The Court examines the application of plain view doctrine with respect to the seizure of items not listed in the search warrant in resolving this Petition for Review on Certiorari^[1] assailing the Decision^[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 28, 2017, in CA-G.R. CR No. 38952 which affirmed the conviction of the accused for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.

Antecedents

On October 23, 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued Search Warrant No. 19-13 authorizing the law enforcers to search the house of petitioner Ruben Comamo y Jimeno (Ruben) in Barangay Gaang, Currimao, Ilocos Norte, for alleged illegal possession of a 9mm caliber pistol,^[3] to wit:

SEARCH WARRANT

TO: ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW

GREETING:

PO2 Reycar L. Almazan has applied for Search Warrant against RUBEN COMAMO [y] JIMENO of Barangay Gaang, Currimao, Ilocos Norte for the purpose of seizing a Cal. 9MM Pistol[,] among other firearms which he keeps in his possession, custody and control inside his residence at the above address.

After a thorough examination conducted on witness Larry Bumiltac, in the form of searching questions, the undersigned has found to his satisfaction that said Ruben Comamo y Jimeno has in his possession the article/item mentioned above which are being located or kept inside his room at Brgy. Gaang, Currimao, Ilocos Norte.

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to make immediate search inside the residence of Ruben Comamo [y] Jimeno at Barangay Gaang, Currimao, Ilocos Norte at any time of the day and night and to forthwith seize and take possession of the above-named article[s] which are said to be kept within the residence above-described.

Return of this Warrant shall be made not later than (10) days from today.

Given thus 23^rd day of October, 2013 at Batac City, Ilocos Norte, Philippines.^[4] (Emphasis supplied)

On October 24, 2013, at around 3:50 a.m., the police officers and barangay officials proceeded to Ruben's house and implemented the search warrant. The authorities asked Ruben to open a small cabinet in the kitchen. Ruben obliged and opened the cabinet.^[5] The operatives found firearms and ammunitions consisting of the following: (a) .45 caliber Colt 1911 pistol with serial number 421003, three magazines, 23 live ammunitions, and one inside holster; (b) one live ammunition for M14 rifle; and (c) one live ammunition for 9mm caliber pistol.^[6] The police officers requested Ruben to present license authorizing him to possess these firearm and ammunitions. However, Ruben failed to show any legal document.^[7] Accordingly, the operatives arrested Ruben and brought him for inquest proceedings. The public prosecutor found probable cause against Ruben and charged him with illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions before the RTC docketed as Criminal Case No. 5002-18, thus:

That on or about 3:50 in the morning of October 24, 2013, at Brgy. Gaang, municipality of Currimao, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, a high powered firearm, one Colt Caliber .45 Pistol with Serial No. 421003; three (3) magazines of Cal. 45; one live ammunition for Caliber 9mm; twenty-three (23) live ammunitions for Cal. 45; one live ammunition for Cal. M14; and one inside holster for Cal. 45, without first securing the necessary license, authority or permit to possess firearms and ammunitions from the proper authorities concerned.

CONTRARY TO LAW.^[8]

Ruben pleaded not guilty.^[9] Thereafter, Ruben moved to suppress the evidence claiming that the firearm and ammunitions are inadmissible. The confiscated items were not described in the search warrant which is limited only to the seizure of a 9mm caliber pistol. The phrase "among other firearms" mentioned in the search warrant constituted a general warrant that is void under the law for lack of particularity in the description of the items to be seized. Lastly, the authorities recovered the items only after they asked Ruben to open the closed cabinet.^[10] Whereas, the prosecution contended that the firearm and ammunitions are admissible in evidence. The police officers seized the contraband in plain view when enforcing the search warrant.^[11]

