the constitutional guarantee[3] and consistent congressional intent,[4] I submit that this Court may interpret the jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts in Article 143(1)(d) of the Muslim Code on customary contracts as exclusive and original on all actions arising from contracts between Muslim parties who did not stipulate on which law shall govern their relations, to the exclusion of civil courts. This is in due recognition of the shari'ah judges' expertise to resolve matters requiring the application of Islamic laws, over which judges assigned in courts of general jurisdiction have no competence, and to give life to the Muslim Code provisions on adopting shari'ah as part of the law of the land.
I
The ponencia ruled that the Muslim Code applies here since the complaint was filed in 2013, before Republic Act No. 11054's effectivity.[5] While I agree to a certain extent, I opine that this requires judicial construction, and a more circumspect review.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or a statute. It is determined in the material allegations in the complaint and character of relief sought, whether the plaintiff is entitled to their claims.[6]
Generally, the law at the time of the filing of the action determines the subject matter jurisdiction.[7] Statutes "altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied to cases already pending prior to their enactment,"[8] as the court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy. An exception to this rule is when a retroactive application is expressly stated in the law, "or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment."[9]
Another exception to the non-retroactivity of the effect of an amendment is when the statute is curative in nature. These are statutes that rectify "defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements."[10]
As there is ambiguity in the laws on jurisdiction, a review of statutes creating the shari'ah courts and the Bangsamoro Justice System is necessary to determine the nature of jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 does not define the jurisdiction of shari'ah courts. Instead, it refers to the creation of shari'ah courts under the Muslim Code and provides for their inclusion in appropriations.[11]
On February 4, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws" (Muslim Code) was enacted "to promote the advancement and effective participation" of Muslim Filipinos in national government. In the formulation and implementation of State policies, their customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests were finally considered.[12] After many years of struggling against the hegemony of civil and common law traditions brought by our colonizers, and the complete neglect of the unique cultural and historical heritage of the Moros who had their sophisticated system of governance, Congress recognized that Moros' legal system, along with their primary sources of law,[13] form part of the laws of the land. To stress, explicitly included in this recognition are the primary sources of shari'ah (Muslim law), the standard treatises and works on shari'ah and jurisprudence (fiqh), and the four Muslim schools of law (madhhab), namely the Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i.[14]
Despite the Muslim Code's noble purpose of making Islamic institutions more effective, only a portion of the otherwise comprehensive system of shari'ah was expressly codified. It covered personal law defined as "personal status, marriage and divorce, matrimonial and family relations, succession and inheritance, and property relations between spouses[.]"[15] It created courts of limited jurisdiction, as well as the shari'a circuit courts and the shari'a district courts under the Supreme Court's administrative supervision,[16] and conferred the courts' scope of jurisdiction.
Article 143 of the Muslim Code defines the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of shari'ah district courts:
Article 143. Original jurisdiction. - (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims. (Emphasis supplied)
The Muslim Code is not the only law that prescribes the jurisdiction of shari'ah courts. I submit that An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) or Republic Act No. 6734, its subsequent amendment in Republic Act No. 9054, and both laws' subsequent repeal in Republic Act No. 11054 are relevant in determining the nature of jurisdiction of shari'a courts.
On August 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6734, the first law providing for the Organic Act for the ARMM was enacted. It established ARMM as "truly reflective of their ideals and aspirations within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty, as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."[17] It provided basic regional government[18] identified provinces voting in favor of their inclusion in a plebiscite.[19]
The grant of powers to the regional government in the ARMM was under the scheme of devolution from the national government through the regional assembly, the regional governor, and the special courts created by the law.[20] Republic Act No. 6734 considers ARMM as a corporate entity with "powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the departments of the National Government,"[21] but removed certain powers such as foreign affairs, national defense, and administration of justice, among others. It created the Shari'ah Appellate Court, and prescribed its jurisdiction, its composition, and the qualification of its members.[22] Significantly, the law affirmed the jurisdiction of shari'a courts under the Muslim Code.[23]
On March 31, 2001, Republic Act No. 9054 amended Republic Act No. 6734, expanding the ARMM and its regional powers. On the administration of justice, the law directs that whenever feasible at least one justice of the Supreme Court and two justices of the Court of Appeals from the autonomous region shall be appointed through the recommendations of the Regional Governor after proper consultations.[24] The Office of the Deputy Court Administrator for ARMM[25] and the Shari'ah Public Assistance Office[26] were also created under the law.
Republic Act No. 9054 recognized the need to ensure mutual respect and protect the "beliefs, customs, and traditions of the people in the autonomous region."[27] The Regional Assembly was directed to formulate the Shari'ah Legal System. Significantly, the law also directed the expansion of the jurisdiction of shari'a courts to not only include personal, family, and property relations, but also commercial transactions and criminal acts involving Muslims:
Section 5. Customs, Traditions, Religious Freedom Guaranteed. The beliefs, customs, and traditions of the people in the autonomous region and the free exercise of their religions as Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, or any other religious denomination in the said region are hereby recognized, protected and guaranteed.
The Regional Assembly shall adopt measures to ensure mutual respect for and protection of the distinct beliefs, customs, and traditions and the respective religions of the inhabitants thereof, be they Muslims, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, or any other religious denomination. The Regional Assembly, in consultation with the Supreme Court and consistent with the Constitution may formulate a Shari'ah legal system including the criminal cases which shall be applicable in the region, only to Muslims or those who profess the Islamic faith. The representation of the regional government in the various central government or national government bodies as provided for by Article V, Section 5 shall be effected upon approval of the measures herein provided.
