SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 263449, November 13, 2023 ]
XXX,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, J., J.:
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting XXX of a violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act.
The Antecedents
The instant case stemmed from an Information filed against XXX, the accusatory portion of which reads:
The prosecution narrated that XXX was married to AAA. In October 2007, AAA found XXX and their househelper, BBB, kissing in the kitchen of their house. AAA confronted them, and she and XXX had an intense fight. AAA spent the night at her parents' house. Returning to their home, she found their house empty as XXX and BBB had already left. She suspected that XXX went to xxxxxxxxxxx, his province.[6] Since their fight, XXX did not return to their residence. In 2013, AAA subsequently found out through Facebook that XXX had a child with BBB.[7]
AAA alleged that she suffered emotionally from the distress brought about by the abandonment and infidelity of XXX. She alleged that she also suffered anxiety as they had contracted multiple loans to finance their business and she was left alone to pay for these. She was also diagnosed with abnormalities in her uterus and myomi uteri which caused vaginal bleeding for months, contributing to her anemia and causing her to undergo surgery.[8]
On the part of the defense, XXX denied the affair, but candidly admitted that he and BBB are now living together with a daughter. He maintained that the case filed against him was baseless. XXX countered that their separation was mutually agreed upon and was brought about at the instigation of AAA's parents, who allegedly disapproved of him.[9]
In its Decision, the RTC found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal to the CA.[13]
In its Decision,[14] the CA affirmed XXX's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
XXX then sought for a reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution.[17]
Hence, this Petition.
Issue
The question for this Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of XXX for a violation of Republic Act No. 9262.
This Court's Ruling
The CA Decision must be affirmed, as the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of XXX beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 defines psychological violence as follows:
Here, the fact that AAA is a woman and married to XXX is undisputed.
The third and fourth elements are likewise present. XXX caused emotional anguish to AAA when he abandoned her to be with BBB.
In the recent case of Mangalino v. People,[20] this Court, in affirming the conviction of the accused, ruled that the husband's abandonment of his family constituted psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.[21]
A perusal of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 would reveal that it does not contain an exclusive list of what constitutes psychological violence as shown by the phrase "such as but not limited to." Instead, it defines psychological violence as any act or omission causing mental or emotional suffering to the victim. To recapitulate, Section 5(i) punishes the act of causing mental or emotional anguish to the woman, including emotional abuse. Undoubtedly, a husband's abandonment of his wife falls under psychological violence and emotional abuse penalized under Republic Act No. 9262, as such an action would naturally cause mental and emotional suffering to the wife, a person whom the husband is obliged to cohabit with, love, respect, and give support to.[22] Indeed, under Article 68 of the Family Code "the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." These obligations could not be fulfilled should the husband abandon the wife. In practice, these obligations need not even be dictated by law, as these naturally arise as part of human nature between two individuals sharing their love with each other. Sudden abandonment without any explanation would certainly cause emotional anguish.
In this case, the Information clearly alleged that XXX caused AAA mental or emotional anguish through his actions of leaving the conjugal dwelling and abandoning AAA. This was established in the testimony of AAA, thus:
Further, the emotional anguish suffered by AAA was exacerbated when their conjugal debts were left unpaid, thus:
It is settled in jurisprudence that the positive testimony of the victim prevails over the bare denial of the accused. Here, XXX even admitted having a child with BBB and cohabiting with her at present.
In fine, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Republic Act No. 9262.
Notably, in convicting XXX, the RTC and the CA harped primarily on his marital infidelity. However, as Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez aptly pointed out, there is insufficient evidence to show that marital infidelity is the cause of the psychological violence suffered by AAA. Rather, what the evidence clearly shows is that his abandonment caused the emotional suffering of AAA. As explained by Justice Lopez:
Thus, we affirm with modification the penalty imposed upon XXX. He is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor. This Court also affirms the fine of PHP 100,000.00 and orders XXX to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 24, 2022 and the Resolution dated July 29, 2022 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner XXX is GUILTY of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
XXX is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor and to PAY a fine of PHP 100,000.00. He is also ORDERED to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and to report his compliance therewith to the court of origin within 15 days after the completion of such counseling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, J., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), I dissent. See separate opinion.
