EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 252739, April 16, 2024 ]
XXX,[1] PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
Pursuant to its policy to protect the safety, health, and welfare of women and children, the State has a duty to acknowledge the different, but no less damaging forms, that violence and abuse can take, to provide meaningful safeguards that concurrently defend the wellbeing of the victims and seek commensurate redress from their abusers. Marital infidelity is one such form of domestic violence that not only transgresses the matrimonial vows of faithfulness and commitment, but also inflicts inconceivable psychological and emotional harm upon the aggrieved spouse and their children. As a form of psychological abuse, marital infidelity destroys the stability and unity of the family at its core, shatters the self-worth and trust of the betrayed spouse, and fosters deep-seated trauma borne of emotional turmoil and related mental health issues. To stem the perpetuation of the cycle of abuse, and to prevent the normalization of extramarital promiscuity in our society, the Court declares marital infidelity to be a form of psychological violence punishable under Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] filed by XXX, assailing the Decision[3] and the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. CR No. 40938. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision[5] rendered by the Branch 144, Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx (RTC), in Criminal Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR which found XXX guilty of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The CA Resolution denied XXX' s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The Factual Antecedents
In an Information[6] dated December 29, 2016, XXX was charged with a violation of Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The accusatory portion reads:
AAA, the private complainant, testified that XXX was an employee of the Bureau of Customs and was assigned at the Port of Manila. Since they resided in Tarlac City, XXX stayed in Sampaloc, Manila, during the weekdays and would come home to Tarlac on weekends.[11]
In the morning of July 16, 2016, AAA's co-worker sent her a private message stating that she needed to know something important. AAA asked what it was and was told that one EEE sent the co-worker some photos and messages. Upon seeing the photos, AAA recognized their family vehicle parked at a certain place, and was told that her husband, XXX, was keeping a mistress therein. AAA's co-worker also told her that XXX has a child with the mistress.[12]
When AAA received these messages, she was beside XXX who was asleep. She felt deeply hurt because it confirmed her previous suspicions that XXX was unfaithful to her.[13]
The co-worker told AAA that she was contacted by EEE because AAA was inaccessible in social media. AAA claimed that EEE previously attempted to contact her through Facebook, but she ignored the attempt since she did not know EEE. However, after receiving the photos and messages from her co worker, AAA accepted the request from EEE. Thereafter, EEE sent AAA a message saying, "Alam mo ba na ang asawa mo ay may asawa [rito]? May kinakasamang babae dito? Na may anak pa sila na four years old? Batang lalaki."[14] In response, AAA asked where "rito" was, to which EEE replied, "Dito sa Makati. Filmore, Palanan, Makati."[15] As XXX was with her at the time, AAA could only cry. XXX asked her what the problem was, but said it was nothing.[16]
On July 19, 2016, AAA, accompanied by her mother and a family friend, BBB, went to Makati City and asked assistance from the Palanan barangay authorities in the hopes of catching XXX. Upon reaching the place, they found the address given by EEE, and XXX and AAA's family vehicle parked outside.[17]
When they knocked at the gate, it was opened by an unknown person. BBB pretended to not know and asked for the owner of the vehicle parked outside, upon which XXX's alleged mistress, YYY, went out. Upon seeing her, AAA could not contain herself and grabbed YYY's hands and pulled her outside the gate yelling, "Ilabas mo yung asawa ko." YYY was then unable to react out of shock. AAA continued demanding to see her husband but XXX did not come out. AAA then directed BBB and her mother to go inside and get XXX to come outside. XXX only appeared after being threatened that AAA and her companions will go to his workplace instead.[18]
A police mobile passed by during the encounter and intervened. The officers were about to pull AAA away from XXX when suddenly a little boy ran outside calling for his "Daddy."[19] Seeing this, AAA told XXX, "May anak ka talaga, ano?"[20] Before XXX could respond, the police officers asked AAA to board the police mobile and escorted them all to the barangay hall. Discussions ensued at the barangay hall which led to XXX eventually admitting that he is the father of the boy. This resulted in a shouting match, with AAA demanding that the whole incident be recorded in the barangay blotter. XXX asked to talk to AAA at his place in Sampaloc, and when they arrived there, XXX asked her what she wanted to do. AAA replied that, at the time, she did not want anything to happen.[21]
The following day, XXX brought his and AAA's son home to Tarlac and asked AAA to have a discussion as a family. He again asked her what she wanted to happen, to which she replied that she wanted XXX to go to jail. XXX responded, "Ah, ganon? Gusto mo akong makulong?" and locked himself in the bathroom.[22]
AA worried that XXX would hurt himself, but he eventually left the bathroom and went to the kitchen where he got a knife and threatened to stab himself with it. Apparently scared, their son ran to AAA. While she was holding their son, XXX grabbed him. Fearing that their son might get injured by the knife, AAA embraced their son to shield him. Thereafter, XXX left the house. He returned only the next weekend, told AAA that their relationship is irreparable, and asked her to leave him alone.[23]
After the incident, AAA was unable to work for three to four months and could not sleep. She stayed with different relatives but kept silent about her marital problems. She just explained that she did not want to see their house, XXX, or his belongings.[24]
On the witness stand, BBB confirmed AAA's narration of events. She added that, during the confrontation on July 19, 2016 in Makati City, she went back to the house where XXX and YYY were found. She talked to YYY and asked her how long they had been staying there. YYY replied, "Hindi pa naman katagalan."[25] BBB further observed that the same little boy was with YYY, and asked him how old he was, to which he replied, "four," and called YYY "Mommy" and XXX "Daddy."[26] BBB added that she asked YYY if she knew that XXX had a wife, to which the latter responded in the affirmative.[27]
BBB further testified that upon discovery of XXX's mistress, AAA was visibly emotional, would not stop crying, and appeared to be in immense disbelief that she had been cheated on by her husband.[28]
For his part, XXX admitted that he and AAA are married and have one child together. He also admitted having a child with YYY. However, he denied keeping a mistress, which supposedly caused AAA emotional and mental anguish. He denied having any relationship with YYY and asserted that the boy was only the result of a one-night stand.[29]
XXX further defended that, on that day on July 19, 2016, he only went to YYY's house in Makati to visit their child, who he only sees about three or four times a year. He also contended that he was only able to enter that house a total of three times.[30]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[31] dated November 17, 2017, the RTC found XXX guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
The trial court likewise gave weight to AAA' s behavior and manner of testifying, describing it as the kind where "anguish can readily be seen," and that the "emotion shown by [AAA] could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that [XXX] himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with [YYY]."[34]
In conclusion, the trial court pronounced:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On November 8, 2019, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision,[36] affirming the RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
Dissatisfied, XXX filed the present Petition, contesting his conviction.
Issue
We determine whether XXX was guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
XXX argues that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA was caused by his unfaithfulness, and, that he did not commit any of the acts mentioned in Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, as charged in the Information.
Our Ruling
We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA. XXX is guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
Before delving into the main issue, the Court finds that a brief discussion on the historical and social contexts that underscore the necessity of Republic Act No. 9262 would be a useful aid in fully elucidating upon the merits of this case.
Violence against women is internationally recognized as a form of discrimination and violation of human rights.[40] Examining violence against women in the human rights framework reveals that the specific causes of such violence are inextricably linked to the broader context of systemic gender-based discrimination and subordination that women are forced to endure.[41] Such violence is a manifestation of the unequal power relationship between men and women, as well as widespread and deeply entrenched gender biases and prejudices against women that have historically placed women beneath men, who are thus in a position to exercise power and control over women.[42]
The discrimination and violence faced by women is an issue of global magnitude with one in three women worldwide having been subjected to either physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime.[43] The international community has sought to address violence against women through the following conventions and international agreements.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on December 18, 1979 to bring women to the forefront of the conversation on human rights, serving not only as an international bill of rights for women, but also as an "agenda for action" by countries to ensure the enjoyment of these rights.[44] Although the CEDAW does not explicitly mention violence against women, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which is the treaty body established to monitor implementation by party-states of the CEDAW, has unequivocally stated that violence against women is a form of gender-based discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.[45] The Committee recommended that states parties take effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based violence and ensure that all laws against gender-based violence provide adequate protection to all women.[46]
As further recognition that violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women, and the continued pervasiveness of gender-based discrimination and violence throughout the world, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) on December 20, 1993, and expressly links the rights espoused therein to those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[47] The DEVAW defines "violence against women" as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."[48] States parties are directed to condemn violence against women and to prioritize pursuing policies of eliminating violence against women.[49]
Lastly, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted by 189 countries at the Fourth Conference on Women on September 15, 1995. The states parties to the Beijing Declaration reaffirmed their commitment to ensure the enjoyment of human rights of women and girls,[50] and to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls.[51]
Having adopted the UDHR, CEDAW, DEVAW, and the Beijing Declaration, the Philippines has a legal obligation to implement the policies and rights enshrined in these conventions. The Philippines's commitment to ending gender-based violence also finds legal impetus in Section 14, Article II of the Constitution, which sets out the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.[52]
As a major step forward towards achieving the goal of eliminating all forms of violence against women, Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 was passed into law. The Court in Estacio v. Estacio,[53] explained the policy considerations behind the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262:
Based on worldwide surveys conducted by the World Health Organization, 27% of women aged 15 to 49 years who have been in a relationship reported that they have been subjected to some form of physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner.[57]
The Philippines reflects similarly alarming statistics. As of December 31, 2022, the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) reported that 17.5% of women aged 15 to 49 have experienced any form of physical, sexual, or emotional violence by their current or most recent husband or intimate partner,[58] with emotional violence as having the highest percentage among the forms of violence against women at 15.2%.[59] Violations of Republic Act No. 9262 reported to the Philippine National Police and the PCW rank first among the different categories of crimes involving violence against women from 2018 to 2022.[60]
The foregoing statistics clearly emphasize the continuing importance and necessity of upholding statutory protections for women and their children. Republic Act No. 9262 provides a clear legal framework to promote and strengthen the rights of women and their children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. As the goal of the law is to achieve equality by eliminating violence against women and children, it is thus imperative to identify and address the varied and intersectional ways that women experience violence.
Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
The contention centers on the third element, against which XXX stresses that "the anguish allegedly suffered by [AAA] could equally have been caused by the refusal of [XXX] to get back together with [AAA],"[64] and that "[AAA] was still hoping at that moment that their family could still be rehabilitated."[65]
XXX's argument utterly lacks legal logic.
We note XXX's admission of the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA; only that, according to him, it could not have been caused by his philandering. However, as correctly observed by both the RTC and the CA, "the anguish of [AAA] was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led [...] to the confrontation between her and [XXX] on July 19, 2016", and "[s]he was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that [XXX] had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her effort to keep their family together."[66] This clearly relays to the courts the fact of XXX's infidelity, including the discovery and confirmation thereof, is the sole source of AAA's stress and grief. XXX's imputation of self- inflicted torment upon AAA will not work to dilute his culpability for her marital woes.
Moreover, XXX's own unwitting statement debilitates his defense that AAA's suffering "could equally have been" caused by his refusal to reconcile. Aside from willfully misinterpreting AAA's reactions, XXX is effectively admitting not just his unfaithfulness, but that it also caused his wife a great amount of mental and emotional distress.
BBB's testimony further supports Our own findings:
We quote with approval the trial court's findings:
Again, XXX is wrong with his gravely misguided reasoning.
A review of the Information will reveal that the offense charged was the act of "causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish," and not the act of "keeping of a mistress."
We quote with approval the CA's findings:
Here, AAA's trauma due to her discovery of XXX's cheating was both palpable and searing. The trial court observed that her "anguish can readily be seen during her narration of the events."[74] XXX's sexual affair bore him a child outside his marriage, and this point must be emphasized: when the unfaithfulness was discovered, the boy was already four years old. This only means that XXX's deceit and clandestine, extramarital affair went on for four years, which he consciously hid from AAA for that long until it was finally unveiled.
Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, in his Concurring Opinion, agrees that "the acknowledgement of filiation and continuing to visit the child, coupled with keeping such fact from his wife for a prolonged time, may be considered proof that he committed marital infidelity of sufficient gravity as to cause mental or emotional anguish on the wife."[75] It is not hard to see how all these deceptions, deliberately and carefully executed together for a long period of time, form a devastating picture to the victim-spouse who suddenly finds that, for the past several years, she had been living a lie and tolerating a liar.
While not invoked as a defense, and to avoid any confusion, a distinction must be made from Acharon v. People,[76] where the Court en banc declared:
While We agree with Acharon that the crimes penalized under Sec. 5(i) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, thereby requiring specific criminal intent, We hereby hold that in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity. This finds basis in the fact that marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms. In the normal course of human behavior, an aggrieved wife will never approve of a rogue and wandering husband, and vice versa. The same line of reasoning just cannot be applied in cases of willful denial of financial support. In other words, marital infidelity, divorced from its legal connotations, is an act which is essentially wrong in itself. To pose a rhetoric, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?
To further illustrate, it can be said that one who kills another person-an inherently vile act-will generally be found guilty, barring all justifications, as long as specific intent to kill is proven. Intent to kill, in turn, is conclusively presumed from the fact of the victim's death, thereby completing the ingredients of the crime.
Applied to the present case, can it also be said that the specific intent to cause 1nental and emotional anguish upon the victim may be conclusively presumed from the fact of infidelity itself?
The Court firmly believes so.
Mr. Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, in his Concurring Opinion, offers a learned view as regards the intent aspect of the present controversy. We quote with approval his view that:
The esteemed Mr. Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa who wrote eloquently for the Court in Acharon, submits in his Dissenting Opinion that Acharon squarely applies to this case, even though what is involved is marital infidelity and not a willful denial of financial support. He posits that the ponencia renders the crime subjective.[79]
The Court disagrees.
To be sure, rendering the crime subjective is not, and should not be, the purpose and objective of the law. To require proof of intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the victim in cases of marital infidelity for purposes of prosecuting violations of Sec. 5(i) would make the enforcement of the law utterly difficult if not impossible to achieve, for offenders would simply feign lack of intent in order to evade prosecution. While intent to inflict emotional suffering and the emotional anguish itself that is suffered by the victim are both states of mind, the key difference is that the latter may be demonstrated externally and consequently, proven through overt acts. The former, on the other hand, is virtually impossible to ascertain, being purely a mental process that may be easily modified at a person's whim. Indeed, it is conceded that the rights of an accused must be safeguarded, especially the right to be presumed innocent, but it must not be extended to a point where a statutory provision is rendered inutile.
Mme. Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, in her Concurring Opinion, delivers a most apt and categorical pronouncement:
As the name suggests, marital infidelity presupposes that there is a bond or commitment to which one owes fidelity, but the Court takes notice of non traditional family setups and more modern relationship arrangements in which extramarital entanglements are not equivalent to unfaithfulness. For example, it may be argued, such as in cases of estranged relations and consciously consenting spouses, that not all instances of extramarital relationships inflict mental or emotional suffering to the other spouse. In such situations, it is the Court's view that there is no crime committed as there is a crime only when the acts or omissions cause or are likely to cause mental or emotional suffering upon the wife or her child. In Our view, this interpretation is more in sync with Republic Act No. 9262's main thrust, which is the protection of women and their children. Thus, it is rational to say that it is more concerned with defending them as victims, rather than penalizing offenders, which is merely a consequence of its defensive and protective stance. In other words, Republic Act No. 9262 looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or their child, rather than the motive of the offender.
In sum, We find XXX guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 for committing marital infidelity, thereby inflicting mental and emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA.
As regards the fourth element, XXX posits that in order to be found liable under Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, it is required that the anguish be caused by any of the following: (1) acts of public ridicule or humiliation; (2) repeated verbal and emotional abuse; and (3) denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children, or similar acts or omissions. He claims that marital infidelity is not one of the acts mentioned.
We disagree.
As already discussed, the law itself includes marital infidelity as one of the forms of psychological violence.
We approve the pronouncement of the appellate court, quoted below:
We do not wish to restrict couples their freedoms as to the manner of handling their personal affairs, relationships, and issues. However, such freedoms must always be within the bounds of what is acceptable in the eyes of the law and morals.
The State's commitments to upholding marriage as an inviolable social institution and to strengthening the solidarity of the family cannot be invoked to let intimate partner violence go unchecked. In harmonizing these provisions of the Constitution and the law, the Court recognizes that violence against women and their children is a pervasive and enduring societal ill that requires State intervention in the form of Republic Act No. 9262. With its stated aim of protecting women and their children from all forms of domestic violence and threats to their safety and security, Republic Act No. 9262, in turn, reinforces the strength of the marital bond and preserves peace and harmony in the family.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The November 8, 2019 Decision and the June 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner XXX is found GUILTY of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Petitioner is SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Zalameda, Gaerlan, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., see dissent.
Lazaro-Javier, J., see concurrence.
Inting, J., see separate concurring opinion.
M. Lopez, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Rosario,* J., no part.
J. Lopez, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Dimaampao, J., I dissent, joining the dissenting opinion of Justice M. Lopez.
Kho, Jr., J., I join the dissent of Justice M. Lopez.
Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.
[1] In line with the Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9262, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
* No part due to prior participation in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-21.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 137-151. The November 8, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 167-172. The June 22, 2022 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[5] RTC records, pp. 101-114 The November 17, 2017 Decision in R-MKT-17-00580-CR was penned by Presiding Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson of Branch 144, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[6] RTC Records, p. 1.
[7] Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
[8] "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members; shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 102.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 103.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 103-104.
[19] Id. at 104.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 105.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 107.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 18.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 110.
[31] Id. at 101-114.
[32] Id. at 114.
[33] Id. at 111.
[34] Id. at 112.
[35] Id.
[36] CA rollo, pp. 137-151.
[37] Id. at 151.
[38] Id. at l49-150.
[39] Id. at 152- 156.
[40] United Nations Study of the Secretary General, Ending violence against women: From words to action, 27, (2006).
[41] Id.
[42] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[43] World Health Organization, Violence Against Women, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/fact sheets/detail/violence-against-women (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[44] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, December 18, 1979, available at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[45] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), par. 1, available at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[46] Id. at par. 24.
[47] See Universal Declaration of Rights, December 10, 1948, General Assembly resolution 217 A.
[48] Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, December 20, 1993, General Assembly resolution 48/104, art. 1.
[49] Id. at art. 4.
[50] Beijing, Declaration, September 15, 1995, available at http://www.un-documents.net/beijingd.htm (last accessed June 12, 2024), par. 9.
[51] Id. at par. 29.
[52] CONST.; art. II, sec. 14.
[53] 885 Phil. 157 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[54] Id. at 169.
[55] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 5-97 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[56] United Nations Study of the Secretary General, Ending violence against women: From words to action, 43, (2006).
[57] World Health Organization, Violence Against Women, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/fact sheets/detail/violence-against-women (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[58] Philippine Commission on Women, Estado ni Juana: State of Filipino Women Report, December 31, 2022, p. 41.
[59] Id. at 41-42.
[60] Id. at 50-51.
[61] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[62] Id. at 373.
[63] RTC records, p. 102.
[64] Rollo, p. 15.
[65] Id.
[66] CA rollo, pp. 149-150.
[67] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 18.
[68] RTC records, p. 112.
[69] CA rollo, p. 149.
[70] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division] at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[71] G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, First Division].
[72] G.R. No. 263449, November 13, 2023 [Per J. Lopez, J.Y., Second Division].
[73] Id. at 5, citing Mangalino v. People, G.R. No. 250051, February 3, 2020 [Notice, Second Division]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[74] RTC records, p. 112.
[75] C.J. Gesmundo, Reflections dated August 8, 2023, p. 2. [to cite Concurring Opinion once available]
[76] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[77] Id.
[78] J. Inting, Reflections dated October 22, 2023, pp. 13-15. [to cite Concurring Opinion once available]
[79] J. Caguioa, Reflections dated April 15, 2024, pp. 1-4. [to cite Dissenting Opinion once available]
[80] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, p. 9.
[81] Id.
[82] J. Singh, Concurring Opinion, p. 5.
[83] CA rollo, p. 150.
[84] FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
LEONEN, SAJ.:
To restore the humanity of our laws in relation to intimate relationships, I dissent.
Infidelity is painful. It can be the most difficult challenge in any relationship. Many of us have gone through it. We know its reality.
Some of our relationships have survived. Some have had to be terminated giving the partners another chance to be in a better place. Some have forgiven. Many have not forgotten.
If we are to be truly human as judges, we have to accept that the acts that constitute fidelity can vary among couples. We need to accept that the causes of infidelity are varied. While none may be justifiable, we also need to be true to our hope that freedom in intimate relationships are the bedrock upon which happiness, meaning, and society are built. We need to read the law as one that provides openings for those who survive their relationships despite infidelities.
With utmost respect, the reading of the law by the slim majority of this Court does not reflect this aspect of our humanity. Regretfully, it misunderstands what intimate relationships often go through.
Reading marital infidelity as criminal per se is unjust.
I acknowledge the existence of patriarchy and the possibility of physical abuse and psychological coercion that can happen in intimate relationships. I acknowledge that in these cases, having the state intervene by making the acts criminal is essentially justifiable. In such cases, it is clear that the relationship has significantly deteriorated to one of power: where the dominant abuses.
In Garcia v. Drilon,[1] I acknowledged that this is generally in heterosexual relationships but I called attention to the possibility that the protection of the State is absent in intimate relationships between men.[2] In Agacid v. People,[3] the Court unanimously applied the provision of this law in an intimate relationship between women.
I cannot, however, in conscience, convict now on the basis of a phrase in the law-marital infidelity-that is vague, infringes on the autonomy of couples to resolve their differences, and stereotypes all women as always victims. Neither can I accept that we criminally punish undefined marital infidelity in the context of our legal order that does not recognize divorce between Filipinos. It is cruel for all those in a relationship. Infidelity in monogamous relationships is a phenomenon that has a lot of causes. It cannot automatically be attributed to an intent to abuse or coerce one of the partners.
Our laws should be interpreted to have a more mature understanding of the complexities of intimate relationships. We should avoid a doctrinal interpretation of morality of only one dominant religion.
There is no dispute that petitioner XXX strayed from the marital relationship. Neither is there doubt that his wife AAA experienced excruciating pain upon learning of his indiscretion. But there being no evidence that he did so precisely to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his wife, I am of the view that petitioner's infidelity is not psychological violence within the meaning of the law.
My vote is for XXX's acquittal.
I
The majority thoroughly discussed the historical and social background surrounding Republic Act No. 9262,[4] stating that the statute is a piece of social legislation created to address the worsening rates of crimes against women in the Philippines.[5] According to the majority, the goal of the law is to achieve equality by eliminating violence against women and their children.[6]
The majority then interpreted "marital infidelity" as a mode of committing violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It held that marital infidelity, regardless of the circumstances, is criminally punished under Republic Act No. 9262.[7] The majority differentiated "marital infidelity" from another mode of committing a violation of Section 5(i)-"denial of financial support"-declaring that specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is presumed in marital infidelity. It explained that, unlike denial of financial support, marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms.[8]
Ultimately, it affirmed XXX's conviction of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
II
I join the majority in recognizing the importance of Republic Act No. 9262 as a progressive step towards equality. Patriarchal ideology has long enabled the systemic oppression of women and their treatment as less than men, especially within the context of intimate relationships. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262, more and more women are now aware that they are equal to men before the law; and that they do not deserve any form of violence by reason of their sex.
The laudable purpose behind Republic Act No. 9262 notwithstanding, I cannot accept the majority's ruling. I remain of the view that marital infidelity, in and of itself, is not a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 absent a showing of intent to cause mental or emotional anguish on the victim.
III
The mention of marital infidelity in the law is vague. For reference, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is reproduced below:
First, the Revised Penal Code already clearly defines the crimes of adultery and concubinage.[11] Both crimes involve sexual intercourse. In contrast, the law is devoid of any explanation as to what constitutes marital infidelity. The Legislative cannot be assumed to have enacted a law that punishes the exact same crime. Thus, marital infidelity must mean something beyond adultery, concubinage, or sexual intercourse.
Marital infidelity may mean different things. It implies more than just a sexual act. It can be going out on a date with a former lover. It can be visiting so-called massage parlors or gentlemen's clubs. It can be receiving lap dances. It can even be watching pornography. It can also be the spouse carrying out a relationship with another of their same sex. These acts may elicit different reactions depending on who you ask. Some might say these constitute infidelity. Some may say that it is infidelity only if an emotional attachment is formed. Others might say it is infidelity only when it becomes habitual. Others may tolerate if the other spouse becomes intimate with one of their similar sex. Still, others might react entirely differently or with a permutation of the foregoing.
Marital infidelity was not defined in the law as strictly being sexual. Even if we read it to mean sexual, what is sexual can include a whole spectrum, from sharing intimate glances to intercourse.
Second, marital infidelity is ultimately a question of boundaries-boundaries that ought to be set between each couple.[12] Couples should first agree on what constitutes marital infidelity for them. This is a conversation in which the State and its prosecutors take no part. However, openly negotiating these decisions are not common in our culture or laws. More often, they are discussed only when one spouse's idea of fidelity is breached. At that point, emotions are running high. With the addition of criminalizing mere marital infidelity, peaceful resolutions seem improbable. With the interpretation of the majority, the State and its prosecutors are invited into the most intimate corners of a marriage.
Third, marital infidelity in the law is vague because there may be many reasons for its commission. Without recognizing the following as licenses for infidelity, we acknowledge that they are possible causes. Marital infidelity may indeed be committed to hurt the other spouse without necessarily constituting psychological coercion. It can happen at a time of weakness. For instance, research shows that husbands who earn less than their wives are more prone to straying from the marital relationship, the reason being that they need to prove their masculinity in ways other than providing financial support to the family.[13] While being outearned by one's wife is definitely not an excuse to cheat, the research nevertheless shows that marital infidelity may be committed for reasons other than causing mental and emotional anguish on the wife. In the case of the outearned husband, he may stray to fill a gaping hole in his perceived identity.
Marital infidelity may be prompted by loneliness, as with the case of a couple where one spouse is an overseas Filipino worker. One might commit marital infidelity to address a perceived gap in the relationship. Nobody possesses all the qualities that the other desires. Lack of communication might lead one spouse to seek from another person a characteristic missing from the other spouse. Even if marital infidelity was committed to hurt the other spouse, it may be a way of communicating needs. Marital infidelity may be an indication that emotions are fading, or that the relationship should be extinguished, or one is simply not built for monogamy.
The vague definition of marital infidelity is more cruel in light of the absence of divorce in our legal system. Tan-Andal v. Andal[14] may offer some relief, but this option is still lengthy, difficult, and inaccessible to many. Unhappy spouses imprisoned in marriages now become vulnerable to criminal complaints. To reiterate, I do not seek to justify the causes of marital infidelity but to demonstrate that there may be many motivations behind it. We draw a hard line between these and domestic violence.
The constitutionality of the provision on marital infidelity is suspect due its vagueness, but this matter was not raised here. Still, the Court must refrain from interpreting the law in such a way as to make it unconstitutional.
IV
The interpretation of the law that is ascribed by the majority infringes on the autonomy of spouses.
To criminalize all acts that cause mental and emotional anguish as "psychological violence" will foreclose any chance for reconciliation between the parties. This infringes on the autonomy of spouses to resolve their differences on their own accord. It is worth noting at this point that psychological violence, like all acts of violence against women and their children under Republic Act No. 9262, is a public crime.[15] As such, it may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime.[16]
In contrast, adultery and concubinage may only be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.[17] Neither may criminal liability for adultery and concubinage be sought if the offended party consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.[18]
Once the prosecution of the criminal case for psychological violence is commenced in court, they cannot be compromised by the spouses. When the case is filed, the State intervenes. The conflict will be out of the control of the parties, foreclosing any chance of reconciliation between the parties. A subsequent conviction will bring about shame and stigma, which will further estrange the parties from each other.
If the spouses are able to reconcile prior to the filing of a complaint, a prescriptive period of 10 years will still loom over their marriage.[19] Despite any compromise, the innocent spouse may renege on the agreement. A complaint may still be filed as retaliation.
V
In addition to the autonomy of spouses to resolve their issues, spouses. ought to enjoy autonomy to set the terms of their relationship. Monogamy, the practice of having one partner at a time, began as an "externally imposed system of control over women's reproduction."[20] It had nothing to do with love and everything to do with lineage and property.[21] But as the institution of marriage evolved to be the "love-based marriage"[22] that we know today, the "ideal of the faithful couple"[23] emerged. Fidelity eventually became the boundary in intimate relationships.[24]
Yet monogamy is not always the reality for all couples, as there are views that monogamy is unnatural and against human nature.[25] There are intimate partners who agree to consensual and ethical nonmonogamy, where they are free to sexually engage with others outside of their relationship, so long as it is with the consent of the other. Some scholars suggest approaching "monogamy not as a given but as a choice."[26] Meanwhile, other couples simply agree to live separately considering the difficulty of obtaining annulments, decrees of absolute nullity, or legal separation. Ethical nonmonogamy is possible, and it should be up to the spouses to decide.
Also, punishing marital infidelity, without regard to intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, reinforces heteronormativity. It bears stressing that Republic Act No. 9262 is broadly worded to apply to different kinds of relationships. In Garcia, the Court ruled that:
VI
In our desire to rid our culture of patriarchy, we should be careful not to stereotype all women as victims. Likewise, we should not typecast all men who commit infidelity as abusers.
Domestic violence should be treated as a power issue, not a gender issue.[29]
The majority's interpretation may allow a wife to use Republic Act No. 9262 and file a criminal complaint for psychological violence against her husband, even if the husband did not intend to cause mental or emotional suffering on her. She may even file a case under Section 5(i) even if she is actually indifferent to her husband's infidelity. This shows that, without requiring proof of deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, marital infidelity could be abused to control or punish individuals within a marriage, allowing citizens to utilize the strong arm of the law for private slights. This, in turn, exacerbates power imbalances and situations of domestic violence.
Infidelity is a human act. It is possible among men and women. There is no biological basis that only men can become disloyal. For the same reasons discussed above, women can also commit marital infidelity. It may also be that the disloyalty by the wife is done not merely to abuse and subject the husband to psychological harm but for some other reason.
We should not unreasonably typecast all marital infidelity by the husband as beyond repair. That is exactly what we do when we make it a criminal act. Spouses should be encouraged to find a fair resolution to marital infidelity, regardless if the infidelity is done by a husband or a wife or both. Finding a resolution, whether it is to move on in a relationship or rescinding that relationship, is not necessarily a vestige of patriarchy that the law must protect against.
VII
It is imperative to consider all the circumstances surrounding the marital infidelity, especially intent. Section 5(i) must be read to require deliberate intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the woman or her child. As examples of causing mental or emotional anguish, Section 5(i) cites "repeated verbal or emotional abuse" as well as "denial of financial support or custody of minor children" or "denial of access to the woman's child/children," all of which connote willfulness. Specifically, for "denial of financial support," it is already settled in Acharon v. People[30] that deliberate intent to withhold financial support for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish must be proved to establish a Section 5(i) violation.[31] Consequently, instances where the accused merely failed or is unable to provide financial support are not considered psychological violence, even if the woman experienced mental or emotional anguish.[32]
The majority in this case holds that "specific criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of infidelity."[33] In other words, deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is presumed upon the commission of the marital infidelity, because, according to the majority, it is "inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms."[34]
With respect, I disagree.
Like denial of financial support, marital infidelity is just one of the numerous modes of committing the same crime, i.e., psychological violence. If proof of deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is required in one mode, then there is no reason why deliberate intent should be outrightly presumed in the other. Nothing in Republic Act No. 9262 warrants this "presumed intent" in cases of marital infidelity, especially since the modes specifically enumerated in Section 5(i) all require willfulness and deliberate intent.
The majority's analogy between marital infidelity and crimes against persons that involve killing is not proper. In murder or homicide, intent to kill is conclusively presumed when the victim dies "because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act."[35] The killing of another is universally considered evil. It is to literally deprive someone of the most fundamental and sacred of human rights-the right to life.
Marital infidelity is not an inherently universally unlawful act. In the Asia-Pacific Region, the Philippines is only one of three other countries that criminalizes marital infidelity, more particularly, adultery.[36] Notably, all European countries already decriminalized marital infidelity.[37]
Even the "prevailing societal, cultural, or religious norms"[38] that marital infidelity allegedly infringes are not universal. While the majority makes no mention of what these norms are, these obviously relate to Christian doctrine, specifically, the Christian practice of monogamy. The ruling in this case imposes the morality of a dominant religion on others who may not want to be bound by these norms. In the absence of divorce in Philippine jurisdiction-another influence of Christian doctrine on our secular laws, hence, contrary to the separation of Church and State-I cannot accept that marital infidelity may be presumed immoral.
VIII
For the State to truly value the dignity of every human person,[39] the Legislative, in making anti-violence against women and children laws, has to take into account all relationship permutations possible. Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 assumes that marital infidelity causes mental and emotional anguish. This may be true for others, but not for all, as was recognized by this Court in AAA v. BBB.[40] In that case, this Court said that "depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the [other spouse]."[41]
To determine what should be criminalized then, we should go back to the definition of a "crime." A crime is a "breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the State."[42] A review of criminal cases involving psychological violence through marital infidelity will reveal that this Court equates marital infidelity to sexual infidelity.[43] It is my view, however, that marital infidelity is an issue that has no bearing to society at large and, therefore, should not be punished as a crime. In a long line of cases, this Court has recognized that the mental or emotional anguish caused by sexual marital infidelity is highly personal to the offended party.[44]
Therefore, instead of punishing marital infidelity for the hurt feelings caused to a party, it should be punished if it is used as a coercive control tactic. It should be a crime only when it is used to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner, thereby infringing on the autonomy and agency of the other and maintaining the power imbalance between the couple.
An example would be a case where the partner consistently engages in extramarital affairs to manipulate and control the other. The unfaithful partner may intentionally flaunt their affairs, openly discuss them, or even threaten to leave the relationship if the other partner does not comply with their demands. In such cases, it is not the infidelity that is punished but the use of fear, insecurity, and dependence on the other partner, making them more likely to give in to the manipulative partner's wishes to avoid the potential loss of the relationship. In this context, infidelity becomes abuse, an affront on the inherent dignity of every of human person. It is the manipulative act, the abuse, that should be criminal.
IX
Thus, XXX should be acquitted. There is no proof that he, in fathering a child with another woman after a one-night stand, did so to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his wife AAA or otherwise control or exert dominance over her.
I do not doubt that AAA experienced emotional anguish upon learning that her husband fathered a child with another woman. However, under the law, emotional anguish is not enough for conviction for psychological violence. Deliberate intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish should be shown.
X
If a legal action is really needed by the spouse who suffers, there is no lack of cause of action. The acquittal does not mean that he cannot be held legally accountable for his actions. Under Article 68[45] of the Family Code, spouses are obliged to observe mutual fidelity. He certainly did not comply with this essential marital obligation.
Under Article 55[46] of the Family Code, a petition for legal separation may be filed if the marital infidelity can be proven to be sexual in nature. If it can be proven that the marital infidelity is a manifestation of psychological incapacity, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36[47] of the Family Code may likewise be filed. Furthermore, a complaint for damages under Article 26[48] of the Civil Code may be filed against the alleged paramour for meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of the offended spouse.
XI
Our laws should be interpreted to have a more mature understanding of the complexities of intimate relationships. Acknowledgment, atonement, understanding, and the possibility of forgiveness may follow sin. So should separation be a recourse after betrayal. For human relationships, restorative justice is better than retribution.
Infidelity is already painful. We should not add to the pain by feeding into the meaningless desire for revenge by incarcerating the human offender. Those in intimate relationships regardless of legal status should be given as much freedom to resolve their differences and to find ways forward. If not, the couple and their family should be given the kindness, by our laws, to have their marriage declared void, to divorce and permanently separate.
Laws should not impose the morality of those belonging to a dominant belief. To do so is plainly unethical. To do so is to encourage a simplistic view of what it is to relate intimately with another individual. To do so is also plainly unjust.
Love is complex. It is unique to individuals in love. The State-in whatever incarnation of any law-will never be able to fully imagine or understand what it means for two unique individuals to survive love or to let go. How to love and how to un-love are both first freedoms that should be protected against the intervention of the state. We continually discover ourselves as we go through all that is there in our intimate relationships.
Infidelity should trigger accountability. Infidelity is an occasion for the one who betrays to introspect. Infidelity provides the couple precious moments to reevaluate the complexity of themselves in a relationship. Thus, even all marital infidelity, should never be dangerously caricatured by the interpretation of the majority into a crime.
At least, in this case, it should not be.
FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari and SET ASIDE the November 8, 2019 Decision and June 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938. Petitioner XXX must be ACQUITTED of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[2] Id. at 171-172.
[3] G.R. No. 242133, April 16, 2024 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[4] Ponencia, pp. 7-10.
[5] Id. at 10.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 11.
[8] Id. at 15-16.
[9] Republic Act. No. 9262 (2004), sec. 3(a)(C) provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
....
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
[10] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in XXX v. People, G.R. No. 263449, November 13, 2023 [Per J. J. Lopez, Second Division].
[11] REV. PEN. CODE, arts. 333 and 334.
[12] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 272-273 (2007).
[13] American Sociological Association, Men more likely to cheat if they are economically dependent on their female partners, study finds, August 18, 2010, available at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/08/100816095617.htm (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[14] 901 Phil. 558 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[15] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 25.
[16] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 25.
[17] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5.
[18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5.
[19] Republic Act. No. 9262 (2004), sec. 24 provides:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. - Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(l) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
[20] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 178 (2007).
[21] Id.
[22] Feeld, Exclusive Relationships: The History of Monogamy, June 20, 2022, available at https://feeld.com/magazine/playbook/monogamy (last accessed on August 4, 2024).
[23] Id.
[24] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 176 (2007).
[25] ESTHER PEREL, THE STATE OF AFFAIRS, RETHINKING INFIDELITY 255-257 (2017). See also ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 275-276 (2007).
[26] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 199 (2007).
[27] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 103-104 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[28] Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 413 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[29] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 171 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[30] 913 Phil. 731 (2021) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[31] Id. at 737-739.
[32] Id.
[33] Ponencia, p. 15.
[34] Id. at 15-16.
[35] Abdulla v. People, 495 Phil. 70, 80 (2005) (Per J. Garcia, Third Division].
[36] See Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[37] Id.
[38] Ponencia, p. 16.
[39] CONST., art. ii, sec. 11.
[40] 823 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[41] Id. at 620.
[42] See Baviera v. Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 119 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division].
[43] See XXX v. People, G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division]; XXX v. People, 887 Phil. 161 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division]; Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607(2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[44] See XXX v. People, G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division]; Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; Reyes v. People, 855 Phil. 991, 1004 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; AAA v. People, 844 Phil. 213, 222 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division]; AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[45] FAMILY CODE, art. 68 provides:
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[46] FAMILY CODE, art. 55(8) provides:
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion[.]
See also Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[47] FAMILY CODE, art. 36, as amended by Executive Order No. 227 (1987), provides:
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[48] CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
....
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another[.]
See also Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
CAGUIOA, J.:
I dissent.
It is of no moment that Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children (VAWC) Act of 2004"[4] does not define "marital infidelity" or any reason why "infidelity" is limited to marriage. With the majority's opinion, it is high time to consider how far the feminist pendulum has swung and ponder on the consequences.
Marital infidelity, without more, does not, and cannot, automatically translate into a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. I thus strongly dissent with the ponencia in convicting petitioner XXX of the charge against him. The evidence of the prosecution simply failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that XXX violated Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by causing psychological violence upon his wife, AAA.
I.
Marital infidelity per se is not penalized under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262
Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to address the social problem of domestic violence; whose usual and likely victims are women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, Republic Act No. 9262 aims to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security in keeping with the State's obligation to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 provided an. encompassing definition of "violence against women and their children" in an attempt to protect women from the different kinds of violence they experience or are vulnerable to while being in an intimate relationship.[5] Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 reads:
Section 5 states:
In addition, it is apparent from the terms employed in Section 5, e.g., causing, threatening, placing, inflicting, engaging, that the acts punished are intentional in character. In other words, the presence of evil intent is precisely what transforms these acts or omissions into the "crime of violence against women and their children." The crime is essentially "dolo" in nature-there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.[6] Thus, while the law employs broad definitions of the different kinds of violence, the penal provisions of the law cover only those acts in which violence of whatever character is intentionally inflicted upon the woman.
In this case, XXX was charged and convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals of psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity, under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, committed as follows:
As above quoted, Section 5(i) considers a crime of psychological violence against women and children the act of "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children."
In Dinamling v. People,[8] the Court explained that the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the woman and the acts of the offender constituting psychological violence which caused such mental or emotional anguish are two (2) distinct elements of the crime that the prosecution must separately prove beyond reasonable doubt:
In the recent En Banc case of Achcron v. People[10] (Acharon), the Court underscored that crimes penalized in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are crimes mala in se. As such, there must be a specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman to constitute a violation of Section 5(i). Stated differently, without any proof that the accused had intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the victim, the acts complained of will not give rise to any criminal liability under Section 5(i). The rationale for this principle is elucidated by the Court in Acharon as follows:
Following Acharon, the "evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause the victim, mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation"[12] with marital infidelity as the weapon of choice. Therefore, the elements of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, insofar as the same deals with marital infidelity, are as follows:
In fact, in an earlier case, the Court had already made a categorical ruling that marital infidelity per se is not what Republic Act No. 9262 penalizes but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering upon the victim. In AAA v. BBB,[13] the Court said:
As every student of constitutional law knows, "[i]t is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule."[15] The fundamental duty of a court is to interpret the law as it is and not as it should be. Here the majority renege on this duty by interpreting Republic Act No. 9262 based on their presumptions and beliefs of what it should be and not based on what the language of the law per se provides. For one, the majority reject the application to the present case of the doctrine in Acharon, which similarly involves a violation of Section 5(i). The majority believe that Section 5(i) must be qualified when it comes to marital infidelity such that intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial. In effect, the majority are carving out from Acharon psychological violence under Section 5(i), committed through marital infidelity, by considering it as a crime malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
During the deliberations of this case, it was opined that for cases of marital infidelity under Section 5(i), the specific criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman is irrelevant. Thus, in keeping with the intent of Republic Act No. 9262) which is the protection of women and children, proof that the woman suffered mental or emotional anguish due to the acts committed by the accused suffices to hold a person criminally liable. Hence, for psychological violence through marital infidelity, the Court should disregard the specific criminal intent to commit the crime.[16]
It was also posited that criminal intent is irrelevant to constitute a violation of Section 5(i). Consequently, it was opined that Acharon is inapplicable to this case because the former involves the deprivation of financial support. Further, considering that Section 5(i) does not use the term "deliberate," "knowingly," "for the purpose of," specific intent is, therefore, not required. Instead, what the law merely looks at is the consequence, effect or actual harm suffered by the victim.[17]
I strongly disagree.
To my mind, ruling that specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial in cases of psychological violence through marital infidelity under Section 5(i), but relevant in other cases as in deprivation of financial support in Acharon, is completely baseless and unwarranted nitpicking. More importantly, it violates the fundamental rule that all penal statutes shall be construed in favor of the accused.
The language of the law does not make such distinction; thus, courts should also refrain from making distinctions. If the Court were to hold that specific intent is irrelevant to prosecute violations of Section 5(i) only with respect to marital infidelity, it would, in effect, be ruling that marital infidelity per se is punished by Republic Act No. 9262, which is not the case. As earlier emphasized, this act is already, and properly punished by the Revised Penal Code. In contrast, and at the risk of being repetitive, what is punished by Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 is the purpose or intention to inflict psychological violence.
Moreover, the discussions in Acharon are on all fours with this case as both cases deal with the same provision of law-Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It would be the height of incongruence for the Court to say that a penal provision would have different constitutive elements depending on the circumstances. Every crime, every penal provision, has a standard set of elements: all of which must be present for guilt beyond reasonable doubt to be established. And to reiterate, what Section 5(i) punishes is the act of "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" with the enumerated examples of doing so (e.g., repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children) being merely the weapons of choice.[18] The Court thus cannot make a distinction between denial of financial support, on the one hand, and marital infidelity, on the other, for purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of violating Section 5(i). Republic Act No. 9262. In each and every case involving said provision, the Court has to be assured that intentional causing of mental or emotional anguish is present before conviction may be had.
Thus, while Acharon involves deprivation of financial support as the "weapon of choice" to commit psychological violence, the Court's ruling therein squarely applies to this case. To be sure, the Court's pronouncement in Acharon as to the requisite specific intent for Section 5(i) is all encompassing. The Court categorically said, in recognition of the respective Opinions of Justices Lazaro-Javier and Mario V. Lopez in Acharon, "that the crimes penalized under Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita,"[19] which includes psychological violence through marital infidelity. Being a crime mala in se, there must be concurrence between the acts complained of and the accompanying criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the victim.
As explained in Acharon, the specific acts penalized by Republic Act No. 9262 as defined under Section 5[20] pertain to various forms of violence which the law aims to protect women from-such as physical violence under Sections 5(a) to 5(d), psychological violence under Sections 5(f), 5(h) and 5(i), physical and sexual violence under Section 5(g), and economic abuse under Section 5(e). Undoubtedly, all these acts are vile and inherently immoral. Punishable acts or omissions that are immoral by nature, are considered crimes mala in se. The absence of the terms "deliberate," "knowingly," or "for the purpose of" does not necessarily mean that the crime is not mala in se. For example, no such words appear in the crimes of homicide and serious illegal detention and yet the element of intent to kill or deprive of liberty is without controversy. On the other hand, acts that are not inherently immoral, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, are crimes mala prohibita.[21] The rule on the subject is, unlike in acts mala prohibita, where the intent of the offender is immaterial, in acts mala in se, intent to commit the crime governs.[22] For violation of Section 5(i), the intent necessary to give rise to criminal liability is expressed therein-"to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child."
In this connection, the ponencia suggests that intent to cause mental and emotional anguish may be conclusively presumed from the act of committing marital infidelity. To support this novel theory, the ponencia draws the absurd analogy between homicide and marital infidelity, to wit:
The ponencia, however, poses a question: "What else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?" Here, the ponencia ironically perhaps thinks too highly of men-it is more probable that the husband was not expecting anything at all, as the latter has been blinded by lust.
In this regard, the ponencia poses the challenge to flesh out how marital infidelity can be used as a means to cause mental and emotional anguish. Consider this: a husband commits marital infidelity but, unlike XXX, videotapes his act of coitus with his mistress and sends a copy thereof to his spouse, or of a man who openly publicizes his extramarital affair in front of his wife. In these scenarios, as opposed to XXX's case where intent to cause mental or emotional anguish was drawn by the majority out of thin air, specific intent to cause mental and emotional anguish can easily be discerned from the acts of the erring husband.
That said, worthy of note as well is that Section 5 does not only enumerate specific acts of violence committed against the woman or child, it also describes the circumstances or context upon which such acts must be performed to give rise to criminal liability. For instance, as illustrated in Acharon, the act of denying financial support is not per se penalized by Republic Act No. 9262. What makes it punishable under Republic Act No. 9262 is the existence of the circumstances or context under which the act of deprivation of financial support was employed by the accused. In Acharon, the Court further noted that deprivation of financial support is both covered under Sections 5(e) and 5(i). What makes the act of denying financial support punishable under Section 5(e) and not under Section 5(i) is the specific intent, as described in Section 5(e), of controlling or restricting the woman's and/or the child's or her children's actions or decisions. On the other hand, denial of financial support becomes punishable under Section 5(i) only when such was done with intent to inflict upon the woman or child mental or emotional anguish, as described in Section 5(i). Clearly, specific intent is a material and relevant element in determining first, whether the act is punishable by Republic Act No. 9262 and, second, in some cases, under which paragraph of Section 5 the complained act falls.
Construing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, in relation to a marital infidelity, as malum prohibitum raises several issues. To begin with, it would be contrary to the plain language of the law. To stress anew, it is not the commission of marital infidelity that is punished, but the "[c]ausing [of] mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child"-this is the overt act punished by the law. The Court need not look further than in Section 5's other subsections as proof that this offense is intentional in nature.