The Shari ah courts shall have jurisdiction over cases involving personal, family and property relations, and commercial transactions, in addition to their jurisdiction over criminal cases involving Muslims.
The Regional Assembly shall, in consultation with the Supreme Court, determine the number and specify the details of the jurisdiction of these courts.
No person in the autonomous region shall be subjected to any form of discrimination on account of creed, religion, ethnic origin, parentage or sex.
The regional government shall ensure the development, protection, and well-being of all indigenous tribal communities. Priority legislation in this regard shall be enacted for the benefit of those tribes that are in danger of extinction as determined by the Southern Philippines Cultural Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provision of Republic Act No. 9054 is an express recognition of the scope of shari'ah courts which includes commercial transactions and criminal cases involving Muslims. While the details of this jurisdiction was only enacted 17 years later on July 27, 2018 in Republic Act No. 11054, or the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), this Court should not ignore this express directive from the Congress as a clear manifestation of its intent to modify the jurisdiction of shari'ah courts.
Espousing the Moros' right to self-determination, Republic Act No. 11054, more widely known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law, changed the system of devolution of regional government structure under Republic Act No. 6734 as amended, to a system of self-governance.[28] It repealed the former organic act and its amendments.[29] ARMM evolved from a corporate entity with limited devolved powers to BARMM, a political entity with the right to self-governance in its pursuit of "political, economic, social, and cultural development" under the Bangsamoro Organic Law.[30] It significantly expanded the powers of the Bangsamoro government,[31] and established the Bangsamoro Justice System founded on shari'ah for the Muslim and tribal laws of indigenous people in BARMM:
SECTION 1. Justice System in the Bangsamoro. - The Bangsamoro justice system shall be administered in accordance with the unique cultural and historical heritage of the Bangsamoro.
The dispensation of justice in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall be in consonance with the Constitution, Shari ah, traditional or tribal laws, and other relevant laws.
Shari ah or Islamic law forms part of the Islamic tradition derived from religious precepts of Islam, particularly the Qur'an and Sunnah.
Shari ah shall apply exclusively to cases involving Muslims. Where a case involves a non-Muslim, Shari'ah law may apply only if the non-Muslim voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah court.
The traditional or tribal laws shall be applicable to indigenous peoples within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.
The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the rights of non-Muslims and nonindigenous peoples.[32]
Under the Bangsamoro Organic Law, the jurisdiction of Shari'ah Circuit and District Courts were also amended:[33]
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. - (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and filiation arising under this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of the Shari'ah District Courts. - The Shari'ah District Courts in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases where either or both are Muslims: Provided, That the non-Muslim party voluntarily submits to its jurisdiction:
ARTICLE 155. Jurisdiction. - The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Circuit Courts. - The Shari'ah Circuit Courts in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases where either or both parties are Muslims: Provided, That the non-Muslim party voluntarily submits to its jurisdiction:
(a) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under Presidential Decree No. 1083, where the act or omission has been committed in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region;
(b) All civil actions and proceedings between parties residing in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region who are Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, involving disputes relating to:
Marriage;
Divorce;
Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
Customary dower or mahr;
Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts; and
Restitution of marital rights.
(c) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties;
(d) All cases involving ta'zir offenses defined and punishable under Shari'ah law enacted by the Parliament punishable by arresto menor or the corresponding fine, or both;
(e) All civil actions under Shari ah law enacted by the Parliament involving real property in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (PHP 400,000.00); and
(f) All civil actions, if they have not specified in an agreement which law shall govern their relations, where the demand or claim does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (PHP 200,000.00).
Notably, the Bangsamoro Organic Law removed the concurrent jurisdiction of existing civil courts under Article 143, paragraph 2 of the Muslim Code, and placed all these actions within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Shari'ah District Courts. This includes "all other personal and real actions not falling under the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Circuit Courts wherein the parties involved are Muslims," except forcible entry and unlawful detainer.[34]
The Bangsamoro Organic Law expanded the Shari'ah District Courts' exclusive and original jurisdiction on all actions arising from any customary contracts under the Muslim Code to expressly include "Shari'ah compliant contracts" between Muslim parties who have not specified the law governing their relations. The law also recognized the power of BARMM's legislative department, its Parliament, to enact laws governing civil, commercial, and criminal matters which are not provided for under the Muslim Code.[35]
Considering these developments, it may be inaccurate to state that only the Muslim Code or Presidential Decree No. 1083 applies in the determination of jurisdiction of Shari'ah District Courts. The legislative history in the various amendments, repeal, and enactment of the present Bangsamoro Organic Law reflects the strong desire of Congress to carry out the policy of inclusivity that was first enunciated in Presidential Decree No. 1083. In the formulation and implementation of policies, the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of the Muslims and indigenous peoples in Mindanao must be considered.[36]
Here, the ponencia discussed the subject matter of the complaint in relation to the scope of jurisdiction of Shari'ah District Court. It stated that the customary nature of the contract between the parties is irrelevant in determining jurisdiction because the records are insufficient to make a determinative ruling on the issue.[37] In any case, it resorted to the catchall provision under Article 143(2)(6) of the Muslim Code in finding the concurrent jurisdiction of shari'a with civil courts, considering that the parties are all Muslims, and that the allegations in the complaint constitute a personal action for the recovery of monies.[38] In ruling so, the ponencia gave importance to the plaintiff's choice on the forum. Since petitioners filed the action before the Shari'ah District Court, the ponente upheld its concurrent jurisdiction, which continues until the full disposition of the case.
