Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari^[1] under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners who are the officers and employees of the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) assailing Decision No. 2022-401^[2] dated January 28, 2022, and Resolution No. 2024-027^[3] dated October 26, 2023, of the Commission on Audit (COA). In the assailed issuances, COA affirmed Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 13-002 (2011)^[4] dated March 18, 2013, which disallowed the payment of Flying Risk Pay (FRP) to CAAP officials and personnel for the year 2011 in the total amount of PHP 323,579.50.

The Antecedents

The FRP payments subject of the present case are additional amounts granted to selected CAAP officials and personnel who take flights to international and/or domestic destinations in connection with their official CAAP functions. These are granted at the discretion of the Administrator-CAAP's chief of office^[5] -as authorized under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776, otherwise known as the "Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines,"^[6] viz.:

SECTION 30. Officials and employees. - Upon recommendation of the Administrator, such officers, assistants and employees as may be necessary for the proper functioning of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be appointed by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry. The Administrator may assign within the limits of available funds officers, assistants, and other personnel for study and training abroad.

All rated and/or licensed airmen and such other authorized personnel of the Civil Aeronautics Board and/or Civil Aeronautics Administration who may be required to undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties, shall at the discretion of the head of the office receive an increase in compensation equivalent to fifty per centum of their respective base pay: Provided, however, That the total flying hours per month shall not be less than four hours.

Whenever the Administrator shall require the personnel of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to work beyond the usual office hours, the employees concerned shall in all cases be entitled to receive, as additional compensation for the overtime work performed, at least twenty-five per centum of their regular salaries. (Emphasis supplied)

Sometime in 2004, the COA disallowed CAAP's FRP payments. However, in Decision No. 2009-125^[7] dated November 18, 2009 (COA Decision No. 2009-125), the COA Proper lifted the disallowance. It underscored that entitlement to FRP is not limited to "rated and/or licensed airmen,"^[8] but shall also extend to "such other authorized [CAAP] personnel."^[9]

The payments questioned in the instant case were granted on January 17, 2011, through Board Resolution No. 2011-007,^[10] Series of 2011. This authorized the CAAP Director General (DG) to grant FRP/flying pay to qualified personnel who have rendered at least four hours of flight per month at the rate of 50% of their basic monthly salary.^[11]

Consequently, Col. Ramon S. Gutierrez, then DG of CAAP, issued Authority Order (AO) No. 320-11^[12] dated November 2, 2011, granting the payment of FRP to the CAAP officials and personnel occupying different positions:^[13]

Considering the nature of their job, the Chief of Staff (Corporate Executive Officer V-SG 27) and the Head Executive Assistant (Corporate Executive Officer IV-SG 26) shall be entitled to monthly flying pay with the minimum required hours of four (4) and six (6), respectively. Also, by virtue of their position and rank (Assistant Director General II-SG 27), the Chiefs of non-technical CAAP Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Enforcement and Legal Service (ELS), and the Administrative and Finance Service, shall also be entitled to flying pay after completing the minimum six (6) hours requirement.

Other personnel who are on official travel, except for training or participation in conference, symposium and the like, may be entitled to flying pay provided that the claims shall not exceed six (6) times a year and the following are complied with:

1. Approval of the Director General of the request for the entitlement with a clear showing of the minimum numbers of flying time hours in one calendar month;
2. Endorsement for the entitlement from the respective Service Head and certification on the availability of funds from the Finance Department;
3. Submission of Travel Order and Travel Report.^[14]

In line with AO No. 320-11, the CAAP paid FRP to the following employees on account of their travel:

On post-audit, the FRP payments to the above-enumerated CAAP officials and personnel, with a total amount of PHP 323,579.50, were tagged as irregular expenditures in ND No. 13-002 (2011) dated March 18, 2013, based on the following grounds:

1.	The payment of FRP is not in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 and Section 315 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) Volume 1; and
2.	The positions held by the recipients are not included in the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)-approved Corporate Operating Budget (COB) for 2011, which specified the positions allowed to be granted the FRP.[16]

The above-enumerated officials and personnel as payees, and the following persons, as approving and/or certifying officers, were determined to be liable for the disallowance:

On August 8, 2013, petitioners Concordia S. Pagkaliwangan, Jocelyn L. Ching, Fe L. Evangelista, Elvira O. Sieja, Regino V. Hofile a, Rosario V. Nalugon, Raul P. Eusebio, Edgardo L. Costes, Raul G. Glorioso, Alex B. Balde, Nephtali G. Velasco, and Deogracias A. Pulmano, Jr., (hereinafter collectively referred to as petitioners) appealed ND No. 13-002 (2011) before the COA-Corporate Government Sector (CGS) Cluster IV.^[18]

