EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985 ]
IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN V. RAMOS +
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LAURENTE C. ILAGAN, ANTONIO B. ARELLANO, AND MARCOS D. RISONAR, JR., INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
[IBP]; FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
[FLAG]
AND MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.,
[MABINI], PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; BRIG. GEN. DIONISIO TAN-GATUE, PC-INP REGIONAL COMMANDER FOR REGION XI, CAMP CATITIPAN, DAVAO CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG); and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI) on behalf of Attorneys Laurente C.
Ilagan, Antonio B. Arellano, and Marcos Risonar, Jr.
The facts follow:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders, and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23, 1985.
In their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.[1], Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition.
During the hearing on May 23, 1985, the detained attorneys narrated to the Court the circumstances of their arrest and detention. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao, but due to lack of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities, the Court, on the same day, resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to give petitioners ten days within which to file a traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply thereto.
The next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the detained attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be released to the custody of the principal counsel of petitioners at the Supreme Court.
On May 27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on thee basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP" x x x" even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the armed overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also implicated the detained attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added that, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detained attorneys until ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a period not exceeding one year.
On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12,349; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
On May 30, 1985, petitioners filed an Opposition to respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process; consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents, on the other hand, filed on the same day a Comment to petitioners' Manifestation and Motion reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Davao.
On June 3, 1985, petitioners filed a Consolidated Comment and Traverse contending that the "Welgang Bayans" were in legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys' participation was limited to serving in the legal panel and the negotiating panels; that Proclamation No. 2045 is unconstitutional because there exists no factual or legal basis for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided for in the Constitution; that the evidence presented by respondents against the detained attorneys are of a doubtful and flimsy nature; and that the PDA is unconstitutional because it violates Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
On July 1, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the Court immediately resolve the issues raised as the case affects not only the detained attorneys but the entire legal profession and the administration of justice as well.
Finally, after two extensions granted by the Court, on July 8, 1985, respondents filed a Consolidated Reply, reiterating first, the validity of Proclamation No. 2045, as amended by Proclamation No. 2045-A and of the PDA issued against petitioners as an incident to the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; secondly, the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.[2]; and thirdly, its prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the filing of an Information for Rebellion against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them.[3] The function of the special proceeding of Habeas Corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of Habeas Corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.[4]
On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112.[7] The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception Thus, the Verification reads:
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:
Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful.
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court.
The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation.[8] As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478[1961], this is the proper procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance".[9] The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.[10]
The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke[12], wherein this Court ordered the release of two of the accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in the case, the accused were charged only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail; whereas in this case, petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court has not allowed bail.
WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, C.J., Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Patajo, J., joins J. Concepcion, Jr. in his dissenting opinion.
Aquino, J., in the result.
[1] 121 SCRA 472 [1983].
[2] Ibid.
[3] In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Joseph Olayer, et als. vs. Gen. Fabian C. Ver, G. R. No. L-59787, May 3, 1985; In the Matter of the Petition of Habeas Corpus in behalf of Pedro Sison, Jr. vs. Ministry of National Defense, G. R. No. 56893, May 3, 1985; Parong vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, G. R. No. 61388, July 19, 1985.
[4] In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Anderson Beltran, et als. vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 717 [1979].
[5] In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Simon Luna vs. Hon. Lorenzo Plaza, etc., et al., 26 SCRA 310, 323 [1968].
[6] Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., 18 SCRA 1168 [1966].
[7] Section 3, Rule 112.
[8] People vs. Abejuela and People vs. Vidal Endan, 38 SCRA 324 [1971].
[9] People vs. Abejuela, supra; Zacarias vs. Hon. Fernando Cruz, 30 SCRA 728 [1969].
[10] People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883 [1966].
[11] Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., et al., 18 SCRA 1168, 1171 [1966].
[12] G. R. No. 68347, December 19, 1984.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
It was Holmes who said that the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. Thus the early Roman law was ritualistic and highly formal. Gradually, however, it evolved and form was replaced by substance. The development of the law did not stop there. The Roman praetorian law enlarged, supplemented and over-rode law which became narrow and rigid in scope. Finally common law produced equity jurisprudence. It is a formal set of legal and procedural rules and doctrines to aid and even override common and statute law in order to protect rights and enforce duties fixed by substantive law.
The majority opinion appeals to the mind for it appears to be logically constructed. It leans heavily on the letter of the law. Upon the other hand the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee which is his article of faith appeals both to the mind and the heart for it is based not only on law but on equity also.
I believe that Justice Teehankee's opinion better serves the ends of justice and I gladly subscribe to it. I also subscribe to Justice Concepcion's separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:
1. I dissent. The petition is not moot and academic.
2. Petitioners should be set free immediately because they were arrested unlawfully, and the information filed against them dismissed for being null and void. However, the authorities may, if they choose to do so, file a case against petitioners in the Fiscal's Office of Davao. The fiscal should conduct a preliminary investigation as required by law. If he finds the existence of a prima facie case, then he should file the necessary information in court. After the court issues a warrant of arrest against petitioners, only then may they be placed in custody.
3. Petitioners have a right to a preliminary investigation, and infringement of this right is a denial of due process.
4. The instances when a person may be arrested without a warrant are clearly laid down by Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as follows:
5. From the facts brought out by the pleadings and at the hearing, petitioners' arrest does not fall under any of the instances enumerated above. Their arrest without a warrant is therefore patently and undeniably illegal and contrary to law.
6. Just as a spring polluted at its source cannot produce a flow of clean water, the unlawful arrest of petitioners cannot give rise to a valid information. The information filed in court against them necessarily is and must remain null and void.
7. In Morales,[1] this Court cautioned against arrests without warrant in this wise:
9. At a time when the Armed Forces of the Philippines has to play a salient role in our affairs of government in view of the existence of a rebellion in our midst, there is all the more a greater need for lawyers to defend the rights of individuals against actual or possible abuses of agents of the State.
10. We must strengthen and solidify the Rule of Law. It is the only way to the survival of democracy in our land.
[1] G.R. No. 61016, Horacio R. Morales, Jr., vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and Col. Galileo Kintanar; and G.R. No. 61107, Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr., vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and Col., Galileo Kintanar, promulgated April 26, 1983.
ADDITIONAL OPINION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I wish to express my views on other aspects of this case with which the majority does not concur.
It is to be noted that in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City "no bail" has been indicated. Neither was bail recommended by the City Fiscal. However, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1834, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1974 (May 2, 1985), the crime of Rebellion is still punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death." Presidential Decree No. 1974 did not reduce the penalty for Rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1834, but merely "tempered" the penalties for "conspiracy or proposal or inciting to commit such crimes," limiting the amended provisions to Articles 136, 138, 141, 142, 142-B, 143, 144, 146, and 147, but not to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering, therefore, that the detained attorneys are not entitled to bail as a matter of right before the prosecution is heard on its evidence, and observing fealty to the Constitutional mandate that "all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties" (Section 18, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, should be directed in Criminal Case No. 12,349, to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the detained attorneys is strong, and considering the gravity of the offense charged, it should likewise be required to hear the case to completion with deliberate speed so that their guilt or innocence may be determined without delay.
Furthermore, pending resolution by this Court of the crucial issues raised in Garcia-Padilla and in Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G. R. No. 66610) consolidated with National Bar Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G. R. No. 66706), it is my view that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, or the duplicate original, or a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the PDAs should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside Metro Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such date of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys were arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt as to its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed "any appreciable danger to national security and public order."
The paramount consideration should be that the Constitutional "right of the people to be secure in their persons x x x against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution). Until the issue of the validity of the PDA is finally resolved, PDAs applied for on the basis of militancy alone in national security cases, of insufficient surveillance, or unsupported deductions and inferences, contravene the Constitutional mandate that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" (ibid.). Adherence to Constitutional mandates could ease the current discontent and growing insurgency gripping the nation today. The objective should be to fight for the hearts and minds of the people by observing the rule of law.
Lastly, I venture to invite attention, particularized for this case, that the Constitution provides for the vesting of judicial power not only in this Court but also in inferior Courts established by law. While this Court can reverse and modify, on appeal or certiorari, actuations of inferior Courts, the latter, as wielders of judicial power, can not only invoke, but also be entitled to, "procedural due process". Without a hearing, howsoever formal, the involved Regional Trial Court branch in Davao City should not be deprived of jurisdiction, substantial or even initial, over persons it has ordered, or confirmed as, arrested.
The facts follow:
On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. One of the visiting lawyers, Atty. Antonio Arellano, was also arrested and detained on the basis of an unsigned Mission Order. On May 13, 1985, the military sent word to the IBP Davao Chapter that Attorney Marcos Risonar would likewise be arrested. The latter went to Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers and was detained on the basis of a Mission Order signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.
This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders, and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.
On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23, 1985.
In their Return, respondents contended that the detained attorneys were arrested on the basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25, 1985; that the Writ of habeas corpus is suspended as to them by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A; and that pursuant to the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.[1], Courts lack the authority to inquire into the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension. Respondents further expounded on the state of rebellion in Davao City on the basis of seized subversive documents, implying that the detained attorneys played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Respondents then prayed for the denial of the petition.
During the hearing on May 23, 1985, the detained attorneys narrated to the Court the circumstances of their arrest and detention. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence of subversive activities in Davao, but due to lack of evidence linking the detained attorneys with the alleged subversive activities, the Court, on the same day, resolved to order the temporary release of the detained attorneys on the recognizance of the principal counsel of petitioners, namely, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes. The Court further resolved to give petitioners ten days within which to file a traverse to the Return of the Writ and the respondents ten days to file a Reply thereto.
The next day, or on May 24, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the detained attorneys had not yet been released and praying that they be released to the custody of the principal counsel of petitioners at the Supreme Court.
On May 27, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of Release reiterating that the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus has the effect of ousting the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, and attached thereto classified documents consisting of the Report of respondent Brig. Gen. Tan-Gatue stating that the detained attorneys "were arrested not on thee basis of their 'lawyering' but for specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the CPP" x x x" even to the extent of attending CPP and NPA rites and using their profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives;" and that the detained attorneys were involved in the Welgang Bayan in Davao City, a mass action "with demands for the armed overthrow of the government." Sworn statements of several persons also implicated the detained attorneys in alleged subversive activities. Respondents added that, while there is a Court Order directing release, they, too, are under orders, pursuant to the PDA, to hold in custody the detained attorneys until ordered released by the President or by his duly authorized representative, and that the PDA, when issued, constitutes authority to preventively detain them for a period not exceeding one year.
On May 28, 1985, respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that an Information for Rebellion was filed on May 27, 1985 against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12,349; that a Warrant of Arrest had been issued against them; and praying that this Petition be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.
On May 30, 1985, petitioners filed an Opposition to respondents' Urgent Motion/Manifestation contending that since the detained attorneys were not given the benefit of preliminary investigation, they were denied their constitutional right to due process; consequently, the Information for Rebellion filed against them is void. Respondents, on the other hand, filed on the same day a Comment to petitioners' Manifestation and Motion reiterating their prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Davao.
On June 3, 1985, petitioners filed a Consolidated Comment and Traverse contending that the "Welgang Bayans" were in legitimate exercise of the constitutional right of expression and assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; that the detained attorneys' participation was limited to serving in the legal panel and the negotiating panels; that Proclamation No. 2045 is unconstitutional because there exists no factual or legal basis for the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided for in the Constitution; that the evidence presented by respondents against the detained attorneys are of a doubtful and flimsy nature; and that the PDA is unconstitutional because it violates Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
On July 1, 1985, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the Court immediately resolve the issues raised as the case affects not only the detained attorneys but the entire legal profession and the administration of justice as well.
Finally, after two extensions granted by the Court, on July 8, 1985, respondents filed a Consolidated Reply, reiterating first, the validity of Proclamation No. 2045, as amended by Proclamation No. 2045-A and of the PDA issued against petitioners as an incident to the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus; secondly, the ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Ponce Enrile, et al.[2]; and thirdly, its prayer for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of mootness by virtue of the filing of an Information for Rebellion against the detained attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them.[3] The function of the special proceeding of Habeas Corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of Habeas Corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.[4]
"SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize to discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment." (Rule 102)If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case.[5] Habeas Corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused.[6] So is it explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, reading:
"SEC. 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. x x x "But petitioners submit that because of the absence of a preliminary investigation, the Information for Rebellion filed against the detained attorneys is void and the Court below could not have acquired jurisdiction over them, and consequently, they are entitled to release.
On the other hand, respondents contend that a preliminary investigation was unnecessary since the detained attorneys were lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Pursuant to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no Information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, except as provided for in Section 7 of Rule 112.[7] The Information filed by the City Fiscal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Davao fell within the exception Thus, the Verification reads:
"VERIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am filing this Information in pursuance with Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, wherein after examining the affidavits of the government witnesses and other documents attached to the records, I found sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial.
(SGD.) EMMANUEL E. GALICIA
City Fiscal"
Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:
"SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person.
"However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
"If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
Section 5, Rule 113 of the same Rules enumerates the instances when an arrest without warrant is lawful.
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;"In cases falling under paragraphs [a] and [b] hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (Rule 113)
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
"(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to cases when a suspect is caught in flagrante delicto or immediately thereafter, while paragraph (c) refers to escaping prisoners. As to whether the detained attorneys fall under either of the first two instances enumerated is a question of fact, which will need the presentation of evidence and is more properly within the province of the trial Court.
The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called upon "not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation.[8] As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478[1961], this is the proper procedure since the "absence of such investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance".[9] The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such investigation could be conducted.[10]
"x x x the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate Court."[11]
The Nolasco case, which petitioners invoke[12], wherein this Court ordered the release of two of the accused, is not on all fours with the case at bar as, in the case, the accused were charged only with Illegal Possession of Subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33, which is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum period, and the trial Court had granted bail; whereas in this case, petitioners are charged with the capital offense of Rebellion, and the trial Court has not allowed bail.
WHEREFORE, this petition for Habeas Corpus is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. Petitioners are now detained by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to the criminal case for Rebellion filed against them before said Court.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, C.J., Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Patajo, J., joins J. Concepcion, Jr. in his dissenting opinion.
Aquino, J., in the result.
[1] 121 SCRA 472 [1983].
[2] Ibid.
[3] In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Joseph Olayer, et als. vs. Gen. Fabian C. Ver, G. R. No. L-59787, May 3, 1985; In the Matter of the Petition of Habeas Corpus in behalf of Pedro Sison, Jr. vs. Ministry of National Defense, G. R. No. 56893, May 3, 1985; Parong vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, G. R. No. 61388, July 19, 1985.
[4] In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Anderson Beltran, et als. vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 717 [1979].
[5] In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Simon Luna vs. Hon. Lorenzo Plaza, etc., et al., 26 SCRA 310, 323 [1968].
[6] Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., 18 SCRA 1168 [1966].
[7] Section 3, Rule 112.
[8] People vs. Abejuela and People vs. Vidal Endan, 38 SCRA 324 [1971].
[9] People vs. Abejuela, supra; Zacarias vs. Hon. Fernando Cruz, 30 SCRA 728 [1969].
[10] People vs. Manlapas, 5 SCRA 883 [1966].
[11] Medina vs. Orozco, Jr., et al., 18 SCRA 1168, 1171 [1966].
[12] G. R. No. 68347, December 19, 1984.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
It was Holmes who said that the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. Thus the early Roman law was ritualistic and highly formal. Gradually, however, it evolved and form was replaced by substance. The development of the law did not stop there. The Roman praetorian law enlarged, supplemented and over-rode law which became narrow and rigid in scope. Finally common law produced equity jurisprudence. It is a formal set of legal and procedural rules and doctrines to aid and even override common and statute law in order to protect rights and enforce duties fixed by substantive law.
The majority opinion appeals to the mind for it appears to be logically constructed. It leans heavily on the letter of the law. Upon the other hand the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee which is his article of faith appeals both to the mind and the heart for it is based not only on law but on equity also.
I believe that Justice Teehankee's opinion better serves the ends of justice and I gladly subscribe to it. I also subscribe to Justice Concepcion's separate opinion.
CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:
1. I dissent. The petition is not moot and academic.
2. Petitioners should be set free immediately because they were arrested unlawfully, and the information filed against them dismissed for being null and void. However, the authorities may, if they choose to do so, file a case against petitioners in the Fiscal's Office of Davao. The fiscal should conduct a preliminary investigation as required by law. If he finds the existence of a prima facie case, then he should file the necessary information in court. After the court issues a warrant of arrest against petitioners, only then may they be placed in custody.
3. Petitioners have a right to a preliminary investigation, and infringement of this right is a denial of due process.
4. The instances when a person may be arrested without a warrant are clearly laid down by Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as follows:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
"(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
"In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
5. From the facts brought out by the pleadings and at the hearing, petitioners' arrest does not fall under any of the instances enumerated above. Their arrest without a warrant is therefore patently and undeniably illegal and contrary to law.
6. Just as a spring polluted at its source cannot produce a flow of clean water, the unlawful arrest of petitioners cannot give rise to a valid information. The information filed in court against them necessarily is and must remain null and void.
7. In Morales,[1] this Court cautioned against arrests without warrant in this wise:
"14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable for arbitrary detention or unlawful arrest or for some other offense."8. It is the responsibility of the judiciary to define and maintain the delicate balance between individual freedom and the security of the State. In the fulfillment of this mission, the active participation and assistance of dedicated human rights lawyers are indispensable. They sacrifice time and effort, and take grave risks to defend the rights of their clients. I salute them and say, "May their tribe increase."
9. At a time when the Armed Forces of the Philippines has to play a salient role in our affairs of government in view of the existence of a rebellion in our midst, there is all the more a greater need for lawyers to defend the rights of individuals against actual or possible abuses of agents of the State.
10. We must strengthen and solidify the Rule of Law. It is the only way to the survival of democracy in our land.
[1] G.R. No. 61016, Horacio R. Morales, Jr., vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and Col. Galileo Kintanar; and G.R. No. 61107, Antonio C. Moncupa, Jr., vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fabian C. Ver and Col., Galileo Kintanar, promulgated April 26, 1983.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I wish to express my views on other aspects of this case with which the majority does not concur.
It is to be noted that in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City "no bail" has been indicated. Neither was bail recommended by the City Fiscal. However, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1834, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1974 (May 2, 1985), the crime of Rebellion is still punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death." Presidential Decree No. 1974 did not reduce the penalty for Rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1834, but merely "tempered" the penalties for "conspiracy or proposal or inciting to commit such crimes," limiting the amended provisions to Articles 136, 138, 141, 142, 142-B, 143, 144, 146, and 147, but not to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
Considering, therefore, that the detained attorneys are not entitled to bail as a matter of right before the prosecution is heard on its evidence, and observing fealty to the Constitutional mandate that "all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties" (Section 18, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch X, should be directed in Criminal Case No. 12,349, to determine whether the evidence of guilt against the detained attorneys is strong, and considering the gravity of the offense charged, it should likewise be required to hear the case to completion with deliberate speed so that their guilt or innocence may be determined without delay.
Furthermore, pending resolution by this Court of the crucial issues raised in Garcia-Padilla and in Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G. R. No. 66610) consolidated with National Bar Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Min. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al. (G. R. No. 66706), it is my view that individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, or the duplicate original, or a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of apprehension. Pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the PDAs should also be enforced within 24 hours in the Metro Manila area or within 48 hours outside Metro Manila, upon receipt by the unit concerned. In this case, although the record does not show such date of receipt, the fact is that the PDA was issued on January 25, 1985 but the detained attorneys were arrested only on May 10 and 13, 1985, respectively. The four-month gap can give room for doubt as to its authenticity and whether, in fact, the detained attorneys posed "any appreciable danger to national security and public order."
The paramount consideration should be that the Constitutional "right of the people to be secure in their persons x x x against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution). Until the issue of the validity of the PDA is finally resolved, PDAs applied for on the basis of militancy alone in national security cases, of insufficient surveillance, or unsupported deductions and inferences, contravene the Constitutional mandate that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" (ibid.). Adherence to Constitutional mandates could ease the current discontent and growing insurgency gripping the nation today. The objective should be to fight for the hearts and minds of the people by observing the rule of law.
Lastly, I venture to invite attention, particularized for this case, that the Constitution provides for the vesting of judicial power not only in this Court but also in inferior Courts established by law. While this Court can reverse and modify, on appeal or certiorari, actuations of inferior Courts, the latter, as wielders of judicial power, can not only invoke, but also be entitled to, "procedural due process". Without a hearing, howsoever formal, the involved Regional Trial Court branch in Davao City should not be deprived of jurisdiction, substantial or even initial, over persons it has ordered, or confirmed as, arrested.