SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 232190, August 20, 2025 ]
XXX v. PEOPLE +
XXX,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 148784, viz.:
| 1) |
Decision[2] dated March 30, 2017 convicting petitioner XXX of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262;[3] and |
|
| 2) |
Resolution[4] dated June 6, 2017 denying XXX's Motion for Reconsideration. |
XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, as follows:
That sometime in the year 2008 and on dates subsequent thereto in the city of xxxxxxxxxxx, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the husband of complainant AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously commits [sic] psychological violence upon her by committing marital infidelity by having sexual relationship with one PPP with whom he has two minor children, which caused mental or emotional anguish on the part of complainant AAA, who was diagnosed as suffering from symptoms of dysthymia.When arraigned, XXX pleaded not guilty.[6] During pre-trial, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) AAA and XXX are husband and wife; (2) the subject incident took place in xxxxxxxxxxx City; (3) AAA and XXX have a son named BBB;[7] (4) they have been living separately from each other since 2008; (5) there is no public record showing that XXX inflicted physical harm on AAA; and (6) the civil registry records bear the certificates of live births of MMM and NNN[8] indicating XXX as their father and PPP as their mother.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Version of the Prosecution
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Maria Carmen P. Lambuson (Dr. Lambuson).[9]
The prosecution also adduced the following as documentary evidence: (1) the sworn statement of AAA; (2) certification of Dr. Lambuson, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on AAA; (3) the prescription of medicine for AAA; (4) printouts of excerpts from the Twitter account of PPP showing pictures of XXX carrying a female child and posing with PPP and two children, and, announcing the birthday of his son NNN; (5) Certificate of Marriage of AAA and XXX; (6) Certificate of Live Birth of BBB, the child of XXX with AAA; (7) Certificates of Live Birth of MMM and NNN, the children of XXX with PPP; and (8) the psychiatric evaluation of AAA.[10]
AAA essentially testified that she was married to XXX on May 6, 2005. They have a son together named BBB, who was born on January 15, 2008. While she was pregnant with BBB, XXX would always go home in the wee hours of the morning, telling her that he was out with his friends. She had a suspicion, however, that he was having an affair with another woman after she saw the messages on XXX's phone. She nonetheless harbored hope that he would change his ways after she gave birth to their son.[11]
XXX, however, continued to go home early in the morning despite the birth of BBB. At the time, she saw a text message on his phone, saying "AYAW KO NG MAGING KABIT." She confronted him about what she saw, but he passed off the text message as a mere prank from his friends. To avoid marital quarrel, she no longer brought the text message up again.[12]
To AAA's surprise, XXX left their home the next day and never lived with her and her son again. He would only visit BBB every weekend. Although XXX never inflicted physical harm on her,[13] she suffered mental and emotional anguish when he left their conjugal home. Her emotional suffering was further aggravated when she discovered that he and his mistress, PPP, had children together, MMM and NNN, and flaunted their love affair on social media. XXX and PPP would announce their children's birthdays and post pictures of them together.[14]
Dr. Lambuson testified that she was engaged by AAA sometime in 2012 after she filed the criminal complaint against XXX. She diagnosed AAA with depression or dysthymia, which she noted cannot be solely attributed to AAA being left by XXX. This kind of depression, she explained, can be ordinarily experienced by anybody in circumstances such as the death of a loved one or in cases of abandonment.[15]
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of XXX and Dr. Visitacion G. Revita (Dr. Revita) and the following documentary evidence: (1) sworn statements of XXX; (2) pictures of AAA; and (3) the psychological report of Dr. Revita.[16]
XXX testified that his marital relationship with AAA became sour sometime in March 2008 because of their differences. AAA was totally dependent and overly attached to her family and never displayed marital maturity. In August 2008, AAA's mother told him to pack up his things and leave their house. He tried to win AAA back but was constrained to leave their conjugal home because of her incessant immaturity and overdependence on her parents.[17]
Even after they parted, AAA continued texting him with vulgar and sarcastic language and told him that his parents were happy about their separation because it meant they would benefit from his earnings. Despite her harsh words, he still tried to mend their marital relationship. He and his family even arranged for them to attend marriage counseling but AAA shrugged off the idea. In fact, she denounced any idea of reconciliation and expressed her desire to file for annulment.[18]
What prompted AAA to file the criminal complaint against him was his refusal to enroll BBB in AAA's chosen school. It was after then that she demanded a huge amount of support and filed the present case to harass him.[19]