In due course, the RTC denied the motion to suppress evidence and held that the merits of the parties' arguments "can only be ventilated by the presentation of their respective evidence."^[12] At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the case involved no other factual questions except on whether "the seizure of the items not listed in the Search Warrant may be justified under the Plain View Doctrine."^[13] The RTC then required the parties to submit their memoranda.^[14] Ruben maintained that the seizure of evidence in plain view is present only if there is a valid intrusion based on lawful warrantless arrest. The police officers must not be searching evidence against the accused but inadvertently discovered the incriminating object.^[15] In this case, the seizure of the firearm and ammunitions resulted from the implementation of the search warrant. On the other hand, the prosecution insisted that the operatives seized the items in plain view. The enforcement of the search warrant gave the police officers prior valid justification to enter Ruben's house. The authorities inadvertently and incidentally came across the contrabands during the implementation of the search warrant. In any event, the operatives recovered one magazine and one live ammunition for 9mm caliber pistol which are related to the item described in the warrant and have direct relation to the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Lastly, Ruben opened the cabinet when the authorities asked him to do so which amounted to waiver of the right against obtrusive search.^[16]

On July 29, 2016, the RTC convicted Ruben of the crime charged and ruled that the seizure of the items not listed in the search warrant is justified under the plain view doctrine. The RTC explained that the plain view doctrine applies not only during valid warrantless searches but also to the implementation of a search warrant, thus:

After considering the undisputed facts in light of the applicable law and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of the items not listed in the Search Warrant. Accordingly, it finds the accused guilty as charged.

. . . .

The argument reveals that the defense misunderstands the notion of inadvertence under the plain view doctrine. It should be reiterated that inadvertent discovery simply means that the discovery of a particular item is not anticipated. In determining whether the discovery of an item is inadvertent or not, the question to be resolved is whether that discovery was anticipated and the policemen knew in advance about the presence of that item. The question of whether the policemen were then looking for evidence is not pertinent in determining whether the discovery was inadvertent or not.

In the implementation of a search warrant, the fact alone that the police were looking for evidence does not by itself bar the application of the plain view doctrine. This is so because to implement a search warrant is to look for evidence listed in that warrant.

. . . .

It should be stressed that the plain view doctrine applies even when the police are implementing a search warrant and necessarily looking for evidence. In that case, the plain view doctrine applies if the police are looking for the item listed in the search warrant but comes across another object not listed [in] the warrant and not known to them in advance. The plain view doctrine ceases to apply only when the police are looking for an item not listed in the search warrant but known to them in advance; in that case, the plain view is not applicable because the discovery of that item would no longer be inadvertent for having been anticipated by the police.

. . . .

This conclusion is bolstered by the practical consequence of the defense argument. As a practical matter, the defense argument would bar the seizure of an immediately apparent contraband like a bomb if the police discover it inside a cabinet while implementing a search warrant for illegal possession of, for example, a small plastic sachet of shabu. Under the argument of the defense, the plain view doctrine would not justify the seizure of the bomb because the police, in implementing a search warrant, would have been looking for evidence. In such case, the defense argument would require the police to secure another warrant for the seizure of the bomb. In the meantime, the police would have no other authority to seize it, and the malefactor would have the opportunity to destroy the bomb or to detonate it in the presence of and to the detriment of other people. That consequence is plainly absurd and could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution [.]

. . . .

Applying the foregoing discussion to the present case, the Court holds that the discovery of the caliber 45 pistol and assorted ammunitions must be deemed inadvertent, for there was no allegation or evidence that their discovery was anticipated. That the police were then looking for evidence does not bar the application of the plain view doctrine, for there was no showing that they were then looking for items other than the 9mm pistol listed in the Search Warrant. To repeat, the discovery of the said items did not cease to be inadvertent just because the police were then looking for evidence. It would have ceased to be inadvertent only if the police knew about the presence of those items in advance.

WHEREFORE, accused RUBEN COMAMO [y] Jimeno is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of a firearm and ammunitions penalized under Republic Act No. 10591 and is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The firearm and ammunitions subject of this case are hereby forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government in accordance with law. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.^[17] (Emphasis supplied)

Ruben elevated the case to the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 38952. Ruben reiterated that the plain view doctrine is inapplicable because the authorities were searching for evidence against him. The firearm and assorted ammunitions were neither apparent nor inadvertently discovered.^[18] On June 28, 2017, the CA ruled out the application of the plain view doctrine because the seized items were not "plainly exposed to sight." However, the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction and ratiocinated that Ruben consented to the search, to wit:

An object is considered in "plain view" if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. . . In this case, it is admitted that it was only after the Accused was ordered to open a cabinet that the police officers found the caliber 45 pistol and ammunition . . . The firearms subject of the case were clearly not plainly exposed to sight, therefore not in "plain view."