I humbly propose that a different approach be employed when applying Article 143(1)(d) on customary contracts and determining whether the loan contracts involved fall under it. The ambiguity in the law must first be recognized, since "customary contracts" were not clearly defined in the law and may admit of an expansive definition.
While there is basis to resort to the catch all concurrent jurisdiction of shari'a courts under Article 143(2)(6) of the Muslim Code, I submit that at the core of jurisdiction is competence, or the ability of courts to resolve disputes presented before them. This is founded on the knowledge of the applicable law, the manner of construing and interpreting its provisions, and their application based on the factual antecedents and the evidence presented before them. Congress will not confer jurisdiction to courts mandating them to resolve cases outside of its competence.
In addition to recognizing the historical injustice on the narratives of the Moros and the unique cultural and historical heritage of the Bangsamoro, knowledge of Islamic law (shari'ah) and jurisprudence (fiqh) are necessary to resolve cases requiring the application of shari'ah in disputes involving Muslim parties. In my view, courts should avoid a literal construction of the provisions of the law conferring concurrent jurisdiction to regular courts that have no competence to resolve the cases entailing the application of Islamic laws. Courts of general jurisdiction have no competence in resolving shari'ah disputes as regular judges are not learned in Muslim law, as much as shari'ah judges are trained in laws of general application.
Respectfully, I submit that judicial construction is required in interpreting Article 143(1)(d) of the Muslim Code on what are customary contracts falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts. I propose that this construction consider the historical context of the Moros and the legislative developments after the law that recognized the shari'ah legal system as part of the laws of the land. There has been consistent intent in expanding shariah courts' jurisdiction, which may include deeming customary contracts as a generic, catchall term over which shari'ah courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
Thus, I disagree with the ponencia that "it would be premature to determine whether the contracts are customary."[39] I submit that this is an opportune time to decisively rule on determining what contracts fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts.
II
Generally, when the words in a statute are clear and unequivocal, they must be given their literal meaning without need of interpretation.[40] The Congress deliberately chose the words of the law upon it, fully aware of their meaning. Thus, congressional intent is determined in the language of the law itself.[41] However, when the "true intent of the law is clear ... such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute."[42] Courts should not resort to a literal construction of the law when there is imprecise language that defeats the purpose of the law, or results in absurdity or injustice.[43]
The interpretation that supports the spirit of the law must be followed where its policies prevail.[44] The ambiguity in the law should be construed in relation to the other relevant portions of the law, with the interpretation that best resonates with reason and justice.[45] In exceptional circumstances, when the literal interpretation of the text of the law contradicts its spirit and exposes an apparent omission in the language of the law which should have been included, judicial construction can supply the omission.[46] This is to give effect to the obvious congressional intent and purpose of the law that is "clearly ascertainable from the context."[47]
A discussion of the basic foundations of Islamic law is necessary to distill the legislative intention on what customary contracts mean to determine the nature of the jurisdiction intended for Shari'ah District Courts.
Shari ah is a "divine system of law." To Muslims, Allah (s.w.t.) is the sole authority who revealed Islam and its legal system through Prophet Muhammad. There are four sources of shari'ah: its principal sources from the Qur'an and the Sunnah as recorded in the hadiths, and secondary sources of Ijma or the juristic consensus, and Qiyas, or those derived from analogy;[48] as recognized in the Muslim Code as forming part of the law of the land.[49]
Allah's infallible words in the Qur'an were revealed to Prophet Muhammad, gradually and intermittently, based on the current demands. Knowledge of the context and reason for the revelations are necessary in construing laws from the Qur'an.[50] Aside from religious instructions, the Qur'an contains fundamental principles on the protection of Islamic faith, laws on family life and personal relations, civil and commercial laws, and penal laws.[51] Islam, although with separate laws regulating worship, cannot be divorced from the laws regulating the relationship of persons. Shari'ah encompasses the entirety of a Muslim's life, both as an individual and as a community member.[52] Adherence to shari'ah is a religious duty among Muslims, and it is considered as a personal law of every Muslim. Muslims believe that shari'ah governs them, wherever they may be residing, regardless of local laws.[53]
Interpretations and commentaries on the Qur'an have a complex set of rules which only believers can appreciate.[54] Moreover, there are four major schools of law with varying doctrines on the application of shari'ah: The Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi'i,[55] as likewise recognized under the Muslim Code.[56]