By Decision[20] dated September 30, 2016, the trial court rendered a verdict of acquittal based on reasonable doubt:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused, XXX, is hereby ACQUITTED.It noted that both prosecution witnesses, AAA and Dr. Lambuson, admitted that the criminal complaint was belatedly filed four years after the incident. This, together with AAA's admissions that XXX consistently communicated with her and their son and provided support after their separation, and the fact that Dr. Lambuson was engaged only five years after the incident and the filing of the criminal case incites reasonable doubt on XXX's guilt.[22]
SO ORDERED.[21] (Emphasis in the original)
The trial court explained that the separation de facto of the parties is part of human experience and a natural consequence of their irreconcilable differences. In all, it found that the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove to a moral certainty the elements of psychological violence.[23]
Consequently, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction against the Regional Trial Court for acquitting XXX. The OSG emphasized that marital infidelity is considered psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262.[24]
By Decision[25] dated March 30, 2017, the Court of Appeals reversed:
WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated September 30, 2016 in Criminal Case No. 13-028 is nullified and set aside. Private respondent XXX is hereby held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(i), R.A. No. 9262 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum period, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as the maximum period. He is also ordered to pay a fine of three hundred thousand pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling and report his compliance therewith to the trial court.The Court of Appeals found that the evidence of the prosecution proved the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. First, the records are replete of evidence showing that XXX had another woman, PPP. They would flaunt their illicit relationship by posting their pictures and those of their children on Twitter. Meanwhile, the certificates of live birth of MMM and NNN proved that XXX is their father. All these pieces of evidence are indicative of XXX's sheer insensitivity and total disregard of the feelings, dignity, and self-worth of AAA. Second, per the psychological evaluation of Dr. Lambuson, AAA suffered from depression and "her life shattered right before her eyes when her husband left her."[27]
SO ORDERED.[26] (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court disregarded the express provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 when it ruled that XXX's marital infidelity, which was committed after the spouses' separation de facto, cannot be considered a violation of the said law since Republic Act No. 9262 identifies "the wife or former wife of the offender" as one of the offended parties.[28]
Under Resolution[29] dated June 6, 2017, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.
XXX now seeks anew a verdict of acquittal, praying that the Decision dated September 30, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court be reinstated. He maintains that the People is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to the rule against double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation,[30] especially here where the judgment of the trial court was made in compliance with the law since the same considered carefully the facts and evidence on record.[31]
In any case, he claims that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt to a moral certainty. The totality of the circumstances, such as AAA's admission that she considered annulling their marriage, consistently received support from him for their child, and that they were civil to each other even after their separation, belie her claim of psychological violence.[32] Verily, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it acquitted him of the crime charged.
In its Comment,[33] the OSG, on behalf of the People, ripostes that the present Petition must be dismissed because the People was not impleaded as a respondent.[34] At any rate, the Court of Appeals did not err in granting its petition for certiorari since the People may file a Rule 65 petition without placing the accused in double jeopardy, especially since the trial court failed to act in contemplation of Republic Act No. 9262 when it acquitted XXX.[35]
The OSG emphasizes that all elements of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 through marital infidelity were duly proven. XXX is the husband of AAA with whom he has a son. He abandoned them when AAA discovered his extramarital affair. He then lived with his mistress, PPP, with whom he has two children. Worse, he publicly flaunted his illicit relationship with her. As a result, AAA suffered emotional, mental, and psychological anguish, culminating in depression, not to mention public humiliation and embarrassment because of her husband's affair.[36] As such, it would allegedly be the height of injustice if XXX would be acquitted on the premise that the complaint against him was filed by AAA four years after their separation in fact.[37]
Under Notice[38] dated December 3, 2018, the Court impleaded the People of the Philippines considering that the action is a criminal action.
Meanwhile, in AAA's Comment,[39] she manifests that she fully and completely adopts the arguments of the OSG. She avers that XXX exhibited bad faith by failing to implead the People and instead impleading her in the case, albeit she was not even included as a party in the case before the Court of Appeals.[40]
First, was the right against double jeopardy of XXX violated when the OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the verdict of acquittal of the Regional Trial Court?
Second, is XXX guilty of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262?
The Petition lacks merit.
