EN BANC
[ A.M. No. MTJ-24-031 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 20-3126-MTJ), April 08, 2026 ]
EMELIE DELGADO-ARANAS v. GINO JOVITO C. ARANAS +
EMELIE DELGADO-ARANAS, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. GINO JOVITO C. ARANAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, KABASALAN-SIAY-PAYAO, ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is a Verified Complaint[1] dated August 27, 2020, filed by complainant Emelie Delgado-Aranas (Emelie) against respondent Judge Gino Jovito C. Aranas (Judge Aranas), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Kabasalan-Siay-Payao, Zamboanga Sibugay for gross immorality, gross misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Antecedents
On November 17, 2020, Emelie filed the instant complaint against her husband, Judge Aranas. Therein, she averred that on the morning of February 20, 2020, her close friend disclosed to her the extramarital affair of her husband with a certain Kristine Rio M. Esteban (Kristine). From the illicit relationship, a boy named Gino Jovito Esteban Aranas, Jr. was born on February 3, 2020. Judge Aranas acknowledged the child as his son by affixing his signature to the child's birth certificate. The friend further informed Emelie that Judge Aranas and Kristine started their relationship some six years ago and established their love nest in Barangay Tuburan, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Sibugay.[2]
At first, Emelie shrugged off the information she received considering that her husband was medically diagnosed to be suffering from low sperm count. However, feeling confused and disturbed, Emelie confronted Judge Aranas. The latter admitted his illicit relationship with Kristine and the birth of his son with her. Judge Aranas, however, quickly apologized for his mistake. Emelie was depressed and could not believe that her husband could betray her when they had been together for almost 22 years.[3]
During their marriage and prior to her discovery of her husband's betrayal, Emelie played a wife-slave role. Despite the couple's physical impossibility to conceive a child, Emelie did not lose hope and even considered domestic adoption. Even after finding out about her husband's infidelity, Emelie still hoped and believed that they could build a happy family together and thought of options to conceive such as in vitro fertilization and surrogacy. However, her husband changed. Judge Aranas became judgmental, suspicious, and argumentative.[4]
The spouses sought advice from Emelie's uncle, retired Judge Rodolfo Vapor (Judge Vapor), on March 15, 2020 in the latter's residence in Ozamis City. During their meeting, Judge Aranas confessed to Judge Vapor his illicit relationship with Kristine.[5]
Emelie later learned that Judge Aranas bought a parcel of land worth PHP 600,000.00 and paid for it from their joint account in Metrobank without her knowledge and consent. Worse, Judge Aranas registered the land under the name of his son. The Deed of Sale even contains the phrases, "by his father, GINO JOVITO C. ARANAS," and "by his mother, KRISTINE RIO M. ESTEBAN."[6]
To add insult to injury, Judge Aranas boasted to his and Emelie's friends and family the fact of his illicit relationship with Kristine and the existence of their son. Judge Aranas even shared this fact with the whole world through social media. This only shows that Judge Aranas was proud of what he had done and felt no remorse for it.[7]
On April 10, 2020, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Judge Aranas fired his handgun inside their house and threatened to kill anyone who was against his relationship with Kristine.[8]
On June 29, 2020, Judge Aranas left their family home without a word. He abandoned Emelie and since then Judge Aranas did not contact her and completely cut her off from his life.[9] Emelie, thus, averred that Judge Aranas's actions were in direct violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics, as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He also violated the Lawyer's Oath for being unlawful and immoral.[10]
On November 24, 2020, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a 1st Indorsement[11] requiring Judge Aranas to file his comment to the complaint filed by Emelie.
