Going now to the timeline of the trial below, the Court notes the following incidents over the course of the proceedings:

Given the exhaustive documentation of the foregoing, the Court laments at the sheer number of delays that plagued the trial below, and the lack of explanations for many of the same. The nearly nine years from the date of the filing of the Information to the date of the promulgation of the trial court's Decision, while not unheard of in the annals of administration of justice in the Philippines, is still a fact both deplorable and unconscionable.

Reviewing the aforementioned dates and incidents in seriatim, the Court easily notes that the trial court set petitioner's arraignment nearly three months after his arrest, in clear violation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8493. Additionally, the pre-trial was reset four times: the first resetting had no indicated reasons, the second and third were because the victim's widow, i.e., the private complainant, failed to appear, the fourth was because both petitioner and the private complainant failed to appear. The case's pre-trial was finally conducted nearly a year after the initial set date of March 15, 2007, and the pre-trial order was only issued on August 19, 2008. Petitioner ™s counsel then duly filed a Motion to Dismiss based on petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial, but the trial court does not have any order or resolution in record of its disposition of the said Motion-an egregious error on the part of the trial court judge.^[162]

Thereafter, the setting for the first day of trial, i.e., September 29, 2008, was postponed due to the prosecutor's attendance at a seminar. The direct examination of the prosecution's first witness finally began on October 27, 2008, but evidently lasted for only 15 minutes due to the trial court's supposed lack of material time. The continuation of the said direct examination on November 10, 2008 only lasted four minutes, with the prosecutor requesting a continuance due to urgent personal reasons. Various delays are also evident from the record: 1) the hearing on February 23, 2009 was cancelled by the trial court with no indicated reasons in its Notice dated February 12, 2009; 2) the hearing on July 6, 2009 was cancelled due to the non-appearance of the prosecutor, who had taken ill but did not apparently submit any medical certificate for the record; the hearing set for January 25,2010 was cancelled by the trial court, but no reasons were given in its Notice dated January 18, 2010; 3) the hearing on February 1, 2010 was cancelled due to the failure of the prosecution's witness to appear; 4) the hearing on February 15, 2010 was cancelled due to the unexplained failure of the prosecutor himself to appear; 5) the hearing on March 8, 2010 was cancelled due to the prosecutor's bringing of the wrong witness; 6) the hearing set for April 19, 2010 was cancelled with no documentation of any order or notice from the trial court advising or ordering the resetting, and any reasons therefor; 7) the planned cross-examination of the witness Antonio on August 23, 2010 and September 20, 2010 were both cancelled due to the unexplained unavailability of the said witness, and it appears that the said cross-examination never took place thereafter; 8) the trial court's Order that denied petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence was promulgated on July 4, 2011, more than nine months after the latter was filed; 9) the trial resumed nearly four months on October 27, 2011 after the promulgation of the trial court's Order that denied petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence; 10) the next hearing was conducted nearly seven months thereafter, i.e., on May 3, 2012, after two cancellations; 11) the hearing on September 11, 2012 was cancelled by the trial court with no indicated reasons in its Order dated September 6, 2012; 12) the scheduled hearing on October 9, 2012 was cancelled by the trial court with no indicated reasons, and with no documentation of the trial court's order or notice advising or ordering the said cancellation; 13) an unexplained gap of more than one year exists between the hearing on January 3, 2013 and the hearing on February 18, 2014; 14) and finally, the trial court took more than one year to decide the case, with the parties memoranda notably and apparently absent from the records.

In Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr.,^[163] the Court had the occasion to discuss the importance of the mandate to timely conduct the arraignment of the accused within the strict time limitations of R.A. No. 8493, viz.:

This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the causes of the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting and upholding petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition [of cases].

Given the length and the unreasonableness of the majority of the delays, the violation of the right of petitioner to speedy trial becomes manifest. Almost two years elapsed from the filing of the Information against him until the filing of this Petition; incredibly, he has not [yet] been arraigned. An arraignment takes, at most ten minutes of the court's business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It consists simply of reading to the accused the charged leveled against them, ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges. A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused are present before the court.

In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from the filing of the information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes that this fundamental right should and can be done with minimal delay. For this reason alone, we are astonished that the court a quo could not complete such a simple but fundamental stage in the proceedings. The protracted delay became all the more oppressive and vexatious when viewed from the perspective that the liberty of the accused was being curtailed for the entire duration.^[164] (Emphases supplied)

Verily, petitioner's arraignment of nearly three months after being arrested was unexplained here by the trial court. With no explanation for such delay, petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial was already infringed upon by the trial court.

But the violations of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial do not end there. The Court also immediately notes that there was no need for the pre-trial below to be postponed for such an appallingly long time. In People v. Tac-An,^[165] the Court had already ruled that the presence of the private complainant during pre-trial is not required. The Court also said therein that even R.A. No. 8493 itself does not require the same.^[166] Thus, pre-trial should have already proceeded without further delay on June 25, 2007, and petitioner's counsel was also thus correctly prompted to accordingly file prior to trial (in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 8493) the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss to precisely invoke petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.

Clearly, petitioner was not brought to trial on time, and clearly, the trial court below appears to have failed in resolving at all the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss. Obviously, it was not petitioner's fault that the said Motion remained unresolved to this day. But petitioner did in fact fail to raise his constitutional right to speedy trial on appeal with the CA. The circumstances of the case, however, merit the Court's keen consideration of the said constitutional right, which seems to have been left beleaguered by the banalities of the Philippine justice system. The Court is reminded of its ruling in Callangan v. People,^[167] wherein the recognized exceptions to the rule that the negligence of counsel generally binds his or her client were restated: "(1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in an outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant."^[168] While the failure of petitioner's counsel to raise his constitutional right to speedy trial before the CA may not seem to be negligence so gross or reckless-and the Court sees fit to consider the same as a regrettable oversight, but a blunder nonetheless-the effect upon both the liberty of petitioner and the overarching interests of justice here are what the Court considers as decisive of the second issue of this case. The paramount importance of the constitutional right to speedy trial thus should prevail over the failure to raise the same as an issue on appeal in light of the disquieting number of delays that had been perennially besetting petitioner's case below since 2006.