Prophet Muhammad, through his teachings and conduct, also known as the Sunnah, supplied the details and clarified some of the ambiguities in the Qur'an.[57] His companions, their followers, and their subsequent followers, preserved the Prophet's teachings and narrated them in their respective generations. Later, they were compiled in writing. Since the Prophet's traditions were relayed from one person to another, the chain of narrators, or isnad, had to be verified as authentic. Aside from its authenticity, the text of the hadith, or the matn, was also examined to verify its consistency with the Qur'an and other traditions of Prophet Muhammad.[58]
Ijma is the "consensus of opinion" of Muslim jurists (mujtahideen) in a formal assembly where a particular question of law is presented. Agreement to the decision can be expressed through words or actions. Ijma may be proven with continuous notoriety among Muslims.[59] On the other hand, Qiyas, or analogical reasoning, is a process of deduction based on an original subject in the Qur'an, Sunnah, or Ijma, which is extended and applied to a new subject not covered here.[60]
Ada, or customary law, refers to the collective, consistent, accepted, and binding practice of people in a particular place.[61] These are not independent sources of shari'ah but the "force of general usage" is considered when there is no applicable text, and when the customs are not opposed to Islamic teachings.[62] Muslim scholars have various ways of treating customs as a source of Islamic law which continue to evolve with the times.[63] Other scholars treat customs as having the force of contract between the parties, which, even if not stipulated, have suppletory application when no conditions have been stipulated.[64] Customs are extraneous sources of Islamic law.[65] Thus, they are required to be proven in evidence as fact.[66]
At the risk of being repetitive, the Muslim Code or Presidential Decree No. 1083 was enacted to recognize "the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land." It created shari'a courts and defined their jurisdiction for the "effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims." The law has inherent limits in recognizing the entire shari'ah system, and expressly codified a small portion of its laws. In my view, the limited scope of the law does not prevent this Court from reading the purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 1083 created shari'ah courts-to recognize a pluralistic legal system, weave the historical and cultural narrative of the Muslim people in the national consciousness, and provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim laws.[67]
The express codification of only a small portion of shari'ah appears to create an ambiguity in the scope of exclusive and original jurisdiction of shari'a courts, as the Muslim Code has likewise recognized the primary sources of shari'ah. Since only personal laws were codified, the question of whether situations requiring the application of other aspects of Muslim law, especially those from the primary sources of shari'ah, that were not expressly codified are included within their exclusive and original jurisdiction.
There is no express provision in the Muslim Code which defines customary contracts.
The literal meaning of a custom is "a practice that by its common adoption and long, unvarying habit has come to have the force of law."[68] By extension, a customary contract is an agreement based on accepted common practice in a locality. The Muslim Code mentions the following: customary dower (mahr),[69] property relations between spouses,[70] their household properties,[71] offenses against customary law which can be settled without formal trial,[72] customary heirloom,[73] and "[a]ny transaction whereby one person delivers to another any real estate, plantation, orchard or any fruit bearing property by virtue of sanda, sanla, arindao, or similar customary contract[.]"[74] Interestingly, any other customary law not mentioned in the Muslim Code may be proven in evidence as fact.[75]
In my view, customary contracts between Muslim parties under Article 143(1)(d) should not be literally read as to only cover the contracts enumerated in the law, to the exclusion of other contracts governed by the primary sources of shari'ah that the Code recognized. A literal interpretation of customary contracts defeats the purpose of the law in recognizing the entire legal system of Muslims in the Philippines, including the primary sources of Islamic law. Congress could not have intended to remove contracts governed by the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijma, and Qiyas within the exclusive original jurisdiction of shari'a courts, especially since their interpretation and application as to questions of law require knowledge and expertise of Islamic laws, which courts of general jurisdiction do not possess.
In Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court,[76] this Court rationalized the concurrent jurisdiction of shari'a courts with regular civil courts in relation to Article 143(2)(b) stating that Muslim law have no application in "actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims"[77] In the same manner, when the cause of action of Muslim parties is based on Islamic law, courts of general jurisdiction have no competence to resolve these cases. Thus, its resolution falls within the competence of shari'ah judges to the exclusion of other courts.
III
An examination of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for by petitioner show that the complaint requires the application of Islamic law, and thus within the competence of Shari'ah District Courts, to the exclusion of other tribunals.
The facts are simple. Petitioner Annielyn Maliga entered verbal loan contracts with respondent Dimasirang Unte, Jr. and respondent Spouses Abrahim and Bai Shor Tingao, agreeing to a 10% monthly interest on their respective loans. Annielyn received the loan proceeds net of the first monthly interest. She used the income of her husband's clinic to pay for her loans. When he found out about his wife's loans, petitioner John Maliga prevented her from further paying as the principal amounts have already been paid through the supposed interest.