Nevertheless, We agree with the People that the Accused is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms on the ground that he consented to the search and even signed the Certificate of Orderly Search, hence he is deemed to have waived his right against unreasonable searches.

. . . .

There is no question that during the Pre-Trial, the Accused admitted that he was ordered by the police to open the cabinet, to which he complied. And it was in the subject cabinet that the .45 caliber and other ammunition were discovered by the police officers.

The Accused also signed a Certification of Orderly Search dated October 24, 2013 . . . where he stated, among others, that "[he] was present at all time and has witnesses the conduct of search which was done in an orderly manner" and that "the search was conducted in accordance with law." Thus, the Accused"[does] not have any complaint whatsoever against any member of the Police Team that conducted the search.

. . . .

In this case, the Accused did not controvert the authenticity of the document neither did he claim having been coerced or threatened into signing the same.

Finding the penalty imposed by the trial court to be in accord with law, the Court hereby affirms the same.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 29, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Batac City in Criminal Case No. 5002-18 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.^[19]

Ruben sought reconsideration but was denied.^[20] Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.^[21]

Ruben argues that the only issue submitted for resolution before the CA and the RTC is whether the seizure of the items not listed in the search warrant may be justified under the plain view doctrine. The CA should have acquitted Ruben after it ruled out the application of the plain view doctrine. Yet, the CA went beyond the issue and held that the seized items were admissible in evidence under the rule on consent searches. At any rate, Ruben avers that a person confronted by police officers are armed with warrants would not have the courage to go against the order of the authorities. The obedience in such situation should not be construed as consent but involuntary conformity to the search.^[22]

In contrast, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintain that an appeal opens the entire case for review. On the merits, the prosecution established all the elements of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. Ruben has no reason to deny the propriety of discovery and seizure of the .45 caliber firearm and assorted ammunitions. Ruben willingly complied with the instructions of the authorities to open the cabinet and admitted that the search was conducted in an orderly manner.^[23]

RULING

The Petition is unmeritorious.

The right against unreasonable searches is one of the basic constitutional^[24] and human liberties.^[25] The courts must be vigilant in preventing an invasion of this right and must ensure that the safeguards to protect it are observed.^[26] Thus, no search can be made without a valid warrant subject to certain legal and judicial exceptions.^[27] Any evidence obtained in violation of this right is inadmissible in any proceeding.^[28]

A search warrant is a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, demanded by public necessity.^[29] The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines a search warrant as a written order issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to peace officers, commanding them to search for personal property and bring it before the court.^[30] Moreover, a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainants and the witnesses they may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.^[31] Simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainants and the witnesses they may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.^[32] The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrant.^[33] Here, the requisites for the valid issuance of a search warrant are undisputed except the particularity in the description of the objects to be seized.

Corollarily, a search warrant particularly describes the things to be seized when: (1) the description is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow;^[34] or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact-not of law-by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or (3) when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.^[35] In contrast, a "general search warrant" is void due to lack of particularity as to the property to be seized. It allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Indeed, the purpose of the "particularity of description" requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those specifically described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. However, technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such thing is sufficient.^[36]

Guided by these precepts, the Court finds that the phrase "among other firearms" in Search Warrant No. 19-13 defeats the objective to eliminate general search warrants. The language used is too all-embracing as to include all conceivable firearms and ammunitions leaving the scope of the search to the discretion of the law enforcers. The executing officer's sole function is to apply the description to its subject matter, which function may frequently involve the exercise of limited discretion in identifying the property described. A description of such generality, however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited discretion as to what property shall be seized, is repugnant to the Constitution,^[37] viz.:

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description of process known to law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going into the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it[.]^[38] (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, the Philippines borrowed from the United States of America its jural concept and provisions on search warrant.^[39] Thus, American jurisprudence has persuasive effect in this jurisdiction. In Dimal v. People,^[40] the Court adopted the principle under American case law that "the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize."^[41] In the same case, the Court held that the search warrant was validly issued but most of the seized items seized are inadmissible in evidence for failure to comply with the "particularity of description" requirement, viz.:

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the validity of Search Warrant No. 10-11 and the admissibility of the items seized which were particularly described in the warrant. This is in line with the principles under American jurisprudence: (1) that the seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure. To be sure, a search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.^[42] (Emphasis supplied)

Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Associate Justice Caguioa) aptly pointed out that the phrase "among other firearms" did not convert Search Warrant No. 19-13 to a general warrant because it still specified and authorized the seizure of "Cal. 9MM Pistol[,]" that petitioner illegally keeps in his residence. A search warrant that merely contains a general statement will not be nullified as a whole. The items not particularly described will be cut off without destroying the entire warrant. Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier) likewise clarified that the general phrase does not render the search warrant void in its totality but merely removes from its protective mantle items confiscated which were not particularly described therein. Consistent with the above legal principles, the Court holds that the seizure of "one live ammunition for 9mm caliber pistol" is valid as it bears direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of "Cal. 9MM Pistol." One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. Here, the search warrant was issued for the alleged crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. As discussed, the prohibited article "Cal. 9MM Pistol" was particularly described in the search warrant. Obviously, the seized live ammunition bears direct relationship to the alleged offense since it can be used in the firearm specified in the search warrant. It is beyond cavil that the confiscated ammunition during the search is of the same kind and nature as the firearm sought.

Similarly, the Court rules that the confiscated "45mm caliber Colt 1911 pistol with serial number 421003, three magazines, 23 live ammunitions, one inside holster, and one live ammunition for M14 rifle" found inside the cabinet are admissible in evidence. Contrary to the CA's theory, the plain view doctrine justifies the seizure of items not listed in the search warrant. The doctrine applies when: (a) the law enforcement officers in search of the evidence have a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which they can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officers that the item they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.^[43] Here, all the requirements are present.

First, the police officers entered the house of petitioner pursuant to a lawful search warrant. The authorities indisputably have prior justification to search and seize evidence related to a specific crime. Second, the law enforcers inadvertently uncovered the other firearm and ammunitions in the course of implementation of the search warrant. The discovery of other contrabands remained unintentional and unexpected notwithstanding the meticulous search of the premises. Indeed, the operatives asked petitioner to open the small cabinet in the kitchen to carry out the search warrant and not to gather additional evidence against him. Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen accurately expounded that it is imperative for law enforcement to conduct a comprehensive search of the premises to guarantee the confiscation and removal of any illicit products. The existence of the search warrant ensures that there is probable cause of illegal activity even before the search is conducted. This prevents arbitrary invasions of privacy and confers the ability to look for and confiscate evidence pertinent to the investigation. Law enforcement should be granted a degree of discretion to effectively execute the warrant. The authorities should not be expected to turn a blind eye if evidence of a crime beyond the scope of the warrant surfaces during the search. The police should confiscate such evidence under the plain view doctrine. In this case, the law enforcers were merely fulfilling their duty when they searched the cabinet within the premises. To abandon the contraband because it was not exactly described in the search warrant would pose a great risk to public safety.

Associate Justice Caguioa added that the execution of a search warrant necessitates a meticulous search for evidence of a crime. The element of inadvertence, in the context of implementation of search warrants, should not require that the police officers are not searching for evidence against the individual, as this goes against the very nature of the said exercise. Rather, it should only require that the discovery of the items be unintentional. The police officers should not have known in advance the location of the evidence, otherwise, they should have included the same in their application for a search warrant. Associate Justice Javier concurred that the law enforcers were not aware in advance that the cabinet contained the subsequently seized firearm and ammunitions. There is no evidence adduced that the authorities anticipated the discovery of contrabands upon the opening of the cabinet or that they requested petitioner to open the same because they knew that it contained firearm and ammunitions. Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao elucidated that the validity of the seizure of the additional items is justified if they were seized prior to the discovery of the items particularly described in the search warrant. Verily, the search warrant had not been fully executed because the operatives were still in the course of searching "Cal. 9MM Pistol[,]" when the other contrabands were discovered.