An interpretation that Section 5(i) is malum prohibitum likewise substantially deviates from the meaning of other subsections under Section 5. Indeed, as discussed above, the verbs used by each of the nine (9) acts under Section 5 are intentional in nature as it would be absurd to consider them as "accidental." Intentionality is implied by the use of words such as "purposeful," "causing" and "threatening." The law thus punishes offenders whose objective is to inflict violence upon the woman or her child by various means. Consequently, the foregoing acts require intentionality simply because the contrary would result in absurdity. For instance, if the family goes on a trip (which the husband planned) but is then kidnapped by malefactors, is the husband guilty under Section 5(d) for accidentally "[p]lacing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm"? What if the husband is driving and forgets to check the tire pressure that results in a crash and injuries to the wife and child. Is the husband liable under Section 5(a) for negligently "[c]ausing physical harm to the woman or her child?" Precisely, adopting the ponencia's view gives rise to these absurdities. To repeat, intent to inflict physical, emotional, sexual, psychological, or economic abuse upon the woman or child victim is an essential element of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
I also underscore that removing the element of specific intent from Section 5(i) does not only go against the plain language of the law, it likewise makes the crime completely subjective. To illustrate its subjectiveness, the ponencia reads in relevant part:
In addition, the individual experience of the complainant cannot be the determinative factor for violations of Section 5(i), for doing so would effectively allow Section 5(i) to criminalize a host of other acts that are normally part of being in an intimate relationship. For example, if a husband continuously fails to put down the toilet seat despite having been repeatedly reminded to do so, and the wife experiences emotional anguish as a result because she feels that her husband does not listen to her, does this already constitute a violation of Section 5(i)? Using the majority's ruling of the present case, the answer is a resounding yes; it is a violation of Section 5(i) for, after all, all that is required is to do an act that causes mental or emotional anguish. Another example would be if a boyfriend decides to break up with his girlfriend-a relationship still covered by Republic Act No. 9262 as the law covers sexual or dating relationships, not just marriage-would this constitute a violation of Section 5(i)? Again, using the majority's reasoning, it will likewise be a violation since logic and experience dictate that going through a breakup is a source of mental or emotional anguish. Lastly, would a 20-year-old man be penalized under Section 5(i) if he finds himself genuinely falling in love with another girl, thereby causing mental and emotional anguish to his current girlfriend? Following the majority's reasoning again, the answer would be in the affirmative.
Clearly, this is a dangerous precedent. By redefining the elements of violation of Section 5(i) to only, essentially, be the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the victim, the majority is putting not just an accused in a disadvantageous position, but also relationships and families in a vulnerable state.
Simply put, it cannot be said that doing an act which will naturally cause emotional anguish to one's partner already constitutes "violence" that may be punished by the law. Once again, what makes an act punishable under the statute-like most Philippine criminal laws-is the intent of the offender.
The ponencia asserts on one hand that a man's specific intent is "purely a mental process" that may not be "demonstrated externally"-proof of which would render "enforcement of the law ... difficult, if not impossible;' and yet, on the other hand, the ponencia is unwilling to apply this same standard to a victim is testimony on her "mental and emotional anguish." Is the latter not a "mental process" as well? Wh&t all this amounts to is simple hypocrisy and virtue-signaling, which was exemplified by the majority when they decided to carve out marital infidelity from the ratio decidendi in Acharon. In Acharon, those in the majority required proof of specific intent with respect to all other offenses covered by Section 5(i) without ever considering the "impracticality" or how doing so will "weaponize" "subjectivity."
As illustrated above, to rule that proof of the victim's suffering determines the guilt and liability of the accused for violation of Section 5(i), without regard to whether the complained act was done for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish, will open a pandora's box of criminal suits and convictions not even contemplated by Republic Act No. 9262. All mistakes, intentional or unintentional, which naturally causes a woman mental or emotional anguish become a criminal offense and will subject a man to incarceration. While Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to protect and empower women, it was never meant to be used as a weapon for women to chastise their partners for every error or mistake committed in their relationships.
This slippery slope has been precisely opened by some members of the Court. In fact, as stated at the outset, the term "marital infidelity" itself is not defined in Republic Act No. 9262. Republic Act No. 9262 neither states that "marital infidelity" is a husband having sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife, nor does it state that ''marital infidelity" includes having lustful thoughts over a woman who is not his wife. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 9262 does it state the nature extent and/or duration of "marital infidelity" and there is no test provided in the statute for the Courts to use and apply. On this point, the Court in People v. Dela Piedra,[26] declared:
First, the premise that requiring intent to cause psychological violence would validate lecherous conduct is absurd. The male stereotype assumed by the example is simply a strawman-as if dispensing with intent in relation to Section 5(i) today will "deter" the cheaters of tomorrow. Aside from being a question of policy that is not within the province of the Court, it is precisely the failure of a man's reasonable faculties, the succumbing to temptation, that leads him into these unfortunate situations. A man like XXX, for example, is precisely in this predicament because his passions overcame his reason, and not because of any elaborate scheme of revenge against his wife that was foiled by its discovery.
Second, rather than "correcting" the supposed "imbalance" in the marriage, dispensing with intent under Section 5(i) would only have the opposite effect. Precisely, doing so would reify these "imbalances" and would highlight marriage roles as rather "victim-oppressor." This stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of power in a marriage relationship, which is not simply a question of who has more votes. A wife is not a "minority shareholder" so to speak who requires protection. Such an analogy does not assume that men and women are fundamentally equals in marriage and disregards the unique and mysterious logic of power in a marriage.
Third, it is inaccurate to state that the language of the law is "clear and unqualified" when Section 5 uses words such as "purposeful," "causing," and "threatening," as discussed above. Hence, intentionality cannot be divorced from Section 5(i).
Lastly, it would precisely be judicial legislation, and against the well settled rule to interpret all penal statutes liberally in favor of the accused, to arbitrarily consider Section 5(i) as malum prohibitum and to send otherwise innocent men to jail.
Here, with the majority's ruling that intent to cause mental or emotional anguish need not be proven in relation to a violation of Section 5(i) in relation to marital infidelity, and that the same can be presumed from the act of marital infidelity per se, the ponencia is amending both the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 and the Revised Penal Code-a plain act of judicial legislation. Not finished there, the ponencia furthers this egregious error when it discussed how marital infidelity (even while not defined in the law) "still admits of defenses akin to exempting circumstances in criminal law" and suggests that "estranged spouses" may not be able to have a cause of action for marital infidelity under Section 5(i). This is clearly inconsistent with Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 which provides that VAWC may be committed against a "former wife" - "estranged" or otherwise. At any rate, what then is the standard to call a couple "estranged"? Similarly, may a man who has an affair now assert that he was a "person who act[ed] under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear [i.e., of his wife]" or that he acted "under the compulsion of an irresistible force [i.e., his lust]"? The absurdities go on.
To be sure, the minority's view is in no way "minimizing" the trauma caused by a partner's betrayal of trust or a "spit in the face of every woman who has been the victim of such one-night stands and casual sexual encounters."[30] This is a complete non sequitur. Vengeance should not be the animating principle in the judicial interpretation of laws. Importantly, the mal perspective is wholly ignored. The incarceration of a partner or spouse for unintentional offenses and the consequent breaking up of a family is no light matter and great caution must be taken before such an interpretation may be given to Section 5(i).
II.
Effects of construing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 as penalizing marital infidelity per se
Even assuming that "infidelity" is a term that was properly defined under Republic Act No. 9262, the interpretation espoused by the majority arbitrarily limits the same within marriage. Republic Act No. 9262 does not only protect married women, but even women in sexual or dating relationships. To recall, Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to address all types of violence suffered by women in intimate relationships; it applies equally to all women and their children who suffer violence and abuse. Thus, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 defines VAWC as:
This is not the intent of Republic Act No. 9262. To reiterate the Court's ruling in Drilon, Republic Act No. 9262 does not discriminate against married men. The law encompasses all forms of violence and abuse committed against women in all types of relationships, even including sexual or dating relationships.
Thus, punishing only married men for committing infidelity for violating Section 5(i) would constitute a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution-the equal protection clause. In such case, the distinction effectively made between married men and unmarried men is not germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, which is to address all types of violence committed against women.[33] To be sure, a woman, who has been cheated on by her partner whom she truly loves, would always feel mental and emotional anguish because of the infidelity. The amount of pain and betrayal cannot be measured on the scales of the law but by one's personal relationship, and the same exists regardless of whether the woman is married or unmarried.
Additionally, the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 is a public crime. Section 25 of Republic Act No. 9262 states that "[v]iolence against women and their children shall be considered a public offense which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime." This means that any John or Jane Doe can file a criminal case against an erring husband or partner.
Contrariwise, marital infidelity under the Revised Penal Code is considered a private offense. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]he crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he [or she] shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[34] as amended, echoes this provision of the Revised Penal Code:
In People v. Lualhati,[35] the Court said that the legal requirement is to "let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the family."[36]
In People v. Ilarde,[37] it was ruled that "the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse."[38] This policy was adopted "out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial"[39]
Succinctly put, the policy of affording the aggrieved woman the decision to seek judicial redress in private crimes is the State's recognition of and respect for familial and marital privacy. If the Court were to say that specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial in Section 5(i), marital infidelity, as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, becomes a public offense under Republic Act No. 9262. As such, any person-a neighbor, an officemate, an acquaintance-can easily pry into the personal and private affairs of the couple and file a case against the erring partner, even regardless of the fact that the aggrieved partner has already reconciled with or forgiven his or her erring partner.
Take for instance, a "concerned" neighbor who has knowledge of his neighbor's husband's visits to a place of ill repute with a woman other than his wife. Can such concerned neighbor institute a criminal case against the erring husband for violation of Section 5(i), even without the wife's consent? Yes, if the Court were to rule that marital infidelity is an offense malum prohibitum and a public crime under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. What if the husband, admitting to his mistake, was forgiven by the wife? Can the husband still be prosecuted and convicted for violation of Section 5(i) after the lapse of ten years? By a complaint filed by the wife herself out of fear for the husband committing infidelity again? Or by the concerned officemate, neighbor, or friend, seeing that the wife has been in continued distress? Again, the answer to these questions would be yes if the Court were to rule that Section 5(i) penalizes marital infidelity per se. In all these scenarios, one thing is clear-a couple's marriage, their marital and familial privacy, and the possibility of their reconciliation will be undermined if not totally destroyed.
Therefore, the majority of the Court resolve this case with a totally myopic viewpoint. It cannot confine the consequences of its interpretation of Section 5(i) solely on the circumstances of the marriage of XXX and AAA. Otherwise, the Court will lose sight of the purpose for which the law was enacted.
Truly, adultery, marital infidelity, and sexual immorality in general, have existed long before Republic Act No. 9262 and have been punished in various ways in history-even with death.[40] The majority should thus disabuse themselves of the notion that interpreting Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 as penalizing marital infidelity per se will drive cheating husbands to extinction. However, the majority seem to have lost sight that the Spouses XXX were, at some point in time, in love and indeed intended to make good on their vows when they were married. It would be absurd to propose that XXX entered into a marriage as a pretext to commit marital infidelity-he simply lost his way down the road. The majority suggest that the reasons for XXX losing his way are irrelevant simply because the pain suffered by AAA is proof enough of violence.
The view of the majority that every marital infidelity committed by a man, without regard to the specific circumstances of such infidelity, is tantamount to intentional violence on the woman-partner is simply vindictive and bordering on misandry. Indeed, marital infidelity, as broad as the term is, involves issues that cannot be examined from a single perspective. If it is truly the policy to "strengthen" the family's "solidarity," how can a marriage address these complex issues when husbands or partners are simply being shipped off to jail? Throwing the partner-husband in jail would not mend the relationship but would rather euthanize it.
The construction of Section 5 by the majority may be worse than the evil sought to be prevented and a descent into puritanism. Effectively ruling that marital infidelity, without more, is penalized under Section 5(i) affects the entire institution of marriage. Erring partners/husbands now face the threat of incarceration should the Court decide to convict XXX as a caricature of another lecherous simpleton who, failing to cover his tracks, got caught red handed by his wife. And in doing so, what is often taken for granted is the couples' personal commitment and vow to each other when they were married.
III.
XXX's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
Applying the foregoing principles to this case, I find that the evidence of the prosecution failed to surpass the standard of moral certainty that XXX committed the crime charged. In particular, the prosecution's evidence fell short of proving the fourth element of Section 5(i)-the specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon AAA, through marital infidelity.
Based on the narration of facts, the evidence by the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
Some members of the Court find that the following circumstances indicate that XXX intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife: (a) XXX signed the birth certificate of his "lovechild;" (b) XXX kept his one-night stand "a secret for good reason;" and (c) XXX visited his child with YYY on several occasions at various places.[42]
I disagree. Proof of specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation cannot be based on conjectures, presumptions and prejudices. As an essential element of the crime, it must be drawn from hard evidence showing that such specific intent was the accused's driving force for committing marital infidelity, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon the victim.
Circumstances (a) and (c) do not even prove that XXX kept an illicit relationship with YYY. Thus, these cannot be reasonable bases to conclude that XXX had intended to cause his wife mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation by maintaining an extra marital relationship. In fact, as I see it, circumstances (a) and (c) only establish that XXX wanted to take responsibility for the child. Circumstance (b) cannot also be equated to intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish public ridicule, or humiliation. To the contrary, keeping his alleged one-night stand and illegitimate child a secret indicates shame and humiliation for his mistake which he kept from his wife precisely to spare her emotional distress.
Furthermore, during the deliberations it was raised that the following circumstances indicate that XXX chose to consciously continue his illicit affair with YYY; (a) XXX went out of YYY's house wearing a white boxer shorts maong pants, slippers, and a sando; (b) XXX admitted that every time he went to YYY's house, he would park on the street in front; (c) XXX admitted having seen his son with YYY 15 to 20 times; (d) AAA and BBB testified (and XXX admitted) that YYY's child called XXX "Dad" or "Daddy;" and (e) XXX characterized his relationship with his son as a "[normal] father and son relationship."
To my mind, in no way do these circumstances prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that XXX maintains an illicit relationship and keeps YYY as his mistress. At most, these circumstances pertain only to XXX's relationship with his illegitimate child and how XXX is supporting said child. In visiting YYY's place and maintaining a relationship with his child, XXX is not keeping a mistress, he is simply fulfilling his obligation as a father. To be sure, nothing in the prosecution's evidence show that XXX was seen with YYY alone. All evidence of the prosecution point to the fact that XXX's connection or relationship with YYY is only in relation to supporting their child.
This reading of the evidence is not to justify or condone XXX's marital infidelity. This is simply the application of the time-honored principle in criminal law that "if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his [or her] guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more favorable to the accused, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty."[43]
I cannot also agree with the conclusion that XXX's unwillingness to reconcile with AAA and save their marriage aggravates proof of criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his part.[44] A husband or a wife is at the liberty to refuse to see, live, or reconcile with his or her spouse without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of such right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband or a wife to live with his or her spouse.[45]
The majority's ruling that such constitutes criminal intent under Section 5(i) runs the risk of compelling couples to stay in a relationship even though one or both parties no longer want to do so. This is especially true in a country like ours which does not have divorce proceedings and has limited grounds for annulment. It is well to be reminded that a couple's continued relationship or cohabitation "is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice."[46]
To end, I wish to emphasize that our system of laws has never meant to provide a remedy for every damage caused-hence the concept of damnum absque injuria-and much less does it require that every damage be met with criminal prosecution. To be clear, this is not to say that having extramarital affairs should be countenanced or even tolerated. In this Opinion, I only wish to stress that the provisions on Adultery and Concubinage in the Revised Penal Code already punish those situations. I merely emphasize that the evil sought to be addressed by Republic Act No. 9262 is the intentional infliction of violence upon the woman. To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9262 is not meant to criminalize marital infidelity per se. By the same token, it is likewise not meant to criminally punish any and all acts that somehow bring emotional pain or suffering upon the woman. This is clear from the plain language of the law itself.
I join the members of the Court who find that marital infidelity per se-whether a one-night stand or an extramarital affair-may be enough to constitute psychological violence. However, as it stands, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 plainly does not penalize marital infidelity alone. Whatever "gap" there is in the law should therefore be addressed to the Legislature and not through this case. The power and duty of the Court is to interpret and apply the law within the boundaries set by its language and intent. It does not include the power to correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein.[47] Consequently, affirming XXX's conviction for Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 on the basis of his unfaithfulness alone is tantamount to judicial legislation, one that is detrimental to the accused whose presumption of innocence is guaranteed by the Constitution and who is entitled to the proscription that all doubts be resolved in his favor.
Therefore, it is my view that the principles laid down in the ponencia are the egregiously wrong interpretation of Section 5(i) insofar as it deals with marital infidelity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition and ACQUIT petitioner XXX from the charge of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, titled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances," the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] John 8:4-6 (NIV).
[2] Leviticus 20:10: "If a man commits adultery with another man's wife-with the wife of his neighbor-both the adulterer and the adulteress are to be put to death."
[3] Deuteronomy 22:22 (NIV).
[4] An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other Purposes.
[5] Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6] Acharon v. People, supra note 5.
[7] Ponencia, p. 3.
[8] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[9] Id. at 376.
[10] Supra note 5.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] 832 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[14] Id. at 620.
[15] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Emphasis supplied.
[16] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, pp. 8-9.
[17] J. Inting, Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 7-8.
[18] See Acharon v. People, supra note 5.
[19] Id.
[20] SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
[21] Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[22] Id. at 658.
[23] Ponencia, p. 16.
[24] The fallacy of faulty analogy occurs when analogies are used as arguments or explanations and the similarities between the two things compared are too remote to support the conclusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/#:~:text=The fallacy of faulty analogywill want use them> (last accessed on May 15, 2024).
[25] Ponencia, p. 17.
[26] 403 Phil. 31 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
[27] Id. at 47-48.
[28] J. Singh, Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 8.
[29] See Id.
[30] Id. at 9.
[31] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[32] Id. at 103-104.
[33] See id.
[34] A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, as amended, December 1, 2000.
[35] G.R. No. 66038, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 277 [Per J. Gri o-Aquino, First Division].
[36] Id. at 283.
[37] G.R. No. L-58595, October 10, 1983, 125 SCRA 11 [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
[38] Id. at 18.
[39] Id.
[40] See Leviticus 20:10, ESV: "If a man commits adultery with the wife of his neighbor, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death."
[41] Ponencia, pp. 3-5.
[42] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, p. 15.
[43] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-50103, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 597, 598-599 [Per J. Fernan, Second Division].
[44] See C.J. Gesmundo, Concurring Opinion, p. 3.
[45] See Ilusorio v. Bildner, 387 Phil. 915 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[46] Id.
[47] Agote v. Judge Lorenzo, 502 Phil. 318, 334 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].
G.R. No. 252739 (XXX,[1] Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent)
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)-a monumental achievement signifying not only the advancement of women's rights but the recognition, too, of the global, yet uniform and harsh reality faced by all women around the world as the usual victims of gender based violence. In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act was enacted in 2004.
In no uncertain terms, the Court in Garcia v. Drilon[2] (Garcia) painstakingly demonstrated, through the voice of a powerful woman in the Court, then Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, the significance of Republic Act No. 9262 and why women, as a class, deserve special protection under the law due to the unequal power relationship between men and women and the statistically-proven fact that women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence. In Garcia, the Court traced the historical context of gender-based violence, viz.:
Here, the Court again reckons with the persisting power imbalance between genders. Petitioner XXX was charged with psychological violence for causing his wife, AAA mental and emotional anguish after the latter discovered his illicit affair with YYY with whom he has a lovechild. XXX maintains, however, that his mere one-night stand could not possibly amount to psychological violence as it happened only once. More important, his extramarital affair was, anyway, not intentionally committed to cause AAA mental and emotional distress.
Thus, the questions at hand: first, must marital infidelity be repeated or continued to constitute psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262; and second, is the intention of the offender material in determining whether psychological violence against a woman has been committed?
The ponencia ordains in the negative. I fully concur. Speaking on behalf of women, I further elucidate why, in the ongoing battle for women empowerment, the intention of the offender must never have a place in ascertaining whether psychological violence has been inflicted on a woman.
Foremost, XXX's argument perpetuates the counter-intuitive rationale that in order for marital infidelity to be punishable, it must be sustained, repeated, blatant, or coupled with other demeaning acts towards the innocent spouse or child. Stated differently, if mental or emotional anguish could be measured on a spectrum, conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 should only issue whenever the mental suffering or emotional anguish is on the extreme end of the said spectrum. In fine, rather than deterring the commission of marital infidelity which may cause psychological distress to the woman, as intended by Republic Act No. 9262, XXX implores the Court to grant imprimatur for the commission of the same so long as it is committed in isolation, or as a one-off, mistake, or momentary lapse in judgment so to speak, and whenever it is coupled with circumstances which depict the offender as an upright spouse and/or parent, then the criminal liability should be extinguished.
Surely, this cannot be what Republic Act No. 9262 intends.
XXX's theory finds no support in Law or in jurisprudence.[6] For one, the reasoning behind it runs counter to the well-entrenched principle that in the Philippines, "absolute monogamy is still the order of the day."[7] Our legal system is replete with laws that enforce monogamy in marriage and penalize those who go against it (e.g., the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy, adultery, and concubinage).[8] More, the Court "value[s] monogamous marriages and consider[s] them worthy of strict legal protection."[9] Clearly, the law values and protects monogamy.[10] XXX's supposition runs against this principle, carves out an exception to monogamy, and allows an unfaithful husband to engage in marital infidelity scot-free so long as he commits it only in isolation.
For another, to warrant a conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, only the following elements are required: (a) the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (b) the woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender; (c) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (d) the anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar to such acts or omissions.
Nowhere in the law or jurisprudence is it required that acts constituting psychological violence be committed with certain gravity and with the specific and singular intent to emotionally hurt a woman. What is required, rather, is that the emotional distress and anguish allegedly suffered by the woman is duly established and supported by the evidence on record, i.e., the psychological abuse should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This is consistent with Araza v. People,[11] where the Court thoroughly laid down its basis, in the form of the woman's testimony, ordaining that the marital infidelity of Araza caused severe emotional distress to his wife which manifested through depression and frequent hospitalization.
Here, I agree that XXX is guilty of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 since the prosecution duly established all the elements of the offense. There is no dispute as regards the first and second elements here.
I thus focus on the third and fourth elements.
Araza is illuminative on the nexus between these two elements. Notably, the Court had been consistent in its pronouncement that the fourth element, i.e., the act/s of psychological violence committed by the man, is the means while the third element, i.e., the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the woman, is the result, viz.:
First. There is no place in the law to contemplate how the man may or may not have thought his actions would affect the woman for so long as he, with full volition, freedom, and will, committed those acts. To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted "to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children."[13] Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
This is precisely why the Court characterized the fourth element as a means to commit the offense, regardless of the man's specific intent in committing the same. A well-meaning focus on the mens rea of the crime, as espoused in Acharon v. People,[15] defeats the very purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, in that it allows an offender who obviously caused mental or emotional anguish upon his victim/s to escape his transgression scot-free so long as he is able to demonstrate that he committed marital infidelity for other reasons, and that he did not "deliberately use it to cause psychological violence to his wife."
Should the viewpoint of XXX be upheld, i.e., that specific criminal intent must be considered indispensable for a conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the purpose of the law would be negated. Offenders could simply claim that they engaged in marital infidelity for virtually any self-serving reason (e.g., boredom, curiosity, or adventure) since it is extremely difficult for the prosecution to show that infidelity was employed specifically to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the offended spouse. Nothing short of a confession by the accused would be necessary to prove his intent to cause psychological violence upon his wife.
I thus respectfully submit that in cases involving violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by means of marital infidelity, courts must, as we have always done, focus largely on the actus reus of the offense, which includes the overt act (marital infidelity) and the consequences thereof (mental or emotional anguish)[16] as this is the gravamen of the offense. An emphasis on the means of commission is important to avert any notion that we are abandoning our unanimous ruling in Acharon which involves a supposed violation of Section 5(i) by failure to provide financial support.
As explained in Acharon:
But here, the means employed cannot be construed in any other manner. Marital infidelity is quite categorical. It cannot be understood like financial support, for it is absurd to posit that a husband may wake up one day and have "insufficient" fidelity towards his wife. It is a sustained obligation which a husband cannot renege on for any reason. A husband either remains loyal or breaches his marital obligation even with only one transgression, as here. This distinction is in keeping with the intent of Republic Act No. 9262 and the time-honored tenet of equity that a person who commits a wrongful act should be held liable for all the consequences of his or her actions.
More important, I humbly believe that this special legislation for the protection of women and children intends for men to be highly circumspect of their actions. To place this in a more realistic context, for so long, society indulged and tolerated men's whims and caprice without really holding them accountable by conveniently raising the irrational excuse that "men will always be men." In fact, even in the midst of the 21st century, we still have criminal laws that discriminate between men and women in terms of extra marital affairs by allowing the conviction of an erring wife for a one-time tryst while an unfaithful husband remains free to sleep with his paramours as long as he remains discreet.
But no more, at least where Republic Act No. 9262 is concerned. If we truly intend to elevate women's rights and empower women, there is no place for the thoughtless and irresponsible, yet historically condoned, acts of men which have hurt, traumatized, and demeaned women for ages, especially not in the interpretation of the very law crafted particularly to protect them. We ought not bastardize the intent of the law in this way.
Second. That XXX's affair was a mere one-night stand is a mere convenient excuse. It is the typical defense of a man who had been caught in the act. As a last-ditch effort, "isang beses lang naman" is said in hopes to assuage the hurt, betrayal, and already broken trust of the woman. Once broken, these pieces will never be perfectly whole again. More, in this case, the fruit of this infidelity will forever remind AAA of XXX's unfaithfulness. To be sure, the damage has already been done. And, in the legal context, all the elements have already been met.
In any case, whether XXX's marital infidelity was a one-night stand or a one-night thing, one night at a time, it does not matter. For it is not the number of times the man committed an affair that matters but the infliction of injury to the woman - the hurt, torture, and mental anguish suffered by her who has been cheated on by her husband.
Indeed, commission of marital infidelity per se, regardless of frequency, intent, or gravity, is not the gravamen of the offense. It does not automatically result in conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 sans a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the woman suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result. In fact, in the very recent case of AAA265336 v. People,[17] the Court acquitted the accused therein of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, principally because the prosecution miserably failed to establish that his wife suffered any mental or emotional anguish as a result of his infidelity, viz.:
Here, the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA due to XXX's marital affair was sufficiently established. In her testimony,[18] AAA recounted blow-by-blow, not only the facts as they transpired, but most important, their traumatic impact on her mental and emotional well-being. Unlike in AAA265336, AAA conveyed with detail and intensity how she felt throughout the entire ordeal, starting from her discovery of XXX's extramarital affair:
The mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA because of XXX's marital infidelity cannot be denied. The traumatic effect it left on her was not only impactful but lasting and ought not to be ignored. In the past, the Court has held that only the testimony of the victim is required to prove this element, precisely because her experience is personal to such party.[21] AAA categorically stated:
Admittedly, the circumstances in this case pale in comparison to those in Araza, and its companion cases.[24] On the most basic level, however, this case still exhibits the gravamen of a Section 5(i) violation: psychological violence resulting in mental or emotional anguish. AAA, like the women and children in the cases discussed in the ponencia, suffered damage because of XXX's marital infidelity. Though XXX did not abandon AAA and his son nor did he forsake his family,[25] both courts below similarly found that he still caused AAA mental and emotional anguish. This is a uniform finding of fact made by the trial court and appellate court which is binding and conclusive on the Court. XXX's continued compliance with his marital and parental obligations did not preclude him from inflicting suffering and anguish upon AAA. These things can concurrently exist; they are not mutually exclusive.
Equally important, I do not believe that Republic Act No. 9262 intends an exact or uniform measure of abuse a man must inflict before an aggrieved woman may hold him liable under the law. For part and parcel of empowering women is recognizing that every woman is different. Every woman has a different threshold for their partner's erring ways and may react differently when faced with such fact. While one may not be intensely aggrieved by the man's marital infidelity, another might be crippled by hurt and distress. In which case, the law steps in to sanction the abuse that has been inflicted on her. This is the essence of the law. It is not meant to be a mechanical measure of how much hurt must be inflicted for the woman to say she has been criminally abused. Accordingly, the Court must evaluate the presence of this element on a case-by-case basis.
In any event, even if the mens rea is considered here, XXX's conviction must stand. The specific intent under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 may be understood as the offender's intention and purpose to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his spouse by committing marital infidelity.[26] Alternatively, the specific intent may also be the offender's knowledge that marital infidelity is wrong, yet he still dips himself into it, totally and callously shrugging off the mental or emotional anguish it will cause to his spouse.[27]
Intent is a state of mind. And so courts may appreciate the same "only though external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the [offender] at the time of [commission of the offense] and immediately thereafter."[28] On this score, XXX committed the following acts after his one-night stand with Aileen: (a) signing the birth certificate of his "lovechild;"[29] (b) keeping his one-night stand "a secret for good reason;"[30] and (c) visiting his child with Aileen on several occasions at various places.[31]
Human experience, common decency, and our entire legal system dictate that a one-night stand is improper for a married individual.[32] Stated differently, not only is marital infidelity illegal but also morally wrong. It is evil. It can never be attributed to noble or pure intentions. As such, marital infidelity regardless of the frequency of commission and the absence of any "other significant factors," must be punished. No amount of interpretation or rationalization could-and should-ever render marital infidelity acceptable.
These premises, coupled with XXX's surreptitious acts after his rendezvous with Aileen, ineluctably show his mental state and his awareness that his marital infidelity would cause mental or emotional anguish upon AAA. His conscious decision to desecrate his marital vow and his promise of monogamy to AAA cannot simply be brushed off as a simple lapse of judgment. To be sure, he did not magically end up in another woman's bed out of sheer Providence. He was not forced to engage in a sexual act, with a woman not his wife. He ended up where he was, because he wanted to be there. Because he intended to be there.
Res ipsa loquitur. His evil acts speak volumes of his evil intentions.
As Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen expounded in Alanis III v. Court of Appeals.[33] "Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture, the more its chances to infect this and future generations." To acquit XXX would normalize the power imbalance between men and women, would be a step in the wrong direction, and "further encode patriarchy into our system."[34]
All told, I vote to AFFIRM the conviction of XXX Manalang for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 7610, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[2] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[3] Id. at 92-95.
[4] Cumigad v. AAA, G.R. No. 219715, December 6, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Perez v. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[5] Id.
[6] See generally Malang v. Hon. Mason, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000 [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[7] Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug in Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[8] Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[9] Id.
[10] Ni al v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) [Per Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[11] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[12] Id. at 919.
[13] Reyes v. People, 855 Phil. 991, 1007 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 588 Phil. 532, 541 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
[14] RA 9262: Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/faq-republic-act-9262/ (last accessed on July 7, 2023).
[15] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[16] See Concurrence of J. Lazaro-Javier in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021.
[17] G.R. No. 265336, November 6, 2023 [Notice, Second Division].
[18] TSN dated June 8, 2017.
[19] Id. at pp. 7-8.
[20] Id. at 18.
[21] See Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[22] TSN dated June 8, 2017, pp. 18-19.
[23] Id. at 20.
[24] Id. at 10-11.
[25] Id. at 11-12.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] People v. Tabura, G.R. No. 228962, February 10, 2021 [Notice, First Division].
[29] Id. at 12.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 3 and 12.
[32] See e.g. Article 333 and 334 of the Revised Penal Code.
[33] 890 Phil. 74, 95 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[34] Id.
G.R. No. 252739 - XXX,* Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
INTING, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the judgment of conviction against XXX for a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the "Anti- Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" must be affirmed by the Court.
Preliminarily, it must be clarified that in the Information, XXX was charged with a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by allegedly keeping a mistress, as follows:
The Court has recognized that the term "mistress" means "a woman with whom a man habitually fornicates."[1] Meanwhile, "marital infidelity" or "conjugal infidelity" has been related to sexual congress by a married man or woman with a person other than his wife or husband.
With the foregoing, it is my position that under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, even a single act of sexual intercourse between a married person and another who is not his/her legal spouse constitutes marital infidelity, provided that all the other elements thereof are present.
Thus, the charge of "keeping a mistress" against XXX is broad enough to include "marital infidelity" or sexual intercourse with a woman who is not XXX's wife. The Information sufficiently states all the elements of the specific offense allegedly committed by XXX - causing mental or emotional anguish to AAA through marital infidelity - and enables him to adequately prepare his defense.[2] Surely, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that keeping a mistress, as charged in the Information, includes marital infidelity and may therefore prepare his defenses accordingly.[3]
Perforce, in accordance with the variance doctrine under Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5,[4] of the Rules of Court, if the prosecution was able to prove that XXX committed marital infidelity that caused mental or emotional anguish upon AAA, then he may be convicted of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
As a rule, the accused must possess a culpable mental state before he or she may be convicted of the crime charged. This springs from the general principle that the wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal, or the required concurrence of actus reus and mens rea.[5]
However, as pointed out by the ponencia,[6] specific intent is not necessary for there to be a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when the means used by the accused to cause emotional or mental anguish upon the woman or her child is marital infidelity.
Philippine laws have distinguished between crimes which are mala in se, where intent is necessary for conviction, and mala prohibita, where intent is immaterial. While there is a general presumption that a penal statute requires mens rea, our jurisdiction equally recognizes the power of Congress to enact criminal statutes that are mala prohibita.[7] This is sourced from the plenary power of the Legislature to define crimes and prescribe penalties therefor.[8] Hence, in the absence of language in the statute making guilty knowledge and criminal intent an essential element of the acts prohibited thereunder, it is not necessary to charge or to prove that the accused acted with specific intent to violate the law in order to sustain convictions under the statute.[9]
Presently, the Court has adopted the approach of looking at the inherent immorality of the penalized act to determine whether it is deemed malum in se, where intent governs, in contrast to acts which are mala prohibita, where intent is immaterial.[10] In Acharon v. People,[11] the Court applied this approach in laying down the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and holding that intent to cause emotional or mental anguish is indispensable for the conviction of an accused charged with a violation thereof, when committed through denial of financial support. Acharon was reiterated and applied by the Court in subsequent cases involving similar alleged violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.[12]
However, it should be stressed that Acharon and the cases[13] where its ruling was applied specifically ruled on the element of intent under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when the means used by the accused is denial of financial support. In these cases, the Court held that mere failure to provide support cannot constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 9262 because the law requires that support be denied. Further, "support" depends on the capacity of the person bound to give support; hence, when the man himself is impoverished and fails to give support, he cannot be made criminally liable under Republic Act No. 9262. Obviously, the man cannot deny from the woman or her child support that he does not have in the first place. Moreover, denial of support under Republic Act No. 9262 ultimately relates to economic abuse, which requires that support be denied for the purpose of controlling the woman or her child or restricting their freedom of movement. Criminal intent was therefore necessary for conviction.
To my mind, Acharon cannot be indiscriminately applied in the present case where marital infidelity is the means used by the accused to cause emotional or mental anguish upon the woman or her child. Intent as an element of the offense charged against Allan must be determined based on the language of Section 5(i) in relation to Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, as well as the policy behind the law. That is, while the Court has used the test of "inherent immorality" to determine whether a crime is mala in se where intent is material, the foremost consideration in determining whether intent is necessary for a violation of the law must still be the language of the statute and legislative intent.
Verily, as early as 1909, the Court in United States v. Go Chico[14] held that intent, as an element of a crime, should be discerned based on the language of the law and the purpose to be accomplished by the law, among others. Thus, when the "statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully," then the prohibited act is mala prohibita and intent is immaterial.[15] Certainly, the Court has been guided with words evincing intent in requiring it as an element of the crime, as when the statute uses terms or phrases like "knowingly,"[16] "willfully,"[17] "deliberately,"[18] or "for the purpose of."[19]
Even when the special law punishes an act that is inherently immoral, Congress may prohibit the very same conduct and delete intent or malice as an element thereof precisely because it has the exclusive power to define crimes and prescribe penalties therefor. If it is so minded, Congress may pass a statute against mala prohibita crimes[20] and remove "intent" from offenses which ordinarily require mens rea before conviction.[21] This applies even for a special law penalizing acts which are similar to crimes traditionally requiring mens rea, e.g., theft.[22]
The Court must be guided by the foregoing principles in determining whether intent is required before XXX may be convicted of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 through marital infidelity. That is, in passing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Legislature may choose to criminalize the prohibited act itself regardless of the perpetrator's intent in violating the law. Whether such is the case will have to be determined from the language of the law itself, the policy behind it, the nature of the prohibited conduct, and other relevant matters as laid down in Go Chico.
With these considerations in mind, I find that intent is not an element of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when mental or emotional anguish is caused to the woman or her child through marital infidelity. My conclusion is based on, among others, the language of the statute itself and the purpose behind it.
First, an examination of Republic Act No. 9262 reveals that it clearly identifies those offenses which require intent, either by expressly requiring that the prohibited act be done knowingly or deliberately, or that it be executed to achieve a specific purpose.
Thus, under Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 9262, the prohibited conduct must be for the purpose of "controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct." Section 5(f) of the law also states that it is unlawful to inflict or threaten to inflict physical harm on oneself "for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions," by "deliberately" providing the woman's children insufficient financial support, among other means. Similarly, Section 5(h) of the law refers to "purposeful" or "knowing" conduct that causes psychological distress to the woman or her child. Significantly, there is no similar language evincing knowledge or intent in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(c) of the same law:
It is my position that the absence of such terms evincing "intent" in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is not merely stylistic. Rather, these terms evincing intent were withheld by the Legislature from Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 deliberately because it intended that the prohibited act be punished regardless of the intent of the accused.[23] In interpreting Republic Act No. 9262, the Court must be guided by well established presumptions: that the Legislature knew the meaning of the terms it used; that it used these terms advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such language; that it inserted those words evincing "intent" with reason, and conversely, must have withheld them from Section 5(i) with reason; and that it is familiar with principles of statutory construction.[24]
To my mind, because Congress deliberately withheld from Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 such terms as would require criminal intent, then the Court must not require it as an element of the crime. Verily, the Court's first duty is to apply the law as long as it is in force and effect, though the law may be regarded as harsh, unwise, or morally wrong.[25] The Court cannot supplant or modify the terms of Republic Act No. 9262 in the guise of statutory interpretation, as such would amount to impermissible judicial legislation.[26]
Second, following Go Chico, the Court may look at the purpose of the law to determine whether the acts punished therein are mala in se or mala prohibita. Significantly, it has been held that penal statutes which are in the nature of police regulations[27] are mala prohibita; they impose criminal penalties, irrespective of any intent and obviously for the purpose of requiring a degree of diligence for the protection of the public.[28]
In this regard, the Court must consider that Republic Act No. 9262 is a special law designed to protect the welfare of women and their children. Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9262 expressly states that the policy behind the law is to "protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security." In passing Republic Act No. 9262, the lawmakers intended that it be a measure for the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence and discrimination against women and children, as well as their protection therefrom. The lawmakers particularly recognized the realities that Filipino women face and acknowledged that because our society considers the woman to be subordinate to the man, it is predominantly the women who become victims in intimate relationships.[29] With these considerations, the legislators saw the need to make our laws "coercive" by putting "more teeth" in penalizing domestic violence, which "would strongly help provide a deterrence to the rising gender-based crime against women and children whose perpetrators are more inclined to commit their nefarious act with impunity."[30]
Evidently, Republic Act No. 9262 is geared towards the protection of women in intimate relationships and the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence. Because the law is aimed towards a public purpose, the Court should hold that the acts punished by Republic Act No. 9262 are mala prohibita, unless the law itself requires 1ntent as an element of the offense.
Finally, legislative deliberations reveal that in passing Republic Act No. 9262, the lawmakers intended to address legal and social inequities between men and women; they acknowledged that in Philippine laws, there is a bias against women, most notably the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on marital infidelity, i.e., Adultery and Concubinage under Articles 333 and 334, respectively. They particularly noted that the Revised Penal Code imposes heavier penalties on adultery than on concubinage. Moreover, in adultery, the married woman is immediately liable the moment that she has sexual intercourse with a man who is not her husband; on the other hand, for a married man to be liable for concubinage, other conditions are required, such as cohabitation and sex under scandalous circumstances.
The discussion among the lawmakers during the deliberations for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 enlightens:
To my mind, the ponencia's ruling is consistent with the foregoing objective of the framers of Republic Act No. 9262. Should the Court require the prosecution to prove that XXX had sexual congress with YYY with the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA, an unfaithful husband can escape conviction by simply claiming that he committed marital infidelity to find sexual relief, to be entertained, to have a child with another woman, or for some other reason unrelated to Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Such a restrictive interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 would divest the law of its coercive powers and perpetuate a situation where unfaithfulness and marital infidelity on the part of the husband are condoned despite the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the wife or child, contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262. It would defeat the Legislature's objective for Republic Act No. 9262 to serve as a measure towards the equality of men and women in our laws, including those that proscribe marital infidelity.
I agree with the ponencia[33] that the Court must apply Section 3(c) in relation to Section 5(i) of Republic .Act No. 9262 as they are written: the law is violated when the husband causes mental or emotional anguish to his wife or child through marital infidelity. Whether the resulting mental or emotional anguish was intended or purposefully sought by the accused is immaterial. The fact that the husband caused such mental or emotional anguish to his wife or child through marital infidelity is sufficient for his conviction.
I also respectfully submit that intent must not be required in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity because the prohibited conduct is "inherently immoral." I have reservations about the constant use of this principle in every criminal case.[34] It should not be applied by the Court if there is no ambiguity in the law. I reiterate that the Legislature has the plenary power to enact criminal laws, define crime, and dictate whether mens rea is required for its violation.[35]
The "inherent immorality" test must not always control the Court's determination of whether a criminal statute is mala in se or mala prohibita. The interpretation of legislative intent as dispensing with knowledge and willfulness as elements of the crime must not be confined to offenses differentiable upon their relative lack of turpitude.[36] "Where the offenses prohibited and made punishable are capable of inflicting widespread injury, and where the requirement of proof of the offender's guilty knowledge and wrongful intent would render enforcement of the prohibition difficult if not impossible (i.e., in effect tend to nullify the statute), the legislative intent to dispense with mens rea as an element of the offense has justifiable basis."[37]
When a special penal law is silent as to criminal intent as an element of the crime, the presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from an "otherwise innocent conduct."[38] That is, when the act punished by the law is not innocent in itself, a general intent to commit the actus reus is sufficient for conviction, and the Court must not read specific intent as an element of the offense when the law is otherwise silent on that matter.[39] This ultimately relates to due process, for no law can be passed nor interpreted in a way that criminalizes a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.[40]
The application of the foregoing principle was illustrated in cases where specific criminal intent to violate the law was required, to wit: (1) possession of food stamps only for authorized purposes recognized by law, because the possession of these items is an innocent act in itself;[41] (2) possession of an unlicensed machinegun,[42] when the US has a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership, as opposed to grenades, the possession of which is not "innocent in itself" because it is a highly dangerous offensive weapon;[43] (3) carrying sharp objects, such as fountain pens and knitting needles, in the streets, because "no rational person could find the presence of fountain pens and knitting needles in the public streets to be a source of alarm," as opposed to four-inch knives, which are "rarely carried on the streets for innocent purposes";[44] and (4) sale or distribution of any obscene visual or print medium if it involves the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, because sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 17 are protected by the First Amendment, and there is opportunity for reasonable mistake as to the actual age of the persons depicted in the medium.[45]
The foregoing cases uniformly reveal that specific criminal intent must be required if, in the absence thereof, a wide array of conduct that is innocent in itself will be penalized, in violation of the constitutional right to due process. However, if the conduct punished is not innocent in itself, the criminal statute will not be taken as one requiring specific intent; instead, the legal maxim, "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is applicable.[46] In such a case, "[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."[47] The law only requires the prosecution to show "general intent," i.e., that the accused "possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime,"[48] or "knowledge of the circumstances that the law has defined as material to the offense."[49]
Applying the foregoing, the Court must resolve the question of whether the conduct prohibited by Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is innocent in itself. If it is, then a strict specific criminal intent must be required; otherwise, only a general intent to voluntarily commit the prohibited act is sufficient for conviction in case of its violation.
There cannot be any serious debate that the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child," through "repeated verbal and emotional abuse" and marital infidelity, among others, is not innocent in itself. Marital infidelity is even violative of the obligations between a husband and wife under Article 68,[50] in relation to Article 55,[51] of the Family Code. Indeed, as early as 1948, the Court has recognized that damages may be recovered for mental and psychological suffering.[52] Verily, any act that causes mental or emotional anguish is a form of violence upon persons.[53]
In light of the above, I find that specific criminal intent to "cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" is not required for XXX's conviction. As long as the prosecution is able to show that all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are present, then XXX may be convicted for its violation. As further discussed below, the prosecution was able to discharge this evidentiary burden. Hence, XXX's conviction must be affirmed by the Court.
I reiterate that the Legislature is ultimately the sole repository of the power to define and punish crime. In the exercise of such power, it may pass statutory crimes "in the commission of which the perpetrator acts at his peril, and that if knowledge is not made a prerequisite by the statute defining the crime, its absence is not a defense, nor is it an element to be proved by the State."[54] I respectfully submit that the Court must adopt a restrained approached in reading intent into a criminal statute that is otherwise silent on mens rea. A contrary ruling, in my opinion, encourages the Court to tread upon impermissible judicial legislation and outright usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to enact penal laws, define crime, and prescribe penalties therefor.[55]
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that for crimes that a:re mala prohibita, the Court has adopted a distinction between volition, as the voluntary performance of an act or knowledge of the act being done, and intent, as the conscious and willful violation of law.[56] Particularly in cases involving Republic Act No. 9262, the Court has ruled that while the law, being mala prohibitum, does not require guilty knowledge and criminal or evil intent, or the conscious intent or will to violate the statute,[57] it must still be shown that the accused intended to commit the prohibited act; conversely, if a person did not intend to perpetrate an act which has been defined by law to be the crime itself, then he is not guilty of the act."[58]
I note the apprehensions of several members of the Court in construing the law in a manner where mens rea is not required because it will supposedly make violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, "subjective" and "dependent on the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant."[59] However, it is my position that the application of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 without requiring mens rea will not result in a penal statute that is purely subjective and dependent on the allegations of the woman or her child. The elements thereof still require objective conduct on the part of the accused, which results in mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to the woman or her child. The resulting mental or emotional condition of the woman or her child is still dependent on the external act or acts of the accused.
It is true that for violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the resulting anguish, ridicule, or humiliation is addressed to the victim's mind; hence, it cannot be tested based on any hard-and-fast rule.[60] Nevertheless, when the statute requires a condition to be produced in the victim's mind as a result of the external acts of the accused, the Court must not shirk its duty to apply the law upon the excuse that it is "subjective" or "dependent" on the victim's allegations. Instead, the resulting mental or emotional anguish must be viewed in light of the perception and judgment of the victim.[61] For example, in rape cases involving intimidation, the Court has required "intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will," which may be determined based on "the age, sex and condition of the [victim]."[62]
Besides, it is precisely the courts' judicial function to apply the rules on evidence to determine the veracity of the victim's claim regarding the mental or emotional suffering that he or she suffered and assess whether the conduct of the accused is sufficient to produce such condition in the mind of the victim.[63] For cases of alleged violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Court may apply well-known principles on evidence, such as "bare allegations" not being equivalent proof and "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as the quantum of evidence required for conviction, among others.
Even assuming that specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is required for XXX's conviction, l humbly submit that the prosecution was able to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.
In the first place, it is presumed that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.[64] Indeed, the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind and capable of understanding the ordinary and natural consequences of their actions, such that when they commit a crime, they are presumed to have committed it intentionally.[65]
Once the prosecution is able to establish that the accused committed an unlawful act, then he or she is presumed to have done so with deliberate intent-with freedom, intelligence, and malice-because the moral and legal presumption under our jurisdiction is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[66] Hence, where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, then the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and, in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent.[67] In such a case, "the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the mind."[68]
Upon review of the records, it is my position that the foregoing presumption should be applied against XXX because the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, namely:
First, AAA is the private complainant and offended party.
Second, AAA is the legal wife of XXX, their marriage having been celebrated in 1999,[70] and they have a son together named CCC;[71]
Third, XXX caused emotional or mental anguish upon AAA.
