EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 264260, July 30, 2024 ]

ILOILO I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ILECO I), ILOILO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ILECO II), AND ILOILO III ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ILECO III), PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON HON. MONALISA C. DIMALANTA, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AS COMPONENT HOUSES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Under the Constitution, the crucial role of determining the existence of common good that would warrant the amendment, alteration, or repeal of a franchise lies with the legislature. Pursuant to this mandate, our legislature breathed flesh and blood through the enactment of a law that would promote competition in the electricity sector. Thus, the Court must tread with deliberate care in striking down this law since any misstep may unravel the people's will through their elected representatives. In the same vein, to undo an act of legislature, there needs to be a compelling reason, which is lacking in this case.

The Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction[1] under Rule 65 that seeks to assail the constitutionality of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918[2] for violation of exclusive franchises, non-impairment of contracts, due process, and equal protection.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I), Iloilo II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO II), and Iloilo III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO III) are grantees of separate certificates of franchise to operate electric light and power services in various municipalities in the province of Iloilo and the city of Passi. ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III's certificate of franchise will expire on August 22, 2053, December 12, 2029, and August 10, 2039, respectively.[3]

On March 9, 2019, Republic Act No. 11212 took effect, which granted MORE Electric and Power Corporation (MORE) a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain an electric power distribution system in Iloilo City. However, on August 30, 2022, Republic Act No. 11918 amended and expanded MORE's franchise area to include 15 municipalities and one city that were previously within the exclusive franchise area of petitioners. This prompted petitioners to challenge Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918, which reads:
SEC. 1. Nature and Scope of Franchise. - Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, rules, and regulations, there is hereby granted to MORE Electric and Power Corporation, hereunder referred to as the Grantee, its successors or assignees, a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain for commercial purposes and in the public interest, a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in the cities of Iloilo and Passi and the municipalities of Alimodian, Leganes, Leon, New Lucena, Pavia, San Miguel, Santa Barbara, Zarraga, Anilao, Banate, Barotac Nuevo, Dingle, Due as, Dumangas, and San Enrique, in the Province of Iloilo.

As used in thus Act, distribution system refers to the system of the wires and associated facilities including subtransmission lines belonging to or used by a franchised distribution utility extending between the delivery point on the national transmission system or generating facility and the metering point or facility of the end-user.[4]
Petitioners assert that MORE's expanded areas overlapped with their franchise areas. Specifically, for ILECO I, the overlapping areas are the municipalities of Alimodian, Leganes, Leon, Pavia, San Miguel, and Santa Barbara; for ILECO II, these are the city of Passi and municipalities of Barotac Nuevo, Dingle, Due as, Dumangas, New Lucena, San Enrique, and Zarraga; and for ILECO III, these are the municipalities of Anilao and Banate.[5]

Issues

Petitioners raise the following grounds:
  1. Section 1 of [Republic Act No.] 11918 violates Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, since there is no common good that justifies the effective alteration of petitioners' respective franchises.

  2. Section 1 of [Republic Act No.] 11918 violates petitioners' right to due process enshrined under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

  3. Section 1 of [Republic Act No.] 11918 violates petitioners' constitutional right to non-impairment of obligation of contracts enshrined under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

  4. Section 1, [Republic Act No.] 11918 violates petitioners' right to equal protection of the laws enshrined under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

  5. Section 1, [Republic Act No.] 11918 infringes upon petitioners' exclusive franchises, in violation of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) Decree and the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).

  6. Section 1, [Republic Act No.] 11918 violates Section 41(c) of the NEA Act.[6]
Simply put, the issues in this case are: (1) whether petitioners have exclusive franchise over its coverage areas; (2) whether petitioners' right to due process was violated; and (3) whether there was no infringement of non-impairment of contracts.

Petitioners argue that in expanding MORE's franchise area to include the overlapping areas effectively amends petitioners' respective franchises and will result in wasteful competition and increase in electricity prices to the damage and prejudice of consumers.[7]

In the Amicus Curiae Brief for the US case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. US,[8] it was explained that the economic characteristics of the electric utility industry bar application of traditional anti-monopoly concepts. First, electric utilities inevitably must invest in huge quantities of capital in long-lived and inflexible facilities directly connected to consumers. Thus, to have direct competition for the patronage of given consumers would require costly facility duplication and therefore impose on society excessive and unnecessary capital costs. Second, electric utility operations are characterized by the existence of substantial economies of scale - that is, by declining costs as the scale of operation increases. Thus, direct competition among electric utilities has long been considered economically wasteful and hence, undesirable.[9]

Further, as expressed by several lawmakers during the deliberations of House Bill No. 10306, which later became Republic Act No. 11918, the potential increase in the rates of petitioners that will be absorbed by the consumers will reach as high as 83%, based on the data of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).[10]

On the issue of right to due process, petitioners raise that the substantive due process requirement of legitimate government purpose or compelling government purpose was not met since there is no common good served by Republic Act No. 11918. There is also no necessity for the expansion of MORE's franchise areas as petitioners are already providing impeccable service in said areas.[11]

As regards their right to non-impairment of contracts, they explained that following industry standards, petitioners have supply contracts with generation companies, which have standard provisions on the take-or-pay principle. Under these contracts, petitioners (as buyers of electricity) have respective contracted capacities that they are obliged to pay to the generation companies (as sellers of electricity), regardless of whether these capacities are used. Granting only for the sake of argument that MORE will be able to reduce electricity prices or resort to marketing promotions to encourage switching to it, this would lead to the reduction of petitioners' consumers. Accordingly, petitioners' energy sales will be reduced, leading to decreased revenues. Nonetheless, petitioners will still be obliged to pay their minimum contracted capacities, by virtue of the take-or-pay provisions under the power supply contracts and electric service contracts. This will lead to stranded contract costs. Thus, petitioners are at an imminent risk of defaulting on their contracts.[12]

With respect to their right to equal protection of laws, petitioners discussed that in expanding MORE's franchise, it was granted certain powers and benefits not normally found in other legislative franchisees. Petitioners allege that MORE is given the unfair advantage of having the power to expropriate, at the onset, assets, buildings, and equipment necessary for the establishment of its distribution services. MORE was also given specific powers to expropriate poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries, and equipment previously, currently, or used by other entities in the operation of a distribution system. This enumeration consists of assets normally owned by electric distribution utilities, such as petitioners. Further, petitioners claim that they are subject to higher requirements of the NEA, such as stringent key performance indicators and more procurement requirements than MORE.[13]

Moreover, under EPIRA, a franchise area is exclusively assigned or granted to a distribution utility. As such, the same franchise area cannot be assigned or granted to any other entity. Here, in expanding MORE's franchise to include the overlapping areas, Section 1 or Republic Act No. 11918 infringes upon petitioners' exclusive franchises.[14] Relatedly, under Section 41(c) of Republic Act No. 6038, or the NEA Act, no franchise shall be granted to any other person within any area in which a cooperative holds a franchise. While there are exceptions to this rule, none apply in this case.[15]

In the Comment filed by respondents through the Office of Solicitor General (OSG), they argue that the petition should be dismissed for raising a political question and violating the hierarchy of courts. They explain that Congress has plenary power to issue franchises under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution and the legislative franchise for operation of a public utility is not exclusive in character. Further, there was no violation of petitioners' arguments on impairment of contract and equal protection of laws.[16]

During the pendency of this case, the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association (PHILRECA), an association composed of 121 electric cooperatives (including petitioners), moved to intervene and admit its Petition-in-Intervention. PHILRECA contends that it has direct interest in the outcome of the case considering that the continued effectivity of Republic Act No. 11918 will encroach upon the existing franchise of a rural electric cooperative. It will also adversely affect its advocacy for total rural electrification and its financial position since its funds are mostly sourced from the annual membership dues of the members-electric cooperatives.[17] PHILRECA further claims that its intervention will not unduly delay the adjudication of rights of the original parties since the issue will be examined in one forum only [18] and its rights will not be protected in a separate proceeding.[19]

In its Petition-in-Intervention, PHILRECA argues that Republic Act No. 11918 results in the overlapping of the franchise areas of petitioners and MORE, thereby violating the exclusive rights of an electric cooperative to sell or convey electricity within its franchise areas. PHILRECA further insists that said law impairs the ability of petitioners to carry out their obligations under the NEA Act and EPIRA, as well as poses existential threat to the operations of the electric cooperatives and severely impairs the ability of the NEA to carry out its mandate, powers, and functions. By allowing the expansion of MORE's franchise, there will ultimately be a rise of stranded contract costs and massive impairment of obligations of contracts.[20]

Ruling of the Court

The petition is DISMISSED and PHILRECA's motion to intervene is DENIED.