Petitioners filed separate complaints for accounting, restitution, or reimbursement with damages and attorney's fees before the Fifth Shari'ah District Court of Cotabato City. They were seeking the following reliefs: first, the extinguishment of their loan contract based on payment; second, for the accounting of all payments made; and third, for the reimbursement of excess payments of interest, which is prohibited under Muslim law.[78] As basis for the third cause of action, petitioners invoke the last sermon of Prophet Muhammad as follows:
13. Based on the foregoing, there is a necessity that an accounting be made as to the amounts collected and received by defendant spouses from Annielyn and consider the loan incurred extinguished. Furthermore, the total amount of interest which have been paid shall be equitably reduced or totally waived and restituted or reimbursed to herein plaintiffs in accordance with the Prophet Muhammad's (Peace Be Upon Him) words during his last Sermon delivered on the Ninth Day of Dhul Hijah, 10 A.H. In the Uranah Valley of Mount Arafat, pertinent portion of which is instructive and I quote:
"ALLAH has forbidden you to take usury (Interest), therefore all interest obligation shall henceforth be waived. Your capital, however, is yours to keep. You shall neither inflict nor suffer inequity. Allah has Judged that there shall be no interest and that all the interest due to Abbas ibn' Abd'al Muttalib shall henceforth be waived."[79]
Considering the foregoing facts and the reliefs prayed for in their complaint, I agree with the ponencia that the action involved is a personal one. Personal actions seek "to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the defendant,"[80] such as collection of a debt, personal duty, or damages.[81] However, I do not agree that the personal action involved is based on customary contracts as the ponencia implies.[82]
In the Petitions, Spouses Maliga stated that they sought the filing of the complaints before the Shari'a District Court, invoking the Islamic law which "prohibits the increase of capital through usury or interest (riba), whether it is with high or low interest."[83] They contend that the loan contracts were not themselves prohibited. It is only the accessory contracts of interest which are prohibited under the Islamic laws that they are seeking to annul.[84]
Indeed, loan transactions among Muslims are covered in the teachings of the Qur'an. Riba is defined as an increase (fadl) which accrues to a lender of a commodity which has no equivalent return ('iwad) to the other party.[85] Riba is common in loans and sale of goods. The prohibition of riba cannot be construed as a customary law, as it is absolutely prohibited in the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Ijma as "an atrocious sin, and a heinous crime."[86]
Without prejudice to my views on the separation of church and state,[87] as it is not our concern here, the reality is that Presidential Decree No. 1083 or the Muslim Code "recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of the land."[88] The Muslim Code is law that expressly recognized the legal system of a minority. The Qur'an, the primary source of Islamic law, under Surah Al-Baqarah 2:275 provides:
(image supposed to be here)
(Those who devour usury shall not rise except as one rises who is felled by the touch of Satan. That is because they say, "Buying and selling are simply like usury," though God has permitted buying and selling and forbidden usury. One who, after receiving counsel from his Lord, desists shall have what is past and his affair goes to God. And as for those who go back, they are the inhabitants of the Fire, abiding therein.)[89]
Riba is prohibited because it causes various social, moral, and economic harm since the rich benefit at the expense of the poor.[90] Hence, the prohibition on riba is not derived from a custom of general usage, but from a primary source of Islamic law. To stress, a contract with riba cannot be deemed customary.
I likewise agree with the ponencia that the Shari'a District Court should not have rejected its mandate in resolving the question of law which requires the application of Islamic law on the sole reason that there was nothing in the Muslim Code that can be applied.[91] As repeatedly stressed, the law recognized the Muslim legal system, including the sources of shari'ah. While only the personal laws have been codified, the Muslim Code also directed that the construction and interpretation of its provisions should consider the primary sources of Muslim law and give persuasive effect to standard treatises and works on Muslim law and jurisprudence.[92]
Thus, I propose that even if it can be conceded that only the Muslim Code should be considered in the determination of subject matter jurisdiction of Shari'ah District Courts, customary contracts should not be construed based on its literal meaning to exclude the primary sources of shari'ah. Instead, customary contracts can be interpreted to mean as typical contracts entered by Muslims, considering that shari'ah prescribes fundamental laws relating to civil and commercial transactions with others.
In sum, to determine jurisdiction under the Muslim Code, the relevant consideration in contracts between Muslims is whether the parties have agreed to a particular law that will govern their transaction. When the parties did not, as in the case here, the loan contracts fall under Article 143(1)(d), over which the Shari'ah District Court has exclusive and original jurisdiction.
It is difficult to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of civil courts on these types of contracts for which the Qur'an and Sunnah impose religious and therefore, legal obligations for Muslim parties. Regular courts do not have authority and expertise to interpret the words of the Qur'an and the actions of Prophet Muhammad. As fundamental sources of law, the Qur'an and the Sunnah will certainly be difficult to grasp for regular courts of general jurisdiction. While the Muslim Code conferred concurrent jurisdiction with regular courts, the judges' lack of knowledge and understanding of Islamic laws necessarily affects the exercise of jurisdiction and their dispensation of justice. Far from placing courts of general jurisdiction below the level of shari'ah courts, my view on the latter's exclusive jurisdiction on any dispute requiring the application of Islamic law is founded on the competence, knowledge, and ability of a judge to resolve the specific dispute presented before them.
Finally, I likewise note that there appears to be anomalies on jurisdiction under the Bangsamoro Organic Law.
First, it states, "[w]here a case involves a non-Muslim, Shari ah law [sic] may apply only if the non-Muslim voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Shari ah court."[93] However, it is the Muslim Code that applies to marriages, their nature, consequences, and incidents between a male Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized in Muslim rites.[94] This appears to mean that if the non-Muslim party to a Muslim marriage does not voluntarily submit to the shari'ah court's jurisdiction, her recourse would be in the regular courts. However, as likewise stressed, a regular court judge lacks competence to rule, for instance, on a civil action "relating to marriage; divorce; betrothal or breach of contract to marry; customary dower or mahr; disposition and distribution of property upon divorce; maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts; and restitution of marital rights"[95] which call for an application of shari'ah. Perhaps, judicial construction may likewise be employed in a proper case. A non-Muslim agreeing to marry a Muslim solemnized in Muslim rites may be deemed to have voluntarily submitted to be governed by the Muslim Code and consequently, voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the shari'ah court which has the competence to properly rule on matters relative to their marriage.[96]
Further, it is strange that while the BOL expressly amends the provisions on jurisdiction of shari'a courts under the Muslim Code,[97] the jurisdictions of shari'ah circuit courts[98] and shari'ah district courts[99] under the Bangsamoro Organic Law appear to limit them to those "in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region" only. The ardent desire of this Court is for a strengthened shari'ah justice system and better access to justice for Muslims. A step is through the Congress' establishment of more shari'ah courts in the rest of the country where a significant number of Muslims reside, which may be outside the BARMM. Limiting the amendment of jurisdiction to shari'ah courts in the BARMM may have been an oversight.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the grant of the consolidated petitions, the reversal of the assailed order, the remand of the case to the Shari'ah District Court of Cotabato City, and the decisive pronouncement on the exclusive original jurisdiction of Shari'ah District Courts on all actions arising from contracts between Muslim parties who did not stipulate on which law shall govern their relations.