Proof of mental and emotional anguish may consist of the testimony of the offended party, AAA, as such damage is personal to her.[72] Thus, in a previous case, the Court held that the testimony of the wife, who mentioned that she could not sleep and was hurt by her husband's marital infidelity, is sufficient proof of the element of "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation."[73]
Here, AAA took the witness stand and adequately testified on the mental and emotional anguish that she suffered where she mentioned her experiences after discovering XXX's marital infidelity: (1) she kept on crying; (2) she could not sleep and was not able to go for work for three to four months; (3) she felt like she was being tortured; (4) she had to make herself feel numb from her hurt feelings; (5) she felt helpless in her situation; and (6) she felt that she was broken and about to go crazy:
Finally, the emotional or mental anguish suffered by AAA is due to XXX's marital infidelity, which was not only proven by the prosecution but also admitted by XXX himself. XXX's marital infidelity is an established fact. Indeed, during pre-trial, XXX stipulated that he is the father of DDD,[76] the fruit of his sexual congress with YYY. The prosecution's evidence further established that YYY is the mother of DDD and that he was born in 2011,[77] 12 years after XXX married AAA in 1999.[78] XXX himself admitted his marital infidelity in open court when he mentioned on direct examination that he had sexual relations with YYY sometime in January 2011.[79]
Some members of the Court take the position that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of proof because, in their opinion, marital infidelity may only constitute psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262 if it is used as a coercive control tactic, to intimidate or dominate the other spouse, or to otherwise infringe on his/her autonomy and agency.[80] With due respect, I find that this statutory interpretation has no basis in the language of Republic Act No. 9262.
All that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires, as applied to the present case, is for the prosecution to prove that XXX committed marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to AAA. Indeed, the Court has previously held that the wife's discovery of her husband's marital infidelity was sufficient to cause her pain and suffering, even though she may not have been "bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband."[81] Requiring the prosecution to prove circumstances that are not provided by law is impermissible judicial legislation.
Further, to take the stance that XXX's purported one-time marital infidelity is insufficient for conviction is to belittle the mental or emotional anguish suffered by AAA. As pointed out by Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (Justice J. Lopez), it is unnatural for a person to allow his/her spouse to engage in sexual relations with another.[82] Certainly, for all its faults, and though Members of the Court may opine differently, our society still values monogamy in marriages, such that our legal system is replete with various laws that penalize marital infidelity.[83] It is therefore not unreasonable to expect AAA to suffer mental or emotional anguish after she discovered XXX's marital infidelity, even if it supposedly happened only once. The Court has even previously stated that "[marital] infidelity is not measured in terms of frequency."[84]
In my assessment, all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were proven by the prosecution. The very act of marital infidelity, a conduct which is not innocent in itself, coupled with the wife's emotional anguish, furnishes the evidence of XXX's criminal intent.[85] Surely, if the Court can make such presumption on intent from the material results of the act in criminal cases involving theft[86] and homicide,[87] it may also presume intent to cause mental or emotional anguish when the latter has been proven by the prosecution, as in this case.
Further, it is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his/her voluntary act, and no person of sane mind should be allowed to escape the natural and ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts by pleading that he did not intend them.[88] Hence, the Court has held that intent on the part of the accused may be established by applying the principle that every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his/her acts.[89]
To apply the foregoing principle, the Court must first address the question of whether mental or emotional anguish to the wife is a natural and ordinary consequence of the husband's marital infidelity. In my assessment, it is. As pointed out by the ponencia, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed acts of unfaithfulness, aside from mental or emotional pain?[90] Thus, XXX, being of reasonable and sane mind, is presumed to have intended the natural and ordinary consequences of his marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional anguish to AAA.
My conclusion is drawn from pertinent laws, jurisprudence, and the legislative history of Republic Act No. 9262.
First, even Article 247[91] of the Revised Penal Code recognizes marital infidelity as a conduct so atrocious that catching someone's spouse in the act of having sexual intercourse with another is considered an exceptional circumstance. In such a situation, the law recognizes that the innocent spouse will be so overcome with passion and obfuscation, or a fit of rage, to the point of homicidal acts.[92]
Second, Article 68 of the Family Code expressly states that the "husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and tender mutual help and support." Thus, Article 55 of the Family Code identifies sexual infidelity as one of the grounds for legal separation that may be taken as evidence that mental or emotional anguish to the innocent spouse is a natural consequence of marital infidelity.
Finally, in assessing intent as derived from the natural and probable consequences of an unlawful act, the Court must still be guided by common sense, logic, and human experience.[93] As earlier discussed, the normative expectation among married couples is monogamy; indeed, marriage and the family remain as inviolable social institutions in the Philippines and recognized as such by the 1987 Constitution.[94] Surely, Filipino mores and common sense dictate that unfaithfulness by a spouse will offend the other, as pointed out by Justice J. Lopez.[95]
Hence, XXX should have known that his marital infidelity would cause anguish to AAA, his legal wife. Common sense dictates that XXX should have and would have known how offensive his marital infidelity was to AAA, especially considering that, by his own admission, he and AAA were living together under one roof when he had sexual relations with YYY, and it was only when AAA found out about his extra-marital relations that they lived separately.[96] Knowing the same yet still proceeding with his unfaithfulness, XXX is presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his unfaithfulness.
The burden then shifts to XXX to prove that he lacked the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA when he had sexual relations with YYY.[97] Such intent may be negated by showing that at the time he had sexual relations with YYY, he and AAA were living separately and had mutually agreed that they are both free to resume romantic or sexual relations with others.[98] Any alleged mental or emotional anguish to AAA may also be defeated by demonstrating that XXX and AAA have been separated for some time by their mutual consensus, and that XXX has been engaging in extra-marital relations with YYY publicly and notoriously.[99]
However, XXX failed to establish any of the foregoing circumstances negating any intent on his part to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA. Perforce, the presumption that XXX acted with criminal intent to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA stands, and his conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is warranted.
Even assuming that intent or mens rea is required for XXX's conviction, it is clear from Republic Act No. 9262 that an accused may be held criminally liable for violations of its provisions based on reckless conduct.
In the context of Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262, "intent" may be interpreted as one that requires the prosecution to show that the accused committed the prohibited act for the specific purpose of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." However, the degree of the accused's culpable mental state is not limited to purposeful or knowing conduct. The culpable mental state of the accused may also be based on recklessness and criminal negligence. Significantly, the Court has ruled that negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences may rise to the level of or be equivalent to criminal intent.[100]
The standards of mens rea are the following: (1) purpose, where the accused acts with specific intent to cause the results of his/her conduct; (2) knowledge, where the accused commits the prohibited act knowing that it will result in harm; (3) recklessness, where the accused consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause harm to another; and (4) negligence, where the accused fails to perceive, even though he/she should be aware of, a substantial and unjustifiable risk to his/her conduct.[101] The degree of mens rea to support a judgment of conviction will depend on the language of the statute.[102] A higher standard of mens rea makes it harder for the prosecution to substantiate the needed inferences to establish intent.[103]
Particularly with regard to "recklessness" as a standard of criminal liability, it is committed when the accused "acted willfully and wantonly, in utter disregard of the consequence of his or her action," as it is the "inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law[.]"[104] It is "wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences and of the rights and of the feelings of others" that is "conceived in the spirit of mischief or of "criminal indifference to civil obligations."[105] Recklessness requires the accused to actually foresee the risk involved and to consciously decide to ignore it.[106]
To show that an accused acted with criminal recklessness, the prosecution must establish that (1) the alleged act or omission, viewed objectively at the time of its commission, created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that occurred; (2) the risk was of such a magnitude that disregard of it constituted a gross deviation from the accepted standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation; (3) the accused was consciously aware or knew of the "substantial and unjustifiable" risk at the time of the conduct; and (4) the accused consciously disregarded that risk.[107]
As earlier mentioned, the required standard of mens rea is derived from the language of the statute itself.[108] Thus, in Voisine V. United States,[109] it was held that the standard of recklessness was sufficient for conviction in a crime involving domestic violence, because the statute punished the act of "use or attempted use of physical force."[110] The U.S. Supreme Court considered that the term "use" "does not demand that the person applying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that it is substantially likely to do so. Or, otherwise said, that word is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct."
Here, the language of the statute itself allows conviction for violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 on the basis of reckless conduct. Indeed, Section 5(h) of Republic Act No. 9262 clearly recognizes that emotional or psychological distress may be caused through "reckless conduct," viz.:
It also bears reiterating that the acts of psychological violence in Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 are subsumed in Sections 5(h) and 5(i) of the same law.[112] Thus, both these sub-sections involve psychological violence. The penalties[113] for violations under Sections 5(h) and 5(i) are even the same. The standard of culpable mental state for psychological violence under Section 5(i) may therefore be based on Section 5(h).
Further, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 penalizes "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" through marital infidelity. Similar to Voisine, there is nothing in the language of the statute indicating that it is limited to "knowing" or "purposeful" acts calculated to result in mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation. It is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.
With these in mind, and to address the constitutional concerns of some members of the Court in the enforcement of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 if intent is not required, I submit that the degrees of culpable mental state in Section 5(h) of Republic Act No. 9262 may also be extended to Section 5(i) of the same law. This means that XXX's conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must be affirmed if it is shown that he acted with "purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct." As discussed below, I find that XXX acted in reckless disregard of or with conscious indifference to the consequences of his marital infidelity, which resulted in mental or emotional anguish to his wife, AAA.
Upon review of the evidence on record, it is my assessment that XXX intended to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA when he committed marital infidelity. At the very least, he knew that his conduct would necessarily cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA, yet he proceeded to commit marital infidelity anyway. He acted in reckless disregard of his marital vows and with conscious indifference to the consequences of his conduct vis- -vis AAA's mental and emotional state, warranting his conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
As discussed above, mental or emotional anguish to the innocent spouse is a natural and probable consequence of marital infidelity, considering that marriage is a protected and inviolable institution under Philippine laws and the Constitution. XXX's marital infidelity therefore created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that AAA will suffer mental or emotional anguish.
I concur in the observation of Justice J. Lopez that Allan's sole defense is premised on the absence of a "mistress" relationship with YYY because, purportedly, they only had a one-night stand.[114] However, as pointed out by the ponencia, a one-time sexual intercourse between a husband and a woman who is not his wife is sufficient to commit marital infidelity under Republic Act No. 9262.
In any case, I stress that the prosecution has established continuing romantic relations between XXX and YYY, and that their relationship is more than what XXX claims it to be.
First, Jennifer Santos, a desk officer of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx City, who attended to AAA's complaint against XXX, testified that during the barangay proceedings between the spouses, XXX admitted his relationship with YYY, stating, "kinasama po niya [XXX] iyong tao na iyon na si YYY."[115] This reveals that XXX did not just have a one-time sexual tryst with YYY, for be even considered her as his "kinasama" or romantic partner. Great weight must be given to the testimony of Jennifer Santos because, being an official of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx City, she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her official duties.[116]
Second, BBB clearly testified on YYY's admission that she and XXX have been together for some time. Specifically, YYY answered in the affirmative when BBB asked her if she and XXX have been together for long.[117]
I find that BBB's testimony on the foregoing matter is not inadmissible hearsay; instead, it constitutes an extra-judicial admission by YYY, XXX's co-conspirator for the violation of Republic Act No. 9262, which is an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 130, Section 31,[118] of the Rules of Court.[119]
It bears pointing out that XXX testified that YYY herself was a married woman.[120] It thus appears that XXX is YYY's co-conspirator in the crime of Adultery. Hence, YYY's statement to BBB, as narrated by the latter, must be given weight, considering that it even constitutes an admission of adulterous acts on YYY's part,[121] and she would not have lied about this matter to incriminate herself for Adultery.[122] For the same reason, XXX's testimony on the marital status of YYY is equally credible under Rule 130, Section 27[123] of the Rules of Court; it is an admission against his interest as YYY's co-conspirator for Adultery.
Finally, in convicting XXX, the RTC observed that XXX was only wearing his undershirt and slippers at YYY's house, and "logic dictates that one would not be too cozy with a woman he was intimate with for only one night."[124] The RTC's findings are supported by the testimony of BBB, who mentioned that during the confrontation on July 19, 2016, XXX was wearing white boxer shorts, jeans, and slippers.[125] BBB additionally testified that XXX removed his shoes at YYY's house and even had to ask one of the tanods of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx to fetch the shoes for him.[126] XXX likewise stated on cross-examination that when he was at YYY's house, he removed his polo and was seen wearing only his sando, his undershirt, and jeans.[127]
XXX's cozy outfit at YYY's house, taken together with the rest of the prosecution's evidence, demonstrates that he was, in truth, cohabiting with YYY. Certainly, if XXX was simply granted visitation rights by YYY, it was suspect that he would he so comfortable at YYY's house as to remove his shoes and polo shirt, and even stay there with only his undershirt on and his white boxer shorts visible.
The risk of substantial harm to AAA that may result from XXX's marital infidelity was of such magnitude that XXX's disregard of the risk constituted a gross deviation from the accepted standard of care that a reasonable husband would have exercised in the same situation. To repeat, under Article 68 of the Family Code, the spouses are obliged to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." There cannot be any quibbling that XXX's marital infidelity is a gross deviation from accepted standards of care for his wife that a husband must observe under Article 68 of the Family Code.
The risk of harm to AAA was not a remote possibility, but a strong likelihood, given that, as earlier mentioned, XXX and his wife were living together under the same roof at that time and were even jointly raising their son.[128] The likelihood of resulting harm from XXX's marital infidelity is even heightened because, by XXX's own testimony, AAA has been supporting XXX's lifestyle by gifting him a car[129] and providing him financial support.[130] Incidentally, the very same car gifted by AAA to XXX is the vehicle that he used to visit YYY in xxxxxxxxxxx City.[131]
Evidently, AAA was committed in their conjugal relationship and has been complying with her spousal obligation to render mutual help and support to her husband, XXX. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to conclude that any betrayal of such trust by XXX created a strong likelihood of substantial harmxxxxxxxxxxxby way of mental or emotional anguishxxxxxxxxxxxto AAA.
"Knowledge" refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact.[132] Because knowledge is a state of mind, it must be determined on a case-to case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances; it may also be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[133]
In the present case, the attendant circumstances and XXX's conduct before, during; and after the marital infidelity reveal that he foresaw the substantial risk of harm to AAA created by his violation of his oath of fidelity to his wife. That is, he was consciously aware or had knowledge that his marital infidelity created the substantial and unjustifiable risk of mental or emotional anguish to AAA.
First, it is well recognized that attempts to conceal the corpus delicti or evidence of a crime indicates knowledge of illegality.[134]
Here, as admitted by XXX on direct testimony, and based on the stipulations [135] by the parties and the prosecution's evidence,[136] XXX had sexual relations with YYY in January 2011.[137] However, he concealed this from AAA, who found out about YYY only on July 19, 2016, the date when AAA appeared at the residence of YYY in Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx
City.[138]
Further, when AAA went to the residence at xxxxxxxxxxx City, on July 19, 2016, XXX did not want to face her and refused to go out and meet her for a time.[139] It was only when AAA's mother went inside the house, and when AAA's mother told XXX, "sige kung hindi ka lalabas, doon na lang tayo sa opisina mo mag-usap," that XXX finally went out to meet AAA.[140]
XXX's furtive behavior is certainly inconsistent with what an innocent man would do. Indeed, why would XXX conceal his infidelity from AAA and even refuse to immediately meet her at xxxxxxxxxxx City, if he did not know that his conduct would cause, as it indeed caused, mental or emotional anguish upon AAA? Certainly, "[a] guilty conscience makes a man such a coward as to bring himself out in the open."[141]
Second, AAA's testimony on direct examination reveals that XXX reacted negatively and even threatened self-harm when she mentioned to him that she sought advice from lawyers about her rights and the legal remedies available to her after she found out that XXX had sexual relations with YYY and even fathered her son, DDD. XXX's conduct is indicative of a person with a guilty conscience and who fears reprisal from his victim, AAA.[142] When AAA stated that she wanted XXX to be incarcerated, XXX was so upset to the point of threatening self-harm.[143] Surely, an innocent husband who has been observing the laws would not fear incarceration or retribution from his wife.
Third, XXX was uniquely situated to understand that his marital infidelity created a substantial risk of emotional or mental anguish to AAA. I repeat that AAA was financially supporting XXX, even going so far as to gift him a car. As the recipient of AAA's care, XXX would have been aware that AAA would be particularly hurt to discover his marital infidelity despite the support that she has extended to her husband.
Respectfully, I do not subscribe tc the view that a one-night stand, concealed by the husband but later on discovered by the wife, cannot be taken as an act of psychological violence;[144] or that XXX's concealment of the marital infidelity is evidence of his intent not to cause mental or emotional anguish to his wife, his shame and humiliation, and his desire to spare AAA mental or emotional distress.[145]
The foregoing conclusion goes against some of the most basic tenets of criminal law-concealment of the corpus delicti is evidence not only of guilt but also of discernment.[146] It is also manifestly violative of the clear provisions of the Family Code on fidelity. Such ruling rewards only the most ingenious unfaithful spouse, for their marital infidelity will not be considered as intentional infliction of mental or emotional anguish upon their clueless spouse, so long as they craftily conceal it. Though their betrayal is later discovered by the innocent spouse, their cover-up would even be taken as an act of benevolence, to "spare" the innocent spouse from emotional distress. This is absurd. It is willful blindness to the fact that the innocent spouse would not have suffered such mental or emotional anguish had the offending spouse chosen observe his/her civil obligation of fidelity to his/her spouse.
To repeat, the Court has previously held that the wife's discovery of her husband's marital infidelity was sufficient to cause her pain and suffering, even though she may not have been "bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband."[147] The discovery of marital infidelity, though it may have happened after the fact, was sufficient to cause mental or emotional anguish. I do not see any need for the Court to depart from this ruling.
XXX's reckless conduct and conscious disregard of the consequences of his marital infidelity to AAA is on record. His testimony reveals that he deliberately, voluntarily, and romantically pursued YYY in January 2011, as shown by the following: (1) XXX helped YYY, then a customs representative, with her shipment at the port of Davao, where XXX was stationed as an administrative aide of the Bureau of Customs; (2) he went out with YYY on a date later that night; (3) in the course of their date, the two had drinks; (4) after their date, XXX accompanied YYY to her hotel (hinatid), where they consummated their carnal desires; and (5) XXX slept with YYY in her hotel room, returned to her later, and accompanied her to the airport. On direct examination, XXX testified:
Respectfully, I also disagree with the view that XXX did not intend to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA because he remained present for AAA and CCC, continued to support them, and was even paying for utility and rent bills.[149] As pointed out by Justice Lazaro-Javier, XXX could continue to support AAA and CCC yet still be guilty of marital infidelity. Indeed, continuing support and marital infidelity are not mutually exclusive. An unfaithful husband may even be more solicitous towards his wife to cover up his philandering ways. As previously held by the Court, "[a] man could hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade."[150] It stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with a woman may even be over-solicitous with his wife to camouflage his infidelity.[151]
A final word. As late as 2015, in Perfecto v. Esidera,[152] the Court was quick to castigate a judge who violated her marital vows, even pointing out that her act of cohabiting, having sexual relations, and siring a child with her paramour had "legal implications." It did not matter to the Court that her marriage to her husband was never consummated, that they never lived together, and that they had long been estranged when she pursued romantic relations with another man. The law is the law, and the Court must consider and apply it as such.
In XXX's case, the prosecution has proven all the elements of his violation of Section 5(i), RA 9262. Given the prosecution's evidence establishing XXX's culpable mental state, the Court should not bend over backwards to accommodate XXX's actions. Excuses have been proffered for his willful marital infidelity and reckless disregard of the consequences thereof, e.g., that the Philippines is one of the few remaining countries to criminalize marital infidelity, that he just had a one-night stand with YYY, that he continued to support his son with AAA, or that he "cared" enough to conceal his infidelity from AAA.
Following case law[153] and the disquisition above, the Court must address only the following issues: (1) whether XXX committed marital infidelity; (2) whether the marital infidelity, if committed by XXX, caused mental or emotional anguish to AAA; and (3) whether XXX, supposing he committed marital infidelity, acted with a culpable mental state-purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct. If XXX, conscious of how his marital infidelity will result in substantial harm to his wife, decides to be unfaithful anyway, in reckless disregard of the consequences of his action, then he is guilty of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The Court need not look any further or consider factor extraneous from what the law requires.
From Esidera to the instant case, the laws remain unchanged; only the sexes of the unfaithful partners have. If the laws on marriage are strictly enforced against the wife, I fail to see why we cannot take the same stance against the husband.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the conviction of XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
* The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 8505, entitled "Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998," approved on February 13, 1998; and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
[1] Fernandez v. Lantin, 165 Phil. 941, 946 (1976).
[2] Singgit v. People, G.R. No. 264179, February 27, 2023.
[3] Jurado v. Suy Yan, 148 Phil. 677 (1971); Enrile v. People, 766 Phil. 75 (2015).
[4] RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, secs. 4 and 5 provide.
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there is variance between the offense charge in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those construting the latter.
[5] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 255877, March 29, 2023. See also Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 142 S. Ct. 2370, 2376-2377 (2022).
American jurisprudence has persuasive effect in the case at bar, given that the Philippines adopted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment as the Due Process Clause in the 1987 Constitution, as well as the legislative practice in the United States of passing special penal laws, both of which have bearing in the resolution of the present case. American decisions and authorities, though not per se controlling the Philippines, have persuasive effect. It may be resorted to if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. [Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205,269 (2014)).
Significantly, the practice of passing special penal laws to criminalize acts in addition to the felonies under the Revised Penal Code was modeled from conventional practice in the United States. [People v. Simon y Sunga, 304 Phil. 725 (1994)]. Thus, the Court has adopted several principles of criminal law from American jurisprudence, including the mens rea requirement in embezzlement [Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 335 Phil. 795 (1997)], "totality of circumstances test" [People v. Bacero, 790 Phil. 745 (2016), malice in libel [MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, 444 Phil. 230 (2003)], and pardon [Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 252 Phil. 192 (1989)].
American jurisprudence has particular persuasiveness in the sphere of constitutional law, particularly with regard to the Due Process Clause, given that the latter was derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. [Saunar v. Ermita, 822 Phil. 536, 543 (2017); Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corp., 844 Phil. 603 (2018)].
[6] Ponencia, p. 12.
[7] U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 132-138 (1909); U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915); People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181, 184-185 (1935).
[8] People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343 (1997); Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[9] U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915).
[10] Patulot v. People, 845 Phil. 439 (2019); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001).
[11] Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021.
[12] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 255877, March 29, 2023; XXX256611 v. People, G.R. No. 256611, October 12, 2022; Calingasan v. People, G.R. No. 239313, February 15, 2022.
[13] Id.
[14] 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
[15] Id.
[16] U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915).
[17] Id.
[18] Guiani-Sayadi v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239930, May 10, 2021 [Notice].
[19] See Coronado v. Sandiganbayan, 296-A Phil. 414 (1993).
[20] People v. Largo, 306 Phil. 24 (1994).
[21] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000). See also People v. Martin, 78 Cal. App.4th 1107, 1117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), citing People v. Lynn, August 28, 1894, 159 (Cal. App. 3d 716), citing People v. Dillon, September 1, 1983, 34 Cal. 3d 441.
[22] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[23] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[24] Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596 (1957); Republic v. Rambuyong, 646 Phil. 373, 381 (2010), citing Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 212 Phil. 215, 224-225 (1984).
[25] See Villanueva v. Estoque, 400 Phil. 6, 14 (2000).
[26] People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[27] See Malcampo-Repollo v. People, 890 Phil. 1159 (2020), and Demata v. People, G.R. No. 228583, September 15, 2021, which involve criminal cases for alleged violations of RA 7610 or the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Relevantly, the Court has held that in general, the offenses punished in RA 7610 are mala prohibita, save for those where the law requires intent, e.g., lascivious conduct upon a child, acts which debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, and being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. In ruling that the prohibited acts in RA 7610 are generally mala prohibita, the Court reasoned that the law is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse and exploitation and to give special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
[28] See U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909); U.S. v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Rehaif v. United States, decided on June 21, 2019; and People v. Merriweather, 139 Misc. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1988).
[29] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, pp. 10-11;
Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated August 27, 2002, pp. 19-26;
Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated March 4, 2003, pp. 9-10.
[30] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, p. 26.
[31] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, pp. 10-11.
[32] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated August 27, 2002, p. 19.
[33] Ponencia, p. 12.
[34] See U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 132-138 (1909); U.S. v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 228-29, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019); and People v. Merriweather, 139 Misc. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1988).
[35] People v. Dillon, September 1, 1983, 34 Cal. 3d 441; People v. Lynn, August 28, 1894, 159 (Cal. App. 3d 716); People v. Martin, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[36] United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438-39 (3d Cir. 1943).
[37] Id.
[38] See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) and Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 142 S. Ct. 2370, 2376-2377 (2022). See also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269-271 (2000).
[39] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269-271 (2000).
[40] Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
[41] Id.
[42] Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
[43] United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
[44] People v. Ortiz, 125 Misc. 2d 318 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984).
[45] United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
[46] United Stares v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). [Concurring Opinion, J. Brennan]
[47] Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256-257 (1952).
[48] Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[49] United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). [Concurring Opinion, J. Brennan].
[50] Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[51] Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
[53] See US v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 (1912).
[54] People v. Largo, 306 Phil. 24 (1994).
[55] See People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[56] U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
[57] See U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577 (1915).
[58] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021.
[59] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
[60] See Astorga v. People, 480 Phil. 585, 594-595 (2004).
[61] Id.
[62] Alejandro v. Bernas, 672 Phil. 698, 708-709 (2011).
[63] For instance, in appreciating passion of obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, there must be facts proved showing provocation sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. [U.S. v. Pilares, 18 Phil. 87 (1910)]
[64] Rule 131, sec. 3(b) OF THE RULES OF COURT.
[65] People v. Aldemita, 229 Phil. 448 (1986).
[66] People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, June 27, 1990.
[67] Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42, 46 (Ark. 1941), citing Harris v. State, 34 Ark. 469; State v. Boggs, 103 W. Va. 641, 645 (W. Va. 1927).
[68] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 461 (2003).
[69] See Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021, citing Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015).
[70] RTC records, pp. 42-43, Marriage Certificate between XXX and AAA.
[71] Id. at 59-60, Pre-Trial Order signed by XXX.
[72] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015).
[73] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[74] TSN, AAA, June 8, 2017, pp. 17-19.
[75] TSN, BBB, June 25, 2017, pp. 17-19, which relevantly reads:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. MISLANG ON BBB
[76] RTC records, pp. 59-60, Pre-Trial Order signed by Allan.
[77] Id. at 57-58, Birth Certificate of DDD.
[78] Id. at 42-43, Marriage Certificate between XXX and AAA.
[79] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[80] See Dissenting Opinions of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[81] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[82] See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[83] Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017).
[84] Quiogue, Jr. v. Quiogue, G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022 [Per J. M.V. Lopez].
[85] Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42 (Ark. 1941), citing Harris v. State, 34 Ark. 469; State v. Boggs, 103 W. Va. 641 (W. Va. 1927); People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003).
[86] In theft, intent to gain is also presumed when it is proven that the accused unlawfully took personal property owned by another. [People v. Togon, Jr., G.R. No. 247501, October 11, 2021]
[87] Intent to kill is presumed from the fact that the victim died. [People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003); People v. Vasquez, 474 Phil. 59 (2004); Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, 689 Phil. 75 (2012)]
[88] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(c).
[89] People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Syvel's Inc., 247 Phil. 209 (1988).
[90] Ponencia, p. 12.
[91] Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
[92] People v. Marquez, 53 Phil. 260 (1929); Peoph v. Dequi a, 60 Phil. 279 (1934); People v. Oyanib, 406 Phil. 650 (2001).
[93] See People v. Jutie, 253 Phil. 578 (1989) and People v. Baylon, May 29, 1974, 156 Phil. 87 (1974).
In People v. Benigno Ang, 223 Phil. 333, 342 (1985), the Court held that in cases involving theft, robbery, or assault, the mitigating alternative circumstance of lack of instruction cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused because "Into one, however unschooled he may be, is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon the person of another is inherently wrong and a violation of the law."
[94] CONST., art. XV, secs. 1 and 2.
[95] See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[96] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 5-6.
[97] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003); People v. Vasquez, 474 Phil. 59 (2004); Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, 689 Phil. 75 (2012).
[98] See Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 789 (1960).
[99] See U.S. v. Rivera, 28 Phil. 13 (1914).
[100] U.S. v. Elvi a, 24 Phil. 230 (1913), citing U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911).
[101] See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823-1824 (2021).
[102] Id.
[103] Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2117-2118 (2023).
[104] Valencia v. People, 889 Phil. 450, 462 (2020).
[105] Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 172-173 (Cal. 1911).
[106] Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750-753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), which relevantly states:
Thus, "[a]t the heart of reckless conduct is conscious disregard of the risk created by the actor's conduct[.]" As has often been noted, "[m]ere lack of foresight, stupidity, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, ordinary carelessness, however serious the consequences may happen to be," do not suffice to constitute either culpable negligence or criminal recklessness. Recklessness requires the defendant to actually foresee the risk involved and to consciously decide to ignore it. Such a "devil may care" or "not giving a damn" attitude toward the risk distinguishes the culpable mental state of criminal recklessness from that of criminal negligence, which assesses blame for the failure to foresee the risk that an objectively reasonable person would have foreseen. "Those who are subjectively aware of a significant danger to life and choose, without justification, to engage in actions (or in some cases inactions) that threaten to bring about that danger have made a calculated decision to gamble with other people's lives." This combination of an awareness of the magnitude of the risk and the conscious disregard for consequences is crucial. "It is callous disregard of risk, and not awareness vel non of risk, however, which is critical." And, of course, determining whether an act or omission involves a substantial and unjustifiable risk "requires an examination of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight." (Emphasis supplied)
[107] Commonwealth v. Sanders, 259 A.3d 524, 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021). See also See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823-1824 (2021).
[108] Id.
[109] Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 69293, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278-2279 (2016).
[110] In Voisine, the subject penal law was "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence", which is "an offense that ... (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim."
[111] United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77-78, 115 S. Ct. 464, 471-472 (1994).
[112] It is evident from Section 3(c) in relation to Section 5, paragraphs (h) and (i), of RA 9262 that the law distinguishes between acts of psychological violence that are deliberate, knowing, and purposeful, and those acts which are prohibited when they cause mental or emotional anguish. Particularly, Section 3(c) of the law defines "psychological violence" and enumerates acts constituting it. These acts of psychological violence are punished either in paragraph (h) or paragraph (i) of Section 5. While paragraphs (h) and (i) of Section 5 both refer to acts of psychological violence enumerated in Section 3(c), only paragraph (h) requires the conduct to be purposeful, knowing, or reckless.
[113] Sec. 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
[115] TSN, Jennifer Santos, June 22, 2017, pp. 7-8 which relevantly reads:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. MISLANG ON JENNIFER SANTOS
[116] Office of the Ombudsman v. Manlulu, G.R. No. 215986, September 21, 2020 [Notice].
[117] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, pp. 14 and 16-17, respectively, which relevantly reads:
[118] Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
[119] The rule on admission by a conspirator prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. Tamargo v. Awingan, 624 Phil. 312, 327-328 (2010).
[120] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 33-34.
[121] See De Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 40 (1960), which relevantly states:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the aduherous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
[122] Id.
[123] Sec. 27. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her.
[124] RTC records, p. 113; RTC Decision, p. 13.
[125] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 16.
[126] Id. at 14.
[127] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 42-43.
[128] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 5-6.
[129] On cross-examination, XXX testified that he does not have a car registered in his name. The car that he uses was gifted to him by AAA. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 51]
[130] On direct examination, XXX testified that AAA is the one who is paying for the rental fees for the condominium unit in xxxxxxxxxxx, Manila, that XXX and his son were staying in. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 21] He further testified on direct examination that AAA is supporting him financially and is the one who controls the funds in their marriage, stating, "[n]akakahiya mang aminin, ma'am, na siya [AAA] po ang bumubuhay sa akin." [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 25-26]
[131] On cross-examination, XXX testified that he uses the car gifted to him by AAA when visiting YYY. He would park this car along xxxxxxxxxxx Street, in front of YYY's apartment. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 51]
[132] People v. Pe aflorida, Jr., 574 Phil. 269, 272 (2008).
[133] Id.
[134] San Jose v. People, G.R. No. 236336, April 23, 2018 [Notice].
[135] As stated in the Pre-Trial Order signed by XXX, he stipulated that he is the father of DDD, YYY's son [RTC records, pp. 59-60].
[136] The prosecution offered into evidence the Birth Certificate of DDD as its Exhibit "E," where it is shown that DDD was born on xxxxxxxxxxx [RTC records, pp. 57-58].
[137] TSN, XXX dated August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[138] Records, pp. 11-13; TSN dated June 8, 2017, pp. 10-13.
[139] TSN, AAA, June 15, 2017, pp. 11-12 and June 8, 2017, p. 12, respectively.
[140] Id.
[141] People v. Peran, 289 Phil. 597, 606 (1992).
[142] Fear of reprisals is indicative of guilt. People v. Villamin, 64 Phil. 880 (1937); People v. Cruz, 219 Phil. 469 (1985); People v. Zumil, 341 Phil. 173 (1997).
[143] TSN, AAA, June 8, 2017, p. 19.
[144] See Dissenting Opinions of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[145] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
[146] Dorado v. People, 796 Phil. 233 (2016); People v. Lacson, 83 Phil. 574 (1949).
[147] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[148] TSN, XXX August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[149] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[150] People v. Fontanilla, 132 Phil. 672, 687 (1968).
[151] Id.
[152] Perfecto v. Esidera, 764 Phil. 384 (2015), cited in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017).
[153] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015).
G.R. No. 252739 - XXX,[1] Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The majority upheld the conviction of XXX for psychological violence committed against his wife. The majority ratiocinated that "in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity."[2] Moreover, the majority concluded that the law "looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or their child, rather than the motive of the offender."[3]
I dissent.
The betrayal between husband and wife is anathema to the sanctity of marriage and the moral values of the family. The act of engaging in extramarital sexual affairs is punishable as adultery and concubinage under certain circumstances. The marital infidelity of the husband may also constitute psychological violence if intentionally adopted to cause mental or emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation against his wife and children. This opinion examines the anatomy of the crime of "psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity" and applies the totality of circumstances approach to determine the criminal liability of the accused.
For proper reference, there is a need to revisit the facts of the case.
In 1999, Spouses XXX and AAA got married and resided in xxxxxxxxxxx. They were blessed with a son.[4] XXX rented a condominium unit in xxxxxxxxxxx because he often had to work out of town and would come home to xxxxxxxxxxx during weekends and holidays.[5] In 2015, XXX transferred to another condominium unit with his son who was about to start his college education. On July 16, 2016, AAA was informed by her co-worker that a certain EEE sent her messages and photographs through social media showing that their family car was parked in another house where XXX was allegedly keeping his mistress. Intrigued> AAA connected directly with EEE who replied "Alam mo ba na ang asawa mo ay may asawa dito? May kinakasamang babae dito? Na may anak pa sila na four years old? lalaki." AAA inquired about the address and EEE answered "Dito sa xxxxxxxxxxx." At that time, AAA was with XXX but she could not stop crying because of her husband's marital infidelity. XXX asked what was wrong but AAA just requested him to accompany her to the church for mass.[6]
On July 19, 2016, AAA requested her mother and family friend BBB to seek assistance from the barangay to locate the address that EEE gave. After finding the place, AAA saw their family car parked outside a house. AAA and BBB knocked and a helper opened the gate. BBB asked for the owner of the vehicle and pretended that it was blocking the driveway. YYY went out minutes later. Thereafter, AAA grabbed YYY and shouted "Ilabas mo yung asawa ko." YYY was shocked while AAA repeatedly demanded XXX to come out. BBB and AAA's mother proceeded inside the house and warned XXX that they would report him to his office. XXX then came out and AAA slapped him on the face. XXX tried to calm AAA and pleaded "Ma, wag dito! Nakakahiya!" However, AAA rebuked XXX and retorted that he had no respect for their relationship. A police mobile later arrived and pacified the commotion. A little boy also ran towards XXX and called him "Daddy." At that instance, A.AA confirmed that XXX and YYY have a child together. Dismayed, AAA remarked to XXX "May anak ka talaga ano?" The police officers then escorted XXX and AAA to the barangay. Thereat, XXX admitted to AAA that he is the father of YYY's child.[7] Meanwhile, BBB returned to YYY's house to get her car. BBB asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan." YYY also told BBB that she knew that XXX had a wife. Subsequently, AAA expressed to XXX her hopes to save their marriage but their relationship became irreconcilable after the incident.[8]
Accordingly, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, for psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR:[9]
On November 17, 2017, the RTC convicted XXX of psychological violence and ruled that he caused mental and emotional anguish upon AAA by keeping YYY as his mistress. The RTC held that the prosecution proved the existence of an extramarital affair when XXX signed the birth certificate of his child with YYY. XXX admitted siring the child after having an intimate encounter with YYY. The RTC noted the testimony of BBB to whom YYY confessed her relationship with XXX and the statement of the barangay desk officer that XXX has no more interest in salvaging his relationship with AAA. The RTC observed that XXX was wearing his undershirt, denim pants, and slippers when he came out of YYY's house. This raised suspicion on the claim that XXX visited the child only three to four times a year since he would not be that comfortable with a woman he was intimate with for just one night:[12]
XXX must be acquitted. The corpus delicti for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity was not fully established.
The constellation of criminal law has long divided crimes into mala in se or acts wrong in themselves, and mala prohibita or acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. However, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws,[20] and mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC.[21] The Court explained that the proper approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.[22] Applying this approach, it is clear that violence, regardless of form and means, is inherently depraved and immoral. Hence, psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262 is a crime mala in se that requires proof of the accused's criminal intent.
Similarly, criminal law is not solely subjective but complementarily objective. The proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.[23] The term corpus delicti refers to the body or substance of the crime, or the fact of its commission.[24] It consists of the criminal act and the accused's agency in the commission of the act. In other words, corpus delicti primarily describes the act (objective) and the agent (subjective) in relation to the actus reus and the mens rea of a crirne. Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind of criminal intent. The mens rea which is subjective must conform with the actus reus which is objective. The confluence of these elements requires a direct causal relationship to sustain the crime committed. The formula is "corpus delicti = actus reus + mens rea." Particularly, the comprehensive anatomy of actus reus can be summarized as: "actus reus = act/omission + circumstances + results/consequences."[25] Corollary, the actus reus of Republic Act No. 9262's penal provisions may be analyzed using this framework as follows:
In this case, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity when he "unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish." The Court enumerated the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262:[27]
Verily, what Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 criminalizes is not marital infidelity per se but psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering. Differently stated, it is violence inflicted under such circumstances that the statute seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish to the wife.[29] As Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen pointed out in his Opinion, not all forms of pain and suffering experienced in intimate relationships automatically translate to psychological abuse. SAJ Leonen emphasized that courts must exercise a certain level of judicial restraint to decide whether the facts presented constitute marital infidelity as psychological violence. This is because not all kinds of suffering within the context of intimate relationships should be considered psychological violence. Marital infidelity should be punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 only when used as a coercive tactic to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner thereby maintaining the power imbalance between the couple.
More importantly, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must not focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity. In the doctrinal case of Acharon v. People,[30] the Court En Banc held that "[f]rom the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must be o concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime." The Court in Acharon unanimously voted to acquit the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife. As such, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed these acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Also, it is outright judicial legislation to consider psychological violence as malum prohibitum and delete the specific intent necessary to complete the corpus delicti which is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.[31] Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa aptly discussed in his Opinion the legal consequences and practical situations if marital infidelity per se would be penalized as psychological violence. Justice Caguioa expounded that the intent necessary to give rise to criminal liability is expressed in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262-"to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." The Court cannot correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein-nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Otherwise, the nature, duration, and extent of "marital infidelity" will effectively be up to the private complainant. It would be the height of incongruence for the Court to say that a penal provision would have different constitutive elements depending on the circumstances.
Indeed, the ponencia maintains an inconsistent position that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence with the qualification that it must result in mental or emotional anguish. This makes the application of the law more subjective and equivocal. The majority even started with an erroneous premise that "marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms."[32] This is not entirely true and accurate. Notably, the Philippines is one of the few countries that still considers marital infidelity as a criminal offense. The legislative proposals to decriminalize adultery and concubinage acknowledged that they constitute matrimonial offenses that violate the marriage contract, hence, the liability should only be civil in nature. The existing laws that penalize marital infidelity invade the rights of consenting adults to their privacy and amount to excessive State interference in the private lives of its citizens.[33] In many foreign jurisdictions, the crime of marital infidelity has been abolished or declared unconstitutional for infringing the rights to privacy and sexual self determination, equal protection guarantees, and human rights treaties.[34] A similar approach will usher the Court into a period of renaissance and conscious reawakening that marital infidelity, unless intentionally employed as an instrument of violence, is a private concern between two consenting adults and does not involve a breach of security and peace of the people at large.
The ponencia becomes more ambivalent in trying to make a comparison between marital infidelity and the crimes of homicide and murder.[35] It is not correct that specific intent to kill is "conclusively" presumed from the fact of the victim's death. Rather, the fact of death raises only a "disputable" presumption since the killing may be a product of culpa or a negligent act. Furthermore, killing is inherently wrong, unlike marital infidelity which is morally wrong. Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting in his Opinion likewise made an inappropriate analogy between psychologic.al violence resulting from marital infidelity and Article 68 of the Family Code on the obligations of the husband and wife.[36] Suffice it to say that psychological violence is a crime while a breach of marital obligations is only civil in nature. I also do not subscribe to the theory of Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Maria Filomena D. Singh that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity and that the "vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those we protect them from or against."[37] As explained in the framework of the anatomy of crimes, the "results/consequences" are merely an aspect of actus reus along with "acts/omissions" and "circumstances." The mens rea or criminal intent is indispensable to compose the corpus delicti.
Hence, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed the acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Otherwise, the crime will be completely subjective entirely dependent on the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant. This is precisely why this Opinion dissected the corpus delicti of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262-to save the courts from a blanket ruling that marital infidelity is equivalent to violence against women and children. To punish marital infidelity per se as violence against women and children effectively discriminates against married men and constitutes a transgression of the equal protection clause. The distinction between married and unmarried men is not germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, which is to protect all women in intimate relationships, marriage or otherwise, from violence by their male partners. The realities of this world reveal that marital infidelity may be committed by both men and women. The effects of marital infidelity do not impact only the wives but also the husbands. Incompatible with the majority's hypothesis, if the situation is reversed, the aggrieved husbands cannot possibly "exact the full measure of retribution" since the wives who committed marital infidelity may only be guilty of adultery under our present state of laws. There is no parallel legislation like Republic Act No. 9262 where abused husbands may find succor although men are likewise not immune from mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation.
It is likewise false for the ponencia to state that specific criminal intent to cause psychological violence is "virtually impossible to ascertain, being purely a mental process that may be easily modified at a person's whim."[38] Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts lest the courts speculate about the determination of the accused to commit the crime. Thus, the Court must consider the entire factual setting surrounding each case of marital infidelity to determine the evil intent to cause psychological violence which refers to the means employed by the perpetrator, and the mental or emotional anguish which pertains to the effect caused or the damage sustained by the offended party. In other words, marital infidelity must be purposely adopted to cause psychological violence upon the wife and her children.
In Araza v. People,[39] the Court convicted therein petitioner of psychological violence after he left his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Petitioner intentionally left his wife groping in the dark without any explanation or mature conversation causing her emotional and psychological distress.[40] Moreover, the wife narrated how she received information about petitioner's affair with his paramour that led to the filing of the complaint for concubinage. Despite the complaint being settled, petitioner resumed the affair with his paramour. Petitioner also admitted that he was fully aware that his wife experienced emotional and psychological suffering because of his decision.[41] In Reyes v. People,[42] therein petitioner was charged by his wife with the crime of bigamy when he cohabited and married another woman who bore him four children.[43] Thereafter, petitioner stopped supporting his wife who got sick with various illnesses such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and osteoarthritis. The Court held that petitioner committed psychological violence against his wife when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support which caused her to suffer emotional and mental anguish.[44] Petitioner's denial of financial support is designed to subjugate and control his wife, either to pressure her to withdraw the bigamy case or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.[45]
In Villalon v. People,[46] the Court affirmed the guilt of therein petitioner for psychological violence through repeated verbal abuse against his wife and public display of marital infidelity. Petitioner and his wife would always argue about his illicit affair with another woman and would hurl invectives at her saying "ang bobo mo naman, hindi ka marunong umintindi." Petitioner admitted to his in-laws that he was having an affair with another woman but promised to end it and focus his attention on his family. However, this did not happen as petitioner ended up abandoning his family. Later, petitioner and his wife reconciled and assured her that he already left his mistress. Yet, petitioner and his wife quarreled on the same issues as before and he would say hurtful words to her such as "gago," "maarte," "tanga," "bobo," "hindi marunong umintindi," "mukhang pera," " mandarambong ang pamilya," "putang-ina," and "walang laman ang utak." Eventually, petitioner left his wife and returned to his mistress. He then posted on social media his intimate relationship with his mistress as shown in pictures of them embracing each other and in their exchange of sweet messages.[47]
In XXX[243049] v. People,[48] therein petitioner had been romantically involved with another woman and had a child with her despite being married for about 17 years to his wife. He even gave allowances to his mistress. The marital infidelity of petitioner has spawned a series of fights that left his wife emotionally wounded. From then on, petitioner and his wife never lived under the same roof again.[49] Thereafter, petitioner texted his wife threatening her "tama ayaw ko [makipag]-away sau gay sira na buhay ko wag mo pilitin idamay ko kau wala akong takot sira na ulo ko baka di ko makontrol kung ano magawa ko sa inyo." The wife feared for her life and the safety of her minor children resulting in the filing of the criminal case against petitioner.[50] The Court affirmed the rulings of the CA and the RTC that the prosecution duly established the fact of petitioner's infidelity as psychological abuse inflicted upon his wife who suffered mental arid emotional anguish.[51]
In XXX[241390] v. People,[52] therein petitioner drove his wife away from their house and brought his mistress into the conjugal home to live with his children. Furthermore, the mental anguish suffered by the wife was compounded by public ridicule and humiliation because of news and gossip about the philandering ways of her husband.[53] Lastly, in XXX[250219] v. People,[54] the prosecution established therein petitioner's marital infidelity, cohabitation with his paramour who even bore him a child, and abandonment of his wife and child who suffered psychological trauma and deep hurt because her father had another family and loved another woman other than her mother.
In the above cases, the Court convicted the husbands not because of marital infidelity per se but based on their evil intent and the psychological trauma and deep hurt that their wives suffered due to the illicit relationship. The marital infidelity of the husband was coupled with other significant factors ranging from the abandonment of the family and cohabitation with the paramour in another place, eviction of the wife and children from the family home, deprivation of financial support, keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, repeated verbal abuse and threats against the wife and her children, resumption of the affair with the paramour, and public display of marital infidelity. These attendant circumstances proved that the husband purposely caused psychological violence upon his wife. However, the factual milieus in those cases are far different from XXX's case. The prosecution miserably failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt the accusations that XXX kept a mistress and that he intentionally caused mental or emotional anguish to his wife.
First, XXX did not abandon AAA and their son. XXX and his son are living in a condominium unit in Manila and would go home to his wife during weekends and holidays because his employment requires him to work out of town. XXX remains present for his family. He attends to the needs of his son and pays for their utility bills and expenses. He has never forsaken his family or deprived them of financial and emotional support. Second, XXX's act of signing the birth certificate of his lovechild is not proof that he maintained an illicit relationship with YYY. At most, this is part of XXX's commitment to acknowledge the paternity of the child upon learning that YYY was pregnant. XXX regrets his mistake but still chooses to be a father to his child with YYY. He kept this a secret but for a good reason. Further, he even endured the pain of not seeing his child with YYY who controlled and limited the number and time of his visits. At any rate, the stigma of illegitimate filiation of a child must never be construed and weaponized as evidence of a crime. Illegitimate children are only collateral victims purely irrelevant to the misdeeds of their parents. After all, it is neither the fault of the children nor their choice to be illegitimate. The Court must be keenly sensitive to protect the children, both legitimate and illegitimate, from the unfortunate consequences of the infidelities of their parents.