Third, it bears emphasis that the "immediately apparent" test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of the evidence, but only that the seizure be presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is a probable cause to associate the property with a criminal activity.^[44] In this case, the existence of a valid search warrant established probable cause that petitioner is in possession of illegal firearm and ammunitions. The incriminating character of the contrabands found inside the cabinet was immediately apparent to the police officers because these objects are related to the criminal charge described in the search warrant. Petitioner appellant also failed to show any legal document authorizing him to possess the seized firearm and ammunitions making it clear to the police officers that these items are illegal.

On the other hand, the CA's ratiocination that petitioner consented to the search has no factual and legal basis. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be shown that the consent to the search was voluntary, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred. The State must prove with clear and positive testimony that consent was freely given, to wit:

The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.^[45] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner can hardly be said to have waived his right against unreasonable search and seizures. The prosecution failed to present convincing evidence that petitioner's consent was in fact voluntary. The mere signing of the certificate of orderly search is not tantamount to a waiver of constitutional right. At most, he had no choice but to sign the certificate after being confronted with the armed presence of the police officers and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ.^[46]

Taken together, the Court declares that Search Warrant No. 19-13 is valid and the seized items consisting of (a) 45mm caliber Colt 1911 pistol with serial number 421003, three magazines, 23 live ammunitions, and one inside holster, (b) one live ammunition for M14 rifle, and (c) one live ammunition for 9mm caliber pistol are admissible in evidence. Under Republic Act No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, if the crimes of unlawful possession of ammunitions and firearms of similar classes are committed by the same person, "the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter,"^[47] to wit:

SECTION 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. - The unlawful acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:

(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;

. . . .

(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;

. . . .

(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter. (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, petitioner can only be charged and convicted of illegal possession of a "small arm" which is intended to be, or primarily designed, for individual use or that which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended to be fired from the hand or shoulder, and is not capable of fully automatic bursts of discharge, such as:

(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired from the hand, which includes:

(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or permanently aligned with the bore which may be self-loading; and

(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with a revolving cylinder containing chambers for individual cartridges.

(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to be fired from the shoulder that can discharge a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which may be classified as lever, bolt, or self-loading; and

(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made and intended to fire a number of ball shots or a single projectile through a smooth bore by the action or energy from burning gunpowder.^[48]

The prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same.^[49] The prosecution witnesses delivered positive testimony how they implemented the search warrant and recovered from petitioner the firearm and assorted ammunitions. The firearm 45mm caliber Colt 1911 pistol is classified as a small arm while the assorted ammunitions are also for a small arm. The prosecution witnesses then identified these confiscated items during trial and offered them in evidence. More importantly, petitioner had no license or permit to own or possess the seized firearm and ammunitions. The negative fact that petitioner is not a registered firearm holder satisfied the element of the offense.^[50] The crime of illegal possession of firearm is a malum prohibitum. To sustain a conviction, it is enough that the accused had no authority or license to possess the subject firearm and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.^[51]

Section 28(a) of Republic Act No. 10591 provides that the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small firearm. Absent any modifying circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty must be within the medium period of the prescribed penalty which ranges from eight years, eight months one day to nine years and four months. Whereas the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence must be within the penalty next lower in degree from that prescribed or prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six years and one day to eight years. Corollarily, the CA and the RTC correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight years, eight months and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

All told, the Court reiterates that law enforcers, regardless of the praise-worthiness of their intentions, cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to implement. Quick solutions of crimes and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights despite the difficulties faced by police authorities in the performance of their duties.^[52] If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, however, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.^[53]

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 28, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38952 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Ruben Comamo y Jimeno is GUILTY of illegal possession of firearm and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight years, eight months and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., and Caguioa, J., see concurring opinions.
Lazaro-Javier, J., with concurrence.
J. Lopez, J., with concurring opinion.
Singh,^* J., on leave but left a concurring vote.