Judge Aranas, in compliance thereto, filed his Comment[12] dated February 19, 2021. He admitted being the legal husband of Emelie, having a child named Gino Jovito Esteban Aranas, Jr. as a result of his one-time fling with Kristine, seeking advice from retired Judge Vapor, purchasing a lot for his child, and leaving the family home. Judge Aranas, however, denied cohabiting with Kristine. He explained that after leaving their family home, he lived alone in an unused stockroom at the back of the municipal hall. He further insisted that he and Kristine did not have an amorous relationship.[13]
Judge Aranas narrated that he met Kristine sometime in March 2019 while having his usual dinner at the Tribu Grill in Buug, Zamboanga Sibugay. Their paths crossed again in April 2019 at the same restaurant. Kristine and her friend were seated near the table of Judge Aranas. At that time, Judge Aranas was suffering from amoebiasis. Kristine challenged him to drink beer, saying that it would kill the bacteria. Judge Aranas acceded and ended up drinking two bottles of beer. He then got tipsy and invited Kristine to accompany him to the drugstore where he could buy medicine for his amoebiasis. Kristine agreed and while they were seated inside Judge Aranas's truck, Judge Aranas held her hand. Kristine did not resist. Then something happened between the two of them in a secluded area inside the truck.[14]
After the incident, Judge Aranas and Kristine went back to the Tribu Grill and went on his way home to Pagadian City. It was the last occasion that he saw Kristine but they exchanged their mobile numbers.[15]
Sometime in May 2019, Kristine called Judge Aranas and informed him that she was pregnant with his child. Frightened, Judge Aranas asked someone to check if Kristine had a boyfriend between March and April 2019, but it turned out he was her only sexual partner in April 2019. He only saw Kristine when she was about to give birth. He, therefore, had no choice but to support Kristine and their son who was born on February 3, 2020, at the Aisah Medical Hospital.[16]
Judge Aranas was just waiting for the right time to inform his wife of his predicament when an alleged friend of his wife spilled the bean about his one-time affair. He, however, planned to take his child to his home to strengthen his relationship with Emelie. They then consulted retired Judge Vapor together with Emelie's sister on this matter, but Emelie did not accept his plan of bringing the child into their home.[17]
One or two days after his wife learned of his predicament, Judge Aranas recalled that Emelie told her that since he has a child, he can do anything good for the child. So, he purchased a lot and named it under his son relying on the generosity of his wife. However, Emelie's generosity proved to be a mere semblance. Judge Aranas learned later that his wife transferred all the funds maintained in their five different banks to her sole account.[18]
Months later, Emelie told Judge Aranas that she would sell their house and lot to her three sisters. Despite being against the proposal, Judge Aranas was made to prepare deeds of absolute sale conveying their house and lot to Emelie's three sisters and sign the same. This explains why he now lives in an unused stockroom.[19]
While Judge Aranas admitted leaving the family home, he did not actually abandon Emelie. He explained that the treatment he received from Emelie and her sisters left him no other choice. Simply, he was booted out of the house. Notwithstanding, he continued hoping and praying that one day everything would be the same as before.[20]
Judge Aranas also denied posting pictures of him and his son and/or Kristine through social media. He explained that the Facebook accounts and posts do not belong to him. While he admitted that he was the man shown in the picture of a child and a man, such picture was posted by Kristine in her account and in an account she made for their child. He also averred that the postings made by Kristine were without his consent and even became the subject of their intense quarrel over the phone.[21]
Judge Aranas also belied Emelie's claim that she considered adoption stating that Emelie rejected domestic adoption as "she could not take someone unrelated to her grow wayward, who might just push her from the top of the stairs just to inherit what they would be leaving."[22]
On the alleged firing of his handgun, Judge Aranas explained that what Emilie heard was not from inside their house, but from the back of their walled compound, somewhere in the neighboring apartment occupied by several people and families. He expounded that the sound may have even come from a wooden improvised firearm, but not his handgun.[23]
To contradict the allegations of Judge Aranas in his Comment, Emelie filed a Reply[24] dated April 26, 2021. Emelie insisted that Judge Aranas's illicit affair with Kristine was not a one-time fling and started in 2014. Even if the alleged "fleeting and one-time sexual fling" is true, it already amounts to immorality.[25]
Emelie stressed that the appropriation of PHP 600,000.00, her hard-earned money, for the benefit of a third party (Kristine and their son), without her consent and through the manipulation of Judge Aranas and Kristine is considered a form of willful, flagrant, and intentional swindling.[26] Finally, Emelie asserted that Judge Aranas deliberately and voluntarily abandoned her, along with his responsibilities as her husband.[27]
On January 31, 2024, the Office of the Executive Director of the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) [now Judicial Integrity Office], through acting executive director Eduardo C. Tolentino (Atty. Tolentino), served a letter[28] to Judge Aranas requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Philippine Bar for violation of Canon II, Section 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA).