Third, the prosecution did not present EEE, who allegedly informed AAA that XXX was keeping a mistress, as a witness. There is also nothing in the testimony of BBB where YYY supposedly confessed her extramarital affair with XXX. Apparently, BBB only asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan. "In any event, the account of BBB is hearsay because the original declarant YYY was neither placed under oath or affirmation nor subjected to cross-examination. It was BBB who conveyed to the trial court the incriminatory statements that YYY allegedly made. Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value. It is an immemorial rule that witnesses can testify only as to their own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. Their testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what they learned or heard from others.[55] The admission of hearsay evidence in a criminal case would be tantamount to a violation of the rights of the accused:
To end, I would like to highlight the ponencia's statement that "not all instances of extramarital relationships inflict mental or emotional suffering to the other spouse."[59] This reasoning is highly self-contradictory and incompatible with the thrust of the majority that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence. Paradoxically, the majority's deduction validly supports the proposition that there must be a direct causal connection between the marital infidelity of the husband (actus reus) and the criminal intent to cause psychological violence upon the wife (mens rea). The ponencia cited "estranged relations" and "consciously consenting spouses" as specific situations where marital infidelity will not result in psychological violence. To further the discourse, I propose that the following factors must likewise be considered in future cases involving psychological violence such as the length and reason for the separation of the parties, mutual guilt or the fact that the victim was already in another relationship, the pardon, acquiescence, condonation on the part of the victim and/or reconciliation and compromise agreement between the spouses, civility between the parties, and the motive for filing the complaint, i.e. revenge or hate. These circumstances that negate evil intent to cause psychological violence or create reasonable doubt about whether the complained acts caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation should be taken liberally in favor of the accused.
Marital infidelity may have transpired during a period when the husband and wife have accepted the hopeless and dysfunctional dynamics of their relationship. The spouses may have decided to move forward and accept the fate of their defunct marriage. Circumstances showing that the victim did not suffer psychological distress as a result of the infidelity should be taken strongly against the criminal charge. No less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. While often challenging and viewed with strict scrutiny by the ardent crusaders of key social legislations, the Court's commitment to liberty follows the dictates of the Constitution. The Court must always endeavor to bridge the meaning of the libertarian tenets with the realities of our time consistent with the State policy to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. The Court must prevent spouses from using the law to compel their partners to remain in a loveless marriage or to punish them in cases of failed expectations and lost hopes. Either scenario already exhibits a lost freedom that we should feel sensitive about. Incarceration can ruin a person's life. The restorative aspect of the law will be swapped for retribution.
On this point, I reiterate that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[60] The inherent weakness of the accused's defenses does not operate to relieve the prosecution of its responsibility to prove the crime itself.[61] Suffice it to say that the guilt of the accused must rest not on the weakness of his defenses but on the strength of the evidence against him.[62] Criminal laws are not abstract concept but pure definitive norms that restrict human conduct and must be construed strictly against the state. Whether marital infidelity constitutes the crime of psychological violence must be understood in its legal context and not based on the personal anguish or feelings of the offended parties. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. All told, the prosecution's evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and acquit XXX of the criminal charge.
[1] The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise their identity, and those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (1192). An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262 (2004). An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (2004). Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children.
[2] Ponencia, p. 15.
[3] Id. at 19.
[4] Rollo, p. 23.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 23-24.
[7] Id. at 24-26.
[8] Id. at 27-28.
[9] Id. at 22.
[10] Id. at 22.
[11] Id. at 29-31.
[12] Id. at 22-35. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson of Branch 144, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[13] Id. at 32-35.
[14] Id. at 36-48.
[15] Id. at 65-79. Penned by Associate Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of this Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[16] Id. at 77-79.
[17] Id. at 9-18.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 100-110.
[20] An example is plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
[21] An example is technical malversation.
[22] Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[23] People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[24] Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[25] Criminal LAW, JANET LOVELESS 38 (5th ed., 2016). See also J. M. Lopez, Concurring Opinion in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[26] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 4 provides that "[c]riminal liability shall be incurred: (1) by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and (2) by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means."
[27] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[28] Id.
[29] AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 621 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[30] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[31] People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[32] Ponencia, pp. 15-16.
[33] Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/20I9/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 17, 2023).
[34] Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/07/PCW-WPLA-Policy-Brief-3-Adultery-Concubinage.pdf (last accessed on August 17, 2023). In 1947, Japan abolished adultery as a crime in the spirit of providing equal rights for women. In 1996, Guatemala struck down the punishment for marital infidelity based on equality guarantees and human rights treaties. In 2005, Haiti decriminalized adultery in the context of eliminating discrimination against women. In 2007, Uganda overturned the adultery law that penalized women for adultery while leaving their male partners unpunished. In 2011, Mexico abolished and decriminalized adultery to condemn a crime historically construed to allow men to hold women as property. In 2015, South Korea struck down a 62-year-old law that made adultery a criminal act. The decision whether to maintain marriage should be left to the free will and love of people. All European nations have decriminalized adultery and, while it is not considered a criminal offense in most Western parts, it may still have legal consequences, especially in divorce proceedings. Adultery is also not a crime in Canada and China but a valid ground for divorce. Adultery has also been decriminalized in most of the Latin American countries and in Australia.
[35] Ponencia, p. 16.
[36] Ponencia, p. 17.
[37] Ponencia, p. 18.
[38] Ponencia, p. 18.
[39] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[40] Id. at 923.
[41] Id. at 926-927.
[42] 855 Phil. 991 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[43] Id. at 998.
[44] Id. at 1004.
[45] Id. at 1006.
[46] G.R. No. 234520 (Notice), February 28, 2018.
[47] Id.
[48] 887 Phil. 161 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division].
[49] Id. at 165.
[50] Id. at 165-166.
[51] Id. at 170.
[52] G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[53] Id.
[54] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[55] People v. Estibal, 748 Phil. 850, 877 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[56] People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499, 513 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[57] People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing People v. Marquita, 383 Phil. 786, 708 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; People v. Aquino, 369 Phil. 701, 726 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; and People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 29 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
[58] People v. Torre, 263 Phil. 458, 461 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division], citing People v. Ramos, 245 Phil. 759, 760-761 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[60] People v. Cabaya, 411 Phil. 616, 630 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division], citing People vs. Villagonzalo, 308 Phil. 231, 247 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
[61] People v. Pajes, 632 Phil. 157, 170 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division], citing People v. Ola, 236 Phil. 1, 17 (1987) Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
[62] People v. Gomez, 345 Phil. 195, 200 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
LOPEZ, J., J.:
"Let marriage be held in honor among all, and let the marriage bed be undefiled, for God will judge the sexually immoral and adulterous." - The Holy Bible, Hebrews 13:4 (ESV)
I concur with the ponencia that the guilt of XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, I wish to elucidate certain points in order to emphasize further why specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish or psychological suffering on the victim need not be proved before the perpetrator may be made to account for his wrongful act. Hence, I write this concurring opinion.
No less than the Bill of Rights as embodied in the Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.[1] The main and perhaps the more known effect or consequence of such presumption is that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused.[2] The other effect of such presumption is that when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him or her, the more lenient interpretation in favor of the accused is to be adopted.[3] Such rule of lenity is known as the pro reo doctrine.[4] Accordingly since the resolution of the case at hand cannot proceed without reconciling the seemingly overlapping provisions of the various parts of Republic Act No. 9262 as it pertains to psychological violence in the context of marital infidelity, the matter of pro reo's applicability or non-applicability must first be elucidated to determine whether there is any doubt affecting those provisions that may or may not be interpreted in favor of the accused.
All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part and that conflicting intention in the same statute is never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.[5] In other words, every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context in that "every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."[6] Thus, the various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency.[7]
Here, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which reads:
Noticeably, a glance at Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 would show that there are two scenarios of acts or omissions involving "mental or emotional suffering" which the law considers as psychological viole ce: (1) "causing;" and (2) "likely to cause." The first scenario refers to those acts or omissions that have actually been consummated, while the second scenario refers to those that are "likely" or probable, and not even required to be consummated.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that psychological violence is a result that is personal to the offended party and which arises by reason of the acts committed by an offender. Thus, the perspective of the offended party, not the intent of the offender, must be given primary significance. This finds support from the very reason why Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted - to promote the protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.[12] Also, the legislative deliberations on the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 9262 show that one of the impetus for the passing of this law is to elevate women on the same plane as men in terms of protection in law, recognizing the incongruence of treatment accorded to women in adulterous relationships with regard to married men who are sexually unfaithful. The legislative deliberations elucidate this point:
In Araza, this Court articulated this legislative intent:
It is clear from the foregoing that the means employed for violation of Section 5(i) can be found under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, while the effect is that stated under Section 5(i) of the Act.
Focusing on the means employed, marital infidelity is clearly enumerated as one of the acts of psychological violence, which is an act that causes or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering. This finds support in XXX v. People[17] which unequivocally held that marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence.[18] In this case, there is no denial that XXX became romantically involved with another person outside of his marriage with AAA. He even admitted having a love child because of such romantic involvement. Whether it was proven to have occurred only once or at several occasions, this is no doubt marital infidelity.
Also, the Information specifically stated that XXX was being charged for keeping a mistress. It would not be amiss to point out that keeping a mistress is a form of marital infidelity. Such an act presupposes not only the act of keeping a mistress but of having a mistress in the first place. A mistress is someone who has a romantic involvement or extramarital sexual relationship with someone who is married. Indeed, it is not easy to prove the fact of having and keeping a mistress as these relationships are usually kept hidden from the public's view, moreso, with the family of the guilty party. However, there becomes a glaring evidence of such an extramarital relationship, as when a love child is born out of such an affair. This fact was already admitted by XXX as, in fact, he claimed that what happened was only a one-night stand.
With respect to the deliberate act of causing mental or emotional anguish, while it may be true that XXX did not abandon his family as he attended to their needs, and even had to endure the pain of not seeing his child with YYY, still, the fact of having an extramarital affair remains. Engaging in a relationship, moreso, sharing an intimate moment, requires the consent of two individuals. Under the law, the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[19] It is the husband and wife, who are joined by marriage, who should be romantically involved with one another. Sharing such an intimate moment with another person other than one's spouse, especially when voluntarily done, goes against not just legal but also moral obligations, and without question, harm, if not destroy, the emotional well-being of the victim.
Moreover, the causal connection between the marital infidelity of XXX and the mental and emotional suffering of AAA cannot be denied. As the legal wife, AAA had every right to expect fidelity and devotion from XXX. Her actuations from the moment she heard of tales of his infidelity clearly demonstrate the torment she experienced both mental and emotional, as a consequence of XXX's conduct. To recall, when AAA received information on XXX's extramarital affair on July 16, 2016, she lost no time in seeking assistance to locate the address she was told her husband and his mistress were staying. On July 19, 2016, she confirmed the veracity of the information she received. On said date and at the given address, she came face to face with both her husband and his paramour. To make matters worse, she found out that he sired a child with his paramour. Soon after that, on December 29, 2017, a case for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 was filed against XXX. The fact that AAA immediately checked on the truth of what she heard about XXX indubitably established that she experienced betrayal, devastation, mental and emotional anguish from such news, which was later confirmed to be true. Had she been unaffected, she would have acted indifferently, which is not the case here.
Besides, even assuming arguendo that XXX did not intend to cause mental or emotional anguish on AAA by committing marital infidelity, he would not be able to pass through the requirement of" likely to cause mental or emotional suffering" as included in the definition of what is "psychological violence" under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262. It stands to reason that marital infidelity is one of the most difficult situation a couple may go through. Any information relating to such an infidelity between married couples would undoubtedly cause, and is likely to cause, mental or emotional suffering. To argue otherwise would be to allow a spouse to commit infidelity and ignore its consequences, which presents a rational infirmity as freely consenting to the sexual infidelity of one's spouse is not in accord with "superior logic of ordinary human experience,"[20] as well as not consistent with the "inviolable" nature of marriage espoused in Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which the State has the duty to protect. It is unnatural for a person in his or her right mind to allow his or her spouse to engage in sexual relations with another person. More, it is not for this Court to alter the traditional view of marriage practices as protected by Congress by coming out with a ruling that erodes basic family values, if it is to respect the constitutionally-ordained principle of separation of powers. These matters are best left to the people to address through their elected representatives.[21] Thus, as it relates to the case at hand, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation, and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.[22]
Further, in the absence of any other circumstance presented by XXX, to look further into his intention after the one-night stand, could lead to a disregard of the emotional suffering of AAA. Instead of intently examining the requirement of emotional suffering from the perspective of AAA, the intention of XXX would have to be given a weightier consideration. To stretch the effect of giving too much weight into the intention of XXX could lead to asking if AAA consented to such an infidelity. However, it is customarily unusual for a person to freely give consent for his or her spouse to have sexual relations with another. In any event, the prosecution was able to show that AAA had suffered mental and emotional anguish, especially during the July 19, 2016 encounter, as a result of XXX's marital infidelity.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23] To do this, the prosecution must establish a "prima facie case" or one "which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused."[24] Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense.[25] It now becomes incumbent upon the accused to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against him or her.[26] In Bautista v. Sarmiento,[27] this Court explained:
However, XXX did not meet the required burden of evidence to redeem himself from conviction. Here, save for his bare claim that a single casual sexual encounter or a "one-night-stand" is not enough to prove that he intended to inflict mental and emotional anguish on AAA, XXX did not present any evidence, or at least proffered a reasonable and convincing explanation, to disprove the means of commission of the offense and the emotional suffering of AAA. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value.[29] As a result, XXX failed to overthrow, or at least equalize,[30] the prima facie case established by the prosecution in order that he might secure a judgment of acquittal.
In sum, XXX's petition must be denied because: (1) his unlawful act of causing mental and emotional anguish was successfully established by his own admission and by the prosecution's evidence; and (2) he did not overcome the prima facie case established by the prosecution that, as an effect to his act, AAA suffered mental and emotional anguish. On its fore, the case may present an inherent unfairness, treading along the bounds of what is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, due the ipso jure criminal liability being imposed on the husband based solely on the "likelihood" of causing mental and emotional anguish on the part of the wife. However, such is not the lis mota or even the issue here which necessitates a novel approach to the interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 on the matter of psychological violence through the act of marital infidelity. Perhaps either this Court in another proceeding raising the Equal Protection Clause ramifications, or Congress in the exercise of its plenary power to enact some remedial legislation, can correct the perceived unfairness. But it is not for this Court in this proceeding to undertake that task, especially by way of interpretation absent any constitutional ground.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the conviction of petitioner XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] Collao v. People, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[2] People v. Pagal, 886 Phil. 570, 654 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[3] Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People, 626 Phil. 177, 200 (2010) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
[4] See Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
[5] People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].
[6] Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
[7] Lichauco & Company, Inc. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138, 148 (1922) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
[8] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[9] Id. at 373.
[10] 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[11] Id. at 917. (Emphasis supplied)
[12] Republic Act No. 9262, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security[.]
[13] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, February 19, 2002, pp. 8-11.
[14] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, August 27, 2002, p. 19.
[15] Id. at 21-22.
[16] Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[17] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[18] Id. at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[19] FAMILY CODE, art. 68.
[20] See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil, 1198, 1219 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
[21] See Separate Opinion of J. Delos Santos in Almonte v. People, 878 Phil. 628, 1078 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[22] People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 712 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
[23] Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36, 43 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[24] Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1196 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
[25] People v. Abdula, 843 Phil. 706, 721 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
[26] Bautista v. Judge Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 185 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
[27] 223 Phil. 181 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].
[28] Id. at 185.
[29] LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
[30] See People v. Santiago, 465 Phil. 151, 159-163 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]. (Citations omitted)
SINGH, J.:
Petitioner XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262, or the Violence Against Women and their Children Act, as follows:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction, pointing out that the element that the accused caused the victim mental and emotional anguish was sufficiently proven.[3]
Citing the primary objective of Republic Act No. 9262 of protecting women and their children from all forms of violence, the ponencia affirms the conviction and concludes that marital infidelity resulting in mental and emotional anguish is punishable under Republic Act No. 9262.
The ponencia distinguished the present case from Acharon v. People,[4] where the Court acquitted the accused of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 for failure of the prosecution to prove the criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, as follows:
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 enumerates the forms of violence that may be committed against women and their children. These include, but are not limited to, physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, and economic abuse. Relevant to the present case is psychological violence, which is defined as:
It is conceded that the fourth element is established. While marital infidelity is not specifically mentioned, it is clear from the phrase, "including, but not limited to," that the list in Section 5(i) is not exhaustive or exclusive.
However, as to the third element, there is the view that this constitutes the mens rea that is the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation resulting from the infliction of some form of violence to the woman or her child.
The commission of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is a crime mala in se, as opposed to a crime mala prohibita, since such act is inherently immoral or evil. It is my position that the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is presumed when a person commits the crime of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, committed through marital infidelity, in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262.
The concept of specific intent is well established in jurisprudence. In People v. Delim,[9] the Court explained:
Even if the accused, as in this case, pleads no intent to cause emotional distress, the very nature of infidelity will unfailingly result in such psychological harm. The sense of security within the relationship is breached. The broken trust and the realization that the partner has strayed emotionally or physically often leads to a profound sense of despair. Infidelity, thus, inherently carries the effect of mental anguish as it violates the very foundation of the marriage. It is a clear betrayal not only of the spouse but also of the institution of marriage, which is considered the foundation of the family.[11]
The act of infidelity itself is a demonstration of a disregard for the emotional well being of the spouse precisely because the emotional distress experienced by the victim-spouse is neither incidental nor unforeseeable, but is rather a natural and logical consequence of the infidelity.
If a wife suffers mentally or emotionally after learning of her husband's infidelity, what other element or circumstance should the prosecution prove before the husband can be found guilty of psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262? Applied by analogy to the attempted or frustrated stage of homicide or murder, it is only when the wife does not undergo mental or emotional anguish that proof of the husband's specific intent becomes necessary.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9262 mandates that the law "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children." A restrictive interpretation that a mere one-night stand that bore a lovechild could not have caused emotional anguish on the wife contradicts the very spirit of the law, which aims to address the violence committed against women and their children, who are the usual victims of violence and abuse.[12]
Jurisprudence provides:
It cannot be denied that XXX intentionally had a sexual encounter with Aileen and that it was committed with the free will and intelligence of a married man. XXX made a series of choices fully aware of his marital commitments. A man who truly values and respects his marriage would not engage in this kind of damaging behavior.
As a matter of fact, the defense that it was a mere one-night stand is belied by the evidence. The transcript quoted above shows that XXX had an illegitimate son with YYY and that he maintained such relationship, which was the reason why AAA was able to find him in the house he was sharing with them. This cohabitation with YYY and the act of having a child out of marriage are undoubtedly constitutive of infidelity which caused lasting and incalculable psychological harm to AAA.
Certain actions, such as infidelity, are inherently likely to cause emotional distress to a spouse upon discovery and carry consequences that extend beyond the immediate act itself. Necessarily, the responsibility extends beyond the act itself as to encompass the foreseeable emotional aftermath for the affected spouse.
Otherwise, what specific circumstances could possibly further show a husband's intent to cause mental or emotional anguish other than the mere fact of committing marital infidelity? What are the limits or standards before considering marital infidelity as a tool used by husbands to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner-having a second or third casual sexual encounter or producing a second or third child from another woman?
It is important to note that the crime of psychological violence will necessarily be subjective in the sense that it considers the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant. As Associate Justice Hernando has emphasized, the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262 is to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.[18] Precisely, the law was enacted to protect the woman and the child. If their perspective of pain and suffering consequent to a duly proven act of violence is disregarded, then the enforcement of the law would be futile.
The commission of the prohibited act may be proven independently of the mental or emotional anguish such that the accused need not be shown to have intended to cause the latter. To hold otherwise would be to unerringly validate the conduct of men who are undeterred by their marriage vows and freely engage in infidelity, without regard to their wives and children. Men, therefore, cannot escape liability by invoking lack of proof that they intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon their defenseless and unknowing wives. This was not the intention of the lawmakers in enacting Republic Act No. 9262. Precisely, the lawmakers intended the law to correct the imbalance in the marital relations by proscribing "marital infidelity" through its classification as "psychological violence." Surely, had the situation been reversed, if it had been a woman who had engaged in a one-night stand which results in a lovechild, the husband would undoubtedly exact the full measure of retribution. The language of the law is clear and unqualified. To add more, by saying that intent must be proven, is to engage in judicial legislation.
It will be a truly dark day in the Court's history if we brush aside the deleterious effects of a husband's marital infidelity by establishing a distinction between a "casual sexual encounter" or a "one night stand" and a relationship intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish. The mere fact that a man who swore to be faithful to his wife had a sexual relation with another woman is marital infidelity, it is betrayal, it is unfaithfulness. The degree of mental anguish and emotional suffering it will bring to a wife is untold, not to mention the children of the marriage. What more for such infidelity to produce an illegitimate child. The psychological trauma to the woman and her children cannot be imagined. To minimize, therefore, such suffering by referring to the betrayal as "casual" or "a one-night stand" is to spit in the face of every woman who has been the victim of such one-night stands and casual sexual encounters. The Court cannot tread such an unenlightened path.
Children are only collateral victims in this situation. Thus, illegitimate children should never be placed in a bad light. However, the fact is that these children born out of wedlock are considered illegitimate under the law and they are born illegitimate precisely because of their parent's marital infidelity.
It is in this context that, viewed from the wife's perspective, knowing one's husband has a child with another woman aggravates one's emotional suffering caused by the fact of the extra-marital affair. The wife is now confronted with the consequences of the infidelity, including the existence of a child outside the marital relationship. This situation will evoke lingering feelings of betrayal as the wife grapples with the reality of a fractured family.
Finally, until such time that the Congress decriminalizes adultery and concubinage, and for that matter, psychological violence caused by marital infidelity, it is our duty as Magistrates of the Highest Court of the land to interpret and apply the law in keeping with the intention of the lawmakers and consistent with justice and equity.
Thus, I agree with the ponencia that psychological violence may be committed through marital infidelity without proof that the husband specifically intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon his wife and therefore VOTE to AFFIRM XXX's conviction as it is what the law requires and what morality dictates.
[1] Draft ponencia, p. 2.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Id. at 7.
[4] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[5] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[6] Id. at 373.
[7] 823 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[8] Id. at 620.
[9] 444 Phil. 430 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
[10] Id. at 448.
[11] CONST., art XV, sec. 2.
[12] See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[13] Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 919 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[14] Rollo, pp. 24, 26.
[15] Id. at 32.
[16] Id. at 34.
[17] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, sec. 5(f).
[18] Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, sec. 2.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] filed by XXX, assailing the Decision[3] and the Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R. CR No. 40938. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision[5] rendered by the Branch 144, Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx (RTC), in Criminal Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR which found XXX guilty of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The CA Resolution denied XXX' s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The Factual Antecedents
In an Information[6] dated December 29, 2016, XXX was charged with a violation of Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The accusatory portion reads:
On July 19, 2016 or prior thereto, in the city of xxxxxxxxxxx,[7] [the] Philippines, accused, being the husband of complainant AAA,[8] did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [keep] a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental ,and emotional anguish, in violation of the aforesaid law.XXX and his wife, AAA, were married on February 11, 1999. They have one child.[10]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
AAA, the private complainant, testified that XXX was an employee of the Bureau of Customs and was assigned at the Port of Manila. Since they resided in Tarlac City, XXX stayed in Sampaloc, Manila, during the weekdays and would come home to Tarlac on weekends.[11]
In the morning of July 16, 2016, AAA's co-worker sent her a private message stating that she needed to know something important. AAA asked what it was and was told that one EEE sent the co-worker some photos and messages. Upon seeing the photos, AAA recognized their family vehicle parked at a certain place, and was told that her husband, XXX, was keeping a mistress therein. AAA's co-worker also told her that XXX has a child with the mistress.[12]
When AAA received these messages, she was beside XXX who was asleep. She felt deeply hurt because it confirmed her previous suspicions that XXX was unfaithful to her.[13]
The co-worker told AAA that she was contacted by EEE because AAA was inaccessible in social media. AAA claimed that EEE previously attempted to contact her through Facebook, but she ignored the attempt since she did not know EEE. However, after receiving the photos and messages from her co worker, AAA accepted the request from EEE. Thereafter, EEE sent AAA a message saying, "Alam mo ba na ang asawa mo ay may asawa [rito]? May kinakasamang babae dito? Na may anak pa sila na four years old? Batang lalaki."[14] In response, AAA asked where "rito" was, to which EEE replied, "Dito sa Makati. Filmore, Palanan, Makati."[15] As XXX was with her at the time, AAA could only cry. XXX asked her what the problem was, but said it was nothing.[16]
On July 19, 2016, AAA, accompanied by her mother and a family friend, BBB, went to Makati City and asked assistance from the Palanan barangay authorities in the hopes of catching XXX. Upon reaching the place, they found the address given by EEE, and XXX and AAA's family vehicle parked outside.[17]
When they knocked at the gate, it was opened by an unknown person. BBB pretended to not know and asked for the owner of the vehicle parked outside, upon which XXX's alleged mistress, YYY, went out. Upon seeing her, AAA could not contain herself and grabbed YYY's hands and pulled her outside the gate yelling, "Ilabas mo yung asawa ko." YYY was then unable to react out of shock. AAA continued demanding to see her husband but XXX did not come out. AAA then directed BBB and her mother to go inside and get XXX to come outside. XXX only appeared after being threatened that AAA and her companions will go to his workplace instead.[18]
A police mobile passed by during the encounter and intervened. The officers were about to pull AAA away from XXX when suddenly a little boy ran outside calling for his "Daddy."[19] Seeing this, AAA told XXX, "May anak ka talaga, ano?"[20] Before XXX could respond, the police officers asked AAA to board the police mobile and escorted them all to the barangay hall. Discussions ensued at the barangay hall which led to XXX eventually admitting that he is the father of the boy. This resulted in a shouting match, with AAA demanding that the whole incident be recorded in the barangay blotter. XXX asked to talk to AAA at his place in Sampaloc, and when they arrived there, XXX asked her what she wanted to do. AAA replied that, at the time, she did not want anything to happen.[21]
The following day, XXX brought his and AAA's son home to Tarlac and asked AAA to have a discussion as a family. He again asked her what she wanted to happen, to which she replied that she wanted XXX to go to jail. XXX responded, "Ah, ganon? Gusto mo akong makulong?" and locked himself in the bathroom.[22]
AA worried that XXX would hurt himself, but he eventually left the bathroom and went to the kitchen where he got a knife and threatened to stab himself with it. Apparently scared, their son ran to AAA. While she was holding their son, XXX grabbed him. Fearing that their son might get injured by the knife, AAA embraced their son to shield him. Thereafter, XXX left the house. He returned only the next weekend, told AAA that their relationship is irreparable, and asked her to leave him alone.[23]
After the incident, AAA was unable to work for three to four months and could not sleep. She stayed with different relatives but kept silent about her marital problems. She just explained that she did not want to see their house, XXX, or his belongings.[24]
On the witness stand, BBB confirmed AAA's narration of events. She added that, during the confrontation on July 19, 2016 in Makati City, she went back to the house where XXX and YYY were found. She talked to YYY and asked her how long they had been staying there. YYY replied, "Hindi pa naman katagalan."[25] BBB further observed that the same little boy was with YYY, and asked him how old he was, to which he replied, "four," and called YYY "Mommy" and XXX "Daddy."[26] BBB added that she asked YYY if she knew that XXX had a wife, to which the latter responded in the affirmative.[27]
BBB further testified that upon discovery of XXX's mistress, AAA was visibly emotional, would not stop crying, and appeared to be in immense disbelief that she had been cheated on by her husband.[28]
For his part, XXX admitted that he and AAA are married and have one child together. He also admitted having a child with YYY. However, he denied keeping a mistress, which supposedly caused AAA emotional and mental anguish. He denied having any relationship with YYY and asserted that the boy was only the result of a one-night stand.[29]
XXX further defended that, on that day on July 19, 2016, he only went to YYY's house in Makati to visit their child, who he only sees about three or four times a year. He also contended that he was only able to enter that house a total of three times.[30]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[31] dated November 17, 2017, the RTC found XXX guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused [XXX] is found GUILTY of the charge of violation of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i) and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and [o]ne (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.The trial court found that the prosecution has sufficiently established all the elements of Sec. 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 against XXX. Specifically, the RTC noted that XXX's acknowledgement as the father on the child's birth certificate proved the existence of an extramarital affair with YYY.[33]
In addition to imprisonment, accused [XXX] is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([PHP] 100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The trial court likewise gave weight to AAA' s behavior and manner of testifying, describing it as the kind where "anguish can readily be seen," and that the "emotion shown by [AAA] could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that [XXX] himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with [YYY]."[34]
In conclusion, the trial court pronounced:
It is clear that the distress experienced by complainant was brought about by the infidelity and dishonesty of accused, including the fact that accused was able to carry on the affair without her knowledge. The situation was further aggravated that private complainant learned of the affair from a stranger who informed her co-worker of the same. Private complainant succinctly described the humiliation she suffered...[35]XXX appealed his conviction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On November 8, 2019, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision,[36] affirming the RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads:
The appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 November 2017 rendered 144 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, xxxxxxxxxxx in Crim. Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR is AFFIRMED in toto.In sustaining XXX's conviction, the CA pointed out that the element of the offense in contention-that the accused caused the victim mental and emotional anguish-was sufficiently proven. The appellate court emphasized:
IT IS SO ORDERED.[37]
As the RTC pointed out in the assailed Decision, "the anguish of private complainant was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led [...] to the confrontation between her and [XXX] on July 19, 2016", and "[s]he was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that [XXX] had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her effort to keep their family together."[38]XXX filed a motion for reconsideration,[39] but the same was denied in the assailed Resolution.
Dissatisfied, XXX filed the present Petition, contesting his conviction.
We determine whether XXX was guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
XXX argues that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA was caused by his unfaithfulness, and, that he did not commit any of the acts mentioned in Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, as charged in the Information.
We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA. XXX is guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
RA 9262 is a form of social legislation that has the primary objective of protecting women and their children from all forms of domestic violence |
Before delving into the main issue, the Court finds that a brief discussion on the historical and social contexts that underscore the necessity of Republic Act No. 9262 would be a useful aid in fully elucidating upon the merits of this case.
Violence against women is internationally recognized as a form of discrimination and violation of human rights.[40] Examining violence against women in the human rights framework reveals that the specific causes of such violence are inextricably linked to the broader context of systemic gender-based discrimination and subordination that women are forced to endure.[41] Such violence is a manifestation of the unequal power relationship between men and women, as well as widespread and deeply entrenched gender biases and prejudices against women that have historically placed women beneath men, who are thus in a position to exercise power and control over women.[42]
The discrimination and violence faced by women is an issue of global magnitude with one in three women worldwide having been subjected to either physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime.[43] The international community has sought to address violence against women through the following conventions and international agreements.
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on December 18, 1979 to bring women to the forefront of the conversation on human rights, serving not only as an international bill of rights for women, but also as an "agenda for action" by countries to ensure the enjoyment of these rights.[44] Although the CEDAW does not explicitly mention violence against women, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which is the treaty body established to monitor implementation by party-states of the CEDAW, has unequivocally stated that violence against women is a form of gender-based discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.[45] The Committee recommended that states parties take effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based violence and ensure that all laws against gender-based violence provide adequate protection to all women.[46]
As further recognition that violence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women, and the continued pervasiveness of gender-based discrimination and violence throughout the world, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) on December 20, 1993, and expressly links the rights espoused therein to those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[47] The DEVAW defines "violence against women" as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."[48] States parties are directed to condemn violence against women and to prioritize pursuing policies of eliminating violence against women.[49]
Lastly, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted by 189 countries at the Fourth Conference on Women on September 15, 1995. The states parties to the Beijing Declaration reaffirmed their commitment to ensure the enjoyment of human rights of women and girls,[50] and to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls.[51]
Having adopted the UDHR, CEDAW, DEVAW, and the Beijing Declaration, the Philippines has a legal obligation to implement the policies and rights enshrined in these conventions. The Philippines's commitment to ending gender-based violence also finds legal impetus in Section 14, Article II of the Constitution, which sets out the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.[52]
As a major step forward towards achieving the goal of eliminating all forms of violence against women, Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 was passed into law. The Court in Estacio v. Estacio,[53] explained the policy considerations behind the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262:
Republic Act No. 9262 is a social legislation enacted as a measure to address domestic violence. It acknowledges that in situations where abuse happens at home, women are the likely victims. This is largely due to the unequal power relationship between men and women, and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women which have historically prevented their full advancement, forcing them into subordination to men.Although We completely reject the perspective that women are always victims and are inherently weaker than men, the Court has recognized the reality that women are the more likely victims of violence as compared to men,[55] and that the most common form of violence experienced by women is domestic violence or intimate partner violence.[56]
The law specifically protects women from violence committed in the context of an intimate relationship, which can be physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, or economic abuse. This also includes those committed against the woman's child.[54] (Citations omitted)
Based on worldwide surveys conducted by the World Health Organization, 27% of women aged 15 to 49 years who have been in a relationship reported that they have been subjected to some form of physical and/or sexual violence by their intimate partner.[57]
The Philippines reflects similarly alarming statistics. As of December 31, 2022, the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) reported that 17.5% of women aged 15 to 49 have experienced any form of physical, sexual, or emotional violence by their current or most recent husband or intimate partner,[58] with emotional violence as having the highest percentage among the forms of violence against women at 15.2%.[59] Violations of Republic Act No. 9262 reported to the Philippine National Police and the PCW rank first among the different categories of crimes involving violence against women from 2018 to 2022.[60]
The foregoing statistics clearly emphasize the continuing importance and necessity of upholding statutory protections for women and their children. Republic Act No. 9262 provides a clear legal framework to promote and strengthen the rights of women and their children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. As the goal of the law is to achieve equality by eliminating violence against women and children, it is thus imperative to identify and address the varied and intersectional ways that women experience violence.
Marital infidelity resulting to mental and emotional anguish is punishable under Republic Act No. 9262 |
Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:In Dinamling v. People,[61] the Court enumerated the elements of this crime:
The presence of the first two elements is undisputed. First, the victim is AAA, a woman; and second, she is married to the accused, XXX, with the fact of their marriage having been stipulated upon during the proceedings before the trial court.[63]
The contention centers on the third element, against which XXX stresses that "the anguish allegedly suffered by [AAA] could equally have been caused by the refusal of [XXX] to get back together with [AAA],"[64] and that "[AAA] was still hoping at that moment that their family could still be rehabilitated."[65]
XXX's argument utterly lacks legal logic.
We note XXX's admission of the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA; only that, according to him, it could not have been caused by his philandering. However, as correctly observed by both the RTC and the CA, "the anguish of [AAA] was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led [...] to the confrontation between her and [XXX] on July 19, 2016", and "[s]he was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that [XXX] had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her effort to keep their family together."[66] This clearly relays to the courts the fact of XXX's infidelity, including the discovery and confirmation thereof, is the sole source of AAA's stress and grief. XXX's imputation of self- inflicted torment upon AAA will not work to dilute his culpability for her marital woes.
Moreover, XXX's own unwitting statement debilitates his defense that AAA's suffering "could equally have been" caused by his refusal to reconcile. Aside from willfully misinterpreting AAA's reactions, XXX is effectively admitting not just his unfaithfulness, but that it also caused his wife a great amount of mental and emotional distress.
BBB's testimony further supports Our own findings:
BBB's testimony is unequivocal and corroborative: AAA's inconsolability is the undisputed by-product of XXX's infidelity. Even if We indulge XXX's contention, the same will not stand, for it does not take much to see that XXX's assertion only flicked a pebble against a wall at best, and is simply baseless and speculative at worst. Vie note that, aside from mere verbal arguments, XXX has not presented even a hint of proof to support his claim that AAA's suffering was caused by his refusal to repair their broken relationship. What is certain at this point, however, is that when AAA witnessed for herself proof of XXX's infidelity, it caused her uncontrollable emotions that could only be described as, "iyak [nang] iyak." It is more in accord with normal human behavior to feel and act utterly deceived and betrayed and consequently, experience mental and emotional sorrow/ Virl1en one is cheated on by their own spouse.
We quote with approval the trial court's findings:
Based on the Court's observation of [AAA's] behavior and manner of testifying, the anguish can readily be seen during her narration of the events that transpired and the emotion shown by [AAA] could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that [XXX] himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with [YYY].[68]Another argument that XXX had raised before the trial and appellate courts-which the Court now wishes to address, due to its important legal implications-is that YYY is not his mistress but rather, merely a one-time sexual partner. He thus concludes that the Information, which charged him of "keeping a mistress," is defective and failed to respect his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, enshrined in Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Again, XXX is wrong with his gravely misguided reasoning.
A review of the Information will reveal that the offense charged was the act of "causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish," and not the act of "keeping of a mistress."
We quote with approval the CA's findings:
Thus, appellant's argument that "[t]here was no showing that[,] at any time between their one-time sexual encounter in 2011 and the incident on 19 July 2016[,] appellant held, maintained, supported, or took care [of] [YYY] as his mistress" merits no consideration, as the element of the offense which needs to be proved is the fact that appellant caused private complainant mental and emotional anguish, and there is no requirement that appellant must have held, maintained, supported, or took care of the putative mistress in order to be liable for inflicting psychological violence on private complainant.[69]An illicit sexual encounter committed by a male person, however casual or infrequent, constitutes marital infidelity that is tantamount to psychological violence punishable by the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262. This is easily apparent from Sec. 3(c) of the law which defines psychological violence, to wit:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphasis supplied)Further, in XXX v. People,[70] the Court explained:
Marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence. The prosecution in this case was able to satisfactorily establish petitioner's marital infidelity, his cohabitation with CCC who even bore him a child, and his abandonment of AAA. BBB's psychological trauma was evident when she wept in open court upon being asked to narrate petitioner's infidelity. In particular, BBB explained that she was deeply hurt because her father had another family and loved another woman other than her mother, BBB. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)Moreover, in XXX v. People,[71] the Court held:
To begin with, We must emphasize that what distinguishes Section 5 (i) from the other violations of Section 5 of R.A. 9262, are the indispensable requirements of (1) psychological violence; and (2) emotional anguish or mental suffering. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. As We said in the case of Dinamling, the "focus of this particular criminal act [Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262] is the causation of non-physical suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the offended party." (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)The Court has recognized the various modes through which psychological violence may be committed though the act or omission was not expressly enumerated in Sec. 3(c), Republic Act No. 9262. In XXX v. People,[72] the Court ruled that a husband's abandonment of his wife amounts to psychological violence and emotional abuse under Republic Act No. 9262 as abandonment "would naturally cause mental and emotional suffering to the wife, a person whom the husband is obliged to cohabit with, love, respect, and give support to."[73] The same spousal obligations are also breached when a husband commits marital infidelity.
Here, AAA's trauma due to her discovery of XXX's cheating was both palpable and searing. The trial court observed that her "anguish can readily be seen during her narration of the events."[74] XXX's sexual affair bore him a child outside his marriage, and this point must be emphasized: when the unfaithfulness was discovered, the boy was already four years old. This only means that XXX's deceit and clandestine, extramarital affair went on for four years, which he consciously hid from AAA for that long until it was finally unveiled.
Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, in his Concurring Opinion, agrees that "the acknowledgement of filiation and continuing to visit the child, coupled with keeping such fact from his wife for a prolonged time, may be considered proof that he committed marital infidelity of sufficient gravity as to cause mental or emotional anguish on the wife."[75] It is not hard to see how all these deceptions, deliberately and carefully executed together for a long period of time, form a devastating picture to the victim-spouse who suddenly finds that, for the past several years, she had been living a lie and tolerating a liar.
While not invoked as a defense, and to avoid any confusion, a distinction must be made from Acharon v. People,[76] where the Court en banc declared:
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish; or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5 (i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and be proven in court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5 (i) of R.A. 9262.The Court's pronouncement in Acharon that the accused must be proven to have intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman applies only to circumstances involving willful denial of financial support, and not marital infidelity. This is only logical since, as We have held, to criminalize the mere inability rather than willful denial of financial support "would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences."[77]
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose. (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
While We agree with Acharon that the crimes penalized under Sec. 5(i) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, thereby requiring specific criminal intent, We hereby hold that in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity. This finds basis in the fact that marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms. In the normal course of human behavior, an aggrieved wife will never approve of a rogue and wandering husband, and vice versa. The same line of reasoning just cannot be applied in cases of willful denial of financial support. In other words, marital infidelity, divorced from its legal connotations, is an act which is essentially wrong in itself. To pose a rhetoric, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?
To further illustrate, it can be said that one who kills another person-an inherently vile act-will generally be found guilty, barring all justifications, as long as specific intent to kill is proven. Intent to kill, in turn, is conclusively presumed from the fact of the victim's death, thereby completing the ingredients of the crime.
Applied to the present case, can it also be said that the specific intent to cause 1nental and emotional anguish upon the victim may be conclusively presumed from the fact of infidelity itself?
The Court firmly believes so.
Mr. Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, in his Concurring Opinion, offers a learned view as regards the intent aspect of the present controversy. We quote with approval his view that:
[W]hen a special penal law is silent as to criminal intent as an element of the crime, the presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct.from "otherwise innocent conduct." That is, when the act punished by the law is not innocent in itself, a general intent to commit the actus reus is sufficient for conviction, and the Court must not read specific intent as an element of the offense when the law is otherwise silent on that matter. This ultimately relates to due process; for no law can be passed nor interpreted in a way that criminalizes a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.Thus, in ascertaining whether the third element is satisfied or not in cases involving marital infidelity, the question to be asked therefore is this: did the wife or her child suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the acts committed by the offender? If the answer is yes, then the third element already exists. The husband's intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the wife or her child is already presumed upon the husband's mere commission of the act of marital infidelity. Another observation that supports this pronouncement is the way the statute is worded: a closer look will reveal that the provision deliberately chose the phrasing "causing mental or emotional anguish" to highlight the idea as discussed above, and without much regard to the intent of the offender. Otherwise, the law could have simply made an explicit requirement that the offender intended to cause such mental or emotional harm. However, it did not.
....
The foregoing cases uniformly reveal that specific criminal intent must be required if, in the absence thereof a wide array of conduct that is innocent in itself will be penalized, in violation of the constitutional right to due process. However, if the conduct punished is not innocent in itself, the criminal statute will not be taken as one requiring specific intent; instead, the legal maxim, "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is applicable. In such a case; "[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities." The law only requires the prosecution to show "general intent," i.e., that the accused "possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime," or "knowledge of the circumstances that the law has defined as material to the offense."
Applying the foregoing, the Court must resolve the question of whether the conduct prohibited by Section 5(i) of RA 9262 is innocent in itself. If it is, then a strict specific criminal intent must be required; otherwise, only a general intent to voluntarily commit the prohibited act is sufficient for conviction in case of its violation.
There cannot be any serious debate that the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child," through "repeated verbal and emotional abuse" and marital infidelity, among others, is not innocent in itself. Marital infidelity is even violative of the obligations between a husband and wife under Article 68, in relation to Article 55, of the Family Code. Indeed, as early as 1948, the Court has recognized that damages may be recovered for mental and psychological suffering. such act that causes mental or emotional anguish is a form of violence upon persons.[78]
The esteemed Mr. Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa who wrote eloquently for the Court in Acharon, submits in his Dissenting Opinion that Acharon squarely applies to this case, even though what is involved is marital infidelity and not a willful denial of financial support. He posits that the ponencia renders the crime subjective.[79]
The Court disagrees.
To be sure, rendering the crime subjective is not, and should not be, the purpose and objective of the law. To require proof of intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the victim in cases of marital infidelity for purposes of prosecuting violations of Sec. 5(i) would make the enforcement of the law utterly difficult if not impossible to achieve, for offenders would simply feign lack of intent in order to evade prosecution. While intent to inflict emotional suffering and the emotional anguish itself that is suffered by the victim are both states of mind, the key difference is that the latter may be demonstrated externally and consequently, proven through overt acts. The former, on the other hand, is virtually impossible to ascertain, being purely a mental process that may be easily modified at a person's whim. Indeed, it is conceded that the rights of an accused must be safeguarded, especially the right to be presumed innocent, but it must not be extended to a point where a statutory provision is rendered inutile.
Mme. Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, in her Concurring Opinion, delivers a most apt and categorical pronouncement:
Indeed, protection of women and children-and no other-is the main objective of Republic Act No. 9262. If we thus seek to fully animate the intent and purpose of the law and truly take upon ourselves to deliver genuine justice to these women and children, our vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those we protect them from or against. For to do the latter would turn a blind eye to the undeniable existence of the injury which the law intends to prevent.[80] (Emphasis supplied)Indeed, to hold otherwise would negate the purpose of the law -
[For] offenders can simply claim that they engaged in marital infidelity for virtually any self-serving reason (e.g., boredom, curiosity, or adventure) since it is extremely difficult for the prosecution to show that infidelity was employed specifically to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the offended spouse. Nothing short of a confession by the accused would be necessary to prove his intent to cause psychological violence upon his wife.[81]Meanwhile, Mme. Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, in her Concurring Opinion, pointedly expounds on the deleterious effects of a seemingly harmless "one-night stand," thus:
Marital infidelity is a deliberate breach of trust. It does not happen by accident. It involves an awareness, a conscious choice to engage in actions that violate the marital vows.Given all of the above, does it now mean that all scenarios involving extramarital relationships will rise to the level of criminality as to make it punishable under Sec. 5(i) of the law? The answer is no.
Even if the accused, as in this case, pleads no intent to cause emotional distress, the very nature of infidelity will unfailingly result in such psychological harm. The sense of security within the relationship is breached. The broken trust and the realization that the partner has strayed emotionally or physically often leads to a profound sense of despair. Infidelity, thus, inherently carries the effect of mental anguish as it violates the very foundation of the marriage. It is a clear betrayal not only of the spouse but also of the institution of marriage, which is considered the foundation of the family.[82]
As the name suggests, marital infidelity presupposes that there is a bond or commitment to which one owes fidelity, but the Court takes notice of non traditional family setups and more modern relationship arrangements in which extramarital entanglements are not equivalent to unfaithfulness. For example, it may be argued, such as in cases of estranged relations and consciously consenting spouses, that not all instances of extramarital relationships inflict mental or emotional suffering to the other spouse. In such situations, it is the Court's view that there is no crime committed as there is a crime only when the acts or omissions cause or are likely to cause mental or emotional suffering upon the wife or her child. In Our view, this interpretation is more in sync with Republic Act No. 9262's main thrust, which is the protection of women and their children. Thus, it is rational to say that it is more concerned with defending them as victims, rather than penalizing offenders, which is merely a consequence of its defensive and protective stance. In other words, Republic Act No. 9262 looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or their child, rather than the motive of the offender.
In sum, We find XXX guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 for committing marital infidelity, thereby inflicting mental and emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA.
Marital infidelity is an act that falls under Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 |
As regards the fourth element, XXX posits that in order to be found liable under Sec. 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, it is required that the anguish be caused by any of the following: (1) acts of public ridicule or humiliation; (2) repeated verbal and emotional abuse; and (3) denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children, or similar acts or omissions. He claims that marital infidelity is not one of the acts mentioned.
We disagree.
As already discussed, the law itself includes marital infidelity as one of the forms of psychological violence.
We approve the pronouncement of the appellate court, quoted below:
Contrary to appellant's claims, however, a reading of the RTC's Decision reveals that the trial court found that his "admission of siring a child with a woman other than his wife was enough to establish the cause of [Donna's] distress." Appellant's contention that the finding of guilt was based on public ridicule or humiliation rather than his extramarital activities appears to be based entirely on the fact that the phrase "public ridicule or humiliation" was written in boldface in a single instance in the assailed Decision, which is an unwarranted conclusion and merits no further discussion.[83]We take this opportunity to issue a reminder that the family is the basic social unit of the community. Marriage, in turn, is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution, whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law.[84] The only "third party" allowed to be involved in contracts of marriage is the State.
We do not wish to restrict couples their freedoms as to the manner of handling their personal affairs, relationships, and issues. However, such freedoms must always be within the bounds of what is acceptable in the eyes of the law and morals.
The State's commitments to upholding marriage as an inviolable social institution and to strengthening the solidarity of the family cannot be invoked to let intimate partner violence go unchecked. In harmonizing these provisions of the Constitution and the law, the Court recognizes that violence against women and their children is a pervasive and enduring societal ill that requires State intervention in the form of Republic Act No. 9262. With its stated aim of protecting women and their children from all forms of domestic violence and threats to their safety and security, Republic Act No. 9262, in turn, reinforces the strength of the marital bond and preserves peace and harmony in the family.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The November 8, 2019 Decision and the June 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner XXX is found GUILTY of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Petitioner is SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Zalameda, Gaerlan, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., see dissent.
Lazaro-Javier, J., see concurrence.
Inting, J., see separate concurring opinion.
M. Lopez, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Rosario,* J., no part.
J. Lopez, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Dimaampao, J., I dissent, joining the dissenting opinion of Justice M. Lopez.
Kho, Jr., J., I join the dissent of Justice M. Lopez.
Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.