Double jeopardy does not attach to void judgments; the OSG correctly filed a Rule 65 Petition to assail the verdict of acquittal of the Regional Trial Court |
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution protects all persons from being placed in double jeopardy of punishment for a single offense:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.It means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice, and conscience.[41] It ensures that the government does not abuse its powers by repeatedly prosecuting the same accused for the same charge. People v. Hon. Velasco[42] elucidated:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. . . ." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing stale of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."[43] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)Indeed, it is a basic principle of law that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal on the merits from being filed. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put the accused a second time in jeopardy for the same offense.[44]
Thus, XXX argues that the People violated his right against double jeopardy when it filed a Rule 65 petition assailing his acquittal.
We do not agree.
It is settled that a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish that the court below acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.[45]
The People was able to fulfill this burden in its petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion attends when the trial court manifestly disregarded the basic rules and procedures, or acted with obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure.[46]
Contrary to XXX's position, the trial court failed to justify its verdict of acquittal. In casting doubt on the evidence of the prosecution, the trial court merely pointed out the circumstances of the parties at the time the criminal complaint was filed. To recall, the trial court hinged its ruling on the fact that the complaint was belatedly filed five years after the separation of the parties; that XXX and AAA were civil to each other despite their separation; and XXX consistently provided support for BBB.[47]
These, however, are matters that do not delve into the essence of the offense. Worse, they are not evidence that dispel the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA as a result of her husband's extramarital affair. It is indeed perplexing how, as between the trial court's bare conjectures arising from the circumstances of the case and the hard evidence showing AAA's mental and emotional suffering (i.e., the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Lambuson) and XXX's marital infidelity (i.e., his own admission, the photos and posts from Twitter, and certificates of live birth of MMM and NNN), the former prevailed.
Worse, it does not escape the Court that part of the trial court's explanation that the marital infidelity of XXX was committed after he and AAA separated de facto, hence, the same falls outside the scope of Republic Act No. 9262.[48] This is a mistaken notion. Legal separation entitles the parties to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;[49] more so, here, where the separation of the parties is merely in fact and not by legal decree. Verily, any extramarital relation maintained by any of the spouses still constitutes marital infidelity, which is one of the means of committing psychological violence under Republic Act No. 9262.
By disregarding the foregoing basic principles of law and rudimentary appreciation of evidence, we find no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in granting the petition for certiorari filed by the OSG on behalf of the People.
XXX is guilty of psychological violence through marital infidelity under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 |
XXX was charged with violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, which reads:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:Dinamling v. People[50] lists the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 that must concur before a judgment of conviction may be rendered:
. . . .
The first two elements are not in dispute. The offended party in this case is AAA, the legal wife of XXX. This fact is duly established by the Certificate of Marriage between the parties.[52]
The contention thus lies in the third and fourth elements. Indeed, conviction under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 requires proof of the indispensable elements of: (1) psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator consisting of any acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar acts; and (2) the mental or emotional suffering or damage sustained by the offended party.[53]
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 9262 defines psychological violence as any act or omission which causes or is likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim. Notably, the enumeration of such acts expressly includes marital infidelity:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, . . .Here, the People was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that XXX committed marital infidelity. He maintained a relationship with another woman who is not his wife and has, in fact, fathered two children with her. This fact is uncontroverted and supported by a number of evidence on record: the social media posts containing photos of XXX, his mistress PPP, and their children[54] and the entries in the certificates of live birth of their children, MMM and NNN, indicating that their father is XXX and their mother is PPP.[55] Notably, XXX also never denied his affair with PPP.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead, his defense consists mainly of imputing vindictive motives against AAA in filing the criminal complaint against him. She was allegedly the cause of the breakdown of their marriage for being overly dependent on her parents and for being immature. He left their home because his mother-in-law told him to.[56] These, however, are not justifiable reasons to leave the conjugal home and to renege on his marital obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support to each other.[57]
More, it is incredible that XXX would have simply agreed to leave his wife and son just because he was told to do so by his mother-in-law. Logic suggests that there was an underlying reason for his abandonment of his legal family. We thus find AAA's narration of facts more credible than XXX's.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, XXX's extramarital affair did not begin only after the spouses got separated. The records are replete with evidence that the cause of the quarrel and eventual separation of XXX and AAA began when the latter discovered the text messages of a woman on XXX's phone. One of the text messages unequivocally told him, "AYAW KO NG MAGING KABIT" and, it was when she confronted him about it that XXX left home.[58] Clearly, therefore, XXX was unfaithful to his wife even before they got separated in fact, and his infidelity was the proximate cause thereof.