Preliminarily, it bears pointing out that the instant petition falls under the exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Under this doctrine, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an established policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.[21]

Here, petitioners deemed the following exceptions as applicable to their case, namely: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time, such as assailing the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (e) the time element; and (f) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice.[22]

We agree with petitioners that this Court may take cognizance of the case at the first instance, considering that the foregoing reasons were clearly laid down in the petition, as well as the presence of genuine issues of constitutionality and involvement of questions on public welfare, advancement of public policy, and broader interest of justice. Nonetheless, as will be discussed at length below, the petition must be dismissed.

I.
Petitioners do not enjoy any Constitutional right to exclusive franchise over its coverage areas


We deem it necessary to state at the outset that exclusive franchises are not sanctioned by the Constitution. Moreover, franchises are subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
The language of the Constitution is clear. Franchises granted by the government cannot be exclusive in character. In the Court's En Banc ruling in Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District,[23] We had occasion to exhaustively explain said provision of the Constitution. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all expressly prohibit exclusivity of franchise, viz:
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:

No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear - franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise[. . .] be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, the Court held that:

Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. As we have held in the case of Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines:
"[. . .]We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed." (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive." In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission, the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive 'franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization' to operate a public utility." In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee." In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."[24]
We are mindful of our ruling in Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas v. Energy Regulatory Commission[25] where we characterized MERALCO's franchise as in the nature of a monopoly because it currently does not have any competitor in its coverage areas. However, MERALCO's status as a monopoly does not preclude Congress from awarding other franchises to accommodate future competition that may lead to better public service and public good.[26] Thus, we pronounced:
Republic Act No. 9209 granted Meralco a congressional franchise to construct, operate, and maintain a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to the end-users in the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila, Bulacan, Cavite, and Rizal, and certain cities, municipalities, and barangays in Batangas, Laguna, Quezon, and Pampanga. Meralco's franchise is in the nature of a monopoly because it does not have any competitor in its designated areas. The actual monopolistic nature of Meralco's franchise was recognized and addressed by the framers of our Constitution, thus:
MR. DAVIDE: [. . .]

Under Section 15 on franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility, we notice that the restriction, provided in the 1973 Constitution that it should not be exclusive in character, is no longer provided. Therefore, a franchise, certificate or any form of authorization for the operation of a public utility may be exclusive in character.

MR. VILLEGAS: I think, yes.

MR. DAVIDE: It may be "yes." But would it not violate precisely the thrust against monopolies?

MR. VILLEGAS: The question is, we do not include the provision about the franchise being exclusive in character.

MR. SUAREZ: This matter was taken up during the Committee meetings. The example of the public utility given was the MERALCO. If there is a proliferation of public utilities engaged in the servicing of the needs of the public for electric current, this may lead to more problems for the nation. That is why the Commissioner is correct in saying that that will constitute an exemption to the general rule that there must be no monopoly of any kind, but it could be operative in the case of public utilities.

MR. DAVIDE: Does not the Commissioner believe that the other side of the coin may also be conducive to more keen competition and better public service?

MR. SUAREZ: The Commissioner may be right.

MR. DAVIDE: Does not the Commissioner believe that we should restore the qualification that it should not be exclusive in character?

MR. SUAREZ: In other words, under the Commissioner's proposal, Metro Manila, for example, could be serviced by two or more public utilities similar to or identical with what MERALCO is giving to the public?

MR. DAVIDE: That is correct.

MR. SUAREZ: The Commissioner feels that that may create or generate improvement in the services?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes, because if we now allow an exclusive grant of a franchise, that might not be conducive to public service.

MR. SUAREZ: We will consider that in the committee level.

MR. MONSOD: With the Commissioner's permission, may I just amplify this.

MR. VILLEGAS: Commissioner Monsod would like to make a clarification.

MR. MONSOD: I believe the Commissioner is addressing himself to a situation where it lends itself to more than one franchise. For example, electric power, it is possible that within a single grid, we may have different distribution companies. So the Commissioner is right in that sense that perhaps in some situations, non-exclusivity may be good for the public. But in the case of power generation, this may be a natural activity that can only be generated by one company, in which case, prohibiting exclusive franchise may not be in the public interest.[27]
As cited by petitioners, Section 41 (c) of the NEA Act prohibits the grant of franchise to any other person within any area or portion for which a cooperative holds a franchise unless and except to the extent that (1) the cooperative's board consents thereto by resolution duly adopted or (2) the Public Service Commission determines that the cooperative is unable within a reasonable time, or is unwilling, to supply service therein in accordance with the provisions of section 37. However, the Constitution must always prevail.

In Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, a local water utility invoked against an applicant for a certificate of public convenience Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, which states:
SEC. 47. Exclusive Franchise. - No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration.
We underscored in said case that the Constitution prohibits the exclusivity of franchise. Thus, in case of any conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the latter yields to the former because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to.[28]

II.
There was no violation of petitioners' right to due process


The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the common good so requires. Petitioners anchor their argument on infringement of due process rights on the alleged absence of common good with the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918. However, this contention is not meritorious.

A perusal of the deliberations reveals that Congress exhaustively discussed the issues relevant to their determination of common good. Our legislators weighed in on the possible consequences to the remaining consumers of petitioners who will bear the brunt of the capital expenditures, as well as possible solutions to these perceived problems. In the final analysis, however, MORE was awarded a franchise in the areas that overlap with the coverage of petitioners' to promote a healthy competitive environment in the Province of Iloilo, especially considering the former's capability of offering lower rates than petitioners, viz:
Senator Gatchalian. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, let me reiterate and commend the good sponsor for looking for ways to improve services and lower down rates. And I join her in this quest and in this goal.

It has always been my goal in the Committee on Energy to also look for bills and proposals to lower down electricity rates in our country.

So, with that, Mr. President, I just want to continue our discussion earlier on. I think I was asking on the distribution rates or the DSM rates and I would like to ask the good sponsor, what is the latest distribution rate being charged by MORE, ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III?

Senator Recto. Mr. President, based on the data available to the committee, as of May 3, ILECO I charges P1.91:, ILECO II, as of April 20, P.1.97; ILECO III, as of April 23, P1.89; and MORE, as of April 18 to May 14, P.1.76.

[. . . .]

Senator Recto. Those rates, as I mentioned earlier, ILECO I, May 3, 2022 - so these are current - ILECO II is April 20, 2022; ILECO III is April 23, 2022; and MORE is from April 18, 2022 to May 14, 2022.

Senator Gatchalian. [. . .] My next question, Mr. President, is on the number of households because I understand from this proposal that a huge portion of ILECO I, ILECO II will be occupied by MORE in the proposal. I just want to ask how many households will transfer to MORE from ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III - the three cooperatives - if ever this proposal will be enacted.

Senator Recto. That would all depend, Mr. President. It will be hard to tell but the population of ILECO I is 134,000; the captive customer connection is roughly about 123,000. For ILECO II, the population is 141,000; the captive customer connection is 104,000. And ILECO III, there is a population of 462,000 but the captive customer connection is 67,000.

Senator Gatchalian. So, Mr. President, we ran some simulation - again, this is from NEA, 2021 data - and I just want to show this slide, slide 16. Based in the current setup, we can see that the households are quite distributed from different utilities. If Iloilo Province is 100% of the total number of connections. ILECO I will be 34%, ILECO II will be 28%, ILECO III will be 23%, and MORE right now will be 19% in terms of connections. But after looking at the proposal, and assuming that everyone will transfer to MORE because of the apparent low rates, we can see that there will be a surge in terms of connections. We can see that from a 13% market share of MORE, it will jump to about 45% market share. And I would just like to ask, with this sudden jump in terms of connection, will competition be stifled in this trend?

Senator Recto. Mr. President, I do not think that in one year, all of these households would immediately connect to MORE; maybe after a period of time. Nevertheless, we are introducing competition here that the consumers now can elect or choose between their service provider today, which is the electric cooperative, or MORE, for that matter. And so, this bill promotes competition.