[1] In line with the Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9262, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
* No part due to prior participation in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-21.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 137-151. The November 8, 2019 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 167-172. The June 22, 2022 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 was penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[5] RTC records, pp. 101-114 The November 17, 2017 Decision in R-MKT-17-00580-CR was penned by Presiding Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson of Branch 144, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[6] RTC Records, p. 1.
[7] Geographical location is blotted out pursuant to Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015.
[8] "The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members; shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262, An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, effective November 15, 2004." (People v. Dumadag, 667 Phil. 664, 669 [2011]).
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 102.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 103.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 103-104.
[19] Id. at 104.
[20] Id.
[21] Id.
[22] Id. at 105.
[23] Id.
[24] Id.
[25] Id. at 107.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 18.
[29] Id.
[30] Id. at 110.
[31] Id. at 101-114.
[32] Id. at 114.
[33] Id. at 111.
[34] Id. at 112.
[35] Id.
[36] CA rollo, pp. 137-151.
[37] Id. at 151.
[38] Id. at l49-150.
[39] Id. at 152- 156.
[40] United Nations Study of the Secretary General, Ending violence against women: From words to action, 27, (2006).
[41] Id.
[42] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 91 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[43] World Health Organization, Violence Against Women, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/fact sheets/detail/violence-against-women (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[44] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, December 18, 1979, available at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[45] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 19 (1992), par. 1, available at https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[46] Id. at par. 24.
[47] See Universal Declaration of Rights, December 10, 1948, General Assembly resolution 217 A.
[48] Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, December 20, 1993, General Assembly resolution 48/104, art. 1.
[49] Id. at art. 4.
[50] Beijing, Declaration, September 15, 1995, available at http://www.un-documents.net/beijingd.htm (last accessed June 12, 2024), par. 9.
[51] Id. at par. 29.
[52] CONST.; art. II, sec. 14.
[53] 885 Phil. 157 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[54] Id. at 169.
[55] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 5-97 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[56] United Nations Study of the Secretary General, Ending violence against women: From words to action, 43, (2006).
[57] World Health Organization, Violence Against Women, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/fact sheets/detail/violence-against-women (last accessed on June 12, 2024).
[58] Philippine Commission on Women, Estado ni Juana: State of Filipino Women Report, December 31, 2022, p. 41.
[59] Id. at 41-42.
[60] Id. at 50-51.
[61] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[62] Id. at 373.
[63] RTC records, p. 102.
[64] Rollo, p. 15.
[65] Id.
[66] CA rollo, pp. 149-150.
[67] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 18.
[68] RTC records, p. 112.
[69] CA rollo, p. 149.
[70] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division] at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[71] G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021 [Per J. Carandang, First Division].
[72] G.R. No. 263449, November 13, 2023 [Per J. Lopez, J.Y., Second Division].
[73] Id. at 5, citing Mangalino v. People, G.R. No. 250051, February 3, 2020 [Notice, Second Division]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[74] RTC records, p. 112.
[75] C.J. Gesmundo, Reflections dated August 8, 2023, p. 2. [to cite Concurring Opinion once available]
[76] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[77] Id.
[78] J. Inting, Reflections dated October 22, 2023, pp. 13-15. [to cite Concurring Opinion once available]
[79] J. Caguioa, Reflections dated April 15, 2024, pp. 1-4. [to cite Dissenting Opinion once available]
[80] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, p. 9.
[81] Id.
[82] J. Singh, Concurring Opinion, p. 5.
[83] CA rollo, p. 150.
[84] FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
To restore the humanity of our laws in relation to intimate relationships, I dissent.
Infidelity is painful. It can be the most difficult challenge in any relationship. Many of us have gone through it. We know its reality.
Some of our relationships have survived. Some have had to be terminated giving the partners another chance to be in a better place. Some have forgiven. Many have not forgotten.
If we are to be truly human as judges, we have to accept that the acts that constitute fidelity can vary among couples. We need to accept that the causes of infidelity are varied. While none may be justifiable, we also need to be true to our hope that freedom in intimate relationships are the bedrock upon which happiness, meaning, and society are built. We need to read the law as one that provides openings for those who survive their relationships despite infidelities.
With utmost respect, the reading of the law by the slim majority of this Court does not reflect this aspect of our humanity. Regretfully, it misunderstands what intimate relationships often go through.
Reading marital infidelity as criminal per se is unjust.
I acknowledge the existence of patriarchy and the possibility of physical abuse and psychological coercion that can happen in intimate relationships. I acknowledge that in these cases, having the state intervene by making the acts criminal is essentially justifiable. In such cases, it is clear that the relationship has significantly deteriorated to one of power: where the dominant abuses.
In Garcia v. Drilon,[1] I acknowledged that this is generally in heterosexual relationships but I called attention to the possibility that the protection of the State is absent in intimate relationships between men.[2] In Agacid v. People,[3] the Court unanimously applied the provision of this law in an intimate relationship between women.
I cannot, however, in conscience, convict now on the basis of a phrase in the law-marital infidelity-that is vague, infringes on the autonomy of couples to resolve their differences, and stereotypes all women as always victims. Neither can I accept that we criminally punish undefined marital infidelity in the context of our legal order that does not recognize divorce between Filipinos. It is cruel for all those in a relationship. Infidelity in monogamous relationships is a phenomenon that has a lot of causes. It cannot automatically be attributed to an intent to abuse or coerce one of the partners.
Our laws should be interpreted to have a more mature understanding of the complexities of intimate relationships. We should avoid a doctrinal interpretation of morality of only one dominant religion.
There is no dispute that petitioner XXX strayed from the marital relationship. Neither is there doubt that his wife AAA experienced excruciating pain upon learning of his indiscretion. But there being no evidence that he did so precisely to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his wife, I am of the view that petitioner's infidelity is not psychological violence within the meaning of the law.
My vote is for XXX's acquittal.
The majority thoroughly discussed the historical and social background surrounding Republic Act No. 9262,[4] stating that the statute is a piece of social legislation created to address the worsening rates of crimes against women in the Philippines.[5] According to the majority, the goal of the law is to achieve equality by eliminating violence against women and their children.[6]
The majority then interpreted "marital infidelity" as a mode of committing violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It held that marital infidelity, regardless of the circumstances, is criminally punished under Republic Act No. 9262.[7] The majority differentiated "marital infidelity" from another mode of committing a violation of Section 5(i)-"denial of financial support"-declaring that specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is presumed in marital infidelity. It explained that, unlike denial of financial support, marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms.[8]
Ultimately, it affirmed XXX's conviction of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
I join the majority in recognizing the importance of Republic Act No. 9262 as a progressive step towards equality. Patriarchal ideology has long enabled the systemic oppression of women and their treatment as less than men, especially within the context of intimate relationships. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262, more and more women are now aware that they are equal to men before the law; and that they do not deserve any form of violence by reason of their sex.
The laudable purpose behind Republic Act No. 9262 notwithstanding, I cannot accept the majority's ruling. I remain of the view that marital infidelity, in and of itself, is not a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 absent a showing of intent to cause mental or emotional anguish on the victim.
The mention of marital infidelity in the law is vague. For reference, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is reproduced below:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:A reading of Section 5(i) will reveal that it does not include "marital infidelity" as an example of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." While it is true that the enumeration of the modes of committing a violation of Section 5(i) is not exclusive, with the use of the words "including, but not limited to"; and that Section 3(a)(C)[9] of the same law mentions "marital infidelity" in defining "psychological violence," still, it is Section 5(i), not Section 3(a)(C) that enumerates the acts explicitly considered as crimes under Republic Act No. 9262.[10] Therefore, it is not even clear if marital infidelity, in and of itself, is a crime under Republic Act No. 9262. My position is that it cannot be so.
First, the Revised Penal Code already clearly defines the crimes of adultery and concubinage.[11] Both crimes involve sexual intercourse. In contrast, the law is devoid of any explanation as to what constitutes marital infidelity. The Legislative cannot be assumed to have enacted a law that punishes the exact same crime. Thus, marital infidelity must mean something beyond adultery, concubinage, or sexual intercourse.
Marital infidelity may mean different things. It implies more than just a sexual act. It can be going out on a date with a former lover. It can be visiting so-called massage parlors or gentlemen's clubs. It can be receiving lap dances. It can even be watching pornography. It can also be the spouse carrying out a relationship with another of their same sex. These acts may elicit different reactions depending on who you ask. Some might say these constitute infidelity. Some may say that it is infidelity only if an emotional attachment is formed. Others might say it is infidelity only when it becomes habitual. Others may tolerate if the other spouse becomes intimate with one of their similar sex. Still, others might react entirely differently or with a permutation of the foregoing.
Marital infidelity was not defined in the law as strictly being sexual. Even if we read it to mean sexual, what is sexual can include a whole spectrum, from sharing intimate glances to intercourse.
Second, marital infidelity is ultimately a question of boundaries-boundaries that ought to be set between each couple.[12] Couples should first agree on what constitutes marital infidelity for them. This is a conversation in which the State and its prosecutors take no part. However, openly negotiating these decisions are not common in our culture or laws. More often, they are discussed only when one spouse's idea of fidelity is breached. At that point, emotions are running high. With the addition of criminalizing mere marital infidelity, peaceful resolutions seem improbable. With the interpretation of the majority, the State and its prosecutors are invited into the most intimate corners of a marriage.
Third, marital infidelity in the law is vague because there may be many reasons for its commission. Without recognizing the following as licenses for infidelity, we acknowledge that they are possible causes. Marital infidelity may indeed be committed to hurt the other spouse without necessarily constituting psychological coercion. It can happen at a time of weakness. For instance, research shows that husbands who earn less than their wives are more prone to straying from the marital relationship, the reason being that they need to prove their masculinity in ways other than providing financial support to the family.[13] While being outearned by one's wife is definitely not an excuse to cheat, the research nevertheless shows that marital infidelity may be committed for reasons other than causing mental and emotional anguish on the wife. In the case of the outearned husband, he may stray to fill a gaping hole in his perceived identity.
Marital infidelity may be prompted by loneliness, as with the case of a couple where one spouse is an overseas Filipino worker. One might commit marital infidelity to address a perceived gap in the relationship. Nobody possesses all the qualities that the other desires. Lack of communication might lead one spouse to seek from another person a characteristic missing from the other spouse. Even if marital infidelity was committed to hurt the other spouse, it may be a way of communicating needs. Marital infidelity may be an indication that emotions are fading, or that the relationship should be extinguished, or one is simply not built for monogamy.
The vague definition of marital infidelity is more cruel in light of the absence of divorce in our legal system. Tan-Andal v. Andal[14] may offer some relief, but this option is still lengthy, difficult, and inaccessible to many. Unhappy spouses imprisoned in marriages now become vulnerable to criminal complaints. To reiterate, I do not seek to justify the causes of marital infidelity but to demonstrate that there may be many motivations behind it. We draw a hard line between these and domestic violence.
The constitutionality of the provision on marital infidelity is suspect due its vagueness, but this matter was not raised here. Still, the Court must refrain from interpreting the law in such a way as to make it unconstitutional.
The interpretation of the law that is ascribed by the majority infringes on the autonomy of spouses.
To criminalize all acts that cause mental and emotional anguish as "psychological violence" will foreclose any chance for reconciliation between the parties. This infringes on the autonomy of spouses to resolve their differences on their own accord. It is worth noting at this point that psychological violence, like all acts of violence against women and their children under Republic Act No. 9262, is a public crime.[15] As such, it may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime.[16]
In contrast, adultery and concubinage may only be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.[17] Neither may criminal liability for adultery and concubinage be sought if the offended party consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.[18]
Once the prosecution of the criminal case for psychological violence is commenced in court, they cannot be compromised by the spouses. When the case is filed, the State intervenes. The conflict will be out of the control of the parties, foreclosing any chance of reconciliation between the parties. A subsequent conviction will bring about shame and stigma, which will further estrange the parties from each other.
If the spouses are able to reconcile prior to the filing of a complaint, a prescriptive period of 10 years will still loom over their marriage.[19] Despite any compromise, the innocent spouse may renege on the agreement. A complaint may still be filed as retaliation.
In addition to the autonomy of spouses to resolve their issues, spouses. ought to enjoy autonomy to set the terms of their relationship. Monogamy, the practice of having one partner at a time, began as an "externally imposed system of control over women's reproduction."[20] It had nothing to do with love and everything to do with lineage and property.[21] But as the institution of marriage evolved to be the "love-based marriage"[22] that we know today, the "ideal of the faithful couple"[23] emerged. Fidelity eventually became the boundary in intimate relationships.[24]
Yet monogamy is not always the reality for all couples, as there are views that monogamy is unnatural and against human nature.[25] There are intimate partners who agree to consensual and ethical nonmonogamy, where they are free to sexually engage with others outside of their relationship, so long as it is with the consent of the other. Some scholars suggest approaching "monogamy not as a given but as a choice."[26] Meanwhile, other couples simply agree to live separately considering the difficulty of obtaining annulments, decrees of absolute nullity, or legal separation. Ethical nonmonogamy is possible, and it should be up to the spouses to decide.
Also, punishing marital infidelity, without regard to intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, reinforces heteronormativity. It bears stressing that Republic Act No. 9262 is broadly worded to apply to different kinds of relationships. In Garcia, the Court ruled that:
VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.[27]However, due to the present state of our marriage laws, marital infidelity is limited to married men and women. Thus, psychological violence through sexual infidelity in other relationships are not similarly punished in Republic Act No. 9262. This aggravates the exclusion and underrepresentation of gender and sexual minorities in our society:
Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative, gender identities that are transgender or fluid, or gender expressions that are not the usual manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural binaries-the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other gender and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+) community-have suffered enough marginalization and discrimination within our society.[28]
In our desire to rid our culture of patriarchy, we should be careful not to stereotype all women as victims. Likewise, we should not typecast all men who commit infidelity as abusers.
Domestic violence should be treated as a power issue, not a gender issue.[29]
The majority's interpretation may allow a wife to use Republic Act No. 9262 and file a criminal complaint for psychological violence against her husband, even if the husband did not intend to cause mental or emotional suffering on her. She may even file a case under Section 5(i) even if she is actually indifferent to her husband's infidelity. This shows that, without requiring proof of deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, marital infidelity could be abused to control or punish individuals within a marriage, allowing citizens to utilize the strong arm of the law for private slights. This, in turn, exacerbates power imbalances and situations of domestic violence.
Infidelity is a human act. It is possible among men and women. There is no biological basis that only men can become disloyal. For the same reasons discussed above, women can also commit marital infidelity. It may also be that the disloyalty by the wife is done not merely to abuse and subject the husband to psychological harm but for some other reason.
We should not unreasonably typecast all marital infidelity by the husband as beyond repair. That is exactly what we do when we make it a criminal act. Spouses should be encouraged to find a fair resolution to marital infidelity, regardless if the infidelity is done by a husband or a wife or both. Finding a resolution, whether it is to move on in a relationship or rescinding that relationship, is not necessarily a vestige of patriarchy that the law must protect against.
It is imperative to consider all the circumstances surrounding the marital infidelity, especially intent. Section 5(i) must be read to require deliberate intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the woman or her child. As examples of causing mental or emotional anguish, Section 5(i) cites "repeated verbal or emotional abuse" as well as "denial of financial support or custody of minor children" or "denial of access to the woman's child/children," all of which connote willfulness. Specifically, for "denial of financial support," it is already settled in Acharon v. People[30] that deliberate intent to withhold financial support for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish must be proved to establish a Section 5(i) violation.[31] Consequently, instances where the accused merely failed or is unable to provide financial support are not considered psychological violence, even if the woman experienced mental or emotional anguish.[32]
The majority in this case holds that "specific criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of infidelity."[33] In other words, deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is presumed upon the commission of the marital infidelity, because, according to the majority, it is "inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms."[34]
With respect, I disagree.
Like denial of financial support, marital infidelity is just one of the numerous modes of committing the same crime, i.e., psychological violence. If proof of deliberate intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is required in one mode, then there is no reason why deliberate intent should be outrightly presumed in the other. Nothing in Republic Act No. 9262 warrants this "presumed intent" in cases of marital infidelity, especially since the modes specifically enumerated in Section 5(i) all require willfulness and deliberate intent.
The majority's analogy between marital infidelity and crimes against persons that involve killing is not proper. In murder or homicide, intent to kill is conclusively presumed when the victim dies "because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act."[35] The killing of another is universally considered evil. It is to literally deprive someone of the most fundamental and sacred of human rights-the right to life.
Marital infidelity is not an inherently universally unlawful act. In the Asia-Pacific Region, the Philippines is only one of three other countries that criminalizes marital infidelity, more particularly, adultery.[36] Notably, all European countries already decriminalized marital infidelity.[37]
Even the "prevailing societal, cultural, or religious norms"[38] that marital infidelity allegedly infringes are not universal. While the majority makes no mention of what these norms are, these obviously relate to Christian doctrine, specifically, the Christian practice of monogamy. The ruling in this case imposes the morality of a dominant religion on others who may not want to be bound by these norms. In the absence of divorce in Philippine jurisdiction-another influence of Christian doctrine on our secular laws, hence, contrary to the separation of Church and State-I cannot accept that marital infidelity may be presumed immoral.
For the State to truly value the dignity of every human person,[39] the Legislative, in making anti-violence against women and children laws, has to take into account all relationship permutations possible. Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 assumes that marital infidelity causes mental and emotional anguish. This may be true for others, but not for all, as was recognized by this Court in AAA v. BBB.[40] In that case, this Court said that "depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the [other spouse]."[41]
To determine what should be criminalized then, we should go back to the definition of a "crime." A crime is a "breach of the security and peace of the people at large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the State."[42] A review of criminal cases involving psychological violence through marital infidelity will reveal that this Court equates marital infidelity to sexual infidelity.[43] It is my view, however, that marital infidelity is an issue that has no bearing to society at large and, therefore, should not be punished as a crime. In a long line of cases, this Court has recognized that the mental or emotional anguish caused by sexual marital infidelity is highly personal to the offended party.[44]
Therefore, instead of punishing marital infidelity for the hurt feelings caused to a party, it should be punished if it is used as a coercive control tactic. It should be a crime only when it is used to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner, thereby infringing on the autonomy and agency of the other and maintaining the power imbalance between the couple.
An example would be a case where the partner consistently engages in extramarital affairs to manipulate and control the other. The unfaithful partner may intentionally flaunt their affairs, openly discuss them, or even threaten to leave the relationship if the other partner does not comply with their demands. In such cases, it is not the infidelity that is punished but the use of fear, insecurity, and dependence on the other partner, making them more likely to give in to the manipulative partner's wishes to avoid the potential loss of the relationship. In this context, infidelity becomes abuse, an affront on the inherent dignity of every of human person. It is the manipulative act, the abuse, that should be criminal.
Thus, XXX should be acquitted. There is no proof that he, in fathering a child with another woman after a one-night stand, did so to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his wife AAA or otherwise control or exert dominance over her.
I do not doubt that AAA experienced emotional anguish upon learning that her husband fathered a child with another woman. However, under the law, emotional anguish is not enough for conviction for psychological violence. Deliberate intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish should be shown.
If a legal action is really needed by the spouse who suffers, there is no lack of cause of action. The acquittal does not mean that he cannot be held legally accountable for his actions. Under Article 68[45] of the Family Code, spouses are obliged to observe mutual fidelity. He certainly did not comply with this essential marital obligation.
Under Article 55[46] of the Family Code, a petition for legal separation may be filed if the marital infidelity can be proven to be sexual in nature. If it can be proven that the marital infidelity is a manifestation of psychological incapacity, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36[47] of the Family Code may likewise be filed. Furthermore, a complaint for damages under Article 26[48] of the Civil Code may be filed against the alleged paramour for meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of the offended spouse.
Infidelity is already painful. We should not add to the pain by feeding into the meaningless desire for revenge by incarcerating the human offender. Those in intimate relationships regardless of legal status should be given as much freedom to resolve their differences and to find ways forward. If not, the couple and their family should be given the kindness, by our laws, to have their marriage declared void, to divorce and permanently separate.
Laws should not impose the morality of those belonging to a dominant belief. To do so is plainly unethical. To do so is to encourage a simplistic view of what it is to relate intimately with another individual. To do so is also plainly unjust.
Love is complex. It is unique to individuals in love. The State-in whatever incarnation of any law-will never be able to fully imagine or understand what it means for two unique individuals to survive love or to let go. How to love and how to un-love are both first freedoms that should be protected against the intervention of the state. We continually discover ourselves as we go through all that is there in our intimate relationships.
Infidelity should trigger accountability. Infidelity is an occasion for the one who betrays to introspect. Infidelity provides the couple precious moments to reevaluate the complexity of themselves in a relationship. Thus, even all marital infidelity, should never be dangerously caricatured by the interpretation of the majority into a crime.
At least, in this case, it should not be.
FOR THESE REASONS, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari and SET ASIDE the November 8, 2019 Decision and June 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938. Petitioner XXX must be ACQUITTED of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[2] Id. at 171-172.
[3] G.R. No. 242133, April 16, 2024 [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[4] Ponencia, pp. 7-10.
[5] Id. at 10.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 11.
[8] Id. at 15-16.
[9] Republic Act. No. 9262 (2004), sec. 3(a)(C) provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
....
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
[10] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in XXX v. People, G.R. No. 263449, November 13, 2023 [Per J. J. Lopez, Second Division].
[11] REV. PEN. CODE, arts. 333 and 334.
[12] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 272-273 (2007).
[13] American Sociological Association, Men more likely to cheat if they are economically dependent on their female partners, study finds, August 18, 2010, available at www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/08/100816095617.htm (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[14] 901 Phil. 558 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[15] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 25.
[16] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 25.
[17] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5.
[18] RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 5.
[19] Republic Act. No. 9262 (2004), sec. 24 provides:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. - Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(l) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
[20] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 178 (2007).
[21] Id.
[22] Feeld, Exclusive Relationships: The History of Monogamy, June 20, 2022, available at https://feeld.com/magazine/playbook/monogamy (last accessed on August 4, 2024).
[23] Id.
[24] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 176 (2007).
[25] ESTHER PEREL, THE STATE OF AFFAIRS, RETHINKING INFIDELITY 255-257 (2017). See also ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 275-276 (2007).
[26] ESTHER PEREL, MATING IN CAPTIVITY 199 (2007).
[27] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 103-104 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[28] Falcis v. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388, 413 (2019) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[29] Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 171 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[30] 913 Phil. 731 (2021) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[31] Id. at 737-739.
[32] Id.
[33] Ponencia, p. 15.
[34] Id. at 15-16.
[35] Abdulla v. People, 495 Phil. 70, 80 (2005) (Per J. Garcia, Third Division].
[36] See Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[37] Id.
[38] Ponencia, p. 16.
[39] CONST., art. ii, sec. 11.
[40] 823 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[41] Id. at 620.
[42] See Baviera v. Paglinawan, 544 Phil. 107, 119 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division].
[43] See XXX v. People, G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division]; XXX v. People, 887 Phil. 161 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division]; Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607(2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[44] See XXX v. People, G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division]; Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; Reyes v. People, 855 Phil. 991, 1004 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; AAA v. People, 844 Phil. 213, 222 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division]; AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[45] FAMILY CODE, art. 68 provides:
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[46] FAMILY CODE, art. 55(8) provides:
ARTICLE 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion[.]
See also Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
[47] FAMILY CODE, art. 36, as amended by Executive Order No. 227 (1987), provides:
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
[48] CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
....
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another[.]
See also Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code Provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 1, 2024).
G.R. No. 252739 - XXX,* Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
"Teacher, this woman was caught in the act of adultery. In the Law Moses commanded us to stone such women. Now what do you say?"[1]The male counterpart in the story is not known to us, but the facts of the case unwittingly serve to complete the picture. Had the Pharisees caught the man in the act of adultery, the majority's answer to the Pharisees' question would be a resounding affirmative-stone him to death as well. The majority opine that the State has the right to prosecute and incarcerate a husband who fails to be faithful to his wife. In their view: male marital infidelity amounts to psychological violence and erring husbands ought to be incarcerated for such behavior over and above concubinage in the Revised Penal Code. And despite their colorful rhetoric of progress and empowerment, the majority have ironically returned to the Law of Moses as their ratio decidendi, reminiscent of a time where adulterers are put to death,[2] except that we have already abolished the death penalty that was deemed to be inhumane. The majority might as well lift and paraphrase the relevant verse from Deuteronomy as the ponencia's doctrine: "If a man is found sleeping with another man's wife, both the man who slept with her and the woman must die. You must purge the evil from [the Philippines]."[3]
I dissent.
It is of no moment that Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children (VAWC) Act of 2004"[4] does not define "marital infidelity" or any reason why "infidelity" is limited to marriage. With the majority's opinion, it is high time to consider how far the feminist pendulum has swung and ponder on the consequences.
Marital infidelity, without more, does not, and cannot, automatically translate into a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. I thus strongly dissent with the ponencia in convicting petitioner XXX of the charge against him. The evidence of the prosecution simply failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that XXX violated Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by causing psychological violence upon his wife, AAA.
Marital infidelity per se is not penalized under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262
a. |
Intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation upon the victim is an essential element of the offense |
Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to address the social problem of domestic violence; whose usual and likely victims are women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, Republic Act No. 9262 aims to protect women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security in keeping with the State's obligation to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 provided an. encompassing definition of "violence against women and their children" in an attempt to protect women from the different kinds of violence they experience or are vulnerable to while being in an intimate relationship.[5] Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 reads:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,Despite the encompassing definition of physical, sexual, psychological, and economic violence under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5 thereof, the penal provision of the law, limited what may constitute criminal violations of the law.
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
- "Physical violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
- "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
- "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
- "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
- withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
- deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
- destroying household property;
- controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 states:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:Plainly, Section 5 is the implementation of the classifications of violence against women already identified and defined under Section 3. Sections 5(a) to 5(d) seek to protect women and their children from physical violence, 5(f), 5(h) and 5(i) from psychological violence, 5(g) from physical and sexual violence, and 5(e) from a mixture of all types of violence that attempts to control the woman or make her lose her agency.
In addition, it is apparent from the terms employed in Section 5, e.g., causing, threatening, placing, inflicting, engaging, that the acts punished are intentional in character. In other words, the presence of evil intent is precisely what transforms these acts or omissions into the "crime of violence against women and their children." The crime is essentially "dolo" in nature-there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.[6] Thus, while the law employs broad definitions of the different kinds of violence, the penal provisions of the law cover only those acts in which violence of whatever character is intentionally inflicted upon the woman.
In this case, XXX was charged and convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals of psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity, under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, committed as follows:
On July 19, 2016[,] or prior thereto, in the [C]ity of Makati, the Philippines, [XXX], being the husband of complainant [AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish, in violation of the aforesaid law.A perusal of Section 5(i), as well as related jurisprudence, is thus imperative in order for the Court to properly rule on the guilt or innocence of XXX.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
As above quoted, Section 5(i) considers a crime of psychological violence against women and children the act of "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children."
In Dinamling v. People,[8] the Court explained that the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the woman and the acts of the offender constituting psychological violence which caused such mental or emotional anguish are two (2) distinct elements of the crime that the prosecution must separately prove beyond reasonable doubt:
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.[9] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)In other words, to sustain a conviction for violation of Section 5(i), it is not enough to establish that the acts complained of constitute psychological violence, there must be concomitant proof that the woman experienced mental or emotional anguish as a result of such acts of violence. Conversely, proving that the woman suffered mental or emotional anguish does not automatically equate to already proving that the acts complained of amount to psychological violence defined and punished under Section 5(i).
In the recent En Banc case of Achcron v. People[10] (Acharon), the Court underscored that crimes penalized in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are crimes mala in se. As such, there must be a specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman to constitute a violation of Section 5(i). Stated differently, without any proof that the accused had intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the victim, the acts complained of will not give rise to any criminal liability under Section 5(i). The rationale for this principle is elucidated by the Court in Acharon as follows:
From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.It must be remembered that in Acharon-promulgated just in November of 2021-the Court En Banc unanimously voted for the acquittal of the accused therein because the prosecution failed to prove intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on the part of the accused.
In this connection, the Court deems it proper to clarify, as Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier [(Justice Lazaro-Javier)] and Mario V. Lopez pointed out in their respective Opinions that the crimes penalized under Section 5(i) and 5(e) of [Republic Act No.] 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita, even though [Republic Act No.] 9262 is a special penal law. The acts punished therein are inherently wrong or depraved, and the language used under the said penal law requires a mental element. Being a crime mala in se, there must thus be a concurrence of both actus reus and mens rea to constitute the crime. "Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind or criminal intent accompanying the actus reus."
It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. In other words, the actus reus of the offense under Section 5(i) is the willful denial of financial support, while the mens rea is the intention to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman. Both must thus exist and be proven in court before a person may be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262.
"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.[11] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Following Acharon, the "evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause the victim, mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule or humiliation"[12] with marital infidelity as the weapon of choice. Therefore, the elements of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, insofar as the same deals with marital infidelity, are as follows:
This means that marital infidelity per se is not punished by Republic Act No. 9262. To be sure, this act is already, and properly, punished by the Revised Penal Code in its articles on Adultery and Concubinage. What is punished by Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 is the infliction of psychological violence where purpose or intention is indispensable.
In fact, in an earlier case, the Court had already made a categorical ruling that marital infidelity per se is not what Republic Act No. 9262 penalizes but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering upon the victim. In AAA v. BBB,[13] the Court said:
[W]hat [Republic Act No.] 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.[14] (Emphasis supplied)As applied to this case, for XXX to be convicted of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the prosecution's evidence must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that XXX intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon AAA with marital infidelity as a weapon of choice to accomplish such purpose. In other words, XXX must have intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon AAA (mens rea) specifically by willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously committing "marital infidelity" (actus reus). Only with the concurrence of these two (2) things established by proof beyond reasonable doubt can conviction of XXX be warranted.
b. |
Acharon squarely applies to this case; ruling that specific intent is immaterial contradicts the plain language of the law and renders the crime subjective |
As every student of constitutional law knows, "[i]t is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule."[15] The fundamental duty of a court is to interpret the law as it is and not as it should be. Here the majority renege on this duty by interpreting Republic Act No. 9262 based on their presumptions and beliefs of what it should be and not based on what the language of the law per se provides. For one, the majority reject the application to the present case of the doctrine in Acharon, which similarly involves a violation of Section 5(i). The majority believe that Section 5(i) must be qualified when it comes to marital infidelity such that intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial. In effect, the majority are carving out from Acharon psychological violence under Section 5(i), committed through marital infidelity, by considering it as a crime malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
During the deliberations of this case, it was opined that for cases of marital infidelity under Section 5(i), the specific criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the woman is irrelevant. Thus, in keeping with the intent of Republic Act No. 9262) which is the protection of women and children, proof that the woman suffered mental or emotional anguish due to the acts committed by the accused suffices to hold a person criminally liable. Hence, for psychological violence through marital infidelity, the Court should disregard the specific criminal intent to commit the crime.[16]
It was also posited that criminal intent is irrelevant to constitute a violation of Section 5(i). Consequently, it was opined that Acharon is inapplicable to this case because the former involves the deprivation of financial support. Further, considering that Section 5(i) does not use the term "deliberate," "knowingly," "for the purpose of," specific intent is, therefore, not required. Instead, what the law merely looks at is the consequence, effect or actual harm suffered by the victim.[17]
I strongly disagree.
To my mind, ruling that specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial in cases of psychological violence through marital infidelity under Section 5(i), but relevant in other cases as in deprivation of financial support in Acharon, is completely baseless and unwarranted nitpicking. More importantly, it violates the fundamental rule that all penal statutes shall be construed in favor of the accused.
The language of the law does not make such distinction; thus, courts should also refrain from making distinctions. If the Court were to hold that specific intent is irrelevant to prosecute violations of Section 5(i) only with respect to marital infidelity, it would, in effect, be ruling that marital infidelity per se is punished by Republic Act No. 9262, which is not the case. As earlier emphasized, this act is already, and properly punished by the Revised Penal Code. In contrast, and at the risk of being repetitive, what is punished by Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 is the purpose or intention to inflict psychological violence.
Moreover, the discussions in Acharon are on all fours with this case as both cases deal with the same provision of law-Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. It would be the height of incongruence for the Court to say that a penal provision would have different constitutive elements depending on the circumstances. Every crime, every penal provision, has a standard set of elements: all of which must be present for guilt beyond reasonable doubt to be established. And to reiterate, what Section 5(i) punishes is the act of "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" with the enumerated examples of doing so (e.g., repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children) being merely the weapons of choice.[18] The Court thus cannot make a distinction between denial of financial support, on the one hand, and marital infidelity, on the other, for purposes of determining whether a person is guilty of violating Section 5(i). Republic Act No. 9262. In each and every case involving said provision, the Court has to be assured that intentional causing of mental or emotional anguish is present before conviction may be had.
Thus, while Acharon involves deprivation of financial support as the "weapon of choice" to commit psychological violence, the Court's ruling therein squarely applies to this case. To be sure, the Court's pronouncement in Acharon as to the requisite specific intent for Section 5(i) is all encompassing. The Court categorically said, in recognition of the respective Opinions of Justices Lazaro-Javier and Mario V. Lopez in Acharon, "that the crimes penalized under Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262 are mala in se, not mala prohibita,"[19] which includes psychological violence through marital infidelity. Being a crime mala in se, there must be concurrence between the acts complained of and the accompanying criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the victim.
As explained in Acharon, the specific acts penalized by Republic Act No. 9262 as defined under Section 5[20] pertain to various forms of violence which the law aims to protect women from-such as physical violence under Sections 5(a) to 5(d), psychological violence under Sections 5(f), 5(h) and 5(i), physical and sexual violence under Section 5(g), and economic abuse under Section 5(e). Undoubtedly, all these acts are vile and inherently immoral. Punishable acts or omissions that are immoral by nature, are considered crimes mala in se. The absence of the terms "deliberate," "knowingly," or "for the purpose of" does not necessarily mean that the crime is not mala in se. For example, no such words appear in the crimes of homicide and serious illegal detention and yet the element of intent to kill or deprive of liberty is without controversy. On the other hand, acts that are not inherently immoral, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, are crimes mala prohibita.[21] The rule on the subject is, unlike in acts mala prohibita, where the intent of the offender is immaterial, in acts mala in se, intent to commit the crime governs.[22] For violation of Section 5(i), the intent necessary to give rise to criminal liability is expressed therein-"to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child."
In this connection, the ponencia suggests that intent to cause mental and emotional anguish may be conclusively presumed from the act of committing marital infidelity. To support this novel theory, the ponencia draws the absurd analogy between homicide and marital infidelity, to wit:
To further illustrate, it can be said that one who kills another person-an inherently vile act-will generally be found guilty, barring all justifications, as long as specific intent to kill is proven. Intent to kill, in turn, is conclusively presumed from the fact of the victim's death, thereby completing the ingredients of the crime.This is a false analogy.[24] Simply because two crimes are "inherently vile" does not give license to transpose rules from one crime to the other. In homicide, there is a metaphysical union between the actor, the object or act, the victim, and the effect. A man (the actor) deliberately picks up and fires a gun (the object or act) at a woman (the victim) and, as a result, the latter dies (the effect). Did the man intend to cause the woman's death? Obviously, all human reason suggests so. Compare this scenario with a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. XXX (a married man) had sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife and then concealed the same from AAA. The intent to have sexual intercourse with a woman other than his wife can be inferred from the act of sexual intercourse. But intent to cause mental or emotional anguish under Republic Act No. 9262 does not reasonably follow from the act of sexual intercourse with another woman. There is hardly any metaphysical connection to use as a foundation for any inference.
Applied to the present case, can it also be said that the specific intent to cause mental and emotional anguish upon the victim may be conclusively presumed from the fact of infidelity itself?
The Court firmly believes so.[23]
The ponencia, however, poses a question: "What else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?" Here, the ponencia ironically perhaps thinks too highly of men-it is more probable that the husband was not expecting anything at all, as the latter has been blinded by lust.
In this regard, the ponencia poses the challenge to flesh out how marital infidelity can be used as a means to cause mental and emotional anguish. Consider this: a husband commits marital infidelity but, unlike XXX, videotapes his act of coitus with his mistress and sends a copy thereof to his spouse, or of a man who openly publicizes his extramarital affair in front of his wife. In these scenarios, as opposed to XXX's case where intent to cause mental or emotional anguish was drawn by the majority out of thin air, specific intent to cause mental and emotional anguish can easily be discerned from the acts of the erring husband.
That said, worthy of note as well is that Section 5 does not only enumerate specific acts of violence committed against the woman or child, it also describes the circumstances or context upon which such acts must be performed to give rise to criminal liability. For instance, as illustrated in Acharon, the act of denying financial support is not per se penalized by Republic Act No. 9262. What makes it punishable under Republic Act No. 9262 is the existence of the circumstances or context under which the act of deprivation of financial support was employed by the accused. In Acharon, the Court further noted that deprivation of financial support is both covered under Sections 5(e) and 5(i). What makes the act of denying financial support punishable under Section 5(e) and not under Section 5(i) is the specific intent, as described in Section 5(e), of controlling or restricting the woman's and/or the child's or her children's actions or decisions. On the other hand, denial of financial support becomes punishable under Section 5(i) only when such was done with intent to inflict upon the woman or child mental or emotional anguish, as described in Section 5(i). Clearly, specific intent is a material and relevant element in determining first, whether the act is punishable by Republic Act No. 9262 and, second, in some cases, under which paragraph of Section 5 the complained act falls.
Construing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, in relation to a marital infidelity, as malum prohibitum raises several issues. To begin with, it would be contrary to the plain language of the law. To stress anew, it is not the commission of marital infidelity that is punished, but the "[c]ausing [of] mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child"-this is the overt act punished by the law. The Court need not look further than in Section 5's other subsections as proof that this offense is intentional in nature.
An interpretation that Section 5(i) is malum prohibitum likewise substantially deviates from the meaning of other subsections under Section 5. Indeed, as discussed above, the verbs used by each of the nine (9) acts under Section 5 are intentional in nature as it would be absurd to consider them as "accidental." Intentionality is implied by the use of words such as "purposeful," "causing" and "threatening." The law thus punishes offenders whose objective is to inflict violence upon the woman or her child by various means. Consequently, the foregoing acts require intentionality simply because the contrary would result in absurdity. For instance, if the family goes on a trip (which the husband planned) but is then kidnapped by malefactors, is the husband guilty under Section 5(d) for accidentally "[p]lacing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm"? What if the husband is driving and forgets to check the tire pressure that results in a crash and injuries to the wife and child. Is the husband liable under Section 5(a) for negligently "[c]ausing physical harm to the woman or her child?" Precisely, adopting the ponencia's view gives rise to these absurdities. To repeat, intent to inflict physical, emotional, sexual, psychological, or economic abuse upon the woman or child victim is an essential element of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
I also underscore that removing the element of specific intent from Section 5(i) does not only go against the plain language of the law, it likewise makes the crime completely subjective. To illustrate its subjectiveness, the ponencia reads in relevant part:
Thus, in ascertaining whether the third element is satisfied or not in cases involving marital infidelity, the question to be asked therefore is this: did the woman or their child suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the acts committed by the offender? If the answer is yes, then the third element already exists. The husband's intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the wife or her child is already presumed upon the husband's mere commission of the act of marital infidelity. Another observation that supports this pronouncement is the way the statute is worded: a closer look will reveal that the provision deliberately chose the phrasing "causing mental or emotional anguish" perhaps to highlight the idea as discussed above, and without regard to the intent of the offender. Otherwise, the law could have simply made an explicit requirement that the offender intended to cause such mental or emotional harm. However, it did not.[25] (Emphasis in the original)If proof that the woman suffered mental or emotional anguish is to be considered the gravamen of Section 5(i), then the determination of whether the crime is committed is no longer based on the overt acts of the accused but on the personal disposition and circumstances of the victim. Effectively, the guilt of the accused will be at the mercy of, and solely to be adjudged by, the allegations of the victim. This is a dangerous reading and application of a criminal statute. It is the law that determines whether an act is criminalized, not the personal feelings of the aggrieved party. XXX can only be held liable for his own acts or omissions.
In addition, the individual experience of the complainant cannot be the determinative factor for violations of Section 5(i), for doing so would effectively allow Section 5(i) to criminalize a host of other acts that are normally part of being in an intimate relationship. For example, if a husband continuously fails to put down the toilet seat despite having been repeatedly reminded to do so, and the wife experiences emotional anguish as a result because she feels that her husband does not listen to her, does this already constitute a violation of Section 5(i)? Using the majority's ruling of the present case, the answer is a resounding yes; it is a violation of Section 5(i) for, after all, all that is required is to do an act that causes mental or emotional anguish. Another example would be if a boyfriend decides to break up with his girlfriend-a relationship still covered by Republic Act No. 9262 as the law covers sexual or dating relationships, not just marriage-would this constitute a violation of Section 5(i)? Again, using the majority's reasoning, it will likewise be a violation since logic and experience dictate that going through a breakup is a source of mental or emotional anguish. Lastly, would a 20-year-old man be penalized under Section 5(i) if he finds himself genuinely falling in love with another girl, thereby causing mental and emotional anguish to his current girlfriend? Following the majority's reasoning again, the answer would be in the affirmative.
Clearly, this is a dangerous precedent. By redefining the elements of violation of Section 5(i) to only, essentially, be the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the victim, the majority is putting not just an accused in a disadvantageous position, but also relationships and families in a vulnerable state.
Simply put, it cannot be said that doing an act which will naturally cause emotional anguish to one's partner already constitutes "violence" that may be punished by the law. Once again, what makes an act punishable under the statute-like most Philippine criminal laws-is the intent of the offender.
The ponencia asserts on one hand that a man's specific intent is "purely a mental process" that may not be "demonstrated externally"-proof of which would render "enforcement of the law ... difficult, if not impossible;' and yet, on the other hand, the ponencia is unwilling to apply this same standard to a victim is testimony on her "mental and emotional anguish." Is the latter not a "mental process" as well? Wh&t all this amounts to is simple hypocrisy and virtue-signaling, which was exemplified by the majority when they decided to carve out marital infidelity from the ratio decidendi in Acharon. In Acharon, those in the majority required proof of specific intent with respect to all other offenses covered by Section 5(i) without ever considering the "impracticality" or how doing so will "weaponize" "subjectivity."
As illustrated above, to rule that proof of the victim's suffering determines the guilt and liability of the accused for violation of Section 5(i), without regard to whether the complained act was done for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish, will open a pandora's box of criminal suits and convictions not even contemplated by Republic Act No. 9262. All mistakes, intentional or unintentional, which naturally causes a woman mental or emotional anguish become a criminal offense and will subject a man to incarceration. While Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to protect and empower women, it was never meant to be used as a weapon for women to chastise their partners for every error or mistake committed in their relationships.
This slippery slope has been precisely opened by some members of the Court. In fact, as stated at the outset, the term "marital infidelity" itself is not defined in Republic Act No. 9262. Republic Act No. 9262 neither states that "marital infidelity" is a husband having sexual intercourse with a woman who is not his wife, nor does it state that ''marital infidelity" includes having lustful thoughts over a woman who is not his wife. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 9262 does it state the nature extent and/or duration of "marital infidelity" and there is no test provided in the statute for the Courts to use and apply. On this point, the Court in People v. Dela Piedra,[26] declared:
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will 1ender them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.[27] (Citations omitted)If the Court were to rule that specific intent is not an element of the offense under Section 5, then the nature, extent, and duration of "marital infidelity" covered by Section 5(i) will effectively be up to the private complainant. By what standard, then, is the Court to decide when the following situations suffice to send the offender-husband to jail?
Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh (Justice Singh) opines:
- The husband gets a second cellphone, refuses to show it to his wife upon the latter's request and, as a result, causes her mental or emotional anguish due to the former's refusal to share his secrets with her.
- The wife discovers that her husband casually flirted with a co worker at an office event.
- The husband ceases to show any desire for his wife but is friendly to other women.
The commission of the prohibited act may be proven independently of the mental or emotional anguish such that the accused need not be shown to have intended to cause the latter. To hold otherwise would be to unerringly validate the conduct of men who are undeterred by their marriage vows and freely engage in infidelity, without regard to their wives and children. Men, therefore, cannot escape liability by invoking lack of proof that they intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon their defenseless and unknowing wives. This was not the intention of the lawmakers in enacting Republic Act No. 9262. Precisely, the lawmakers intended the law to correct the imbalance in the marital relations by proscribing "marital infidelity" through its classification as "psychological violence." Surely, had the situation been reversed, if it had been a woman who had engaged in a one-night stand which results in a lovechild, the husband would undoubtedly exact the full measure of retribution. The language of the law is clear and unqualified. To add more, by saying that intent must be proven is to engage in judicial legislation.[28]Justice Singh thus raises four (4) arguments in favor of the proposition that marital infidelity is malum prohibitum under Republic Act No. 9262:
Again, these reasons are absurd.
- The contrary position would encourage infidelity.
- The proposition corrects an "imbalance" in the marital relations by proscribing "marital infidelity" through its classification as "psychological violence."
- The language of the law is "clear and unqualified."
- To hold the contrary is judicial legislation.[29]
First, the premise that requiring intent to cause psychological violence would validate lecherous conduct is absurd. The male stereotype assumed by the example is simply a strawman-as if dispensing with intent in relation to Section 5(i) today will "deter" the cheaters of tomorrow. Aside from being a question of policy that is not within the province of the Court, it is precisely the failure of a man's reasonable faculties, the succumbing to temptation, that leads him into these unfortunate situations. A man like XXX, for example, is precisely in this predicament because his passions overcame his reason, and not because of any elaborate scheme of revenge against his wife that was foiled by its discovery.
Second, rather than "correcting" the supposed "imbalance" in the marriage, dispensing with intent under Section 5(i) would only have the opposite effect. Precisely, doing so would reify these "imbalances" and would highlight marriage roles as rather "victim-oppressor." This stems from a misunderstanding of the nature of power in a marriage relationship, which is not simply a question of who has more votes. A wife is not a "minority shareholder" so to speak who requires protection. Such an analogy does not assume that men and women are fundamentally equals in marriage and disregards the unique and mysterious logic of power in a marriage.
Third, it is inaccurate to state that the language of the law is "clear and unqualified" when Section 5 uses words such as "purposeful," "causing," and "threatening," as discussed above. Hence, intentionality cannot be divorced from Section 5(i).
Lastly, it would precisely be judicial legislation, and against the well settled rule to interpret all penal statutes liberally in favor of the accused, to arbitrarily consider Section 5(i) as malum prohibitum and to send otherwise innocent men to jail.
Here, with the majority's ruling that intent to cause mental or emotional anguish need not be proven in relation to a violation of Section 5(i) in relation to marital infidelity, and that the same can be presumed from the act of marital infidelity per se, the ponencia is amending both the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 and the Revised Penal Code-a plain act of judicial legislation. Not finished there, the ponencia furthers this egregious error when it discussed how marital infidelity (even while not defined in the law) "still admits of defenses akin to exempting circumstances in criminal law" and suggests that "estranged spouses" may not be able to have a cause of action for marital infidelity under Section 5(i). This is clearly inconsistent with Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 which provides that VAWC may be committed against a "former wife" - "estranged" or otherwise. At any rate, what then is the standard to call a couple "estranged"? Similarly, may a man who has an affair now assert that he was a "person who act[ed] under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear [i.e., of his wife]" or that he acted "under the compulsion of an irresistible force [i.e., his lust]"? The absurdities go on.
To be sure, the minority's view is in no way "minimizing" the trauma caused by a partner's betrayal of trust or a "spit in the face of every woman who has been the victim of such one-night stands and casual sexual encounters."[30] This is a complete non sequitur. Vengeance should not be the animating principle in the judicial interpretation of laws. Importantly, the mal perspective is wholly ignored. The incarceration of a partner or spouse for unintentional offenses and the consequent breaking up of a family is no light matter and great caution must be taken before such an interpretation may be given to Section 5(i).
