"I'm for truth, no matter who tells it. I'm for justice, no matter who it is for or against."
	- Malcolm X, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965)
	"Our ruling does not absolve petitioner Duterte from any of the charges."
	- SAJ Leonen, Decision in Duterte v. House of Representatives, July 25, 2025

We affirm that impeachment is a powerful process to exact accountability from government especially from public officers mentioned in the Constitution. We affirm that accountability done in accordance with the Constitution is a core value in a democratic and republican government.

We also affirm that the House of Representatives has the sole prerogative to initiate impeachment complaints and to promulgate its rules of impeachment in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. However, its Rules must be consistent with the provisions of our Constitution.

It is in this light that we deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents.

We clarify the constitutional requirements of impeachment:

First, the impeachment process is primarily a legal, political, and constitutional procedure. It is not a purely political proceeding. This means that the Bill of Rights, especially the due process clause and the right to speedy disposition of cases, applies to the entire impeachment process.^[1] However, the application of the due process clause in the initiation stage of the impeachment process is sui generis.

Second, given the nature of the offices and institutions subject to impeachment, the effect of impeachment on the independence of constitutional departments and organs, and its status as a constitutional process, and our power under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, constitutional issues involving impeachment proceedings may, in proper cases, be subject to judicial review.

The Court does not determine when, who, and whether an impeachable officer may be removed and disqualified from political office. It only has the duty to construe the process in proper cases and its limitations as mandated by the Constitution.^[2]

Third, Article XI, Section 3(2) of the Constitution requires that a verified impeachment complaint be immediately put in the Order of Business within 10 session days from its endorsement. A session day, only for purposes of this constitutional provision, means a calendar day on which the House of Representatives holds a plenary session.

Neither the secretary general nor the speaker of the House is granted by the Constitution any discretion to determine when this period commences. Neither does the House of Representatives have any discretion except to refer these matters to the proper committee within three session days. The House may opt to consolidate all properly commenced and endorsed impeachment complaints.^[3]

We are aware that for legislative purposes, a session day follows the interpretation of the House, which is not equivalent to a calendar day. It is a period that starts from a call to order until the session is adjourned, regardless of the passage of time.

However, for the initiation stage of impeachment which is a constitutional process, a session day is a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session. This aligns with the primordial value of accountability of impeachable public officials and therefore that impeachment proceedings should be accorded the weight and priority that it is due.

Respondents were therefore not able to comply with Article XI, Section 3(2) by putting the three endorsed impeachment complaints in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days. Thus, the fourth impeachment complaint, even if endorsed by more than one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives, is barred by Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Fourth, complaints based on the first mode or Article XI, Section 3(2) is deemed to have been initiated for purposes of the one-year bar under Section 3(5) when: (a) it is referred to the Committee on Justice; (b) it is properly verified and endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives and it is not put in the Order of Business or referred to the proper committee within the constitutional periods; (c) it is properly verified and endorsed or it has been properly referred to the proper committee but has not been acted upon by the House upon its adjournment sine die.

For this purpose, we reiterate and amplify Gutierrez v. House of Representatives^[4] based on the facts of this case.

Complaints based on the second mode or Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution are deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar under Article XI, Section 3(5) upon the valid endorsement of at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives. A valid endorsement includes valid verifications from all endorsing members that they have also seen the evidence supporting the allegations of the complaint as provided in the current Rules on Impeachment of the House of Representatives.

Fifth, we clarify that in cases of multiple complaints, the Constitution does not require any priority between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. The process of gathering support for impeachment complaints under the second mode is not constitutionally prohibited, even while the House is considering complaints filed under the first mode. However, the second mode of impeachment will be barred under Article XI, Section 3(5) if there are pending complaints under the first mode that violate the periods mandated in the Constitution.

Sixth, the House of Representatives has the prerogative to determine that the requirements of the second mode of initiating a complaint under Article XI, Section 3(4)-that it is properly verified, accompanied with evidence and endorsed by at least one-third of all its members-have been met. This process can be done by the plenary of the House of Representatives, or through the verification of the appropriate committee prior to the endorsement of the majority floor leader or as provided for in the Rules for transmittal in plenary session, or any other alternative means at the discretion of the House of Representatives.

However, the House of Representatives of the 19^th Congress provided in Section 2 of its Rules of Impeachment that the complaint be referred to the Committee on Justice. Granting respect to the ability of the House of Representatives to craft its own rules, and the presumption of constitutionality, we interpret that to mean that the referral to the Committee for complaints under the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, that is when there is at least one-third of all its members who have endorsed and verified, is not mandatory.

To be consistent with the Constitution, when the House opts to refer a complaint under the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice, it is only for the following purposes:

(1) To ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) To confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every endorsing member has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and
 
(3) To respect the House's prerogative to consolidate multiple complaints, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

Referral to the Committee on Justice under the first mode of initiating impeachment complaints is for a different purpose, that is the determination of the sufficiency in form and substance. This is different from referral to the Committee on Justice to verify whether the requirements of the second mode as stated above have been fully complied with.

Obviously, sham complaints-for example, those that are not verified-should be dismissed immediately. These types of dismissals will not trigger the one-year bar covered under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Seventh, Article XI, Section 3(4) does not exist in isolation of the other provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, it is subject to the requirement of due process of law.^[5] Due process as applied to the impeachment process is sui generis.

Eighth, the fairness and non-arbitrariness principles of due process for the second mode or for transmittals under Article XI, Section 3(4) require that:

(1) The draft Articles of Impeachment or resolution should be accompanied by evidence when made available to the members of the House, especially those who are considering its endorsement;

(2) The evidence should meet the quantum of proof determined by the House of Representatives to establish the charges in the Articles of Impeachment;

(3) During the plenary that endorses the draft Articles of Impeachment, their accompanying evidence should also be made available to all the members of the House of Representatives for their information. The Constitution, however, requires that the transmittal can be made for so long as there is at least one-third of all the members who have endorsed the complaint.

(4) The respondent's opportunity to be fully heard on the entire Articles of Impeachment and the supporting evidence shall be during the trial in the Senate;

(5) The basis of any charge must be for impeachable acts or omissions committed in relation to their office and during the current term of the impeachable officer.

For the president and vice president, these acts must be sufficiently grave, amounting to the offenses described in Article XI, Section 2. For the other impeachable officers, the acts must be sufficiently grave that they undermine and outweigh the respect for their constitutional independence and autonomy.

Again, while we deem the fourth complaint as barred by Article XI, Section 3(5) under the unique circumstances of this case, we underscore that the July 25, 2025 Decision did not absolve Vice President Sara Duterte. At the House's discretion, the grounds raised in the Articles of Impeachment may again be raised based on any evidence that may have been discovered, if any. It is for Congress, by initiation of the House of Representatives and trial by the Senate, to determine the fate of the incumbent Vice President.

We further clarify by reiterating the factual backdrop and addressing the issues raised in the Solicitor General's Motion for Reconsideration and the Petitioners' Comments.

Before this Court are the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration^[6] filed by respondent House of Representatives, through the Office of the Solicitor General; (2) Consolidated Motion with Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Status Quo Ante Order, and for Oral Arguments^[7] filed by movants-intervenors 1Sambayan Coalition, Cielo D. Magno, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Christian S. Monsod, Katrina Diane Noelle C. Monsod, Gen. Noel A. Baraceros, Bishop Gerardo A. Alminaza, Father Odine L. Areola, Fr. Geowen A. Porcincula, Fr. Joselito S. Sarabia, Fr. Emmanuel Alfonso, Pastor Eduardo P. De Guzman, and members of San Beda College Alabang Human Rights Center, namely Aramaine P. Balon, Gloriette Marie C. Abundo, Elvie T. Amiscosa, Gillian Aia G. Capili, Sarah Katrina T. Maralit, and Charmae Ann Sherina Maravilla; (3) Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam^[8] filed by movant-intervenors Percival V. Ce dana, as a member of the House of Representatives, Sylvia Estrada Claudio, Francis Joseph A. Dee, Teresita Quintos Deles, Eugene Louie P. Gonzalez, Ma. Yvonne Christina C. Jereza, Alicia Murphy, and Filomena Cinco; (4) Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene, Adopt the Comment filed by Respondent House of Representatives dated March 6, 2025 as their Comment in Intervention, and to Admit the Attached Motion for Reconsideration^[9] filed by movants-intervenors ACT Teachers Partylist Representative Antonio Tinio, KABATAAN Partylist Representative Renee Louise Co, France Castro, Arlene Brosas, Raoul Manuel, Liza Largoza Maza, Teodoro A. Casi o, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Eufemia P. Doringo, Modesto Floranda, and Amirah Lidasan; and (5) Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention,^[10] filed by Reverend Father Antonio Labiao, Jr., Reverend Father Joel Saballa, Reverend Father Ruben Villanueva, Wilfredo G. Villanueva, Pinky L. Tam, Union of Peoples' Lawyers in Mindanao, and Maria Loreto A. Lopez, seeking this Court's reconsideration of its July 25, 2025 Decision,^[11] declaring the Articles of Impeachment against petitioner Vice President Duterte as unconstitutional and void ab initio.

The facts surrounding the impeachment case against the vice president, as culled from the case records and subsequent developments following the promulgation of the assailed Decision, are restated as follows:

In December 2024, three impeachment complaints were filed against the vice president: (1) the first impeachment complaint was filed on December 2, 2024 by private individuals and various organizations led by Teresita Quintos Deles, Father Flaviano Villanueva, and Gary Alejano, among others, and endorsed on the same day by Akbayan Partylist Representative Percival Ce dana;^[12] (2) the second impeachment complaint was filed on December 4, 2024 led by Bagong Alyansang Makabayan and endorsed on the same day by ACT Teachers Partylist Representative France Castro, Gabriela Partylist Representative Arlene Brosas, and Kabataan Partylist Representative Raoul Manuel;^[13] and (3) the third impeachment complaint was filed on December 19, 2024 by a coalition of religious workers, lawyers, and civil society members led by Father Antonio E. Labiao, Jr. and Father Joel Saballa of the Diocese of Novaliches, and Carmelite priests Father Rico Ponce and Father Esmeraldo Reforeal, and endorsed^[14] by Camarines Sur Third District Representative Gabriel Bordado, Jr. and AAMBIS-OWA Partylist Representative Lex Anthony Cris Colada.^[15]
 
These three impeachment complaints were filed pursuant to the first mode of initiation under Article XI, Section 3(2) of the Constitution,^[16] as implemented by Rule II, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Rules on Impeachment).^[17] Under these provisions, private citizens may file a verified complaint for impeachment against an impeachable officer upon a resolution or endorsement by any member of the House of Representatives.^[18]