The Ruling of the COA-CGS Cluster IV

In CGS-Cluster 4 Decision No. 2016-03^[19] dated March 4, 2016, the COA-CGS Cluster IV denied the Appeal and affirmed the disallowance, to wit:

In the present case, CAAP clearly committed excessive expenditures when they paid the flying pay as it was unreasonable to grant it on top of its personnel's salaries, per diem and other regular allowances when they go on official travels.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant Appeals are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the solidary liability of the Appellants under the Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 13-002 (2011) dated March 8, 2013 in the amount of [PHP] 323,579.50 is hereby AFFIRMED.^[20]

The COA-CGS Cluster IV ruled that Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 means that only those whose functions are essentially related to the performance of aerial flights are entitled to the FRP.^[21] Thus, the AO granting FRP to CAAP personnel other than those whose functions are related to performance of aerial flight was issued beyond the ambit of Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776.^[22]

Petitioners received the decision through the CAAP on March 10, 2016. Thereafter, petitioners Pagkaliwangan et al. and Balde et al. filed separate Petitions for Review on April 13, 2016, and April 11, 2016, respectively.

The Ruling of the COA Proper

On January 28, 2022, the COA issued the assailed Decision denying the Petition for Review and affirming ND No. 13-002 (2011).

The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review of Ms. Concordia S. Pagkaliwangan et al. and Mr. Alex B. Balde et al., all of the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) are DENIED. Accordingly, Commission on Audit Corporate Government Sector-Cluster 4 Decision No. 2016-03 dated March 4, 2016 and Notice of Disallowance No. 13-002 (2011) dated March 18, 2013, on the payment of Hazard Pay/Flying Risk Pay to the CAAP officials and employees for the calendar year 2011, in the total amount of [PHP] 323,579.50, are AFFIRMED. The approving and certifying officers are solidarily liable for the total disallowance which shall be reduced by the refunds made by the payees who are liable to return the amounts they actually received.^[23] (Emphasis omitted)

The COA Proper explained as follows:

First, the payment of the FRP contravenes Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 and Section 315(c) of the GAAM Volume 1, both of which provide that FRP recipients must be those whose functions are related to aerial and flight missions. In this case, the COA Proper found that the FRP was granted to petitioners whose functions and responsibilities merely involve administrative and financial matters, which ordinary duties are not related to aircraft operations and aerial missions. The petitioners were granted FRP for having attended "conferences and seminars, airport inspections, public hearings, pre-bid conferences, and the like."^[24]

Second, petitioners' reliance on COA Decision No. 2009-125 is misplaced. In that Decision, the payees were qualified to receive the FRP because their accumulated flight time was related to aircraft operations and flight missions, unlike the petitioners' accumulated flight time which was incurred on activities related to administrative and financial matters only.^[25]

Third, the payees are liable to return the amounts they actually received, applying the principles of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti.^[26]

On March 20, 2023, petitioners seasonably filed their Motion for Reconsideration,^[27] which the COA denied in COA Resolution No. 2024-027^[28] dated October 26, 2023, for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed the present action.

The Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners maintain that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ND No. 13-002 (2011). They allege that the flying pay under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 and the FRP under Section 315(c) of GAAM Volume 1 pertain to two completely different sets of recipients, such that the GAAM cannot be interpreted to limit the application of Republic Act No. 776.^[29] Thus, "other authorized personnel of the Civil Aeronautics Board and/or Civil Aeronautics Administration who may be required to undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties" may be granted flying pay at the discretion of the head of the office, regardless of whether their functions or responsibilities are related to aerial and flight missions.^[30]

Moreover, petitioners argue the application of COA Decision No. 2009-125 to the present case.^[31] In COA Decision No. 2009-125, flying pay were granted to lawyers and/or administrative personnel whose work are not directly related to aerial and flight missions, but were necessarily performed in relation to the strengthening of the operations of different Air Transportation Office (ATO) satellites. By analogy, the petitioners, although administrative personnel, reasoned that they are likewise entitled to flying pay in performing their functions in relation to strengthening the operations of the CAAP.^[32]

Finally, citing the case of Madera v. Commission on Audit,^[33] petitioners insist that the CAAP officials and personnel received the disallowed benefits in good faith, and should not be made liable to refund the same.^[34]

To be sure, petitioners submit the foregoing allegations in support of its prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.