That XXX committed an act of psychological violence, specifically, marital infidelity, is thus beyond doubt. True, what Republic Act No. 9262 criminalizes is not marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. For it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.[59]
On this score, we find that the appraisal of evidence by the Court of Appeals vis- -vis AAA's mental and emotional suffering is legally sound. As astutely observed by the Court of Appeals, the effect of XXX's marital infidelity on AAA was duly explained and proven in the psychological evaluation of AAA by Dr. Lambuson.[60]
The psychiatric evaluation convincingly illustrated what AAA suffered as a result of the breakdown of her marriage. She had sleep disturbances, constant self-pity, feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, palpitations, social withdrawal, and depressions,[61] viz.:
This is a case of a 36-year-old married woman with a 4-year-old child who was left by her husband for another woman. She manifested with the following signs and symptoms of sleep disturbances, having self-pity, feelings of guilt, hopelessness and worthlessness, crying episodes, palpitations, social withdrawal, and depressed mood most of the day and felt most days of the week. The abovementioned signs and symptoms were severe enough for the patient to affect her social as well as occupational functioning. . .Dr. Lambuson's admission that AAA approached her after she already filed the criminal complaint against XXX[63] is of no moment. This fact does not negate the fact that even prior to her psychiatric consultation, AAA had already been suffering from mental and emotional turmoil. The psychiatric evaluation merely confirmed this fact. Nor is it incriminatory that AAA consulted a psychiatrist to obtain evidence to support her allegation of psychological violence against XXX. It is but natural that one who institutes a legal action would endeavor to collect all necessary evidence to support their claim. It does not necessarily follow that such evidence was fabricated.
. . . .
The main cause of the depression for this particular patient, her life shattered before her eyes when her husband left; her child becoming an orphan having no father to be with him, to guide him while growing up because the father, the patient's spouse, had decided to leave them. Whatever her beliefs were about marriage were now fractured, dreams shattered, self-confidence gone. Medication is helping her as well as psychotherapy we do when she comes in for follow-up. It will take several more sessions for her to believe in herself again and not blame herself for whatever happened to her and to her child. She has on her own, re-build her dreams, her beliefs mended, her self-confidence fixed and this may take her months or years or maybe when the goal of this legal battle achieved in her favor, this disorder will be easier to overcome.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither does Dr. Lambuson's clarification that AAA's depression or dysthymia cannot be solely attributed to XXX leaving their marital home and committing an illicit affair[64] militate against the finding of mental and emotional anguish. There indeed can be many reasons why a person may feel distressed and emotionally or mentally disturbed. Here, however, Dr. Lambuson's psychiatric evaluation clearly indicated that the main cause of AAA's depression is XXX leaving her and, as a result, her son losing his father. Consequently, she lost self-confidence, blamed herself for failing to keep her husband, and felt worthless.
At any rate, the law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser. The law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim be presented in court since such experiences are personal to this party.[65]
Here, AAA testified in detail how she suffered as a result of her husband's infidelity, especially whenever she would see the posts of XXX's mistress flaunting their illicit affair on social media. PPP would announce their children's birthday parties and post pictures of them together.[66] Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine how XXX's illicit affair shattered AAA's life and caused her to live a nightmare. Instead of keeping true to the vows he made when he wed her, XXX callously left her and instead kept the same promises with another woman. As pointedly found by the Court of Appeals:[67]
[XXX's] marital infidelity, aggravated by the public display and exhibits of photographs and words of endearment by and between private respondent and his mistress PPP through the social media, flaunting their illicit relationship and their two children, are indicative of [XXX's] sheer insensitivity and total disregard of the feelings, dignity, and self-worth of [AAA]. All such acts constituted psychological violence, causing [AAA] mental torture, emotional pain, and anguish.[68] (Emphasis supplied)To be sure, whatever XXX's intention was when he chose another woman over his wife is immaterial. For his leaving their conjugal home and building a family with his mistress are acts that were done by him consciously and deliberately. He could not feign innocence by hiding behind good intentions-may they be excuses that he remained civil with AAA or he constantly supported his legitimate son, BBB. The incontrovertible fact remains: he was unfaithful to his wife, and this caused her irreparable mental and emotional hurt. Thus, XXX v. People[69] ratiocinated:
While We agree with Acharon that the crimes penalized under Sec. 5(i) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, thereby requiring specific criminal intent, We hereby hold that in instances of marital infidelity, the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause menial and emotional suffering is already satisfied at the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity. This finds basis in the fact that marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms. In the normal course of human behavior, an aggrieved wife will never approve of a rogue and wandering husband, and vice versa. The same line of reasoning just cannot be applied in cases of willful denial of financial support. In other words, marital infidelity, divorced from its legal connotations, is an act which is essentially wrong in itself. To pose a rhetoric, what else could adulterers have expected to cause upon their spouse when they committed an act of unfaithfulness, aside from mental and emotional pain?[70] (Emphasis supplied)All told, XXX is guilty of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 committed against his wife, AAA.