Anent the length of the trial below, the Court notes that from the first day of the start of the direct examination of the prosecution's witness, i.e., October 27, 2008, to the last trial date on May 20, 2014, a total of 2,031 days had elapsed. Even if the Court were to remove from the said counting any and all of the trial delays attributable to the defense, the remaining period would still be beyond the 180 days prescribed as the mandatory period within which a criminal trial should be completed, as stated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 8493; Rule 119, Section 2 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure; and the Court's own Circular No. 38-98.^[169] To illustrate, the unexplained gap of more than one year between the hearing on January 3, 2013 and the hearing on February 18, 2014 is enough to deserve the Court's attention and well-deserved consternation here.

All told with regard to the second issue of this case, petitioner is entitled to a dismissal of the charge against him clue to the numerous and abominable violations heaped upon his constitutional right to speedy trial. While jurisprudence has consistently stated that the determination of delay when considering the constitutional right to speedy trial is not an entirely mathematical evaluation,^[170] the sheer number of the vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays here are enough to warrant the Court's recognition of the said constitutional right of herein petitioner. The dismissal of the charges against petitioner is indeed in order, but even brushing aside this critical issue of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial, the acquittal of petitioner on the merits is appropriately merited.

Going now to the third and final issue, the Court first requires a summary review of the proven facts mid the evidence on record. To recall, it is beyond doubt here that the victim died due to hypovolemic shock secondary to hemorrhaging from a stab wound to his right side, which penetrated the liver, as indicated in the Certificate of Death dated May 26, 2006. It is also undoubted that petitioner suffered multiple cuts and stab wounds caused by the victim, including stabs to his torso/abdominal area and an open fracture/deep cut on his right ring finger, as indicated on the Certificate of Confinement dated July 19, 2006. Additionally, Rother and Eric also suffered multiple cuts and stab wounds caused by the victim, as gathered from the Medico-Legal Certificate dated July 19, 2006 and the Certificate of Confinement dated July 24, 2006. There is also no dispute as to the weapon wielded by the victim at the time, which was a long bolo knife, and that Eric is petitioner's nephew.

The crux of the matter is thus to determine how the victim's death actually came about. The Affidavit of Leoncio avers that he saw the victim causing no undue provocation upon arrival at the scene, and that the victim was actually defending himself from Eric, who was apparently wielding a handgun and pointing the same at the victim. The Affidavit also states that Leoncio saw the victim fall down after bumping into a motorcycle, and the victim being stabbed by petitioner while helpless on the ground facing upwards. These narrations were corroborated by the near-identical Affidavit of Antonio.

But on the witness stand, Leoncio testified that he did not actually notice the victim wielding a weapon, and that he noticed no other persons suffering any blows or cuts during the incident. Leoncio also revealed his bias with regard to the case, since he admitted to being distantly related to the victim's widow. He also admitted that his initial Affidavit was prepared by the counsel of the victim's widow without the contents thereof sufficiently explained to him. Antonio, for his part, testified that the victim, who was his uncle, was on the ground facing upwards when stabbed by petitioner, the latter using his left hand in a downward thrust and hitting the victim's right side below the right armpit. This, however, contradicts Leoncio's account of petitioner stabbing in a rightward direction. It also goes without saying that despite being an actual witness to the incident, Antonio's bias here cannot be discounted.

Petitioner's Counter-Affidavit, on the other hand, states that he was immediately challenged and attacked without warning by the victim upon the latter's arrival at the scene, which caused the deep cut into petitioner's right ring finger (as petitioner tried to block the blow) and the stabs to petitioner's torso/abdominal area. Having retreated and upon seeing that the victim was attacking his nephew Eric, petitioner then went to his motorcycle, retrieved his knife, returned to the scene, and thereafter stabbed the victim in the latter's right rib, but petitioner averred a note of haziness of his memory due to the possible delirium he was suffering at the time, since he remembers that he was facing the victim's back while the latter was facing towards and stabbing Eric. On the witness stand, petitioner confirmed the victim's initial challenge and immediate attack upon arrival at the scene, as well as the wounds petitioner sustained-even demonstrating the same in open court.^[171] He then described his condition when he saw the victim attacking Eric, which made him decide to retrieve the knife in his motorcycle's utility box nearby. Petitioner, in his own words, had blurred sight, was suffering from the obvious pain from his wounds, and was even preventing his intestines from protruding out of a stab wound on his torso/abdominal area. Petitioner then clarified that according to his own memory, he stabbed the victim below the latter's left armpit while the victim had Eric pinned down, and thereafter the victim was still able to inflict stab wounds upon Rother. Petitioner also admitted to being left-handed.^[172]

Three other witnesses filed their sworn statements and took to the witness stand to aver as to the victim's initial aggression. In fact, Benedicto, Eddie Mar, and Rother (although obviously a biased witness) all testified that they saw the victim challenging petitioner upon arrival at the scene and immediately attacking with his bolo knife. Both Benedicto and Rother were able to see petitioner sustaining injuries to the latter's hand and abdomen, while Eddie Mar was able to see petitioner holding his own abdomen while the latter struggled towards his motorcycle to retrieve the knife therein. Eddie Mar also confirmed that the victim was shouting petitioner's name upon arriving at the scene, and asking people regarding petitioner's whereabouts.

Article 11, paragraph 2 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the RPC, states the following:

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the persons or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second prerequisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

The first and second requisites mentioned above refer to the first and second circumstances required to concur for the invocation of the previously justifying circumstance of self-defense as defined in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, namely: 1) unlawful aggression and 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the said aggression.

In the most recent restatement of the commentaries of the eminent and late former CA Associate Justice Luis B. Reyes (Reyes), the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives is noted to be "founded not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood."^[173] In Velasquez v. People,^[174] the Court had the occasion to elaborate on the proper invocation of justifying circumstances in criminal cases, viz.:

A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted hmm upon another person-a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.

The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the accused performed acts which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits[.]^[175]

In Belbis, Jr. v. People,^[176] the Court reiterated that the standard of proof for a successful invocation of a justifying circumstance, albeit the discussion therein pertained to the justifying circumstance of self-defense, is clear and convincing evidence on the part of the accused, viz.:

It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.^[177]

Verily, petitioner then needs to have proven by clear and convincing evidence the following: 1) the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) the reasonable necessity of the knife he used to stab the victim; and 3) that he did not provoke the victim.