M. Lopez, J., please see concurring opinion.
Kho, Jr., J. I join the dissent of SAJ. Marvic Leonen.
* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9262 of the Revised Penal Code, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-45.
[2] Id. at 46-70. The January 24, 2022 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[3] Id. at 71-72. The July 29, 2022 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and concurred in by Associate Justices Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa and John Z. Lee of the Special Former Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[4] Id. at 10-11.
[5] Id. at 11.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 49-51.
[10] Id. at 16.
[11] Id. at 52.
[12] Id. at 108.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 46-70.
[15] Id. at 69.
[16] Id. at 62-68.
[17] Id. at 71-72.
[18] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[19] Id. at 373.
[20] G.R. No. 250051, February 3, 2020 [Notice, Second Division].
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Rollo, pp. 63-67.
[24] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[25] Id. at 919.
[26] Rollo, p. 11.
[27] Id. at 48-49.
[28] Letter dated October 10, 2023.
The instant case stemmed from an Information filed against XXX, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about and during the period comprised between November 1, 2007 and November 30, 2007 and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, the wedded husband of one private complainant [AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously leave the conjugal dwelling, desert or abandon the latter not knowing that the former had eloped or ran away with [BBB], their 17-year old working student, causing the said private complainant to look and search for the former for years, when in early part of 2010, browsing the "facebook" of the internet, the said private complainant saw pictures of respondent and [BBB] with a child, believed born to them on May 20, 2009, and which horrible discovery not only added, insult to the injury of mental and emotional anguish which the former had caused upon the latter due to the said accused disappearance and public humiliation but also physically, the private complainant [sic] health deteriorated when finally getting the scalpel in 2010.[4]Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial was conducted, then trial on the merits ensued.[5]
The prosecution narrated that XXX was married to AAA. In October 2007, AAA found XXX and their househelper, BBB, kissing in the kitchen of their house. AAA confronted them, and she and XXX had an intense fight. AAA spent the night at her parents' house. Returning to their home, she found their house empty as XXX and BBB had already left. She suspected that XXX went to xxxxxxxxxxx, his province.[6] Since their fight, XXX did not return to their residence. In 2013, AAA subsequently found out through Facebook that XXX had a child with BBB.[7]
AAA alleged that she suffered emotionally from the distress brought about by the abandonment and infidelity of XXX. She alleged that she also suffered anxiety as they had contracted multiple loans to finance their business and she was left alone to pay for these. She was also diagnosed with abnormalities in her uterus and myomi uteri which caused vaginal bleeding for months, contributing to her anemia and causing her to undergo surgery.[8]
On the part of the defense, XXX denied the affair, but candidly admitted that he and BBB are now living together with a daughter. He maintained that the case filed against him was baseless. XXX countered that their separation was mutually agreed upon and was brought about at the instigation of AAA's parents, who allegedly disapproved of him.[9]
In its Decision, the RTC found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding accused [XXX] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of section 5 (i) of R. A. No. 9262, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months[,] and one (1) day of prision correccional[,] as minimum[,] to twelve (12) years of prision mayor[,] as maximum, to pay a fine in the amount of [PHP] 100,000.00 and to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the Court.The RTC gave prime consideration to the testimony of AAA on the ordeal she suffered, which it found to be clear, categorical, and straightforward.[11] The RTC did not give any credence to the weak denial of XXX.[12]
SO ORDERED.[10]
Aggrieved, XXX filed an appeal to the CA.[13]
In its Decision,[14] the CA affirmed XXX's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 13 August 2019 promulgated by the RTC xxxxxxxxxxx of xxxxxxxxxxx, is AFFIRMED.The CA held that AAA's testimony was strong and credible, and that the abandonment and marital infidelity of XXX are forms of psychological violence, which is the proximate cause of AAA's emotional anguish and mental suffering. The denial of XXX was not given any weight, as such was a weak defense which could not prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.[16]
SO ORDERED.[15] (Emphasis in the original)
XXX then sought for a reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution.[17]
Hence, this Petition.
The question for this Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the conviction of XXX for a violation of Republic Act No. 9262.