[1] Spelled as "shari'a" in Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines." When not referring to the courts that the law created, it will be spelled as "shari'ah" here.
[2] Malaki v. People, G.R. No. 221075, November 15, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[3] CONST., art. II, sec. 22 provides:
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
CONST., art. XIV, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
[4] See Republic Act No. 6734; Republic Act No. 9054; and Republic Act No. 11054.
[5] Ponencia, p. 8.
[6] Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court, 734 Phil. 239, 251 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[7] Erectors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 640, 645 (1996) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[8] Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155-156 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
[9] Philippine National Bank v. Tejano, Jr., 619 Phil. 139, 147 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
[10] Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 640, 647 (1996) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[11] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, sec. 45 states:
SECTION 45. Shari'a Courts. - Shari'a Courts to be constituted as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," shall be included in the funding appropriations so provided in this Act.
[12] Whereas Clauses of Presidential Decree No. 1083.
[13] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 4, par. 1.
[14] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 6, par. 2.
[15] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 7(i).
[16] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 137.
[17] Preamble of Republic Act No. 6734.
[18] Republic Act No. 6734, art. I, sec. 2 states:
SECTION 2. It is the purpose of this Organic Act to establish the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to provide its basic structure of government within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, and to ensure the peace and equality before the law of all people in the Autonomous Region.
[19] Republic Act No. 6734, art. II, sec. 1, par. 2.
[20] Republic Act No. 6734, art. IV, sec. 2.
[21] Republic Act No. 6734, art. V, sec. 2(9).
[22] Republic Act No. 6734, art. IX, secs. 3-5.
[23] Republic Act No. 6734, art. IX, sec. 13 states:
SECTION 13. The Shari'ah District Courts and the Shari'ah Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein. The judges of the Shari'ah courts shall have the same qualifications as the judges of the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts as the case may be. In addition, they must be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence.
[24] Republic Act No. 9054, art. VIII, sec. 2.
[25] Republic Act No. 9054, art. VIII, sec. 4.
[26] Republic Act No. 9054, art. VIII, sec. 6.
[27] Republic Act No. 9054, art. III, sec. 5.
[28] Republic Act No. 11054, art. I, sec. 3.
[29] Republic Act No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054.
[30] Republic Act No. 11054, art. IV, sec. 2.
[31] Republic Act No. 11054, art. V, sec. 2.
[32] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 1.
[33] Republic Act No. 11054, art. XVIII, sec. 4(d) states:
SECTION 4. Amendatory Clause. - (h) Upon the ratification of this Organic Law, the pertinent provisions of the following laws which are inconsistent with this Organic Law are hereby amended accordingly:
. . . .
(d) Articles 140, 143, 152, 153, 154, 164, 165, 166, 167 and 168 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines[.]"
[34] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 6.
[35] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. Power of the Parliament to Enact Laws Pertaining to Shari'ah. - The Parliament shall have the power to enact laws on personal, family, and property law jurisdiction.
The Parliament has the power to enact laws governing commercial and other civil actions not provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1083, as amended, otherwise known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," and criminal jurisdiction on minor offenses punishable by arresto menor or ta'zir which must be equivalent to arresto menor or fines commensurate to the offense.
[36] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 2.
[37] Ponencia, p. 11.
[38] Id. at 8.
[39] Ponencia, p. 11.
[40] Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 283 Phil. 649, 660 (1992) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
[41] Ta ada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, 518 (1935) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
[42] Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 144 Phil. 312, 323 (1970) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].
[43] Pobre v. Mendieta, 296 Phil. 634, 644 (1993) [Per J. Gri o-Aquino, En Banc].
[44] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology, 491 Phil. 317, 343 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[45] Roa v. Insular Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 339 (1912) [Per J. Trent, First Division].
[46] Matabuena v. Cervantes, 148 Phil. 295, 300 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
[47] RUBEN E. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 232 (6th edition, 2009).
[48] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 3.
[49] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 2, 4, par. 1, and 6.
[50] BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND SPECIAL PROCEDURE 79 (2011).
[51] Id. at 81-82.
[52] Id. at 55-60.
[53] JAINAL D. RASUL, COMPARATIVE LAWS: THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MUSLIM CODE (1994).
[54] BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND SPECIAL PROCEDURE 86-103 (2011).
[55] Id. at 33-50.
[56] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 6.
[57] BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND SPECIAL PROCEDURE 110-111 (2011).
[58] Id. at 117-126.
[59] Id. at 158-173.
[60] Id. at 174-176.
[61] Commentary, p. 204.
[62] Tahir Mahmood, Custom as a Source of Law in Islam. 7 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE, 102, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/43949882 (accessed May 29, 2023).