The first three complaints alleged several grounds, as follows: (a) unaccounted or misused confidential and intelligence funds amounting to PHP 612.5 million from 2022 to 2025 with the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Education;^[19] (b) fabricated or falsified liquidation reports;^[20] (c) defiance of congressional oversight during budget deliberations;^[21] (d) unexplained wealth and omissions in the vice president's Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth;^[22] (e) procurement irregularities in her capacity as secretary of Education;^[23] (f) public threats to kill or contract an assassin to kill the president, the first lady, and the speaker of the House of Representatives;^[24] (g) alleged involvement in Davao Death Squad killings in 2011 to 2013 and 2016 to 2022;^[25] and (h) other high crimes and moral unfitness or psychological incapacity.^[26]

The three complaints were referred to the speaker of the House on February 5, 2025.^[27]

On that date, February 5, 2025, a fourth impeachment complaint was filed against Vice President Duterte by one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives, or 215 members,^[28] pursuant to the second mode of initiation under Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution,^[29] as implemented by Rule II, Section 2(c) of the House Rules on Impeachment.^[30]

The fourth impeachment complaint was transmitted to the plenary and included as an Additional Reference of Business of the 19th Congress's 36^th Session, alongside the first three impeachment complaints.^[31]

The secretary general confirmed that 215 members of the House of Representatives had signed and verified the fourth impeachment complaint. Representative and House Majority Leader Manuel Jose Dalipe (Majority Leader Dalipe) affirmed that the one-third constitutional threshold had been met, and thereafter moved for the immediate endorsement of the fourth impeachment complaint to the Senate.^[32]

With no objection to the motion, the speaker of the House then directed the secretary general to immediately endorse the fourth impeachment complaint to the Senate, thereby constituting the Articles of Impeachment.^[33]

After the approval to transmit the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate, Majority Leader Dalipe moved to send the first three impeachment complaints to the Archives. Again, with no objection to the motion, the House speaker ordered the archiving of the first three impeachment complaints.^[34]

The 19th Congress adjourned its 36^th Regular Session on February 5, 2025 at 7:27 p.m.^[35] The 37^th Regular Session was scheduled to resume on June 2, 2025.^[36]

This Court takes judicial notice of the 19^th Congress's House Rules on Impeachment, adopted on May 30, 2023 and published on June 2, 2023.^[37]

On February 18, 2025, two separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition were filed before this Court by Vice President Duterte and a group of lawyers led by Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (Torreon et al.), assailing the constitutionality of the fourth impeachment complaint. The Petitions were docketed as G.R. No. 278353 and G.R. No. 278359, respectively.^[38]

On June 10, 2025, the Senate convened as an impeachment court.^[39] Sitting in this capacity, the Senate voted to return the impeachment case to the House of Representatives to clarify its constitutionality. In response, the House issued Resolution No. 328, certifying the regularity and lawfulness of the proceedings that led to the constitution of the Articles of Impeachment.^[40]

On June 13, 2025, the 19^th Congress adjourned sine die.^[41] The first three impeachment complaints remained archived and unacted upon at the time of adjournment.

On June 30, 2025, Vice President Duterte filed her Answer Ad Cautelam to the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate, reiterating her position that the impeachment complaint was void ab initio for violating the one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution-the same argument she had raised before this Court as petitioner.^[42]

On July 8, 2025, this Court issued a Resolution^[43] directing all parties to respond and submit, under oath, the necessary documents relating to the procedure employed by the House of Representatives in handling the four impeachment complaints.

On July 16, 2025, respondent House of Representatives filed its Compliance.^[44] It clarified the exact dates of filing of the first three impeachment complaints, their respective status,^[45] and the number of session days that had lapsed from their endorsement to transmittal.^[46] Regarding this Court's inquiries on the "preparation, circulation, and perusal of the impeachment complaint, as well as its attachments," respondent House of Representatives maintained that these are "matters [pertaining] to its internal proceedings ... [and] regarded as beyond the jurisdiction and scrutiny of this Honorable Court."^[47]

On July 25, 2025, this Court issued the assailed Decision,^[48] partially granting the Petitions and declaring the Articles of Impeachment unconstitutional and void ab initio for violating the one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution and the constitutional requirements of due process.^[49]

Respondent House of Representatives filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated August 4, 2025,^[50] seeking reconsideration of this Court's July 25, 2025 Decision, the dismissal of the Petitions for lack of merit, and the reversal of the immediately executory nature of the Decision.^[51]

Respondent House of Representatives maintains that it faithfully observed the procedure mandated in the Constitution in handling the first three impeachment complaints. It also asserts that the fourth impeachment complaint did not violate the one-year bar rule or the constitutional requirements on due process.^[52] Further, it contends that even assuming it was bound by the new rules introduced by this Court in the assailed Decision, it should not be prejudiced for having relied on the existing guidelines established in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,^[53] and thus seeks the prospective application of any new rule.^[54]
 
On August 5, 2025, this Court directed petitioners Duterte and Torreon et al. to file their respective Comments within 10 days from receipt.^[55]

On August 13, 2025, petitioners Torreon et al. filed their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration.^[56]

Petitioners Torreon et al. contend that respondent House of Representatives gravely abused its discretion when it archived the first three impeachment complaints and delayed taking action on them until the filing of the fourth impeachment complaint, which they describe as a "calculated move to circumvent the one-year bar rule."^[57]

First, petitioners Torreon et al. point out that the deliberate nonreferral of the first three impeachment complaints to the House Committee on Justice constituted a "blatant departure from the Constitution's prescribed impeachment procedure."^[58] They stress that such "inaction cannot be used to perpetually freeze complaints to evade the [one-year] bar," as this would effectively "[manipulate] the impeachment process for political ends."^[59] They note that by expanding the trigger to include termination through archiving, this Court addressed "the specific abuse of stalling minority-endorsed complaints to favor a majority-backed one."^[60]

Second, petitioners Torreon et al. argue that respondent House of Representatives' position that the one-year bar was triggered only by the fourth complaint is a "self-serving and novel reading of the Constitution" and goes against established doctrine.^[61]

Third, petitioners Torreon et al. oppose the prayer for prospective application, maintaining that the constitutional requirements, particularly the referral to the Committee on Justice and the observance of the one-year bar and adherence to due process, were already settled principles and not "new standards" as respondents claim.^[62] They assert that this Court's Decision merely applied the doctrine laid down in the cases of Francisco and Gutierrez "to address procedural abuses that the House itself created" through its willful departure from already established procedures under the Constitution and jurisprudence.^[63]
 
On August 11, 2025, petitioners Torreon et al. filed their Opposition to the Motions to Intervene (with Motion to Expunge Submissions),^[64] seeking the denial of the intervenors' Motions for Reconsideration and to strike off these Motions from the records of the case.^[65] They subsequently filed a Consolidated Comment / Opposition Ad Cautelam dated August 14, 2025,^[66] reiterating the same arguments they raised in their Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration;^[67] and a Supplemental Opposition dated August 15, 2025,^[68] mainly arguing that the intervenors lack legal interest in the case^[69] and that their Motions were filed out of time.^[70]

On August 18, 2025, petitioner Duterte filed her Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration.^[71]

Petitioner Duterte preliminarily argues that the Motion for Reconsideration is an unauthorized pleading, as the Office of the Solicitor General did not first submit it for deliberation and approval by the plenary of the 20^th Congress. Consequently, she asserts that the Motion must be dismissed outright.^[72]

Even assuming that the pleading was authorized by respondent House of Representatives, petitioner Duterte maintains that the House nonetheless committed grave abuse of discretion by exceeding its constitutional authority to initiate impeachment proceedings. She claims that the House of Representatives' "fixation[s] on peripheral details" diverts attention from issues already settled in the assailed Decision.^[73]

First, petitioner Duterte contends that no plenary vote was conducted in the manner required by respondent House of Representatives' own Internal Rules of Procedure.^[74]

Second, petitioner Duterte argues that the archival of the first three impeachment complaints constituted a "deliberate act of disposition," specifically an inaction that "indicates a calculated effort to evade the [one-year bar rule]."^[75] She emphasizes that by neglecting these complaints, respondent House of Representatives failed to comply with the constitutional periods-10 session days to include the complaints in the Order of Business and three session days to refer them to the Committee on Justice.^[76]

Third, petitioner Duterte posits that the Constitution, when interpreted as a whole, mandates the observance of due process at every stage of the proceedings, underscoring that impeachment is both a political and legal process.^[77]

Finally, petitioner Duterte insists that the principle of prospective application should not apply in this case, arguing that jurisprudence allowing prospectivity is intended only to protect nonparties who would otherwise be affected by a ruling.^[78]

From the arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent House of Representatives, the issues for this Court's resolution are as follows:

First, whether respondent House of Representatives committed grave abuse of discretion in the interpretation and application of their Rules of Impeachment in relation to the provisions of the Constitution;

Second, whether the House of Representatives had the discretion to choose which mode of impeachment to prioritize among several impeachment complaints; and

Third, whether petitioner Duterte's right to due process was violated when the House of Representatives transmitted the fourth impeachment complaint to the Senate.

Before addressing the substantive issues, this Court must first resolve the procedural question of whether the Office of the Solicitor General was authorized to file the Motion for Reconsideration on behalf of the House of Representatives of the 20^th Congress.

Ordinarily, under Rule 3, Section 17^[79] of the Rules of Court, a public officer who is a party to a case but ceases to hold office during its pendency may be substituted by their successor, provided that the successor is given an opportunity to be heard before the substitution. In this case, the respondent is the House of Representatives of the 19^th Congress, which became functus officio as of July 30, 2025.^[80] Thus, if this Court were to strictly apply the Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor General would first have to secure the authority of the House of Representatives of the 20^th Congress before filing the Motion for Reconsideration.

The requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard in the substitution of parties is a principle grounded in due process. Considering that the House of Representatives of the 20^th Congress made no objection before this Court to the Office of the Solicitor General's filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on its behalf, nor disputed any of the arguments raised in the Motion, it cannot be said that its right to due process was violated.

In any case, this Court has previously stated that "[a]bove all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."^[81] The novelty of the issues, the repercussions they may have on future cases, and the fact that this involves impeachment-an important accountability measure of the Constitution-are sufficient reasons to set aside lingering procedural issues such as the one raised by petitioner Duterte.

We proceed to resolve the Motion on the merits.

I.
Interpretation of the Rules of Impeachment of the House of
Representatives during the 19^th Congress
The House of Representatives has the prerogative to promulgate its own Rules of Impeachment.^[82] These Rules must be consistent with the Constitution. Definitely, any deviation by the House of Representatives from its own Rules will be considered as a grave abuse of discretion.

We reproduce the entire Rules of Impeachment of the House of Representatives during its 19^th Congress^[83] for reference:

RULE I
Applicability of Rules
SECTION 1. Applicability of Rules. - These Rules shall apply to all proceedings for impeachment in the House of Representatives against the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust.

RULE II
Initiating Impeachment
SECTION 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of:

1. a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or;
   
2. a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or
   
3. a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

SECTION 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. - A verified complaint for impeachment by a Member of the House or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof shall be filed with the office of the Secretary General and immediately referred to the Speaker.