In compliance, Judge Aranas filed his Supplemental Comment[29] dated February 12, 2024 wherein he adopted in toto his Verified Comment dated February 19, 2021. He also added that the sale of their family home to Emelie's three siblings demonstrates Emelie's unwavering determination to shoo him away from their conjugal abode and to strip him of everything that is left of him.[30]
On March 6, 2024, Emelie filed her Reply[31] to Judge Aranas's Supplemental Comment. She averred that Judge Aranas's allegation that he now leads a life of being alone is only for a show, as he and his mistress still publicized their life together with their love child on social media.[32]
Report and Recommendation of Atty. Tolentino
In his Report, Atty. Tolentino recommended that Judge Aranas be administratively held liable for gross immorality and prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service. He should likewise be sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Atty. Tolentino explained that despite a subsisting marriage, Judge Aranas chose to have an affair and have a child out of wedlock. His excuse that it was only a one-time sexual fling does not alter the gravity of his infraction. By engaging in an extramarital affair and having a child with someone not his wife is a violation of the trust reposed on his office and failed to strictly live up to the standards of morality. Furthermore, such infraction tarnishes the image and integrity of the Judiciary.[33]
As a member of the Bar, his infidelity is a violation of Canon II, Sections 1 and 2(2) of the CPRA.[34] Atty. Tolentino, thus, submitted the following recommendations:
- [R]espondent Judge Gino Jovito C. Aranas, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabasalan-Siay-Payao, Zamboanga Sibugay be found GUILTY of gross immorality and prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service and accordingly DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including any government-owned or -controlled corporation;
- [T]he instant matter be TREATED as a complaint against respondent Judge as a member of the Philippine Bar; and
- [R]espondent Judge Aranas be found GUILTY of violation of Canon II, Sections 1 and 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability and accordingly DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective immediately upon receipt of the Supreme Court's decision or resolution.[35]
Report of the JIB
In its Report[36] dated July 30, 2024, the JIB affirmed Atty. Tolentino's recommendation with modification in that Judge Aranas should be held guilty of gross immorality and violation of Canon II, Sections 1 and 2 of the CPRA, but not conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. The JIB agreed with the recommendation of Atty. Tolentino that Judge Aranas should be dismissed from the service and be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.[37]
The Issue
Whether Judge Aranas should be held administratively liable for the administrative offenses charged against him as a judge and as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The Ruling of the Court
At the very outset, during the pendency of this case, A.M. No. 25-04-04-SC,[38] otherwise known as The Code of Judicial Conduct and Accountability, (CJCA) took into effect. Section 1 of the General Provisions of the CJCA specifically states that the CJCA shall be applied to all pending and future cases. Thus, the Court will be guided by the pertinent provisions of the CJCA in resolving this case.
Judge Aranas is administratively liable for gross immorality |
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of judges and justices under the Rules of Court. Canon IV (Propriety), Sections 1 and 2 of the CJCA cover propriety, overall conduct of a judge and conformity to the highest ethical standards. It requires all judges to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. It obliges judges to refrain from committing any act, in or out of court, that may cause dishonor to, or reasonably tend to tarnish the image and dignity of the judicial office. Simply put, it requires judges to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities.
Immorality includes not only sexual matters, but also "conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare."[39] Despite this broad scope, jurisprudence on gross immorality often involves a judicial personnel having an illicit affair or cohabiting with a person other than his or her spouse.[40]
In this case, it is established that Judge Aranas had an illicit sexual relationship with Kristine, who is not his wife. Such an illicit relationship even bore him a son. To recall, Judge Aranas admits that he had a one-time sexual fling with Kristine. He also admitted to having a child with Kristine. The birth certificate of the child with Judge Aranas written and signed as the father is a testament of the child born out of an illicit relationship. He even admitted to giving a parcel of land to his child with Kristine. These facts render him administratively liable for gross immorality.
While Judge Aranas raised an excuse that it was only a one-time sexual fling, the frequency or infrequency of such an immoral act is irrelevant. Otherwise stated, having an affair with someone other than his or her spouse, regardless of how many times it happened, is inherently immoral, and there can never be an excuse for it. "[I]t is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with a person other than his or her spouse."[41]
It bears stressing that in a plethora of cases,[42] the Court did not hesitate to hold a judge administratively liable for gross immorality for having an illicit affair with someone other than his or her spouse.