The CA Decision must be affirmed, as the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of XXX beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 defines psychological violence as follows:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual[,] or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphasis supplied)In turn, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 punishes the infliction of psychological violence, which reads:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:In Dinamling v. People,[18] this Court enumerated the elements of psychological violence, as follows:
....
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis supplied)
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows.All the elements of psychological violence are present in the case at bar.
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children[,] or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.[19] (Citations omitted)
Here, the fact that AAA is a woman and married to XXX is undisputed.
The third and fourth elements are likewise present. XXX caused emotional anguish to AAA when he abandoned her to be with BBB.
In the recent case of Mangalino v. People,[20] this Court, in affirming the conviction of the accused, ruled that the husband's abandonment of his family constituted psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.[21]
A perusal of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 would reveal that it does not contain an exclusive list of what constitutes psychological violence as shown by the phrase "such as but not limited to." Instead, it defines psychological violence as any act or omission causing mental or emotional suffering to the victim. To recapitulate, Section 5(i) punishes the act of causing mental or emotional anguish to the woman, including emotional abuse. Undoubtedly, a husband's abandonment of his wife falls under psychological violence and emotional abuse penalized under Republic Act No. 9262, as such an action would naturally cause mental and emotional suffering to the wife, a person whom the husband is obliged to cohabit with, love, respect, and give support to.[22] Indeed, under Article 68 of the Family Code "the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." These obligations could not be fulfilled should the husband abandon the wife. In practice, these obligations need not even be dictated by law, as these naturally arise as part of human nature between two individuals sharing their love with each other. Sudden abandonment without any explanation would certainly cause emotional anguish.
In this case, the Information clearly alleged that XXX caused AAA mental or emotional anguish through his actions of leaving the conjugal dwelling and abandoning AAA. This was established in the testimony of AAA, thus:
As to the element of mental or emotional anguish, it was held in Araza v. People[24] that the testimony of the wife suffices to prove the emotional anguish caused by the actions of the husband, viz.:
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.[25] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)As shown in her testimony above, AAA suffered emotional anguish due to the act of XXX. The emotional stress of AAA even affected her physical health, as she was diagnosed with having abnormalities in her uterus or myomi uteri, causing her vaginal bleeding for months, which contributed to her anemia. She was even rushed to the hospital four times due to frequent vaginal bleeding. Ultimately, AAA underwent surgical operation to remove her uterus and uterine myomas.[26]
Further, the emotional anguish suffered by AAA was exacerbated when their conjugal debts were left unpaid, thus:
[AAA] and appellant were married on December 17, 2005. They lived together in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx for about one month and then later on transferred to a house near the Philippine National Bank (PNB), xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx. They operated carenderia and acoustic bar business in front of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx. They also had another carenderia in xxxxxxxxxxx, xxxxxxxxxxx. They operated the business for over a year. They contracted loans to finance their businesses: P40,000.00 from Rural Bank, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (sic) and P80,000.00 from [AAA]'s aunt, [CCC]. After a year, they stopped operating their businesses because appellant left [AAA]. Appellant abandoned [AAA] because he had an illicit affair with their house helper [BBB]. [AAA] discovered said illicit affair around the end of October 2007, when she saw appellant and [BBB] kissing in their kitchen one evening. [AAA] confronted appellant and [BBB] but appellant immediately left the kitchen and went to the living room and they had an intense fight. [AAA] felt devastated when appellant did not apologize so she went to her parents' house and spent the night there. She stayed in her parents' house for one night and one day and went back to their house near PNB but found out that appellant and [BBB] were no longer in the house. [AAA] had no idea where they went but she suspected that they went to xxxxxxxxxxx because appellant is from that place. [AAA] cried hard and was deeply hurt. She experienced emotional breakdown and mental anxiety. She could not sleep as she was always crying. She lost her appetite and she gradually lost weight. She developed anxiety because appellant abandoned her and there were loan obligations which had to be paid. She was also admitted to the hospital about four times between the period of September 2009 to April 2010 because of frequent vaginal bleeding and underwent surgical operation to remove her uterus and uterine myomas. Appellant never contacted [AAA] and she only new of appellant's whereabouts when she saw it in Facebook in 2013. She also learned that appellant had a child with [BBB] which caused emotional and physical distress. She confirmed that the child was the daughter of appellant and [BBB]. She felt that the world crushed (sic) on her that after years of not knowing where appellant was and bearing the pain of his abandonment, the realization that appellant father a child with their former house helper was painful and shattering.[27] (Emphasis supplied)Applying Araza, AAA's testimony is sufficient to prove that she suffered mental and emotional anguish due to the emotional abuse inflicted on her by XXX.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the positive testimony of the victim prevails over the bare denial of the accused. Here, XXX even admitted having a child with BBB and cohabiting with her at present.
