EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999 ]
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY +
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before us is an appeal via certiorari interposed by the Civil Service Commission from a decision of the Court of Appeals ruling that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was not guilty of nepotism and declaring null and void the Civil Service
Commission's resolution dismissing him from the service as Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trade, Allen, Northern Samar.
The facts may be succinctly related as follows:
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.[1]
After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal charge against him.[2] Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.[3]
On February 25, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration;[4] however, on May 20, 1997, the Civil Service Commission denied the motion.[5]
On July 18, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction[6] to set aside the Civil Service Commission's resolutions.
On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act."[7]
Hence, this appeal.
On November 17, 1998, we required respondent to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.[8] On December 11, 1998, respondent filed his comment
We give due course to the petition.
The basic issue raised is the scope of the ban on nepotism.
We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The law defines nepotism[9] as follows:
Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag's immediate supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that "funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy" and even rated his performance as "very satisfactory". On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was "his next higher supervisor". The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.
To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him.[10] He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent[11] as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.[12]
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.[13] Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.[14] By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase `party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office"[15] and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary"[16] or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal."[17] In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission;[18] Mendez v. Civil Service Commission;[19] Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;[20] Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority[21] and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission[22]
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission,[23] to support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there."[24]
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one."[25] "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive."[26] If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."[27]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Melo, J., concurs and dissent in separate opinion.
Puno, J., please see concurring opinion.
Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Melo.
Mendoza, J., join the concurring opinion of Justice Puno.
[1] CSC Rollo, pp. 261-262.
[2] Report of Investigation, CSC, Rollo, pp. 154-162.
[3] Resolution No. 970684, dated January 28, 1997, CSC Rollo, pp. 108-115.
[4] CSC Rollo, pp. 82-92.
[5] Resolution No. 972881, dated May 20, 1997, Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[6] Petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
[7] Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 44711, Rollo, pp. 17-22.
[8] Resolution, dated November 17, 1998, Rollo, p. 39.
[9] Section 59, Executive Order 292, dated July 25, 1987.
[10] Rule 43, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; R.A. No. 7902.
[11] Resolution adopted on July 23, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
[12] Article IX (B), Constitution; Section 12, par. 1, Book V, Executive Order No. 292, dated July 25, 1987.
[13] Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 99, citing Gonzalo vs. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120.
[14] Rule 45, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[15] Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 967.
[16] Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85.
[17] Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 968.
[18] 192 SCRA 84.
[19] 204 SCRA 965.
[20] 215 SCRA 398.
[21] 226 SCRA 207.
[22] 241 SCRA 317..
[23] 237 SCRA 184.
[24] On page 198.
[25] On page 195.
[26] On page 197.
[27] Callanta vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 285 SCRA 648, 669.
The facts may be succinctly related as follows:
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter, Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.[1]
After the fact-finding investigation, the Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, found a prima facie case against respondent, and, on March 5, 1996, issued the corresponding formal charge against him.[2] Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission conducted a formal investigation, and, on January 28, 1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.[3]
On February 25, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration;[4] however, on May 20, 1997, the Civil Service Commission denied the motion.[5]
On July 18, 1997, respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction[6] to set aside the Civil Service Commission's resolutions.
On July 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court further held that it is "the person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act."[7]
Hence, this appeal.
On November 17, 1998, we required respondent to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.[8] On December 11, 1998, respondent filed his comment
We give due course to the petition.
The basic issue raised is the scope of the ban on nepotism.
We agree with the Civil Service Commission that respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was guilty of nepotism and correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.
The law defines nepotism[9] as follows:
"Sec. 59. Nepotism. - (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
"As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission."
a) appointing authority;Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclag's immediate supervision. On July 1, 1992, Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that "funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy" and even rated his performance as "very satisfactory". On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was "his next higher supervisor". The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.
To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him.[10] He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent[11] as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.[12]
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government.[13] Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.[14] By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase `party adversely affected by the decision' refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office"[15] and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary"[16] or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal."[17] In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission;[18] Mendez v. Civil Service Commission;[19] Magpale v. Civil Service Commission;[20] Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority[21] and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission[22]
The Court of Appeals' reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission,[23] to support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction there."[24]
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one."[25] "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive."[26] If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."[27]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Melo, J., concurs and dissent in separate opinion.