In the Resolution^[35] dated April 3, 2024, the Court required respondent COA to file its comment on the Petition and prayer for TRO and/or WPI.

The Respondent COA's Arguments

In its Comment,^[36] respondent COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contends that in both Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 and Section 315(c) of the GAAM Volume 1, the grant of FRP is predicated on aerial and flight missions, which necessarily require the performance of duties inherent in aircraft operations.^[37] Because the duties of petitioners herein are limited to administrative and financial matters, they are not entitled to FRP.^[38]

The COA further contends that, contrary to petitioners' argument, the COA Decision No. 2009-125 is inapplicable in the instant case. COA maintains that the payees therein were given FRP because their duties were related to aircraft operations and flight missions, unlike petitioners who merely performed administrative and financial duties excluded from aircraft operations and/or aerial missions.^[39]

In addition, respondent COA argues that petitioners cannot claim good faith to exempt them from the liability to refund the disallowed amounts they received.^[40]

Finally, in response to petitioners' prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or WPI, respondent COA avers that petitioners failed to establish their clear and unmistakable right to the grant of FRP; neither did they substantiate the urgency or necessity of the issuance of the reliefs prayed for.^[41]

Petitioners filed a Reply^[42] on August 12, 2024, reiterating the same arguments laid down in their Petition.

The Issues

The central issue in this case is whether the COA Proper acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming ND No. 13-002 (2011). The resolution of the issue turns upon the following questions:

1.	Are the FRP payments in question sanctioned by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776?
2.	If the FRP payments in question are disallowed, are the certifying and approving officers, as well as the recipient-payees thereof liable to return the disallowed amount?

The Ruling of the Court

The Petition is without merit.

The COA Proper's disallowance of the FRP payments was proper for being contrary to the conditions set under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776, Section 315(c) of the GAAM, and the DBM's approved COB for 2011.

The second paragraph of Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 reads:

All rated and/or licensed airmen and such other authorized personnel of the Civil Aeronautics Board and/or Civil Aeronautics Administration who may be required to undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties, shall at the discretion of the head of the office receive an increase in compensation equivalent to fifty per centum of their respective base pay: Provided, however, That the total flying hours per month shall not be less than four hours. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the law limits the FRP to the following group of persons:

1. all rated and/or licensed airmen; and
2. such other authorized personnel who may be required to undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties.

Section 3(l) of the same law comprehensively and extensively defines an "airman" as follows:

SECTION 3. Words and phrases defined -

(l) "Airman" means any individual who engages, as the person in command or as pilot, mechanic, flight radio operator or member of the crew, in the navigation of aircraft while under way; and any individual who is directly in charge of inspection, maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engine, propellers, or appliances; and any individual who serves in the capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control operator.

Notably, the enumerated positions involve functions that are inherently connected to aircraft operation and navigation, none of which pertains to the CAAP officials and personnel who received the FRP payments in question.

Anent the second group, petitioners argue that any "authorized personnel of the Civil Aeronautics Board and/or Civil Aeronautics Administration" may be granted flying pay at the discretion of the head of the office, irrespective of whether their functions involve aerial and flight missions.^[43] To bolster their position, petitioners invoke COA Decision No. 2009-125, where flying pay had been previously granted to lawyers and administrative personnel whose work did not directly relate to aerial and flight missions.

The Court is not persuaded.

To determine who constitute "such other authorized personnel" entitled to FRP under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776, the critical statutory condition is that the personnel must be required to "undertake or perform regular and frequent aerial flights in connection with their duties." The law itself imposes a functional limitation, grounded not on the designation by or discretion of the agency head, but on the nature of the duties performed and their connection to aerial operations.

Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "undertake" as "to take on an obligation or task"^[44] or "to make oneself responsible for (a person, fact, or the like)."^[45] In turn, to "perform" means "to carry out or bring about"^[46] or "to make available or do in line of duty."^[47] These definitions reinforce that the law expressly refers to actual execution of duties which, by their nature, necessitate "regular and frequent aerial flights." Had the legislative intent been to allow any personnel designated as "authorized" by the CAAP, regardless of function or responsibility, the Congress could have clearly and unequivocally so provided. The absence of such language precludes the expansive interpretation urged by the petitioners. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Nevertheless, applying the maxim noscitur a sociis, any ambiguity in the phrase "such other authorized personnel" must be reviewed by reference to the preceding term "airmen." Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.^[48] As used in Republic Act No. 776, "airmen" refers to individuals engaged in aeronautical activities, whose functions are inherently connected with aircraft operation, inspection and navigation. Thus, the phrase "such other authorized personnel" necessarily pertains to those who perform duties akin to or sharing the character of those executed by "airmen," i.e., technical and operational in nature, involving exposure to risks peculiar to flight.