In fine, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Republic Act No. 9262.
Notably, in convicting XXX, the RTC and the CA harped primarily on his marital infidelity. However, as Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez aptly pointed out, there is insufficient evidence to show that marital infidelity is the cause of the psychological violence suffered by AAA. Rather, what the evidence clearly shows is that his abandonment caused the emotional suffering of AAA. As explained by Justice Lopez:
Immediately before and after [XXX] was caught in 2007, there is no clear evidence of ongoing emotional harm caused by marital infidelity. Six years later, in 2013, the victim found out that [XXX] had a child with the house helper. Yet, during the interceding period of six years, it is unclear if [XXX] continued the illicit affairs or just left the conjugal dwelling to escape his marital vow so he could pursue his selfish desires.[28] (Emphasis supplied)Anent the imposable penalty, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262 reads:
SECTION 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:Thus, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262 and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be taken from prision mayor in its medium period, or eight years and one day to 10 years, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime. The minimum term of the penalty is that next lower in degree, which is prision correccional, in the sound discretion of this Court.
....
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
....
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, we affirm with modification the penalty imposed upon XXX. He is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor. This Court also affirms the fine of PHP 100,000.00 and orders XXX to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 24, 2022 and the Resolution dated July 29, 2022 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner XXX is GUILTY of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
XXX is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor and to PAY a fine of PHP 100,000.00. He is also ORDERED to undergo a mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and to report his compliance therewith to the court of origin within 15 days after the completion of such counseling or treatment.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, J., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), I dissent. See separate opinion.
M. Lopez, J., please see concurring opinion.
Kho, Jr., J. I join the dissent of SAJ. Marvic Leonen.
* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9262 of the Revised Penal Code, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-45.
[2] Id. at 46-70. The January 24, 2022 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa of the Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[3] Id. at 71-72. The July 29, 2022 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN was penned by Associate Justice Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan and concurred in by Associate Justices Anisah B. Amanodin-Umpa and John Z. Lee of the Special Former Twenty-First Division, Court of Appeals, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[4] Id. at 10-11.
[5] Id. at 11.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 49-51.
[10] Id. at 16.
[11] Id. at 52.
[12] Id. at 108.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 46-70.
[15] Id. at 69.
[16] Id. at 62-68.
[17] Id. at 71-72.
[18] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[19] Id. at 373.
[20] G.R. No. 250051, February 3, 2020 [Notice, Second Division].
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Rollo, pp. 63-67.
[24] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[25] Id. at 919.
[26] Rollo, p. 11.
[27] Id. at 48-49.
[28] Letter dated October 10, 2023.
LEONEN, SAJ.:
To be abandoned can indeed be one of the most painful experiences a person can have in their life. However, it is my view that spousal abandonment, in and of itself, cannot be considered a violation of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i). Apart from the act of abandonment, there must be proof of the accused's intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the abandoned spouse. Hurt feelings are not enough for conviction.
I add that abandonment, like marital infidelity, is a violation primarily of the essential marital obligations of spouses to each other. Considering that it is, fundamentally, a violation of civil and matrimonial law, the liability for it should likewise be civil in nature. To criminalize civil law violations can have dire constitutional consequences, including infringing on the right to life and liberty, and to autonomy and human dignity.
I therefore dissent.
Petitioner XXX was convicted of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004. The provision states:
The elements of the crime of violating Section 5(i) are: (1) the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) the woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode; (3) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) the anguish is caused through the acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children, or access to the children or similar such acts or omission.[1]
- SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
- ....
