DISSENTS IN A SEPARATE OPINION

ANGELES, J.:

It is my considered opinion that the amended petition stating that the applicant Francisco Cokeng owned a residential building situated at 12th Street, No. 28, Broadway, Quezon City, purportedly valued at P20,000.00, having been published in the issue of the Official Gazette of June, 1955, and three times in the Daily Record, a newspaper then having general circulation, to all intents and purposes, it was a sufficient notice to give the public and the investigating agencies of the Government an opportunity to gather information and to express objection relative to the petition, which fact negates any idea of an attempt to conceal a relevant matter to the application, and it appearing that until now the State has not come forward with any adverse or derogatory evidence against him from persons who live adjoining or close to the said house in Quezon City, for this reason alone, I vote to grant appellee's motion for reconsideration.

SEPARATE OPINION

 CASTRO, J.:

Francisco Cokeng, on December 29, 1958, became a Filipino citizen through the procedure prescribed by law for naturalization; on this day he took the oath of allegiance and was issued his certificate of naturalization.

More than two years later, or more precisely on March 7, 1961, the Solicitor General instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the court that granted Cokeng Fi­lipino citizenship, a proceeding for the denaturalization of the latter, on the ground that he had obtained his certificate of naturalization fraudulently and/or illegally.  More particularly it was averred (1) that he made it ap­pear in the naturalization proceeding that he was a resident of Manila when in fact he was residing at no. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City, and (2) that he had habitually concealed his taxable income and evaded payment of taxes due from him to the Government.  The court denied the Solicitor General's motion on December 11, 1961.

On appeal by the State, this Court on July 30, 1966 re­versed, and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of citizenship upon the two grounds raised by the Solicitor Gen­eral.  On September 20, 1966 Cokeng filed the present motion for reconsideration.

In the resolution penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the two conclusions reached by him are (1) that the denatu­ralization of Cokeng cannot be predicated upon the charge of underdeclaration of his income; and (2) that his denaturalization should nevertheless be ordered on the ground that his omission to state in his original application for naturalization his residence in Quezon City is fatal.  With respect to the latter, Mr. Justice Reyes has this to say:  "The good faith of the applicant in omitting one or more of his 'present and past places of residence' in his application, becomes and is irrelevant for the purposes of the law.  Whether the omission be in good or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the irreproachability of applicant's behaviour is well thereby prevented, and the law's intent frustrated.  Hence this Court in a long line of decisions has invariably held that such omission is fatal to the application for naturalization * * * the act of the appellee Cokeng is not disclosing his residence in Quezon City * * * rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper, being contrary to the requirements and policy of the law.  While the decree had become final, the State is not thereby deprived of corrective action through denaturalization proceedings for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate.  For under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'a competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the civil registry whenever it is shown that . . . . said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally.'  These terms were reproduced from the American law that allowed cancellation of naturalizations 'fraudulently or illegally procured,' and it has been the constant interpretation of the Federal and Supreme Courts of the United States that the term 'illegally procured' is not limited to irregularity, but also denoted a determination by the court contrary to law of the matter submitted to it."

With all due respect for the opinion of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we are constrained to disagree with his con­clusion that the certificate of naturalization issued to Cokeng should be cancelled, for the reasons that will hereunder be stated.

More specifically, we hold the view (1) that the resi­dential building, situated at no. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City, and owned by Cokeng, was not a "residence" within the meaning of the word as used in the Naturalization Law; and (2) that measured by the injunction that in a denaturalization proceeding the proof of fraudulent or illegal procurement of the certificate of naturalization must be "clear, un­equivocal and convincing," the evidence in the present case does not meet this stringent requirement.

1.       Although the word "residence" may have varying connotations in different statutes and situations, it is nonetheless the consensus of legal lexicographers that "residence" is the place where a person has established a home, with intention to remain thereat permanently or for an indefinite time, and implies something of permanence or continuity at least for an indefinite period, to the exclusion of other contemporaneous residence (see Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, vol. 37, pp. 317-323).  Quoting from Van Dyne's Na­turalization, Velayo, in his book Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization, p. 73, states that in its broad sense, residence "means a place of abode, selected with the inten­tion of remaining permanently or for an indefinite period." Also from Van Dyne, Velayo (p. 74) makes this explicit quotation of what the court said in the case of In Re Hawley, 1 Daly 531:  "There are few questions that come up for the consideration of judicial tribunals which are more difficult to define than what will constitute a residence.  The best definition that I have ever been able to find, or which my own experience could suggest -- and I have had a great deal -- is that to be deduced from the Roman Law -- that a man's residence is the place where his family dwells or which he makes the chief seat of his affairs and interests." In Pe­tition of Oganesoff, 20 F (2d) 980, the court had this to say:  "While the words 'domicile' and 'residence' may be dis­tinguished for certain purposes, I think they are synonymous for the purpose of naturalization.  It has often been held that they are synonymous, and I think the authorities bear out the conclusion here expressed.  Statutes using these two terms have frequently been construed to this effect. * * * The presumption is that a married man's residence is where his family resides, when the family resides in a permanent home, and no separation has taken place. * * * When a residence or domicile is once acquired, it continues until a new one takes its place.  It is not lost merely by temporary absence, or temporary residence elsewhere, though that may be continued for a period of years."