Puno, J., please see concurring opinion.
Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Melo.
Mendoza, J., join the concurring opinion of Justice Puno.
[1] CSC Rollo, pp. 261-262.
[2] Report of Investigation, CSC, Rollo, pp. 154-162.
[3] Resolution No. 970684, dated January 28, 1997, CSC Rollo, pp. 108-115.
[4] CSC Rollo, pp. 82-92.
[5] Resolution No. 972881, dated May 20, 1997, Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[6] Petition, CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
[7] Decision CA-G.R. SP No. 44711, Rollo, pp. 17-22.
[8] Resolution, dated November 17, 1998, Rollo, p. 39.
[9] Section 59, Executive Order 292, dated July 25, 1987.
[10] Rule 43, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; R.A. No. 7902.
[11] Resolution adopted on July 23, 1997, in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
[12] Article IX (B), Constitution; Section 12, par. 1, Book V, Executive Order No. 292, dated July 25, 1987.
[13] Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 99, citing Gonzalo vs. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120.
[14] Rule 45, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[15] Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 967.
[16] Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 85.
[17] Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965, 968.
[18] 192 SCRA 84.
[19] 204 SCRA 965.
[20] 215 SCRA 398.
[21] 226 SCRA 207.
[22] 241 SCRA 317..
[23] 237 SCRA 184.
[24] On page 198.
[25] On page 195.
[26] On page 197.
[27] Callanta vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 285 SCRA 648, 669.
MELO, J.:
Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in which the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a
judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private complainant - and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges
against, or even imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission (192 SCRA 84 [1990]), faithfully and consistently reiterated by the Court En Banc in Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission
(204 SCRA 965 [1991]); Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission (215 SCRA 398 [1992]); Navarro vs. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority (226 SCRA 522 [1993]); University of the Philippines vs. Civil Service Commission (228 SCRA 207
[1993]); and more recently in Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission (241 SCRA 317 [1995]); that, the Philippine Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges.
The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. From such "adverse decision", the Civil Service Commission, through its Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine.
Although in Mendez, what was particularly assailed was the authority of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to review decisions of the Merit System Promotion Board (MSPB), the Court nevertheless spelled out the rule regarding appeal from decisions where officers and employees are exonerated of the administrative charges leveled against them. Thus, we held:
There is more cogent reason, therefore, for the Court to adhere to the general rule in an administrative case involving nepotism. Besides, the law cannot be clearer on the matter. It made no distinction as regards the charge of nepotism. When the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish.
It should also be noted that Presidential Decree No. 807 has not undergone any pertinent amendment since the Court applied the law in Paredes. From the time of its passage on October 6, 1975 until the present, appeals by the government in cases of exoneration in an administrative case had been disallowed. It was not only the result of this Court's "interpretation" of the law in Paredes that made it so. It was rather the real and definite intention of the Philippine Civil Service law. If it was the intention of Legislature to allow appeals as the majority holds or as Mr. Justice Puno suggests, then, an amendment to that effect could have been introduced and passed. Then President Marcos who had full legislative power could have easily amended the said law. The records show that he did not. The fact that no such amendment has been introduced even after the re-institution of a legislative body, the Batasang Pambansa, and later in 1987, the Congress of the Philippines, signifies that, at the very least our interpretation in Paredes and the other subsequent cases sits well with Congress. It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or not, exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to disallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation, if not outright disregard of Article 7 of the Civil Code which states that:
Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an administrative case, in particular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature (cf. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345 [1969]). Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the State (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684 [1962]). Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism.
To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people, working under supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not easily cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can, therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor by successive appeals.
What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government employee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of the ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that the good of the majority prevailed.
A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. The Court En Banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason in Mendoza vs. Civil Service Commission (233 SCRA 657 [1994]), held:
Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof.
The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. From such "adverse decision", the Civil Service Commission, through its Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine.