Going into the first of the aforementioned requisites, the Court notes that petitioner and three other witnesses ail confirm as to the initial and unanticipated attack of the victim upon immediate arrival at the scene, accompanied by challenging words addressed to petitioner to the effect of basically threatening him with mortal harm. How the trial court relied on the biased and uncorroborated testimonies of Leoncio and Antonio leaves one astounded, since the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is also very much proven by the wounds suffered by petitioner and his relatives. Verily, the accounts under oath of two other witnesses who regrettably did not appear on the witness stand, i.e., Eric and Samuel, point to the victim running amok that night. One immediately notes that the trial court made no mention of the threatening words uttered by the victim upon arrival (i.e., only stating that he and petitioner exchanged words and then thereafter began attacking each other), or even the wounds suffered by petitioner and his relatives, in the reasoning of the Decision dated July 28, 2015.

In fact, the trial court's reasoning seems to have gone with a theory that is unsupported by the evidence on record: as mentioned above, the Decision dated July 28, 2015 states that the victim was actually surrounded, and was repelling the gun supposedly pointed by Eric. This gun-pointing was what prompted the victim to allegedly step back and thus bump into a motorcycle and accordingly fall flat on the ground facing upwards, after which, petitioner then, and without any justification stabbed the victim, as the trial court believed. According to the trial court, due to the supposed remark of petitioner addressed to the victim earlier that day which seems to have insulted the latter, the victim basically challenged petitioner that they would see each other soon. The trial court then made the conclusion without any supporting evidence that petitioner had, in the intervening time, gathered male relatives in order to anticipate and repel any violent action that may come from the victim. The trial court then presumed-again without citing any evidence on the record-that petitioner and his relatives were ready to fight the victim, and that they were already sufficiently armed before the victim's arrival.

The Court cannot countenance the erroneous and unacceptable conclusions of the trial court here on the facts duly proven. The trial court basically took it as a given that the victim and petitioner had a mutual agreement to fight, despite nothing in the record indicating that petitioner had agreed to a time and place for their violent meeting. It is true that there would have been no unlawful aggression had there been such an agreement,^[178] but without such acceptance by petitioner proven or even remotely indicated here, the Court is thus confounded as to how the trial court came to such a finding.

The Court also cannot understand how the victim, who was supposedly trying to repel a pointed gun at him, came to such close proximity with regard to his opponents to the point of inflicting multiple cuts and stab wounds upon petitioner and his relatives, and still come out to be the non-aggressor in the trial court's eyes. If the victim were really trying to repel a gun pointed at him, he would have surely not approached any further, or would have at least maintained his distance. Surprisingly, the trial court did not even discuss or narrate who made the first approach after the gun was pointed-the Decision simply jumped to the scenario where the victim supposedly neutralized the gun in the hands of Eric. Verily, the Decision simply mentioned that the victim and petitioner moved in to strike at each other simultaneously after a few initial verbal exchanges, only to be interrupted by Eric's gun-pointing-a supposed factual scenario which again has no supporting evidence on record. Moreover, it is very telling that the victim suffered only one wound: the fatal blow to his right lower armpit that penetrated his liver and caused his demise. Had there been an actual melee here where, as the trial court erroneously presumed, petitioner was already armed, it goes without saying that the victim would definitely have suffered more injuries that would have been evident and indicated in his death certificate. Also, the fact that petitioner and his two other relatives suffered multiple cuts and stab wounds belies the assertion that the victim was the recipient of any attack, and in turn strongly supports the notion that the victim started his attack in a sudden and unprovoked manner, and was actually running amok that night.

Further, the trial court found that the victim neutralized Eric by hacking at the same and hitting the latter's lower armpit. However, this is easily dispelled by the injuries actually suffered by Eric as stated in his Certificate of Confinement, which indicate that his wounds were on his left back and left arm. Clearly, this slapdash evaluation of the facts and evidence by the trial court merits the Court's disapprobation here. Despite the accounts of two disinterested persons, i.e., Benedicto and Eddie Mar, who confirm that the victim started the unprovoked attack upon petitioner, the trial court failed to mention the same in its Decision's reasoning. Despite the fact that at least one witness, i.e., Eddie Mar, confirmed the fact of petitioner's retrieval of the knife in his motorcycle's utility box while holding in his own intestines, and again, despite the confirmed injuries sustained by petitioner and his relatives due to the victim's hacking and stabbing, the trial court still viewed the situation as one where the victim was basically surrounded and ganged upon before being fatally stabbed while on the ground by petitioner.

Worse, the trial court even faulted petitioner for his non-readiness to defend himself from the initial attack, and then in changing tack to state that the petitioner's non-readiness was not believable, the trial court made another baseless assumption without any evidentiary foundation that the wounds he sustained were from the victim's own attempts at self-defense. Again, this is despite overwhelming evidence on the record pointing to the more-than-believable fact of the victim charging towards petitioner for the initial attack with the bolo knife, and petitioner parrying the same unarmed. Without even discussing this in its Decision's reasoning, the trial court thus so gravely erred in a way that showed its apparent bias readily in favor of petitioner's conviction.

To the eyes of this Court, the overwhelming evidence points to the fact that the victim did indeed challenge, threaten, and attack petitioner in a swift and unprovoked manner, which caused the successive number of injuries upon the latter, and which in turn prompted petitioner to temporarily retreat and procure a weapon in order to, in turn neutralize the victim before he could cause more bodily harm. The trial court's supply of facts not in evidence here is more than a regrettable series of errors-this veritably amounts to a grave injustice that the Court must correct.

Moreover, the reasoning of the appellate court is quite telling as to its unfortunately perfunctory review of the facts here. The CA actually found the victim to be the aggressor, albeit initially, since the biased testimony of Leoncio was fully appreciated and not thoroughly scrutinized on appeal. According to the CA, which heavily and uncritically relied on the said testimony, the victim's initial unlawful aggression had already ended when Eric pointed his gun, and thus the victim's unlawful aggression had become no longer actual or imminent, and especially when he was already lying on the ground. And even assuming that petitioner's account of retrieving the knife from his motorcycle's utility box were true, the same was done only out of retaliation and not in the defense of his nephew.