According to the ponencia, the prosecution proved all the elements of violation of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i).[2] It highlights how XXX, in abandoning his wife AAA, caused her emotional anguish.[3] It cites AAA's testimony on how her physical health suffered upon learning that XXX actually eloped with their former helper, even fathering a child with the latter.[4] The unpaid conjugal debts are likewise cited as reason for XXX's conviction.[5]
Without discounting the pain and emotional anguish AAA may have experienced when XXX left her, I disagree that XXX violated Section 5(i). A review of Republic Act No. 9262 reveals that a conviction for Section 5(i) violations requires deliberate intent to inflict emotional anguish on the accused's wife or their child. This deliberate intent is the element that the prosecution failed to establish in this case.
In Acharon v. People,[6] this Court had the occasion to rule that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, at least with respect to "denial of financial support," is dolo in nature. This means that Section 5(i) violations must be committed with the deliberate intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman and her child to warrant a conviction. In Acharon, the accused and his wife loaned PHP 85,000.00 from his wife's godmother as placement fee. He then left for Brunei in 2011 to work as a delivery rider.
At first, Acharon was able to send money to his wife but eventually failed to do so. When his wife learned that he allegedly kept a paramour, she charged him with violation of Section 5(i) for denying her financial support.
In his defense, Acharon contended that he initially sent money to his wife totaling to PHP 71,000.00. However, because a fire had razed his apartment, and he got into a vehicular accident that cost him USD 1,000.00 in medical expenses, he eventually failed to provide financial support to his wife. He likewise denied that he kept a paramour, although he admitted that he encouraged his wife to look for another man. After trial, Acharon was convicted as charged.
On appeal, this Court acquitted Acharon. In so ruling, this Court first examined the text of Section 5(i) and held that "denial" in "denial of financial support" denotes "refusal to satisfy a request or desire"[7] or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something."[8] Thus, according to the Court, "denial of financial support" requires willfulness or "an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something."[9] Excluded are instances where the accused merely failed or is unable to provide financial support, even if the woman experienced mental or emotional anguish.[10]
This Court addressed the misconception that only acts punished under the Revised Penal Code are mala in se or "inherently wrong or depraved,"[11] while those punished under special laws, such as Republic Act No. 9262, are mala prohibita. While this is generally true, this Court explained that there are special laws that punish crimes mala in se, the same way that the Revised Penal Code punishes some crimes mala prohibita. Among those special laws that punish crimes mala in se is Republic Act No. 9262, because the language used in the law "requires a mental element."[12] Violations of Republic Act No. 9262 being crimes mala in se, this Court held that such violations require both actus reus, or "the external or overt acts or omission included in a crime's definition;"[13] and mens rea, or the "accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying the actus reus."[14] This Court continues:
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5 (i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support." there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5 (i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and be proven in court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5 (i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262.In acquitting Acharon, the Court found that he, for a time, provided financial support to his wife. He only failed to continue to support his wife because of the fire that had razed his apartment in Brunei and the vehicular accident that he had gotten into. More importantly, this Court held that Acharon's lack of financial support was not a "willful refusal" to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife, just an inability to do so. With no mens rea to accompany the actus reus, the Court held that Acharon "cannot be held guilty of violating Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262."[16]
"It bears emphasis that Section 5 (i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5 (i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5 (i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5 (i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.[15] (Citations omitted)
Applying Acharon here by analogy, I am of the view that XXX is not guilty of violating Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i) when he left AAA for their helper. For XXX to be criminally punished for abandoning AAA, there must be evidence on record that he willfully did so to inflict moral and emotional anguish on her. This evidence of deliberate intent is lacking in this case.
The prosecution heavily dwelled on AAA's testimony on the emotional anguish she experienced. However, there is no evidence that XXX left her to inflict mental or emotional anguish on her. As was held in Acharon, evidence of the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the woman is not enough for conviction. With no evidence of XXX's intent to inflict emotional anguish on AAA, he cannot be convicted of violating Section 5(i), even if AAA experienced emotional anguish.
The same is true with marital infidelity, for which XXX was convicted, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. There must be proof that he strayed with the specific intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish on his wife to be convicted. While it is true that Section 3(a)(C)[17] of Republic Act No. 9262 mentions "marital infidelity" as an example of "psychological violence," the specific intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish remains necessary because it is Section 5(i), not Section 3(a)(C), that specifically enumerates the acts considered as crimes under Republic Act No. 9262. And under Section 5(i), the act should have been done precisely to cause mental or emotional anguish on the woman. To repeat, this intent was not proven in this case.