Although in Mendez, what was particularly assailed was the authority of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to review decisions of the Merit System Promotion Board (MSPB), the Court nevertheless spelled out the rule regarding appeal from decisions where officers and employees are exonerated of the administrative charges leveled against them. Thus, we held:
It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA 318).The Mendez ruling was a reiteration of Paredes wherein we said:
A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. x x x. (Italics supplied) (p. 7 Rollo)Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be 807) which contemplates:
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision x x x. (italics supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative case below.
Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.
By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in the case, there is no occasion for appeal.
(pp. 967-968.)
Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision.It is true that as early as Paredes, this Court was already aware of the fact that in an administrative case, any offense, not only that involving nepotism as intimated in the majority opinion, is committed against the government. As rightly pointed out in Mr. Justice Puno's Separate Opinion, the charges in Paredes and the other subsequent cases were as serious, if not more serious than the present charge of nepotism. In fact, there might even be instances when the unlawful and nepotic act may prove to be beneficial to the government, as in the case where the appointed employee is more than qualified for the position. Surely, charges of abuse of authority or of graft and corruption are more serious than an accusation of nepotism, for the acts therein involved cannot but cause injury to government. If the complainant is allowed to appeal in cases involving nepotism, then with more reason should appeals be allowed in the dismissal of, or in the imposition of lighter penalties in, the charges mentioned. How about sexual harassment? Malversation? Where will this end up in except allowing appeal in all cases. The Court shall then be legislating or, at least, abandoning settled doctrines for no compelling reasons. Taking the case of nepotism as the exception to the rule would not be justified considering that, despite the greater seriousness of the charges in the earlier cases, we still did not rule therein that the government may take the appeal as the "party adversely affected".
Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of memoranda exonerated private respondent Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by the decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
As correctly ruled by private respondent, petitioner Paredes the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose as appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120). Even if she is the Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is merely a witness for the government in an administrative case. No private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government.
(pp. 98-99.)
There is more cogent reason, therefore, for the Court to adhere to the general rule in an administrative case involving nepotism. Besides, the law cannot be clearer on the matter. It made no distinction as regards the charge of nepotism. When the law does not distinguish, the Court should not distinguish.
It should also be noted that Presidential Decree No. 807 has not undergone any pertinent amendment since the Court applied the law in Paredes. From the time of its passage on October 6, 1975 until the present, appeals by the government in cases of exoneration in an administrative case had been disallowed. It was not only the result of this Court's "interpretation" of the law in Paredes that made it so. It was rather the real and definite intention of the Philippine Civil Service law. If it was the intention of Legislature to allow appeals as the majority holds or as Mr. Justice Puno suggests, then, an amendment to that effect could have been introduced and passed. Then President Marcos who had full legislative power could have easily amended the said law. The records show that he did not. The fact that no such amendment has been introduced even after the re-institution of a legislative body, the Batasang Pambansa, and later in 1987, the Congress of the Philippines, signifies that, at the very least our interpretation in Paredes and the other subsequent cases sits well with Congress. It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or not, exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to disallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation, if not outright disregard of Article 7 of the Civil Code which states that:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violations or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments or final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an administrative case, in particular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature (cf. Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345 [1969]). Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the State (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684 [1962]). Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving nepotism.
To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people, working under supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not easily cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfer of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can, therefore, understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor by successive appeals.
What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government employee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of the ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that the good of the majority prevailed.
A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. The Court En Banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason in Mendoza vs. Civil Service Commission (233 SCRA 657 [1994]), held:
We decided this case with full awareness of the decisions in Paredes v. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84 (1990) and Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 965 (1991), where we held that only the respondent in the administrative disciplinary case, not the complainant, can appeal from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (See also Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 398 [1992]). These decisions were anchored on the interpretation of Section 39(a) of P.D. No. 807, the "Philippine Service Law," which provide that appeals to the CSC shall be made by the "party adversely affected by the decision." We interpreted the quoted phrase as referring to the respondent in the administrative case.As a final observation, it may well be noted that the result in the present case may already be achieved by the application of this Court's ruling in Mendoza. It might not be necessary to step over board by institutionalizing the case of nepotism as an exception to Paredes, or, as Mr. Justice Puno proposes, abandoning Paredes altogether. I believe that it will do our justice system more good than harm if we abide by the principle of stare decisis in the present case. This case, I humbly submit is not the proper vehicle to review and abandon doctrines of long standing, for nonetheless, the appeal by the complainant is allowed there being no objection thereto by respondent Dacoycoy. We need not disturb at this time our old rulings We need not enter uncertain and mined fields, for the result sought to be accomplished by the majority can well be achieved by simply following and applying our previous rulings on the matter.