Had the CA taken the time to thoroughly scrutinize the case records, other unrebutted pieces of evidence in favor of petitioner would have readily been noticeable. The CA did not even bother to mention in its reasoning the fact that petitioner and his relatives sustained multiple injuries from the victim's bolo knife, whereas the victim only suffered one (1) injury that ultimately led to his demise. The independent accounts that verify the fact of the victim's unlawful aggression, as well as petitioner's retrieval of the knife from his motorcycle's utility box, should have put the CA on notice that there were many things amiss in the trial court's Decision. Moreover, the CA's finding that the victim's unlawful aggression had ceased upon Eric's gun-pointing is again belied by the fact that petitioner and his relatives all suffered multiple cuts and stab wounds-a clear indication that the victim was being a clear, present, and active danger to anyone in the vicinity as long as he was wielding his bolo knife. It also clearly indicates-and there is nothing in the record showing otherwise-that at no point during the incident (that is, until he finally fell after sustaining the lone stab wound from petitioner, and not without making his final slashes directed at petitioner) was the victim disarmed- which again still made him a present threat to petitioner and his relatives until finally and effectively neutralized by petitioner. Thus, in the eyes of the Court, the victim's unlawful aggression had not ended at all until finally being mortally wounded, and thus petitioner s compulsion to repel or even neutralize the victim, who remained an active threat unless sufficiently repelled or neutralized must be deemed to have been proper given the circumstances.

On a further note, the Court notes its relatively recent ruling in People v. Olarbe,^[179] (Olarbe) where the Court considered the state of mind of the accused therein, who invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger. For a better understanding of the said case, a brief mention of its facts is warranted:

Let us now revisit the events of that fateful night of May 7, 2006. Arca, armed with the rifle (described as an airgun converted into a caliber .22) and the bolo, we[nt] to the house of Olarbe towards midnight. The latter and his household [we]re already slumbering, but were roused from bed because Arca fired his gun and was loudly shouting, Mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo. Thereafter, Arca forcible entered Olarbe's house. Olarbe managed [sic] to the gun of Arca, and they struggled for control of it. upon wresting the gun from Arca, Olarbe fired at him, causing him to totter. But Arca next took out the bolo from his waist and charged at Olarbe's common-law spouse. This forced Olarbe to fight for possession of the bolo, and upon seizing the bolo, he hacked Arca with it.

Arca's death was certified to have been due to the gunshot on the head and hacking wounds. The CA noted the following injuries, aside from the gunshot wound in the head, namely:

-Lacerated wound on the forehead;
-Lacerated wound, front rib area;
-Lacerated wound on the left upper quadrant;
-Lacerated wound on the left lower quadrant;
-Lacerated wound on the occipital area;
-Two (2) hacking wounds posterior of neck; and
-Hacking wound on lumbar area

Only Olarbe's account of the incident existed in the records, but instead of giving weight to the account, the RTC and the CA rejected his pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger based on their common holding that Arca had been weakened from being hit on the head; and concluded that consequently, Arca could not have charged with his bolo.^[180]

The Court here rejected the conclusions of both the trial and appellate courts as unwarranted surmises and speculations, viz.:

The CA's rejection of Olarbe's pleas of self defense and defense of stranger was unwarranted.

To start with, there was no credible showing that the shot to the head had rendered Arca too weak to draw the bolo and carry on with his aggression in the manner described by Olarbe. The conclusion of the RTC and the CA thereon was obviously speculative. Secondly, the State did not demonstrate that the shot from the airgun converted to .22 caliber fired at close range sufficed to disable Arca from further attacking with his bolo. Without such demonstration, the RTC and the CA clearly indulged in pure speculation. Thirdly, nothing in the record indicated Area's physical condition at the time of the incident. How could the CA then reliably conclude that he could not have mounted the bolo assault? And lastly, to rule out any further aggression by Arca with his bolo after the shot in the head was again speculative. On the other hand, our substantial judicial experience instructs that an armed person boldly seeking to assault others-like Arca-would have enough adrenaline to enable him to persist on his assault despite sustaining a wound that might otherwise be disabling.

To us, Olarbe's account of what did happen on that fateful night was highly plausible. At the minimum, the details and sequence of the events therein described conformed to human experience and the natural course of things. Armed with both the gun and the bolo, Arca not only disturbed Olarbe ™s peace but physically invaded the sanctity of [the] latter's home at midnight. Given that the aggression by Arca was unprovoked on the part of Olarbe, and with no other person disputing the latter's account, we should easily see and understand why Olarbe would feel that his and his common[ ]law spouse's lives had been put in extreme peril.^[181]

The Court therein ruled that "[t]o disbelieve Olarbe's account is to give primacy to surmise and speculation."^[182] In determining whether or not therein accused was able to prove therein victim's continued unlawful aggression, the Count had this to say:

We find that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Such armed assault was not a mere threatening act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-law spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca who had just fired his gun in anger outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be considered idle in the light of his having forced himself upon their home. The imminent threat to life was positively strong enough to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel the unlawful and unprovoked aggression. For Olarbe to hesitate to act as he had done would have cost him his own life. Arca's being dispossessed of his gun did not terminate the aggression, for, although he had been hit on the head, he quickly reached for the bolo and turned towards Olarbe's common-law spouse. Olarbe was again forced to struggle for control of the bolo. The swiftness of the action heightened Olarbe's senses that the danger to their lives was present and imminent.^[183]

And in a crucial discussion, the Court therein emphasized that when deciding invocations of justifying circumstances, the state of mind of the accused at the time of the incident must always be taken into consideration, viz.:

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand that the accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his responses should be commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only way to judge him, for the law of nature-the foundation of the privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an aggression that endangers one's own life and the lives of others-did not require him to use unerring judgment when he had the reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. The test is whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable or not, and the reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his standpoint at the time he acted. The right of a person to take a life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of the circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill.^[184] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The aforementioned statement carries echoes from the old case of United States v. Esmedia,^[185] wherein the Court exempted the two accused therein from criminal liability upon their honest belief that the victim they killed would have continued his bolo knife attack on the father of the two accused.