Senator Gatchalian. [. . .] Mr. President, I am just putting this on record that with the proposal, we are actually creating a new giant in the Province of Iloilo, which is MORE, because right now, from 13% connection, it will now command to about 45%. So, we are actually creating a new utility giant in the Province of Iloilo as opposed to the present setup. If we see the present setup, it is quite equally distributed.

Senator Recto. Yes. Again, let me reiterate, nothing here mandates customers to go to MORE. Wala tayong pinipilit dito. What this bill provides is for consumers to have an option - either to go to the electric cooperative, the distribution utility, or to go to MORE, if they wish to, if MORE can provide better services at lower rates, and so on and so forth [. . .]

Senator Gatchalian. [. . .] Mr. President, another topic that came out during the hearing are the leftover customers because, apparently, MORE will be allowed to operate in areas included in the franchise of ILECO I, ILECO II, and some of ILECO III. And one of the gravest concerns is what will happen to the leftover customers because [they] will now absorb the existing generation contracts, will have to absorb also the distribution cost and other costs. We inquired with the ERC on the effect of those that will be left behind after MORE goes into those franchise areas.

[. . . .]

[. . .] Assuming that all of the customers will move to MORE because of their apparent low rates, the rates of ILECO I will increase by P4.4, which is about 58%; ILECO II by P5.7, which is about 83%; and ILECO III, about P0.26, which is about 4.16%. ILECO III has the least because there is only one LGU that will be covered by the franchise.

[. . . .]

Mr. President, have the sponsor and the committee addressed this issue of spiking generation rates and spiking retail rates if ever [MORE] will be allowed to enter the various areas of the three ILECOs?

[. . . .]

Senator Recto. [. . . .] [E]very time customers transfer to MORE Power, especially if it provides better service and lower rates, it means that there will be smaller consumer base for ILECO. So, that is correct. Given the level of investment that ILECO was already sunk in with decrease of consumers, the rate of ILECO may go up. But there are ways for their ILECO to minimize their cost, going forward, to minimize generation rates to their remaining customers. And they can sell or lease their distribution assets and the expansion area to MORE Power. The proceeds of that sale or lease can be used for the cost of their operation. ILECO can enter into a joint venture or technical service agreement and let MORE Power help them reduce their operating cost so that the cost of electricity of the power rates for their remaining customers will not increase.

[. . . .]

Senator Gatchalian. [. . .] So, Mr. President, I am quite concerned about that because, in effect, we are giving a few customers a chance to choose but the leftover customers will not have any chance to choose and in effect, they will be absorbing the cost of the leftover contracts. xxx

[. . . .]

Senator Recto. [. . .] [T]here are two ways of going about it: 1) to even expand the franchise area of MORE; 2) [. . .] for ILECO to minimize their cost, going forward [. . .]

[. . . .]

Senator Gatchalian. [. . .] [W]e have to somehow give certainty to the leftover customers because those proposals are still proposals, and we do not know if those proposals will, indeed, lower down electricity cost. [. . .] But what is certain is that in the computation or the simulation of ERC, ILECO I rates will increase by P4; ILECO II rates will increase by P5; and ILECO III P2.6.

Senator Recto. That is correct if ILECO does not do anything about it. [. . .] There are ways moving forward [. . .]. But it also cannot be denied that those customers who would choose MORE in the franchise area, there will be a reduction in electricity rates by roughly about P3.50.[29]
It also bears repeating that petitioners ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III's franchise will expire on August 22, 2053, December 12, 2029, and August 10, 2039, respectively. Until then, without competition, petitioners can easily dictate the price of electricity on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and consumers have no other choice.

Ultimately, a franchise is a privilege granted by the State. It is not an exclusive private property of the franchisee and must yield to serve the common good, as may be determined by Congress as the people's elected representatives. In the first place, the very essence of a franchise is to serve public welfare. Here, Congress decided that a healthy competition will improve public welfare in the Province of Iloilo.

III.
The principle of non-impairment of contracts cannot prevail over the exercise of police power


As to what constitutes impairment of contracts under Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, we explained that there is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.[30]

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove how the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918 changed the terms of their contracts with their respective suppliers. That they are still obligated to pay their minimum contracted capacities (by virtue of a take-or-pay provision), verily, does not support the conclusion that there is any change in the terms of the contracts. Neither does the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918 impose new conditions, dispense with those agreed upon, or withdraw remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties in their power supply contracts and/or electric service agreements. On the contrary, that petitioners are still bound by their alleged take-or-pay provisions, in fact, shows that their power supply contracts and electric service agreements have not been impaired and that they remain as valid and efficacious notwithstanding the passage of Republic Act No. 11918.

At this juncture, it is well to remember that under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9136, or the EPIRA, distribution utilities (DUs), such as petitioners ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III are mandated to supply electricity to their captive market in the least cost manner. Said section provides in part:
SEC. 23. Functions of Distribution Utilities. - A distribution utility shall have the obligation to provide distribution services and connections to its system for any end-user within its franchise area consistent with the distribution code. Any entity engaged therein shall provide open and non discriminatory access to its distribution system to all users.

[. . . .]

A distribution utility shall have the obligation to supply electricity in the least cost manner to its captive market, subject to the collection of retail rate duly approved by the ERC.

[. . . .]
The foregoing provision now begs the question as to why petitioners ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III, in contracting their power requirements, entered into take-or-pay provisions, which, are onerous to the interests of the consumers. This, notwithstanding, petitioners are not without any recourse. If the issue of petitioners lies in the take-or-pay provisions, Rule 11, Section 7(d) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA empowers the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), after due hearing, to stop and redress any unfair trade, practice that harms the interests of the consumers, viz:
SEC. 7. ERC Responsibilities. -

[. . . .]

(d) ERC shall, motu proprio, monitor and penalize any market power abuse or anti-competitive or unduly discriminatory act or behavior, or any unfair trade practice that distorts competition or harms consumers, by any Electric Power Industry Participant. Upon finding of a prima facie case that an Electric Power Industry Participant has engaged in such act or behavior, the ERC shall after due notice and hearing stop and redress the same. Such remedies shall, without limitation, include the separation of the business activities of an Electric Power Industry Participant into different juridical entities, the imposition of bid or price controls, issuance of injunctions in accordance, with the Rules of Court, divestment or disgorgement of excess profits, and imposition of fines and penalties pursuant to Section 46 of the Act[.]
Even assuming arguendo that the subject law, indeed, changed the terms of their respective contracts, or that it unduly enlarged, abridged, or in any manner changed the intention of the contracting parties, it is well-settled that the State, in the exercise of its police power, like any other inherent power, may validly limit the non-impairment clause. This is so because in every contract, there is art implied reservation that it is subject to police power. This is especially true in cases of a franchise, which partakes of the nature of a grant, which, in turn, is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.[31]

It must be also emphasized that police power is superior to property rights, including non-impairment of contracts. In Carlos Superdrug Corp v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[32] we declared that when the conditions so demand, as determined by legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights must yield to general welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.[33]

In this case, as explained above, the Constitution is explicit that petitioners' franchise is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress. Hence, petitioners' respective certificates of franchise all contain conditions to the grant. For ILECO I, its "franchise is hereby granted subject to the decision, and to the conditionalities prescribed by this Commission in NEC Case No. 2005-03 and subject further to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the common good so requires."[34] Meanwhile, for both ILECO II and ILECO III, their respective "franchise is hereby granted subject to existing laws, the rules and regulations of the Commission and the conditions prescribed in the decision of the Commission."[35] Thus, as between petitioners' existing contracts and police power, the latter must prevail. In other, words, petitioner cannot validly prevent Congress from amending its franchise on account of its existing contracts.

IV.
PHILRECA ™s motion to intervene must be denied


Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court only when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under the Rules of Court, what qualities a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The legal interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest, must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which is limited by considering whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the intervener's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.[36]

Guided by these principles, We find that PHILRECA's interest is not of a direct and immediate character because it is merely hinged on the rights of its members, ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III, who are already petitioners in this case. Tellingly, PHILRECA merely reiterated the arguments raised by petitioners. Thus, allowing its intervention will serve no other purpose but delay the resolution of this case.

All told, petitioners cannot take refuge in the due process and non-impairment clauses, much less their constituting charters and/or franchises, to nullify the assailed law. Indeed, the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918 is founded on the promotion of the common good, that is to promote a healthy competitive environment in the Province of Iloilo, and their remedy, if any at all, does not lie in the Court, but in the ERC, which has been duly empowered by Congress to regulate power supply agreements.

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., I dissent. See separate opinion.



[1] Rollo, pp. 3-83.

[2] Republic Act No. 11918 (2022), An Act Amending Sections 1, 15, And 21 Of Republic Act No. 11212, Entitled 'An Act Granting More Electric And Power Corporation A Franchise To Establish, Operate, And Maintain, For Commercial Purposes And In The Public Interest, A Distribution System For The Conveyance Of Electric Power To The End Users In The City Of Iloilo, Province Of Iloilo, And Ensuring The Continuous And Uninterrupted Supply Of Electricity In The Franchise Area.

[3] Rollo, pp. 3-10.

[4] Id. at 10-11.

[5] Id. at 11-12.

[6] Id. at 20-21.

[7] Id. at 21-43.

[8] 410 US 366, 93 S. Ct. 1022, 35 L. Ed.2d 359 (1973).

[9] Rollo, pp. 21-43.

[10] Id. at 21-32.

[11] Id. at 32-43.

[12] Id. at 43-49.

[13] Id. at 49-60.

[14] Id. at 60-66.

[15] Id. at 66-69.

[16] Id. at 1121-1122.

[17] Petition-in-Intervention dated April 14, 2023, pp. 13-18.

[18] Rollo, pp. 18-19.

[19] Id. at 19-20.

[20] Id. at 28-29.

[21] People v. Cuaresma, 254 Phil. 418 (1989) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

[22] Rollo, pp. 18-20.

[23] 661 Phil. 390 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[24] Id. at 399-401.

[25] 825 Phil. 1 (2019) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, 661 Phil. 390 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[29] Records of the Senate (May 23, 2022), pp. 19-24.

[30] Siska Development Corp. v. Office of the President, 301 Phil. 678 (1994) [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].

[31] PAGCQR v. BIR, 660 Phil. 636 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

[32] 553 Phil. 120 (2007) [Per J. Azcuna, En Banc].

[33] Id.

[34] Id. at 113.

[35] Id. at 114-115.

[36] Virra Mall Tenants Association, Inc. v. Virra Mall Greenhills Association, Inc., 674 Phil. 517 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].





DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, SAJ.:

I dissent.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918,[1] which expands More Electric and Power Corporation's (More Electric) franchise area to include those already covered by petitioners', is unconstitutional. It introduces competition in electricity distribution, a naturally monopolistic industry that should be operated by a single entity if stable prices are to be maintained. Furthermore, by implication, it amended the franchise of petitioners-the electric cooperatives who have been operating in Iloilo without satisfying the "common good" standard found in Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution. Worse, petitioners were not even given the opportunity to be heard despite the encroachment on their franchise areas, in violation of their right to due process of law.

The expansion of More Electric's franchise area likewise impairs the obligation of contracts entered into by petitioners. As distribution utilities, petitioners enter into off-take agreements with generation companies, obliging themselves to pay for a fixed amount of electricity regardless of the actual consumption of end-users. Through the expansion of More Electric's franchise, the electricity that petitioners purchased from generation companies and the electricity distributed and consumed by end-users becomes larger. This results in higher stranded costs for petitioners, which translates to lower revenues and higher risk of petitioners defaulting on their loan obligations.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918, being a class legislation, also violates petitioners' right to equal protection and grants unwarranted benefits to More Electric. These benefits are not granted to other distribution utilities similarly situated.

Therefore, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 is void and must be struck down.

I

To recall, in 2022, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 11918, Section 1 of which expanded the franchise area of More Electric for the distribution of electricity. Initially covering Iloilo City, More Electric's franchise area now additionally covers Passi City and the municipalities of Alimodian, Leganes, Leon, New Lucena, Pavia, San Miguel, Santa Barbara, Zarraga, Anilao, Banate, Barotac Nuevo, Dingle, Due as, Dumangas, and San Enrique in Iloilo Province.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 provides:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11212 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Nature and Scope of Franchise. - Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, rules and regulations, there is hereby granted to MORE Electric and Power Corporation, hereunder referred to as the Grantee, its successors or assignees, a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain, for commercial purposes and in the public interest, a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in the cities of Iloilo and Passi and the municipalities of Alimodian, Leganes, Leon, New Lucena, Pavia, San Miguel, Santa Barbara, Zarraga, Anilao, Banate, Barotac Nuevo, Dingle, Due as, Dumangas and San Enrique, in the Province of Iloilo.

As used in this Act, distribution system refers to the system of wires and associated facilities including subtransmission lines belonging to or used by a franchised distribution utility extending between the delivery point on the national transmission system or generating facility and the metering point or facility of the end-user.
These additional areas overlap with the areas that are already covered by the subsisting franchises of petitioners Iloilo I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO I), Iloilo II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO II), and Iloilo III Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ILECO III), thus:

Petitioner / Electric Cooperative
Grant of Franchise
Expiration Date of Franchise
Overlapping Areas
ILECO I
August 22, 1978
August 22, 2053
Municipalities of Alimodian, Leganes, Leon, Pavia, San Miguel, and Santa Barbara, in the province of Iloilo
ILECO II
December 12, 1979
December 12, 2029
City of Passi and the Municipalities of Barotac Nuevo, Dingle, Due as, Dumangas, New Lucena, San Enrique, and Zarraga
ILECO III
August 10, 1989
August 10, 2039
Municipalities of Anilao and Banate

According to the majority, the overlap is constitutionally allowable. The ponencia highlights the constitutional prohibition on the grant of exclusive franchises, concluding that petitioners ILECO I, ILECO II, and ILECO III, previously the sole distributors of electricity in their respective franchise areas, cannot prevent the entry of More Electric into the electricity distribution market.[2]

The majority likewise holds that there was no violation of due process, citing deliberations where the Senate discussed the ramifications of expanding More Electric's franchise area and decided that More Electric's entry into the distribution market is for the common good.[3] It further emphasizes that More Electric has charged lower prices than those charged by petitioners.[4] To the majority, this justifies the expansion of More Electric's franchise so as to provide consumers the choice of their own electricity distributor and to ensure competitive pricing.[5]

In addition, the majority holds that the expansion of More Electric's franchise was made in the exercise of the police power of the State, specifically, to "promote the general welfare of the people of Iloilo."[6] The majority points out that expanding More Electric's franchise does not violate their right to non-impairment of contracts, even if it results in stranded costs to petitioners.[7]

On the issue of equal protection, the majority declares that More Electric is not similarly situated to other distribution utilities, it being a "new entrant insofar as the new covered areas or overlapping areas are concerned."[8] The majority states that this justifies the grant of extraordinary eminent domain powers to More Electric so that the latter could "hit the ground running and ensure the uninterrupted and continuous supply of electricity to the covered areas."[9] In More Electric and Power Corporation v. Panay Electric Company, Inc.,[10] this Court held that the grant of franchise to More Electric, including the grant of eminent domain powers to it, is not unconstitutional, effectively holding that the 2020 case operated as res judicata to the present case, and that the constitutionality of the grant of eminent domain powers to More Electric is already settled.

Finally, the majority denies the Motion to Intervene filed by Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, an association composed of 121 electric cooperatives advocating for total rural electrification, and rejects the association's claim of direct interest in the outcome of the case.[11]

II

I cannot agree with the majority. Allowing More Electric to encroach on the franchise areas of petitioners violates Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution. The expansion of More Electric's franchise area to include those already under petitioners' is not for the common good. It is solely for the benefit of More Electric.

II(A)

Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution, which governs the operation of public utilities, reads:
SECTION 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.
Based on this provision, a franchise for the operation of a public utility may be amended, altered, or repealed only when the common good so requires. Anything for "the common good" is said to be that which benefits all members of a given community and should be beneficial to every citizen so as "to enable him or her to attain his or her fullest development economically, politically, culturally and spiritually."[12] It is not simply that which is "the greatest good for the greatest number" but should be for the good of all.[13]

Petitioners are electric cooperatives that were granted certificates of franchise to operate an electric light and power service under Presidential Decree No. 269, otherwise known as National Electrification Administration Decree. The enactment of Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 prompted the restructuring of the electric power industry and reclassified electric cooperatives as "distribution utilities."[14] Under Republic Act No. 9136, distribution utilities have "the exclusive franchise to operate a distribution system according to this Act."[15] The Act also defines "franchise area" as "a geographical area exclusively assigned or granted to a distribution utility for distribution of electricity."[16]

Under the law, therefore, the franchise areas of petitioners are to be exclusively served by them. However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918, parts of petitioners' franchise areas will likewise be served by More Electric. It follows that petitioners' franchise areas are no longer exclusively assigned to them as envisioned by Republic Act No. 9136. Necessarily, petitioners' franchises were amended.

There being an amendment of a franchise here, the "common good" standard in Article XII, Section 11 should apply. This standard, however, was not met in this case.

The industry of electricity distribution is more economically efficient for one firm to provide the service to the entire market. It is characterized by high fixed costs due to the substantial amount of investment required to set up distribution lines, power stations, operation centers, and transformers. These high fixed costs are tremendous, but they do not increase in proportion to the electricity distributed. This means that as more electricity is distributed to more customers, the fixed costs are spread over a larger market. As a result, the cost of delivering electricity to each additional user becomes lower, leading to a lower average cost and prices overall.

It is in such industries characterized by high fixed costs and economies of scale where natural monopolies occur. Natural monopolies are the regulated monopolies allowed by the Constitution,[17] as opposed to the prohibited ones formed purely from government grant. Natural monopolies are allowed, because to allow competition in a naturally monopolistic industry will result in duplication in infrastructure and, ultimately, to higher prices in the market.

The reality of distribution utilities being natural monopolies; and the need for them to be operated exclusively within a given franchise area to maintain lower electricity prices, are recognized in law and jurisprudence. As touched upon in the preceding paragraphs, Republic Act No. 9136 acknowledges the need to operate distribution systems in exclusive franchise areas:
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. -
. . . .
(n) "Distribution of Electricity" refers to the conveyance of electric power by a distribution utility through its distribution system pursuant to the provisions of this Act;

(o) "Distribution System" refers to the system of wires and associated facilities belonging to a franchised distribution utility extending between the delivery points on the transmission or subtransmission system or generator connection and the point of connection to the premises of the end-user;

. . . .

(q) "Distribution Utility" refers to any electric cooperative, private corporation, government-owned utility or existing local government unit which has an exclusive franchise-to-operate a distribution system in accordance with this Act;

. . . .

(w) "Franchise Area" refers to a geographical area exclusively assigned or granted to a distribution utility for distribution of electricity[.]
The recently enacted Republic Act No. 11659, which amended the Public Service Act to legislatively define the term "public utility," enumerates "distribution of electricity" as a public utility. In turn, the law characterizes public utilities as commodities or services that are natural monopolies:
Section 13. . .

. . . .

(d) Public Utility - Public Utility refers to a public service that operates, manages or controls for public use any of the following:

(1) Distribution of Electricity;

. . . .

(e) Upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the President may recommend to Congress the classification of a public service as a public utility on the basis of the following criteria:

. . . .

(2) The commodity or service is a natural monopoly that needs to be regulated when the common good so requires. For this purpose, natural monopoly exists when the market demand for a commodity or service can be supplied by a single entity at a lower cost than by two or more entities[.]
In Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative, Inc.,[18] this Court exhaustively discussed why distribution utilities are granted the exclusive right to sell electricity in their respective franchise areas: the huge pre-operation costs:
The distribution utility, whether an electric cooperative or a private entity, possesses the exclusive right to sell electric power to consumers within its authorized area of operation. In turn, NAPOCOR, as the sole agency authorized to generate electric power - at least before the enactment of Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) - in turn may sell electric power only to duly franchised distribution utilities and electric cooperatives. It may sell electricity directly to end-users only with the consent of the distribution utility or electric cooperative operating in the area concerned.

The electric power industry is highly capital-intensive and as such operates as a natural monopoly. This is true for all the traditional sectors, namely: generation, transmission and distribution, the latter insofar as private distribution utilities is concerned. Specifically, distribution utilities have to spend tremendous amounts to set up distribution lines, power stations, operation centers, transformers and the like, not to mention the typical operating costs, to operate and do business. In consideration of the huge pre-operation costs, generating companies in view of the exigencies of the business have to grant distribution companies the exclusive right to sell electricity within the latter's area of operation.[19]
In Alyansa Para Sa Bagong Pilipinas, et al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission[20] this Court recognized the legality of barring competition among distribution utilities to "protect the consuming public from exorbitant or unconscionable charges":
The State grants electricity distribution utilities, through legislative franchises, a regulated monopoly within their respective franchise areas. Competitors are legally barred within the franchise areas of distribution utilities. Facing no competition, distribution utilities can easily dictate the price of electricity that they charge consumers. To protect the consuming public from exorbitant or unconscionable charges by distribution utilities, the State regulates the acquisition cost of electricity that distribution utilities can pass on to consumers.[21]
More recently, this Court again acknowledged the existence of natural monopolies, explaining why it would be "economically infeasible" to introduce competition in some industries. In New Vision Satellite Network, Inc. v. The Provincial Government of Cagayan:[22]
. . .[A] survey of franchises recognized in jurisprudence shows that they involve: (i) public utilities and common carriers; (ii) economic activities which are in the nature of natural monopolies, or industries where the most efficient number of operators is one or only a few; (iii) industries where the first entrants or incumbents have near-monopoly status because of prohibitive fixed costs, economies of scale, and network effects, such that the first entrants or incumbent market players have a high degree of market dominance that impose an insurmountable barrier on potential entrants to enter the market and compete; and (iv) industries that require the use of natural resources or other scarce resources (such as the airwaves), which utilization thereof necessitates the exclusion of other persons or entities.

This is why tollway operation requires a franchise, while a financing company does not. This is why the operation of a broadcast system requires a franchise, while a virtual currency platform operator does not. This is why the operation of a light railway requires a franchise, while a lending company does not. This is why the operation of a telecommunication system requires a franchise, while a pawnshop does not. Once the tollway operator constructs an expressway, it would be practically impossible, if not economically unfeasible, for a rival tollway operator to build a competing infrastructure in the same area. Once the broadcast operator utilizes a particular radio frequency in the radio spectrum, no other broadcast operator can utilize the same frequency. Once the light railway operator constructs a railroad track, it would not make economic sense for a competing railway operator to construct a similar structure in the same area. Once the telecommunication operator excavates cables in common public areas, it would confer a first incumbent status and it would impose insurmountable barriers for other competing telecommunication operators to again request the local government to allow excavations in the said common public areas.

In the case of a financing company, lending company, virtual currency exchange operator, pawnshops, and other similar regulated entities requiring a secondary license in addition to general business and local permits, there can be as many market players as are qualified and eligible under the specific laws regulating the business activity. This is because these entities are not engaged in industries which are natural monopolies, or industries where first entrants do not have monopoly or near-monopoly status. Succeeding market players are free to enter the market as long as they comply with the requirements for the issuance of the administrative license to operate these businesses. Moreover, the requirement of obtaining a prior government permit to operate in these businesses is merely within the dictates of general welfare, and not because the economic reality of the industry involves scarce resources.[23]
The foregoing show that it is against the common good to introduce new entrants to compete with natural monopolies.

The ponencia highlights how More Electric currently charges lower electricity prices than petitioners, seemingly contradicting the above discussions on how competition will raise prices in a naturally monopolistic industry. In the May 23, 2022 Records of the Senate, Senator Sherwin Gatchalian interpellated Senator Ralph Recto (Senator Recto), the sponsor of Republic Act No. 11918, regarding the electricity prices charged by petitioners and More Electric. Senator Recto replied that "as of May 3 [2022], ILECO I charges [PHP] 1.91 [kWh]; ILECO II, as of April 20, [PHP] 1.97 [kWh]; ILECO III, as of April 23, [PHP] 1.89 [kWh]; and MORE, as of April 18 to May 14, [PHP] 1.76 [kWh]."[24]

Based on these cited prices, the difference between the price charged by More Electric and those charged by petitioners is insignificant and minuscule, with little to no real effect on the welfare of the people of Iloilo. The only entity benefiting in the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918 is no other than More Electric, who will be receiving the profits from encroaching into the franchise area of petitioners.

Compared to the PHP 1.76 per kilowatt-hour charged by More Electric, petitioner ILECO I charged PHP 0.15 more, petitioner ILECO II charged PHP 0.21 more, and petitioner ILECO III charged PHP 0.13 more. If multiplied by 200 kilowatt-hours-the average monthly electricity consumption of residential customers in the Philippines[25] -the savings of those who will transfer from ILECO I to More Electric is just PHP 30.00 per month; from ILECO II to More Electric, PHP 42.00 per month; and, from ILECO III to More Electric, PHP 26.00 per month. These are minuscule amounts considering that More Electric did not create the distribution system in Iloilo and, therefore, should have significantly lower costs to pass on to consumers. This even reveals More Electric's lack of technical expertise to significantly lower the price of electricity in Iloilo. It may even indicate that More Electric is overcharging its end-users but charging just enough to make it appear that its prices are lower than its competitors.

Worse, More Electric is conducting its business at the expense of petitioners, "riding piggy-back"[26] on the existing infrastructure built and developed by them. This is unfair and detrimental to petitioners who have been providing quality service to their franchise areas.[27]

Besides, the reduced prices is only for the short term. It will not be long before electricity prices start to rise in Iloilo considering that More Electric has commenced duplicating distribution infrastructure in Iloilo.[28] Being a private, for-profit corporation, More Electric will necessarily pass on these investment costs to its end-users, and whatever savings the latter had in the early years of More Electric's operation will be rendered nugatory.

All told, the expansion of More Electric's franchise is not for the common good, in violation of Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution.

II(B)

It is true that Article XII, Section 11 provides that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall. . . be exclusive in character"; and that, according to Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District,[29] "[t]his constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception."[30]

Tawang involved a cooperative applying for a franchise to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. The local water utility opposed the application, arguing that under Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, its franchise is exclusive.[31]

Despite Section 47 of the Decree, the National Water Resources Board approved the cooperative's application, holding that the local water utility's franchise is unconstitutional in view of the prohibition on exclusive franchises in Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the ruling, holding that the Constitution prohibits the grant of exclusive franchise that precludes the State from granting a subsequent franchise when the public interest so requires, not the grant of an exclusive franchise per se.[32]

In reversing the trial court and affirming the ruling of the National Water Resources Board, this Court explained in Tawang that the words of Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution are plain and need no further explanation.[33] Therefore, courts have no other duty but to apply the provision.[34] Ultimately, the cooperative was allowed to operate in Barangay Tawang, and Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 47 was declared unconstitutional:
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied)
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear - franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise ... be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. In Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, the Court held that:
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. As we have held in the case of Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines:
". . . We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed." (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc., the Court held that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the operation of a public utility shall not be exclusive." In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission, the Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC can grant an exclusive 'franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization' to operate a public utility." In National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that, "Exclusivity of any public franchise has not been favored by this Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is taken against the grantee." In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, the Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."[35] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Tawang notwithstanding, I maintain that the Constitution allows for the grant of an exclusive franchise in the case of natural monopolies.

Reading Tawang, it appears that this Court made its declaration only based on Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution and its previous iterations in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. Even the cases[36] cited in Tawang to justify the supposed absolute prohibition on exclusive franchises relied only on this sole provision of the Constitution.

However, if Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution is read in conjunction with Article XII, Section 19, an allowance for the grant of exclusive franchises may be made without offending the plain words used in Article XII, Section 11. It only means that an exception exists but is found in another provision of the Constitution.

Article XII, Section 19 provides:
SECTION 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
The use of "regulate" in Article XII, Section 19 means that there are instances where the Constitution allows for a monopoly, an exclusive seller of a good or service within a market, to exist when the public interest so requires. I share the view that these regulated monopolies are the natural monopolies "that actually favor the consumers because of the existence of. . . economies of scale since we do not have unnecessary duplication of resources."[37] However, these regulated monopolies should be heavily regulated by the State to prevent them from taking advantage of the inelastic demand for their service to charge exorbitant prices.

During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Commissioners Rama and Villegas had the following discussion. Notably, Commissioner Villegas was a Harvard-trained economist:
MR. RAMA: Section 14 states: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires."

I have heard the Chairman say that this would not prohibit the State to set up monopolies for the common good.

MR. VILLEGAS: That is right.

. . . .

MR. RAMA: I was thinking for instance, of the procedure or the system in Japan where tobacco is the monopoly of the State and serves substantially the common good and its revenues form a substantial part of the budget of the Japanese government.

Therefore, the monopoly on tobacco is a desirable monopoly; first, it is hazardous to health; and second, the State converts this kind of industry into something that benefits the country. On the other hand, although the statement has been made by the Chairman that this would not prohibit the State from setting up monopolies, the second sentence in Section 14 seems to contradict that statement because it states: "No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." It is addressed to both the State and the private sector. So, does the Commissioner think that there should be some kind of a phrase here that would allow the government or the State to set up monopolies that would serve the common good?

MR. VILLEGAS: The second sentence is interpreted in the context of antitrust legislation or the jurisprudence on antitrust legislation for example, in the United States, to the extent that combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition actually prejudice the consumers and the people. Then that is where the law comes in but precisely, there are certain monopolies which actually favor the consumers because of the economies of scale since we do not have unnecessary duplication of resources. However, these types of monopolies should be regulated.[38]
If it were true that the prohibition on the grant of exclusive franchises was absolutely prohibited by the Constitution, then Congress would not have enacted numerous laws, including Presidential Decree No. 269, Republic Act No. 9136, and the newly enacted Republic Act No. 11659, among others, that allowed for exclusive franchises. Congress is presumed to enact laws that are in accord with the Constitution.

It must be remembered that the rationale behind the prohibition on exclusive franchises is to promote free competition.[39] Indeed, under normal circumstances, it leads to innovation, improved quality of service, and lower prices.

However, competition is not always beneficial. At times, it can be wasteful and ruinous. As discussed, it is in the case of natural monopolies where it is more economically efficient for a single entity to serve an entire market. Introducing competition in naturally monopolistic industries will only lead to higher prices to consumers, contrary to the public interest and the common good.

Given the foregoing, the general rule should be that the grant of exclusive franchise for the operation of a public utility is prohibited. The reason is that granting exclusive franchises inhibits free and healthy competition. However, in industries where competition would instead be injurious and detrimental to the public, as in the case of natural monopolies, an exclusive franchise may be granted to them subject to their regulation by the State. This holistic reading of the provisions of the Constitution, without negating the plain words used in Article XII, Section 11, gives life to the Constitution as a whole.[40]

III

Not only is the expansion of More Electric's franchise not for the common good, it also impedes the equity participation in public utilities by the general public.

Article XII, Section 1 of the Constitution states that "[t]he goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth[.]" Relatedly, Article XII, Section 6 provides that "[t]he use of property bears a social function"; and that the right of corporations, cooperatives, and similar organizations to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises is "subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so requires."

Here, instead of promoting distributive justice, the State gives opportunities to the already powerful. It must be remembered that More Electric is controlled by the same person controlling a water utility, among others. The expanded franchise granted to More Electric concentrates wealth and power in the hands of the few, giving less opportunity for ordinary individuals, such as cooperative members, to invest in public utilities.

The circumstances in this case are even worse than when More Electric first took over the electricity distribution in Iloilo City. At least at that time, the first mover's franchise had already expired before More Electric began operating.

In this case, petitioners are electric cooperatives who, at the time of the grant of their franchise, was assured of support and assistance by the national government. This is in consideration of the "heavy financial burdens" they had to bear to pursue the State's objective of total electrification of the country. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 269, before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10531, provided:
SECTION 2. Declaration of National Policy. - The total electrification of the Philippines on an area coverage basis being vital to the welfare of its people and the sound development of the Nation, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to pursue and foster, in an orderly and vigorous manner, the attainment, of this objective. For this purpose, the State shall promote, encourage and assist all public service entities engaged in supplying electric service, particularly electric cooperatives, which are willing to pursue diligently this objective.

Because of their non-profit nature, cooperative character and the heavy financial burdens that they must sustain to become effectively established and operationally viable, electric cooperatives, particularly, shall be given every tenable support and assistance by the National Government, its instrumentalities and agencies to the fullest extent of which they are capable; and, being by their nature substantially self-regulating and Congress having, by the enactment of this Decree, substantially covered all phases of their organization and operation requiring or justifying regulation, and in order to further encourage and promote their development they should be subject to minimal regulation by other administrative agencies.

Area coverage of electrification cannot be achieved unless service to the more thinly settled areas and therefore more costly to electrify is combined with service to the most densely settled areas and therefore less costly to electrify. Every public service entity should hereafter cooperate in a national program of electrification on an area coverage basis, or else surrender its franchise in favor of those public service entities which will. It is hereby found that the total electrification of the Nation requires that the laws and administrative practices relating to franchised electric service areas be revised and made more effective, as herein provided. It is therefore hereby declared to be the policy of the State that franchises for electric services areas shall hereafter be so issued, conditioned, altered or repealed, and shall be subject to such continuing regulatory surveillance, that the same shall conduce to the most expeditious electrification of the entire Nation on an area coverage basis.
However, contrary to this assurance, the national government, through Congress, allowed More Electric to encroach on petitioners' franchise areas. The State continues to embolden a big corporation to dominate and force businesses out of business, in violation of the Constitution's mandate to encourage the general public to invest in public utilities.

IV

Petitioners' right to procedural due process was also violated.

Procedural due process consists of the right to be heard.[41] Specifically with respect to cancellation or revocation of franchises, this Court has held that the party whose franchise was cancelled or revoked should be given the opportunity to explain one's side.[42] The reason is that a franchise "involve[s] investment of a big amount of capital, both in securing the [franchise] and in maintaining the operation of the [infrastructure] covered thereby."[43] Therefore, the operator should at least be given "an opportunity to improve its service, if it be deficient, or to be heard and to defend in case of a complaint being filed against it for the violation of any law or of the terms of its [franchise]."[44]

Based on the submissions of the parties to this Court, it appears that petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard by Congress before it granted an expanded franchise to More Electric. Considering that the expansion will greatly affect the terms of their franchise, their market share, and the viability of their business, they should have at least been given the opportunity to explain why there is no need to introduce competition in their franchise area.

It is true that petitioners' franchise was not, in the strictest sense, cancelled or revoked. Nevertheless, this does not make petitioners less entitled to due process. They still invested tremendous amounts of capital to set up the distribution system in their respective franchise areas. At the very least, they should have been given the opportunity to be heard by Congress.

V

Apart from being contrary to the common good, expanding More Electric's franchise impaired petitioners' obligations under their respective contracts with power generation firms.

Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." The impairment under this provision is not limited to a literal change in the terms of the contract. New conditions need not even be imposed.[45] So long as the contract is diminished in some way, the non-impairment clause is considered violated.[46]

Distribution utilities such as petitioners enter into power contracts with generation firms in an offtake or take-or-pay basis. This means that they obligate themselves to pay a contracted volume of electricity at a fixed cost, regardless of the actual demand from the consumers. Distribution utilities enter into these off-take agreements with confidence and expectation their franchises will be allowed to their full term. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9136 provides:
SECTION 27. Franchising in the Electric Power Sector. - The power to grant franchises to persons engaged in the transmission and distribution of electricity shall be vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines and all laws inconsistent with this Act particularly, but not limited to, Section 43 of PD 269, otherwise known as the "National Electrification Decree," are hereby deemed repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That all existing franchises shall be allowed to their full term: Provided, further, That in the case of electric cooperatives, renewals and cancellations shall remain with the National Electricity Commission under the National Electrification Administration for five (5) more years after the enactment of this Act.
However, contrary to this assurance, the State allowed More Electric to concurrently operate with petitioners in their franchise area, thus dividing the market and unprecedentedly lowering the demand for petitioners' electricity. This lower demand, in turn, impaired petitioners' contracts with generation companies because they remained in locked-in contracts, paying for the offtake price but with fewer customers to shoulder the costs. Worse, petitioners will have no choice but to charge higher distribution charges, resulting in an overall higher cost of electricity in Iloilo.

It is true that property rights protected by the non-impairment clause yields to the police power of the State.[47] However, there is only a valid impairment if the police power is exercised to promote the general welfare.[48]

The discussions on how competition drives prices up in naturally monopolistic industries show that the impairment of petitioners' contracts was not intended for the general welfare. Allowing More Electric to operate in the franchise areas already served by petitioners results in the unnecessary duplication of infrastructure and the inevitable rise in the cost of electricity. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 puts everyone in a position worse off than before More Electric entered the distribution industry.

In sum, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 is void for being violative of the non-impairment clause.

VI

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 also violates the equal protection clause because it grants More Electric benefits that are not granted to other distribution utilities similarly situated to it.

Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Meanwhile, under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed.[49]

The equal protection guarantee still allows for classification, so long as it conforms to the traditional standard of reasonableness, which is based on substantial distinctions, relevant to the purpose of the law, applies equally to all the members of the class, and is not be limited to existing conditions only.[50]

Here, More Electric and petitioners are all distribution utilities as defined in the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001.[51] Yet, More Electric is given extraordinary eminent domain powers.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212 on More Electric's power of eminent domain provides:
SECTION 10. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient establishment, improvement, upgrading, rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of its services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles wires, and other facilities over, under, and across public property, including streets, highways, parks, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted, including, but not limited to poles, wires, cables, transformers, switching equipment and stations, buildings, infrastructure, machineries and equipment previously, currently or actually used, or intended to be used, or have been abandoned, unused or underutilized, or which obstructs its facilities, for the operation of a distribution system for the conveyance of electric power to end users in its franchise area: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid:

Provided, further, That upon the filing, of the petition for expropriation, or at any time thereafter, and after due notice to the owner of the property to be expropriated and the deposit in a bank located in the franchise area of the full amount of the assessed value of the property or properties, the grantee shall be entitled to immediate possession, operation, control, use and disposition of the properties sought to be expropriated, including the power of demolition, if necessary, notwithstanding the pendency of other issues before the court, including the final determination of the amount of just compensation to be paid. The court may appoint a representative from the ERC as a trial commissioner in determining the amount of just compensation. The court may consider the tax declarations, current audited financial statements, and rate-setting applications of the owner or owners of the property or properties being expropriated in order to determine their assessed value. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the right of eminent domain of electric cooperatives is provided under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165:
SEC. 23. Functions of Distribution Utilities. -

. . . .

Distribution utilities may exercise the power of eminent domain subject to the requirements of the Constitution and existing laws.
Furthermore, under the National Electrification Administration Decree,[52] by virtue of which petitioners were granted their franchises, electric cooperatives are likewise granted general eminent domain powers:
Section 16. Powers. A cooperative is hereby vested with all powers necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of its corporate purpose and capable of being delegated by the President or the National Assembly when it comes into existence; and no enumeration of particular powers hereby granted shall be construed to impair any general grant of power herein contained, nor to limit any such grant to a power or powers of the same class as those so enumerated. Such powers shall include but not be limited to, the power:

. . . .

 
(k)
To exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such power by other corporations constructing or operating electric generating plants and electric transmission and distribution lines or systems[.]
As for other distribution utilities, below are the eminent domain provisions in their respective franchises:
Olongapo Electricity Distribution Company, Inc. [Republic Act No. 10373 (2013)]
SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
Angeles Electric Corporation [Republic Act No. 9381 (2007)]
SEC. 10. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
 
First Bay Power Corp. [Republic Act No. 10891 (2016)]
SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
Cotabato Light and Power Company [Republic Act No. 10637 (2014)]
SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
Cotabato Electric Cooperative, Inc. - PPALMA [Republic Act No. 11322 (2019)]
SECTION 10. Right of Eminent Domain. Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires, and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches, or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper condemnation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
Mactan Electric Company, Inc. [Republic Act No. 10890 (2016)]
SECTION 9. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed by law, the grantee is authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the efficient maintenance and operation of services. The grantee is authorized to install and maintain its poles, wires, and other facilities over and across public property, including streets, highways, forest reserves, and other similar property of the Government of the Philippines, its branches or any of its instrumentalities. The grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That proper expropriation proceedings shall have been instituted and just compensation paid.
Comparing the eminent domain powers of More Electric, petitioners, and other distribution utilities, it can be gleaned that More Electric has extraordinary eminent domain powers despite a lack of substantial distinction between them. Unlike other distribution utilities, More Electric is specifically allowed to expropriate properties already used by other entities in the operation of a distribution system. In other words, it is allowed to conduct its operations at the expense of those who actually had the distribution system put up in Iloilo, i.e., petitioners.