Reverting now to the case at bar, the record, to our mind, shows that the house in Quezon City owned by Cokeng was not a residence within the meaning given to the term "resi­dence" by the cases we have above quoted.  True that the house is owned by him, but the lot on which it stands is owned by some other person.  He bought the house for his ailing father who was afflicted with tuberculosis.  Although he and his wife had a room in that house reserved for their use on their occasional visits to his father, nevertheless he, his wife and children actually lived for all purposes in Sto. Cristo, Manila.  That the house in Sto. Cristo, Manila was the actual residence of Cokeng and his family, is proved by the mention of that place as his residence in no less than twenty-three important documents executed by him, eight of which were presented in evidence by the Office of the Solicitor General itself.

The eight documents referred to by the Solicitor General as showing that he had a second residence, indicate at best that the house he owns in Quezon City was mentioned in the said documents in the concept of a mere second address.  Exhibit A is a petition for the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of Cokeng's deceased father.  Attorney Federico Amacio who prepared the petition explained that he did not consider Cokeng's address material, and because he remembered the address of Cokeng's father in Quezon City, he instructed his stenographer to place it in the pe­tition.  Exhibits B and C are the birth certificates of the two sons of Cokeng.  It was obviously someone else who gave the information that was placed in the birth certificates; otherwise if it was he who did give the information, he would not have committed the errors that appear in the said certificates as to his own age as well as that of his wife.  Exhibit AA is a tax declaration of the house in Quezon City, which document was prepared by the Quezon City assessor.  For the purposes of the said tax assessment, all that is important is an address of the taxpayer.  Exhibits Y-5, Y-6 and Y-1 are articles of incorporation.  The mention of the actual residences of the stockholders or incorporators is not material, because all that matters with respect to the validity of the said articles of incorporation is a statement of the addresses of said incorporators or stockholders, which addresses can even be their respective offices or places of business.  Exhibit SSS is an income tax return accomplished for the year 1957.  Income tax returns can be filed in any place in the Philippines and the taxes paid in such place.  All that is necessary as far as the Bureau of Internal Revenue is concerned is an address of the taxpayer to which the assessments made by it can be sent.

All these go to show that Cokeng did not consider the house in Quezon City as a residence.  And even if the said house could be considered a residence, two facts stand out, which must be construed in favor of Cokeng, namely, (1) that his ownership of a house in Quezon City was mentioned in his amended petition for naturalization which was published in the issue of the Official Gazette of June, 1955 and three times in the Daily Record; and (2) that until now the State has not come forward with any adverse or derogatory evidence against him from persons who live adjoining or close to the said house in Quezon City.

It may be noted, in passing, that four of the above-described documents, namely, exhs. A, Y-5, Y-6 and Y-1, were executed after the filing of the amended petition for naturalization, and are therefore irrelevant and incompetent evi­dence.

The entire picture, as we see it, demonstrates a sincere conviction on the part of Cokeng that his house in Quezon City was not a residence of his at the time of the filing of his original petition for naturalization.

2.       We cannot in words emphasize our reasoned adherence to the view that the remedy afforded the Government in a denaturalization proceeding is "a narrower one than that of direct appeal from the granting of a petition. * * * To set aside such a grant the evidence must be 'clear, unequivocal and convincing' -- it can not be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt. * * * This is so be­cause rights once conferred should not be lightly revoked.  And more especially is this true when the rights are precious and when they are conferred by solemn adjudication as is the si­tuation when citizenship is granted. * * * Were the law otherwise, valuable rights would rest upon a slender reed, and the security of the status of our naturalized citizens might depend in considerable degree upon the political temper of majority thought and the stresses of the times" (Justice Frank Murphy in Schneiderman vs. U.S., 320 U.S. 125, 158-159).

In the phrase of Justice Rutledge (Schneiderman vs. U.S., 320 U.S. 165-169) --

"Immediately we are concerned with only one man, William Schneiderman.  Actually, though indirectly, the decision affects millions.  If, seventeen years after a federal court adjudged him entitled to be a citizen, that judgment can be nullified and he can be stripped of the most precious right, by nothing more than re-examination upon the merits of the very facts the judgment established, no naturalized person's citizenship is or can be secure.  If this can be done after that length of time, it can be done after thirty or fifty years.  If it can be done for Schneiderman, it can be done for thousands or tens of thousands of others.