Returning to the facts and evidence of the present controversy, the Court notes that petitioner's state of mind is indeed decisive of his invocation of the justifying circumstance of defense of his nephew. Just like in Olarbe, petitioner was threatened with death and thereafter attacked in a swift and unprovoked manner, to which he was unprepared to repel or prevent. The multiple cuts and stab wounds suffered by petitioner and his relatives are again the main sticking point here, since they prove the imminent presence of danger of bodily harm that actually befell their persons. Having suffered a deep cut to his right ring finger and stabs in his torso/abdominal area, it was only natural for petitioner to retreat momentarily, and right then and there, make a decision to find a way to end the violent confrontation still ongoing between the victim and his relatives-most especially Eric. Indeed, the imminent threat to petitioner personally had ceased, but the danger of bodily harm to his relatives had not. It is thus reasonable for the Court to conclude-especially with no credible evidence on record that the victim had at any point been disarmed-that the victim, as an imminent threat to petitioner and his relatives, had persisted in his determination and actions, and still presented a clear and present danger to those remaining on the scene.^[186]

And with at least one eyewitness confirming petitioner's short trek to his motorcycle in order to retrieve the knife in its utility box, and with another eyewitness confirming that petitioner tried to parry the victim's initial assault with his own bare hands, the Court easily sees that petitioner was indeed unarmed beforehand and during the initial assault, and that petitioner had decided to come to the aid of his relatives still confronting the bolo knife-wielding victim, whose actions (and the aftermath thereof) show determination and zeal to either kill or seriously maim petitioner and his relatives. To fault petitioner for returning to the scene in order to help repel the still-unabated danger presented by the victim, and when in his mind the danger to his relatives had still not yet gone away, would be to precisely fault him for the very thing that the law allows him to do when a relative is in imminent peril. This is not retaliation, as the CA viewed it, but a person acting upon impulse while sustaining wounds, bodily weakness, obvious shock, and indescribable pain in order to ensure that his relatives would not be further harmed by the victim's indiscriminate hacking.

Unlike in Olarbe, petitioner here has independent accounts confirming the victim's unlawful and determined aggression and his temporary retreat to procure a weapon. But like in Olarbe, petitioner's own account of what happened was subjected to twisting surmises and speculations by the trial court below. Verily, the trial court did precisely what the Court in Olarbe warned about: using ordinary standards to judge upon the thinking and reasonableness of the actions of the accused invoking a justifying circumstance.

Going now to the second requisite of reasonable necessity of the means employed by petitioner, the Court is now reminded of its discussion in Cano v. People,^[187] (Cano) viz.:

The particular circumstances which confronted the petitioner at the time of the incident condoned the means he employed to protect his life. It must be remembered that the measure of rational necessity is to be found in the situation as it appeared to petitioner at the time when the blow was struck. The law does not require that he should mete out his blows in such a manner that upon a calm and deliberate review of the incident it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow more than was absolutely necessary to save his own life; or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less sever stoke might have served the purpose. Under such conditions, an accused cannot be expected to reflect coolly nor wait after each blow to determine the effects thereof.^[188]

Further, the commentator Reyes opined that "[w]hether the means employed is reasonable, will depend upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character, size, and other circumstances, and those of the person defending himself, and also the place and occasion of the assault."^[189] Crucially, Reyes points out that "[p]erfect equality between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required, because the person assaulted does not have the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate and to choose which weapon to use."^[190]

And in People v. Samson,^[191] the Court therein considered that "the nature and location of wounds are considered important indicators whether or not to disprove a plea of self-defense."^[192] The Court noted that the victim therein suffered only a lone stab wound to the chest, which was seen as reasonable given the circumstances of the accused, viz.:

In the case at bench, the lone stab wound located on the victim's chest supports the argument that Cristina feared for her life and this fear impelled her to defend it by stabbing him. It was a reasonable means chosen by her in view of the attending circumstances, to wit: that her strong husband, who had earlier pointed the said knife to her throat, approached her and grabbed her arm, despite her plea that he refrain from coming near her; and that she had no other available means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand. She did not have the time or sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. In predicaments like this, human nature does not act upon the processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. When it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that act or to mitigate his liability.^[193] (Citations omitted)

Returning again to the facts and evidence of the present controversy, there actually seems to be a degree of equivalence between the American-made "Rambo"-style knife or bayonet of petitioner and the bolo knife wielded by the victim, despite the testimonies of petitioner, Benedicto, and Eddie Mar pointing to the victim's bolo knife as, in all likelihood, significantly longer in length than petitioner's knife. Moreover, the fact that petitioner inflicted only one wound upon the victim's person, which hit the latter in the right lower armpit and penetrated the victim's liver, becomes all the more reasonable considering the number of cuts and stab wounds petitioner and his relatives sustained due to the victim's bolo knife. Comparing this to the blows inflicted by the accused (who was duly acquitted) upon the victim in Olarbe, the reasonableness of the single stab wound here becomes even more evident. Clearly, petitioner's intention in only inflicting one blow is manifest: to simply stop the victim from causing any more bodily harm upon petitioner's relatives.

Going to the third and final requirement of lack of participation in the provocation of the person being defended (had there been indeed such provocation), the commentator Reyes opined the following:

The clause, "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked," used in stating the third requisite of defense of relatives does not mean that the relative defended should give provocation to the aggressor. The clause merely states an event which may or may not take place.

The phrase "in case" means "in the event that."

There is still a legitimate defense of relative even if the relative being defended has given provocation, provided that the one defending such relative has no part in the provocation.

Reason for the rule:

That although the provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do not reach the defender who took no part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a relative.^[194]

Reyes also explained how "[t]he fact that the relative defended gave provocation is immaterial," viz.:

Thus, even if A had slapped the face of B who, as a consequence of the act of A, immediately commenced to retaliate by drawing a knife and trying to stab A and C, father of A killed B in defense of his son, C is completely justified, notwithstanding the fact that the provocation was given by his son A.

But if C had induced his son A to injure B, thereby taking part in the provocation made by A, C would not be completely justified in killing B while the latter was about to stab A, because the third requisite of defense of relative is lacking.