When private respondent appealed the decision of the MSPB to the CSC, petitioner never questioned the propriety of the appeal and preferred to defend the correctness of the decision. Likewise, petitioner failed to question before this Court the right of private respondent to appeal from the decision of the MSPB. A law limiting the right to appeal to the respondent in the administrative case is a rule of procedure, not of substantive law. Failure to invoke timely a rule of procedure in favor of a party constitutes a waiver thereof (Republic vs. Judge Villanueva, G.R. No. 83333, February 13, 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution).
(pp. 663-664.)
Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof.
ROMERO, J.:
Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an administrative case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the Commission's finding that the
respondent employee is guilty as charged?
After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal personality.
The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government.[1] Corollarily, it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it.[2] This is in consonance with its authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law.[3] Sitting en banc, it is composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners[4] who shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it for resolution.[5]
It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority. Such has always been the intent of the 1987 Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission, as well as the Civil Service Law. In fact, the Proposed Civil Service Code of the Philippines seeks to provide that the Commission shall have concurrent original disciplinary jurisdiction over officials and employees, including Presidential appointees of the departments, agencies, bureaus, provinces, cities, municipalities, state colleges and universities, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, it acts as an impartial tribunal in the resolution of the cases brought before it.
Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the Commission, thus:
Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority. The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant petition.
While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead."[10]
I dissent from the ponencia's conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition.
[1] Article IX-B, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution.
[2] Chapter 3, Sec. 12 (11), The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission.
[3] Rule XIV, Sec. 31, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
[4] Article IX-B, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.
[5] Article IX-A, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution.
[6] Sec. 38 (a), of the Civil Service Law, Sec. 48 (1) Chapter 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission.
[7] P.D. No. 807, Sec. 38 (g).
[8] Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Ed., 1990, p. 160.
[9] Chapter 3, Sec. 12, The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
[10] Judge Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992].
After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal personality.
The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government.[1] Corollarily, it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it.[2] This is in consonance with its authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law.[3] Sitting en banc, it is composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners[4] who shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it for resolution.[5]
It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority. Such has always been the intent of the 1987 Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission, as well as the Civil Service Law. In fact, the Proposed Civil Service Code of the Philippines seeks to provide that the Commission shall have concurrent original disciplinary jurisdiction over officials and employees, including Presidential appointees of the departments, agencies, bureaus, provinces, cities, municipalities, state colleges and universities, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, it acts as an impartial tribunal in the resolution of the cases brought before it.
Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the Commission, thus:
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the following officials and employees:Consequently, the complainant can either be the Secretary of department, head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other person or party. "The phrase `any other party' has been understood to be a complainant other than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors."[7] As further illustrated in Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person."[6] (Underscoring supplied)
"x x x . A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee x x x".The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the parties, either as complainant or respondent in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot considered either a complaint or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.[8] Based on the foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved party.[9] By inference, an aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint before the Commission or the respondent, the person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as to who is an "aggrieved party" has long been settled in a litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative case is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Law.
Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority. The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the instant petition.
While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach himself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and has become adversarial instead."[10]
I dissent from the ponencia's conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition.
[1] Article IX-B, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution.
[2] Chapter 3, Sec. 12 (11), The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission.
[3] Rule XIV, Sec. 31, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
[4] Article IX-B, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution.
[5] Article IX-A, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution.
[6] Sec. 38 (a), of the Civil Service Law, Sec. 48 (1) Chapter 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission.
[7] P.D. No. 807, Sec. 38 (g).
[8] Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Ed., 1990, p. 160.
[9] Chapter 3, Sec. 12, The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 on the Civil Service Commission in accordance with Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
[10] Judge Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992].