Worse, expropriating properties that are already devoted to electricity distribution is not the "public use" required for the valid exercise of the power of expropriation, in violation of Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution:
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
If private property is taken for the same public use as to which the property was originally devoted, it is actually not for a public purpose, but for proprietary reasons. In reality, there will only be a change as to who gets the profits,[53] and any public benefit is only pretended or, at best, incidental. Therefore, should More Electric expropriate properties already used for the operation of a distribution system in Iloilo, the purpose of the taking is no longer for the benefit of the public. Rather, it will be solely for the benefit of More Electric, the new entity who will be profiting from the use of the expropriated facilities.

Contrary to respondents' claim, there is no collateral attack on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212 in this case. The reason is that the object of the present Petition is to set aside Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918, which, in turn, is operationalized by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212. For this reason, as petitioners argue, "[i]t is only proper that [this Court examine] Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212[.]"

It is true that in More Electric and Power Corporation v. Panay Electric Company, Inc.,[54] this Court held that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212 does not violate the equal protection clause. However, it must be remembered that the circumstances when More Electric was decided are different from the circumstances in this case. The cited case was decided when More Electric's franchise area only covered Iloilo City, while in this case, More Electric has an expanded franchise area which encroached on the respective franchise areas of petitioners. The respondent in More Electric, Panay Electric Company, Inc., had an expired franchise, while the petitioners in this case have subsisting franchises. Therefore, the constitutionality of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 11212, in relation to its operationalization under the current circumstances, can be revisited.

Perhaps the most striking of the unwarranted benefits given to More Electric is the expansion of its franchise area despite the prior operators' subsisting franchise. As pointed out by petitioners, Section 27 of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001[55] mandates the Congress to allow existing franchises to their full term. To add, it was even the basis for President Marcos's veto of House Bill No. 10554, which would have expanded the franchise of another distribution utility, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc., to cover the franchise area of Northern Davao Electric Cooperative. Still, Republic Act No. 11918 was allowed to lapse into law despite the existing franchise of petitioners. There is no other conclusion that Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 constitutes class legislation to give unwarranted benefits to More Electric.

All told, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 is void for being violative of the equal protection clause.

VII

The Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association should have been allowed to intervene in this case. Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court on intervention provides:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the interveners' rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
This provision requires an intervenor to have a legal interest in the matter in litigation that may either be in the success of the parties, or against the success of both. The intervenor may also be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other distribution of property in custody of the court or its officer.

Further, the interest must be actual, material, direct, and immediate character, such that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.[56] It cannot be merely contingent or expectant. And even if interest exists, admission as an intervenor is still subject to the discretion of court. A motion for intervention may also be denied if it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, or if the rights of the person wanting to intervene may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.[57]

I do not see why, as the ponencia found, Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association's interest "is not of a direct and immediate character." Associations have long been allowed to sue and intervene on behalf of their members, especially when "the results of the case will affect [the associations'] vital interests."[58] To add, direct interest of associations is not even required. So long as their members are affected by the action, the association can represent its members in suits.[59]

Here, the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association is composed of rural electric cooperatives for their mutual cooperation, development, and the protection of their rights and interests.[60] Considering that the enactment of Republic Act No. 11918 negatively affected the welfare and interests of petitioners, which are members of the Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, the latter should be allowed to intervene on behalf of petitioners.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918 must be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and a WRIT OF PROHIBITION must be ISSUED to permanent enjoin and prohibit respondent More Electric and Power Corporation and all other persons acting on its behalf from implementing Section 1 of Republic Act No. 11918.

The Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and the Petition-in-Intervention must likewise be GRANTED.



[1] Republic Act No. 11918 (2022), An act amending Sections 1, 15, and 21 of Republic Act No. 11212, entitled 'An Act Granting More Electric and Power Corporation a Franchise to Establish, Operate, and Maintain, for Commercial Purposes and in the Public Interest, a Distribution System for the Conveyance Of Electric Power to the End Users in the City of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, and Ensuring the Continuous and Uninterrupted Supply of Electricity in the Franchise Area'

[2] Ponencia, pp. 7-11.

[3] Id. at 11-12.

[4] Id. at 12.

[5] Id. at 15.

[6] Id. at 15.

[7] Id. at 16-19.

[8] Id. at 19.

[9] Id.

[10] 884 Phil. 673 (2020) [Per J. J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc].

[11] Ponencia, pp. 20-21.

[12] JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003 ed), p. 2.

[13] Id.

[14] Republic Act No. 9136 (2001), sec. 4(q).

[15] Republic Act No. 9136 (2001), sec. 4(q).

[16] Republic Act No. 9136 (2001), sec. 4(w).

[17] CONS'T., art. XII, sec. 19, provides:

SECTION 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

[18] 474 Phil. 439 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

[19] Id. at 451-452.

[20] 852 Phil. 20 (2019) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[21] Id.

[22] 906 Phil. 698 (2021) [Per J. J. Lopez, Third Division].

[23] Id. at 714-716.

[24] Ponencia, p. 12.

[25] Christy Balita, Typical monthly electricity bill of residential customers of Manila Electric Company, STATISTA, August 22, 2024, available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/1409314/meralco-average-monthly-electricity-bill-by-electricity-consumption/  (last accessed on December 20, 2024).

[26] See J. Cruz's Dissenting Opinion in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 268 Phil. 784, 807 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].

[27] Senate Journal Session No. 36, 121 (2022).

[28] Ashley Erika O. Jose, MORE Power energizes substation in Iloilo, BUSINESS WORLD ONLINE, March 7, 2023, available at https://www.bworldonline.com/corporate/2023/03/07/509026/more-power-energizes-substation-in-iloilo/ (last accessed December 20, 2024).

[29] 661 Phil. 395 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

[30] Id. at 403.

[31] Id. at 395.

[32] Id.

[33] Id. at 400.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 399-401.

[36] Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission, 457 Phil. 106 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; Republic of the Philippines v. Express Telecommunications. Co., Inc., 424 Phil. 380 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 234 Phil. 443 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division].

[37] III Record, Constitutional Commission 258 (1986).

[38] Id.

[39] See Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 268 Phil 784, 805 (1990) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].

[40] See Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc].

[41] See Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, 918-A Phil 144, 167 (2021) [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].

[42] Id. at 161-166.

[43] See Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. v. Halili, 95 Phil. 694, 697-698 (1954) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

[44] See Bohol Land Transportation Co. v. Jureidini, 53 Phil. 560, 569 (1929) [Per J. Villa-Real, En Banc].

[45] Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, 706 Phil. 431, 438 (2013) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].

[46] Id.

[47] The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment, 836 Phil. 214, 273 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

[48] Id. at 265, citing Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 398 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, En Banc].

[49] Lopez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 221 Phil. 325, 331 (1985) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

[50] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 786, 808 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

[51] Republic Act No. 9136, sec. 4(q).

[52] Presidential Decree No. 269 (1973), sec. 16(k).

[53] See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in More Electric and Power Corporation v. Panay Electric Co. Inc., 884 Phil. 673, 758 (2020) [Per J. J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc], citing Concurring Opinion of J. McLean in The West River Bridge Company v. Dix, et al. 47 U.S. 507, 537 (1848) [Per J. Daniel, Supreme Court of the United States].

[54] 884 Phil. 673 (2020) [Per J. J. Reyes, Jr., En Banc].

[55] Republic Act No. 9136, sec. 27 provides:

SECTION 27. Franchising Power in the Electric Power Sector. - The power to grant franchises to persons engaged in the transmission and distribution of electricity shall be vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines and all laws inconsistent with this Act particularly, but not limited to, Section 43 of PD 269, otherwise known as the "National Electrification Decree", are hereby deemed repealed or modified accordingly: Provided, That all existing franchises shall be allowed to their full term: Provided, further, That in the case of electric cooperatives, renewals and cancellations shall remain with the National Electrification Commission under the National Electrification Administration for five (5) more years after the enactment of this Act.

[56] Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 407 (1999) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

[57] RULES OF COURT, rule 19, sec. 1.

[58] Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health, 561 Phil. 392, 396 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].

[59] Id. at 395.

[60] Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.