The particular words, clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions; rather, the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole.^[49] As emphasized by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776, when read in its entirety, contemplates individuals whose regular duties entail a technical or operational responsibility that exposes them to the risks of flight or involves control over flight safety. Consequently, the statutory text cannot be extended to cover administrative personnel who merely undertake air travel for meetings, conferences, or inspections.

Moreover, GAAM Volume 1 reinforces this limitation through Section 315(c), which provides:

Section 315. Duty hazards. - Duty hazard pay may be granted to personnel in these cases:

. . . .

(c) Flying risk pay - the payment of additional compensation not exceeding 50% of their monthly base pay of 1980 rate shall be restricted to those airmen performing duties inherent in the operation of the aircraft while in flight and such other airmen as may be required to fly with the aircraft, excluding passengers as such, when it performs its assigned mission. The duties of the airmen assigned to flying status must involve frequent and regular participation in aerial flights of not less than four (4) hours per month. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 315(c) of the GAAM Volume 1 thus underscores that FRP is strictly limited to personnel whose duties inherently involve active participation in aircraft operations. Other personnel who travel as mere passengers are explicitly excluded from this category.

Additionally, as astutely observed by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, a survey of statutes and other issuances granting flying pay similar to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 reveals a consistent legislative and administrative intent: flying pay is granted as a form of hazard pay in recognition of the risk to which "airmen" and other personnel directly involved in aircraft operation and navigation are exposed due to regular and frequent flight missions. These laws and issuances are as follows: 

Applying the foregoing construction to the present case, it is undisputed that the CAAP officials and personnel who received the FRP payments occupied positions involving managerial, administrative, and financial functions that bear no relation to the participation in, supervision of, or direct involvement in aircraft operations. While it is true that their duties occasionally require travel, these are purely incidental to the discharge of their administrative responsibilities. Records show that their travels consisted of attending international conferences and meetings, inspecting airports and facilities, verifying legal cases, and overseeing projects and ceremonies in various domestic and foreign locations. While these were unquestionably legitimate and work-related, they did not entail performing duties in connection with "regular and frequent aerial flights" as contemplated under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 that would justify the payment of FRP. On the contrary, the CAAP officials and personnel boarded the aircraft solely as passengers to reach the venues of their official engagements.

Equally significant is the fact that the positions of the subject payees are not among those authorized by the DBM in CAAP's COB for 2011. The approved COB expressly enumerates the positions eligible for FRP which are confined to personnel directly engaged in aircraft operations, such as those under the Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board, Flight Inspection and Calibration Group, Flight Standards Inspectorate Service, Airworthiness Department, Flight Operations Department, Licensing and Certification Department, Airmen Examination Board, Office of the Flight Surgeon, and Air Traffic Service.^[53] The deliberate inclusion of these positions and exclusion of purely administrative and managerial offices demonstrates DBM's clear intent to restrict FRP payments only to officials and personnel whose regular functions expose them to flight-related hazards. As correctly pointed out by COA, petitioners' positions do not appear in the DBM-approved roster of FRP-eligible posts.^[54]

As such, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the COA Proper when it affirmed the disallowance of FRP payments which lack legal basis and constitute an unauthorized disbursement of public funds. Verily, the grant of FRP to the CAAP officials and personnel whose duties are administrative in nature and who traveled only as passengers is contrary to Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776, Section 315(c) of the GAAM Volume 1, and the DBM' approved COB for 2011.

The affirmation of the COA Proper's disallowance of the FRP payments, however, does not automatically cast liability upon the approving and certifying officers to return the disallowed amounts.

In determining the civil liability of approving/authorizing/certifying officers for disallowances issued by the COA, the Court's ruling in Madera is instructive:

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court pronounces:

1.	If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.
2.	If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
	a.	Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
	b.	Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarily liable to return only the net disallowed amount which, as discussed herein, excludes amounts excused under the following sections 2c and 2d.
	c.	Recipients - whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients - are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively received by them, unless they are able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.
	d.	The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other [bona fide] exceptions as it may determine on a [case-to-case] basis.[55]

As explained in Madera, the assessment of the presumptions of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions and proof thereof will be done by the Court on a case-to-case basis. Additionally, the Court adopts the following badges for the determination of whether an approving or certifying officer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family:

For one to be absolved of liability the following requisites [may be considered]: (1) Certificates of Availability of Funds pursuant to Section 40 of the Administrative Code, (2) In-house or Department of Justice legal opinion, (3) that there is no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence, (4) that it is traditionally practiced within the agency and no prior disallowance has been issued, [or] (5) with regard the question of law, that there is a reasonable textual interpretation on its legality.^[56] (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, badges (3) and (5) apply.

