HULL, J.:

E. Vesnan applied to the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience with authority to operate two hundred small taxicabs in the City of Manila and its suburbs.

After due hearing, the Public Service Commission granted a certificate authorizing nine small taxicabs but refused authority to place in operation two hundred. From the orders of the Public Service Commission refusing to grant the authority for the two hundred cars, applicant brings this appeal.

The appellees are existing taxicab operators in the City of Manila who opposed any grant to applicant. In a companion case promulgated this date, G. R. No. 40317,^[1] we discussed the right of applicant to have the certificate for the operation of nine cars.

On the whole record we find no abuse of authority in the commission's denying her application for two hundred cars. There is, however, a middle ground that has given us considerable concern. Originally appellant had a provisional permit for the operation of fifty-five midget taxicabs. With the knowledge and approval of the then members of the Public Service Commission, she purchased and ordered from over seas twenty small cars of a new type. As fast as they arrived appellant placed the cars in service, and at the time that this court acted on the question of the validity of the provisional permits she had nine cars in operation. Shortly thereafter the eleven other cars arrived, which she could not place in operation under her provisional permit due to the limitations which this court placed upon the holder of the permit in that decision. The cars have been in storage awaiting the result of these proceedings.

The number of cars that an operator should operate is obviously one that pertains especially to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission; but as the cars were actually purchased with the knowledge and consent of the then Public Service Commission, were bought in good faith, and could be used in supplying a demand by the public for transportation, that has been demonstrated to exist, we believe under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case that we are justified in modifying the orders of the Public Service Commission to the extent that appellant be permitted to operate the twenty taxicabs which she hasalready purchased.

As thus modified the orders of the Public Service Commission are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

MALCOLM and BUTTE, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting: in part:

We think that the decision of the Public Service Commission in these seven cases should be sustained without change. This means concurrence with the majority opinion in the cases of the Austin Taxicab Company vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab CoCmpany, G. R. No. 40241, p. 923, post; Silos vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Company, G. R. No. 40425, p. 802, post; Manila Yellow Taxicab Company vs. Vesnanr G. R. No. 40317, p. 775, ante; and Sabellano vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Company, G. R. No. 40335, p. 923, post, arid dissent from the majority opinion in the cases of Manila Yellow Taxicab Company vs. Austin Taxicab Company, G. R. No. 40315, p. 771, ante; Manila Yellow Taxicab Company vs. Sabellano, G. R. No. 40316, p. 773, ante; and Vesnan vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Company, G. R. No. 40319, p. 787, ante. Our position will bear a brief word of explanation.

The Public Service Commission Act, No. 3108, as amended, created a Public Service Commission and vested it with the powers and duties therein specified (sec. 1). Among other things, the law gave to the commission general supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public utilities (sec. 13). The various powers of the commission were enumerated, and included the right to grant certificates of public convenience (sees. 14 and 15). Finally, provision was made for the taking of cases from the Public Service Commission to the Supreme Court, which was given jurisdiction to review an order of the commission "and to modify or set aside such order when it clearly appears that there was no evidence before the commission to support reasonably such order, or that the same was without the jurisdiction of the commission" (sec. 35).

In connection with the provisions of the law which have been cited, this court has time without number emphasized that the court will refrain from substituting its discretion for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and will only reverse or modify orders of the Public Service Commission when it clearly appears that the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions, or otherwise stated, the court will not attempt to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Public Service Commission if there is any evidence before it reasonably supporting its order. (Phil. Shipowners' Ass'n. vs. Public Utility Commissioner and Board of Appeal [1922], 43 Phil., 328; Ynchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner and Board of Appeal [1923], 44 Phil., 363; Mejica vs. Public Utility Commission [1926], 49 Phil., 774; Phil. Shipowners* Ass'n. vs. Public Utility Commission [1926], 51 Phil., 957; San Miguel Brewery vs. Lapid [1929], 53 Phil., 539; Calabia vs. Orlanes & Banaag Transportation Co. [1931], 55 Phil., 659; Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. and Aero Taxicab Co. vs. Danon [1933], 58 Phil., 75.) The basic decision with reference to the granting of certificates of public convenience for taxicab service in the City of Manila is found in the case of Carmelo and Oriol vs. Monserrat <[1931], 55 Phil., 644), where the point was stressed that in the granting or refusal of a certificate of public convenience, all things considered, the question is what is for the best interests of the public.

In the cases before us we find a well-written decision prepared by the commissioner and concurred in by the two associate commissioners. In the decision it was said that the principal issue for determination by the commission was whether or not applicants should be granted permanent certificates of public convenience. It was then stated that the applicants and opponents presented both oral and documentary evidence. Specific findings were made with reference to the cases of the Austin Taxicab Company, Panfilo Sabellano and E. Vesnan, which are the cases where this court substitutes its findings for the findings of the commission. The commission gave consideration to the proposition that the applicants by reason of their temporary permits have made investments in good faith for the operation of their thirty-nine units which the commission could not in equity ignore. Then after premising its conclusions on a careful review of the evidence, the commission announced that it would authorize the Austin Taxicab Company to operate twenty units, Panfilo Sabellano ten units, and E. Vesnan nine units.

We, therefore, are unable to understand how this court can state "that there was no evidence before the commission to support reasonably" its order. Instead we find this court telling the commission that in the Austin Taxicab Company case it should not have allowed the company to operate twenty units; telling the commission in the Sabellano case that it should not have allowed the applicant to operate ten units, and telling the commission in the Vesnan case that instead of allowing Vesnan to operate nine units it should have allowed her to operate twenty units. Peculiarly unjust do we find these pronouncements in the Austin Taxicab Company case, for there we have a company permitted to be incorporated by the Government, and which the Government has taken no steps to dissolve, now in a collateral manner deprived of valuable property rights without due process of law. We sincerely believe that the question of how many taxicabs should be permitted to operate in Manila and what companies should operate those taxicabs can safely be left for determination by the Public Service Commission; that every time the commission makes a finding of fact predicated on evidence on such questions, the losing party should not be encouraged to bring the case to the Supreme Court for review, and that the Supreme Court should not transform itself into a supervisory Public Service Commission and thus usurp functions which are not granted it by law.