An impeachment complaint is verified by an affidavit that the complainant has read the complaint and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

An impeachment complaint required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned impeachment complaint.

The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten (10) session days from receipt. It shall then be referred to the Committee on Justice within three (3) session days thereafter.

RULE III
Finding Probable Cause for Impeachment
A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

SECTION 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form. - Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant(s) together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.

SECTION 5. Determination of Sufficiency in Substance. - Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.

SECTION 6. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice that the respondent shall answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant(s). No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.

The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the respondent fails or refuses to file an answer within the reglementary period, the respondent is deemed to have interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days from receipt of the answer, the complainant may file a reply, serving a copy thereof to the respondent who may file a rejoinder within three (3) days from receipt of the reply, serving a copy thereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply, all the material allegations in the answer are deemed controverted. Together with their pleadings, the parties shall file their affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may be, with their documentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shall be subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary General. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, failure to file an answer will not preclude the respondent from presenting evidence to support the defenses.

When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with a copy of the verified complaint of a Member of the House or a copy of the verified complaint of a private citizen together with the resolution of endorsement thereof by a Member of the House of Representatives and a written notice to answer. In this case, reference to respondent in these Rules shall be understood as respondents.

SECTION 7. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. - After receipt of the pleadings, affidavits and counter-affidavits and relevant documents provided for in Section 6, or the expiration of the time within which they may be filed, the Committee shall determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment.

If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report required hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a hearing. The Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination and cross-examination by members of the Committee. The Committee shall have the power to issue compulsory processes for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other related evidence.

Hearings before the Committee shall be open to the public except when the security of the State or public interest requires that the hearings be held in executive session.

After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for resolution.

SECTION 8. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. - The House may, upon proper petition, provide adequate protection to a complainant or witness if it is shown that the personal safety of the complainant or witness is in jeopardy because of participating in the impeachment proceeding.

SECTION 9. Report and Recommendation. - The Committee on Justice after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House containing its findings and recommendations within sixty (60) session days from the referral to it of the verified complaint and/or resolution. Together with the report shall be a formal resolution of the Committee regarding the disposition of the complaint which shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten (10) session days from receipt thereof.

If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Members that a probable cause exists on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee, it shall submit with its report a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. Otherwise, the complaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 12 of these Rules.

SECTION 10. Report to be Calendared. - The Committee on Rules shall calendar the report and the accompanying resolution of the Committee on Justice regarding the disposition of the complaint in accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives. The House shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session days from its submission by the Committee on Justice.

B. HOUSE ACTION

SECTION 11. Vote Required for Approval. - A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House is necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then be endorsed to the Senate.

On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, it shall result in the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.

SECTION 12. Where Dismissal [is] Recommended. - When the report of the Committee on Justice dismisses the complaint, it shall submit to the House a resolution for the dismissal of the verified complaint and/or resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to override such resolution, in which case the Committee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the Articles of Impeachment.

SECTION 13. Vote by Roll Call. - The voting on a resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee on Justice or a contrary resolution dismissing the impeachment complaint shall be by roll call, and the Secretary General shall record the vote of each Member.

RULE IV
Verified Complaint/Resolution by One-Third of Members 
SECTION 14. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. - A verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved bill of the House.

The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and sworn to before the Secretary General by each of the Members constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

The contents of the verification shall be as follows:

"We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state: That we are the complainants in the above-entitled complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.

______________________"

(Signature)

RULE V
Bar Against Impeachment
SECTION 15. Scope of Bar. - No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one (1) year.

RULE VI
Prosecutor in All Impeachment Proceedings
SECTION 16. Impeachment Prosecutor. - The House of Representatives shall act as the prosecutor at the trial in the Senate through a committee of eleven (11) Members thereof to be elected by a majority vote of the Members present, there being a quorum.

RULE VII
Applicability of the Rules of Court
SECTION 17. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

Adopted, May 30, 2023
Published, June 2, 2023^[84]

The opening paragraph of Rule II, Section 2 and subsection (c) of the Rules of Impeachment clearly provides: 

SECTION 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of:

. . . .

c. a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The opening paragraph seems to require that even a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment already filed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives still needs referral to the Committee on Justice.

A strict textual reading appears to support this conclusion due to the use of the words "shall" and "filing and subsequent referral." Applying the rules on syntax and statutory construction, this seems to mean that both filing and referral to the Committee on Justice are imperative and conjunctive requirements for all the modes of initiating impeachment complaints.

We accord the House of Representatives its competence and power as the legislative branch of government in promulgating its Rules on Impeachment. However, in their interpretation of their Rules, it cannot contravene the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution.

We cannot read the provision as implied by our colleague, Justice Raul B. Villanueva, to be worded this way:^[85]

RULE II
Initiating Impeachment

SECTION 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by:  
 

(a)	the filing and referral to the Committee of Justice of a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of Representatives; or
(b)	the filing and referral of a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or
(c)	the filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House. (Emphasis supplied)

If it were to be crafted based on the House's interpretation, the wording should have expressly required that the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint under Rule II, Section 2(a) and (b) requires both filing and referral to the Committee on Justice while the second mode under Rule II, Section 2(c) only requires the filing of an impeachment complaint and no more referral to the Committee on Justice.

Instead, we read the current House Rules on Impeachment to mandatorily require referral of any complaint or complaints filed under Article XI, Section 3(2) or the first mode of initiating a complaint to the Committee on Justice.

However, based on the House Rules on Impeachment, the House of Representatives may also refer any complaint filed under Article XI, Section 3(4) or the second mode of initiating a complaint to the committee but only for a limited purpose. Clearly, the referral under the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint is not mandatory.

The Court cannot ignore the formulation of this provision without undermining the constitutional prerogative of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own Rules of Impeachment. We cannot also read the provisions so that they contravene the provisions of the Constitution.

We assume that the speaker and members of the House of Representatives were fully aware of the two modes of initiating a complaint under Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution:

SECTION 3. ...

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

Article XI, Section 3, subsections (2) and (3) cover the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.

Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) covers the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.
 
In the first mode, as contemplated under subsections (2) and (3), impeachment is initiated through the regular and deliberative process in the House of Representatives. A verified complaint may be filed either by a member of the House or by a private citizen with the endorsement of a member. Upon filing, the complaint is referred to the House Committee on Justice, which evaluates its sufficiency in form and substance and conducts the appropriate hearings. Only after favorable committee action does the impeachment process proceed further. This mode therefore emphasizes institutional screening and committee review.

By contrast, subsection (4) introduces an alternative and more direct mechanism for initiating impeachment. Under this provision, a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives immediately initiates impeachment proceedings.

These provisions reflect a deliberate constitutional design; subsections (2) and (3) provide a structured and committee-directed approach, while subsection (4) allows a streamlined initiation when a sufficient level of consensus already exists.

Given the House's plenary power under the Constitution to craft its own Rules, the House formulated the present House Rules on Impeachment and required the filing and referral of the impeachment complaint under the two modes.

I.A.
Referral under the First Mode
The first mode of filing an impeachment complaint pertains to the filing of a complaint by a citizen, which should be subsequently endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives, or by the filing of a complaint by a member of the House.

In such cases, the Constitution and the House Rules on Impeachment require that impeachment complaints be included in the Order of Business within 10 session days from receipt, and referred to the Committee on Justice within three session days thereafter.

Rule II, Section 2, paragraphs (a) and (b) and Rule III provide for the procedure as detailed in the Rules of Impeachment approved by the House of Representatives.^[86]

From the Rules of the House of Representatives, the purpose of the referral is for the Committee to receive the evidence for the purpose of evaluating it so that the Committee itself will draft the report to be submitted to the plenary. Also, the procedure already clearly respects the respondent's due process rights.

I.B.
Referral under the Second Mode
A cursory reading of Article XI, Section 3(4) might suggest that referral to a committee of the House is no longer necessary or even contrary to its intent.

The second mode exists because the Constitution requires that impeachment can commence with the support of only one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives.

However, the House Rules on Impeachment require that any ground raised in a complaint must be supported by evidence and that this evidence has been furnished to and evaluated by the endorsing member.

This is clear in the provision on verification in Rule IV, Section 14 of the House Rules on Impeachment, thus:

RULE IV
Verified Complaint/Resolution by One-Third of Members
SECTION 14. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. - A verified complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved bill of the House.

The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and sworn to before the Secretary General by each of the Members constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

The contents of the verification shall be as follows:

"We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state: That we are the complainants in the above-entitled complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents thereof; and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of our reading and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.

______________________" (Signature) (Emphasis supplied)

The verification requirement in the House Rules exacts compliance under oath that the endorsing members read the contents of the complaint and examined the evidence pertinent to the allegations.

To give effect to the House Rules on Impeachment, as well as to the intent of the constitutional provision, the optional referral to the Committee on Justice provided by the opening paragraph of Section 2 in relation to Subsection (c) of the same provision, if availed of by the House, should only be for the following purposes:

(1) To ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) To confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every member has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) To respect the Committee's prerogative to consolidate different formulations of the complaint, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

Unlike during the referral under the first mode, the Committee does not need to hold a hearing to present witnesses or documentary or other evidence. If the House opts to refer the complaint to the Committee under the second mode, the process is more expedited. It merely requires the endorsement by at least one-third of the members of the House.

Initiating an impeachment complaint under the second mode is the act of the entire House of Representatives. It does so with only a one-third vote of all its members, manifested through their endorsement and verification of a draft Articles of Impeachment. Thus, the transmittal of the endorsed complaint as the Articles of Impeachment can only be done in a plenary session where the transmittal is part of the Order of Business.

This means that all members of the House of Representatives should have been given copies of the complaint and its accompanying evidence. However, the transmittal should be made immediately if it appears that one-third of the House membership has already endorsed the complaint. Providing the other non-endorsing members with copies during plenary is not only a matter of courtesy but also so they can properly inform their constituents that an impeachment complaint has already been initiated. This is not idle ceremony, it is an essential so all members-not only those who endorse-can discharge their functions as representatives.^[87]

II.
Distinguishing initiated complaints from sham complaints
This Court is aware that, as in this case, multiple impeachment complaints may sometimes be filed against the same official within the same period. Hence, in the assailed Decision, this Court introduced a rule:

Third, Article XI, Section 3(2) of the Constitution clearly requires that a verified impeachment complaint be immediately put in the Order of Business within 10 session days from its endorsement. Neither the secretary general nor the speaker of the House is granted by the Constitution any discretion to determine when this period commences. Neither does the House of Representatives have any discretion except to refer these matters to the proper committee within three session days. Within these periods, the House may opt to consolidate all impeachment complaints properly commenced and endorsed.