[63] Gideon Libson, On the Development of Custom as a Source of Law in Islamic Law: Al-Ruju u Ila al-urfi Ahadu al-Qawa idi al-Khamsi Allati Yatabanna alayha al-Fiqhu, 4 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 133, 141-142 (1997), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3399492 (accessed June 2, 2023).
[64] Id. at 152-154.
[65] BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND SPECIAL PROCEDURE 264 (2011).
[66] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 5.
[67] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 2.
[68] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (8th edition, 2004).
[69] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 13, par. 3., in relation to art. 15(d).
[70] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 37(c).
[71] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 43.
[72] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 163.
[73] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 173(a).
[74] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 175.
[75] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 5.
[76] 734 Phil 239 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[77] Id. at 255.
[78] Rollo (G.R. No. 211089), p. 24.
[79] Id.
[80] WILLARD B. RIANO, CIVIL PROCEDURE (THE BAR LECTURES SERIES) 186-187 (Volume I, 2011).
[81] Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 263, 270 [Per J. Purisima, Third Division].
[82] Ponencia, p. 11.
[83] Id. at 11-12.
[84] Id. at 12.
[85] Ziaul Haque. The Nature Of Riba Al-Nasi'a And Riba Al-Fadl. 21 ISLAMIC STUDIES 19, 19-20 (1982)., available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20847217 (accessed May 29, 2023).
[86] Id.
[87] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Re: Letter of Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Bldg. in Q.C., 806 Phil. 822 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
[88] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 2(a).
[89] SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE STUDY QURAN: A NEW TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 240.
[90] Muhammad Samiullah. Prohibition Of Riba (Interest) & Insurance In The Light Of Islam. 21 ISLAMIC STUDIES 53, 53-54 (1982), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20847200 (accessed May 29, 2023).
[91] Ponencia, p. 14.
[92] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 4.
[93] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 1. See also Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, secs. 5, 6, and 7.
[94] Presidential Decree No. 1083, art. 13, par. 1.
[95] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 5(b).
[96] See also Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court, 734 Phil. 239, 255-256 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], which provides:
"[T]here are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code, provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim. Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code, a person of a different religion is disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim decedent. However, by operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the decedent's parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim 'shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification.' In these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari'a court proceedings." (Citations omitted.)
[97] Republic Act No. 11054, art. XVIII, sec. 4(d).
[98] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 5.
[99] Republic Act No. 11054, art. X, sec. 6.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
The crux of the instant controversy revolves around the propriety of the Shari ah District Court's dismissal of the complaints[1] filed by petitioners. In doing so, the Shari ah District Court held:
The parties in the above-titled cases clearly entered into contracts of loan with agreed interest rates. Unlike the Civil Code where there are provisions that govern transactions involving payment of interest. Presidential Decree No. 1083, the Code on Muslim Personal Laws does[sic] not contain any provision regarding any transaction/contract involving payment of interests. Laws on the matter have yet to be codified and incorporated in the present Muslim Code via an amendment to the same.
While the Acting Presiding Judge is aware that "Islam permits increase in capital through trade x x x x Islam blocks the way for anyone who tries to increase his capital through lending on usury or interest (riba), whether it is at low or a high rate x x x x", he dismissed the first case and will also dismiss the second case for lack of jurisdiction.
To reiterate, the parties entered into contracts of loan with agreed interest rates, hence, although verbally made, they are binding between and among them. The applicable laws should be applied to them by the proper court and therefore, this court is not the proper forum for the parties.[2]
At the incipience, I applaud the Court's efforts in strengthening Shari ah justice by enriching Islamic jurisprudence through the instant ponencia. In this regard, I express my full concurrence thereto, and offer several points worth considering: first, the Shari ah District Judge's unwarranted refusal to take cognizance of the complaint; second, the need for a specialized court to settle the present cases; and, third, a clarion call to fill the gaps in the existing Shari ah legal framework, particularly those pertaining to Islamic finance.
The Shari ah District Judge cannot decline to rule on the complaints on the simple pretext that Presidential Decree No. 1083 has no provision on transactions involving payment of interest or riba. |
To ingeminate the words of the esteemed ponente, "x x x x [J]urisdiction, once acquired, is retained until the end of litigation. The applicable law or the validity of the contract at issue is immaterial. They do not bear on the issue of jurisdiction, much less divest the SDC of the same."[3]
Article 187 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083,[4] better known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides for the suppletory application of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code), the Rules of Court, and other existing laws, insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. Corollary thereto, Article 9 of the Civil Code reads:
No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Here, the Shari ah District Judge dismissed petitioners' complaints for lack of jurisdiction, since they involved the application of Act No. 2655[5] or the Usury Law.
An insightful perusal of PD No. 1083 glaringly evinces that it does not explicitly disallow the application of the Usury Law. There is also no mention of prohibition on interest or riba. Certainly, the suppletory application of the Usury Law or the Civil Code, as the case may be, is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
To be sure, the mere application of a law other than PD No. 1083 does not justify the outright dismissal of a complaint filed before the Shari ah courts. At risk of redundancy, no judge shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws. On this ground alone, the Shari ah District Judge should not have dismissed herein petitioners' complaints.