Suppose, the person defending his relative was also induced by revenge or hatred, would there be a legitimate defense of relative? As long as the three requisites of defense of relatives are present, it will still be a legitimate defense.^[195]

In Cano, the Court also had the occasion to expound on the principle, albeit with a focus on the justifying circumstance of self-defense, viz.:

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act committed and that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.^[196] (Citations omitted)

From the facts and evidence of the present controversy, the only plausible provocation directed towards the victim by petitioner's nephew would have been the gun-pointing that came after the victim's initial assault. However, nothing in the record points to any participation on the part of petitioner, with the trial court even noting in its erroneous speculation that petitioner and Rother were standing by at the ready-to-fight the victim if necessary. There is nothing to indicate that petitioner prompted his nephew to brandish a gun, or even to show that the victim gave his nephew any weapon. Moreover, to surmise that Eric's gun-pointing was provocative in the first place would be to discount entirely the fact that it was the victim's threatening and violent behavior that prompted the drawing and brandishing of such firearm in the first place. It is an obvious statement, then, that it is not provocation when one acts in preparation to defend oneself from an impending attack, and that there is an element of reasonable proportionality here between the victim's unlawful aggression and petitioner's defensive response.^[197]

And crucially, petitioner's supposed encounters antecedent to the incident, i.e., his supposed remark directed towards the victim which the latter took to mean that petitioner was insulting the victim's earning capacity, and petitioner's handling of the situation of the motorcycle of the victim's son, cannot possibly be considered as petitioner's participation in provoking the victim to violent anger. Such events were clearly so cut off by the long intervening time between them and the incident that night. Again, the trial court's surmises and speculations in its Decision dated July 28, 2015 come to view, and the Court must reiterate here that the conclusions that petitioner and his relatives had somehow agreed to the confrontation that happened, and that they were in the wrong in preparing themselves for the assault (which, clearly, they and especially petitioner, were not), cannot stand to be uncorrected here.

All in all, the Court here finds that petitioner was actually able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed was justified in killing the victim in order to defend his nephew. His state of mind at the time of the incident, the independent accounts that verify the victim's unlawful aggression (that did not cease until the said victim was mortally wounded) and petitioner's retrieval of the knife from the utility box in his motorcycle nearby, and the undoubted fact that petitioner and his relatives sustained multiple cuts and stab wounds due to the victim's bolo knife attack, all point to a harrowing ordeal that petitioner and his relatives had to endure, and which only and finally ended when the victim was effectively neutralized with just one stab to his right lower armpit. The Court also notes that petitioner had to endure the longer and even more harrowing ordeal of court proceedings (both trial and appellate) that has lasted a little over 17 years. He now merits the Court's favorable action, which lawfully confirms his justification in defending his own kin within the third civil degree of consanguinity that fateful night.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 28, 2015 of Branch 51, Regional Trial Court of Carmen, Bohol in Criminal Case No. 0954, as well as the Decision dated February 22, 2019 and the Resolution dated August 28, 2020 of the Court of Appeals 20^th Division in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02697, are all REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Floro Galorio y Gapas is thus ACQUITTED on the ground of DEFENSE OF A RELATIVE in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Petitioner Floro Galorio y Gapas is also ADJUDGED and DECLARED to be NOT CIVILLY LIABLE to the heirs of the late Andres G. Muring, Sr.

Petitioner Floro Galorio y Gapas is also ORDERED to be IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from confinement if he is still detained, unless he is being held for other lawful case.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Caguioa (Chairperson) and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Inting^* and Singh,^* JJ., on official business.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 3-23.

^[2] Id. at 32-44; penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga.

^[3] Id. at 27-30; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Emily R. Ali o-Geluz and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga.

^[4] Id. at 45-68; penned by Executive Presiding Judge Patsita Sarmiento-Gamutan.

^[5] Records, pp. 46-47.

^[6] Id. at 46.

^[7] Id. at 52-53.

^[8] Id.

^[9] Id. at 4.

^[10] Id. at 5.

^[11] Id.

^[12] Id. at 6-7.

^[13] Spelled as "Erik" or "Erick" in some parts of the record.

^[14] Records, pp. 8-9.

^[15] Id. at 10-11.

^[16] Id. at 22.

^[17] Id. at 12.

^[18] Id. at 13-14.

^[19] Id. at 15 and 16.

^[20] Id. at 17.

^[21] Id. at 18.

^[22] Id.

^[23] Id. at 19.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Id. at 20.

^[26] TSN, Leoncio Cagande, November 10, 2008, p. 2.

^[27] TSN, Leoncio Cagande, September 14, 2009, p. 4.

^[28] Id. at 6.

^[29] Id.

^[30] Id. at 7.

^[31] Id. at 8.

^[32] Id. at 14.

^[33] Id. at 15.

^[34] Id. at 17.

^[35] Id. at 25.

^[36] TSN, Leoncio Cagande, October 5, 2009, pp. 9-10.

^[37] Id. at 11.

^[38] TSN, Leoncio Cagande, December 7, 2009, pp. 2-3.

^[39] TSN, Antonio Muring, March 15, 2010, p. 3.

^[40] Id. at 6-7.

^[41] Id. at 7.

^[42] Id.

^[43] Id. at 8.

^[44] TSN, Floro Galorio, October 27, 2011, pp. 5-6.

^[45] Id. at 6.

^[46] Id. at 6-7. Note, however, the TSN, Floro Galorio, May 3, 2012, p. 5, which indicate that petitioner demonstrated the length of the victim's bolo to have been more or 24 inches.

^[47] Id. at 7.

^[48] Id. at 8.

^[49] TSN, Floro Galorio, May 3, 2012, p. 8.

^[50] Id.

^[51] Id.

^[52] Id. at 9-10.

^[53] TSN, Floro Galorio, August 14, 2012, p. 2.

^[54] Id. at 3.

^[55] Id. at 4.

^[56] Id. at 7.

^[57] TSN, Floro Galorio, September 4, 2012, p. 5.

^[58] Id. at 7.

^[59] Id.

^[60] TSN, Benedicto Baluran, September 6, 2012, p. 3.

^[61] Id. at 5.

^[62] Id. at 6-8.

^[63] Id. at 8.

^[64] TSN, Eddie Mar Galagar, September 25, 2012, pp. 3-4.

^[65] Id. at 5.

^[66] Id. at 8.

^[67] TSN, Eddie Mar Galagar, September 27, 2012, p. 3.

^[68] Id. at 4.

^[69] TSN, Rother Galorio, October 16, 2012, p. 3.

^[70] Id.

^[71] Id. at 4.

^[72] Id.

^[73] Id. at 5.

^[74] Id. at 5-6.

^[75] Id. at 6.

^[76] Id.

^[77] Rollo, p. 68.

^[78] Id. at 64.

^[79] Id. at 64-65.

^[80] Id. at 66-67.

^[81] Id. at 67-68.

^[82] Id. at 69.

^[83] Id. at 43.

^[84] Id. at 35-36.

^[85] Id. at 36-41.

^[86] Id. at 42-43.

^[87] 783 Phil. 806 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[88] Rollo, pp. 109-116.

^[89] Id. at 29-30.

^[90] Id. at 137-155.

^[91] 335 Phil. 1163 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[92] Id. at 1168-1169. See also Tabingo v. People, G.R. No. 241610, February 1, 2021 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; Alburo v. People, 792 Phil. 876, 889 (2016); Macayan, Jr. v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 215-216 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] and Salcedo v. People, 400 Phil. 1302, 1308-1309 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[93] 735 Phil. 663 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].

^[94] Id. at 215, citing Seguritan v. People, 632 Phil. 415, 418 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]: "In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial [sic] evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below."

^[95] 484 Phil. 899 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

^[96] Id. at 917.

^[97] 714 Phil. 55 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

^[98] Id. at 61.

^[99] G.R. Nos. 206438 & 210141-42, July 31, 2016.

^[100] Id.

^[101] Id.

^[102] Id.

^[103] 871 Phil. 390 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. See also Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3, 2021 [Per J. Zalameda, First Division].

^[104] Id. at 395.

^[105] Records, p. 43.

^[106] Id. at 57.

^[107] Id. at 62.

^[108] Id. at 72. Order dated October 19, 2006, 73 (Notice of Arraignment of even date), and 77 (Certificate of Arraignment dated January 8, 2007).

^[109] Id. at 78 (Minutes of Session, January 6, 2007) and 79 (Order of even date).

^[110] Id. at 81 (Memorandum/Notice of the Trial Court dated March 9, 2007).

^[111] Id. at 83 (Minutes of Session, June 25, 2007) and 84 (Order of even date).

^[112] Id. at 92 (Minutes of Session, September 24, 2007) and 93 (Order of even date).

^[113] Id. at 104 (Minutes of Session, January 11, 2008) and 105 (Order of even date).

^[114] Id. at 112 (Minutes of Session, March 3, 2008), and 113 (Order of even date).

^[115] Id. at 116 (Minutes of Session, June 23, 2008) and 117 (Order of even date).

^[116] Id. at 123-124.

^[117] Id. at 127-132.

^[118] Id. at 142.

^[119] Id. at 153-154.

^[120] Id. at 157 (Minutes of Session, October 27, 2008) and 159 (Order of even date). See TSN (of even date), pp. 1-8.

^[121] Id. at 162 (Minutes of Session, November 10, 2008) and 163 (Order of even date). See TSN (of even date), pp. 1-3.

^[122] Id. at 167 (Minutes of Session, November 24, 2008) and 168 (Order of even date).

^[123] Id. at 170.

^[124] Id. at 171 (Minutes of Session, July 5, 2009) and 172 (Order of even date).

^[125] Id. at 173 (Minutes of Session, September 14, 2008).

^[126] Id. at 174 (Minutes of Session, September 28, 2008) and 175 (Order of even date).

^[127] Id. at 178 (Minutes of Session, October 5, 2009).

^[128] Id. at 179 (Minutes of Session, December 7, 2009).

^[129] Id. at 180 (Minutes of Session, January 11, 2010).

^[130] Id. at 186 (Minutes of Session, January 18, 2010).

^[131] Id. at 189.

^[132] Id. at 193.

^[133] Id. at 194 (Minutes of Session, February 1, 2010).

^[134] Id. at 201.

^[135] Id. at 202 (Minutes of Session, February 15, 2010).

^[136] Id. at 206 (Minutes of Session, March 8, 2010) and 207 (Order of even date).

^[137] Id. at 216 (Minutes of Session, March 15, 2010) and 217 (Order 0f even date).

^[138] Id. at 222 (Minutes of Session, April 26, 2010) and 223 (Order of even date).

^[139] Id. at 224 (Minutes of Session, August 23, 2010) and 225 (Order of even date).

^[140] Id. at 233 (Minutes of Session, September 20, 2010).

^[141] Id. at 234-235.

^[142] Id. at 236-246.

^[143] Id. at 260.

^[144] Id. at 263-264.

^[145] Id. at 265 (Minutes of Session, October 27, 2011) and 266 (Order of even date). See TSN (of even date), pp. 1-10.

^[146] Id. at 269.

^[147] Id. at 277.

^[148] Id. at 279 (Minutes of Session, May 3, 2012) and 280 (Order of even date).

^[149] Id. at 288 (Minutes of Session, August 14, 2012) and 289 (Order of even date).

^[150] Id. at 295 (Minutes of Session, September 4, 2012) and 296 (Order of even date).

^[151] Id. at 302 (Minutes of Session, September 6, 2012) and 303 (Order of even date).

^[152] Id. at 303.

^[153] Id. at 307 (Minutes of Session, September 25, 2012) and 308 (Order of even date).

^[154] Id. at 312 (Minutes of Session, September 27, 2012) and 313 (Order of even date).

^[155] Id. at 319 (Minutes of Session, October 2, 2012) and 320 (Order of even date).

^[156] Id. at 324 (Minutes of Session, October 16, 2012) and 325 (Order of even date).

^[157] Id. at 326 (Minutes of Session, January 3, 2013) and 327 (Order of even date).

^[158] Id. at 333.

^[159] Id. at 334 (Minutes of Session, February 18, 2014) and 335 (Order of even date).

^[160] See TSN, Rother Galorio, May 20, 2014, pp. 1-14.

^[161] Records, pp. 338 (Minutes of Session, July 29, 2015) and 339-362 (Decision of the Trial Court).

^[162] Id. at 127-132 (Minutes of Session, June 23, 2008) and 117 (Order of even date).

^[163] 517 Phil. 588 (2006) [Per C.J. Panganiban, First Division].

^[164] Id. at 600. (Emphases supplied).

^[165] 446 Phil. 496 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

^[166] Id.

^[167] 526 Phil. 239 (2006) [Per J. Corona, Second Division].

^[168] Id. at 245.

^[169] See People v. Hernandez, et al., 531 Phil. 289 (2006) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

^[170] See, among others, Domondon v. Sandiganbayan, 512 Phil. 852 (2005) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division, citing People v. Tee, 443 Phil. 521 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, En Banc], and Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 424 Phil. 945 (2002) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. See also Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, 393 Phil. 172 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes].

^[171] TSN, Floro Galorio, October 27, 2011, pp. 6-8.

Q	While watching that coronation, what other things transpired, if any?
A	And Andres Muring arrived.
Q	The same Andres Muring who is the father of that Christopher Muring?
A	Yes.
Q	When he arrived, meaning when Andres Muring arrived, how far was he to where you were located?
A	Very near. He was at my side when he arrived.
Q	Did this Andres Muring say anything upon his arrival?
A	And he said, "What do you want pre, we will kill each other?"
Q	Did you know to whom Andres Muring directed such statement?
A	It was directed to me.
Q	With such statement coming from Andres Muring, what else happened?
A	And he hacked me.
Q	What did he use in hacking you?
A	A bolo.
INTERPRETER:
	And witness is indicating the length of the bolo which is 15 inches more or less.
ATTY. J. ALBERT R. TINAMPAY: (to witness)
Q	Were you hit when he delivered that hacking blow?
A	I was hit on my fingers.
INTERPRETER:
	And witness is showing his right palm and pointing to the two digits finger.
ATTY. J. ALBERT R. TINAMPAY: (to witness)
	Please show or point out to the Honorable Court which particular finger was hit that hacking blow?
INTERPRETER:
	And the witness is indicating his small finger and the ring finger and added that the ring finger was cut off and it was reconnected.
ATTY. J. ALBERT R. TINAMPAY: (to witness)
Q	Aside from that ring finger which you said was cut off but later on reconnected, do you have any scars to show to the Honorable Court as a result of that hacking blow?
A	Yes.
INTERPRETER:
	And witness is showing a long scar at the side of his right palm from the base of the small finger up to the side of the palm down to the writ.
ATTY. J. ALBERT R. TINAMPAY: (to witness)
Q	If you know, where is that bolo used by Andres Muring during that time?
A	He brought with him the bolo.
Q	After delivering that hacking blow resulting to the cutting off of your ring finger and the corresponding scar down on the side of your palm, what else happened?
A	And he stabbed me.
Q	Were you hit with the second blow which was to stab you?
A	Yes.
INTERPRETER:
	And witness is unfolding his shirt and showing a scar on his abdomen a big scar measuring 4 to 5 inches at the left side and there is also a scar measuring 2 inches and also a 2-inches scar situated at the right side of his abdomen.
ATTY. J. ALBERT R. TINAMPAY: (to witness)
Q	On the first blow cutting your rights ring finger, was there any occasion that you ever hit back Andres Muring?
A	I was not able to hit him back when he hacked my small ring because he immediately stabbed me.
Q	After you were stabbed hitting your stomach, was there any occasion that you were able to hit back Andres Muring.
A	It was when he also stabbed my nephew that I was able to hit him back.
Q	What is the name of that nephew of yours that was subsequently stabbed?
A	Eric Galorio.

^[172] TSN, Floro Galorio, May 3, 2012, pp. 8-9.

Q	So, when your nephew Erik was already wounded, what happened next?
A	I went up and got near to Andres Muring because Andres Muring is pinning down to Erik.
Q	In your observation what was Andres Muring doing while pinning down your nephew Erik?
A	It is just very near, from here to a distance of 2 meters.
Q	So, observing what Andres Muring was continuously doing to your nephew, what happened next?
A	I went to my motorcycle which was parked nearby and opened my toolbox and get my bayonet.
Q	Were you able to get hold of the bayonet of the toolbox of your motorcycle?
A	Yes.
Q	Your physical condition at that time while you were already suffering 2 wounds on your body, please describe it to the Honorable Court?
A	I already have a blurred sight and I was even holding my intestine that protruding from my stomach.
Q	So, with that condition what did you do with your bayonet?
A	I stabbed Andres Muring and hit his left lower armpit.
ATTY. J. ALBERT TINAMPAY: (to witness)
Q	What was your purpose in delivering that stabbing blow to Andres Muring?
A	So that he won't kill us.
Q	With that Andres Muring was already hit by you, what happened to Andres Muring?
A	He went away.
Q	What about you, what did you do after Andres Muring left?
A	We ride a motorcycle ad go to the municipal hall office of Alicia.

^[173] LUIS REYES, I CRIMINAL LAW: THE REVISED PENAL CODE (2021 ed.), p. 207.

^[174] 807 Phil. 438 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

^[175] Id. at 449.

^[176] 698 Phil. 706 (2012) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[177] Id. at 719.

^[178] LUIS REYES, I CRIMlNAL LAW: THE REVISED PENAL CODE (2021 ed.), pp. 175-176.

^[179] 836 Phil. 1015 (2018) [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division]. See also Abuyo v. People, G.R. No. 250495, July 6, 2022 [Per J. Lopez, M., Second Division].

^[180] Id. at 1026.

^[181] Id. at 1027.

^[182] Id. at 1028.

^[183] Id.

^[184] Id. at 1028-1029.

^[185] 17 Phil. 260 (1910) [Per J. Trent].

^[186] See People v. Rabandaban, 85 Phil. 636 (1950) [Per J. Reyes].

^[187] 459 Phil. 416 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

^[188] Id. at 436.

^[189] LUIS REYES, I CRIMINAL LAW: THE REVISED PENAL CODE (2021 ed.), p. 196.

^[190] Id.

^[191] 768 Phil. 487 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

^[192] Id. at 499-500.

^[193] Id. at 500.

^[194] LUIS REYES, I CRIMINAL LAW: THE REVISED PENAL CODE (2021 ed.), pp. 210-211.

^[195] Id. at 211.

^[196] Cano v. People, 459 Phil. 416, 436-437 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

^[197] See Velasquez v. People, 807 Phil. 438 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].