Obviously, sham complaints, for example, those that are not verified, should be dismissed immediately, even if endorsed. Complaints that are not properly endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives within a reasonable period should also be dismissed. These types of dismissals will not trigger the one-year ban.^[88] (Emphasis supplied)

This rule reinforces the doctrine established in the case of Gutierrez, which sought to prevent the filing of frivolous or sham complaints.^[89] Sham complaints may be weaponized to create a false "initiation" and, in effect, insulate an impeachable officer from legitimate impeachment proceedings for one year.

Under the House Rules on Impeachment, insufficiency of form determines whether an impeachment complaint is a sham complaint. While it should be the respondent House that determines how it dismisses sham complaints, the 19^th Congress has, through its House Rules on Impeachment, determined that it be only through referral to the Committee on Justice.
 
Respondent House of Representatives, in turn, has already provided in its own Rules what constitutes a sham complaint.

At the minimum, an impeachment complaint is determined to be a sham complaint if: (1) under the first mode, it is not properly verified when it was first filed and, therefore, should not be included in the Order of Business, or it was not properly endorsed by a member of the House (Rule III, Sections 3 and 4); or (2) under the second mode, it is insufficient in form, such as when the signing members of the House did not properly verify in accordance with the House Rules on Impeachment (Rule IV, Section 14), or it was not endorsed by at least one-third of all members of the House in accordance with Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution.

In any case, mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers, we reiterate that while this Court may define what constitutes initiation for constitutional purposes, we will not intrude upon the discretion of respondent House of Representatives, as a collective body, to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient in form and in substance. This Court is likewise not positioned to make such factual determinations in the present case, particularly in deference to the House of Representatives, which opted not to respond to the Court's specific inquiry in its July 8, 2025 Resolution.^[90]

The House Rules on Impeachment already provide guidance on how to address sham complaints or those that are not properly verified. It is not for this Court to dictate how the House of Representatives should exercise its discretion in making these determinations; neither is it within the authority of the speaker or the secretary general to do so unilaterally on behalf of the entire House.

III.
On the Priority between the First and Second Mode of Impeachment
We clarify that the Constitution accords no priority to either the first or the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint. The House has the prerogative to file impeachment complaints, to dismiss impeachment complaints for being sham complaints or due to insufficiency in form or substance, to choose which among multiple complaints to prioritize, or to consolidate multiple complaints.

We thus rule that the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment was not rendered invalid merely because it was based on the fourth complaint, which was endorsed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives. Rather, the transmittal was invalid because it was already barred by Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

The circumstances of this case are unique. At the time the House acted on the fourth impeachment complaint endorsed by at least one-third of all House members, three impeachment complaints had already been properly filed and endorsed under the first mode and remained pending.

The Constitution and the House Rules on Impeachment prescribe specific timelines within which the House must act on impeachment complaints filed under the first mode. Consequently, preference may be accorded to a complaint filed under the second mode only insofar as doing so does not result in the violation of the timelines or procedural requirements governing complaints filed under the first mode.

During the deliberations of this Resolution, Justice Amy Lazaro-Javier and Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting submitted that the constitutional periods in Article XI should be interpreted to mean calendar days when respondent House is in session.^[91]

Citing Gutierrez, Justice Lazaro-Javier pointed out that the constitutional mandates, particularly the prescribed timelines under the Constitution, are self-executing provisions that do not need legislation to take effect. Otherwise, they would be rendered ineffective by the action or inaction of Congress.^[92]

Justice Inting also raised that the definition of a session day, as the term used in the Constitution, should be interpreted in its plain and ordinary meaning, and not as a technical term in legislation.^[93]

We agree. Article XI, Section 3(2) provides for the constitutional periods to be observed by respondent House in impeachment proceedings, as follows:

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

We are aware that, for legislative purposes, a session day follows the interpretation of the House, which is not equivalent to a calendar day. It is a period that starts from a call to order until the session is adjourned, regardless of the passage of time. In our July 25, 2025 Decision, we previously interpreted session days as follows:

Session days, however, are not calendar dates. To determine the session days, we first refer to House Concurrent Resolution No. 30 of both the Senate and the House. Second, we consider how the Rules of the House of Representatives are interpreted and implemented by the House.^[94]

However, this is not the only interpretation.

There are two approaches in interpreting the length of a session day: first, how respondent House applies it; and second, how the wording in the Constitution is to be interpreted within its plain, ordinary meaning. Ultimately, interpreting the Constitution is a judicial function. The role of the Judiciary is to give spirit to the values of every provision of the Constitution in light of its entire context and the present social reality.

Considering the two approaches, the intention of the impeachment process is that it be done expeditiously. If the allegations are true and can be proven during trial, an impeachable officer should not be allowed to continue to serve within the soonest possible time. Impeachable officers enumerated under Article XI, Section 2 play a significant role in the constitutional order and have a great impact on the Filipino people.

If, however, the allegations are not true, having an efficient and expeditious impeachment process means not subjecting the impeachable officer to further harassment.

The 10 session days is sufficient to include the complaint in the agenda and refer it to the proper committee. During this period, the House may decide to wait for other impeachment complaints, if any, such as in this case, to make sure that the impeachment is taken as a serious process and any sham complaint is not considered or entertained.

Based on the tabulated session days of the first three impeachment complaints submitted by Justice Inting in his Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,^[95] the House had session on the following dates:  

Impeachment Complaints	Filing Date	Session days lapsed
First Impeachment Complaint	December 2, 2024	19 Session days: December 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 18, 2024; January 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 27, and 28, 2025; February 3, 4, and 5, 2025
Second Impeachment Complaint	December 4, 2024	17 Session days: December 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, and 18, 2024; January 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 27, and 28, 2025; February 3, 4, and 5, 2025
Third Impeachment Complaint	December 19, 2024	11 Session days: January 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 27, and 28, 2025; February 3, 4, and 5, 2025

Here, the 10 session days should be reckoned from the filing and endorsement of the first impeachment complaint on December 2, 2024. Thus, respondent House had until January 14, 2025 to include it in the Order of Business and until January 21, 2025 to refer it to the proper committee. As Justice Ramon Paul Hernando raised during deliberations, any delay in the proceeding is immoral.

Since the first impeachment complaint failed to follow the constitutional periods, any succeeding complaints are barred by Article XI, Section 3(5).

IV.
On Due Process of Law
There is insistence that the due process clause does not apply to impeachment proceedings.

One strand of the argument posits that Article XI of the Constitution should be interpreted separately from any provision in Article III, and that due process protections shall only be applicable during the Senate trial stage.

Another strand contends that entitlement to an elective public office such as the Office of the Vice President does not fall within the "life, liberty, or property" protected under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

IV.A.
Nature of Impeachment
Impeachment-the power of Congress to remove the highest public officials for serious crimes and misconduct resulting in loss of public trust^[96] -is not merely a political process. It is a mechanism provided in the Constitution and, therefore, a constitutional, legal, and political process.^[97]

Impeachment was not designed to be merely adjudicatory, nor was it intended to operate exclusively as a political exercise. Rather, it draws from both legal and political foundations to ensure accountability at the highest levels of government. As such, impeachment proceedings must comply with the Constitution as a whole and must operate within its bounds, including the fundamental requirements of due process.

The Constitution mandates the observance of due process in all proceedings, including impeachment. Article III, Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.^[98]

"Every person is guaranteed the right to due process before any judgment against them is issued."^[99] Thus, applying due process principles to the constitutional provisions on impeachment is neither novel nor extraneous, but a necessary, holistic approach to giving full effect to the Constitution.

Due process is anchored on fairness and equity. It is flexible and context-dependent, shaped by the circumstances, subject matter, and necessities of the situation.^[100] At its core, due process requires notice, hearing, and a fair opportunity to be heard.^[101]

A due process issue arises "if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against [them], or raise substantive defenses through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body ... where [they stand] charged."^[102]

At the same time, impeachment is undeniably political in character. The Constitution vests in Congress the exclusive power to initiate impeachment^[103] and to promulgate its own rules to govern the process.^[104] It is political in the sense that impeachment authority is exercised by politically accountable bodies: the House of Representatives, which initiates, and the Senate, which tries and decides.

This political character reflects the framers' intent to entrust the ultimate judgment over impeachable officials to the people's representatives. During the deliberations on Article XI, one of the framers proposed that procedural matters be left to Congress's discretion, as follows:

MR. REGALADO: Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance, under Section 3(2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new Section 4, which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken care of by the Rules of the Congress.^[105] (Emphasis supplied)

However, impeachment being a legal, political, and constitutional process, Congress's authority is not unbridled. Where constitutional rights are violated or grave abuse of discretion is committed, judicial review lies. In cases where there is no grave abuse of discretion, this Court must defer to Congress. Where two interpretations of the Rules on Impeachment are possible-one consistent with the Constitution and the other not-the constitutional interpretation must prevail.

IV.B.
Inalienable Rights
Past jurisprudence already reflects recognition that the due process clause also applies to impeachment proceedings.

In his Separate Concurring Opinion in Francisco, former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban explained:

The due process clause, enshrined in our fundamental law, is a conditio sine qua non that cannot be ignored in any proceeding-administrative, judicial or otherwise. It is deemed written into every law, rule or contract, even though not expressly stated therein. Hence, the House rules on impeachment, insofar as they do not provide the charged official with (1) notice and (2) opportunity to be heard prior to being impeached, are also unconstitutional.^[106] (Citations omitted)

Former Chief Justice Panganiban agreed that the impeachment proceedings against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. were void ab initio for failure to comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. He further rejected the view that the Court lacks jurisdiction to intervene in impeachment proceedings simply because the House of Representatives has the "exclusive" power to initiate impeachment cases and the Senate the "sole" prerogative to try and decide them.^[107] He also clarified that the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked in cases of grave abuse of discretion:

3. The Constitution has granted many powers and prerogatives exclusively to Congress. However, when these are exercised in violation of the Constitution or with grave abuse of discretion, the jurisdiction of the Court has been invoked; and its decisions thereon, respected by the legislative branch. Thus, in Avelino v. Cuenco, the Court ruled on the issue of who was the duly elected President of the Senate, a question normally left to the sole discretion of that chamber; in Santiago v. Guingona, on who was the minority floor leader of the Senate; in Daza v. Singson and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr., on who were the duly designated members of the Commission on Appointments representing the House of Representatives. It was held in the latter two cases that the Court could intervene because the question involved was "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointment as prescribed by the Constitution."^[108] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The Court's intervention in such cases is not an intrusion into political questions, but the discharge of its duty to resolve justiciable controversies arising from constitutional violations.^[109]

The phrase "right to life, liberty, or property" should not be read with undue literalism. It must be accorded reasonable flexibility to achieve its intent of protecting inherent and inalienable rights that could not have been exhaustively articulated at the time of its framing. The due process clause embodies the fundamental constitutional commitment to reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. It envisions that we cannot have a true democratic and republican/representative state that is arbitrary and unfair.

The Office of the Vice President is neither decorative nor ornamental. It was deliberately created to ensure continuity in executive leadership.