Effects of construing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 as penalizing marital infidelity per se
a. |
Discriminates against married men |
Even assuming that "infidelity" is a term that was properly defined under Republic Act No. 9262, the interpretation espoused by the majority arbitrarily limits the same within marriage. Republic Act No. 9262 does not only protect married women, but even women in sexual or dating relationships. To recall, Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to address all types of violence suffered by women in intimate relationships; it applies equally to all women and their children who suffer violence and abuse. Thus, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 defines VAWC as:
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis supplied)In Garcia v. Judge Drilon, et al.,[31] (Drilon) the Court En Banc had the opportunity to clarify that Republic Act No. 9262 does not discriminate against a husband or father because the law encompasses all types of intimate relationships, even lesbian relationships, to wit:
There is likewise no merit to the contention that [Republic Act No.] 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, the parents in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.[32] (Citations omitted)Indeed, "infidelity" does not discriminate between married and unmarried women. The proper interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262, which is consistent with its purpose, is to guard all women, married or unmarried, in intimate relationships against malefactors intending to cause them mental or emotional anguish. This is not achieved if the Court were to rule that the commission of marital infidelity per se constitutes psychological violence punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Effectively, only married men may be charged and convicted of violating Section 5(i) through marital infidelity. The infidelity or unfaithfulness committed by a person against a woman with whom he or she has or had a sexual or dating relationship, even if such act/s was/were done with intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation upon the said woman, will not be covered by Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
This is not the intent of Republic Act No. 9262. To reiterate the Court's ruling in Drilon, Republic Act No. 9262 does not discriminate against married men. The law encompasses all forms of violence and abuse committed against women in all types of relationships, even including sexual or dating relationships.
Thus, punishing only married men for committing infidelity for violating Section 5(i) would constitute a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution-the equal protection clause. In such case, the distinction effectively made between married men and unmarried men is not germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, which is to address all types of violence committed against women.[33] To be sure, a woman, who has been cheated on by her partner whom she truly loves, would always feel mental and emotional anguish because of the infidelity. The amount of pain and betrayal cannot be measured on the scales of the law but by one's personal relationship, and the same exists regardless of whether the woman is married or unmarried.
b. |
Undermines marriage and the possibility of reconciliation between spouses/couples |
Additionally, the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 is a public crime. Section 25 of Republic Act No. 9262 states that "[v]iolence against women and their children shall be considered a public offense which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime." This means that any John or Jane Doe can file a criminal case against an erring husband or partner.
Contrariwise, marital infidelity under the Revised Penal Code is considered a private offense. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]he crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he [or she] shall have consented or pardoned the offenders."
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[34] as amended, echoes this provision of the Revised Penal Code:
SEC. 5. Who must Prosecute Criminal Actions. -In a catena of cases, the rationale of the law on the prosecution of private crimes has been explained in this wise:
....
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
In People v. Lualhati,[35] the Court said that the legal requirement is to "let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the family."[36]
In People v. Ilarde,[37] it was ruled that "the law leaves it to the option of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring spouse."[38] This policy was adopted "out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial"[39]
Succinctly put, the policy of affording the aggrieved woman the decision to seek judicial redress in private crimes is the State's recognition of and respect for familial and marital privacy. If the Court were to say that specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish is immaterial in Section 5(i), marital infidelity, as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, becomes a public offense under Republic Act No. 9262. As such, any person-a neighbor, an officemate, an acquaintance-can easily pry into the personal and private affairs of the couple and file a case against the erring partner, even regardless of the fact that the aggrieved partner has already reconciled with or forgiven his or her erring partner.
Take for instance, a "concerned" neighbor who has knowledge of his neighbor's husband's visits to a place of ill repute with a woman other than his wife. Can such concerned neighbor institute a criminal case against the erring husband for violation of Section 5(i), even without the wife's consent? Yes, if the Court were to rule that marital infidelity is an offense malum prohibitum and a public crime under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. What if the husband, admitting to his mistake, was forgiven by the wife? Can the husband still be prosecuted and convicted for violation of Section 5(i) after the lapse of ten years? By a complaint filed by the wife herself out of fear for the husband committing infidelity again? Or by the concerned officemate, neighbor, or friend, seeing that the wife has been in continued distress? Again, the answer to these questions would be yes if the Court were to rule that Section 5(i) penalizes marital infidelity per se. In all these scenarios, one thing is clear-a couple's marriage, their marital and familial privacy, and the possibility of their reconciliation will be undermined if not totally destroyed.
Therefore, the majority of the Court resolve this case with a totally myopic viewpoint. It cannot confine the consequences of its interpretation of Section 5(i) solely on the circumstances of the marriage of XXX and AAA. Otherwise, the Court will lose sight of the purpose for which the law was enacted.
Truly, adultery, marital infidelity, and sexual immorality in general, have existed long before Republic Act No. 9262 and have been punished in various ways in history-even with death.[40] The majority should thus disabuse themselves of the notion that interpreting Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 as penalizing marital infidelity per se will drive cheating husbands to extinction. However, the majority seem to have lost sight that the Spouses XXX were, at some point in time, in love and indeed intended to make good on their vows when they were married. It would be absurd to propose that XXX entered into a marriage as a pretext to commit marital infidelity-he simply lost his way down the road. The majority suggest that the reasons for XXX losing his way are irrelevant simply because the pain suffered by AAA is proof enough of violence.
The view of the majority that every marital infidelity committed by a man, without regard to the specific circumstances of such infidelity, is tantamount to intentional violence on the woman-partner is simply vindictive and bordering on misandry. Indeed, marital infidelity, as broad as the term is, involves issues that cannot be examined from a single perspective. If it is truly the policy to "strengthen" the family's "solidarity," how can a marriage address these complex issues when husbands or partners are simply being shipped off to jail? Throwing the partner-husband in jail would not mend the relationship but would rather euthanize it.
The construction of Section 5 by the majority may be worse than the evil sought to be prevented and a descent into puritanism. Effectively ruling that marital infidelity, without more, is penalized under Section 5(i) affects the entire institution of marriage. Erring partners/husbands now face the threat of incarceration should the Court decide to convict XXX as a caricature of another lecherous simpleton who, failing to cover his tracks, got caught red handed by his wife. And in doing so, what is often taken for granted is the couples' personal commitment and vow to each other when they were married.
XXX's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
Applying the foregoing principles to this case, I find that the evidence of the prosecution failed to surpass the standard of moral certainty that XXX committed the crime charged. In particular, the prosecution's evidence fell short of proving the fourth element of Section 5(i)-the specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon AAA, through marital infidelity.
Based on the narration of facts, the evidence by the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
To my mind, these pieces of evidence were able to establish that XXX was unfaithful to his wife and such unfaithfulness resulted in an illegitimate child. While marital infidelity-whether a one-night stand or an illicit relationship-is morally reprehensible and may cause mental or emotional anguish upon a woman, especially to a wife, this cannot and does not automatically give rise to criminal liability under Section 5(i), without proof of intent, i.e., that the accused intended to cause the woman mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation by engaging in marital infidelity. Here, the evidence of the prosecution does not reasonably suggest, much less prove, that XXX kept YYY as his mistress so that he could inflict mental or emotional anguish upon AAA.
- AAA was informed by a certain EEE that XXX was keeping a mistress and a four-year-old child in Makati;
- AAA with her mother and family friend, BBB went to the place and saw their family car parked outside;
- Inside the house, AAA saw XXX, with the alleged mistress, YYY, and a boy who called XXX "Daddy;"
- XXX admitted to AAA that he is the father of YYY's child;
- XXX signed the boy's birth certificate; and
- BBB asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area, to which YYY replied "hindi pa naman katagalan."[41]
Some members of the Court find that the following circumstances indicate that XXX intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife: (a) XXX signed the birth certificate of his "lovechild;" (b) XXX kept his one-night stand "a secret for good reason;" and (c) XXX visited his child with YYY on several occasions at various places.[42]
I disagree. Proof of specific intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation cannot be based on conjectures, presumptions and prejudices. As an essential element of the crime, it must be drawn from hard evidence showing that such specific intent was the accused's driving force for committing marital infidelity, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon the victim.
Circumstances (a) and (c) do not even prove that XXX kept an illicit relationship with YYY. Thus, these cannot be reasonable bases to conclude that XXX had intended to cause his wife mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation by maintaining an extra marital relationship. In fact, as I see it, circumstances (a) and (c) only establish that XXX wanted to take responsibility for the child. Circumstance (b) cannot also be equated to intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish public ridicule, or humiliation. To the contrary, keeping his alleged one-night stand and illegitimate child a secret indicates shame and humiliation for his mistake which he kept from his wife precisely to spare her emotional distress.
Furthermore, during the deliberations it was raised that the following circumstances indicate that XXX chose to consciously continue his illicit affair with YYY; (a) XXX went out of YYY's house wearing a white boxer shorts maong pants, slippers, and a sando; (b) XXX admitted that every time he went to YYY's house, he would park on the street in front; (c) XXX admitted having seen his son with YYY 15 to 20 times; (d) AAA and BBB testified (and XXX admitted) that YYY's child called XXX "Dad" or "Daddy;" and (e) XXX characterized his relationship with his son as a "[normal] father and son relationship."
To my mind, in no way do these circumstances prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that XXX maintains an illicit relationship and keeps YYY as his mistress. At most, these circumstances pertain only to XXX's relationship with his illegitimate child and how XXX is supporting said child. In visiting YYY's place and maintaining a relationship with his child, XXX is not keeping a mistress, he is simply fulfilling his obligation as a father. To be sure, nothing in the prosecution's evidence show that XXX was seen with YYY alone. All evidence of the prosecution point to the fact that XXX's connection or relationship with YYY is only in relation to supporting their child.
This reading of the evidence is not to justify or condone XXX's marital infidelity. This is simply the application of the time-honored principle in criminal law that "if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his [or her] guilt, the Court should adopt that which is more favorable to the accused, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty."[43]
I cannot also agree with the conclusion that XXX's unwillingness to reconcile with AAA and save their marriage aggravates proof of criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish on his part.[44] A husband or a wife is at the liberty to refuse to see, live, or reconcile with his or her spouse without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of such right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband or a wife to live with his or her spouse.[45]
The majority's ruling that such constitutes criminal intent under Section 5(i) runs the risk of compelling couples to stay in a relationship even though one or both parties no longer want to do so. This is especially true in a country like ours which does not have divorce proceedings and has limited grounds for annulment. It is well to be reminded that a couple's continued relationship or cohabitation "is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice."[46]
To end, I wish to emphasize that our system of laws has never meant to provide a remedy for every damage caused-hence the concept of damnum absque injuria-and much less does it require that every damage be met with criminal prosecution. To be clear, this is not to say that having extramarital affairs should be countenanced or even tolerated. In this Opinion, I only wish to stress that the provisions on Adultery and Concubinage in the Revised Penal Code already punish those situations. I merely emphasize that the evil sought to be addressed by Republic Act No. 9262 is the intentional infliction of violence upon the woman. To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9262 is not meant to criminalize marital infidelity per se. By the same token, it is likewise not meant to criminally punish any and all acts that somehow bring emotional pain or suffering upon the woman. This is clear from the plain language of the law itself.
I join the members of the Court who find that marital infidelity per se-whether a one-night stand or an extramarital affair-may be enough to constitute psychological violence. However, as it stands, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 plainly does not penalize marital infidelity alone. Whatever "gap" there is in the law should therefore be addressed to the Legislature and not through this case. The power and duty of the Court is to interpret and apply the law within the boundaries set by its language and intent. It does not include the power to correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein.[47] Consequently, affirming XXX's conviction for Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 on the basis of his unfaithfulness alone is tantamount to judicial legislation, one that is detrimental to the accused whose presumption of innocence is guaranteed by the Constitution and who is entitled to the proscription that all doubts be resolved in his favor.
Therefore, it is my view that the principles laid down in the ponencia are the egregiously wrong interpretation of Section 5(i) insofar as it deals with marital infidelity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition and ACQUIT petitioner XXX from the charge of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, titled "Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances," the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] John 8:4-6 (NIV).
[2] Leviticus 20:10: "If a man commits adultery with another man's wife-with the wife of his neighbor-both the adulterer and the adulteress are to be put to death."
[3] Deuteronomy 22:22 (NIV).
[4] An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and for Other Purposes.
[5] Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc]. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[6] Acharon v. People, supra note 5.
[7] Ponencia, p. 3.
[8] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[9] Id. at 376.
[10] Supra note 5.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] 832 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[14] Id. at 620.
[15] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Emphasis supplied.
[16] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, pp. 8-9.
[17] J. Inting, Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 7-8.
[18] See Acharon v. People, supra note 5.
[19] Id.
[20] SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) |
Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; |
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(b) |
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; |
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(c) |
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; |
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(d) |
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; |
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(e) |
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: |
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(1) |
Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family; |
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(2) |
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; |
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(3) |
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; |
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(4) |
Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties; |
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(f) |
Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; |
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(g) |
Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; |
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(h) |
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include but not be limited to, the following acts: |
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(1) |
Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; |
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(2) |
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; |
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(3) |
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; |
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(4) |
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and |
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(5) |
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; |
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(i) |
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. |
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[21] Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[22] Id. at 658.
[23] Ponencia, p. 16.
[24] The fallacy of faulty analogy occurs when analogies are used as arguments or explanations and the similarities between the two things compared are too remote to support the conclusion. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/#:~:text=The fallacy of faulty analogywill want use them> (last accessed on May 15, 2024).
[25] Ponencia, p. 17.
[26] 403 Phil. 31 (2001) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
[27] Id. at 47-48.
[28] J. Singh, Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 8.
[29] See Id.
[30] Id. at 9.
[31] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[32] Id. at 103-104.
[33] See id.
[34] A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, as amended, December 1, 2000.
[35] G.R. No. 66038, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 277 [Per J. Gri o-Aquino, First Division].
[36] Id. at 283.
[37] G.R. No. L-58595, October 10, 1983, 125 SCRA 11 [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
[38] Id. at 18.
[39] Id.
[40] See Leviticus 20:10, ESV: "If a man commits adultery with the wife of his neighbor, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death."
[41] Ponencia, pp. 3-5.
[42] J. Lazaro-Javier, Concurring Opinion, p. 15.
[43] People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-50103, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 597, 598-599 [Per J. Fernan, Second Division].
[44] See C.J. Gesmundo, Concurring Opinion, p. 3.
[45] See Ilusorio v. Bildner, 387 Phil. 915 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[46] Id.
[47] Agote v. Judge Lorenzo, 502 Phil. 318, 334 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].
G.R. No. 252739 (XXX,[1] Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent)
CONCURRENCE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
In 1979, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)-a monumental achievement signifying not only the advancement of women's rights but the recognition, too, of the global, yet uniform and harsh reality faced by all women around the world as the usual victims of gender based violence. In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act was enacted in 2004.
In no uncertain terms, the Court in Garcia v. Drilon[2] (Garcia) painstakingly demonstrated, through the voice of a powerful woman in the Court, then Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, the significance of Republic Act No. 9262 and why women, as a class, deserve special protection under the law due to the unequal power relationship between men and women and the statistically-proven fact that women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of violence. In Garcia, the Court traced the historical context of gender-based violence, viz.:
The United Nations [recognizes] that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." x x xThough a decade may have passed since Garcia and numerous women victims of domestic violence have achieved their quest for justice since then under Republic Act No. 9262, the power imbalance and gender bias which the law seeks to address still persist. The Court's keen observation in Garcia rings true to this day:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control.
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy - the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women....
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. x x x Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half - and full - steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes."[3] (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied)
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continue. Men are expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women - power, which must necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such power. (Emphasis supplied)We cannot deny that "patriarchal dominance [ ] still pervades many social relationships."[4] Courts should continue to be sensitive of the existing power relations between genders.[5] This remains to be a duty of this Court as the exigency which breathes life to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262 persists.
Here, the Court again reckons with the persisting power imbalance between genders. Petitioner XXX was charged with psychological violence for causing his wife, AAA mental and emotional anguish after the latter discovered his illicit affair with YYY with whom he has a lovechild. XXX maintains, however, that his mere one-night stand could not possibly amount to psychological violence as it happened only once. More important, his extramarital affair was, anyway, not intentionally committed to cause AAA mental and emotional distress.
Thus, the questions at hand: first, must marital infidelity be repeated or continued to constitute psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262; and second, is the intention of the offender material in determining whether psychological violence against a woman has been committed?
The ponencia ordains in the negative. I fully concur. Speaking on behalf of women, I further elucidate why, in the ongoing battle for women empowerment, the intention of the offender must never have a place in ascertaining whether psychological violence has been inflicted on a woman.
Foremost, XXX's argument perpetuates the counter-intuitive rationale that in order for marital infidelity to be punishable, it must be sustained, repeated, blatant, or coupled with other demeaning acts towards the innocent spouse or child. Stated differently, if mental or emotional anguish could be measured on a spectrum, conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 should only issue whenever the mental suffering or emotional anguish is on the extreme end of the said spectrum. In fine, rather than deterring the commission of marital infidelity which may cause psychological distress to the woman, as intended by Republic Act No. 9262, XXX implores the Court to grant imprimatur for the commission of the same so long as it is committed in isolation, or as a one-off, mistake, or momentary lapse in judgment so to speak, and whenever it is coupled with circumstances which depict the offender as an upright spouse and/or parent, then the criminal liability should be extinguished.
Surely, this cannot be what Republic Act No. 9262 intends.
XXX's theory finds no support in Law or in jurisprudence.[6] For one, the reasoning behind it runs counter to the well-entrenched principle that in the Philippines, "absolute monogamy is still the order of the day."[7] Our legal system is replete with laws that enforce monogamy in marriage and penalize those who go against it (e.g., the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy, adultery, and concubinage).[8] More, the Court "value[s] monogamous marriages and consider[s] them worthy of strict legal protection."[9] Clearly, the law values and protects monogamy.[10] XXX's supposition runs against this principle, carves out an exception to monogamy, and allows an unfaithful husband to engage in marital infidelity scot-free so long as he commits it only in isolation.
For another, to warrant a conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, only the following elements are required: (a) the offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (b) the woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender; (c) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (d) the anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar to such acts or omissions.
Nowhere in the law or jurisprudence is it required that acts constituting psychological violence be committed with certain gravity and with the specific and singular intent to emotionally hurt a woman. What is required, rather, is that the emotional distress and anguish allegedly suffered by the woman is duly established and supported by the evidence on record, i.e., the psychological abuse should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This is consistent with Araza v. People,[11] where the Court thoroughly laid down its basis, in the form of the woman's testimony, ordaining that the marital infidelity of Araza caused severe emotional distress to his wife which manifested through depression and frequent hospitalization.
Here, I agree that XXX is guilty of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 since the prosecution duly established all the elements of the offense. There is no dispute as regards the first and second elements here.
I thus focus on the third and fourth elements.
Araza is illuminative on the nexus between these two elements. Notably, the Court had been consistent in its pronouncement that the fourth element, i.e., the act/s of psychological violence committed by the man, is the means while the third element, i.e., the mental and emotional anguish suffered by the woman, is the result, viz.:
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.[12] (Citations omitted)XXX, however, envisions to add to what has already been settled in law and jurisprudence. He proposes to split hairs by reasoning that the marital infidelity he committed is a mere one-night stand, a so-called fluke, which could not have caused psychological distress to AAA. To this, I am compelled to raise two important points so that I may speak on behalf of the women we seek to protect under Republic Act No. 9262.
First. There is no place in the law to contemplate how the man may or may not have thought his actions would affect the woman for so long as he, with full volition, freedom, and will, committed those acts. To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted "to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children."[13] Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.To further emphasize, Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted to protect women or children who are in abusive relationships. The law recognizes that women and children are usually placed at a disadvantage in such situations.[14] The legislature's deliberations on the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 9262 are likewise instructive:
....
Wednesday, December 10, 2003Indeed, the protection of women and children-and no other-is the main objective of Republic Act No. 9262. If we thus seek to fully animate the intent and purpose of the law and truly takes upon ourselves to deliver genuine justice to these women and children, our vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those we protect them from or against. For to do the latter would turn a blind eye to the undeniable existence of the injury which the law intends to prevent.
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.
....
Wednesday. January 14, 2004
....
The President Pro Tempore....
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senate Estrada. Yes, Mr. President. As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. x x x
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman....
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children. While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized. Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
....
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President. The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
....
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment. The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment? Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment -
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. - more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women. (Emphases supplied)
This is precisely why the Court characterized the fourth element as a means to commit the offense, regardless of the man's specific intent in committing the same. A well-meaning focus on the mens rea of the crime, as espoused in Acharon v. People,[15] defeats the very purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, in that it allows an offender who obviously caused mental or emotional anguish upon his victim/s to escape his transgression scot-free so long as he is able to demonstrate that he committed marital infidelity for other reasons, and that he did not "deliberately use it to cause psychological violence to his wife."
Should the viewpoint of XXX be upheld, i.e., that specific criminal intent must be considered indispensable for a conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the purpose of the law would be negated. Offenders could simply claim that they engaged in marital infidelity for virtually any self-serving reason (e.g., boredom, curiosity, or adventure) since it is extremely difficult for the prosecution to show that infidelity was employed specifically to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the offended spouse. Nothing short of a confession by the accused would be necessary to prove his intent to cause psychological violence upon his wife.
I thus respectfully submit that in cases involving violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by means of marital infidelity, courts must, as we have always done, focus largely on the actus reus of the offense, which includes the overt act (marital infidelity) and the consequences thereof (mental or emotional anguish)[16] as this is the gravamen of the offense. An emphasis on the means of commission is important to avert any notion that we are abandoning our unanimous ruling in Acharon which involves a supposed violation of Section 5(i) by failure to provide financial support.
As explained in Acharon:
To be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.A distinction is necessary because the means employed in Acharon (i.e., failure to provide financial support) is susceptible of multiple interpretations, some of which may be acceptable. For example, it could be that the husband is simply unable to provide the necessary support because his income is insufficient and the necessary expenses for the family are high. In such a case, the husband cannot be criminally held liable.
This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise.
But here, the means employed cannot be construed in any other manner. Marital infidelity is quite categorical. It cannot be understood like financial support, for it is absurd to posit that a husband may wake up one day and have "insufficient" fidelity towards his wife. It is a sustained obligation which a husband cannot renege on for any reason. A husband either remains loyal or breaches his marital obligation even with only one transgression, as here. This distinction is in keeping with the intent of Republic Act No. 9262 and the time-honored tenet of equity that a person who commits a wrongful act should be held liable for all the consequences of his or her actions.
More important, I humbly believe that this special legislation for the protection of women and children intends for men to be highly circumspect of their actions. To place this in a more realistic context, for so long, society indulged and tolerated men's whims and caprice without really holding them accountable by conveniently raising the irrational excuse that "men will always be men." In fact, even in the midst of the 21st century, we still have criminal laws that discriminate between men and women in terms of extra marital affairs by allowing the conviction of an erring wife for a one-time tryst while an unfaithful husband remains free to sleep with his paramours as long as he remains discreet.
But no more, at least where Republic Act No. 9262 is concerned. If we truly intend to elevate women's rights and empower women, there is no place for the thoughtless and irresponsible, yet historically condoned, acts of men which have hurt, traumatized, and demeaned women for ages, especially not in the interpretation of the very law crafted particularly to protect them. We ought not bastardize the intent of the law in this way.
Second. That XXX's affair was a mere one-night stand is a mere convenient excuse. It is the typical defense of a man who had been caught in the act. As a last-ditch effort, "isang beses lang naman" is said in hopes to assuage the hurt, betrayal, and already broken trust of the woman. Once broken, these pieces will never be perfectly whole again. More, in this case, the fruit of this infidelity will forever remind AAA of XXX's unfaithfulness. To be sure, the damage has already been done. And, in the legal context, all the elements have already been met.
In any case, whether XXX's marital infidelity was a one-night stand or a one-night thing, one night at a time, it does not matter. For it is not the number of times the man committed an affair that matters but the infliction of injury to the woman - the hurt, torture, and mental anguish suffered by her who has been cheated on by her husband.
Indeed, commission of marital infidelity per se, regardless of frequency, intent, or gravity, is not the gravamen of the offense. It does not automatically result in conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 sans a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the woman suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result. In fact, in the very recent case of AAA265336 v. People,[17] the Court acquitted the accused therein of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, principally because the prosecution miserably failed to establish that his wife suffered any mental or emotional anguish as a result of his infidelity, viz.:
Here, the Court of Appeals solely relied on the following testimony of BBB265336, stating that she was "mad" upon learning about AAA265336's extramarital affairs, in ruling that she suffered mental and emotional anguish, viz.: x x xClearly, there is thus no hard and fast rule in determining whether psychological abuse under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 has been committed. Whether the accused will be adjudged guilty will always depend on the circumstances of each case, taking into careful consideration each allegation, counter-argument, and evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. In all cases, however, conviction may issue only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt that psychological abuse as defined under the law was inflicted upon the woman.
To us, however, BBB265336's testimony, standing alone, failed to prove that she suffered any mental or emotional anguish. It notably did not relay, nay, prove any considerable and lasting suffering which she sustained as a result of AAA265336's infidelity. What was merely alleged was her momentary reaction when she discovered that AAA265336 was in a relationship with another woman. She was angry. Subsequently, she decided to fly back to the Philippines to confront him. Yet, in the interim and even after the confrontation, her testimony is notably bereft of how the entire ordeal affected her mental and emotional well-being or disrupted her normal daily life. The simple phrase "I was mad" without more, to the mind of this Court, simply does not suffice and cannot be equated to the mental and emotional suffering required by Republic Act No. 9262.
All told, the prosecution failed to establish that AAA265336's marital infidelity caused BBB265336 mental and emotional anguish within the contemplation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Accordingly, a verdict of acquittal based on reasonable doubt is in order.
Here, the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA due to XXX's marital affair was sufficiently established. In her testimony,[18] AAA recounted blow-by-blow, not only the facts as they transpired, but most important, their traumatic impact on her mental and emotional well-being. Unlike in AAA265336, AAA conveyed with detail and intensity how she felt throughout the entire ordeal, starting from her discovery of XXX's extramarital affair:
From her narration, one clearly witnesses how AAA's world crumbled upon her discovery. She recounted in vivid detail how she felt-initially confused and understandably shocked. But when it finally sunk in, she minced no words in relaying how much XXX's illicit relationship hurt, nay, broke her-she cried nonstop because of the unbearable pain and this pain crippled her, rendered her non-functional. But more than that, the greatest testament proving that XXX's actions, whether intentional or not, so deeply and gravely affected AAA was the fact that nothing could anymore ease her pain but the divine. Still, it did not end there. She continued:
[19]
More than proving her nonchalance, AAA's statements that she eventually steeled herself and willed herself to no longer feel anything only establishes the intensity of her trauma. For it illustrates how the torturous pain she tried to endure far exceeded what she could bear, such that the only thing she can do was to numb herself to survive. She was evidently helpless. At the same time, she was hopeless. For she knew that any confrontation would only be met by hard denial, as indeed it was-the exact denial which XXX champions here to defeat her cause of action.
The mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA because of XXX's marital infidelity cannot be denied. The traumatic effect it left on her was not only impactful but lasting and ought not to be ignored. In the past, the Court has held that only the testimony of the victim is required to prove this element, precisely because her experience is personal to such party.[21] AAA categorically stated:
By saying that no pecuniary amount could ever compensate for the emotional and mental anguish she suffered because of XXX's infidelity, AAA in effect already said everything there is to say to prove the gravamen of this offense. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that:
Based on the Court's observation of private complainant's behavior and manner of testifying, the anguish can readily be seen during her narration of events that transpired and the emotion shown by complainant could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that accused himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with Aileen Quintos....Surely, AAA's testimony can, by no stretch of imagination, be equated to the insufficient claim "I was mad" in AAA265336 so as to warrant an acquittal. On the contrary, her testimony sufficiently establishes the element of emotional anguish or mental suffering pursuant to Araza. Indeed, that XXX's tryst was a mere one-night stand is irrelevant against the entirety of this factual backdrop. At the end of the day, the harm has been done. Whether intentional or otherwise, the injury which Republic Act No. 9262 seeks to redress was still caused, and for which XXX must be held liable.
While he denies giving support to Aileen Quintos or their child, accused's admission of siring a child with a woman other than his wife was enough to establish the cause of private complainant's distress. (Emphasis supplied)
Admittedly, the circumstances in this case pale in comparison to those in Araza, and its companion cases.[24] On the most basic level, however, this case still exhibits the gravamen of a Section 5(i) violation: psychological violence resulting in mental or emotional anguish. AAA, like the women and children in the cases discussed in the ponencia, suffered damage because of XXX's marital infidelity. Though XXX did not abandon AAA and his son nor did he forsake his family,[25] both courts below similarly found that he still caused AAA mental and emotional anguish. This is a uniform finding of fact made by the trial court and appellate court which is binding and conclusive on the Court. XXX's continued compliance with his marital and parental obligations did not preclude him from inflicting suffering and anguish upon AAA. These things can concurrently exist; they are not mutually exclusive.
Equally important, I do not believe that Republic Act No. 9262 intends an exact or uniform measure of abuse a man must inflict before an aggrieved woman may hold him liable under the law. For part and parcel of empowering women is recognizing that every woman is different. Every woman has a different threshold for their partner's erring ways and may react differently when faced with such fact. While one may not be intensely aggrieved by the man's marital infidelity, another might be crippled by hurt and distress. In which case, the law steps in to sanction the abuse that has been inflicted on her. This is the essence of the law. It is not meant to be a mechanical measure of how much hurt must be inflicted for the woman to say she has been criminally abused. Accordingly, the Court must evaluate the presence of this element on a case-by-case basis.
In any event, even if the mens rea is considered here, XXX's conviction must stand. The specific intent under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 may be understood as the offender's intention and purpose to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his spouse by committing marital infidelity.[26] Alternatively, the specific intent may also be the offender's knowledge that marital infidelity is wrong, yet he still dips himself into it, totally and callously shrugging off the mental or emotional anguish it will cause to his spouse.[27]
Intent is a state of mind. And so courts may appreciate the same "only though external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the [offender] at the time of [commission of the offense] and immediately thereafter."[28] On this score, XXX committed the following acts after his one-night stand with Aileen: (a) signing the birth certificate of his "lovechild;"[29] (b) keeping his one-night stand "a secret for good reason;"[30] and (c) visiting his child with Aileen on several occasions at various places.[31]
Human experience, common decency, and our entire legal system dictate that a one-night stand is improper for a married individual.[32] Stated differently, not only is marital infidelity illegal but also morally wrong. It is evil. It can never be attributed to noble or pure intentions. As such, marital infidelity regardless of the frequency of commission and the absence of any "other significant factors," must be punished. No amount of interpretation or rationalization could-and should-ever render marital infidelity acceptable.
These premises, coupled with XXX's surreptitious acts after his rendezvous with Aileen, ineluctably show his mental state and his awareness that his marital infidelity would cause mental or emotional anguish upon AAA. His conscious decision to desecrate his marital vow and his promise of monogamy to AAA cannot simply be brushed off as a simple lapse of judgment. To be sure, he did not magically end up in another woman's bed out of sheer Providence. He was not forced to engage in a sexual act, with a woman not his wife. He ended up where he was, because he wanted to be there. Because he intended to be there.
Res ipsa loquitur. His evil acts speak volumes of his evil intentions.
As Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen expounded in Alanis III v. Court of Appeals.[33] "Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture, the more its chances to infect this and future generations." To acquit XXX would normalize the power imbalance between men and women, would be a step in the wrong direction, and "further encode patriarchy into our system."[34]
All told, I vote to AFFIRM the conviction of XXX Manalang for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Republic Act No. 7610, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[2] 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[3] Id. at 92-95.
[4] Cumigad v. AAA, G.R. No. 219715, December 6, 2021 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Perez v. People, 830 Phil. 162 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[5] Id.
[6] See generally Malang v. Hon. Mason, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000 [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, En Banc].
[7] Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug in Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
[8] Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[9] Id.
[10] Ni al v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000) [Per Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
[11] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[12] Id. at 919.
[13] Reyes v. People, 855 Phil. 991, 1007 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 588 Phil. 532, 541 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
[14] RA 9262: Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/faq-republic-act-9262/ (last accessed on July 7, 2023).
[15] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[16] See Concurrence of J. Lazaro-Javier in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021.
[17] G.R. No. 265336, November 6, 2023 [Notice, Second Division].
[18] TSN dated June 8, 2017.
[19] Id. at pp. 7-8.
[20] Id. at 18.
[21] See Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[22] TSN dated June 8, 2017, pp. 18-19.
[23] Id. at 20.
[24] Id. at 10-11.
[25] Id. at 11-12.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] People v. Tabura, G.R. No. 228962, February 10, 2021 [Notice, First Division].
[29] Id. at 12.
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 3 and 12.
[32] See e.g. Article 333 and 334 of the Revised Penal Code.
[33] 890 Phil. 74, 95 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[34] Id.
G.R. No. 252739 - XXX,* Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
INTING, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that the judgment of conviction against XXX for a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the "Anti- Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004" must be affirmed by the Court.
I. |
XXX may be convicted of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Ac No. 9262 for causing mental or emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA, through marital infidelity, pursuant to the variance doctrine |
Preliminarily, it must be clarified that in the Information, XXX was charged with a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 by allegedly keeping a mistress, as follows:
On July 19, 2016 or prior thereto, in the city of xxxxxxxxxxx, the Philippines, accused, being the husband of complainant [AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kept (sic) a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish, .in violation of the aforesaid law.Notwithstanding the above, I respectfully submit that XXX may be convicted of the offense charged but through a different means - marital infidelity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Court has recognized that the term "mistress" means "a woman with whom a man habitually fornicates."[1] Meanwhile, "marital infidelity" or "conjugal infidelity" has been related to sexual congress by a married man or woman with a person other than his wife or husband.
With the foregoing, it is my position that under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, even a single act of sexual intercourse between a married person and another who is not his/her legal spouse constitutes marital infidelity, provided that all the other elements thereof are present.
Thus, the charge of "keeping a mistress" against XXX is broad enough to include "marital infidelity" or sexual intercourse with a woman who is not XXX's wife. The Information sufficiently states all the elements of the specific offense allegedly committed by XXX - causing mental or emotional anguish to AAA through marital infidelity - and enables him to adequately prepare his defense.[2] Surely, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that keeping a mistress, as charged in the Information, includes marital infidelity and may therefore prepare his defenses accordingly.[3]
Perforce, in accordance with the variance doctrine under Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5,[4] of the Rules of Court, if the prosecution was able to prove that XXX committed marital infidelity that caused mental or emotional anguish upon AAA, then he may be convicted of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
II. |
Intent is not material under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when emotional or mental anguish is caused to a woman or her child due to marital infidelity |
As a rule, the accused must possess a culpable mental state before he or she may be convicted of the crime charged. This springs from the general principle that the wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal, or the required concurrence of actus reus and mens rea.[5]
However, as pointed out by the ponencia,[6] specific intent is not necessary for there to be a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when the means used by the accused to cause emotional or mental anguish upon the woman or her child is marital infidelity.
Philippine laws have distinguished between crimes which are mala in se, where intent is necessary for conviction, and mala prohibita, where intent is immaterial. While there is a general presumption that a penal statute requires mens rea, our jurisdiction equally recognizes the power of Congress to enact criminal statutes that are mala prohibita.[7] This is sourced from the plenary power of the Legislature to define crimes and prescribe penalties therefor.[8] Hence, in the absence of language in the statute making guilty knowledge and criminal intent an essential element of the acts prohibited thereunder, it is not necessary to charge or to prove that the accused acted with specific intent to violate the law in order to sustain convictions under the statute.[9]
Presently, the Court has adopted the approach of looking at the inherent immorality of the penalized act to determine whether it is deemed malum in se, where intent governs, in contrast to acts which are mala prohibita, where intent is immaterial.[10] In Acharon v. People,[11] the Court applied this approach in laying down the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and holding that intent to cause emotional or mental anguish is indispensable for the conviction of an accused charged with a violation thereof, when committed through denial of financial support. Acharon was reiterated and applied by the Court in subsequent cases involving similar alleged violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.[12]
However, it should be stressed that Acharon and the cases[13] where its ruling was applied specifically ruled on the element of intent under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when the means used by the accused is denial of financial support. In these cases, the Court held that mere failure to provide support cannot constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 9262 because the law requires that support be denied. Further, "support" depends on the capacity of the person bound to give support; hence, when the man himself is impoverished and fails to give support, he cannot be made criminally liable under Republic Act No. 9262. Obviously, the man cannot deny from the woman or her child support that he does not have in the first place. Moreover, denial of support under Republic Act No. 9262 ultimately relates to economic abuse, which requires that support be denied for the purpose of controlling the woman or her child or restricting their freedom of movement. Criminal intent was therefore necessary for conviction.
To my mind, Acharon cannot be indiscriminately applied in the present case where marital infidelity is the means used by the accused to cause emotional or mental anguish upon the woman or her child. Intent as an element of the offense charged against Allan must be determined based on the language of Section 5(i) in relation to Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, as well as the policy behind the law. That is, while the Court has used the test of "inherent immorality" to determine whether a crime is mala in se where intent is material, the foremost consideration in determining whether intent is necessary for a violation of the law must still be the language of the statute and legislative intent.
Verily, as early as 1909, the Court in United States v. Go Chico[14] held that intent, as an element of a crime, should be discerned based on the language of the law and the purpose to be accomplished by the law, among others. Thus, when the "statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully," then the prohibited act is mala prohibita and intent is immaterial.[15] Certainly, the Court has been guided with words evincing intent in requiring it as an element of the crime, as when the statute uses terms or phrases like "knowingly,"[16] "willfully,"[17] "deliberately,"[18] or "for the purpose of."[19]
Even when the special law punishes an act that is inherently immoral, Congress may prohibit the very same conduct and delete intent or malice as an element thereof precisely because it has the exclusive power to define crimes and prescribe penalties therefor. If it is so minded, Congress may pass a statute against mala prohibita crimes[20] and remove "intent" from offenses which ordinarily require mens rea before conviction.[21] This applies even for a special law penalizing acts which are similar to crimes traditionally requiring mens rea, e.g., theft.[22]
The Court must be guided by the foregoing principles in determining whether intent is required before XXX may be convicted of a violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 through marital infidelity. That is, in passing Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Legislature may choose to criminalize the prohibited act itself regardless of the perpetrator's intent in violating the law. Whether such is the case will have to be determined from the language of the law itself, the policy behind it, the nature of the prohibited conduct, and other relevant matters as laid down in Go Chico.
A. |
Based on the language of Republic Act No. 9262, intent is not an element of the offense charged against XXX |
With these considerations in mind, I find that intent is not an element of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when mental or emotional anguish is caused to the woman or her child through marital infidelity. My conclusion is based on, among others, the language of the statute itself and the purpose behind it.
First, an examination of Republic Act No. 9262 reveals that it clearly identifies those offenses which require intent, either by expressly requiring that the prohibited act be done knowingly or deliberately, or that it be executed to achieve a specific purpose.
Thus, under Section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 9262, the prohibited conduct must be for the purpose of "controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct." Section 5(f) of the law also states that it is unlawful to inflict or threaten to inflict physical harm on oneself "for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions," by "deliberately" providing the woman's children insufficient financial support, among other means. Similarly, Section 5(h) of the law refers to "purposeful" or "knowing" conduct that causes psychological distress to the woman or her child. Significantly, there is no similar language evincing knowledge or intent in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(c) of the same law:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:Had it been the intention of the legislators to require intent as an element of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, they would have used therein the same language evincing intent, as in Sections 5(e), 5(f), and 5(h) of the same law. The absence of any such term requiring intent on the part of the violator supports the conclusion that intent is not required in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Instead, the law merely looks at the consequences, effect, or actual harm suffered by the victim, i.e., when the conduct causes mental or emotional anguish to the woman or her child.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
It is my position that the absence of such terms evincing "intent" in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is not merely stylistic. Rather, these terms evincing intent were withheld by the Legislature from Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 deliberately because it intended that the prohibited act be punished regardless of the intent of the accused.[23] In interpreting Republic Act No. 9262, the Court must be guided by well established presumptions: that the Legislature knew the meaning of the terms it used; that it used these terms advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such language; that it inserted those words evincing "intent" with reason, and conversely, must have withheld them from Section 5(i) with reason; and that it is familiar with principles of statutory construction.[24]
To my mind, because Congress deliberately withheld from Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 such terms as would require criminal intent, then the Court must not require it as an element of the crime. Verily, the Court's first duty is to apply the law as long as it is in force and effect, though the law may be regarded as harsh, unwise, or morally wrong.[25] The Court cannot supplant or modify the terms of Republic Act No. 9262 in the guise of statutory interpretation, as such would amount to impermissible judicial legislation.[26]
Second, following Go Chico, the Court may look at the purpose of the law to determine whether the acts punished therein are mala in se or mala prohibita. Significantly, it has been held that penal statutes which are in the nature of police regulations[27] are mala prohibita; they impose criminal penalties, irrespective of any intent and obviously for the purpose of requiring a degree of diligence for the protection of the public.[28]
In this regard, the Court must consider that Republic Act No. 9262 is a special law designed to protect the welfare of women and their children. Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9262 expressly states that the policy behind the law is to "protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security." In passing Republic Act No. 9262, the lawmakers intended that it be a measure for the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence and discrimination against women and children, as well as their protection therefrom. The lawmakers particularly recognized the realities that Filipino women face and acknowledged that because our society considers the woman to be subordinate to the man, it is predominantly the women who become victims in intimate relationships.[29] With these considerations, the legislators saw the need to make our laws "coercive" by putting "more teeth" in penalizing domestic violence, which "would strongly help provide a deterrence to the rising gender-based crime against women and children whose perpetrators are more inclined to commit their nefarious act with impunity."[30]
Evidently, Republic Act No. 9262 is geared towards the protection of women in intimate relationships and the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence. Because the law is aimed towards a public purpose, the Court should hold that the acts punished by Republic Act No. 9262 are mala prohibita, unless the law itself requires 1ntent as an element of the offense.
Finally, legislative deliberations reveal that in passing Republic Act No. 9262, the lawmakers intended to address legal and social inequities between men and women; they acknowledged that in Philippine laws, there is a bias against women, most notably the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on marital infidelity, i.e., Adultery and Concubinage under Articles 333 and 334, respectively. They particularly noted that the Revised Penal Code imposes heavier penalties on adultery than on concubinage. Moreover, in adultery, the married woman is immediately liable the moment that she has sexual intercourse with a man who is not her husband; on the other hand, for a married man to be liable for concubinage, other conditions are required, such as cohabitation and sex under scandalous circumstances.
The discussion among the lawmakers during the deliberations for the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 enlightens:
MS. [MAUREEN] PAGADUAN (Executive Director, Women's Legal Bureau):Based on the foregoing, it appears that the legislators deliberately included marital infidelity as an act of psychological violence upon the woman or her child in Republic Act No. 9262 so that men and women are placed on the same standard of public morals where both husband and wife are expected to remain faithful to their marital vows and obligation of fidelity to each other. That is, while the husband's marital infidelity under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code on Concubinage requires additional conditions to be punishable, Republic Act No. 9262 punishes the same conduct as long as it causes mental or emotional anguish upon the wife.
....
The four criteria for a reasonable classification have been squarely met by the Anti-AWIR [Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships] bill:
First, the bill rest[s] on substantial distinctions. Men and women are afforded different degrees of protection under Philippine law and society. In intimate relationships, Philippine society still condones sexual infidelity by men. Hindi pa ho nagbabago iyan. And allows them to exercise inordinate amount of power over their wives, girlfriends, and lovers. Siguro nararamdaman ng marami sa atin iyan. Philippine law also remains bias against women. The most glaring example of this legislative bias in favor of men and against women is the discrepancy in the crime of marital infidelity committed by husbands and wives, both as to the conditions for its commission and the penalties imposed. Mas malala sa babae, siyempre.
Second, the classification is therefore germane to the purpose of the law. By granting women with a legal arsenal for their protection, the bill merely seeks to address th[ese] legal and societal inequalities by providing women in particular with a weapon to counteract the inequity of their situation.[31]
....
MS. AURORA JAVATE-DE DIOS (Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women): Thank you.
Just on that point about whether or not the law addresses men and women equally. I think we are essentially dealing with a law...with a problem of inequality. A while ago, our Chairperson was saying that men and women cannot be equal. I slightly disagree with that because our...while women and men are unequal because of historical and structural inequalities, the point about having laws, legislation and policies to improve the plight of women is precisely to equalize their situation.
Now, the violence against women bill that is before us precisely addresses that very serious problem of inequality...[32]
To my mind, the ponencia's ruling is consistent with the foregoing objective of the framers of Republic Act No. 9262. Should the Court require the prosecution to prove that XXX had sexual congress with YYY with the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon his wife, AAA, an unfaithful husband can escape conviction by simply claiming that he committed marital infidelity to find sexual relief, to be entertained, to have a child with another woman, or for some other reason unrelated to Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Such a restrictive interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 would divest the law of its coercive powers and perpetuate a situation where unfaithfulness and marital infidelity on the part of the husband are condoned despite the mental or emotional anguish suffered by the wife or child, contrary to the purpose behind the enactment of Republic Act No. 9262. It would defeat the Legislature's objective for Republic Act No. 9262 to serve as a measure towards the equality of men and women in our laws, including those that proscribe marital infidelity.
I agree with the ponencia[33] that the Court must apply Section 3(c) in relation to Section 5(i) of Republic .Act No. 9262 as they are written: the law is violated when the husband causes mental or emotional anguish to his wife or child through marital infidelity. Whether the resulting mental or emotional anguish was intended or purposefully sought by the accused is immaterial. The fact that the husband caused such mental or emotional anguish to his wife or child through marital infidelity is sufficient for his conviction.
B. |
If the criminal statute does not include an express mens rea element, the Court must require it only to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. Marital infidelity is not an act that is innocent in itself that should require intent as an element of the offense charged |
I also respectfully submit that intent must not be required in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity because the prohibited conduct is "inherently immoral." I have reservations about the constant use of this principle in every criminal case.[34] It should not be applied by the Court if there is no ambiguity in the law. I reiterate that the Legislature has the plenary power to enact criminal laws, define crime, and dictate whether mens rea is required for its violation.[35]
The "inherent immorality" test must not always control the Court's determination of whether a criminal statute is mala in se or mala prohibita. The interpretation of legislative intent as dispensing with knowledge and willfulness as elements of the crime must not be confined to offenses differentiable upon their relative lack of turpitude.[36] "Where the offenses prohibited and made punishable are capable of inflicting widespread injury, and where the requirement of proof of the offender's guilty knowledge and wrongful intent would render enforcement of the prohibition difficult if not impossible (i.e., in effect tend to nullify the statute), the legislative intent to dispense with mens rea as an element of the offense has justifiable basis."[37]
When a special penal law is silent as to criminal intent as an element of the crime, the presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from an "otherwise innocent conduct."[38] That is, when the act punished by the law is not innocent in itself, a general intent to commit the actus reus is sufficient for conviction, and the Court must not read specific intent as an element of the offense when the law is otherwise silent on that matter.[39] This ultimately relates to due process, for no law can be passed nor interpreted in a way that criminalizes a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.[40]
The application of the foregoing principle was illustrated in cases where specific criminal intent to violate the law was required, to wit: (1) possession of food stamps only for authorized purposes recognized by law, because the possession of these items is an innocent act in itself;[41] (2) possession of an unlicensed machinegun,[42] when the US has a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership, as opposed to grenades, the possession of which is not "innocent in itself" because it is a highly dangerous offensive weapon;[43] (3) carrying sharp objects, such as fountain pens and knitting needles, in the streets, because "no rational person could find the presence of fountain pens and knitting needles in the public streets to be a source of alarm," as opposed to four-inch knives, which are "rarely carried on the streets for innocent purposes";[44] and (4) sale or distribution of any obscene visual or print medium if it involves the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, because sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of 17 are protected by the First Amendment, and there is opportunity for reasonable mistake as to the actual age of the persons depicted in the medium.[45]
The foregoing cases uniformly reveal that specific criminal intent must be required if, in the absence thereof, a wide array of conduct that is innocent in itself will be penalized, in violation of the constitutional right to due process. However, if the conduct punished is not innocent in itself, the criminal statute will not be taken as one requiring specific intent; instead, the legal maxim, "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is applicable.[46] In such a case, "[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."[47] The law only requires the prosecution to show "general intent," i.e., that the accused "possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime,"[48] or "knowledge of the circumstances that the law has defined as material to the offense."[49]
Applying the foregoing, the Court must resolve the question of whether the conduct prohibited by Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is innocent in itself. If it is, then a strict specific criminal intent must be required; otherwise, only a general intent to voluntarily commit the prohibited act is sufficient for conviction in case of its violation.
There cannot be any serious debate that the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child," through "repeated verbal and emotional abuse" and marital infidelity, among others, is not innocent in itself. Marital infidelity is even violative of the obligations between a husband and wife under Article 68,[50] in relation to Article 55,[51] of the Family Code. Indeed, as early as 1948, the Court has recognized that damages may be recovered for mental and psychological suffering.[52] Verily, any act that causes mental or emotional anguish is a form of violence upon persons.[53]
In light of the above, I find that specific criminal intent to "cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" is not required for XXX's conviction. As long as the prosecution is able to show that all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 are present, then XXX may be convicted for its violation. As further discussed below, the prosecution was able to discharge this evidentiary burden. Hence, XXX's conviction must be affirmed by the Court.