As to the imposable penalty, Canon VII, Section 18(i) of the CJCA categorizes gross immorality as a serious offense. Canon VII, Section 22(1) of the CJCA further provides that a serious offense is punishable by:
In the previous cases where judges were found grossly immoral for having an extramarital affair, the Court meted upon the erring judges the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service. The Court finds no reason to deviate from settled jurisprudence and imposes upon Judge Aranas the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits. He is likewise disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
It must be stressed that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that the behavior of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety both in his professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the Court. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code further dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times.[43] The Court, in Tuvillo v. Laron,[44] reminded judges that:
As the judicial [frontliners], judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of justice. These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity in the [J]udiciary.[45]
Judge Aranas clearly failed to adhere to the standards required of him as a member of the bench when he had an illicit sexual relationship with Kristine who bore him a son. The imposition of the most extreme penalty is, therefore, warranted in this case.
Anent the other allegations of Emelie against Judge Aranas, such as the firing of his handgun inside their house and threatening to kill anyone who is against his relationship with Kristine, the Court finds the same bereft of any merit.
It is settled that it is the complainant who has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his or her complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.[46]
In the present case, Emelie failed to prove, by substantial evidence, these specific allegations in her complaint. Other than her allegations, she failed to present corroborative evidence, either documentary or otherwise, to support her claims. Thus, her allegations remain mere speculations which cannot be given credence. There is, therefore, no sufficient, clear, and convincing evidence to hold Judge Aranas administratively liable for such alleged acts.
Judge Aranas, as a member of the Philippine Bar, is administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct |
Canon II, Sections 1 and 2 of the CPRA[47] states:
SECTION 1. Proper Conduct. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
SECTION 2. Dignified Conduct. - A lawyer shall respect the law, the courts, tribunals, and other government agencies, their officials, employees, and processes, and act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on one s fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner, whether in public or private life, to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied)
As to what constitutes grossly immoral conduct, Perez v. Atty. Catindig[48] is on point:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[49]
The established facts and, ironically, Judge Aranas's own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral. It is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
In this case, despite being wed to his wife for more than 20 years, Judge Aranas chose infidelity. He had an illicit relationship with Kristine and had a son with her. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Judge Aranas's sense of social propriety and moral values, and constitute a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. Such is tantamount to grossly immoral conduct.
Under Canon VI, Section 33(f) of the CPRA, grossly immoral conduct is considered a serious offense. Such offense is punishable by any of the following: (i) disbarment, (ii) suspension from the practice of law for a period exceeding six months, (iii) revocation of notarial commission and disqualification as notary public for not less than two years, or (iv) a fine exceeding PHP 100,000.00.[50]
Meanwhile, Section 38(a) of the CPRA enumerates the mitigating circumstances that may be appreciated in the imposition of penalties, to wit:
SECTION 38. Modifying Circumstances. - In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
Meanwhile, the second paragraph of Canon VI, Section 39 of the CPRA states that "[I]f one (1) or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed under the CPRA."
The Court has lent zero tolerance to lawyers who openly engaged in illicit affairs during the subsistence of their marriages. In fact, in a catena of cases,[51] the Court disbarred lawyers for abandoning their families and maintaining their illicit relationship with their paramours. The Court, however, must not turn a blind eye to the mitigating circumstances that may be appreciated in a particular case in the imposition of the appropriate penalty.
In this case, the following circumstances fall within the ambit of the mitigating circumstance of expression of remorse, humanitarian consideration and other analogous circumstances: First, Judge Aranas admitted to his wrongdoing, apologized for what he had done, and showed remorse for having a one-time fling. To recall, Judge Aranas would have disclosed to Emelie his one-time fling with Kristine if not for Emelie's gossiping friend. When Emelie confronted Judge Aranas, the latter admitted his illicit relationship with Kristine and the birth of his son with her. Judge Aranas, however, quickly apologized for his mistake. Moreover, he tried to mend their marriage and even sought advice from Emelie's uncle, retired Judge Vapor.
Second, while Judge Aranas admitted leaving the family home, he did not actually abandon Emelie but was booted out of the house. He explained that the treatment he received from Emelie and her sisters left him no other choice but to leave. He now lives alone and is continuously hoping and praying that one day everything will be the same as before.
Third, Judge Aranas exerted effort to be a father to his son. Unlike other men who choose to leave and abandon their illegitimate children, Judge Aranas acknowledged the child as his and made himself responsible for the child.
Fourth, Judge Aranas did not post pictures of him and his son and/or Kristine through social media. He adequately explained that the Facebook accounts and posts do not belong to him. They were posted by Kristine in her account and in a Facebook account she made for their child. Furthermore, the postings made by Kristine were without his consent.
Finally, if the Court imposes upon Judge Aranas the most severe penalty of disbarment, he will be deprived of his only source of income, that is, being a lawyer. Needless to state, stripping Judge Aranas of his profession, his sole means of livelihood, will greatly affect his son, who relies on him for all his needs. The Court cannot allow an innocent child to suffer due to the shortcomings and mistakes of his father.
The Court condemns and denounces the actions of Judge Aranas, but if the Court imposes upon him the penalty of disbarment and deprives his son of his right to live a modest life, the Court will be condemning an innocent child for a misdemeanor he is not and cannot be a part of.
From all the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to impose upon Judge Aranas suspension from the practice of law for three years, which is still within the imposable penalty for Grossly Immoral Conduct under the CPRA. Judge Aranas's dismissal from the service, including his perpetual disqualification from service, forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and suspension for three years from the practice of law, are commensurate sanctions to his wrongful conduct.
On a final note, the Court reiterates and reminds lawyers to always be honorable and reliable. This is so because any lawyer who cannot abide by the laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional dealings.[52]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Gino Jovito C. Aranas of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabasalan-Siay-Payao, Zamboanga Sibugay, GUILTY of gross immorality. He is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including any government-owned or -controlled corporation.
The Court also finds Judge Gino Jovito C. Aranas GUILTY of grossly immoral conduct under Canon VI, Section 33(f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant for immediate implementation; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country; and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concur.
Leonen, SAJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., see concurring.
Hernando, J., see dissenting opinion.
Singh,* J., on leave.
* On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-15.
[2] Id. at 5-6.
[3] Id. at 6.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 7.
[6] Id. at 7.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 8.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 10.
[11] Id. at 93.
[12] Id. at 95-109.
[13] Id. at 95-96.
[14] Id. at 96.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 96-97.
[17] Id. at 98-99.
[18] Id. at 99.
[19] Id. at 100-101.
[20] Id. at 101.
[21] Id. at 106.
[22] Id. at 104.
[23] Id. at 106.
[24] Id. at 124-132.
[25] Id. at 125.
[26] Id. at 127.
[27] Id. at 127-128.
[28] Id. at 167-168.
[29] Id. at 171-173.
[30] Id. at 171-172.
[31] Id. at 197-202.
[32] Id. at 200.
[33] Id. at 209-210.
[34] Id. at 211-212.
[35] Id. at 212.
[36] Id. at 298-309.
[37] Id. at 308-309.
[38] December 21, 2025.
[39] Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Pintac and Ms. Sumague, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamiz City, 886 Phil. 1, 19-21 (2020) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[40] See Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 119-120 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[41] Galit-Inoy v. Inoy, 926 Phil. 185, 189 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].
[42] See Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, 814 Phil. 103, 136 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Tuvillo v. Judge Laron, 797 Phil. 449, 468 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., 276 Phil. 70, 83 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[43] Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., 276 Phil. 70, 81 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[44] Tuvillo v. Judge Laron, 797 Phil. 449 (2016) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[45] Id. at 462-463.
[46] Macaventa v. Atty. Nuyda, 887 Phil. 818, 824 (2020) [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[47] CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Effective May 29, 2023.
[48] 755 Phil. 297 (2015) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[49] Id. at 307-308.
[50] CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon VI, sec. 37(a).
[51] See Panagsagan v. Atty. Panagsagan, 864 Phil. 19 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, Jr., 851 Phil. 372 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Dantes v. Atty. Dantes, 482 Phil. 64 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Narag v. Atty. Narag, 353 Phil. 643 (1998) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[52] Panagsagan v. Atty. Panagsagan, 864 Phil. 19, 28-29 (2019) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
LEONEN, SAJ:
I respectfully disagree with the majority that respondent Hon. Gino Jovito C. Aranas is administratively liable for gross immorality. However, I concur with the result that he should be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits, and be suspended from the practice of law for three years, but on a different ground-gross misconduct.
This case involves an administrative complaint for gross immorality, gross misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service filed by respondent's wife.[1] She charges her husband with having an extramarital affair with whom he sired a child.[2] Respondent's wife also found out that her husband bought a parcel of land using their conjugal funds, without her knowledge and consent, and registered it under his son's name.[3]
Complainant also claims that respondent bragged about his illicit relationship and the existence of his son in social media, showing no remorse to her feelings.[4] She also avers that respondent fired his handgun inside their family house and threatened to kill anyone who was against his extramarital relationship. Eventually, respondent left their family home, abandoning complainant without any communication until the filing of the case.[5]
Meanwhile, respondent admitted having a child outside of his marriage, but denied having a relationship with his son's mother. He claims that it was only a "fleeting and one-time sexual fling resulting in unintended consequence."[6] Respondent also admitted to purchasing a lot under his son's name, stating that he did so in reliance on his wife's generosity,[7] who had told him he could "do anything good for the boy."[8]
However, respondent denied posting pictures of him, his son, and her alleged paramour in social media. He explained that his photo carrying a child was posted by his child's mother in her own account and the account she made for their son.[9]
Respondent also denied firing his handgun and claimed that the gunshot that his wife heard came from the back of their walled compound, which might have come from a real firearm or an improvised one.[10] Lastly, respondent admitted to leaving the family home, but claimed that he was effectively forced out after his wife sold the property to her three sisters. Feeling unwelcome and excluded, respondent ultimately chose to vacate the house.[11]
On July 30, 2024, the Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) found respondent guilty of gross immorality and of violating Canon II, Sections 1 and 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA). Consequently, the JIB recommended respondent's dismissal from service and disbarment.[12]
The ponencia affirmed with modification the recommendation of the JIB, finding respondent administratively liable for gross immorality. It emphasized that the Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently held that judges who engage in illicit relationships outside of marriage should be dismissed from service.[13]
With all due respect, I disagree.
I
I reiterate my position that the Court must exercise prudence and circumspection in resolving administrative cases involving allegations of gross immorality.
In Perfecto v. Judge Esidera:[14]
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described morality as how we ought to live and why.
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz, is a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator. A conduct is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans.
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose.
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed rights.[15] (Citations omitted)
In my separate opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala,[16] I emphasized that it is important to distinguish between standards imposed on judges and those expected of religious figures such as priests, imams, and other faith leaders:
A lawyer and a judge should not be required to be saints. We should not confuse the morality of our secular law with the ethical requirements of our religious faiths.
The vulnerability of having committed mistakes in the past even assists the human incumbents of our judicial offices. Past mistakes properly acknowledged, addressed, and atoned broaden the understanding of a judge of human frailty and the possibility of forgiveness from those he or she has wronged. Properly addressed, human sins inscribe compassion for our judges. Within the limits of the law, he or she will be able to calculate the proper reliefs of penalties appropriate to the action.
Implicit in this understanding is the view that our judiciary is not simply a mechanical cog that dispenses specific penalties without full regard for the context of the facts proven. If this were so, current technology could simply be harnessed to substitute judges and justices, even for this Court, with robots. The legal system composed of the branches that promulgate, execute, and interpellate the law should not be seen as less than human institutions.
Justices should be able to see the general norms that would apply given the set of facts that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence. However, in interpreting the facts, we should always examine the premises we have that are articulated by our conception of our realities that provide us with the basis for our inferences.[17]
It is also my view that under our current legal framework which does not recognize divorce, individuals who find themselves in irreparably broken or loveless marriages are placed in an unjust position. The absence of a legal and just remedy for dissolving a failed union renders it profoundly difficult, if not inhumane, for a person to make morally responsible choices without running afoul of societal judgment or legal repercussions.
In effect, the law may compel individuals to remain bound to relationships that no longer serve their emotional, psychological, or even moral well-being. This raises serious questions about the fairness and humanity of our legal system in matters of family and personal autonomy. I remain firm in my stand that the choice to stay or leave a marriage is not for this Court or the State to make. The choice is and should be given to the partners.
Owing to these realities, an objective criterion of immorality, which is tantamount to an illegal act, should be used in cases of administrative sanctions for erring judges and lawyers:
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public's confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court's supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.[18]
Here, respondent admitted that he has sired a child with a woman other than his wife. However, this admission alone is inadequate to prove gross immorality.
Respondent's decision to acknowledge and provide care for a child, regardless of the child's status as marital or nonmarital, should never be viewed as immoral. This act is not illegal. In fact, recognizing and taking responsibility for one's own child is a moral obligation, not a transgression. It demonstrates a profound sense of responsibility and commitment to the child's well-being-the right conduct that is, and ought to be, expected of any parent.
Morality should' not be measured by rigid legal classifications, but by the actions taken to ensure that every child is treated with dignity, love, and support. To condemn such a decision is to place outdated notions of propriety above the fundamental values of empathy and parental duty. For this reason, I disagree with the majority.
II
Be that as it may, I still concur with the majority that respondent should be dismissed from service and be suspended from the practice of law for three years for having committed violations against the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and the CPRA.
In Divinagracia v. Ozon:[19]
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The offense becomes gross misconduct when any of the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, and flagrant disregard of established rule is present.[20] (Citations omitted)
To recall, complainant alleged that respondent purchased a parcel of land using their conjugal funds, without her knowledge or consent, and registered it in his son's name.[21] She also claimed that respondent had an extramarital affair with the mother of his child, discharged a firearm within their family home, threatened to harm anyone who opposed his extramarital relationship, and abandoned their family home.[22]
With respect to the allegations that respondent fired his handgun inside their house and threatened to kill anyone who opposed his illicit affair, I concur with the ponencia that these claims lack merit.
There is no supporting evidence beyond complainant's bare assertions. Thus, for failure of complainant to present "corroborative evidence, either documentary or otherwise,"[23] her allegations cannot be sustained.
With regard to the purchase of the lot using conjugal funds, complainant submitted the following documents in support of her claim: (1) a Deed of Absolute Sale indicating respondent as the payor and his son as the lawful owner;[24] (2) a Metrobank application for a miscellaneous transaction amounting to PHP 600,000.00, listing respondent as the applicant and Alfredo Araneta Atilano, the seller of the lot, as the payee;[25] and (3) a photocopy of a passbook showing the joint account of complainant and respondent and the corresponding withdrawal of PHP 600,000.00.[26]
Respondent did not deny that he bought a parcel of land which he registered under his son's name, saying that his wife allowed him to do anything that was good for his child.[27] I find this excuse without merit.
The administration and enjoyment of funds belong to both spouses jointly. This rule is enshrined in Article 96 of the Family Code, which states that any disposition or encumbrance, of community property requires the written consent of both spouses or judicial authorization if one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the property. In the absence of such consent or authority, the transaction shall be void.[28]
While this present case does not concern the legality of the purchase of the lot, it is impossible to ignore the glaring irregularity in respondent's actions. The evidence on record clearly establishes that respondent disposed of conjugal funds-resources which legally belong to both him and complainant-to purchase the lot.[29] However, disregarding Article 96 of the Family Code, respondent did not secure his wife's written consent to the transaction.
Such conduct, especially when committed with full knowledge of the nature and ownership of the funds used, constitutes more than a procedural oversight. It reeks of an unlawful act, tainted with bad faith and a willful intent to exclude the other spouse from a decision that legally required her participation.
This act reveals not only a violation of law, but a betrayal of the trust and mutual confidence that form the foundation of a marital union. Thus, respondent's actions do not simply breach property rules under the Family Code, it underscores a dishonest and deceitful conduct that undermines both legal norms and moral obligations within a marriage. This is a violation of the law and a flagrant disregard to an established rule. Thus, I find respondent guilty of gross misconduct.
III
Respondent also denied engaging in an illicit affair, claiming that his relationship with the mother of the child is purely friendly and he never even considered cohabiting with her when he left their home.[30] He stated that he had been living alone in an unused stockroom located at the back of the municipal hall building near the barracks of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) since he was forced out of his home by his wife.[31]
To support his claim, respondent attached the affidavits of Wilberto B. Carriedo, a clerk in the same office of respondent,[32] and Samuel F. Alipuyo, a CAFGU member of the municipality.[33] Both affidavits attest to the fact that respondent was living in the unused stockroom of the municipal hall.[34]
Although the ponencia did not elaborate on this point, I consider this act to be an additional violation committed by the respondent.
No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust.[35] In Office of the Court Administrator v. Puno:[36]
Public servants are mandated to uphold public interest over personal needs. Certainly, no less can be expected from those involved in the administration of justice. Everyone, from the highest official to the lowest rank employee must live up to the strictest norms of probity and integrity in the public service. Safekeeping of public and trust funds is essential to an orderly administration of justice. Personal problems cannot justify the misuse by any court employee of judiciary funds in their custody. Such are government funds, and public servants have absolutely no right to use them for their own purposes.[37] (Citations omitted)
Largo v. Court of Appeals[38] defines conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service as any misconduct "which need not be related or connected to the public officers['] official functions. . . [but tends to tarnish] the image and integrity of his/her public office."[39]
Abos v. Borromeo[40] provides for examples of what constitute this offense:
While there is no specific list of acts that may constitute the offense, this court has previously characterized certain acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service: seeking the assistance of an elite police force for a purely personal matter; changing the internet protocol (IP) address on a work computer to gain access to restricted websites; and fencing in a litigated property in order to assert ownership.[41] (Citations omitted)
In this case, respondent openly admits to using government property-the stockroom of the municipal hall as his residence-for his personal benefit.[42] While he claims that owing to his personal circumstances led him to do so, whether such condition was voluntary or not, it does not and cannot serve as a valid excuse.
Personal hardships, no matter how compelling, do not justify the unauthorized use of government resources for private purposes. Such conduct reflects a clear disregard for public trust and tends to tarnish the integrity and the responsibility attached to public office. Thus, I find respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
IV
While I concur with the ponencia that respondent should be administratively liable as a member of the Philippine Bar, I respectfully dissent as to the ground cited. As discussed above, respondent's actions do not rise to the level of grossly immoral conduct, but constitute violations of the CPRA.
Canon II of the CPRA provides:
A lawyer shall, at all times, act with propriety and maintain the appearance of propriety in personal and professional dealings, observe honesty, respect and courtesy, and uphold the dignity of the legal profession consistent with the highest standards of ethical behavior.
Section 1. Proper conduct. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers are expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. They must exercise prudence not only in their legal practice but also in their personal affairs,[43] as they may be disciplined for "gross misconduct not connected with [their] professional duties, which [show them] to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which [their] license and the law confer to [them]."[44]
V
Regarding the penalty, Section 14(a) and (l) of Rule 140, as amended, classifies gross misconduct and conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service as a serious charge. Section 17(a) of the same rule provides for the penalty for a serious charge which may be: (1) dismissal from service; (2) suspension from office for more than six months but not exceeding one year; or (3) a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. Thus, the penalty of dismissal from service is proper in this case.
Meanwhile, Canon VI, Section 33(a) and (b) of the CPRA classifies gross misconduct, or any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct; serious dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, including falsification of documents and making untruthful statements as a serious offense. Canon VI, Section 37 of the same code provides for the penalty of a serious offense which may be: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension from the practice of law for a period exceeding six months; (3) revocation of notarial commission and disqualification as notary public for not less than two (2) years; or (4) a fine exceeding Php100,000.00.
The ponencia modified the recommendation of the JIB as to the penalty for his violation of the CPRA from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for three years.[45] The ponencia also explained that to deprive respondent with his only source of income would be to deny his son a right to a modest life.[46]
I agree.
No parent is perfect, but responsibility defines true parenthood. Those who admit their failings yet continue to provide for their child deserve not condemnation, but the Court's grace and understanding. Consequently, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three years is also proper.
All told, while I do not agree with the majority that respondent is liable for gross immorality. In my opinion, it is enough to hold him liable for gross misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and for violation of Canon II, Section 1 of the CPRA.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS respondent Judge Gino Jovito C. Aranas from service and to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for three years.
[1] Ponencia, pp. 1-2.
[2] Id. at 2.
[3] Id. at 3.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Rollo, p. 96.
[7] Ponencia, p. 4.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 5.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 7.
[13] Id. at 8-10.
[14] 764 Phil. 384 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[15] Id. at 397-398.
[16] J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala, 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[17] Id. at 149.
[18] Perfecto v. Judge Esidera, 764 Phil. 384, 399-400 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[19] 950 Phil. 571 (2024) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[20] Id. at 579-580. (Citations omitted)
[21] Ponencia, p. 3.
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 10.
[24] Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[25] Id at 29.
[26] Id. at 30-31.
[27] Ponencia, p. 4.
[28] See Dadis v. Spouses De Guzman, 810 Phil. 749, 766 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
[29] Ponencia, p. 3.
[30] Rollo, p. 101.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 110-113.
[33] Id. at 114-119.
[34] Id. at 110, 115.
[35] CONST., art. XI, sec. F.
[36] 587 Phil. 549 (2008) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
[37] Id. at 555-556.
[38] 563 Phil. 293 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
[39] Id. at 305.
[40] 765 Phil. 10 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[41] Id. at 17-18.
[42] Rollo, p. 101.
[43] Agno v. Cagatan, 580 Phil. 1, 17 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
[44] Enriquez v. De Vera, 756 Phil. 1, 13 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. (Citations omitted)
[45] Ponencia, p. 14.
[46] Id.