A deeper reason exists for punishing spousal abandonment or marital infidelity as psychological violence only if there is proof of the intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the wife and/or child. As explained in Garcia v. Drilon,[18] Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to address the unequal power relations between men and women, with society considering men as the more dominant sex.[19] With this perceived dominance comes the need to control women to maintain the upper hand, and violence against women is one such form of control.[20] Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted precisely to prevent and punish this coercive control.
Therefore, for an act to be considered as violence against women and children under Republic Act No. 9262, it should be done to control the woman and maintain power and dominance over her. Within the context of spousal abandonment or marital infidelity, it can only be considered psychological violence if it is done with the intent of inflicting mental and emotional anguish on the woman to control or otherwise manipulate her into submission.
The facts of this case show that XXX left AAA not because he wanted to inflict mental or emotional anguish on her, but because, for reasons known only to XXX, he just did not want to be with AAA anymore. It appears that XXX abandoned AAA not to control but to cut ties with her. From 2007, when XXX left AAA, to 2013, when AAA learned through Facebook that XXX fathered a child with their former helper, XXX never returned to the conjugal residence. There is also no evidence that XXX contacted AAA after he left. On the contrary, it was AAA who actively searched for him on Facebook.
I do not doubt the pain and emotional anguish AAA experienced when XXX abandoned her. The hurt from the betrayal was probably excruciating, especially since her husband eloped with someone she trusted enough to allow in her home. However, with no proof that XXX left AAA specifically to inflict mental and emotional anguish on her, I am not ready to vote for XXX's conviction.
My vote for acquittal does not mean that XXX cannot be held liable for his actions. Article 68[21] of the Family Code obliges spouses to live together and observe mutual fidelity, and XXX, based on the facts of this case, did not comply with these essential marital obligations. Considering that the law violated is civil in nature, only civil remedies may be pursued against XXX.
Under Article 55(10)[22] of the Family Code, spousal abandonment for more than one year, if without justifiable cause, is a ground for filing a petition for legal separation. A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36[23] of the Family Code may likewise be filed if it can be proven that the abandonment is a manifestation of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
For marital infidelity, a petition for legal separation may be filed if it can be proven that the infidelity was sexual in nature.[24] If it can be proven that the marital infidelity is a manifestation of psychological incapacity, again, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage may likewise be filed. Furthermore, a complaint for damages under Article 26[25] of the Civil Code may be filed against the alleged paramour for meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of the offended spouse. All these remedies can be pursued to hold XXX civilly liable.
To hold XXX criminally liable for what should only be a civil liability will entail violation of the Constitution. To imprison consenting adults for their private sexual activities is to violate their rights to life and liberty protected under the due process clause.[26] It is likewise a violation of their right to privacy, with the State interfering into what should be a private matter between sexual partners.[27]
Furthermore, criminalizing activities the State has no business meddling in is to violate its people's dignity.[28] Conviction brings about shame and stigma, making it difficult for former convicts to walk back to their old life and reclaim their dignity. Instead of intruding into peoples' private lives, the State should criminalize activities that are truly deserving of its outrage, such as "breach[es] of the security and peace of the people at large . . . against the very sovereignty of the State."[29]
Instead of applying the morality of some to others, the State should empower couples to exercise their autonomy and decide for themselves what constitutes cheating. Society, through our laws on marital infidelity, assumes that monogamy is the norm when there are intimate partners who agree[30] to or are indifferent[31] to nonmonogamy. If the latter case is true, intimate partners should be allowed to sexually engage with others outside of the relationship without fear of our criminal laws being weaponized against them. The Legislative, in legislating against domestic violence, should acquaint itself with the myriad permutations and configurations of intimate relationships.
Assuming the truth of the allegations in this case, what XXX violated was his marital obligation to live with AAA. However, with no proof that he did so with the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish on her, XXX cannot be convicted of violating Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to the GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the January 24, 2022 Decision and July 29, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01923-MIN. Petitioner XXX must be ACQUITTED of violating Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i).