I reiterate that the Legislature is ultimately the sole repository of the power to define and punish crime. In the exercise of such power, it may pass statutory crimes "in the commission of which the perpetrator acts at his peril, and that if knowledge is not made a prerequisite by the statute defining the crime, its absence is not a defense, nor is it an element to be proved by the State."[54] I respectfully submit that the Court must adopt a restrained approached in reading intent into a criminal statute that is otherwise silent on mens rea. A contrary ruling, in my opinion, encourages the Court to tread upon impermissible judicial legislation and outright usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to enact penal laws, define crime, and prescribe penalties therefor.[55]
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that for crimes that a:re mala prohibita, the Court has adopted a distinction between volition, as the voluntary performance of an act or knowledge of the act being done, and intent, as the conscious and willful violation of law.[56] Particularly in cases involving Republic Act No. 9262, the Court has ruled that while the law, being mala prohibitum, does not require guilty knowledge and criminal or evil intent, or the conscious intent or will to violate the statute,[57] it must still be shown that the accused intended to commit the prohibited act; conversely, if a person did not intend to perpetrate an act which has been defined by law to be the crime itself, then he is not guilty of the act."[58]
I note the apprehensions of several members of the Court in construing the law in a manner where mens rea is not required because it will supposedly make violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, "subjective" and "dependent on the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant."[59] However, it is my position that the application of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 without requiring mens rea will not result in a penal statute that is purely subjective and dependent on the allegations of the woman or her child. The elements thereof still require objective conduct on the part of the accused, which results in mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to the woman or her child. The resulting mental or emotional condition of the woman or her child is still dependent on the external act or acts of the accused.
It is true that for violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the resulting anguish, ridicule, or humiliation is addressed to the victim's mind; hence, it cannot be tested based on any hard-and-fast rule.[60] Nevertheless, when the statute requires a condition to be produced in the victim's mind as a result of the external acts of the accused, the Court must not shirk its duty to apply the law upon the excuse that it is "subjective" or "dependent" on the victim's allegations. Instead, the resulting mental or emotional anguish must be viewed in light of the perception and judgment of the victim.[61] For example, in rape cases involving intimidation, the Court has required "intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will," which may be determined based on "the age, sex and condition of the [victim]."[62]
Besides, it is precisely the courts' judicial function to apply the rules on evidence to determine the veracity of the victim's claim regarding the mental or emotional suffering that he or she suffered and assess whether the conduct of the accused is sufficient to produce such condition in the mind of the victim.[63] For cases of alleged violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the Court may apply well-known principles on evidence, such as "bare allegations" not being equivalent proof and "proof beyond reasonable doubt" as the quantum of evidence required for conviction, among others.
III. |
Even if the Court considers specific intent as an element of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, the accused's intent to cause mental or emotional anguish through marital infidelity must be presumed once infidelity is established as a fact |
Even assuming that specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is required for XXX's conviction, l humbly submit that the prosecution was able to prove it beyond reasonable doubt.
A. |
The act of marital infidelity furnishes the evidence on intent to cause mental or emotional anguish because it is presumed that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent |
In the first place, it is presumed that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.[64] Indeed, the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind and capable of understanding the ordinary and natural consequences of their actions, such that when they commit a crime, they are presumed to have committed it intentionally.[65]
Once the prosecution is able to establish that the accused committed an unlawful act, then he or she is presumed to have done so with deliberate intent-with freedom, intelligence, and malice-because the moral and legal presumption under our jurisdiction is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[66] Hence, where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, then the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and, in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent.[67] In such a case, "the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some causes or influences moving the mind."[68]
Upon review of the records, it is my position that the foregoing presumption should be applied against XXX because the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, namely:
The records bear that the prosecution was able to prove the following against XXX:
First, AAA is the private complainant and offended party.
Second, AAA is the legal wife of XXX, their marriage having been celebrated in 1999,[70] and they have a son together named CCC;[71]
Third, XXX caused emotional or mental anguish upon AAA.
Proof of mental and emotional anguish may consist of the testimony of the offended party, AAA, as such damage is personal to her.[72] Thus, in a previous case, the Court held that the testimony of the wife, who mentioned that she could not sleep and was hurt by her husband's marital infidelity, is sufficient proof of the element of "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation."[73]
Here, AAA took the witness stand and adequately testified on the mental and emotional anguish that she suffered where she mentioned her experiences after discovering XXX's marital infidelity: (1) she kept on crying; (2) she could not sleep and was not able to go for work for three to four months; (3) she felt like she was being tortured; (4) she had to make herself feel numb from her hurt feelings; (5) she felt helpless in her situation; and (6) she felt that she was broken and about to go crazy:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. MISLANG ON AAANotably, AAA's testimony on the mental and emotional anguish that she suffered due to XXX's marital infidelity was corroborated by BBB.[75]
Finally, the emotional or mental anguish suffered by AAA is due to XXX's marital infidelity, which was not only proven by the prosecution but also admitted by XXX himself. XXX's marital infidelity is an established fact. Indeed, during pre-trial, XXX stipulated that he is the father of DDD,[76] the fruit of his sexual congress with YYY. The prosecution's evidence further established that YYY is the mother of DDD and that he was born in 2011,[77] 12 years after XXX married AAA in 1999.[78] XXX himself admitted his marital infidelity in open court when he mentioned on direct examination that he had sexual relations with YYY sometime in January 2011.[79]
Some members of the Court take the position that the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of proof because, in their opinion, marital infidelity may only constitute psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262 if it is used as a coercive control tactic, to intimidate or dominate the other spouse, or to otherwise infringe on his/her autonomy and agency.[80] With due respect, I find that this statutory interpretation has no basis in the language of Republic Act No. 9262.
All that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires, as applied to the present case, is for the prosecution to prove that XXX committed marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation to AAA. Indeed, the Court has previously held that the wife's discovery of her husband's marital infidelity was sufficient to cause her pain and suffering, even though she may not have been "bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband."[81] Requiring the prosecution to prove circumstances that are not provided by law is impermissible judicial legislation.
Further, to take the stance that XXX's purported one-time marital infidelity is insufficient for conviction is to belittle the mental or emotional anguish suffered by AAA. As pointed out by Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (Justice J. Lopez), it is unnatural for a person to allow his/her spouse to engage in sexual relations with another.[82] Certainly, for all its faults, and though Members of the Court may opine differently, our society still values monogamy in marriages, such that our legal system is replete with various laws that penalize marital infidelity.[83] It is therefore not unreasonable to expect AAA to suffer mental or emotional anguish after she discovered XXX's marital infidelity, even if it supposedly happened only once. The Court has even previously stated that "[marital] infidelity is not measured in terms of frequency."[84]
In my assessment, all the elements of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were proven by the prosecution. The very act of marital infidelity, a conduct which is not innocent in itself, coupled with the wife's emotional anguish, furnishes the evidence of XXX's criminal intent.[85] Surely, if the Court can make such presumption on intent from the material results of the act in criminal cases involving theft[86] and homicide,[87] it may also presume intent to cause mental or emotional anguish when the latter has been proven by the prosecution, as in this case.
B. |
XXX is also presumed to have intended the resulting emotional or mental anguish suffered by his wife because it is the natural and probable consequence of his marital infidelity |
Further, it is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his/her voluntary act, and no person of sane mind should be allowed to escape the natural and ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts by pleading that he did not intend them.[88] Hence, the Court has held that intent on the part of the accused may be established by applying the principle that every person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his/her acts.[89]
To apply the foregoing principle, the Court must first address the question of whether mental or emotional anguish to the wife is a natural and ordinary consequence of the husband's marital infidelity. In my assessment, it is. As pointed out by the ponencia, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed acts of unfaithfulness, aside from mental or emotional pain?[90] Thus, XXX, being of reasonable and sane mind, is presumed to have intended the natural and ordinary consequences of his marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional anguish to AAA.
My conclusion is drawn from pertinent laws, jurisprudence, and the legislative history of Republic Act No. 9262.
First, even Article 247[91] of the Revised Penal Code recognizes marital infidelity as a conduct so atrocious that catching someone's spouse in the act of having sexual intercourse with another is considered an exceptional circumstance. In such a situation, the law recognizes that the innocent spouse will be so overcome with passion and obfuscation, or a fit of rage, to the point of homicidal acts.[92]
Second, Article 68 of the Family Code expressly states that the "husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and tender mutual help and support." Thus, Article 55 of the Family Code identifies sexual infidelity as one of the grounds for legal separation that may be taken as evidence that mental or emotional anguish to the innocent spouse is a natural consequence of marital infidelity.
Finally, in assessing intent as derived from the natural and probable consequences of an unlawful act, the Court must still be guided by common sense, logic, and human experience.[93] As earlier discussed, the normative expectation among married couples is monogamy; indeed, marriage and the family remain as inviolable social institutions in the Philippines and recognized as such by the 1987 Constitution.[94] Surely, Filipino mores and common sense dictate that unfaithfulness by a spouse will offend the other, as pointed out by Justice J. Lopez.[95]
Hence, XXX should have known that his marital infidelity would cause anguish to AAA, his legal wife. Common sense dictates that XXX should have and would have known how offensive his marital infidelity was to AAA, especially considering that, by his own admission, he and AAA were living together under one roof when he had sexual relations with YYY, and it was only when AAA found out about his extra-marital relations that they lived separately.[96] Knowing the same yet still proceeding with his unfaithfulness, XXX is presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his unfaithfulness.
The burden then shifts to XXX to prove that he lacked the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA when he had sexual relations with YYY.[97] Such intent may be negated by showing that at the time he had sexual relations with YYY, he and AAA were living separately and had mutually agreed that they are both free to resume romantic or sexual relations with others.[98] Any alleged mental or emotional anguish to AAA may also be defeated by demonstrating that XXX and AAA have been separated for some time by their mutual consensus, and that XXX has been engaging in extra-marital relations with YYY publicly and notoriously.[99]
However, XXX failed to establish any of the foregoing circumstances negating any intent on his part to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA. Perforce, the presumption that XXX acted with criminal intent to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA stands, and his conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is warranted.
IV. |
Even assuming that mens rea is required, the standard of culpable mental state in Republic Act No. 9262 allows conviction based on reckless conduct |
Even assuming that intent or mens rea is required for XXX's conviction, it is clear from Republic Act No. 9262 that an accused may be held criminally liable for violations of its provisions based on reckless conduct.
In the context of Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262, "intent" may be interpreted as one that requires the prosecution to show that the accused committed the prohibited act for the specific purpose of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." However, the degree of the accused's culpable mental state is not limited to purposeful or knowing conduct. The culpable mental state of the accused may also be based on recklessness and criminal negligence. Significantly, the Court has ruled that negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences may rise to the level of or be equivalent to criminal intent.[100]
The standards of mens rea are the following: (1) purpose, where the accused acts with specific intent to cause the results of his/her conduct; (2) knowledge, where the accused commits the prohibited act knowing that it will result in harm; (3) recklessness, where the accused consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the conduct will cause harm to another; and (4) negligence, where the accused fails to perceive, even though he/she should be aware of, a substantial and unjustifiable risk to his/her conduct.[101] The degree of mens rea to support a judgment of conviction will depend on the language of the statute.[102] A higher standard of mens rea makes it harder for the prosecution to substantiate the needed inferences to establish intent.[103]
Particularly with regard to "recklessness" as a standard of criminal liability, it is committed when the accused "acted willfully and wantonly, in utter disregard of the consequence of his or her action," as it is the "inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law[.]"[104] It is "wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences and of the rights and of the feelings of others" that is "conceived in the spirit of mischief or of "criminal indifference to civil obligations."[105] Recklessness requires the accused to actually foresee the risk involved and to consciously decide to ignore it.[106]
To show that an accused acted with criminal recklessness, the prosecution must establish that (1) the alleged act or omission, viewed objectively at the time of its commission, created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that occurred; (2) the risk was of such a magnitude that disregard of it constituted a gross deviation from the accepted standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation; (3) the accused was consciously aware or knew of the "substantial and unjustifiable" risk at the time of the conduct; and (4) the accused consciously disregarded that risk.[107]
As earlier mentioned, the required standard of mens rea is derived from the language of the statute itself.[108] Thus, in Voisine V. United States,[109] it was held that the standard of recklessness was sufficient for conviction in a crime involving domestic violence, because the statute punished the act of "use or attempted use of physical force."[110] The U.S. Supreme Court considered that the term "use" "does not demand that the person applying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that it is substantially likely to do so. Or, otherwise said, that word is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct."
Here, the language of the statute itself allows conviction for violations of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 on the basis of reckless conduct. Indeed, Section 5(h) of Republic Act No. 9262 clearly recognizes that emotional or psychological distress may be caused through "reckless conduct," viz.:
While "reckless conduct" is mentioned only in Section 5(h) of Republic Act No. 9262, there is basis to state that it may also be extended to violations under Section 5(i) of the same law. Indeed, in determining whether the prohibited act is mala in se or mala prohibita, the Court may review the language of the law and the totality of its provisions to conclude the degree of culpable mental state required by the statute. To this end, a term evincing intent in one section of the law or element of the crime may modify and be extended to another, such that scienter may also be required for the other elements of the offense.[111]
It also bears reiterating that the acts of psychological violence in Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 are subsumed in Sections 5(h) and 5(i) of the same law.[112] Thus, both these sub-sections involve psychological violence. The penalties[113] for violations under Sections 5(h) and 5(i) are even the same. The standard of culpable mental state for psychological violence under Section 5(i) may therefore be based on Section 5(h).
Further, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 penalizes "[c]ausing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child" through marital infidelity. Similar to Voisine, there is nothing in the language of the statute indicating that it is limited to "knowing" or "purposeful" acts calculated to result in mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation. It is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.
With these in mind, and to address the constitutional concerns of some members of the Court in the enforcement of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 if intent is not required, I submit that the degrees of culpable mental state in Section 5(h) of Republic Act No. 9262 may also be extended to Section 5(i) of the same law. This means that XXX's conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must be affirmed if it is shown that he acted with "purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct." As discussed below, I find that XXX acted in reckless disregard of or with conscious indifference to the consequences of his marital infidelity, which resulted in mental or emotional anguish to his wife, AAA.
V. |
The evidence on record establishes XXX's malice and criminal intent through his reckless conduct |
Upon review of the evidence on record, it is my assessment that XXX intended to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA when he committed marital infidelity. At the very least, he knew that his conduct would necessarily cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA, yet he proceeded to commit marital infidelity anyway. He acted in reckless disregard of his marital vows and with conscious indifference to the consequences of his conduct vis- -vis AAA's mental and emotional state, warranting his conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
A. |
XXX's marital infidelity created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of mental or emotional anguish to AAA |
As discussed above, mental or emotional anguish to the innocent spouse is a natural and probable consequence of marital infidelity, considering that marriage is a protected and inviolable institution under Philippine laws and the Constitution. XXX's marital infidelity therefore created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that AAA will suffer mental or emotional anguish.
I concur in the observation of Justice J. Lopez that Allan's sole defense is premised on the absence of a "mistress" relationship with YYY because, purportedly, they only had a one-night stand.[114] However, as pointed out by the ponencia, a one-time sexual intercourse between a husband and a woman who is not his wife is sufficient to commit marital infidelity under Republic Act No. 9262.
In any case, I stress that the prosecution has established continuing romantic relations between XXX and YYY, and that their relationship is more than what XXX claims it to be.
First, Jennifer Santos, a desk officer of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx City, who attended to AAA's complaint against XXX, testified that during the barangay proceedings between the spouses, XXX admitted his relationship with YYY, stating, "kinasama po niya [XXX] iyong tao na iyon na si YYY."[115] This reveals that XXX did not just have a one-time sexual tryst with YYY, for be even considered her as his "kinasama" or romantic partner. Great weight must be given to the testimony of Jennifer Santos because, being an official of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx City, she enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her official duties.[116]
Second, BBB clearly testified on YYY's admission that she and XXX have been together for some time. Specifically, YYY answered in the affirmative when BBB asked her if she and XXX have been together for long.[117]
I find that BBB's testimony on the foregoing matter is not inadmissible hearsay; instead, it constitutes an extra-judicial admission by YYY, XXX's co-conspirator for the violation of Republic Act No. 9262, which is an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 130, Section 31,[118] of the Rules of Court.[119]
It bears pointing out that XXX testified that YYY herself was a married woman.[120] It thus appears that XXX is YYY's co-conspirator in the crime of Adultery. Hence, YYY's statement to BBB, as narrated by the latter, must be given weight, considering that it even constitutes an admission of adulterous acts on YYY's part,[121] and she would not have lied about this matter to incriminate herself for Adultery.[122] For the same reason, XXX's testimony on the marital status of YYY is equally credible under Rule 130, Section 27[123] of the Rules of Court; it is an admission against his interest as YYY's co-conspirator for Adultery.
Finally, in convicting XXX, the RTC observed that XXX was only wearing his undershirt and slippers at YYY's house, and "logic dictates that one would not be too cozy with a woman he was intimate with for only one night."[124] The RTC's findings are supported by the testimony of BBB, who mentioned that during the confrontation on July 19, 2016, XXX was wearing white boxer shorts, jeans, and slippers.[125] BBB additionally testified that XXX removed his shoes at YYY's house and even had to ask one of the tanods of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx to fetch the shoes for him.[126] XXX likewise stated on cross-examination that when he was at YYY's house, he removed his polo and was seen wearing only his sando, his undershirt, and jeans.[127]
XXX's cozy outfit at YYY's house, taken together with the rest of the prosecution's evidence, demonstrates that he was, in truth, cohabiting with YYY. Certainly, if XXX was simply granted visitation rights by YYY, it was suspect that he would he so comfortable at YYY's house as to remove his shoes and polo shirt, and even stay there with only his undershirt on and his white boxer shorts visible.
B. |
The risk created is not a mere remote possibility but a likelihood of substantial harm, such that its disregard constitutes a gross violation of accepted standards of care under the relevant laws |
The risk of substantial harm to AAA that may result from XXX's marital infidelity was of such magnitude that XXX's disregard of the risk constituted a gross deviation from the accepted standard of care that a reasonable husband would have exercised in the same situation. To repeat, under Article 68 of the Family Code, the spouses are obliged to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." There cannot be any quibbling that XXX's marital infidelity is a gross deviation from accepted standards of care for his wife that a husband must observe under Article 68 of the Family Code.
The risk of harm to AAA was not a remote possibility, but a strong likelihood, given that, as earlier mentioned, XXX and his wife were living together under the same roof at that time and were even jointly raising their son.[128] The likelihood of resulting harm from XXX's marital infidelity is even heightened because, by XXX's own testimony, AAA has been supporting XXX's lifestyle by gifting him a car[129] and providing him financial support.[130] Incidentally, the very same car gifted by AAA to XXX is the vehicle that he used to visit YYY in xxxxxxxxxxx City.[131]
Evidently, AAA was committed in their conjugal relationship and has been complying with her spousal obligation to render mutual help and support to her husband, XXX. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to conclude that any betrayal of such trust by XXX created a strong likelihood of substantial harmxxxxxxxxxxxby way of mental or emotional anguishxxxxxxxxxxxto AAA.
C. |
XXX was conscious of or had knowledge of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his marital infidelity created |
"Knowledge" refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact.[132] Because knowledge is a state of mind, it must be determined on a case-to case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances; it may also be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[133]
In the present case, the attendant circumstances and XXX's conduct before, during; and after the marital infidelity reveal that he foresaw the substantial risk of harm to AAA created by his violation of his oath of fidelity to his wife. That is, he was consciously aware or had knowledge that his marital infidelity created the substantial and unjustifiable risk of mental or emotional anguish to AAA.
First, it is well recognized that attempts to conceal the corpus delicti or evidence of a crime indicates knowledge of illegality.[134]
Here, as admitted by XXX on direct testimony, and based on the stipulations [135] by the parties and the prosecution's evidence,[136] XXX had sexual relations with YYY in January 2011.[137] However, he concealed this from AAA, who found out about YYY only on July 19, 2016, the date when AAA appeared at the residence of YYY in Barangay xxxxxxxxxxx
City.[138]
Further, when AAA went to the residence at xxxxxxxxxxx City, on July 19, 2016, XXX did not want to face her and refused to go out and meet her for a time.[139] It was only when AAA's mother went inside the house, and when AAA's mother told XXX, "sige kung hindi ka lalabas, doon na lang tayo sa opisina mo mag-usap," that XXX finally went out to meet AAA.[140]
XXX's furtive behavior is certainly inconsistent with what an innocent man would do. Indeed, why would XXX conceal his infidelity from AAA and even refuse to immediately meet her at xxxxxxxxxxx City, if he did not know that his conduct would cause, as it indeed caused, mental or emotional anguish upon AAA? Certainly, "[a] guilty conscience makes a man such a coward as to bring himself out in the open."[141]
Second, AAA's testimony on direct examination reveals that XXX reacted negatively and even threatened self-harm when she mentioned to him that she sought advice from lawyers about her rights and the legal remedies available to her after she found out that XXX had sexual relations with YYY and even fathered her son, DDD. XXX's conduct is indicative of a person with a guilty conscience and who fears reprisal from his victim, AAA.[142] When AAA stated that she wanted XXX to be incarcerated, XXX was so upset to the point of threatening self-harm.[143] Surely, an innocent husband who has been observing the laws would not fear incarceration or retribution from his wife.
Third, XXX was uniquely situated to understand that his marital infidelity created a substantial risk of emotional or mental anguish to AAA. I repeat that AAA was financially supporting XXX, even going so far as to gift him a car. As the recipient of AAA's care, XXX would have been aware that AAA would be particularly hurt to discover his marital infidelity despite the support that she has extended to her husband.
Respectfully, I do not subscribe tc the view that a one-night stand, concealed by the husband but later on discovered by the wife, cannot be taken as an act of psychological violence;[144] or that XXX's concealment of the marital infidelity is evidence of his intent not to cause mental or emotional anguish to his wife, his shame and humiliation, and his desire to spare AAA mental or emotional distress.[145]
The foregoing conclusion goes against some of the most basic tenets of criminal law-concealment of the corpus delicti is evidence not only of guilt but also of discernment.[146] It is also manifestly violative of the clear provisions of the Family Code on fidelity. Such ruling rewards only the most ingenious unfaithful spouse, for their marital infidelity will not be considered as intentional infliction of mental or emotional anguish upon their clueless spouse, so long as they craftily conceal it. Though their betrayal is later discovered by the innocent spouse, their cover-up would even be taken as an act of benevolence, to "spare" the innocent spouse from emotional distress. This is absurd. It is willful blindness to the fact that the innocent spouse would not have suffered such mental or emotional anguish had the offending spouse chosen observe his/her civil obligation of fidelity to his/her spouse.
To repeat, the Court has previously held that the wife's discovery of her husband's marital infidelity was sufficient to cause her pain and suffering, even though she may not have been "bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband."[147] The discovery of marital infidelity, though it may have happened after the fact, was sufficient to cause mental or emotional anguish. I do not see any need for the Court to depart from this ruling.
D. |
XXX willfully engaged in marital infidelity with YYY and consciously disregarded the risk of harm to AAA |
XXX's reckless conduct and conscious disregard of the consequences of his marital infidelity to AAA is on record. His testimony reveals that he deliberately, voluntarily, and romantically pursued YYY in January 2011, as shown by the following: (1) XXX helped YYY, then a customs representative, with her shipment at the port of Davao, where XXX was stationed as an administrative aide of the Bureau of Customs; (2) he went out with YYY on a date later that night; (3) in the course of their date, the two had drinks; (4) after their date, XXX accompanied YYY to her hotel (hinatid), where they consummated their carnal desires; and (5) XXX slept with YYY in her hotel room, returned to her later, and accompanied her to the airport. On direct examination, XXX testified:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. BANSUELO ON XXXXXX's testimony reveals his criminal intent. He recklessly and shamelessly behaved like an unmarried man when he romantically pursued YYY. His reckless conduct rises to the level of intent to cause AAA mental or emotional anguish. It demonstrates his utter lack of even the slightest care for AAA and how she would feel if she knew that her husband broke his vow of fidelity to her by romantically pursuing another woman, taking her out on a date, and even engaging in amorous sexual relations with her.
Respectfully, I also disagree with the view that XXX did not intend to cause mental or emotional anguish to AAA because he remained present for AAA and CCC, continued to support them, and was even paying for utility and rent bills.[149] As pointed out by Justice Lazaro-Javier, XXX could continue to support AAA and CCC yet still be guilty of marital infidelity. Indeed, continuing support and marital infidelity are not mutually exclusive. An unfaithful husband may even be more solicitous towards his wife to cover up his philandering ways. As previously held by the Court, "[a] man could hide his evil motives and immoral conduct behind a deceptive facade."[150] It stands to reason that a husband who has illicit relations with a woman may even be over-solicitous with his wife to camouflage his infidelity.[151]
A final word. As late as 2015, in Perfecto v. Esidera,[152] the Court was quick to castigate a judge who violated her marital vows, even pointing out that her act of cohabiting, having sexual relations, and siring a child with her paramour had "legal implications." It did not matter to the Court that her marriage to her husband was never consummated, that they never lived together, and that they had long been estranged when she pursued romantic relations with another man. The law is the law, and the Court must consider and apply it as such.
In XXX's case, the prosecution has proven all the elements of his violation of Section 5(i), RA 9262. Given the prosecution's evidence establishing XXX's culpable mental state, the Court should not bend over backwards to accommodate XXX's actions. Excuses have been proffered for his willful marital infidelity and reckless disregard of the consequences thereof, e.g., that the Philippines is one of the few remaining countries to criminalize marital infidelity, that he just had a one-night stand with YYY, that he continued to support his son with AAA, or that he "cared" enough to conceal his infidelity from AAA.
Following case law[153] and the disquisition above, the Court must address only the following issues: (1) whether XXX committed marital infidelity; (2) whether the marital infidelity, if committed by XXX, caused mental or emotional anguish to AAA; and (3) whether XXX, supposing he committed marital infidelity, acted with a culpable mental state-purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct. If XXX, conscious of how his marital infidelity will result in substantial harm to his wife, decides to be unfaithful anyway, in reckless disregard of the consequences of his action, then he is guilty of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The Court need not look any further or consider factor extraneous from what the law requires.
From Esidera to the instant case, the laws remain unchanged; only the sexes of the unfaithful partners have. If the laws on marriage are strictly enforced against the wife, I fail to see why we cannot take the same stance against the husband.
Accordingly, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the conviction of XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
* The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 8505, entitled "Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998," approved on February 13, 1998; and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
[1] Fernandez v. Lantin, 165 Phil. 941, 946 (1976).
[2] Singgit v. People, G.R. No. 264179, February 27, 2023.
[3] Jurado v. Suy Yan, 148 Phil. 677 (1971); Enrile v. People, 766 Phil. 75 (2015).
[4] RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, secs. 4 and 5 provide.
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there is variance between the offense charge in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those construting the latter.
[5] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 255877, March 29, 2023. See also Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 142 S. Ct. 2370, 2376-2377 (2022).
American jurisprudence has persuasive effect in the case at bar, given that the Philippines adopted the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment as the Due Process Clause in the 1987 Constitution, as well as the legislative practice in the United States of passing special penal laws, both of which have bearing in the resolution of the present case. American decisions and authorities, though not per se controlling the Philippines, have persuasive effect. It may be resorted to if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. [Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205,269 (2014)).
Significantly, the practice of passing special penal laws to criminalize acts in addition to the felonies under the Revised Penal Code was modeled from conventional practice in the United States. [People v. Simon y Sunga, 304 Phil. 725 (1994)]. Thus, the Court has adopted several principles of criminal law from American jurisprudence, including the mens rea requirement in embezzlement [Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 335 Phil. 795 (1997)], "totality of circumstances test" [People v. Bacero, 790 Phil. 745 (2016), malice in libel [MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, 444 Phil. 230 (2003)], and pardon [Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr., 252 Phil. 192 (1989)].
American jurisprudence has particular persuasiveness in the sphere of constitutional law, particularly with regard to the Due Process Clause, given that the latter was derived from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. [Saunar v. Ermita, 822 Phil. 536, 543 (2017); Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corp., 844 Phil. 603 (2018)].
[6] Ponencia, p. 12.
[7] U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 132-138 (1909); U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915); People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181, 184-185 (1935).
[8] People v. Echegaray, 335 Phil. 343 (1997); Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
[9] U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915).
[10] Patulot v. People, 845 Phil. 439 (2019); Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290 (2001).
[11] Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021.
[12] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 255877, March 29, 2023; XXX256611 v. People, G.R. No. 256611, October 12, 2022; Calingasan v. People, G.R. No. 239313, February 15, 2022.
[13] Id.
[14] 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
[15] Id.
[16] U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577, 581 (1915).
[17] Id.
[18] Guiani-Sayadi v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239930, May 10, 2021 [Notice].
[19] See Coronado v. Sandiganbayan, 296-A Phil. 414 (1993).
[20] People v. Largo, 306 Phil. 24 (1994).
[21] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000). See also People v. Martin, 78 Cal. App.4th 1107, 1117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), citing People v. Lynn, August 28, 1894, 159 (Cal. App. 3d 716), citing People v. Dillon, September 1, 1983, 34 Cal. 3d 441.
[22] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[23] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[24] Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596 (1957); Republic v. Rambuyong, 646 Phil. 373, 381 (2010), citing Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 212 Phil. 215, 224-225 (1984).
[25] See Villanueva v. Estoque, 400 Phil. 6, 14 (2000).
[26] People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[27] See Malcampo-Repollo v. People, 890 Phil. 1159 (2020), and Demata v. People, G.R. No. 228583, September 15, 2021, which involve criminal cases for alleged violations of RA 7610 or the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Relevantly, the Court has held that in general, the offenses punished in RA 7610 are mala prohibita, save for those where the law requires intent, e.g., lascivious conduct upon a child, acts which debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, and being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. In ruling that the prohibited acts in RA 7610 are generally mala prohibita, the Court reasoned that the law is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse and exploitation and to give special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
[28] See U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909); U.S. v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Rehaif v. United States, decided on June 21, 2019; and People v. Merriweather, 139 Misc. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1988).
[29] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, pp. 10-11;
Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated August 27, 2002, pp. 19-26;
Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated March 4, 2003, pp. 9-10.
[30] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, p. 26.
[31] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated February 19, 2002, pp. 10-11.
[32] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women dated August 27, 2002, p. 19.
[33] Ponencia, p. 12.
[34] See U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 132-138 (1909); U.S. v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 228-29, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019); and People v. Merriweather, 139 Misc. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1988).
[35] People v. Dillon, September 1, 1983, 34 Cal. 3d 441; People v. Lynn, August 28, 1894, 159 (Cal. App. 3d 716); People v. Martin, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[36] United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438-39 (3d Cir. 1943).
[37] Id.
[38] See Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) and Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450, 142 S. Ct. 2370, 2376-2377 (2022). See also Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269-271 (2000).
[39] See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269-271 (2000).
[40] Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
[41] Id.
[42] Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
[43] United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
[44] People v. Ortiz, 125 Misc. 2d 318 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984).
[45] United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
[46] United Stares v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). [Concurring Opinion, J. Brennan]
[47] Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256-257 (1952).
[48] Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
[49] United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). [Concurring Opinion, J. Brennan].
[50] Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
[51] Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....[52] See Concurring Opinion of J. Perfecto in Castro v. Acro Taxicab Co., Inc., 82 Phil. 359 (1948).
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
[53] See US v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 (1912).
[54] People v. Largo, 306 Phil. 24 (1994).
[55] See People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
[56] U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
[57] See U.S. v. Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577 (1915).
[58] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 252087, February 10, 2021.
[59] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
[60] See Astorga v. People, 480 Phil. 585, 594-595 (2004).
[61] Id.
[62] Alejandro v. Bernas, 672 Phil. 698, 708-709 (2011).
[63] For instance, in appreciating passion of obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, there must be facts proved showing provocation sufficient to produce such a condition of mind. [U.S. v. Pilares, 18 Phil. 87 (1910)]
[64] Rule 131, sec. 3(b) OF THE RULES OF COURT.
[65] People v. Aldemita, 229 Phil. 448 (1986).
[66] People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 87084, June 27, 1990.
[67] Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42, 46 (Ark. 1941), citing Harris v. State, 34 Ark. 469; State v. Boggs, 103 W. Va. 641, 645 (W. Va. 1927).
[68] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430, 461 (2003).
[69] See Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021, citing Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015).
[70] RTC records, pp. 42-43, Marriage Certificate between XXX and AAA.
[71] Id. at 59-60, Pre-Trial Order signed by XXX.
[72] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015).
[73] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[74] TSN, AAA, June 8, 2017, pp. 17-19.
[75] TSN, BBB, June 25, 2017, pp. 17-19, which relevantly reads:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. MISLANG ON BBB
Q |
Did you see the effect of the discovery of the mistress and the child on AAA? |
A |
Opo. |
Q |
What was the effect to AAA? |
A |
Yun pong emotion na iyak na (sic) iyak si AAA, parang normal po sa isang babae iyong hindi niya matanggap na niloko siya ng asawa nya. Iyak ng (sic) iyak, hindi siya humihinto sa kakaiyak. |
Q |
Did you have communication with AAA after the July 19, 2016 (sic)? |
A |
After July 19 po, siguro po mga ilang days na iyon after, pumunta po si AAA sa bahay. |
Q |
And what happened when she went to your house, if any? |
A |
Mayroon po siyang pinabasang text ni XXX sa kanya. |
Q |
What was the text message? |
A |
Yung text po ni XXX sa kanya eh iyong part na lang po na magpapakamatay siya at susunugin niya po iyong bahay. |
Q |
And what was the effect of the text on AAA? |
A |
Iyak ng iyak siyempre si AAA po. Hindi niya po alam kung anong gagawin nya. |
[76] RTC records, pp. 59-60, Pre-Trial Order signed by Allan.
[77] Id. at 57-58, Birth Certificate of DDD.
[78] Id. at 42-43, Marriage Certificate between XXX and AAA.
[79] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[80] See Dissenting Opinions of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[81] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[82] See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[83] Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017).
[84] Quiogue, Jr. v. Quiogue, G.R. No. 203992, August 22, 2022 [Per J. M.V. Lopez].
[85] Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42 (Ark. 1941), citing Harris v. State, 34 Ark. 469; State v. Boggs, 103 W. Va. 641 (W. Va. 1927); People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003).
[86] In theft, intent to gain is also presumed when it is proven that the accused unlawfully took personal property owned by another. [People v. Togon, Jr., G.R. No. 247501, October 11, 2021]
[87] Intent to kill is presumed from the fact that the victim died. [People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003); People v. Vasquez, 474 Phil. 59 (2004); Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, 689 Phil. 75 (2012)]
[88] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3(c).
[89] People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Syvel's Inc., 247 Phil. 209 (1988).
[90] Ponencia, p. 12.
[91] Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
[92] People v. Marquez, 53 Phil. 260 (1929); Peoph v. Dequi a, 60 Phil. 279 (1934); People v. Oyanib, 406 Phil. 650 (2001).
[93] See People v. Jutie, 253 Phil. 578 (1989) and People v. Baylon, May 29, 1974, 156 Phil. 87 (1974).
In People v. Benigno Ang, 223 Phil. 333, 342 (1985), the Court held that in cases involving theft, robbery, or assault, the mitigating alternative circumstance of lack of instruction cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused because "Into one, however unschooled he may be, is so ignorant as not to know that theft or robbery, or assault upon the person of another is inherently wrong and a violation of the law."
[94] CONST., art. XV, secs. 1 and 2.
[95] See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[96] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 5-6.
[97] People v. Delim, 444 Phil. 430 (2003); People v. Vasquez, 474 Phil. 59 (2004); Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, 689 Phil. 75 (2012).
[98] See Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 789 (1960).
[99] See U.S. v. Rivera, 28 Phil. 13 (1914).
[100] U.S. v. Elvi a, 24 Phil. 230 (1913), citing U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911).
[101] See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823-1824 (2021).
[102] Id.
[103] Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2117-2118 (2023).
[104] Valencia v. People, 889 Phil. 450, 462 (2020).
[105] Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 172-173 (Cal. 1911).
[106] Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750-753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), which relevantly states:
Thus, "[a]t the heart of reckless conduct is conscious disregard of the risk created by the actor's conduct[.]" As has often been noted, "[m]ere lack of foresight, stupidity, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, ordinary carelessness, however serious the consequences may happen to be," do not suffice to constitute either culpable negligence or criminal recklessness. Recklessness requires the defendant to actually foresee the risk involved and to consciously decide to ignore it. Such a "devil may care" or "not giving a damn" attitude toward the risk distinguishes the culpable mental state of criminal recklessness from that of criminal negligence, which assesses blame for the failure to foresee the risk that an objectively reasonable person would have foreseen. "Those who are subjectively aware of a significant danger to life and choose, without justification, to engage in actions (or in some cases inactions) that threaten to bring about that danger have made a calculated decision to gamble with other people's lives." This combination of an awareness of the magnitude of the risk and the conscious disregard for consequences is crucial. "It is callous disregard of risk, and not awareness vel non of risk, however, which is critical." And, of course, determining whether an act or omission involves a substantial and unjustifiable risk "requires an examination of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight." (Emphasis supplied)
[107] Commonwealth v. Sanders, 259 A.3d 524, 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021). See also See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1823-1824 (2021).
[108] Id.
[109] Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 69293, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278-2279 (2016).
[110] In Voisine, the subject penal law was "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence", which is "an offense that ... (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim."
[111] United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 77-78, 115 S. Ct. 464, 471-472 (1994).
[112] It is evident from Section 3(c) in relation to Section 5, paragraphs (h) and (i), of RA 9262 that the law distinguishes between acts of psychological violence that are deliberate, knowing, and purposeful, and those acts which are prohibited when they cause mental or emotional anguish. Particularly, Section 3(c) of the law defines "psychological violence" and enumerates acts constituting it. These acts of psychological violence are punished either in paragraph (h) or paragraph (i) of Section 5. While paragraphs (h) and (i) of Section 5 both refer to acts of psychological violence enumerated in Section 3(c), only paragraph (h) requires the conduct to be purposeful, knowing, or reckless.
[113] Sec. 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
....[114] See Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[115] TSN, Jennifer Santos, June 22, 2017, pp. 7-8 which relevantly reads:
DIRECT-EXAMINATION OF ATTY. MISLANG ON JENNIFER SANTOS
Q |
So did the parties talk to each other? |
A |
Yes, ma'am. |
Q |
What was their conversation about if you can remember? |
A |
Ang pinag-uusapan po nila, gusto sana na maging maayos ng complainant na si AAA and relasyon nila doon sa asawa niyang si XXX. |
Q |
So what was the reply of XXX? |
A |
Ang gusto kasing mangyari ni XXX is, hindi na makipagbalikan po kay AAA na asawa niya po. |
Q |
Aside from this, was there other conversation that happened? |
A |
Noong nangyari po kasi iyon, nasaktan po ma'am si AAA so umiyak po siya noong oras na iyon. |
Q |
Was there any admission by XXX? |
A |
Yes po, ma'am. |
Q |
What did he say? |
A |
Ang sabi niya po na kinasama po niya iyong tao na iyon na si YYY tapos po gusto rin naman po niyang hiwalayan po, ma'am, tapos iyon tapos bibisitahin na lang daw po niya iyong anak niya. |
[116] Office of the Ombudsman v. Manlulu, G.R. No. 215986, September 21, 2020 [Notice].
[117] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, pp. 14 and 16-17, respectively, which relevantly reads:
Q |
You have a conversation with YYY. |
A |
Yes. |
Q |
What was your conversation? |
A |
Tinanong ko po si YYY kung matagal na sila ni XXX Sumagot po si YYY ng... |
Q |
And what was the reply of YYY? |
A |
Oo, sabi niya. |
.... |
|
Q |
So after staying in the house, what happened next, if any? |
A |
Nagpaalam na po ako kay YYY. Binigyan nya kasi ako ng tubig, pinainum niya aka doon sa loob. Nagkwentuhan kami, tinanong ko si YYY kung alam nyang may asawa na si XXX. |
Q |
And what was her reply? |
A |
Opo. |
[118] Sec. 31. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
[119] The rule on admission by a conspirator prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. Tamargo v. Awingan, 624 Phil. 312, 327-328 (2010).
[120] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 33-34.
[121] See De Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 40 (1960), which relevantly states:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taken place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the aduherous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
[122] Id.
[123] Sec. 27. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her.
[124] RTC records, p. 113; RTC Decision, p. 13.
[125] TSN, BBB, June 15, 2017, p. 16.
[126] Id. at 14.
[127] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 42-43.
[128] TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 5-6.
[129] On cross-examination, XXX testified that he does not have a car registered in his name. The car that he uses was gifted to him by AAA. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 51]
[130] On direct examination, XXX testified that AAA is the one who is paying for the rental fees for the condominium unit in xxxxxxxxxxx, Manila, that XXX and his son were staying in. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 21] He further testified on direct examination that AAA is supporting him financially and is the one who controls the funds in their marriage, stating, "[n]akakahiya mang aminin, ma'am, na siya [AAA] po ang bumubuhay sa akin." [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, pp. 25-26]
[131] On cross-examination, XXX testified that he uses the car gifted to him by AAA when visiting YYY. He would park this car along xxxxxxxxxxx Street, in front of YYY's apartment. [TSN, XXX, August 24, 2017, p. 51]
[132] People v. Pe aflorida, Jr., 574 Phil. 269, 272 (2008).
[133] Id.
[134] San Jose v. People, G.R. No. 236336, April 23, 2018 [Notice].
[135] As stated in the Pre-Trial Order signed by XXX, he stipulated that he is the father of DDD, YYY's son [RTC records, pp. 59-60].
[136] The prosecution offered into evidence the Birth Certificate of DDD as its Exhibit "E," where it is shown that DDD was born on xxxxxxxxxxx [RTC records, pp. 57-58].
[137] TSN, XXX dated August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[138] Records, pp. 11-13; TSN dated June 8, 2017, pp. 10-13.
[139] TSN, AAA, June 15, 2017, pp. 11-12 and June 8, 2017, p. 12, respectively.
[140] Id.
[141] People v. Peran, 289 Phil. 597, 606 (1992).
[142] Fear of reprisals is indicative of guilt. People v. Villamin, 64 Phil. 880 (1937); People v. Cruz, 219 Phil. 469 (1985); People v. Zumil, 341 Phil. 173 (1997).
[143] TSN, AAA, June 8, 2017, p. 19.
[144] See Dissenting Opinions of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa and Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[145] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
[146] Dorado v. People, 796 Phil. 233 (2016); People v. Lacson, 83 Phil. 574 (1949).
[147] XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021.
[148] TSN, XXX August 24, 2017, pp. 8-14.
[149] See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez.
[150] People v. Fontanilla, 132 Phil. 672, 687 (1968).
[151] Id.
[152] Perfecto v. Esidera, 764 Phil. 384 (2015), cited in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017).
[153] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356 (2015).
G.R. No. 252739 - XXX,[1] Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The majority upheld the conviction of XXX for psychological violence committed against his wife. The majority ratiocinated that "in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity."[2] Moreover, the majority concluded that the law "looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or their child, rather than the motive of the offender."[3]
I dissent.
The betrayal between husband and wife is anathema to the sanctity of marriage and the moral values of the family. The act of engaging in extramarital sexual affairs is punishable as adultery and concubinage under certain circumstances. The marital infidelity of the husband may also constitute psychological violence if intentionally adopted to cause mental or emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation against his wife and children. This opinion examines the anatomy of the crime of "psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity" and applies the totality of circumstances approach to determine the criminal liability of the accused.
For proper reference, there is a need to revisit the facts of the case.
In 1999, Spouses XXX and AAA got married and resided in xxxxxxxxxxx. They were blessed with a son.[4] XXX rented a condominium unit in xxxxxxxxxxx because he often had to work out of town and would come home to xxxxxxxxxxx during weekends and holidays.[5] In 2015, XXX transferred to another condominium unit with his son who was about to start his college education. On July 16, 2016, AAA was informed by her co-worker that a certain EEE sent her messages and photographs through social media showing that their family car was parked in another house where XXX was allegedly keeping his mistress. Intrigued> AAA connected directly with EEE who replied "Alam mo ba na ang asawa mo ay may asawa dito? May kinakasamang babae dito? Na may anak pa sila na four years old? lalaki." AAA inquired about the address and EEE answered "Dito sa xxxxxxxxxxx." At that time, AAA was with XXX but she could not stop crying because of her husband's marital infidelity. XXX asked what was wrong but AAA just requested him to accompany her to the church for mass.[6]
On July 19, 2016, AAA requested her mother and family friend BBB to seek assistance from the barangay to locate the address that EEE gave. After finding the place, AAA saw their family car parked outside a house. AAA and BBB knocked and a helper opened the gate. BBB asked for the owner of the vehicle and pretended that it was blocking the driveway. YYY went out minutes later. Thereafter, AAA grabbed YYY and shouted "Ilabas mo yung asawa ko." YYY was shocked while AAA repeatedly demanded XXX to come out. BBB and AAA's mother proceeded inside the house and warned XXX that they would report him to his office. XXX then came out and AAA slapped him on the face. XXX tried to calm AAA and pleaded "Ma, wag dito! Nakakahiya!" However, AAA rebuked XXX and retorted that he had no respect for their relationship. A police mobile later arrived and pacified the commotion. A little boy also ran towards XXX and called him "Daddy." At that instance, A.AA confirmed that XXX and YYY have a child together. Dismayed, AAA remarked to XXX "May anak ka talaga ano?" The police officers then escorted XXX and AAA to the barangay. Thereat, XXX admitted to AAA that he is the father of YYY's child.[7] Meanwhile, BBB returned to YYY's house to get her car. BBB asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan." YYY also told BBB that she knew that XXX had a wife. Subsequently, AAA expressed to XXX her hopes to save their marriage but their relationship became irreconcilable after the incident.[8]
Accordingly, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, for psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) docketed as Criminal Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR:[9]
On July 19, 2016[,] or prior thereto, in xxxxxxxxxxx, the Philippines, accused, being the husband of complainant [AAA], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish, in violation of the aforesaid law.XXX denied the accusation and claimed that he met YYY sometime in 2011 when they had a one-night stand. After six months, YYY informed XXX that she was pregnant. XXX first saw his child with YYY the day after she gave birth. XXX acknowledged the paternity of the child and signed the birth certificate. YYY explained to XXX that she would understand if he would be unable to support their child because of his economic situation. Also, XXX had to ask permission from YYY for available dates to see their child. XXX next visited the child three months after he was born, and he only got to see the child three to four times a year. On these occasions, XXX met the child at malls and restaurants because YYY seldom allowed him to visit their house. XXX clarified that he was at YYY's house on July 19, 2016 only to see his child. Additionally, XXX also pointed out that he is not paying the rent of YYY's house and that he has no capacity to maintain a mistress. He is earning a meager salary of PHP 14,000.00 a month which he used to pay for the utilities of the condominium where he and his son with AAA were staying. As supporting evidence, XXX submitted his certificate of employment and bill payments for the condominium utilities.[11]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10] (Emphasis supplied)
On November 17, 2017, the RTC convicted XXX of psychological violence and ruled that he caused mental and emotional anguish upon AAA by keeping YYY as his mistress. The RTC held that the prosecution proved the existence of an extramarital affair when XXX signed the birth certificate of his child with YYY. XXX admitted siring the child after having an intimate encounter with YYY. The RTC noted the testimony of BBB to whom YYY confessed her relationship with XXX and the statement of the barangay desk officer that XXX has no more interest in salvaging his relationship with AAA. The RTC observed that XXX was wearing his undershirt, denim pants, and slippers when he came out of YYY's house. This raised suspicion on the claim that XXX visited the child only three to four times a year since he would not be that comfortable with a woman he was intimate with for just one night:[12]
The prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of an extramarital affair, as seen from the birth certificate of accused's child with [YYY] where the former affixed his signature as recognition of filiation. Accused himself admitted to siring the child after having an intimate encounter with [YYY].Dissatisfied, XXX elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA G.R. CR No. 40938.[14] On November 8, 2019, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that XXX is guilty of psychological violence committed against his wife:[15]
Apart from the affair, the testimony of the barangay desk officer affirmed that accused was no longer interested in his marriage to complainant, and even suggested that they live separately while the latter was willing to exert efforts into salvaging their relationship. The desk officer attested to the complainant's emotional state during the confrontation at the barangay hall, as she was present when the parties tried to talk things over.