---

^* On leave but left a concurring vote.

^[1] Rollo, pp. 9-21.

^[2] Id. at 26-31. The Decision dated June 28, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38952 was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired member of this Court) with the concurrence of Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela of the Fourth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

^[3] Id. at 27.

^[4] Id. at 20.

^[5] Id. at 27.

^[6] Id. at 70.

^[7] Records, p. 69.

^[8] Rollo, pp. 26-27.

^[9] Id. at 27.

^[10] Records, p. 70.

^[11] Rollo, p. 51.

^[12] Id. at 24.

^[13] Id. at 12.

^[14] Id. at 54.

^[15] Id. at 28.

^[16] Records at 103-107.

^[17] Id. at 109-127. The Judgment dated July 29, 2016 in Crim. Case No. 5002-18 was penned by Acting Presiding Judge Presiding Judge Francisco R. D. Quilala of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Batac City, Ilocos Norte.

^[18] Rollo, p. 29.

^[19] Id. at 30-31.

^[20] Id. at 40.

^[21] Id. at 9-19.

^[22] Id. at 14-15.

^[23] Id. at 48-76.

^[24] CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Notably, this right has been included in the Philippine Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos Constitution and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the Philippines during the American colonization, the 1935 Constitution, and the 1973 Constitution.

^[25] The right is recognized under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, sec. 17(1) of the Covenant states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, while Article 17(2) of the Declaration states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

^[26] See Ogayan v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 283 (2015) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

^[27] The exceptions include: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented warrantless search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In Valmonte v. De Villa, 258 Phil. 838 (1989), the Supreme Court held that not all searches are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. See also Esquillo v. People, 643 Phil. 577, 592-593 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division]; People v. Nuevas, 545 Phil. 356, 369-370 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]; and RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 13.

^[28] CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. See Comerciante v. People, 764 Phil. 627, 633-634 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division], citing Ambre v. People, 692 Phil. 681, 693 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

^[29] Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, 713 Phil. 18, 33 (2014) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].

^[30] RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 1.

^[31] RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 4. See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 821 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].

^[32] See Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 325 Phil. 762, 821-822 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].

^[33] People v. Francisco, 436 Phil. 383, 391 (2002) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]. See also Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 397 Phil. 892, 906 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

^[34] People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

^[35] Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, 147 Phil. 794, 811 (1971) [Per J. Villamor, En Banc].

^[36] Kho v. Makalintal, 365 Phil. 511, 519-520 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].

^[37] Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 670, 688 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

^[38] People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 (1925) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

^[39] See Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 302 Phil. 273, 285 (1994) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], citing Macondray & Co., Inc. v. Bernabe, et al., 67 Phil. 658 (1939) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc] and Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945) [Per J. Feria, En Banc]

^[40] 830 Phil. 309 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

^[41] Id. at 349.

^[42] Id.

^[43] Miclat, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191, 206 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

^[44] Dimal v. People, 830 Phil. 309, 348-349 (2018) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division] citing United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, 500 Phil. 342, 363 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

^[45] Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 286 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].

^[46] Roan v. Gonzales, 230 Phil. 90, 98 (1986) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

^[47] Republic Act No. 10591, sec. 28(g), (i), and (k).

^[48] Republic Act No. 10591, sec. 3(dd).

^[49] People v. Castillo, 382 Phil. 499, 507 (2000) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; See also People v. Dorimon, 378 Phil. 660, 666-667 (1999) [Per J. Quisimbing, Second Division]; People v. Cerveto, 374 Phil. 220, 234 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; Cadua v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 627, 645 (1999) [Per J. Quisimbing, Second Division]; and People v. Khor, 366 Phil. 762, 777 (1999) [J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

^[50] See People v. Velasco, 860 Phil. 159, 166 (2019) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].

^[51] See Evangelista v. People, 634 Phil. 207, 222 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

^[52] People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301, 321 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

^[53] People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640, 658 (1998) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc].