EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 76353, September 29, 1989 ]
SOPHIA ALCUAZ v. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION +
SOPHIA ALCUAZ, MA. CECILIA ALINDAYU, BERNADETTE ANG, IRNA ANONAS, MA. REMEDIOS BALTAZAR, CORAZON BUNDOC, JOHN CARMONA, ANNA SHEILA DINOSO, RAFAEL ENCARNACION, ANNALIZA EVIDENTE, FRANCIS FERNANDO, ZENNY GUDITO, EDGAR LIBERATO, JULIET LIPORADA, GABRIEL MONDRAGON, JOSE MARIA
PACKING, DOMINIC PETILLA, MA. SHALINA PITOY, SEVERINO RAMOS, VICTOR SANTIAGO, CAROLINA SARMIENTO, FERDINAND TORRES, RICARDO VENTIGAN AND OTHER STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (Q.C.) SIMILARLY SITUATED, PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, QUEZON CITY BRANCH (PSBA), DR. JUAN D. LIM, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PSBA, ATTY. BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS VICE-PRESIDENT FOR ADMISSION AND REGISTRATION, MR. RUBEN ESTRELLA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, MR. RAMON AGAPAY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS AND MR. ROMEO RAFER, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF SECURITY OF PSBA, RESPONDENTS.
R E S O L U T I O N
PARAS, J.:
On May 2, 1988, this Court through its Second Division rendered a Decision in the instant case which prodded the Intervenor Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union) to file a motion for reconsideration. Its argument hinges on the pronouncement that -
"x x x. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer ha any existing contract either with the students or with intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. x x x" (p. 12, Decision, underscoring supplied). (p. 874-875, Rollo)
with the allegedly inevitable consequence of extenuating the pernicious practice of management to arbitrarily and wantonly terminate teachers simply because their contracts of employment have already lapsed.
The motion likewise points out the fact that two of the faculty members, namely Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo, and Mr. Rene Encarnacion, supposedly found guilty by the Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Antonio M. Magtalas (p. 342, Rolo), had been issued permanent appointments (not mere temporary contracts) by no less than the President of the School himself. The appointment of Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo dated August 9, 1986 (p. 887, Rollo) can attest to this claim.
It is on the basis of the foregoing that We hereby amend Our previous statements on the matter.
In a recent Decision,[1] this Court had the opportunity to quite emphatically enunciate the precept that full-time teachers who have rendered three (3) years of satisfactory service shall be considered permanent (par. 75 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). Thus, having attained a permanent status, they cannot be removed from office except for just cause and after due process.
Now applying the same principle in the case at bar, Mr. Asser (Bong) Tamayo having stayed in the Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA, for brevity) for three and one-half (3½) years (in a full-time capacity) may be deemed a permanent faculty member provided, of course, the services rendered have been satisfactory to the school. However, because the investigation showed that Mr. Tamayo had participated in the unlawful demonstration, his services cannot be deemed satisfactory.
In the case of Mr. Rene Encarnacion, and Mr. Severino Cortes, Jr. who taught in PSBA for two and one-half (2½) years and one and one-half (1½) years respectively, to them a permanent status cannot be accorded for failure to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years set by the aforementioned Manual of Regulations. Of equal importance, at this point, is the fact that the letter of appointment had been extended only to Mr. Tamayo and not to Mr. Encarnacion, neither to Mr. Cortes, Jr.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons adverted to hereinabove, the motion for reconsideration, except insofar as We have made the aforementioned clarificatory statements about the tenure of full-time teachers and professors, is hereby DENIED.
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.
SO ORDERED.Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, and Feliciano, JJ., join in Mme. Justice Cortes' concurring and dissenting opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., except for the general statement that students' enrollment is limited to per semester, I concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.
Cruz, J., see dissent.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. Please see dissenting opinion.
Cortes, J., concurring and dissenting in a separate opinion.
Regalado, J., no part. Did not participate in deliberations.
[1] Labajo, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., G.R. NO. 80383, Sept. 26, 1988
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CORTES, J.:
I concur with the majority insofar as it disposes of the motion for reconsideration filed by the teachers, in view of the decision of the Court in Escudero v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989, which recognized and applied the three-year probationary period for teachers as provided in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.
However, I find that the majority has failed to fully appreciate the nature of the relation between the student and his school and to rectify the doctrinal error in the decision. The public interest attached to education, owing to the Constitution's express mandate for the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation over all educational institutions [Art. XIV, Secs. 1 and 4(1)], prevents one from viewing the relation between the student and the school as a simple contract with a term of one semester. By its nature, the "contract" cannot be terminated by the school on the ground of expiration of the term, i.e., the end of the semester for which the student is enrolled.
The majority acknowledges by way of obiter dictum, after the damage to the students has been done, that "We value the right of students to complete their education in the school or university of their choice . . ." However, this expression of sentiment does not effect the necessary reversal of the law of the case as far as the students are concerned. As stated earlier, neither does it reverse the erroneous doctrine enunciated in the decision.
I also find it necessary to bring to mind, as Mr. Justice Sarmiento has done, that we had already recognized, in the landmark case of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the right of students to peaceably assemble within the premises of their school and to air their grievances on matters that affect their education, subject to reasonable limitations as to time and place. And even the recognition of the right to assembly is nothing new, having been in our casebooks since the turn of the century. Malabanan also told us that the school is not entirely without power to discipline students for misconduct in the course of the exercise of these rights. If there be any infractions of reasonable rules established by the school or agreed upon by the school and the students, the school may discipline the erring students, but the penalty must be commensurate to the violation. Hence, in Malabanan, the penalty of suspension of one year imposed on those who led the rally that resulted in the disruption of classes because of the noise was reduced to suspension for one week. I am of the view that the majority's disposition of the present case, as to the students, which sanctioned the school's stand of refusing to allow re-enrolment of some of the students under the guise of expiration of contract and, subsequently "academic deficiency," goes against the very grain of the rule that the Court, sitting en banc, had established in Malabanan that while the authority of the schools over the conduct of their students is recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards.
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DISSENTING OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
Like Mr. Justice Sarmiento, I am also disturbed by the ruling of the majority sustaining the disciplinary action taken against the students for what I consider a valid exercise of their freedom of expression. The circumstance that the demonstrations were attended by some disorder is not in my view sufficient justification for the curtailment of their right, much less for their punishment. And I do not agree either that the sanctions may be sustained because some of the students were academically deficient, for the truth is that they were denied re-enrollment not because of such deficiency but because of the demonstrations. Surely, freedom of expression is not only for the intelligent.
I also have my misgivings about the ruling of the Court that a student's enrollment is from semester to semester and may be terminated at will by the school after each period. I submit that when a student is enrolled for a particular course, the implicit understanding is that he is entitled to remain in the school until he graduates, subject only to the usual academic, financial and other reasonable requirements.
For these reasons, I must also dissent.