Penalty
Republic Act No. 9262, Section 6[71] punishes acts falling under Section 5(i) with prision mayor. And, in addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall pay a fine in the amount of not less than PHP 100,000.00 but not more than PHP 300,000.00 and undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be applied in its medium period, which is eight years and one day to 10 years of prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this shall serve as the maximum term. Meanwhile, the penalty next lower in degree shall serve as the minimum term, or prision correccional, which is six months and one day to six years. The Court of Appeals thus correctly imposed the indeterminate sentence of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional, as the minimum term, and eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum term.
We affirm the directive of the Court of Appeals for XXX to pay a fine, but we lower the amount from PHP 300,000.00 to PHP 100,000.00 per prevailing jurisprudence.[72] He is also ordered to undergo psychological counseling pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 30, 2017 and Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 148784 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. XXX is GUILTY of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional, as the minimum term, and eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum term. He is also ordered to PAY a fine of PHP 100,000.00 and to undergo psychological counseling and to report his compliance therewith to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262.
SO ORDERED.
J. Lopez and Villanueva, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Kho, Jr., please see dissenting opinion.
* In line with Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, as mandated by Article 266(A) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, the names of the private offended parties, along with all other personal circumstances that may tend to establish their identities, are made confidential to protect their privacy and dignity.
[1] Rollo, pp. 36-55.
[2] Id. at 14-28. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3] Otherwise known as "The Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
[4] Rollo, at 30-31. Penned by Associate Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
[5] Id. at 79-80.
[6] Id. at 80.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 82.
[9] Id. at 16.
[10] Id. at 16-17.
[11] Id. at 80.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 15.
[15] Id. at 80-81.
[16] Id. at 17 & 83.
[17] Id. at 82.
[18] Id. at 83.
[19] Id. at 83.
[20] Id. at 79-86. Penned by Presiding Judge Leandro C. Catalo, Branch xxx, Regional Trial Court, xxxxxxxxxxx.
[21] Id. at 86.
[22] Id. at 85.
[23] Id. at 86.
[24] Id. at 17.
[25] Id. at 14-28.
[26] Id. at 27-28.
[27] Id. at 24-25.
[28] Id. at 26.
[29] Id. at 30-31.
[30] Id. at 47.
[31] Id. at 48.
[32] Id. at 48-49.
[33] Id. at 114-125.
[34] Id. at 118.
[35] Id. at 119-120.
[36] Id. at 121-122.
[37] Id. at 123.
[38] Id. at 138.
[39] Id. at 141-145.
[40] Id. at 144.
[41] Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].
[42] 394 Phil. 517 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
[43] Id. at 555-556.
[44] People v. Serrano, 374 Phil. 302, 306 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
[45] People v. Arcega, 880 Phil. 291, 308 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[46] Gacad, Jr. v. Corpuz, 927 Phil. 259, 267-268 (2022) [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[47] Rollo, p. 85.
[48] Id. at 26.
[49] FAMILY CODE, art. 63.
[50] 761 Phil. 356 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
[51] Id. at 373.
[52] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[53] XXX v. People, 937 Phil. 356, 364 (2023) [Per J. Hernando, First Division].
[54] Rollo, p. 81.
[55] Id. at 82.
[56] Id.
[57] FAMILY CODE, art. 68.
[58] Rollo, p. 80.
[59] AAA v. BBB, 823 Phil. 607, 620 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
[60] Id. at 25.
[61] Rollo, p. 25.
[62] Id.
[63] Id. at 80-81.
[64] Id.
[65] XXX270257 v. People, 957 Phil. 604, 611 (2024) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].
[66] Rollo, p. 15.
[67] Id. at 25.
[68] Id.
[69] 953 Phil. 462 (2024) [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
[70] Id. at 481.
[71] Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:
. . . .[72] XXX v. People, 953 Phil. 462 (2024) [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
f. Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
. . . .
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.