The testimony of private complainant's family friend, meanwhile, had the opportunity to talk to [YYY], the alleged mistress, who admitted that she and accused have been in a relationship for a considerable period of time.
....
Based on the Court's observation of private complainant's behavior and manner of testifying, the anguish can readily be seen during her narration of the events that transpired and the emotion shown by complainant could not have resulted in an exaggeration of her feelings, considering that accused himself admitted to committing marital infidelity that resulted in the birth of his child with [YYY].
....
While he denies giving support to [YYY] or their child, accused's admission of siring a child with a woman other than his wife was enough to establish the cause of private complainant's distress.
Accused denials of the existence of any present romantic relationship between him and [YYY] cannot be given credence as the same is self-serving testimony, uncorroborated by any other evidence. The fact that he was comfortable enough to wear his undershirt and slippers at the time of the confrontation arouses suspicion as to his claim that he only got to visit the child three to four times a year, at the whim of [YYY]. Logic dictates that one would not be too cozy with a woman he was intimate with for only one night and who would only let him inside the house on rare occasions.
....
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused [XXX] is found GUILTY of the charge of violation of Republic Act No. 9262, Section 5(i) and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
In addition to imprisonment, accused [XXX] is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([PHP] 100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
It should be emphasized that the offense alleged in the Information dated 29 December 2016 is appellant's act of "causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish", while the allegation that he "kept a mistress" merely constitutes the mode of commission of the offense under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.XXX sought reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition[17] for Review on Certiorari. XXX argues that the prosecution merely established that the July 19, 2016 incident actually transpired and that he has a lovechild with YYY. Yet, these are insufficient to prove that XXX kept a mistress to intentionally cause psychological violence against his wife AAA. XXX insists that he and YYY only had a one-night sexual encounter. There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that XXX maintained an illicit affair with YYY. The CA and the RTC reversibly erred in concluding that XXX's admission of siring a child with another woman was enough to cause psychological distress on the part of his wife.[18] In contrast, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that the prosecution established all the elements of psychological violence. The marital infidelity of XXX is the proximate cause of AAA's mental and emotional anguish.[19]
Thus, appellant's argument that "[t]here was no showing that[,] at any time between their one-time sexual encounter in 2011 and the incident on 19 July 2016[,] appellant held, maintained, supported, or took care [of] [YYY] as his mistress" merits no consideration, as the element of the offense which needs to be proved is the fact that appellant caused private complainant mental and emotional anguish, and there is no requirement that appellant must have held, maintained, supported, or took care of the putative mistress in order to be liable for inflicting psychological violence on private complainant.
As the RTC pointed out in the assailed Decision, "the anguish of private complainant was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led ... to the confrontation between her and [appellant] on July 19, 2016", and "[s]he was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that [appellant] had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her effort to keep their family together."
....
The appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 November 2017 rendered by Branch 144 of the Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx in Crim. Case No. R-MKT-17-00580-CR is AFFIRMED in toto.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
XXX must be acquitted. The corpus delicti for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity was not fully established.
The constellation of criminal law has long divided crimes into mala in se or acts wrong in themselves, and mala prohibita or acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the law was violated. A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. However, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws,[20] and mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC.[21] The Court explained that the proper approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.[22] Applying this approach, it is clear that violence, regardless of form and means, is inherently depraved and immoral. Hence, psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262 is a crime mala in se that requires proof of the accused's criminal intent.
Similarly, criminal law is not solely subjective but complementarily objective. The proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.[23] The term corpus delicti refers to the body or substance of the crime, or the fact of its commission.[24] It consists of the criminal act and the accused's agency in the commission of the act. In other words, corpus delicti primarily describes the act (objective) and the agent (subjective) in relation to the actus reus and the mens rea of a crirne. Actus reus pertains to the external or overt acts or omissions included in a crime's definition while mens rea refers to the accused's guilty state of mind of criminal intent. The mens rea which is subjective must conform with the actus reus which is objective. The confluence of these elements requires a direct causal relationship to sustain the crime committed. The formula is "corpus delicti = actus reus + mens rea." Particularly, the comprehensive anatomy of actus reus can be summarized as: "actus reus = act/omission + circumstances + results/consequences."[25] Corollary, the actus reus of Republic Act No. 9262's penal provisions may be analyzed using this framework as follows:
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 refers to the specific acts of violence committed against women and children:
(Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262)
(Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262)
(Section 3 in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262)
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.-The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 illustrates the different forms of violence and enumerates the circumstances surrounding the criminal acts. Section 3 likewise necessitates that the commission of the specific acts results in violence, whether physical, sexual, psychological, or economic suffering,
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody or access to her/his family;(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis supplied)
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
Section 3. Definition of Terms.-As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis supplied)In relation to Section 3, the provisions of Section 6 impose the penalties according to the crime committed, thus:
Section 6. Penalties.-The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:Anent the "mens rea" of the crime, a distinction must be made between general intent and specific intent. General criminal intent pertains to the dolo required under Article 4[26] of the RPC or the accused's purpose to do an act prohibited by law regardless of the result. On the other hand, specific criminal intent refers to the particular intent comprising the definition of the crime. In this regard, the specific intent of the crime of violence against women and children must be framed to the actual purposes mentioned in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262.
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code; those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prision mayor; those constituting less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two (2) degrees lower than the prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no case be lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts arc committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
In this case, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 or psychological violence resulting from marital infidelity when he "unlawfully and feloniously kept a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish." The Court enumerated the elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262:[27]
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;The first and second elements refer to the "circumstances" described in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262. The third and fourth elements pertain to the specific "acts" that the accused committed corresponding to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. Also, the third element evinces the mens rea, which is the specific intent to cause "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation" resulting from the infliction of some form of violence to the woman or her child. A violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires a causal connection between the actus reus and the mens rea. Otherwise, no crime of violence against a woman or her children under this provision is committed. As regards the actus reus, the surrounding "circumstances" that the offended party is a woman and that the accused and the victim are husband and wife were undisputed. However, the evidence of the prosecution fell short of proving the specific "act," "results/consequences," and "mens rea" constituting the crime.
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.[28] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, what Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 criminalizes is not marital infidelity per se but psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering. Differently stated, it is violence inflicted under such circumstances that the statute seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish to the wife.[29] As Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen pointed out in his Opinion, not all forms of pain and suffering experienced in intimate relationships automatically translate to psychological abuse. SAJ Leonen emphasized that courts must exercise a certain level of judicial restraint to decide whether the facts presented constitute marital infidelity as psychological violence. This is because not all kinds of suffering within the context of intimate relationships should be considered psychological violence. Marital infidelity should be punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 only when used as a coercive tactic to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner thereby maintaining the power imbalance between the couple.
More importantly, Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must not focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity. In the doctrinal case of Acharon v. People,[30] the Court En Banc held that "[f]rom the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature - there must be o concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime." The Court in Acharon unanimously voted to acquit the accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon his wife. As such, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed these acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Also, it is outright judicial legislation to consider psychological violence as malum prohibitum and delete the specific intent necessary to complete the corpus delicti which is indispensable in the prosecution of crimes.[31] Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa aptly discussed in his Opinion the legal consequences and practical situations if marital infidelity per se would be penalized as psychological violence. Justice Caguioa expounded that the intent necessary to give rise to criminal liability is expressed in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262-"to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child." The Court cannot correct, expand, or supplant by reading into the law what is not written therein-nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Otherwise, the nature, duration, and extent of "marital infidelity" will effectively be up to the private complainant. It would be the height of incongruence for the Court to say that a penal provision would have different constitutive elements depending on the circumstances.
Indeed, the ponencia maintains an inconsistent position that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence with the qualification that it must result in mental or emotional anguish. This makes the application of the law more subjective and equivocal. The majority even started with an erroneous premise that "marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms."[32] This is not entirely true and accurate. Notably, the Philippines is one of the few countries that still considers marital infidelity as a criminal offense. The legislative proposals to decriminalize adultery and concubinage acknowledged that they constitute matrimonial offenses that violate the marriage contract, hence, the liability should only be civil in nature. The existing laws that penalize marital infidelity invade the rights of consenting adults to their privacy and amount to excessive State interference in the private lives of its citizens.[33] In many foreign jurisdictions, the crime of marital infidelity has been abolished or declared unconstitutional for infringing the rights to privacy and sexual self determination, equal protection guarantees, and human rights treaties.[34] A similar approach will usher the Court into a period of renaissance and conscious reawakening that marital infidelity, unless intentionally employed as an instrument of violence, is a private concern between two consenting adults and does not involve a breach of security and peace of the people at large.
The ponencia becomes more ambivalent in trying to make a comparison between marital infidelity and the crimes of homicide and murder.[35] It is not correct that specific intent to kill is "conclusively" presumed from the fact of the victim's death. Rather, the fact of death raises only a "disputable" presumption since the killing may be a product of culpa or a negligent act. Furthermore, killing is inherently wrong, unlike marital infidelity which is morally wrong. Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting in his Opinion likewise made an inappropriate analogy between psychologic.al violence resulting from marital infidelity and Article 68 of the Family Code on the obligations of the husband and wife.[36] Suffice it to say that psychological violence is a crime while a breach of marital obligations is only civil in nature. I also do not subscribe to the theory of Associate Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Maria Filomena D. Singh that Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 must focus only on the consequences of marital infidelity and that the "vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those we protect them from or against."[37] As explained in the framework of the anatomy of crimes, the "results/consequences" are merely an aspect of actus reus along with "acts/omissions" and "circumstances." The mens rea or criminal intent is indispensable to compose the corpus delicti.
Hence, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused performed the acts or omissions with the willful intent to cause the victim psychological suffering. Otherwise, the crime will be completely subjective entirely dependent on the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant. This is precisely why this Opinion dissected the corpus delicti of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262-to save the courts from a blanket ruling that marital infidelity is equivalent to violence against women and children. To punish marital infidelity per se as violence against women and children effectively discriminates against married men and constitutes a transgression of the equal protection clause. The distinction between married and unmarried men is not germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262, which is to protect all women in intimate relationships, marriage or otherwise, from violence by their male partners. The realities of this world reveal that marital infidelity may be committed by both men and women. The effects of marital infidelity do not impact only the wives but also the husbands. Incompatible with the majority's hypothesis, if the situation is reversed, the aggrieved husbands cannot possibly "exact the full measure of retribution" since the wives who committed marital infidelity may only be guilty of adultery under our present state of laws. There is no parallel legislation like Republic Act No. 9262 where abused husbands may find succor although men are likewise not immune from mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation.
It is likewise false for the ponencia to state that specific criminal intent to cause psychological violence is "virtually impossible to ascertain, being purely a mental process that may be easily modified at a person's whim."[38] Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts lest the courts speculate about the determination of the accused to commit the crime. Thus, the Court must consider the entire factual setting surrounding each case of marital infidelity to determine the evil intent to cause psychological violence which refers to the means employed by the perpetrator, and the mental or emotional anguish which pertains to the effect caused or the damage sustained by the offended party. In other words, marital infidelity must be purposely adopted to cause psychological violence upon the wife and her children.
In Araza v. People,[39] the Court convicted therein petitioner of psychological violence after he left his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Petitioner intentionally left his wife groping in the dark without any explanation or mature conversation causing her emotional and psychological distress.[40] Moreover, the wife narrated how she received information about petitioner's affair with his paramour that led to the filing of the complaint for concubinage. Despite the complaint being settled, petitioner resumed the affair with his paramour. Petitioner also admitted that he was fully aware that his wife experienced emotional and psychological suffering because of his decision.[41] In Reyes v. People,[42] therein petitioner was charged by his wife with the crime of bigamy when he cohabited and married another woman who bore him four children.[43] Thereafter, petitioner stopped supporting his wife who got sick with various illnesses such as hypertension, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and osteoarthritis. The Court held that petitioner committed psychological violence against his wife when he suddenly stopped giving her financial support which caused her to suffer emotional and mental anguish.[44] Petitioner's denial of financial support is designed to subjugate and control his wife, either to pressure her to withdraw the bigamy case or dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him.[45]
In Villalon v. People,[46] the Court affirmed the guilt of therein petitioner for psychological violence through repeated verbal abuse against his wife and public display of marital infidelity. Petitioner and his wife would always argue about his illicit affair with another woman and would hurl invectives at her saying "ang bobo mo naman, hindi ka marunong umintindi." Petitioner admitted to his in-laws that he was having an affair with another woman but promised to end it and focus his attention on his family. However, this did not happen as petitioner ended up abandoning his family. Later, petitioner and his wife reconciled and assured her that he already left his mistress. Yet, petitioner and his wife quarreled on the same issues as before and he would say hurtful words to her such as "gago," "maarte," "tanga," "bobo," "hindi marunong umintindi," "mukhang pera," " mandarambong ang pamilya," "putang-ina," and "walang laman ang utak." Eventually, petitioner left his wife and returned to his mistress. He then posted on social media his intimate relationship with his mistress as shown in pictures of them embracing each other and in their exchange of sweet messages.[47]
In XXX[243049] v. People,[48] therein petitioner had been romantically involved with another woman and had a child with her despite being married for about 17 years to his wife. He even gave allowances to his mistress. The marital infidelity of petitioner has spawned a series of fights that left his wife emotionally wounded. From then on, petitioner and his wife never lived under the same roof again.[49] Thereafter, petitioner texted his wife threatening her "tama ayaw ko [makipag]-away sau gay sira na buhay ko wag mo pilitin idamay ko kau wala akong takot sira na ulo ko baka di ko makontrol kung ano magawa ko sa inyo." The wife feared for her life and the safety of her minor children resulting in the filing of the criminal case against petitioner.[50] The Court affirmed the rulings of the CA and the RTC that the prosecution duly established the fact of petitioner's infidelity as psychological abuse inflicted upon his wife who suffered mental arid emotional anguish.[51]
In XXX[241390] v. People,[52] therein petitioner drove his wife away from their house and brought his mistress into the conjugal home to live with his children. Furthermore, the mental anguish suffered by the wife was compounded by public ridicule and humiliation because of news and gossip about the philandering ways of her husband.[53] Lastly, in XXX[250219] v. People,[54] the prosecution established therein petitioner's marital infidelity, cohabitation with his paramour who even bore him a child, and abandonment of his wife and child who suffered psychological trauma and deep hurt because her father had another family and loved another woman other than her mother.
In the above cases, the Court convicted the husbands not because of marital infidelity per se but based on their evil intent and the psychological trauma and deep hurt that their wives suffered due to the illicit relationship. The marital infidelity of the husband was coupled with other significant factors ranging from the abandonment of the family and cohabitation with the paramour in another place, eviction of the wife and children from the family home, deprivation of financial support, keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, repeated verbal abuse and threats against the wife and her children, resumption of the affair with the paramour, and public display of marital infidelity. These attendant circumstances proved that the husband purposely caused psychological violence upon his wife. However, the factual milieus in those cases are far different from XXX's case. The prosecution miserably failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt the accusations that XXX kept a mistress and that he intentionally caused mental or emotional anguish to his wife.
First, XXX did not abandon AAA and their son. XXX and his son are living in a condominium unit in Manila and would go home to his wife during weekends and holidays because his employment requires him to work out of town. XXX remains present for his family. He attends to the needs of his son and pays for their utility bills and expenses. He has never forsaken his family or deprived them of financial and emotional support. Second, XXX's act of signing the birth certificate of his lovechild is not proof that he maintained an illicit relationship with YYY. At most, this is part of XXX's commitment to acknowledge the paternity of the child upon learning that YYY was pregnant. XXX regrets his mistake but still chooses to be a father to his child with YYY. He kept this a secret but for a good reason. Further, he even endured the pain of not seeing his child with YYY who controlled and limited the number and time of his visits. At any rate, the stigma of illegitimate filiation of a child must never be construed and weaponized as evidence of a crime. Illegitimate children are only collateral victims purely irrelevant to the misdeeds of their parents. After all, it is neither the fault of the children nor their choice to be illegitimate. The Court must be keenly sensitive to protect the children, both legitimate and illegitimate, from the unfortunate consequences of the infidelities of their parents.
Third, the prosecution did not present EEE, who allegedly informed AAA that XXX was keeping a mistress, as a witness. There is also nothing in the testimony of BBB where YYY supposedly confessed her extramarital affair with XXX. Apparently, BBB only asked YYY how long she and her child had been staying in the area to which she responded "hindi pa naman katagalan. "In any event, the account of BBB is hearsay because the original declarant YYY was neither placed under oath or affirmation nor subjected to cross-examination. It was BBB who conveyed to the trial court the incriminatory statements that YYY allegedly made. Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value. It is an immemorial rule that witnesses can testify only as to their own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. Their testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what they learned or heard from others.[55] The admission of hearsay evidence in a criminal case would be tantamount to a violation of the rights of the accused:
We have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual.[56] (Emphasis supplied)Fourth, the RTC's extrapolation about XXX's outfit in relation to the commission of the crime is speculative. The RTC cannot conveniently rely on the sole observation that XXX was wearing comfortable clothes to prove that he is cohabiting with YYY. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass.[57] Distrust and suspicion, no matter how strong, should not be permitted to sway judgment.[58] Fifth, it bears emphasis that infidelity per se is not a crime under Republic Act No. 9262 unless the husband deliberately used it to cause psychological violence to his wife and children. It must be clarified that this doesn't refer to sheer unfaithfulness but to deceitful and false-hearted infidelity purposely employed to cause psychological violence. Lastly, the filing of the criminal complaint is a mere afterthought when XXX and AAA's marital relationship becomes irreconcilable. Taken together, there is reasonable doubt whether XXX's actions caused mental or emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation to his wife. These circumstances also negate XXX's intent to cause his wife psychological violence.
To end, I would like to highlight the ponencia's statement that "not all instances of extramarital relationships inflict mental or emotional suffering to the other spouse."[59] This reasoning is highly self-contradictory and incompatible with the thrust of the majority that marital infidelity is a form of psychological violence. Paradoxically, the majority's deduction validly supports the proposition that there must be a direct causal connection between the marital infidelity of the husband (actus reus) and the criminal intent to cause psychological violence upon the wife (mens rea). The ponencia cited "estranged relations" and "consciously consenting spouses" as specific situations where marital infidelity will not result in psychological violence. To further the discourse, I propose that the following factors must likewise be considered in future cases involving psychological violence such as the length and reason for the separation of the parties, mutual guilt or the fact that the victim was already in another relationship, the pardon, acquiescence, condonation on the part of the victim and/or reconciliation and compromise agreement between the spouses, civility between the parties, and the motive for filing the complaint, i.e. revenge or hate. These circumstances that negate evil intent to cause psychological violence or create reasonable doubt about whether the complained acts caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule, or humiliation should be taken liberally in favor of the accused.
Marital infidelity may have transpired during a period when the husband and wife have accepted the hopeless and dysfunctional dynamics of their relationship. The spouses may have decided to move forward and accept the fate of their defunct marriage. Circumstances showing that the victim did not suffer psychological distress as a result of the infidelity should be taken strongly against the criminal charge. No less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. While often challenging and viewed with strict scrutiny by the ardent crusaders of key social legislations, the Court's commitment to liberty follows the dictates of the Constitution. The Court must always endeavor to bridge the meaning of the libertarian tenets with the realities of our time consistent with the State policy to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. The Court must prevent spouses from using the law to compel their partners to remain in a loveless marriage or to punish them in cases of failed expectations and lost hopes. Either scenario already exhibits a lost freedom that we should feel sensitive about. Incarceration can ruin a person's life. The restorative aspect of the law will be swapped for retribution.
On this point, I reiterate that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[60] The inherent weakness of the accused's defenses does not operate to relieve the prosecution of its responsibility to prove the crime itself.[61] Suffice it to say that the guilt of the accused must rest not on the weakness of his defenses but on the strength of the evidence against him.[62] Criminal laws are not abstract concept but pure definitive norms that restrict human conduct and must be construed strictly against the state. Whether marital infidelity constitutes the crime of psychological violence must be understood in its legal context and not based on the personal anguish or feelings of the offended parties. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. All told, the prosecution's evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and acquit XXX of the criminal charge.
[1] The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise their identity, and those of their immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (1192). An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes; Republic Act No. 9262 (2004). An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes; and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (2004). Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children.
[2] Ponencia, p. 15.
[3] Id. at 19.
[4] Rollo, p. 23.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. at 23-24.
[7] Id. at 24-26.
[8] Id. at 27-28.
[9] Id. at 22.
[10] Id. at 22.
[11] Id. at 29-31.
[12] Id. at 22-35. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson of Branch 144, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[13] Id. at 32-35.
[14] Id. at 36-48.
[15] Id. at 65-79. Penned by Associate Walter S. Ong and concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of this Court) and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[16] Id. at 77-79.
[17] Id. at 9-18.
[18] Id.
[19] Id. at 100-110.
[20] An example is plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
[21] An example is technical malversation.
[22] Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[23] People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[24] Rimorin, Sr. v. People, 450 Phil. 465, 474 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
[25] Criminal LAW, JANET LOVELESS 38 (5th ed., 2016). See also J. M. Lopez, Concurring Opinion in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[26] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 4 provides that "[c]riminal liability shall be incurred: (1) by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; and (2) by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means."
[27] Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 373 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[28] Id.
[29] AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 621 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[30] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[31] People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 275 (2000) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[32] Ponencia, pp. 15-16.
[33] Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/20I9/10/PCW-WPLA-PB-02-Repeal-of-RPC-provisions-on-Adultery and-Concubinage-AEB.pdf?x23702 (last accessed on August 17, 2023).
[34] Philippine Commission on Women, Women's Priority Legislative Agenda for the 18th Congress, Repealing the Revised Penal Code provisions on Adultery and Concubinage, available at https://pcw.gov.ph/assets/files/2019/07/PCW-WPLA-Policy-Brief-3-Adultery-Concubinage.pdf (last accessed on August 17, 2023). In 1947, Japan abolished adultery as a crime in the spirit of providing equal rights for women. In 1996, Guatemala struck down the punishment for marital infidelity based on equality guarantees and human rights treaties. In 2005, Haiti decriminalized adultery in the context of eliminating discrimination against women. In 2007, Uganda overturned the adultery law that penalized women for adultery while leaving their male partners unpunished. In 2011, Mexico abolished and decriminalized adultery to condemn a crime historically construed to allow men to hold women as property. In 2015, South Korea struck down a 62-year-old law that made adultery a criminal act. The decision whether to maintain marriage should be left to the free will and love of people. All European nations have decriminalized adultery and, while it is not considered a criminal offense in most Western parts, it may still have legal consequences, especially in divorce proceedings. Adultery is also not a crime in Canada and China but a valid ground for divorce. Adultery has also been decriminalized in most of the Latin American countries and in Australia.
[35] Ponencia, p. 16.
[36] Ponencia, p. 17.
[37] Ponencia, p. 18.
[38] Ponencia, p. 18.
[39] 882 Phil. 905 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[40] Id. at 923.
[41] Id. at 926-927.
[42] 855 Phil. 991 (2019) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[43] Id. at 998.
[44] Id. at 1004.
[45] Id. at 1006.
[46] G.R. No. 234520 (Notice), February 28, 2018.
[47] Id.
[48] 887 Phil. 161 (2020) [Per J. Delos Santos, Second Division].
[49] Id. at 165.
[50] Id. at 165-166.
[51] Id. at 170.
[52] G.R. No. 241390, January 13, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[53] Id.
[54] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[55] People v. Estibal, 748 Phil. 850, 877 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[56] People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499, 513 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
[57] People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc], citing People v. Marquita, 383 Phil. 786, 708 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; People v. Aquino, 369 Phil. 701, 726 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; and People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 29 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
[58] People v. Torre, 263 Phil. 458, 461 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division], citing People v. Ramos, 245 Phil. 759, 760-761 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
[60] People v. Cabaya, 411 Phil. 616, 630 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division], citing People vs. Villagonzalo, 308 Phil. 231, 247 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
[61] People v. Pajes, 632 Phil. 157, 170 (2010) [Per J. Perez, Second Division], citing People v. Ola, 236 Phil. 1, 17 (1987) Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
[62] People v. Gomez, 345 Phil. 195, 200 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
CONCURRING OPINION
LOPEZ, J., J.:
"Let marriage be held in honor among all, and let the marriage bed be undefiled, for God will judge the sexually immoral and adulterous." - The Holy Bible, Hebrews 13:4 (ESV)
I concur with the ponencia that the guilt of XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, I wish to elucidate certain points in order to emphasize further why specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish or psychological suffering on the victim need not be proved before the perpetrator may be made to account for his wrongful act. Hence, I write this concurring opinion.
| On the presumption of innocence and the application of related canons of construction |
No less than the Bill of Rights as embodied in the Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.[1] The main and perhaps the more known effect or consequence of such presumption is that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused.[2] The other effect of such presumption is that when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him or her, the more lenient interpretation in favor of the accused is to be adopted.[3] Such rule of lenity is known as the pro reo doctrine.[4] Accordingly since the resolution of the case at hand cannot proceed without reconciling the seemingly overlapping provisions of the various parts of Republic Act No. 9262 as it pertains to psychological violence in the context of marital infidelity, the matter of pro reo's applicability or non-applicability must first be elucidated to determine whether there is any doubt affecting those provisions that may or may not be interpreted in favor of the accused.
All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part and that conflicting intention in the same statute is never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.[5] In other words, every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context in that "every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."[6] Thus, the various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency.[7]
Here, XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which reads:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:In Dimamling v. People,[8] the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 were enumerated as follows:
....
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
Essentially, as what this Court did in the case of Araza v. People,[10] Section 5(i) must be related to Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, which defines "psychological violence" as those referring "to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity."[11]
Noticeably, a glance at Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 would show that there are two scenarios of acts or omissions involving "mental or emotional suffering" which the law considers as psychological viole ce: (1) "causing;" and (2) "likely to cause." The first scenario refers to those acts or omissions that have actually been consummated, while the second scenario refers to those that are "likely" or probable, and not even required to be consummated.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that psychological violence is a result that is personal to the offended party and which arises by reason of the acts committed by an offender. Thus, the perspective of the offended party, not the intent of the offender, must be given primary significance. This finds support from the very reason why Republic Act No. 9262 was enacted - to promote the protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.[12] Also, the legislative deliberations on the precursor bills of Republic Act No. 9262 show that one of the impetus for the passing of this law is to elevate women on the same plane as men in terms of protection in law, recognizing the incongruence of treatment accorded to women in adulterous relationships with regard to married men who are sexually unfaithful. The legislative deliberations elucidate this point:
Ms. MAUREEN PAGADUAN (Executive Director, Women's Legal Bureau)[.]As Republic Act No. 9262 has levelled the playing field, wives now can come to its succor to seek redress for their husbands' marital infidelity without the need to prove the stringent requirements under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code on concubinage, as it is enough that it be shown that they suffered mental or emotional anguish by reason of their husbands' marital infidelity.
....
Yung una ho, sinasabi na yung anti-AWIR bill violates the equal protection clause and the gender neutrality provision of the Constitution because it does not extend its protection to men. Ito yung pinakamalakas na resistance. Ang sa amin ho ang tingin namin the anti-AWIR bill does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause presupposes a situation wherein all the parties to the controversy are similarly situated with the same power, resources and ability. However, social conditions and culture have subjected women to abuse and violence more than men Kaya nga yung CEDAW, yung Conven[t]ion on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, focus on what they call gender-based violence.
Philippine Constitutional Law also recognize the validity of class legislation or that which applies to a specific group or class of people only provided that such class legislation is based on reasonable classification.
The four criteria for a reasonable classification have been squarely met by the anti-AWIR bill:
First, the bill rest on substantial distinctions. Men and women are afforded different degrees of protection under Philippine law and society. In intimate relationships, Philippine society still condones sexual infidelity by men. Hindi pa ho nababago iyan. And allows them to exercise an inordinate amount of power over their wives, girlfriends, and lovers. Siguro nararamdaman ng marami sa atin iyan. Philippine law also remains bias against women. The most glaring example of this legislative bias in favor of men and against women is the discrepancy in the crime of marital infidelity committed by husbands and wives, both as to the conditions for its commission and the penalties imposed. Mas malala sa babae, siempre.
Second, the classification is therefore germane to the purpose of the law. By granting women with a legal arsenal for their protection, the bill merely seeks to address this legal and societal inequalities by providing women in particular with a weapon to counteract the [inequality] of their situation.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
....
MS. AURORA JAVATE-DE DIOS (Chairperson, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women)[.]
Just on that point about whether or not the law addresses men and women equally. I think we are essentially dealing with a law ... with a problem of inequality. A while ago, our Chairperson was saying that men and women cannot be equal. I slightly disagree with that because our ... while women and men are unequal because of historical and structural inequalities, the point about having laws, legislation and policies to improve the plight of women is precisely to equalize their situation.
Now, the violence against women bill that is before us precisely addresses that very serious problem of inequality[.][14] (Emphasis supplied)
REP. ANGARA-CASTILLO ... What we are saying is that the reason we want focus on a bill against abuse or violence against women especially in intimate relationships is because there is a gap in legislation covering that particular situation and the fact that there is really a distinction between violence against women and violence against men. In the gender base violence contemplated in the anti-AWIR bill, we are saying that women are violated or abused because they are women. It's like a ... parang a position of superiority of the man over the woman. This is what distinguishes the violence committed against the man or against the woman. You've got to get that distinction, that basis for that distinction is a gender base violence ... that is not covered by any existing legislation[.][15] (Emphasis supplied)
In Araza, this Court articulated this legislative intent:
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.[16] (Citations omitted)It bears emphasis that psychological violence pertaining to marital infidelity under Section 3(c) is punished under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 if the act, among others, "[c]aused mental or emotional anguish ... to the woman or her child."
It is clear from the foregoing that the means employed for violation of Section 5(i) can be found under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262, while the effect is that stated under Section 5(i) of the Act.
Focusing on the means employed, marital infidelity is clearly enumerated as one of the acts of psychological violence, which is an act that causes or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering. This finds support in XXX v. People[17] which unequivocally held that marital infidelity is one of the forms of psychological violence.[18] In this case, there is no denial that XXX became romantically involved with another person outside of his marriage with AAA. He even admitted having a love child because of such romantic involvement. Whether it was proven to have occurred only once or at several occasions, this is no doubt marital infidelity.
Also, the Information specifically stated that XXX was being charged for keeping a mistress. It would not be amiss to point out that keeping a mistress is a form of marital infidelity. Such an act presupposes not only the act of keeping a mistress but of having a mistress in the first place. A mistress is someone who has a romantic involvement or extramarital sexual relationship with someone who is married. Indeed, it is not easy to prove the fact of having and keeping a mistress as these relationships are usually kept hidden from the public's view, moreso, with the family of the guilty party. However, there becomes a glaring evidence of such an extramarital relationship, as when a love child is born out of such an affair. This fact was already admitted by XXX as, in fact, he claimed that what happened was only a one-night stand.
With respect to the deliberate act of causing mental or emotional anguish, while it may be true that XXX did not abandon his family as he attended to their needs, and even had to endure the pain of not seeing his child with YYY, still, the fact of having an extramarital affair remains. Engaging in a relationship, moreso, sharing an intimate moment, requires the consent of two individuals. Under the law, the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[19] It is the husband and wife, who are joined by marriage, who should be romantically involved with one another. Sharing such an intimate moment with another person other than one's spouse, especially when voluntarily done, goes against not just legal but also moral obligations, and without question, harm, if not destroy, the emotional well-being of the victim.
Moreover, the causal connection between the marital infidelity of XXX and the mental and emotional suffering of AAA cannot be denied. As the legal wife, AAA had every right to expect fidelity and devotion from XXX. Her actuations from the moment she heard of tales of his infidelity clearly demonstrate the torment she experienced both mental and emotional, as a consequence of XXX's conduct. To recall, when AAA received information on XXX's extramarital affair on July 16, 2016, she lost no time in seeking assistance to locate the address she was told her husband and his mistress were staying. On July 19, 2016, she confirmed the veracity of the information she received. On said date and at the given address, she came face to face with both her husband and his paramour. To make matters worse, she found out that he sired a child with his paramour. Soon after that, on December 29, 2017, a case for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 was filed against XXX. The fact that AAA immediately checked on the truth of what she heard about XXX indubitably established that she experienced betrayal, devastation, mental and emotional anguish from such news, which was later confirmed to be true. Had she been unaffected, she would have acted indifferently, which is not the case here.
Besides, even assuming arguendo that XXX did not intend to cause mental or emotional anguish on AAA by committing marital infidelity, he would not be able to pass through the requirement of" likely to cause mental or emotional suffering" as included in the definition of what is "psychological violence" under Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262. It stands to reason that marital infidelity is one of the most difficult situation a couple may go through. Any information relating to such an infidelity between married couples would undoubtedly cause, and is likely to cause, mental or emotional suffering. To argue otherwise would be to allow a spouse to commit infidelity and ignore its consequences, which presents a rational infirmity as freely consenting to the sexual infidelity of one's spouse is not in accord with "superior logic of ordinary human experience,"[20] as well as not consistent with the "inviolable" nature of marriage espoused in Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which the State has the duty to protect. It is unnatural for a person in his or her right mind to allow his or her spouse to engage in sexual relations with another person. More, it is not for this Court to alter the traditional view of marriage practices as protected by Congress by coming out with a ruling that erodes basic family values, if it is to respect the constitutionally-ordained principle of separation of powers. These matters are best left to the people to address through their elected representatives.[21] Thus, as it relates to the case at hand, whatever is repugnant to the standards of human knowledge, observation, and experience becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.[22]
Further, in the absence of any other circumstance presented by XXX, to look further into his intention after the one-night stand, could lead to a disregard of the emotional suffering of AAA. Instead of intently examining the requirement of emotional suffering from the perspective of AAA, the intention of XXX would have to be given a weightier consideration. To stretch the effect of giving too much weight into the intention of XXX could lead to asking if AAA consented to such an infidelity. However, it is customarily unusual for a person to freely give consent for his or her spouse to have sexual relations with another. In any event, the prosecution was able to show that AAA had suffered mental and emotional anguish, especially during the July 19, 2016 encounter, as a result of XXX's marital infidelity.
Overcoming the presumption of innocence and evidentiary burdens |
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23] To do this, the prosecution must establish a "prima facie case" or one "which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused."[24] Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense.[25] It now becomes incumbent upon the accused to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case against him or her.[26] In Bautista v. Sarmiento,[27] this Court explained:
When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed - the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.[28] (Citation omitted)In this case, the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case of marital infidelity and the commission of psychological violence by XXX against AAA. Thus, the burden of evidence to prove that the elements or acts constituting the offense charged subject herein are absent or lacking has shifted to the accused.
However, XXX did not meet the required burden of evidence to redeem himself from conviction. Here, save for his bare claim that a single casual sexual encounter or a "one-night-stand" is not enough to prove that he intended to inflict mental and emotional anguish on AAA, XXX did not present any evidence, or at least proffered a reasonable and convincing explanation, to disprove the means of commission of the offense and the emotional suffering of AAA. Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative value.[29] As a result, XXX failed to overthrow, or at least equalize,[30] the prima facie case established by the prosecution in order that he might secure a judgment of acquittal.
In sum, XXX's petition must be denied because: (1) his unlawful act of causing mental and emotional anguish was successfully established by his own admission and by the prosecution's evidence; and (2) he did not overcome the prima facie case established by the prosecution that, as an effect to his act, AAA suffered mental and emotional anguish. On its fore, the case may present an inherent unfairness, treading along the bounds of what is violative of the Equal Protection Clause, due the ipso jure criminal liability being imposed on the husband based solely on the "likelihood" of causing mental and emotional anguish on the part of the wife. However, such is not the lis mota or even the issue here which necessitates a novel approach to the interpretation of Republic Act No. 9262 on the matter of psychological violence through the act of marital infidelity. Perhaps either this Court in another proceeding raising the Equal Protection Clause ramifications, or Congress in the exercise of its plenary power to enact some remedial legislation, can correct the perceived unfairness. But it is not for this Court in this proceeding to undertake that task, especially by way of interpretation absent any constitutional ground.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the conviction of petitioner XXX for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
[1] Collao v. People, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021 [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].
[2] People v. Pagal, 886 Phil. 570, 654 (2020) [Per J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
[3] Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People, 626 Phil. 177, 200 (2010) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
[4] See Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
[5] People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].
[6] Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, 635 Phil. 447, 454 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
[7] Lichauco & Company, Inc. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138, 148 (1922) [Per J. Street, En Banc].
[8] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[9] Id. at 373.
[10] 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[11] Id. at 917. (Emphasis supplied)
[12] Republic Act No. 9262, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security[.]
[13] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, February 19, 2002, pp. 8-11.
[14] Minutes of the Meeting of the House Committee on Women, August 27, 2002, p. 19.
[15] Id. at 21-22.
[16] Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 917 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[17] G.R. No. 250219, March 1, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[18] Id. at 10. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of this Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
[19] FAMILY CODE, art. 68.
[20] See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil, 1198, 1219 (1999) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
[21] See Separate Opinion of J. Delos Santos in Almonte v. People, 878 Phil. 628, 1078 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[22] People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 712 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
[23] Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36, 43 (2016) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division].
[24] Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1196 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
[25] People v. Abdula, 843 Phil. 706, 721 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
[26] Bautista v. Judge Sarmiento, 223 Phil. 181, 185 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
[27] 223 Phil. 181 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].
[28] Id. at 185.
[29] LNS International Manpower Services v. Padua, Jr., 628 Phil. 223, 224 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
[30] See People v. Santiago, 465 Phil. 151, 159-163 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]. (Citations omitted)
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
SINGH, J.:
Petitioner XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262, or the Violence Against Women and their Children Act, as follows:
On July 19, 2016, or prior thereto, in the city of Makati, [the] Philippines, accused, being the husband of complainant AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [keep] [sic] a mistress, thereby causing upon complainant mental and emotional anguish, in violation of the aforesaid law.The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted XXX, finding that the emotional anguish of his wife, AAA (Donna), was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led to her confrontation with Allan.[2]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction, pointing out that the element that the accused caused the victim mental and emotional anguish was sufficiently proven.[3]
Citing the primary objective of Republic Act No. 9262 of protecting women and their children from all forms of violence, the ponencia affirms the conviction and concludes that marital infidelity resulting in mental and emotional anguish is punishable under Republic Act No. 9262.
The ponencia distinguished the present case from Acharon v. People,[4] where the Court acquitted the accused of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 for failure of the prosecution to prove the criminal intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish, as follows:
In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of [Republic Act No.] 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.I agree with Associate Justice Hernando that the pronouncement in Acharon, particularly the need to prove intent to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon the victim, should be limited in its application to the act of willful denial of financial support. Such intent need not be proved to convict an accused for inflicting psychological violence through marital infidelity.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262 enumerates the forms of violence that may be committed against women and their children. These include, but are not limited to, physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, and economic abuse. Relevant to the present case is psychological violence, which is defined as:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphasis supplied)Here, XXX is charged for the act of psychological violence, as defined in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which reads:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.As cited in the ponencia, Dinamling v. People[5] enumerates the elements of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 3, of Republic Act No. 9262:
The Court in Dinamling, as cited in AAA v. BBB,[7] clarified what the third and fourth elements of Section 5(i), Republic Act No. 9262 meant:
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.[8] (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)There must thus be proof of the psychological violence, as the means employed in committing the prohibited act under Section 5(i), and proof of the victim's mental or emotional anguish as a result of the psychological violence.
It is conceded that the fourth element is established. While marital infidelity is not specifically mentioned, it is clear from the phrase, "including, but not limited to," that the list in Section 5(i) is not exhaustive or exclusive.
However, as to the third element, there is the view that this constitutes the mens rea that is the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation resulting from the infliction of some form of violence to the woman or her child.
The commission of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 is a crime mala in se, as opposed to a crime mala prohibita, since such act is inherently immoral or evil. It is my position that the specific intent to cause mental or emotional anguish is presumed when a person commits the crime of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, committed through marital infidelity, in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9262.
The concept of specific intent is well established in jurisprudence. In People v. Delim,[9] the Court explained:
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime requiring specific intent[.][10] ( Citation omitted)Marital infidelity is a deliberate breach of trust. It does not happen by accident. It involves an awareness, a conscious choice to engage in actions that violate the marital vows.
Even if the accused, as in this case, pleads no intent to cause emotional distress, the very nature of infidelity will unfailingly result in such psychological harm. The sense of security within the relationship is breached. The broken trust and the realization that the partner has strayed emotionally or physically often leads to a profound sense of despair. Infidelity, thus, inherently carries the effect of mental anguish as it violates the very foundation of the marriage. It is a clear betrayal not only of the spouse but also of the institution of marriage, which is considered the foundation of the family.[11]
The act of infidelity itself is a demonstration of a disregard for the emotional well being of the spouse precisely because the emotional distress experienced by the victim-spouse is neither incidental nor unforeseeable, but is rather a natural and logical consequence of the infidelity.
If a wife suffers mentally or emotionally after learning of her husband's infidelity, what other element or circumstance should the prosecution prove before the husband can be found guilty of psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262? Applied by analogy to the attempted or frustrated stage of homicide or murder, it is only when the wife does not undergo mental or emotional anguish that proof of the husband's specific intent becomes necessary.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9262 mandates that the law "shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children." A restrictive interpretation that a mere one-night stand that bore a lovechild could not have caused emotional anguish on the wife contradicts the very spirit of the law, which aims to address the violence committed against women and their children, who are the usual victims of violence and abuse.[12]
Jurisprudence provides:
Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of [Republic Act] No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.[13] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)Assuming without conceding that there is a need to prove intent to cause mental or emotional anguish on the victim of marital infidelity, I respectfully submit that the evidence of the prosecution established the emotional anguish sustained by the private complainant. The evidence of the prosecution, as summarized by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), reveals that:
Private complainant found herself unable to function properly thus, asked accused to accompany her to Manaoag to hear mass. Accused agreed and when they went to mass, private complainant continued to cry and ask what she had done to be in this situation.The findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, further reveal:
Thus, on July 19, 2016, private complainant, accompanied by her mother and a family friend she called tita, went to Makati and asked assistance from the Palanan barangay authorities because she was afraid that she might do something drastic.
....
Accused again asked complainant what she wanted to happen and complainant replied that she wanted accused to be incarcerated. Accused responded, "Ah, ganon? Gusto mo akong makulong?" and locked himself in the bathroom.
Private complainant feared that accused would hurt himself but accused eventually got out and went to the kitchen where he saw a knife and threatened to stab himself with it. Their son ran to complainant out of fear.
....
After the incident, private complainant was unable to work for three to four months and could not sleep. She averred that she went to different relatives but did not tell them about her marital difficulties at first. She explained that she did not want to see their house and did not want to see accused or his belongings.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
Apart from the affair, the testimony of the barangay desk officer affirmed that accused was no longer interested in his marriage to complainant, and even suggested that they live separately while the latter was willing to exert efforts into salvaging their relationship. The desk officer attested to complainant's emotional state during the confrontation at the barangay hall, as she was present when the parties tried to talk things over.Donna also testified:
....
Finally, the anguish of private complainant was apparent during her emotional breakdown while narrating the circumstances that led to up to the confrontation between her and accused on July 19, 2016. She narrated that she was hurt by the confirmation of her suspicions that accused had been unfaithful during their marriage and that he disregarded her efforts to keep the family together.[15]
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the private complainant suffered deep emotional anguish. It is only natural for any woman going through this kind of ordeal to suffer psychologically as a consequence. To make matters worse, aside from the anguish caused by XXX's marital infidelity, his threats to commit suicide are clearly a form of emotional abuse and manipulation that cannot be simply ignored. In fact, threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling the woman's actions or decisions is also considered an act of violence against women and their children.[17]
It cannot be denied that XXX intentionally had a sexual encounter with Aileen and that it was committed with the free will and intelligence of a married man. XXX made a series of choices fully aware of his marital commitments. A man who truly values and respects his marriage would not engage in this kind of damaging behavior.
As a matter of fact, the defense that it was a mere one-night stand is belied by the evidence. The transcript quoted above shows that XXX had an illegitimate son with YYY and that he maintained such relationship, which was the reason why AAA was able to find him in the house he was sharing with them. This cohabitation with YYY and the act of having a child out of marriage are undoubtedly constitutive of infidelity which caused lasting and incalculable psychological harm to AAA.
Certain actions, such as infidelity, are inherently likely to cause emotional distress to a spouse upon discovery and carry consequences that extend beyond the immediate act itself. Necessarily, the responsibility extends beyond the act itself as to encompass the foreseeable emotional aftermath for the affected spouse.
Otherwise, what specific circumstances could possibly further show a husband's intent to cause mental or emotional anguish other than the mere fact of committing marital infidelity? What are the limits or standards before considering marital infidelity as a tool used by husbands to dominate, manipulate, or intimidate the other partner-having a second or third casual sexual encounter or producing a second or third child from another woman?
It is important to note that the crime of psychological violence will necessarily be subjective in the sense that it considers the allegations and personal feelings of the private complainant. As Associate Justice Hernando has emphasized, the purpose of Republic Act No. 9262 is to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.[18] Precisely, the law was enacted to protect the woman and the child. If their perspective of pain and suffering consequent to a duly proven act of violence is disregarded, then the enforcement of the law would be futile.
The commission of the prohibited act may be proven independently of the mental or emotional anguish such that the accused need not be shown to have intended to cause the latter. To hold otherwise would be to unerringly validate the conduct of men who are undeterred by their marriage vows and freely engage in infidelity, without regard to their wives and children. Men, therefore, cannot escape liability by invoking lack of proof that they intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish upon their defenseless and unknowing wives. This was not the intention of the lawmakers in enacting Republic Act No. 9262. Precisely, the lawmakers intended the law to correct the imbalance in the marital relations by proscribing "marital infidelity" through its classification as "psychological violence." Surely, had the situation been reversed, if it had been a woman who had engaged in a one-night stand which results in a lovechild, the husband would undoubtedly exact the full measure of retribution. The language of the law is clear and unqualified. To add more, by saying that intent must be proven, is to engage in judicial legislation.
It will be a truly dark day in the Court's history if we brush aside the deleterious effects of a husband's marital infidelity by establishing a distinction between a "casual sexual encounter" or a "one night stand" and a relationship intended to inflict mental or emotional anguish. The mere fact that a man who swore to be faithful to his wife had a sexual relation with another woman is marital infidelity, it is betrayal, it is unfaithfulness. The degree of mental anguish and emotional suffering it will bring to a wife is untold, not to mention the children of the marriage. What more for such infidelity to produce an illegitimate child. The psychological trauma to the woman and her children cannot be imagined. To minimize, therefore, such suffering by referring to the betrayal as "casual" or "a one-night stand" is to spit in the face of every woman who has been the victim of such one-night stands and casual sexual encounters. The Court cannot tread such an unenlightened path.
Children are only collateral victims in this situation. Thus, illegitimate children should never be placed in a bad light. However, the fact is that these children born out of wedlock are considered illegitimate under the law and they are born illegitimate precisely because of their parent's marital infidelity.
It is in this context that, viewed from the wife's perspective, knowing one's husband has a child with another woman aggravates one's emotional suffering caused by the fact of the extra-marital affair. The wife is now confronted with the consequences of the infidelity, including the existence of a child outside the marital relationship. This situation will evoke lingering feelings of betrayal as the wife grapples with the reality of a fractured family.
Finally, until such time that the Congress decriminalizes adultery and concubinage, and for that matter, psychological violence caused by marital infidelity, it is our duty as Magistrates of the Highest Court of the land to interpret and apply the law in keeping with the intention of the lawmakers and consistent with justice and equity.
Thus, I agree with the ponencia that psychological violence may be committed through marital infidelity without proof that the husband specifically intended to cause mental or emotional anguish upon his wife and therefore VOTE to AFFIRM XXX's conviction as it is what the law requires and what morality dictates.
[1] Draft ponencia, p. 2.
[2] Id. at 6.
[3] Id. at 7.
[4] G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021 [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[5] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[6] Id. at 373.
[7] 823 Phil. 607 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[8] Id. at 620.
[9] 444 Phil. 430 (2003) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
[10] Id. at 448.
[11] CONST., art XV, sec. 2.
[12] See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
[13] Araza v. People, 882 Phil. 905, 919 [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[14] Rollo, pp. 24, 26.
[15] Id. at 32.
[16] Id. at 34.
[17] Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, sec. 5(f).
[18] Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, sec. 2.