Thus, extending due process protections in impeachment proceedings does not merely safeguard the incumbent, but also protects the electorate that entrusted the office to them and their right to have a competent and qualified commander-in-chief leading them.

In Morfe v. Mutuc,^[110] this Court considered security of tenure as a constitutional guarantee "analogous to property" that should be protected by due process.^[111]

However, the privilege to serve the public is more than just property. Security of tenure is founded on public trust, conferred by the electorate, whose right to competent and lawful governance must likewise be protected. Public service is sometimes a profession or even a vocation. In some cases, the public itself is invested in both the office and in its incumbent, as in the case of elected public officers. In this instance, the public selects the public officer who they will entrust the duty of delivering the kind of public service they want.

The right to the public office or the privilege to serve is not only a choice of occupation but an answer to the call of the electorate to deliver the public service committed to them. This right is not only held by the incumbent but also by the public, knowing that their chosen public officers serve them.

Jurisprudence also provides that due process is a malleable and flexible concept anchored on fairness and equity and dependent on the circumstances, subject matter, and necessities of the situation.^[112] It does not have a controlling and precise definition but responds to reason, obeys justice, and avoids arbitrariness and unfairness.^[113] It does not have a particular form of procedure but nonetheless protects substantial rights^[114] and promotes orderly administration of justice.

IV.C.
Impeachment Proceedings are Sui Generis
We clarify further that the application of the due process clause in impeachment proceedings at the initiation stage is sui generis.

Particularly under the second mode of impeachment, and as raised by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo during deliberations, due process is required under the House of Representatives' own Rules. This due process requirement is a class of its own because it does not demand an administrative hearing or a mandatory referral of the impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice.

For the process of initiating the impeachment complaint under Article XI, Section 3(4), due process only requires:

One. The grounds invoked in the complaint or resolution are those contained in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Two. The procedure is governed by the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the House of Representatives prior to any filing of any impeachment complaint.

Three. As already provided by the current House Rules on Impeachment, all endorsing members should have been given a copy of the complaint and all its supporting evidence.

V.
The Doctrine of Operative Fact
Respondents submit that the July 25, 2025 Decision should be applied and enforced only "prospectively in the commencement of future impeachment complaints,"^[115] arguing that its immediate application "would simply be unfair."^[116] They also suggest that the "doctrine of operative fact" should apply to this case to justify the prospective applicability of the guidelines stated in the Decision.^[117]

The general rule for the applicability of laws and administrative acts can be found in Article 7 of the Civil Code, which states:

ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

In the 1971 case of Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,^[118] this Court was confronted with the issue of whether a bank could still foreclose on a mortgage in 1959 for a loan that matured in 1944. The debtor's defense was that the period for foreclosure had already prescribed. The bank argued, however, that in 1945, a law had decreed a moratorium on the collection of loans, which was subsequently nullified in 1948. The nullification of the law had been further affirmed by the 1953 case of Rutter v. Esteban.^[119] In resolving the issue, the Court explained:

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution." It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.^[120] (Citations omitted)

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,^[121] the doctrine of operative fact is described as "an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration."^[122] This Court further stated:

[F]or the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a "legislative or executive measure," meaning a law or executive issuance, that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid.^[123]

As an exception to a general rule, the doctrine "is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play."^[124] In Araullo v. Aquino III,^[125] although the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was unconstitutional, its consequences and all its related issuances could no longer be undone without causing grave inequity, given the scale of reliance, the good faith of the actors involved, and the irreversible nature of the resulting public projects:

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter' of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.

We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.

. . . .

It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle - the budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.

As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.

The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.^[126] (Citations omitted)

This Court further emphasized that the doctrine "can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice:"^[127]

This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.^[128]

Likewise, laws and governmental acts are presumed constitutional until otherwise declared to the contrary by this Court, and thus the public should not be penalized for its reliance in good faith in its validity. Justice Fernando explains in his Concurring Opinion in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito:^[129]

Since under our Constitution, judicial review exists precisely to test the validity of executive or legislative acts in an appropriate legal proceeding, there is always the possibility of their being declared inoperative and void. Realism compels the acceptance of the thought that there could be a time-lag between the initiation of such Presidential or congressional exercise of power and the final declaration of nullity. In the meanwhile, it would be productive of confusion, perhaps at times even of chaos, if the parties affected were left free to speculate as to its fate being one of doom, thus leaving them free to disobey it in the meanwhile. Since, however, the orderly processes of government, not to mention common sense, requires that the presumption of validity be accorded an act of Congress or an order of the President, it would be less than fair, and it may be productive of injustice, if no notice of its existence as a fact be paid to it, even if thereafter, it is stricken down as contrary, in the case of Presidential act, either to the Constitution or a controlling statute.^[130]

Thus, the doctrine of operative fact is a doctrine rooted in equity and fair play. It calls for the prospective application of this Court's decision when the consequences of nonprospectivity would result, for example, in "the physical undoing of [worthy results such as public infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms, and the like] by destruction" or "most undesirable wastefulness."^[131] The consequences must be of a magnitude that it can no longer be undone. Thus, the doctrine of operative fact does not apply in every case where parties invoke it.

In Mandanas v. Ochoa,^[132] the doctrine of operative fact "applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application."^[133] Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation^[134] explains further:

Therefore, in applying the doctrine of operative fact, courts ought to examine with particularity the effects of the already accomplished acts arising from the unconstitutional statute, and determine, on the basis of equity and fair play, if such effects should be allowed to stand. It should not operate to give any unwarranted advantage to parties, but merely seeks to protect those who, in good faith, relied on the invalid law.^[135]

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,^[136] this Court hesitated to apply the doctrine to a mere administrative practice not formalized as a rule or ruling and not known to the general public:

Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency.^[137]

While Araullo recognized the beneficial effects that would be undone based on a good faith application of an otherwise invalid executive act, not all alleged "beneficial consequences" are to be considered in applying the doctrine. In Concerned Officials and Employees of the National Food Authority-Regional Office No. II, Santiago, Isabela v. Commission on Audit,^[138] the continuous grant of benefits to employees did not merit retroactive application in circumstances where the facts clearly show a failure to comply with the pertinent rules and regulations:

The situation in the case at bar, however, does not call for the application of the doctrine of operative fact. The basis of the underlying disallowance that precipitated this case was not because of a statute, law, or executive issuance or act being judicially declared unconstitutional or invalid. The disallowance was for failure to follow the pertinent laws or rules for the grant of additional benefits to NFA personnel. As a rule, originating from considerations of equity, the doctrine does not and cannot bypass or erase laws, rules, or regulations that apply to a certain state of facts on the basis of an allegation that an executive act or issuance is valid because of its beneficial consequences - in this case the grant of FGI to NFA personnel - when these state of facts clearly demonstrate a failure to comply with the pertinent laws, rules, or regulations. This is not how the doctrine of operative fact should be applied. To subscribe to this line of thinking that petitioners would most certainly render the audit power of COA over the use of public funds nugatory.^[139]

Thus, the doctrine of operative fact is not a tool to legitimize noncompliance with rules, regulations, laws, or the Constitution, or to validate unlawful or unconstitutional acts. It can only be invoked by the party who acted in good faith, and cannot be used by a party directly responsible in the commission of an illegal or unlawful act. An Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III^[140] explains:

As a rule of equity, the doctrine of operative fact can be invoked only by those who relied in good faith on the law or the administrative issuance, prior to its declaration of nullity. Those who acted in bad faith or with gross negligence cannot invoke the doctrine. Likewise, those directly responsible for an illegal or unconstitutional act cannot invoke the doctrine. He who comes to equity must come with clean hands, and he who seeks equity must do equity. Only those who merely relied in good faith on the illegal or unconstitutional act, without any direct participation in the commission of the illegal or unconstitutional act, can invoke the doctrine.^[141] (Citation omitted)

Most recently, in Casta eda v. Commission on Audit,^[142] this Court emphasized:

To stress, the doctrine of operative fact is an equitable tool designed to mitigate the unintended negative consequences of the subsequent invalidation of statutes or executive issuances. It is not a tool to validate or excuse actions that were never lawful in the first place.^[143]

In this case, the doctrine of operative fact has doubtful applicability. The July 25, 2025 Decision squarely found that respondent House of Representatives failed to comply with the requirements of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution and its own House Rules on Impeachment in initiating the impeachment complaints, effectively resulting in a violation of petitioner Duterte's fundamental right to due process. The operative fact invoked by respondents-the transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment against petitioner Duterte-was itself tainted by serious constitutional and procedural infirmities, all of which were already extensively discussed in the assailed Decision and reiterated in this Resolution.

We clarify the constitutional requirements of impeachment:

First, the impeachment process is primarily a legal, political, and constitutional procedure. It is not a purely political proceeding. This means that the Bill of Rights, especially the due process clause and the right to speedy disposition of cases, applies to the entire impeachment process.^[144] However, the application of the due process clause in the initiation stage of the impeachment process is sui generis.

Second, given the nature of the offices and institutions subject to impeachment, the effect of impeachment on the independence of constitutional departments and organs, and its status as a constitutional process, and our power under Article VIII, Section 1, constitutional issues involving impeachment proceedings may, in proper cases, be subject to judicial review.

The Court does not determine when, who, and whether an impeachable officer may be removed and disqualified from political office. It only has the duty to construe the process in proper cases and its limitations as mandated by the Constitution.^[145]

Third, Article XI, Section 3(2) of the Constitution requires that a verified impeachment complaint be immediately put in the Order of Business within 10 session days from its endorsement. A session day, only for purposes of this constitutional provision, means a calendar day on which the House of Representatives holds a plenary session.

Neither the secretary general nor the speaker of the House is granted by the Constitution any discretion to determine when this period commences. Neither does the House of Representatives have any discretion except to refer these matters to the proper committee within three session days. The House may opt to consolidate all properly commenced and endorsed impeachment complaints.^[146]

We are aware that for legislative purposes, a session day follows the interpretation of the House, which is not equivalent to a calendar day. It is a period that starts from a call to order until the session is adjourned, regardless of the passage of time.
 
However, for the initiation stage of impeachment which is a constitutional process, a session day is a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session. This aligns with the primordial value of accountability of impeachable public officials and therefore that impeachment proceedings should be accorded the weight and priority that it is due.

Respondents were therefore not able to comply with Article XI, Section 3(2) by putting the three endorsed impeachment complaints in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days. Thus, the fourth impeachment complaint, even if endorsed by more than one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives, is barred by Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Fourth, complaints based on the first mode or Article XI, Section 3(2) is deemed to have been initiated for purposes of the one-year bar under Section 3(5) when: (a) it is referred to the Committee on Justice; (b) it is properly verified and endorsed by a member of the House of Representatives and it is not put in the Order of Business or referred to the proper committee within the constitutional periods; (c) it is properly verified and endorsed or it has been properly referred to the proper committee but has not been acted upon by the House upon its adjournment sine die.

For this purpose, we reiterate and amplify Gutierrez v. House of Representatives^[147] based on the facts of this case.

Complaints based on the second mode or Article XI, Section 3(4) of the Constitution are deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar under Article XI, Section 3(5) upon the valid endorsement of at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives. A valid endorsement includes valid verifications from all endorsing members that they have also seen the evidence supporting the allegations of the complaint as provided in the current Rules on Impeachment of the House of Representatives.

Fifth, we clarify that in cases of multiple complaints, the Constitution does not require any priority between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. The process of gathering support for impeachment complaints under the second mode is not constitutionally prohibited, even while the House is considering complaints filed under the first mode. However, the second mode of impeachment will be barred under Article XI, Section 3(5) if there are pending complaints under the first mode that violate the periods mandated in the Constitution.

Sixth, the House of Representatives has the prerogative to determine that the requirements of the second mode of initiating a complaint under Article XI, Section 3(4)-that it is properly verified, accompanied with evidence and endorsed by at least one-third of all its members-have been met. This process can be done by the plenary of the House of Representatives, or through the verification of the appropriate committee prior to the endorsement of the majority floor leader or as provided for in the Rules for transmittal in plenary session, or any other alternative means at the discretion of the House of Representatives.

However, the House of Representatives of the 19^th Congress provided in Section 2 of its Rules of Impeachment that the complaint be referred to the Committee on Justice. Granting respect to the ability of the House of Representatives to craft its own rules, and the presumption of constitutionality, we interpret that to mean that the referral to the Committee for complaints under the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, that is when there is at least one-third of all its members who have endorsed and verified, is not mandatory.

To be consistent with the Constitution, when the House opts to refer a complaint under the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice, it is only for the following purposes:

(1) To ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) To confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every endorsing member has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) To respect the House's prerogative to consolidate multiple complaints, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

Referral to the Committee on Justice under the first mode of initiating impeachment complaints is for a different purpose, that is the determination of the sufficiency in form and substance. This is different from referral to the Committee on Justice to verify whether the requirements of the second mode as stated above have been fully complied with.

Obviously, sham complaints-for example, those that are not verified-should be dismissed immediately. These types of dismissals will not trigger the one-year ban covered under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Seventh, Article XI, Section 3(4) does not exist in isolation of the other provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, it is subject to the requirement of due process of law.^[148] Due process as applied to the impeachment process is sui generis.

Eighth, the fairness and non-arbitrariness principles of due process for the second mode or for transmittals under Article XI, Section 3(4) require that:

(1) The draft Articles of Impeachment or resolution should be accompanied by evidence when made available to the members of the House, especially those who are considering its endorsement;

(2) The evidence should meet the quantum of proof determined by the House of Representatives to establish the charges in the Articles of Impeachment;

(3) During the plenary that endorses the draft Articles of Impeachment, their accompanying. evidence should also be made available to all the members of the House of Representatives for their information. The Constitution, however, requires that the transmittal can be made for so long as there is at least one-third of all the members who have endorsed the complaint.

(4) The respondent's opportunity to be fully heard on the entire Articles of Impeachment and the supporting evidence shall be during the trial in the Senate;

(5) The basis of any charge must be for impeachable acts or omissions committed in relation to their office and during the current term of the impeachable officer.

For the president and vice president, these acts must be sufficiently grave, amounting to the offenses described in Article XI, Section 2. For the other impeachable officers, the acts must be sufficiently grave that they undermine and outweigh the respect for their constitutional independence and autonomy.

Again, while we deem the fourth complaint as barred by Article XI, Section 3(5) under the unique circumstances of this case, we underscore that the July 25, 2025 Decision did not absolve Vice President Duterte. At the House's discretion, the grounds raised in the Articles of Impeachment may again be raised based on any evidence that may have been discovered, if any. It is for Congress, by initiation of the House of Representatives and trial by the Senate, to determine the fate of the incumbent Vice President.

A FINAL NOTE
The Court once more underscores the nature of all public office as a public trust. We emphasize that impeachment, carried out in accordance with the promulgated rules for initiation by the House of Representatives and trial by the Senate, and, more importantly, in accordance with the Constitution, is a powerful public and democratic process to ensure accountability.

Corruption and abuse in any form are a failure to discharge the public trust. It is a failure of the incumbent who, given the temporary privilege of power, fails to discharge the fiduciary agency given to them by its principal: our people.

Impeachment is a powerful democratic process to call out corruption and grave abuse.

But impeachment can be abused. It has never been imagined in our basic law as a tool for the powerful to maintain the status quo, to maintain a political faction in power by silencing independent, strident, and insistent critics. Impeachment should never be abused to maintain the hegemonic dominance of greed by shaming those who occupy high government positions into preventing them into doing what they were sworn to do.

This is why impeachment has been designed so that it is not merely a political process initiated by mere allegations or by perceived public acclaim shaped by the propagandistic effect of timed press releases or irresponsible viral posts on social media. Impeachment is conscious, deliberate, and grave. Impeachment is a constitutional, legal, and political process.

Justice works not with the speed of a social media commentary but with the due, deliberate, conscious, and impartial consideration of issues properly framed and with evidence fairly presented.

The mandate of this Court is to check abuses by examining the process and ensuring that its interpretation of the rules, the law, and the Constitution cannot be used to undermine the values and the goals embedded in the impeachment process. Every justice that sits in this Court should have the moral courage to have that foresight and the conscience to decide justly, even if their decision produces a result contrary to their political predilections.

Judicial decisions are laid down not for the political convenience of a faction of those in power. Judicial decisions are also not laid down for the political convenience of the opposition. 

The rule of law that does justice is our lodestar. Justice includes accountability. Justice also includes fairness. Without fairness, there is abuse. This fairness is what our democracy is all about.

There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time. That is inherent in the rule of law. That is inherent in the rule of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

The following Motions are NOTED:

1. The Consolidated Motion with Leave of Court to Intervene and Admit the Attached Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Status Quo Ante Order, and for Oral Arguments dated August 1, 2025 filed by movants-intervenors 1Sambayan Coalition et al.;
   
   
2. Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene, Adopt the Comment filed by respondent House of Representatives dated March 6, 2025, and Admit the Attached Motion for Reconsideration dated August 7, 2025 filed by movants-intervenors-respondents ACT Teachers Partylist Representative Antonio Tinio et al.;
   
   
3. Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention, the Omnibus Motion (1. For Reconsideration; 2. For Status Quo Ante Order; and 3. For Oral Arguments) dated August 8, 2025 filed by movants-intervenors Rev. Fr. Antonio Labiao, Jr. et al.;
   
   
4. Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam and Joint Motion for Reconsideration [of the Decision dated July 25, 2025] dated August 1, 2025 filed by intervenors Percival V. Ce dana et al.;
   
   
5. Opposition to the Motions to Intervene (with Motions to Expunge Submissions) dated August 11, 2025 filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 278353;
   
   
6. Consolidated Comment/Opposition Ad Cautelam (to the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Movants-Intervenors) dated August 14, 2025 filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 278359;
   
   
7. Supplemental Opposition (to the Motion to Intervene of Labiao, Jr. et al.; to the Motion for Status Quo Ante Order; and to the Motion for Oral Arguments) dated August 15, 2025 filed by petitioners in G.R. No. 278359; and 
   
   
8. Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene with Attached Petition-In-Intervention dated September 11, 2025 filed by movant-intervenor Henry R. Giron.

This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. It shall be deemed served on the parties and released upon publication in the Supreme Court website and receipt of the parties of their digital copy in accordance with A.M. No. 25-05-16-SC or the Guidelines on the Transition to Electronic Filing in the Supreme Court.

No further pleadings shall be allowed.

Let entry of judgment be issued IMMEDIATELY.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Zalameda, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa,^* J., no part.
Hernando, Inting, and Rosario, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Lazaro-Javier and Villanueva, JJ., see separate opinion.
Singh,^** J., on leave.

---

^* No part.

^** On leave.

^[1] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 3. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[2] Id.

^[3] Id.

^[4] 660 Phil. 271 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[5] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 4.

^[6] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, pp. 1-71.

^[7] Consolidated Motion with Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Attached Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Status Quo Ante Order, and for Oral Arguments (Movants-Intervenors 1Sambayan Coalition et al.) dated August 1, 2025, pp. 1-23; Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration (Movants-Intervenors 1Sambayan Coalition et al.) dated August 1, 2025, pp. 1-116.

^[8] Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam (Movants-Intervenors Cende a et al.) dated August 1, 2025, pp. 1-22.

^[9] Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene, Adopt the Comment filed by respondent House of Representatives dated March 6, 2025 as their Comment in Intervention, and to Admit the Attached Motion for Reconsideration (Movants-Intervenors ACT Teachers Partylist et al.) dated August 7, 2025, pp. 1-27; Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated August 7, 2025, pp. 1-27.

^[10] Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention (Movants-Intervenors Labiao, Jr. et al.) dated August 8, 2025, pp. 1-88.

^[11] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[12] Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, pp. 4, 6; See Annex B to the Petition, Impeachment Complaint dated December 2, 2024, pp. 1-50.

^[13] Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, pp. 4, 6; See Annex C to the Petition, Impeachment Complaint dated December 4, 2024, pp. 1-48.

^[14] The endorsement did not contain any dates. See Annex D to the Petition, Impeachment Complaint dated December 19, 2024, pp. 1-2.

^[15] Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, pp. 4, 6; see Annex D to the Petition, Impeachment Complaint dated December 19, 2024, pp. 1-48.

^[16] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 5.

^[17] Comment (Respondent House of Representatives) dated March 24, 2025, p. 4; see Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023), Rule II, sec. 2(b), which provides:

SECTION 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of:

. . . .

(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof[.]

^[18] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(2) reads:

A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (Emphasis supplied). See also Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023), Rule II, sec. 2; Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[19] See Annex B (First Impeachment Complaint dated December 2, 2024), pp. 4-7, 8-11; Annex C (Second Impeachment Complaint dated December 4, 2024), pp. 15-28; and Annex D (Third Impeachment Complaint dated December 19, 2024), pp. 63-66.

^[20] See Annex C (Second Impeachment Complaint dated December 4, 2024), pp. 28-34.

^[21] See Annex B (First Impeachment Complaint dated December 2, 2024), pp. 7-8 and Annex C (Second Impeachment Complaint dated December 4, 2024), pp. 34-39.

^[22] See Annex B (First Impeachment Complaint dated December 2, 2024), pp. 18-19.

^[23] Id. at 16-17.

^[24] Id. at 24, 31-33.

^[25] Id. at 23-24.

^[26] Id. at 25-26, 28-31.

^[27] Comment (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, p. 4.

^[28] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 7. See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), pp. 75-76.

^[29] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(4) reads:

SECTION 3. -

. . . .  
 

(4)	In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

^[30] Comment (Respondent House of Representatives) dated March 24, 2025, p. 4. See Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023), Rule II, sec. 2(c), which provides:

SECTION 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of: ....

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House.

^[31] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 5; See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), p. 75; See Annex 1 (Additional Reference of Business) of Compliance dated July 16, 2025 (Respondent House of Representatives), p. 1.

In the assailed Decision, footnote 30 on p. 8 was misplaced. It should have been placed five words prior to the original placement. This will be corrected according to how errors in proofreading are usually corrected by the Court in due time. With the promulgation of this Resolution, the corrected pages will be released, published, and served to the parties. Whether there was a plenary vote or not is not determinative of the resolution of this case. (See Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 8.) The misplacement of the footnote did not affect the substantive reasoning in the main Decision.

^[32] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 8; See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), p. 75.

^[33] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 6; See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), p. 75.

^[34] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 6; See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), pp. 75-76.

^[35] See Journal No. 36, House, 19^th Congress, Third Regular Session (February 3 to 5, 2025), p. 88. The numbering of session days are adopted from the House of Representatives' Compliance dated July 16, 2025.

^[36] Id.

^[37] Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023). See Rules of the House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, pp. 121-129, available at https://docs.congress.hrep.online/download/docs/hrep.house.rules.adopted.ebook.pdf (last accessed on November 24, 2025).

^[38] Rollo (G.R. No. 278353), pp. 8-43; rollo (G.R. No. 278359), pp. 3-146.

^[39] Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, p. 11.

^[40] Id. at 10. See also Annex 5 of the Compliance, Resolution No. 328 dated June 11, 2025, pp. 1-2.

^[41] Motion for Reconsideration dated August 4, 2025, pp. 9, 14-15; Sine die is a Latin maxim for "without a day." In the context of a parliamentary body such as the House of Representatives, it means they adjourn without setting a specific day to reconvene. In some cases, it marks the end of a congressional term. All bills and actions in the House of Representatives not completed are terminated. They will have to be refiled. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 47 (9th ed., 2009); CONST., art. VI, secs. 4, 7, and 15; Rules of the House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, rule XXII, sec. 147, pp. 79.

^[42] Manifestation with Submission dated June 30, 2025, pp. 1-4.

^[43] July 8, 2025 Resolution, pp. 1-3.

^[44] Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, pp. 1-16. As of this time, respondent Senate has not yet submitted its Compliance.

^[45] Id. at 3-4.

^[46] Id. at 6-7.

^[47] Id. at 9.

^[48] G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[49] Id. at 95.

^[50] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, pp. 1-71.

^[51] Id. at 61.

^[52] Id. at 45-47, 53.

^[53] 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[54] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, pp. 26-27, 31-34.

^[55] August 5, 2025 Resolution, pp. 1-2.

^[56] Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent House of Representatives (Petitioners Torreon et al.) dated August 13, 2025, pp. 1-54.

^[57] Id. at ii, 5.

^[58] Id. at 4.

^[59] Id. at 10.

^[60] Id. at 11.

^[61] Id. at 5.

^[62] Id. at 6.

^[63] Comment (Petitioners Torreon et al.), pp. 33-35.

^[64] Opposition to the Motions to Intervene (with Motion to Expunge Submissions) (Petitioners Torreon et al.) dated August 11, 2025, pp. 1-35.

^[65] Id. at 28-29.

^[66] Consolidated Comment / Opposition Ad Cautelam (Petitioners Torreon et al.) dated August 14, 2025, pp. 1-35.

^[67] Id. at 3, 5, 13, 30-31.

^[68] Supplemental Opposition (Petitioners Torreon et al.) dated August 15, 2025, pp. 1-35.

^[69] Id. at 5.

^[70] Id. at 8.

^[71] Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent House of Representatives (Petitioner Duterte) dated August 18, 2025, pp. 1-28.

^[72] Id. at 6-7.

^[73] Id. at 2.

^[74] Id. at 4.

^[75] Id. at 5.

^[76] Id. at 13.

^[77] Id. at 24-25.

^[78] Id. at 16, 19.

^[79] RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 17 reads:

SECTION 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. - When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.

^[80] See CONST., art. VI, secs. 4 and 7.

^[81] Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 383 (1949) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc].

^[82] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(8) provides:

SECTION 3 - ... (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

^[83] Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023). See Rules of the House of Representatives, Nineteenth Congress, pp. 121-129, available at https://docs.congress.hrep.online/download/docs/hrep.house.rules.adopted.ebook.pdf (last accessed on November 24, 2025).

^[84] Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023), secs. 1-17. (Citation omitted)

^[85] J. Villanueva, Separate Opinion, p. 19.

^[86] Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (2023), Rule II, sec. 2(a) and 2(b) and Rule III.

^[87] The ponencia notes without action the statements made by Senator Rodante Marcoleta and former Senate President Francis Escudero at the floor of the Senate. Senator Marcoleta suggested that even as a member of the House of Representatives during its 19^th Session, he did not receive a copy of the complaint together with its evidence. (See Journal No. 6, Senate, 20^th Congress, First Regular Session (August 6, 2025), p. 12). Former Senate President Escudero alleged that, to his knowledge the endorsement of many of the members of the House of Representatives to the Fourth Impeachment Complaint were in consideration for favorable provisions in the Appropriations Act (See Journal No. 25, Senate, 20^th Congress, First Regular Session (September 29, 2025), pp. 2-7). While serious, it is not within the competence of this Court to consider these disturbing allegations because they were not properly presented in evidence here.

^[88] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 92.

^[89] Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, 660 Phil. 271 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[90] See Compliance (Respondent House of Representatives) dated July 16, 2025, p. 9.

^[91] See J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, pp. 11-16; See also J. Inting, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

^[92] J. Lazaro-Javier, Separate Opinion, p. 7.

^[93] J. Inting, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, p. 3.

^[94] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 61.

^[95] J. Inting, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, pp. 3-4.

^[96] CONST., art. XI, sec. 2 reads:

SECTION 2. - The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

^[97] See J. Vitug, Separate Opinion in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[98] CONST., art. III, sec. 1.

^[99] Flores-Concepcion v. Judge Casta eda, 884 Phil. 66, 92 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[100] Saunar v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 822 Phil. 536, 546 (2017) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].

^[101] See Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

^[102] Fontanilla v. The Commission Proper, COA, 787 Phil. 713, 725-726 (2016) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].

^[103] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(3). A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

^[104] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(8). The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

^[105] Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 41, July 28, 1986.

^[106] J. Panganiban, Separate Concurring Opinion in Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 979 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[107] Id. at 977.

^[108] Id. at 978.

^[109] Ta ada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 574-575 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

^[110] 130 Phil. 415 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[111] Id. at 428-429, 430.

^[112] Saunar v. Executive Secretary Ermita, 822 Phil. 536, 546, 555 (2017) [Per J. Martires, Third Division].

^[113] Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 319 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[114] Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration v. Wenle, 937 Phil. 148, 180 (2023) [Per C.J. Gesmundo, En Banc].

^[115] Motion for Reconsideration (Respondent House of Representatives) dated August 4, 2025, p. 4.

^[116] Id.

^[117] See Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam (Movants-Intervenors Ce dana et al.) dated August 1, 2025, p. 13; Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention (Movants-Intervenors Labiao, Jr. et al.) dated August 8, 2025, pp. 66-70.

^[118] 148 Phil. 443 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[119] 93 Phil. 68 (1953) [Per J. Bautista Angelo, En Banc].

^[120] De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 148 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

^[121] 719 Phil. 137 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[122] Id. at 157.

^[123] Id. at 158.

^[124] Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 621 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[125] 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[126] Id. at 620-621, 624-625.

^[127] Id. at 625.

^[128] Id. at 623.

^[129] 137 Phil. 358 (1969) [Per J. Ruiz Castro, En Banc].

^[130] J. Fernando, Concurring Opinion in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 137 Phil. 358, 370 (1969) [Per J. Ruiz Castro, En Banc].

^[131] Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 625 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[132] 835 Phil. 97 (2018) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[133] Id. at 171.

^[134] 865 Phil. 384 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[135] Id. at 395.

^[136] 719 Phil. 137 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

^[137] Id. at 162.

^[138] 913 Phil. 1020 (2021) [Per J. Carandang, En Banc].

^[139] Id. at 1035.

^[140] 737 Phil. 457 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[141] J. Carpio, Separate Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 658 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].

^[142] G.R. No. 263014, February 25, 2025 [Per J. Inting, En Banc].

^[143] Id.

^[144] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 3. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

^[145] Id.

^[146] Id.

^[147] 660 Phil. 271 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[148] Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc] at 4.

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SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
HERNANDO, J.:

I join the ponencia in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the House of Representatives^[1] (respondent House) concerning the issue on the viability of the fourth impeachment complaint. I reiterate that the fourth impeachment complaint is constitutionally proscribed by the one-year bar rule, albeit based on different reasons. The orchestrated and synchronized actions of respondent House and former Secretary General Reginald S. Velasco (respondent Secretary General Velasco) unveil a clear attempt to circumvent the one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.^[2] Their deliberate and unjustified inaction on the first three impeachment complaints^[3] lodged against petitioner Vice President Sarah Z. Duterte thus amounts to a grave abuse of discretion and constitutes more than a sufficient ground to bar the fourth impeachment complaint.^[4]   
 

The one-year bar rule was violated in principle

Respondent House maintains that the one-year bar rule was never violated, and that based on the records, the referral of the fourth impeachment complaint happened first, while the archiving of the first three impeachment complaints only came afterwards.^[5] It insists that its actions are hinged upon a faithful adherence to the rulings^[6] in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives^[7] and Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice.^[8]

I disagree.

As extensively discussed in my main Separate Concurring Opinion,^[9] the one-year bar rule was put in place to strike a balance between accountability and stability. It is a constitutional limitation installed mainly to protect impeachable officials-like the vice president of the Republic-from harassment, and at the same time, to enable Congress to focus on its principal task of legislation. Thus, whenever interpretation of the rule is necessary, this is the mindset that must be kept.

In the present case, the totality of circumstances reveals without a doubt the intent of the respondent House to sidestep this rule: Consider these: (a) the inclusion of the first three impeachment complaints in respondent House's order of business only on February 5, 2025 despite having been filed as early as December 2024, without any plausible explanation; (b) the admission of respondent Secretary General Velasco in public interviews that certain members of respondent House asked him to withhold action on the first three impeachment complaints; and (c) the refusal of respondent House to immediately refer the first three impeachment complaints to the Speaker of the House, thereby violating its own impeachment rules. Only an impulsive adherence to the rulings in Francisco and Gutierrez, would show that respondent House was able to hurdle every loophole, achieve its purpose of preventing the operation of the one-year bar rule, and push through with the fourth impeachment complaint. However, an in-depth and rigorous review of Francisco and Gutierrez would reveal that the purpose of the one-year bar rule was not attained.

I stress that with the respondent House's machinations, the one-year bar rule was not only corrupted but veered away from its purpose. It was circumvented. A mechanism, crafted to foster balance between stability and accountability, and given life through jurisprudence in order to achieve those ends, was instead handled in a manner comparable to any other procedural hurdle or technicality that must be overcome. As guardians of the Constitution, the Court cannot allow this degradation.

Respondent House treated the one-year bar rule as a mere formality or technicality that it only needs to follow, unconcerned whether the intent behind it is fulfilled or not. It lost sight of the rule's significant purpose, and instead viewed it as a shallow, cursory decree. But this should not be the case. We must remember that the Constitution and its provisions are sacred; it must be distinguished and treated differently from the normal, everyday rules and regulations we encounter.

To emphasize, the one-year bar rule is installed as a mechanism to balance extracting accountability from public officers, and stability of government operations. We can neither court impeachment too much, nor excessively avoid it. Drift too much to one side, and disorder ensues. As one of the three major branches of the government, I would like to think that Our interpretation, application, and obedience to laws-more so, to constitutional provisions-should not stop at mere cursory compliance. A deeper contemplation must be made, anchored to the avowed intent and purpose of every regulation.

Triggering the one-year bar rule and averting the progress of the fourth impeachment complaint on the basis of these circumstances is the only course of action that is fair, just, and faithful to the intended purpose of the relevant constitutional provisions. Otherwise, these great systems-which deserve respect and reverence-will lose their power and will be relegated to but mere nuisances that must be overcome to satisfy one's aims.  
 

The impeachment proceedings and the pending fourth impeachment case before the House and Senate, respectively, of the 19th Congress, cannot crossover to the 20th Congress.

I reiterate my position that the 20^th Congress cannot continue the business of the 19^th Congress.

Having already discussed all the rules, jurisprudence, and statutes relevant to this view, I wish however to emphasize the higher reason for this: the newly elected Congress could not be bound by the acts of the previous Congress. The people exercise government authority through the election of representatives. Binding the succeeding Congress to the acts of the previous one would be tantamount to restricting or even disregarding the will of the people which was expressed anew in the conduct of elections. Casting a vote is the representation of the change or reaffirmation of the people's will.

The foregoing principles should be applied to impeachment proceedings. The reason is that only the House can impeach, and only the Senate can try and decide impeachment cases. There is no reason for impeachment proceedings to be classified differently from the other constitutional powers and duties that only the House and Senate can exercise. Thus, the phrase "all unfinished business" in the last statement, second paragraph of Rule XI, Section 80(a) of the House Rules (pertaining to the end of term of a Congress), as well as the phrase "All pending matters and proceedings" in the second paragraph of Rule 123 of the Senate Rules, shall cover impeachment proceedings and pending impeachment cases, respectively.

However, as before, with due consideration of public accountability, the 20^th Congress is by no means precluded from initiating a fresh impeachment complaint, subject to relevant constitutional limitations, such as the one-year bar rule under Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.  
 

Respondent House should not be allowed to use the doctrine of operative fact as a defense

According to respondent House, it faithfully relied on the rulings in Francisco and Gutierrez; thus, its actions must be sustained on the basis of the doctrine of operative fact:

92. The House acted within the bounds of existing jurisprudence when it acted on the fourth impeachment complaint and transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. However, in its recent pronouncement, the Honorable Court appears to have adopted a substantially different meaning of the term "initiate," thereby holding that even impeachment complaints that have not been endorsed or acted upon by the House, even if compliant within the periods mandated by the Constitution, may nonetheless be considered "initiated" for purposes of applying the [one]-year constitutional proscription on the initiation of impeachment proceedings.

. . . .

94. In view of this sudden doctrinal shift, it is respectfully submitted that respondent House should clearly not be found to have acted with grave abuse of discretion for having faithfully and judiciously adhered to the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution at the time it acted upon the fourth complaint, particularly given that such interpretation was established by no less than the Honorable Court itself.^[10] (Emphasis supplied)

I cannot agree with respondent House's claims. The rulings in Francisco and Gutierrez were never meant to allow the skirting of the one-year bar rule.

Looking back at Francisco, the Court laid down the proper interpretation of the word "initiate" as used in the context of impeachment proceedings:

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.^[11]

Meanwhile, in Gutierrez, the Court discussed the dangers prevented by the Francisco interpretation of the word "initiate":

Contrary to petitioner's emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the singular tense of the word "complaint" to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time...

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.
 
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner's stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the impeachment process.^[12] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Gutierrez, what was sought to be avoided was the possibility of upsetting the entire impeachment mechanism through the triggering of the one-year bar rule, by a sham baseless complaint that was filed hastily. In other words, the Francisco interpretation aims to prevent the "first-to-file" scheme. The rulings were never meant to allow an avenue where the one-year bar rule is to be avoided by unreasonably sitting on an impeachment complaint while contemplating the filing of another one.

Was this also the objective of respondent House behind its actions? I do not think so, for the many reasons already discussed above.

Given this, I cannot accept respondent House's claim that it "acted within the bounds of existing jurisprudence," or that it "faithfully and judiciously adhered to the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution"^[13] when in the same breath, it effectively admitted, through respondent Secretary General Velasco, that it was merely avoiding the one-year bar rule. Respondent Secretary General Velasco's statement in a public interview on January 7, 2025 is illuminating:

Karen Davila: Now the three impeachment complaints are now in your office. And your office has been under pressure to already act on these three complaints. Take us through the process. Upon receiving the three complaints, should you have already reported to the [O]ffice of the Speaker? What made you not to?

Secretary General Velasco: It's really the request of the House [m]embers. There will be complications if I will refer for instance the three impeachment complaints. Because this is one of the rare times where there [is] more than one complaint. So, if I will transmit the three complaints filed so far then that [sic] would be the only complaints that will be studied by the [O]ffice of the [S]peaker for referring to the [C]ommittee on [R]ules, plenary, then from the plenary to the [C]ommittee on [J]ustice. So, the House [m]embers that whatever complaints they will file[,] or they will endorse will be referred to the Speaker at the same time, one package, instead of just referring the first, the second, and the third, and then the fourth will not be referred or transmitted to the [O]ffice of the Speaker.^[14]

Meanwhile, in another public interview on January 20, 2025, respondent Secretary General Velasco made the following statements:

Secretary General Velasco: Ang problem, alam mo na Christmas break, karamihan sa kanila nasa districts nila or nagbabakasyon with the family or loved ones, so wala, kailangan pagbigyan natin sila... Anyway, sila boss ko eh, 'di naman ako 'yong boss.

. . . .

Secretary General Velasco: Well kasi nga, in my case, wala kasing nakalagay na naka specify... Unfortunately, 'yun 'yung rules natin na it's really up to me to decide. Walang time na nakalagay. Unlike Speaker has 10 session days [sic], the Committee on Rules has three session days, Committee on Justice has 60 session days. Sa akin kasi wala eh. So it's my decision.^[15]

Evidently, respondent Secretary General Velasco's answers were vague and avoidant at best. There really was no meaningful response to the question as to why he refused to act on the first three impeachment complaints. What is more surprising is his claim, albeit false, that he is not bound by any period within which to act, when respondent House's own impeachment rules^[16] require him to immediately refer a complaint to the Speaker:

Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. A verified complaint for impeachment by a Member of the House or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof shall be filed with the office of the Secretary General and immediately referred to the Speaker. (Emphasis supplied)

In light of all these findings, it would be unreasonable to allow respondent House to use the doctrine of operative fact as a defense. In Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation,^[17] the doctrine is discussed:

The operative fact doctrine recognizes the existence and validity of a legal provision prior to its being declared as unconstitutional and hence, legitimizes otherwise invalid acts done pursuant thereto because of considerations of practicality and fairness. In this regard, certain acts done pursuant to a legal provision which was just recently declared as unconstitutional by the Court cannot be anymore undone because not only would it be highly impractical to do so, but more so, unfair to those who have relied on the said legal provision prior to the time it was struck down.

. . . .

Therefore, in applying the doctrine of operative fact, courts ought to examine with particularity the effects of the already accomplished acts arising from the unconstitutional statute, and determine, on the basis of equity and fair play, if such effects should be allowed to stand. It should not operate to give any unwarranted advantage to parties, but merely seeks to protect those who, in good faith, relied on the invalid law.^[18] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

As can be seen, this doctrine first and foremost, was borne out of considerations of justice and fair play-qualities both lacking in respondent House's actions. Its invocation requires reliance in good faith on an otherwise invalid law. Here, however, there was neither a genuine reliance nor a faithful adherence; instead, what happened was a narrow legal and technical approach. Thus, it would be unfair to allow respondent House to invoke the doctrine of operative fact as a defense, when there is failure to fully observe-in word and in spirit-the principal case law it relies upon.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the motion for reconsideration.

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^[1] August 4, 2025 Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent House of Representatives through the Office of the Solicitor General (Motion for Reconsideration of the House).

^[2] CONST., art. XI, sec. 3(5) states: "(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

^[3] The first three impeachment complaints are: (1) Verified Complaint for Impeachment endorsed by Representative Percival V. Ce dana and filed on December 2, 2024; (2) Verified Impeachment Complaint endorsed by Representatives France L. Castro, Arlene D. Brosas and Raoul Danniel A. Manuel, and filed on December 4, 2024; and (3) Impeachment Complaint endorsed by Representatives Gabriel Bordado, Jr. and Lex Anthony Cris A. Colada, and filed on December 19, 2024.

^[4] The fourth impeachment complaint refers to the Verified Complaint for Impeachment filed by 215 members, or more than one-third of all the members, of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2025, and endorsed to the Senate during the February 5, 2025 plenary session of the House of Representatives, III Record, House, 19^th Congress, 3^rd Session (February 5, 2025).

^[5] Motion for Reconsideration of the House, pp. 19, 52.

^[6] Motion for Reconsideration of the House, pp. 30-31.

^[7] 460 Phil. 830 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[8] 660 Phil. 271 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[9] J. Hernando, Separate Concurring Opinion in Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 278353 and 278359, July 25, 2025 [Per S.A.J. Leonen, En Banc].

^[10] Motion for Reconsideration of the House, pp. 33-34.

^[11] Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 932-933 (2003) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[12] Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 660 Phil. 271, 393-395 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

^[13] Motion for Reconsideration of the House, pp. 33-34.

^[14] Petition (G.R. No. 278353) p. 10, citing ANC 24/7, Headstart: House Secretary General Velasco on status of impeachment raps vs VP Duterte, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxKiv87iugE (last accessed on August 22, 2025).

^[15] Petition (G.R. No. 278353) pp. 11-13, citing ANC 24/7, WATCH: House Sec. General Reginald Velasco gives updates on impeachment raps vs VP Duterte, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CxzIbKeCyZU (last accessed on August 22, 2025).

^[16] Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House of Representatives (19^th Congress).

^[17] 865 Phil. 384 (2019) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[18] Id. at 394-395.

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