[1] See Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[2] Ponencia, p. 4.
[3] Id. at 5-7.
[4] Id. at 5-6.
[5] Id. at 7.
[6] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[7] Id. (Citation omitted)
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Republic Act No. 9262, sec. 3(a)(C) provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
....
C. |
"Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. |
[18] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[19] Id. at 91. See also J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 171 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. I am of the view that violence in intimate relationships should not be seen simply as a gender issue, especially considering cases where the woman wields more power than the man. Rather, domestic violence is a power issue.
[20] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91-92 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[21] FAMILY CODE, art. 68 provides:
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[22] FAMILY CODE, art. 55( 10) provides:
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
[23] FAMILY CODE, art. 36, as amended by Executive Order 227, provides:
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[24] FAMILY CODE, art. 55(8) provides:
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion[.]
See Philippine Commission on Women, Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, Philippine Commission on Women, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/20l9/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery-and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on November 9, 2023).
[25] CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
See Philippine Commission on Women, Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, Philippine Commission on Women, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/20l9/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery-and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on November 9, 2023).
[25] CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
....
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another[.]
See Philippine Commission on Women, Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, Philippine Commission on Women, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery-and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on November 9, 2023).
[26] CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[27] See Philippine Commission on Women, Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, Philippine Commission on Women, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery-and-Concubinagc-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on November 9, 2023).
[28] See Tan-Andal v. Andal, 902 Phil. 558, 595 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203-204 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. This Court said that "[t]he state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties."
[29] See Baviera v. Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 119 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division], where this Court defined what a "crime" is.
[30] See ESTHER PEREL, THE STATE OF AFFAIRS: RETHINKING INFIDELITY (2017). See also ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY: SEX, LIES AND DOMESTIC BLISS (2007).
[31] See AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]. In this case, this Court recognized that situations where the infidelity may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the other spouse.
[26] CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[27] See Philippine Commission on Women, Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, Philippine Commission on Women, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery-and-Concubinagc-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on November 9, 2023).
[28] See Tan-Andal v. Andal, 902 Phil. 558, 595 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc], citing J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203-204 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. This Court said that "[t]he state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties."
[29] See Baviera v. Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 119 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division], where this Court defined what a "crime" is.
[30] See ESTHER PEREL, THE STATE OF AFFAIRS: RETHINKING INFIDELITY (2017). See also ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY: SEX, LIES AND DOMESTIC BLISS (2007).
[31] See AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]. In this case, this Court recognized that situations where the infidelity may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the other spouse.
M. LOPEZ, J.:
I register my concurrence with the ponencia, which affirmed the conviction of the accused xxxxxxxxxxx (xxxxxxx) for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262[1] or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 committed against his wife xxxxxxxxxxx (xxxxxxx). Contrary to the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court's ratiocinations, I respectfully opine that the crime of psychological violence resulted not from marital infidelity per se on the part of xxxxx but on his acts of abandoning xxxxxxx and leaving her alone to pay for their conjugal debts.
Prefatorily, psychological violence under Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262 is a crime mala in se that requires proof of the accused's criminal intent. This is because violence, regardless of form and means, is inherently depraved and immoral. The law also does not punish marital infidelity per se but psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.[2] Indeed, not all kinds of suffering within the context of intimate relationships should be considered psychological violence. The Court must consider the entire factual setting surrounding each case of marital infidelity to determine the evil intent to cause psychological violence which refers to the means employed by the perpetrator, and the mental or emotional anguish which pertains to the effect caused or the damage sustained by the offended party.
In several cases, the Court convicted the husbands not because of marital infidelity per se but based on their evil intent and the psychological trauma and deep hurt that their wives suffered due to the illicit relationship. The marital infidelity of the husband was coupled with other significant factors ranging from abandonment of the family and cohabitation with the paramour in another place, eviction of the wife and children from the family home, deprivation of financial support, keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, repeated verbal abuse and threats against the wife and her children, resumption of affair with the paramour, and public display of marital infidelity.[3]
The Court cannot oversimplify the complexity of marital infidelity and its relationship with psychological violence. Marital infidelity is an abstruse and multifaceted concept. Many permutations of interactions reshape perceptions and responses to infidelity. What constitutes infidelity can differ significantly from one person to another, making it a highly subjective experience for the victim involved. The variability and intensity of intimate human relationships make it more difficult to draw the line, requiring the courts to observe a level of restraint in deciding whether the facts presented constitutes marital infidelity as psychological violence. To reiterate, it is not within the competence of the courts to reach too far into intimate relations and meddle in personal affairs. Litigation should not dictate on or even pressure a person into accepting a life of marriage with a person they reject. The Constitution directs the State to value the dignity of every human person and guarantee full respect for human rights. Freedom of choice to associate or to identify forms part of one's dignity. As much as the Family Code provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, one's choice of intimate relations is also protected by the liberty and human dignity clauses of the Constitution.[4]
Here, the facts narrated that xxxxxxxx caught xxxxxxx in 2007 kissing their househelper that led to an intense fight. xxxxxxxx then spent the night at her parents' house. Upon her return, xxxxxxxx discovered that xxxxxxxx already left the conjugal dwelling. In 2013 or after six years, xxxxxxxx found out that xxxxxxxx had a child with the househelper. However, the criminal information against xxxxxxxx does not allege marital infidelity as the cause of psychological violence. The isolated instance of marital infidelity even lacks context and elaboration. Immediately before and after xxxxxxxx was caught in 2007, there is no clear evidence of ongoing emotional harm caused by marital infidelity. Six years later, in 2013, the wife found out that xxxxxxxx had a child with the house helper. Yet, during the interceding period of six years, it is unclear if xxxxxxxx continued the illicit affairs or just left the conjugal dwelling to escape his marital vow so he could, in the meantime, pursue his selfish desires. There is a gap in the circumstances that deficiently corroborate a continued pattern of psychologically abusive infidelity. The extended period between the cheating incident and the subsequent discovery of the nonmarital child blurs the connection between marital infidelity and psychological violence. The potential shifts in the parties' perspective, behavior, and circumstances during the long intervening period cannot be ignored. xxxxxxxx even asserted that the marital separation was mutually agreed upon and prompted by the disapproval of xxxxxxxx's parents. Suppose xxxxxxxx left xxxxxxxxxx to resume his extramarital affair, would it be safe to assume that he did so with specific criminal intent to inflict psychological violence? Or was xxxxxxxx impelled by the dysfunctional or deteriorated dynamics of a failed marriage? Again, marital infidelity extends beyond casual or sexual infidelity and contemplates a pervasive, willful, and criminal intent to damage the emotional well-being of the aggrieved party.[5] This nuanced approach acknowledges the complexity of human relationships and respects the autonomy of individuals in defining the parameters of their own unions, rather than simply criminalizing all instances of marital infidelity.
In contrast, the fact of desertion on the part of xxxxxxxx is extant which indubitably caused xxxxxxxx psychological distress and financial burden in settling the conjugal loans. The totality of circumstances presents a case of abandonment that has direct connection to the mental and emotional anguish of the victim. As the ponencia aptly observed:
Undoubtedly, a husband's abandonment of his wife falls under psychological violence and emotional abuse penalized under Republic Act No. 9262, as such an action would naturally cause mental and emotional suffering to the wife, a person whom the husband is obliged to cohabit with, love, respect, and give support to.... Sudden abandonment without any explanation would certainly cause emotional anguish.FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to DENY the petition. xxxxxxxx is liable for psychological violence by reason of abandonment and not marital infidelity.
In this case, the Information clearly alleged that xxxxxxxx caused xxxxxxxx mental or emotional anguish through his actions of leaving the conjugal dwelling and abandoning xxxxxxxx[.]
....
Further, the emotional anguish suffered by xxxxxxxxx was exacerbated when their conjugal debts were left unpaid[,]
[1] Entitled, "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved on March 8, 2004.
[2] AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[3] Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 917-919 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; Reyes v. People, 855 Phil. 991, 1002-1004 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; XXX[243049] v. People, 887 Phil. 161, 169 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division]; XXX[241390] v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division]; XXX[250219] v. People, G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[4] Guevarra, et al. v. Banach, G.R. No. 214016, November 24, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[5] Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].