A petition for mandamus to set aside respondent court's orders of October 22, 1968 and February 5, 1969 holding that the appeal sought to be perfected by petitioners from respondent court's adverse decision of July 9, 1968 was not perfected on time and did not comply with the legal requirements and for a writ commanding respondent court to give due course to the proposed appeal. The petition filed on April 29, 1968 in respondent court by herein petitioners against herein respondents public officials and private respondent Maria Rosario Sy likewise as respondents therein, sought the annulment and setting aside of respondent Secretary's decision resolving the conflict between the contending applicants for the timber license to operate the forest concession known as Block II at Labo, Camarines Norte with 11,650 hectares, in favor of respondent Sy and against petitioners.^[1] Petitioners manifest expressly that "the inherent merit of this petition is not involved in these proceedings."^[2]After some incidents involving the issuance of preliminary injunction and upon separate motions of respondents both principally pleading failure on the part of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and prematurity of petitioners' action since petitioners had admittedly a pending appeal in the Office of the President  which was as yet undecided, respondent court in a "decision" dated July 9, 1968, granted the motions to dismiss "for lack of cause of action against respondents" and consequently denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and lifted its interim order of May 3, 1968 restraining respondents from committing the acts complained of.  

Respondent court thus justified its dismissal of the petition:  "(I)t is very apparent that the petitioners have not exhausted all their administrative remedies before going to court.  The petitioners cannot deny that the appeal is still pending in the Office of the President.  How could this court now review the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources when under the law said decisions are appealable to the Office of the President, and only then if this last stage of the administrative proceeding fail could a party go to court for judicial review?  (Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court; Presidential Executive Order No. 19; Hodges vs. Mun. Board of Iloilo City, G. R. No. L-18276, Jan. 12, 1967; Roman Santos vs. Hon. Florencio Moreno, L-15829, Dec. 4, 1967); that, clearly, therefore, petitioners have no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies which is a condition sine qua non in a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed for the purpose of reviewing the decision of a department secretary."

As already indicated above, petitioners filed the present action of mandamus  upon respondent court's refusal to give due course to their proposed appeal, upon respondents' separate oppositions as sustained by it that the appeal was not perfected on time and in the manner prescribed by the Rules.^[3]The petition was given due course, respondents filed their separate answers, and memoranda in lieu of oral argument were filed by the parties on the question at issue of whether or not petitioners seasonably perfected their appeal from respondent court's adverse decision so as to entitle them to the writ of mandamus herein prayed for.  

The pleadings of record, however, make manifest now that the ultimate objective of the present action for the granting of a writ of mandamus requiring respondent court to give due course to petitioners' proposed appeal has been rendered moot and academic  by the President's decision in the administrative appeal released on June 10, 1969 thru then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the issuance of the timber license to Block II (as well as Block I applied for by another claimant not involved herein) to respondent Maria Rosario Sy.^[4]

Petitioners in their memorandum of September 18, 1969, however, disputed respondents' claim that their action has been rendered moot by the presidential decision of June 10, 1969 and submitted copy of their motion for reconsideration dated August 4, 1969 praying for reconsideration of the President's adverse decision, which was then pending and unresolved.^[5]In private respondent's pleadings of February 28, 1970 and February 2, 1972, it has been asserted without contradiction from petitioners that on February 11, 1970, the Office of the President thru then Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Ponciano A. Mathay denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and adjudged "the case considered closed" on the ground that it was "filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period fixed in section 4 of Executive Order No. 19, series of 1966" which it was noted "was promulgated to discourage frivolous and dilatory appeals, as well as motions for reconsideration, which erode the stability and finality of administrative decisions." Nevertheless, the President's said order of denial took pains to reaffirm that the facts of the administrative case fully justify that respondent Maria Rosario Sy "indubitably possesses better qualifications" than petitioners' predecessor and therefore was deserving of the award.^[6]It is evident, therefore, as contended by private respondent, that the presidential decision definitely and finally dismissing petitioners' administrative appeal renders moot and futile any further proceedings in the case at bar.  

Respondent court had duly dismissed petitioners' action before it questioning respondent Secretary's award of the questioned timber license in favor of respondent Sy precisely because of prematurity  and lack of cause of action, since petitioners still were pursuing their administrative appeal in the Office of the President.  Respondent Secretary's questioned award has now been supplanted by the presidential actions of June 10, 1969 and February 11, 1970 issued long after the herein challenged orders of October 22, 1968 and February 5, 1969 dismissing petitioners' proposed appeal from respondent court's adverse decision of July 9, 1968.

It is consequently now purely academic and serves no practical purpose to still rule on the question at bar as to the timeliness of petitioner's proposed appeal for the simple reason that even if such appeal were to be allowed, any review of the respondent Secretary's challenged award would likewise be academic.  The subsequent presidential determinations in the administrative case definitely and finally awarding the contested timber license in favor of respondent Maria Rosario Sy now constitute the final administrative decision that should be judicially challenged, assuming the existence of valid grounds therefor in accordance with well established principles of administrative law.^[7] Such challenge must be raised by petitioners in an entirely separate case, assuming that the same may still be seasonably done.  Assuming the utmost that petitioners' appeal from respondent Secretary's action is given due course herein and that petitioners succeed in securing on appeal a reversal of respondent court's ruling of prematurity of their action, their action below would nevertheless remain academic since what control now are the later presidential determinations of June 10, 1969 and February 11, 1970 which cannot be reviewed in the case below since they were never the subject-matter thereof. 

"The granting of writs of prohibition and mandamus," as observed by the Chief Justice, "is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to be exercised on equitable principles and * * * said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear."^[8] As restated by Mr. Justice Castro for the Court in Lemi vs. Valencia^[9] "It is essential, therefore, for a writ of mandamus  to issue, that the plaintiff has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required.  The legal right of the plaintiff to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain.  The corresponding duty of the defendant to perform the required act must also be clear and specific." Since petitioners' issues have become moot and academic, it is patent that the present action must likewise fail for lack of a clear right. 

ACCORDINGLY , the Court hereby orders the dismissal of the petition.  Without costs. 

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., concurs in the result. 

Barredo, J., see concurring opinion. 

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^[1] Civil Case No. Q-12071 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, entitled "Petronila Reyes Vda. de Pimentel, et al, petitioners vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, et al, respondents." 

^[2] Petition, par. 2a. 

^[3] Respondent Sy's oppositions to motion for elevation of original records both dated Sept. 17, 1968, Annexes I and J, petition, and, respondents officials' motion for dismissal of appeal, dated Sept. 17, 1968, Annex K, petition.

^[4] Annex 4, respondent Sy's motion to dismiss dated July 18, 1969.  

^[5] Annex A, petitioners' memorandum.

^[6] Annex "I", respondent Sy's motion and manifestation dated February 28, 1970.  

^[7] See Timbancaya vs. Vicente, 9 SCRA 852 (Dec. 17, 1963); Resolution of March 15, 1972 in L-33831, Subido vs. Pangramuyen.

^[8] Concurring and dissenting op. of the new Chief Justice in Aytona vs. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1, 17 (1962); italics supplied.  

^[9] 26 SCRA 203, 210 (Nov. 29, 1968); italics supplied. 

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