The Shari ah District Judge, having acquired specialized expertise in Islamic law and jurisprudence, must resolve the complaints considering that petitioners invoked the Last Sermon of the Prophet Muhammad. (image supposed to be here) |
Shari ah courts were originally conceived in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement[6] for Muslim Filipinos in areas of the Autonomy "to set up their own Courts which will implement the Islamic Shari ah laws."[7] While the terms of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement were not implemented, PD No. 1083 gave it life by creating courts of limited jurisdiction such as the Shari ah District Court and the Shari ah Circuit Court, both of which fall under the administrative supervision of this Court.[8]
On that score, Article 140 of PD No. 1083 requires Shari ah District Judges to have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years or has held a public office requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite in addition to being learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence. At present, Republic Act (RA) No. 11054,[9] or the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, requires all Shari ah judges to be regular members of the Philippine Bar, in addition to having completed at least two years of Shari ah or Islamic Jurisprudence.[10]
Tellingly, Shari ah judges developed an exclusive expertise in issues concerning Shari ah by reason of their qualifications and by the very nature of their functions. This expertise becomes all the more apparent when conventional civil laws and rules of procedures are juxtaposed with the Ijra-at Mahakim al-Shari ah, or the Special Rules of Procedure Governing the Shari ah Courts, and the provisions of PD No. 1083.
This specialized expertise finds significance in these consolidated cases.
Literally, riba means excess. By virtue of RA No. 11439,[11] riba, in the context of banking business, refers to the receipt and payment of interest, including in the various types of lending and borrowing and in the exchange of currencies on forward basis.[12] The prohibition on riba in the conventional concept of interest comes from the practice of earning profit on money, without any goods or services being rendered.
In proscribing riba, the Qur'an which is the ultimate source of Shari ah, declares:
(image supposed to be here)
"O believers! Do not consume interest, multiplying it many times over. And be mindful of All, so you may prosper." (Al-Qur'an 3:130)
This divine revelation was echoed by the Prophet Muhammad (image supposed to be here) in his Last Sermon when he said, thusly: "Allah (image supposed to be here) has forbidden you to take usury, therefore all interest obligation shall henceforth be waived. Your capital is yours to keep. You will neither inflict nor suffer any inequality. Allah (image supposed to be here) has judged that there shall be no interest and that all interest due to Abbas Ibn 'Aal-Muttalib be waived."
In the instant case, petitioners invoked the Last Sermon in seeking the accounting of the monies received by respondents, extinguishment of their obligations, and reimbursement of excess payments.[13] Surely, the grounds relied upon by petitioners call for the application of a specialized knowledge in the field of Shari ah which judges of conventional civil courts are not equipped with. Logic, thus, dictates that Shari ah judges, having acquired specialized expertise in the field of Islamic law and jurisprudence, interpret the provisions of the Qur an and the Prophetic practices (Sunnah), and apply them pertinently to the cases before them. No such expectation can be had from civil court judges who are neither required to be Shari ah counselors-at-law nor enjoined to acquire knowledge of Islamic law and jurisprudence.
The need to fill the gaps in legislation concerning Islamic financial and commercial transactions to attain equal and inclusive justice. |
Notwithstanding the passage of RA No. 11439, the current efforts to institutionalize the prohibition on riba, while indeed commendable, leave much to be desired. As previously enunciated, these legislative gaps do not absolve the courts from adjudicating disputes relative to such issue. In sooth, the Qur an and the Sunnah already provide a comprehensive code of conduct for Muslim Filipinos governing the various facets of their lives, including financial transactions. The principles of equity, fairness, and justice enshrined in Shari ah demand that the tenets from the primary sources of Shari ah[14] be applied in resolving cases involving riba.
All the same, the Court can only do so much in the face of inadequate specific legislation. Justice for every Filipino cannot simply come from the Judiciary but from the concerted endeavors of all sectors of the Government. This controversy presents a unique opportunity for the Court to direct the legislature's attention to the conspicuous gaps in the prevailing Shari ah legal framework. In joining the ponencia's call for equal and inclusive justice,[15] I strongly urge the Philippine Congress and other relevant stakeholders to expedite the enactment or adoption of more robust measures encompassing the promotion and protection of Islamic financial and commercial transactions, among others.
Given the foregoing disquisitions, I humbly vote to GRANT the consolidated Petitions.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 211089), pp. 21-27; Rollo (G.R. No. 211135), pp. 21-36.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 211135), pp. 42-44.
[3] Decision, p. 12.
[4] A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on February 4, 1977.
[5] AN ACT FIXING RATES OF INTEREST UPON LOANS AND DECLARING THE EFFECT OF RECEIVING OR TAKING USURIOUS RATES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on February 24, 1916.
[6] THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COMMISSION MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. Done in the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. corresponding to 23rd December 1976 A.D.
[7] Paragraph 3, 3rd Agreement.
[8] Article 137, PD No. 1083.
[9] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ORGANIC LAW FOR THE BANGSAMORO AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, REPEALING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734. ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO," AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9054, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ORGANIC ACT FOR THE AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO." Approved on July 27, 2018.
[10] Section 8, Article X, RA No. 11054.
[11] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REGULATION AND ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC BANKS. Approved on August 22, 2019.
[12] Section 2(a)(7), RA No. 11439.
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 211135), p. 32, and Rollo (G.R. No. 211089), pp. 24-25.
[14] Under Section 3, Article X. RA No. 11054, the Qur an, along with the Sunnah, are the primary sources of Shari ah.
[15] Decision, p. 2.