"For all that would be needed would be to produce some evidence from which any one of the federal district judges could draw a conclusion, concerning one of the ultimate facts in issue, opposite from that drawn by the judge decreeing admission.  The statute does not in terms prescribe 'jurisdictional' facts.  But all of the important ones are 'jurisdictional,' or have that effect, if by merely drawing a contrary conclusion from the same, at any later time a court can overturn the judgment.  An applicant might be admitted today upon evidence satisfying the court he had complied with all requirements.  That judgment might be affirmed on appeal and again on certiorari here.  Yet the day after, or ten years later, any district judge could overthrow it, on the same evidence, if it was conflicting or gave room for contrary inferences, or on different evidence all of which might have been presented to the first court.

"If this is the law and the right the naturalized citizen acquires, his admission creates nothing more than citizenship in attenuated, if not suspended, animation.  He acquires but prima facie status, if that.  Until the Government moves to cancel his certificate and he knows the outcome, he cannot know whether he is in or out.  And when that is done, nothing forbids repeating the harrowing process again and again, unless the weariness of the courts should lead them to speak res judicata.

"It may be doubted that the framers of the Constitution intended to create two classes of citizens, one free and independent, one haltered with a lifetime string tied to the status.  However that may be, and conceding that the power to revoke exists and rightly should exist to some extent, the question remains whether the power to admit can be delegated to the courts in such a way that their determination, once made, determines and concludes nothing with finality.

"If every fact in issue, going to the right to be a citizen, can be re-examined, upon the same or different proof, years or decades later; and if this can be done de novo, as if no judgment had been entered, whether with respect to the burden of proof required to reach a different decision or otherwise, what does the judgment determine? What does it settle with finality? If review is had and the admission is affirmed, what fact is adjudicated, if next day any or all involved can be redecided to the contrary? Can Congress, when it has empowered a court to determine and others to review and confirm, at the same time or later authorize any trial court to overturn their decrees, for causes other than such as have been held sufficient to overturn other decrees?

"I do not undertake now to decide these questions.  Nor does the Court.  But they have a hearing on the one which is decided.  It is a judgment which is being attacked. Accordingly, it will not do to say the issue is identical with what is presented in a naturalization proceeding, is merely one of fact, upon which therefore the finding of the trial court concludes, and consequently we have no business to speak or our speaking is appellate intermeddling.  That ignores the vital fact that it is a judgment, rendered in the exercise of the judicial power created by Article 3 which it is sought to overthrow, not merely a grant like a patent to land or for invention.  Congress has plenary power over naturalization.  That no one disputes.  Nor that this power, for its application, can be delegated to the courts.  But this is not to say, when Congress has so placed it, that body can decree in the same breath that the judgment rendered shall have no conclusive effect.  Limits it may place, But that is another matter from making an adju­dication under Article 3 merely an advisory opinion or prima facie evidence of the fact or all the facts determined.  Congress has, with limited exceptions, plenary power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  But to confer the jurisdiction and at the same time nullify entirely the effects of its exercise are not matters heretofore thought, when squarely faced, within its authority.  To say therefore that the trial court's function in this case is the same as was that of the admitting court is to ignore the vast difference between overturning a judgment, with its adjudicated facts, and deciding initially upon facts which have not been adjudged."

United States vs. Anastacio, 226 F.2d 916 and Baumgartner vs. U.S., 322 U.S. 665, 670 are authority for the rule that "there must be a * * * solidity of proof which leaves no troubling doubt in deciding a question of such gravity as is implied in an attempt to reduce a person to the status of alias [or stateless person] from that of citizen." (see also 3 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 1046) Such being the case, citizenship once granted should not be taken away upon the slightest pretext of some alleged fraud or irregularity.  Citizenship obtained through naturalization is not a se­cond-class citizenship.  Unlike, therefore, in naturalization proceedings where the facts and the law may be interpreted and construed strictly against the applicant, in a denaturalization case, the reverse is true.  "A strict burden of proof is placed on the government.  If there is any doubt on the facts, the interest of the government, and not that of the individual, must give way.  When fraud is charged, the power of denaturalization will apparently be exercised only to denaturalize the most perfidious applicants" (Torre, Aliens:  Denaturalization for Fraud, 35 Calif. L.R, 449, 453). "The courts must be less concerned with what one undesirable citizen can do if he is permitted to retain his citizenship and residence in this country than with what one bad precedent-making decision can do" (U.S. v. Anastacio, supra, p. 919).  "In its consequences, it [denaturalization] is more serious than a taking of one's property or the imposition of a fine or other penalty. * * * Once conferred [citizenship] should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof. * * * The facts and the law should be construed as far as is reasonably possible in favor of the citizen.  Especially is this so when the attack is made long after the time when the certificate of citizenship was granted, and the citizen has meanwhile met his obligations and has committed no act of lawlessness" (Schneiderman vs. U.S., supra).

ACCORDINGLY, we vote to grant the appellee's motion for reconsideration, and to reverse the decision this Court of July 30, 1966.