First, when the FRP was granted in 2011 under Board Resolution No. 2011-007 and AO No. 320-11, jurisprudence was bereft of cases squarely interpreting Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776. At that point, the prevailing administrative guidance was found in COA Decision No. 2009-125 dated November 18, 2009, which lifted a prior disallowance of similar FRP payments. The approving and certifying officers of CAAP thus cannot be faulted for relying on the aforementioned COA Decision. As the constitutionally-mandated auditing institution, COA's pronouncements carry a persuasive and controlling weight in matters of public expenditure. COA Decision No. 2009-125, therefore, supplied a colorable legal basis for granting the FRP at the time.

Second, Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776 is susceptible of differing interpretations, as demonstrated by the COA in COA Decision No. 2009-125. In that ruling, the COA construed the terms "airmen" and "such other authorized personnel" as referring to two different classes of individuals. The COA reasoned that limiting the phrase "such other authorized personnel" to those similar to "airmen" would render the statutory text redundant and superfluous.^[57] COA's interpretation, although later rejected by the Court, represented at the time a plausible textual reading of Section 30.

In view of the foregoing, the approving and certifying officers in this case acted in good faith. They relied on a then-prevailing interpretation issued by the COA itself, an agency with recognized technical expertise in government accounting and auditing matters. In the absence of any judicial pronouncement disallowing FRP payments to personnel performing administrative duties at the time, their reliance on COA's construction was reasonable, "it is unfair to penalize public officials based on overly stretched and strained interpretations of rules which were not that readily capable of being understood at the time such functionaries acted in good faith."^[58] They should not be held liable for an act performed under a then-existing administrative construction of the law that had yet to be overturned.

Conversely, the recipient-payees are required to return the amounts they received. As declared in Madera, payees shall be liable to return the disallowed amount, regardless of good faith or the passive nature of their receipt thereof, in accordance with the principle of unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti. They may be excused from this obligation only when (1) they are able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of the services rendered (Rule 2c of Madera), or (2) the Court excuses them based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, or the bona fide exceptions as will be determined on a case-to-case basis (rule 2d of Madera).^[59] As later clarified in Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit,^[60] a payee may benefit from exception under Rule 2c of Madera only when the following conditions concur: (a) if the personnel incentive or benefit has proper basis in law but is only disallowed due to irregularities that are merely procedural in nature; and (b) the personnel incentive or benefit must have a clear, direct, and reasonable connection to the actual performance of the payee recipient's official work and functions for which the benefit or incentive was intended as further compensation.^[61]

None of these circumstances obtain in the present case. The payees cannot invoke that the FRP was received "in consideration of services rendered." The disallowance was not a mere procedural irregularity-the payees were not entitled to FRP precisely because their positions did not involve the performance of aerial flight duties as contemplated under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 776. The absence of legal entitlement negates any claim that the amount received was legitimately earned. In the absence of bona fide exceptions manifest on the record, the Court shall remain stringent in appreciating the defense of good faith when determining a payee's liability over disallowed expenses.^[62]

All told, the COA properly disallowed the excessive and unlawful payment of FRP to CAAP officials and personnel in the amount of PHP 323,579.50. The disallowance itself is proper, as the payments lacked statutory basis and were granted to individuals who were not legally entitled thereto. However, the COA erred in holding the approving and certifying officers solidarily liable for the disallowed amount. The records clearly show that these officers relied in good faith on COA Decision No. 2009-125, the prevailing administrative interpretation at the time, which provided a reasonable legal basis for the grant of FRP. Absent any showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the approving and certifying officers should be absolved from liability.

Finally, the Court acknowledges the use of the terms airman and airmen when quoting the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 776, in fidelity to the language of the law as presently written. On the same note, the Court emphasizes that the use of gender-fair language is essential to ensure inclusivity and to reflect the equal dignity and participation of all persons in the aviation sector. Accordingly, the Court respectfully urges Congress to revisit Republic Act No. 776 and consider adopting gender-sensitive and gender-fair language terminology in its provisions.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision No. 2022-401 dated January 28, 2022, and the Resolution No. 2024-027 dated October 26, 2023, of the Commission on Audit are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the approving and certifying officers of the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines are ABSOLVED from the solidary liability to return the net disallowed amount.

Meanwhile, the recipients of the flying risk pay in the total amount of PHP 323,579.50 REMAIN individually liable for the return of the disallowed amounts they respectively received.

Let copies of this Decision be FURNISHED to the Congress of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., Singh, and Villanueva, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., see concurring.

^[2] Id. at 30-39. Signed by Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo and Commissioners Roland C. Pondoc and Mario G. Lipana, as attested by Commission Secretary and Director IV Bresilo R. Sabaldan of the Commission on Audit, Quezon City.

^[3] Id. at 44. Signed by Commission Secretary Joel S. Estolatan of the Office of the Secretariat, Commission Proper, Commission on Audit, Quezon City.

^[4] Id. at 40-43. Signed by Audit Team Leader - Teams 1 and 3 and Concurrent OIC-Supervising Auditor Gina Maria P. Molina.

^[5] SECTION 25. Organization of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. - The Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be under the administrative supervision and control of the Department of Commerce and Industry. The Civil Aeronautics Administration shall have one chief and one deputy chief who shall be known as "Administrator" and "Deputy Administrator," respectively.

^[6] "An Act to Reorganize the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, to Provide for the Regulation of Civil Aeronautics in the Philippines and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds Therefor, approved on June 20, 1952.

^[7] Rollo, pp. 101-105. Signed by Chairperson Reynaldo A. Villar and Commissioner Juanito G. Espino, Jr., as attested by Commission Secretariat, Director IV Fortunata M. Rubico of the Commission on Audit, Quezon City.

^[8] The Court uses the term "airman" or "airmen" when citing the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 776 in order to remain faithful to the statutory language. Nonetheless, gender-sensitive terminology is observed throughout this Decision where direct textual citation is not involved.

^[9] Rollo, p. 83.

^[10] Id. at 86-87.

^[11] Id. at 87.

^[12] Id. at 82.

^[13] Id. at 31.

^[14] Id. at 82.

^[15] Id. at 31-33.

^[16] Id. at 41.

^[17] Id. at 69-70.

^[18] Id. at 67.

^[19] Id. at 90-100. Signed by Director IV Leila S. Paras.

^[20] Id. at 99.

^[21] Id. at 98.

^[22] Id. at 99.

^[23] Id. at 37.

^[24] Id. at 34-35.

^[25] Id. at 35.

^[26] Id. at 36.

^[27] Id. 45-64.

^[28] Id. at 44.

^[29] Id. at 9-10.

^[30] Id. at 10-11.

^[31] Id.

^[32] Id. at 16.

^[33] 882 Phil. 744 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[34] Id. at 786; rollo, p. 16.

^[35] Rollo, pp. 106-107.

^[36] Id. at 126-141.

^[37] Id. at 130. (Emphasis supplied)

^[38] Id.

^[39] Id. at 132.

^[40] Id. at 134.

^[41] Id. at 134-135.

^[42] Id. at 155-167.

^[43] Id. at 11.

^[44] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1837 (11^th ED., 2019).

^[45] Id.

^[46] WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1678 (1993).

^[47] Id.

^[48] Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 200 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

^[49] Id.

^[50] Fixing the Allowances of the flight Personnel of the Philippine Army Air Force, Restoring the Longevity Pay for the Philippine Army, and for Other Purposes.

^[51] An Act to Increase the Compensation of Flight Officers and Enlisted Men of the Air Corps of the Philippine Army.

^[52] Granting Flying Pay to Officers of the Philippine Navy Who are Engaged in Regular and Frequent Aerial Flights and Whose Duties are Inherent in the Operation of the Aircraft While in Flight.

^[53] Rollo, pp. 74-76.

^[54] Id. at 33.

^[55] Madera v. Commission or Audit, 882 Phil. 744, 817-818 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].

^[56] Id. at 797-798.

^[57] Rollo, p. 103.

^[58] Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Commission on Audit, 797 Phil. 117, 142 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

^[59] Philippine Health Insurance Corp. v. Commission on Audit, 930 Phil. 323, 343 (2022) [Per J. Inting, En Banc].

^[60] 890 Phil. 413 (2020) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

^[61] Id. at 430.

^[62] National Transmission Corp. v. Commission on on Audit, 891 Phil. 107, 122 (2020) [Per J. Inting, En Banc].